Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Phronesis L/2Also available online www.brill.nl

Accepted September 20041 There has been much speculation on this point in the scholarship and Proclus

arguments are widely read as primarily anti-Christian. L. J. Rosn, The Philosophy of

Perpetuity, Eternity, and Time in Proclus Cosmos

HELEN S. LANG

ABSTRACTProclus composed 18 arguments for the eternity of the world and they surviveonly because Philoponus, intending to refute Proclus arguments one by one,quotes each; one copy of Philoponus work and so Proclus arguments too survives. Because of their odd history, these arguments have received little atten-tion either in themselves or in relation to Proclus other works, even though theyare intrinsically interesting and reflect his larger philosophical enterprise. I firstexamine Argument XVIII, in which Proclus calls on perpetuity, eternity, andtime to argue that the cosmos must be eternal. This argument leaves unan-swered two important questions. The cosmos is caused by god and is itself a god;how can a cause and its effect both be gods? Proclus concludes that the cosmosis a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal; but what does this phrase and theconclusion that it expresses mean? To answer these questions, I turn to TheElements of Theology, a systematic progression of 211 propositions disclosing the causal structure of all reality. Eternity and time, along with being perpet-ual, also appear here, particularly in propositions 40-55, to which I turn in thesecond part of this paper. They are conjoined with what Proclus calls the Self-Constituted. I argue that by understanding the relation of the Self-Constitutedas a cause to its effect, what depends upon another, we can also understand thecausal relation between god and the cosmos. The cosmos can be called divinebecause, via the cause/effect relation between them, god and the cosmos are botheternal; the cosmos is a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal because via itsrelation to god, the cosmos becomes what its cause is, and in this precise sensean effect imitates its cause.

Introduction

Although widely circulated in antiquity, Proclus 18 arguments for theeternity of the world did not survive as an independent work. His thesis the cosmos must be eternal iterated (on Proclus view proven) in eachargument may have been anti-Christian and, as Europe turned to Christianity,Christians may have intentionally destroyed this work.1 17 arguments,

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Proclus: The Final Phase of Ancient Thought (New York: Cosmos, 1949) gives thetitle of these arguments as Eighteen Arguments in Favor of the Eternity of the WorldAgainst the Christians (Oktvkadeka Epixeirmata per Aidithtow to Ksmoukat tn Jristiann), although there is little evidence. Rosn is often cited, e.g.,Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science, (New Haven and London:Yale University Press, 1996) p. 318. I would like to take this opportunity to thank thereader of this paper whose constructive criticisms were very helpful.

2 H. Rabe (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899; reprint Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1984); recently abi-lingual text and translation has appeared of Proclus 17 Arguments surviving inGreek, along with appendices that provide the Arabic text and translation of the firstargument and an edition of the most important of several Renaissance Latin transla-tions: On the Eternity of the World: (de Aeternitate Mundi) trans. and ed. Helen S.Lang and A. D. Macro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), hereafter referred to as L/M.

3 Proclus was a devout worshipper of the ancient Greek gods and the god of thisargument clearly lies outside the Judeo-Christian tradition; therefore, I do not capital-ize the first letter.

however, survive in Greek because Philoponus, intending to refuteProclus arguments one by one, quotes each; one copy of Philoponuswork, along with Proclus arguments too, survives, except for the open-ing pages, which are lost and contained the first argument, although itdoes survive in an Arabic translation.2 Because of this odd history, thesearguments have received little attention either in themselves or in relationto Proclus other works. This situation should be rectified in both regards:these arguments are intrinsically interesting and clearly reflect his largerphilosophical enterprise.

I shall first examine Argument XVIII, in which Proclus calls on con-cepts of perpetuity, eternity, and time to argue that the cosmos must beeternal. This argument raises questions about the cosmos that remainunanswered in its context. The cosmos is caused by god and is itself agod;3 how can a cause and its effect both be gods? Proclus concludes thatthe cosmos is a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal; but what does thisphrase and the conclusion that it expresses mean? To answer thesequestions, I shall turn to Proclus most important work, The Elements ofTheology, which is a systematic sequence of 211 propositions that disclosethe causal structure of all reality. Eternity and time, along with beingperpetual, also appear here, particularly in propositions 40-55, to whichI shall turn in the second part of this paper. They are conjoined with whatProclus calls the Self-Constituted. This conjunction, I shall argue in con-clusion, provides important clues for interpreting his conclusions in ArgumentXVIII.

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4 For some examples, cf. Plato, Timaeus 27A4 and C4, 28C4, 29C5 and D7, 30B5,31B7, 32A8, 37D7, 41A5; for an interesting comparison, cf. Parmenides 128A8. Allreferences to Plato are to the O.C.T. Cf. below n. 28.

5 Plato, Timaeus 28A4-C3.6 Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 7. All references to Aristotle are to the O.C.T.7 L/M 142.8.

On the Eternity of the World (de Aeternitate Mundi) has neither thescope nor the systematic character of The Elements; rather, its unity restson the reiteration of a single thesis about the cosmos and the implicit claimthat all philosophical concepts, all true analysis, necessarily lead to theconclusion that the cosmos must be eternal. Throughout these arguments,Proclus conceives of the cosmos as the realm of becoming, first distin-guished from being at Timaeus 27D6 and then identified with the all (tpn) that forms the specific topic of Timaeus discourse.4 The languageof the all appears in Aristotle too, for example throughout the De Caelo.The earth rests at its center and it is bounded by the circuit of the stars.For Plato, this cosmos is made by god, the demiurge;5 but for Aristotle,god is not a demiurge (a maker) but an absolutely unmoved mover, whomust be fully actual and who must act always in the same way, i.e. as anobject of desire, to move the circuit of the stars always and always in thesame way.6

Proclus shifts between Platos and Aristotles different conceptions ofthe causal relation between god and the cosmos, using their distinct lan-guages, as each argument requires. As a result, the arguments differ fromone another conceptually, but each bears on the same object and eachreaches the same conclusion: the cosmos must be eternal. Indeed, Proclusmay find the philosophical unity of Plato and Aristotle in the fact that dif-ferent concepts of the causal relation of god to the cosmos, when prop-erly understood, demonstrate a single conclusion. I turn to ArgumentXVIII, preserved by Philoponus as the last of Proclus arguments for theeternity of the cosmos.

I. Argument XVIII: God and The Cosmos

Argument XVIII breaks down into two parts, first Proclus constructiveaccount and then his reply to his opponents, Atticus and his coterie.7 Inhis constructive account, he combines the claim from Platos Statesman(269D5) that what is most divine must be ever uniform, unchanging andself-identical with the identification of the demiurge as the maker of the

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8 L/M 140.10-12. This phrase from the Statesman, or variations on it, occur fre-quently in Plato; for some examples, cf. Timaeus 29A1; Phaedo 78C6; Sophist248A12; Laws X, 898A8. Also cf. Plotinus, Ennead VI, 2, 7.30-31. All references toPlotinus are to Enneads, 7 vols. trans. and ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1966-1988).

9 In Metaphysics XII, 7, 1072a23-1072b8, Aristotle argues that the first heavenmust be eternal and goes on to conclude that its mover, being unmoved and fullyactual, cannot in any way be other than it is.

10 Cf. also, Aristotle, Physics VIII, 6 and 10.11 L/M 142.22. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 7, 1072a25; 1072b16.12 Of course, Plato can be made to say different things all of which look thor-

oughly Platonic by selecting or emphasizing different texts. Proclus view of thedemiurge as making always and the cosmos as always becoming begins with the firstdistinction in Timaeus account, i.e. the distinction between that which always is andthat which always becomes (Timaeus 27D6-28A1).

13 It is important to keep in mind that Neoplatonism itself is a response to an ear-lier tradition of reading Plato, particularly the Timaeus. See for example, J. Dillon,The Timaeus in The Old Academy, pp. 80-94 in Platos Timaeus as Cultural Icon,ed. Gretchen J. Reydams-Schils (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).On Neoplatonism (with particular reference to Iamblichus and Proclus, as originatingin the Academy and in Aristotle, see Philip Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism,2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff:1960), pp. 221-231.

cosmos (Timaeus 28C2-29A3).8 This conjunction of texts (and terms) fromPlato specifies the being of the demiurge in a way not found in Plato;indeed, it makes the demiurge of the Timaeus resemble Aristotlesunmoved mover;9 the identification of gods being as unchanging takentogether with the causal relation of the demiurge to the cosmos, allowsProclus to argue from the necessary characteristics of the demiurge, ascause, to the necessary character of the cosmos, gods effect again, anargument that makes the language of Platos Statesman and Timaeusresemble arguments about god and the cosmos in Aristotle, particularlyMetaphysics XII.10 (Later in the argument, Proclus uses nrgeia, a wordstrongly identified with Aristotles argument for the unmoved mover andthe eternal motion of the heaven.)11 As a result, Argument XVIII exem-plifies the philosophical project of Neoplatonism: it combines texts fromPlato to form an argument and to reach a conclusion that, though notfound in Plato, looks thoroughly Platonic (as Proclus reads him).12 At thesame time, Aristotles account of the unmoved mover, god, is implicitlyidentified with Platos view as Proclus, by combining and interpretingtexts of Plato, produces an argument that silently calls to mind texts ofAristotle (for those who know them and thereby enter into this project).13

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14 L/M 140.1-5.15 L/M 140.16-20.16 L/M 140.21-23.17 L/M 140.24-30. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 7, 1072b28-30; 1073a11.18 The logic of this transition, i.e. the character of the cause yields the necessary

character of the effect, reflects both Plato, Timaeus 28C5-29B1 and Aristotle, MetaphysicsXII, 7, 1072b13-14; 1073a3-13; 10, 1075a11-23.

19 L/M 140.30-32.20 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 30A2-6.21 Cf. Argument XVI, 129, 1-3: But surely a cosmos is nothing other than order

and the ordered. Therefore, the cosmos is ungenerated and incorruptible. L/M, p. 131,n. 19 suggest that this theme runs throughout Proclus; cf. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum

Prima facie, Argument XVIII is not difficult. Because the demiurge is(as Platos Timaeus says) the best of causes, eternal and most divine, hemust (as Plato says in the Statesman of what is most divine) also beinvariable;14 being invariable, he can change neither from making to notmaking, nor from not making to making.15 If he cannot change from oneto the other, then the demiurge must either always make or never make;but it is inconceivable that he never makes, for the very meaning of theword demiurge is maker or producer. If he never makes, Proclusasks, when would he be a demiurge?16 Therefore, the demiurge mustalways make, always act, always produce order; and, consequently, hiseffect, the cosmos, must always be produced; the cosmos can have nei-ther a beginning nor an end of being acted upon by the demiurge but isordered always and always ordered in the same way.17

Proclus completes this argument for the eternity of the cosmos with aseries of conclusions about the character that the cosmos must have, giventhat it is the effect of a god, who is the most perfect and invariablecause.18 Therefore the cosmos must be a cosmos without beginning orend, must be a cosmos without generation and without corruption, mustbe a cosmos ungenerated and incorruptible.19 If we say of the cause thedemiurge acts always in the same way, then we must say of the effectthe cosmos must be ungenerated and incorruptible. A cause alwayscausing produces an effect always being effected. The meaning of gen-eration and corruption appear clearly here. The cosmos is ungener-ated and incorruptible in the sense of having neither beginning nor end;it is caused, i.e. comes to be, in the sense of being ordered always by acause that makes always. Gods causality is also specified: the demiurgemakes always and invariably and to make means to produce order.20

Being ordered (by god) and ordered always, i.e. without beginning or end,is the very essence of the cosmos.21 This conclusion, together with the

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Commentarii, 3 vols. ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903-1906; reprint Amsterdam:Hakkert, 1965), I, 387.27-28; II, 37.21; 41.7-9; III, 85.2-3.

22 L/M 142.2-12. Atticus was a follower of Plutarch; see Plutarch, De an. Proc.1016F-1017A.

23 The notion of actuality (L/M 142.22) suggests that Aristotles account of theunmoved mover, Metaphysics XII, 7, is also contributing to Proclus conception ofgod.

24 L/M 142.21.25 L/M 142.20-21. The noun genhsa is rare; it appears only three times in all

of Proclus, including this appearance, one other in the 18 Arguments for the Eternityof the World (Argument XVI 128.18) and once in the Th. Pl. (5, 116.15); it is notfound in Plato, Aristotle, or Plotinus. In Philoponus, it appears only in the context ofrefuting Proclus arguments (de Aet. Mundi contra Proclum XVI, 562.17, XVIII607.8, 634.15). The sole appearance in Simplicius is found at In Caelo 7.139.24.

implication that the cosmos must be eternal, completes the first, constructive,moment of Proclus argument.

In the second moment of the argument, Proclus turns to his opponentsin order to refute their views and thereby draw out further implications ofthe causal relation between the demiurge and the cosmos. Atticus and hisfriends, Proclus asserts, contradict Plato for two closely related reasons:they fail to read him rightly and they fail to grasp the causal relationbetween god and the cosmos. First, Atticus fails to understand the textualrelation between the Timaeus and the Statesman a relation that, as wehave just seen, Proclus defines and exploits in his constructive account.22Contra Atticus, Proclus now continues, Platos genius lies in making theorder or disorder of the cosmos a direct consequence of the presence orabsence of god (Timaeus), while also establishing the everlasting actual-ity of god and so too his everlasting presence to the cosmos (Statesman).23

Thus, god is always a cause of order and always present to the cosmosas a cause of order.

Together these two points lead to the substantive issue for Proclus:when we rightly understand the relation of the cosmos as an effect to themost divine of causes, a cause that is always present to the cosmos, wemust conclude that the cosmos is necessarily ordered and necessarily orderedalways; therefore, it is neither generated nor corruptible: it is withoutbeginning and without end.24 The demiurge, god, is both the essentialmaker of the cosmos and makes it eternally. Therefore, the cosmos wasnecessarily ordered for unlimited time and will be ordered into unlimitedtime. Proclus is emphatic: Platos truly divine contrivance is to estab-lish gods everlasting actuality as the cause of the non-generation of thecosmos (tn genhsan . . . to ksmou).25 Plato makes it clear even to

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26 L/M 144.1-4. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 27D6.27 L/M 144.8.28 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 37C6-38B5; Plotinus, Ennead VI, 6, 7.14-20. Both Plato and

Plotinus associate the eternal living being with the all. Also, Proclus, Comm. InTim. II, 53.25-54.5; 59.24-60.2; 80.33-81.11.

29 The notion of to pay respect (eseben 144.12; 146.8 in L/M) also appears inArgument IV, 50.14.20 and may reflect Plotinus conclusion at Ennead III,2.7.42-43that since the All is a single living being it is not respectful (esebw) to admit thatthe lower parts are not well made. Cf. also Ennead III, 2.3.1-6.

the obtuse that the paradigm is a being for all eternity while the cos-mos comes to be completely and is and will be for all time.26 Therefore,the cosmos, being temporally unlimited in both directions, is a copy ofthe perpetuity of the eternal (mmhma . . . tw to anow dithtow).27

Proclus clearly thinks that his position alone fulfills Platos purpose andthereby truly explains the cosmos: time is like eternity and the cosmos islike the eternal living being (t d avn z).28 And his quarrel withAtticus is not only textual and metaphysical; it is also ethical. No one,Proclus argues, pays more respect to the cosmos than Plato, for whom godis uniform, unchanging and self-identical, while the cosmos, being theeffect of god, is ordered by god and ordered always. The perfection ofgod, the eternal presence of god to the cosmos, and the causal dependenceof the cosmos upon god imply that either the demiurge and the cosmosare both gods, or neither is a god. This point lays the ground for Proclusfinal thrust against Atticus: if one pays great respect to god, then one mustdo the same for the cosmos; conversely, to dishonor the cosmos is to dis-honor god.29 Therefore, if being uniform, unchanging, and self-identical isshared in common by everything divine, then we must affirm it of boththe demiurge, a cause always acting for the best, and the cosmos, theeffect ordered by the demiurge in a way that is always best. The conclu-sion is left implicit: like god, the cosmos must be eternal.

Argument XVIII is a model of efficiency. In about 100 lines of text,Proclus (on his own view) establishes his main thesis: the eternity of thecosmos, which is the effect without beginning or end of a god who ordersalways. Proclus also claims to offer a true reading of Plato, in particularthe Timaeus, the Statesman, and the relation between them. From this plat-form, he explicitly rejects Atticus (and his followers), whom Proclus pre-sumably takes to be his most important opponents. The coup de grace liesin Proclus claim that his view alone expresses proper respect for god andhis effect, the cosmos, which Proclus also calls divine and a god.

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30 Cf. Proclus, Procli Diadochi in Primum Euclidies Elementorum Librum Commentariiex Recognitione Godofredi Friedlein (Leipzig, 1873) 207.4-13; this has been translatedas: Proclus, A Commentary on the First Book of Euclids Elements, trans. and ed.Glenn R. Morrow (Princeton University Press, 1970; reprint with a forward by IanMueller, 1992), p. 162. For several examples of a double conclusion, cf. L/M, ArgumentIV, 50.8, 14; VI, 62.12, 18; VIII, 74.2, 7; XIV, 114.22, 24; XVII, 136.9, 10.

But the efficiency of Proclus argument comes at a price. It raises twoquestions that remain unanswered at its end. First, Proclus concludes thatthe cosmos must be eternal because it is the effect of god, an eternalinvariable cause; but he also concludes that the cosmos must be a god.If god is the cause and the cosmos his effect, then does not calling thecosmos a god confuse the cause with the effect, the relation central toProclus argument for the eternity of the cosmos? Second, he concludesthat the cosmos is a mmhma . . . tw to anow dithtow (a copy of theperpetuity of the eternal). This occurence of mmhma is unique in the 17arguments for the eternity of the cosmos that survive in Greek; the samemay be said of dithw it is unique in these arguments. Proclus givesno indication of what these words mean, of the causal relation signifiedby them, or of the conceptual force of the expression as a whole. Thesequestions, I shall now argue, are answered in another text, and context,The Elements of Theology. Of particular importance are the propositionsconcerning eternity and time ( an ka xrnow) and the Self-Constituted (t ayupstatow).

But what justifies looking to The Elements for an answer to the ques-tions raised by Argument XVIII? At first glance, these works seem quitedifferent. The Arguments for the Eternity of the World presents, with noapparent internal order, 18 independent arguments that bear on only onepart and not the most important part of all reality and reach the sameconclusion: the cosmos must be eternal. The Elements of Theology is con-ceived as a theoretical whole of 211 propositions deductively organizedto establish (and exhibit) the formal and causal unity of all reality fromthe Good, which is the highest reality, to beings that are the first effect ofthe Good, to what relates to being and so to the Good only through aprocess of coming-to-be.

These differences notwithstanding, there are important similarities betweenThe Elements of Theology and the Arguments for the Eternity of the Worldand they should not be overlooked. Both works clearly imitate Euclidsuse of proofs. Several of the Arguments for the Eternity of the World drawa double conclusion, a characteristic of geometrical proofs discussed byProclus in his Commentary on Euclids Elements.30 The Elements of Theology

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31 This account of the Good combines the conception of good in Plato and Aristotle.In Plato, cf. Resp. VI, 509B 6-10, the metaphor of the sun in which the good isdescribed as exceeding being in dignity and power (ll ti pkeina tw osawpresbe& ka dunmei perxontow); in Aristotle, the claim that all things that aredesire the good (pnta t nta to gayo fetai) appears at E.N. I, 1, 1094a1:Psa txnh ka psa myodow, movw d prjw te ka proaresiw, gayo tinwfesyai doke . . . Cf. also Physics I, 9, 192a22-25. For the view that everything thatknows the good, desires it, cf. Plato, Philebus 20D7-10.

32 For a possible origin for the notion of the self-sufficient in Plato, cf. Timaeus33D1-3. Of particular interest may be the spurious Definitiones 411A3-4: yew zonynaton, atarkew prw edaimonan: osa diow, tw tgayo fsevw ata.412B6-7: Atrkeia teleithw ktsevw gayn: jiw kay n o xontew atoatn rxousin. Again, there may be a silent call upon Aristotle, who closely asso-ciates what is self-sufficient with what is good. Cf. E.N. X, 7, 1177a27-28; Metaph.XIV, 4, 1091b16, 18, 19; Pol. I, 2, 1253a1-2, 25-28; VII, 5, 1026b27-30.

imitates Euclids Elements in its name, its organization and its use ofpropositions and proofs. Furthermore, both are independent works ratherthan commentaries, and both are discursive philosophical works, asopposed to hymns or other religious works, which Proclus also composed.

The Elements of Theology and The Arguments for the Eternity of theWorld both express Proclus own conceptual commitments and so may berelated in a way that recalls his account of the relationship between theTimaeus and the Statesman: together their arguments serve a larger pro-ject that yields a true account of the cosmos and, indeed, all reality.Indeed, I shall argue that the causal relation analyzed in the Elements ofTheology is identical with that presupposed by Argument XVIII and inthis sense the two works share a common project. Consequently, an under-standing of the one provides grounds for an answer to the questions raisedby the other.

II. The Elements of Theology: Systematic Cause/Effect RelationsAt the outset of The Elements of Theology, Proclus establishes three prin-ciples that he analyzes to yield a unified system embracing all reality. Thefirst principle is the highest cause: The Good, a single, transcendent onethat possesses unqualified unity; since all things that are desire the Good,it must be beyond things that are (prop. 8).31 Consequently, the Good issuperior to and a cause of things that are and these things are the secondcausal principle; by their very nature they desire the good and so are self-sufficient (t atarkew);32 appetite for the good is a cause of their goodwithin themselves and so they have an intrinsic relation to the Good (prop.

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33 See Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 6, 1362a22-30; 7, 1364a5-10.34 E. R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology: A Revised Text with Translation

and Commentary, 2nd ed., (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), refers Proclus useof a triad here to Iamblichus, cf. Introduction p. xxii.

35 For the identification of what is self-sufficient with the Self-Constituted, cf. Prop.40. Dodds comments on the apparent identity of these principles, p. 224.

36 See John Whittaker, The Historical Background of Proclus Doctrine of the AUYU-POSTATA in De Jamblique Proclus: neuf exposs suivis de discussions, Entretienssur LAntiquit Classique in vol 21 (Vandoeuvres-Genve 1974), pp. 193-230.Whittaker argues that the Self-Constituted cannot be found before Iamblichus; he maybe following Doddss note, p. 224.

37 See Prop. 13; 20. Plato, Republic VI, 509B9-10 (see above, n. 31); Parmenides137C4-5; 141E9-142A1. For an explicit identification of The Good and the One, seeProclus Commentary on Platos Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M.Dillon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 1097.14; for the Good as sunek-tikn, see Plato, Phaedo 99C5, which is cited by Proclus at in Parm. 1097.14.

9). This intrinsic relation makes what is self-sufficient more akin to theGood and superior to the third principle, what experiences participation(t metxein) and so relates to the Good not through itself, i.e. immediatelyand by appetite, but externally through another, i.e. through the self-sufficient(prop. 9; 10-11).33 This triad, which at once represents descending degreesof unity, of reality, and of causal efficacy, is the most general way of char-acterizing all reality.34 Consequently, to understand the causal relationsthat define the descent through these principles is to understand the unifiedcausal structure derived from the Good that informs and thereby consti-tutes all reality.

The analysis of these principles in terms of their cause/effect relationis the first resemblance between The Elements of Theology and ArgumentXVIII insofar as this too rests exclusively on an analysis of this relation,i.e. the causal relation between god and the cosmos. I shall argue in con-clusion that the causal relation between the two lower categories, the self-sufficient, later called the self-constituted (t ayupstaton)35 and whatexperiences participation (t metxein) bears a striking resemblance to thecausal relation between the demiurge and the cosmos.36 Therefore I turnnow to the cause/effect relation that defines these categories.

The first cause and principle of all reality is the primal Good (tprtvw gayn) that is nothing else but good and absolute unity beyondall things that are (prop. 8). A regular feature of Neoplatonism, this ideaof the Good originates in Platos Republic VI, the Good that surpassesbeing in power and dignity, conjoined with the One that is not of thefirst hypothesis of Platos Parmenides.37 But Proclus specifies the causal-

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38 Prop. 28, p. 32, 10-11. Doddss translation reads: Every producing cause bringsinto existence things like to itself before the unlike.

39 Prop. 28, p. 32, 28-33. My translation differs slightly from that of Dodds. Theentire text reads: e on ka suggen tow atoiw kat at t enai ka sumpayt p atn, ka jrthtai atn kat fsin, ka rgetai tw prw at sunafw,regmena to gayo ka tugxnonta di tw ataw to rekto, dlon d timllon nvtai tow pargousi t paragmena diakkritai p atn.

40 Prop. 28, p. 34, 1-2.41 Cf., n. 39 above for the Greek of these phrases. The notion of by nature (kat

fsin) is widely associated with Aristotle, but here represents a Neoplatonic combi-nation of Plato and Aristotle. For relevant examples of Platos use of this phrase, cf.Timaeus 30B1, 6, and 31A1. In Aristotle, it appears throughout the de Caelo and isapparently identical in meaning with fsei as defined in Physics II, 1.

ity of the Good in a way not found in Plato. Every productive cause, ofwhich the Good is the first and most important, remains undiminished asit produces its effects because of its completeness (absolute unity in thecase of the Good) and the overflow of its power (prop. 26-27). This is tosay that, as it produces its effects, the Good remains absolutely unified,even exceeding the identity signified by being.

Proclus now makes the key point about cause/effect relations: everyproducing cause brings forth things that are like itself before things thatare unlike (Pn t pargon t moia prw aut pr tn nomovnfsthsin.)38 Every productive cause (and the Good first of all causes)must be superior to its effects (the Good produces beings). Since theeffects can never be identical or equal in potency to their cause, they mustbe diverse and unequal to it; hence, effects must be either altogether dis-tinct from their cause or at once united with it and distinct from it. It mustbe the latter: effects cannot be altogether distinct because then there wouldbe no association or sympathy between cause and effect. Consequently,insofar as effects (in this case beings) are in their very being cognate andsympathetic with their causes, . . . by nature dependent on them and desir[ing]to be conjoined with them . . . it is clear that effects are more united totheir producing causes than they are distinct from them.39 In short, effectsare more like their cause than unlike it and so every cause produces effectsthat are like itself before those that are unlike itself.40 Thus a cause/effectrelation rests on a likeness ( moithw) of the immediate effect to its causethroughout any procession of causes and effects (prop. 29).

Likeness appears clearly in the case of the Good and its immediateeffect, the Self-Constituted. What is immediately caused by the Good mustbe in its very being cognate and sympathetic to the Good because bynature it depends upon and desires the Good immediately;41 therefore, it

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42 Prop. 29, p. 34, 8-11. Dodds translates prtvw as primitively.43 Prop. 25, p. 28.28; Prop. 26, p. 30.12, 18.44 Prop. 64.

is more united to the Good than distinguished from it, more like thanunlike. Likeness characterizes the cause/effect relation because through itthe cause/effect procession preserves an identity between the engendererin relation to the engendered (. . . szei t tatn to gennhyntow prwt gennsan . . .) such that what the cause has primarily (prtvw) theeffect has secondarily (deutrvw).42

An effect produced immediately by the Good and so like it is the Self-Constituted (prop. 40), i.e. the Self-Constituted is in its very nature sym-pathetic to and desirous of the Good. Therefore, the Self-Constituted is secondarily what the Good is primarily: ungenerated (gnhton) andincorruptible (fyarton) (prop. 45-46), simple (plon) (prop. 47) andperpetual (dion) (prop. 49). Because anything Self-Constituted isungenerated and incorruptible, it transcends (jrhtai) all things thatare measured by time; therefore, the Self-Constituted can neither be mea-sured by time nor does it subsist in time (n xrn fsthken) (prop.51). In short, because the Self-Constituted is caused immediately by theprimal Good, it is an effect that most intimately resembles the Good: whatthe Good as cause possesses in virtue of itself and independently of itseffect, its immediate effect, the Self-Constituted, possesses by virtue of itsdependence on the Good. And within this causal relation, insofar as theeffect is in its very nature like its cause, the effect imitates (mimetai)its cause.43

I shall return to Argument XVIII below. But we may note already thestrong resemblance between these two arguments. Both rest on a cause/effectrelation in which the primary, independent character of the cause is repro-duced in a secondary, dependent way in the effect. Consequently, the char-acter of the cause produces and necessarily produces the character of theeffect: cause and effect are the same in content and differ only as primaryand secondary, independent and dependent. As in Argument XVIII, acause that is always causing produces an effect that is always beingeffected.

The Self-Constituted (always and immediately caused by the Good andso like it) is also a productive cause and its production follows the samecausal pattern.44 As a cause, the Self-Constituted is superior to its effect,i.e. what depends upon another (props. 9, 40). But while the Good is an

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absolute and uncaused first cause producing what is like itself, i.e. theSelf-Constituted, the Self-Constituted is itself an effect that depends on theGood for its very nature as incorruptible, simple, perpetual, and not sub-sisting in time. Therefore, when the Self-Constituted acts as a productivecause, its effect, i.e. what depends upon another, is immediately related toa nature that is secondary and derivative; it relates to the Good, which isprimary, only through the mediation of the Self-Constituted (prop. 9).

The immediate effect of the Self-Constituted must be more like thanunlike its cause (because every cause produces the like before the unlike).Since what depends upon another is first related to an effect of the Good,rather than having a direct relation to the Good, it is at a further removefrom the Good than is the Self-Constituted. The difference between adirect relation to the Good and a more remote relation to the Good willbe crucial to Proclus project, i.e. establishing a unified system thatembraces all reality.

Clearly, the causal relation between the primal Good and the Self-Constituted yields an effect that in its nature is like its cause: the Self-Constituted, having a natural appetite for the Good, relates to the Goodimmediately and intrinsically. And when the Self-Constituted in its turnacts as a cause, it too produces what depends immediately upon itself (andupon the Good only through it); again, the effect must be like its imme-diate cause, the Self-Constituted. But now a further implication follows:this effect must be more diverse and different from the Good than the Self-Constituted because it participates in the Good only via the mediation ofthe Self-Constituted (prop. 9). What depends on another receives its char-acteristics not from the primary progenitor, but only from what possessesthem secondarily. Its indirect relation to the Good is reflected in how itresembles the Good. The Self-Constituted, being intrinsically like theGood, is perpetual and outside of time; what depends upon another, deriv-ing its nature from what is secondary and relating only indirectly to theGood, is neither perpetual nor outside of time. It can pass in and out ofbeing and is measured by time.

Here Proclus faces a serious problem. If something is measured by time,then it possesses a distinct past and future, i.e. it was and will be andso cannot be a simultaneous whole; rather, it can pass in and out of beingand it experiences the process of coming-to-be. Its cause, the Self-Constituted,being immediately like the Good, is perpetual, a simultaneous whole, andoutside of time. Prima facie, the cause, the Self-Constituted, and its effect,what depends upon another, look quite different and so violate the prin-ciple that an effect must be more like than unlike its cause. Hence Proclus

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45 Like all Neoplatonists, Proclus ultimately addresses Platos famous text atTimaeus 37D7 where time is characterized as a moving image of eternity.

46 Prop. 53; p. 50, 24-25. I may note that Dodds translates this Proposition differ-ently: Prior to all things eternal there exists Eternity; and prior to all things tempo-ral, Time. The Greek reads: Pntvn tn avnvn pro#prxei an, ka pntvntn kat xrnon xrnow pro#fsthken.

47 In his commentary, Dodds criticizes Prop. 53 as an unfortunate developmentand suggests that Proclus had a special reason for hypostatizing an and xrnow,namely their importance in late Hellenistic cults and contemporary magic (p. 228).

48 A full analysis clearly lies beyond this paper, but a clear reference may be foundin Plotinus, Ennead III, 7.1.1-4.

49 It is very tempting to see this point as a reference to Platos Timaeus, where god

must explain how what depends upon another (measured by time and com-ing-to-be) is like the Self-Constituted (perpetual, outside of time, and asimultaneous whole).

Proclus turns to this task immediately by examining the relationbetween eternity and time.45 In The Elements of Theology, the analy-sis of eternity and time occupies Propositions 52 through 55 and the rela-tion between them is another variant of the causal relation that we haveseen here and in Argument XVIII. But this variant is considerably morecomplex.

What is eternal (anion) always is (e n); to be always meansto have no becoming and so what is eternal must be simultaneously thewhole of what it is (prop. 52). And eternity is a cause of things that areas wholes. The next proposition (prop. 53) draws out a striking implicationfor Proclus account of the causal relation between the Self-Constitutedand what depends upon another: eternity exists prior (pro#prxei) to alleternal things and time has subsisted (pro#fsthken) before all things intime.46 Consequently, eternity and time each found a triad.47 There is (1)an undivided Eternity that is a wholly unified source of (2) the eternity thatin its turn measures (3) eternal things; there is (1) a one Time, that is thewholly unified source of (2) time that is participated in and so measures (3)temporal things (prop. 54).

Proclus problem is now full blown: the task at hand in The Elementsis to deduce a unified system embracing all reality and this unity is inlarge part expressed by a likeness between any cause and its immediateeffect; but the second and third principles, the Self-Constituted and whatdepends upon another, seem neither like nor united because one is eter-nal and the other is in time.48 If his system is to be unified, Proclusrequires a mean (t mson) to unite into a single whole the two separatetriadic series founded by eternity and time.49 Establishing this mean and

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forms body by finding a mean (t mson) between three numbers (31B4-32C4; cf. esp.31C4-32A7).

50 For example, cf. Prop. 51, p. 50.1-2: All that is self-constituted transcends thethings which are measured by time in respect of their existence, which seems toemphasize the difference between the Self-Constituted and what is measured by time.

51 Prop. 55, 52.27-29. For the Greek text, see n. 53.52 Elements of Theology, Prop. 55, p. 52.30-31: k d totvn fanern ti ditt

n dithw, aniow mn llh, kat xrnon d llh. This distinction may answera question raised by Plotinus, Ennead III, 7.3.1-4: . . . what is everlastingness ( idithw)?Is it the same thing as, and identical with eternity (t ani) or is eternity in con-formity with it (kat atn an)? (Armstrong translation).

its character (prop. 55) concludes Proclus analysis of eternity and timeby making explicit the causal relation between them the mean estab-lishes a likeness between them as cause and effect. This analysis can thenbe applied to the Self-Constituted and its effect, what depends uponanother, in order to clarify why and in what respects this cause and effecttoo are like and so united. I shall suggest that it also explains why inArgument XVIII the cosmos as an effect of god may be properly calleda god and a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal.

The crucial issue is the dependence of the effect upon its cause. In anyseries of productive causes, the subsequent terms depend on the priorterms insofar as they are like rather than unlike. Being like is the pos-itive, or constructive, moment of the causal relation. But what comes tobe in time is different (unlike) and of a distinctly lower order than whatis eternal.50 Consequently, it is impossible for what comes to be in timeto attach directly, i.e. to be immediately related to, what is eternal and sowhat is temporal cannot serve as the mean between the two triadic seriesfounded on eternity and time. Proclus requires something like, or sharedin common, to act as a mean between things that come to be for a timeand things that are perpetually. What comes to be always (t e ginmenonenai) is like both: it attaches to the lower order, temporal things, by virtueof its coming to be (t mn gnesyai); it attaches to eternal nature by virtueof its always (t d e . . .); because what comes to be always iscoming to be forever it imitates the eternal nature and serves as the meanbetween the temporal and the eternal.51

This analysis leads Proclus to distinguish between two kinds of perpe-tuity ( dithw): (1) eternal perpetuity, steadfastness concentrated in asimultaneous whole, and (2) temporal perpetuity that is an endless processunfolding as a temporal continuation.52 Perpetuity, he concludes, is thecommon term by which we can understand that a perpetual endless

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53 Elements of Theology, Prop. 55, p. 52.27-29: lepetai ra t e ginmenonenai t mson mfon, t mn gnesyai sunpton tow xerosi, t d emimomenon tn anion fsin.

54 Prop. 94, p. 84, 17-18: Psa mn dithw peira tw stin: o psa dpeira dithw. Dodds reads: All perpetuity is a kind of infinitude, but not all infinitudeis perpetuity.

55 Prop. 94, p. 84, 23-24: ti d dithw peira dlon: t gr mhdpotepilepon peiron: toto d t e, tn pstasin nkleipton xon.

process imitates the perpetuity of what is steadfast in a simultaneouswhole: It remains that the mean is that which perpetually comes-to-be:which in virtue of its coming-to-be is attached to the inferior order, whilein its perpetuity it imitates the eternal nature.53 The meaning of it imi-tates appears unambiguously here and it is identical to that seen in therelation of the Self-Constituted to the Good: the relation of an effect to itscause whereby what is dependent and secondary is like rather than unlikewhat is primary. And since every productive cause produces what is likeprior to what is unlike, imitation is the more direct positive relation ofany effect to its cause.

Perpetuity is Proclus solution to a serious problem: via perpetuity, whatis in time is like, and so united to, what is eternal and a simultaneouswhole; via perpetuity, what depends upon another, which comes to be intime, is like what is Self-Constituted, which is outside of time. Althoughthe point is not made explicit, what depends upon another must have anindirect relation to the Good because it depends directly on the Self-Constituted: a direct relation to what-is immediately grants coming-to-bean indirect dependence upon and expression of the productivity of theGood. By uniting these three principles, this solution furthers the largerproject of The Elements.

Although this distinction concludes Proclus discussion of time andeternity, it does not conclude The Elements of Theology. He goes on to anumber of topics that seem less immediately relevant to the puzzles ofArgument XVIII. But in one of these topics, the infinite, perpetuity reap-pears and is unambiguously defined: All perpetuity is something infinite,but not all infinitude is a perpetuity.54 It is clear, Proclus concludes, thatperpetuity is an infinitude; for that which never fails is infinite, and thisis what we mean by perpetuity, which involves an unfailing subsistence.55

That which never fails is perpetual, i.e. is forever. And this point returnsus to the cosmos, which, he concludes in his 18 independent arguments,must be eternal.

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56 Proclus constructive argument runs to some 35 lines and in it he repeats thisphrase, or a close variant of it, again and again: 140.2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 30, 33;142.18-19, 27; 144.14-15, 28; 146.7, 11-12. Although the language is much moreAristotelian, cf. Elements of Theology, Prop. 76 and Prop. 77.

57 Merlan, p. 11, characterizes Proclus (and Iamblichus) work as an example ofmultiple realism, i.e. a realism asserting the subsistence of more than one type ofnon-sensibles and universals. Dodds makes it clear that the intermediate class, i.e.the class of beings between the primal Good and that which is caused by another,includes a wide range of beings and cites Th. Pl. I, xix.50. Cf. also, Prop. 127.

How does an account that makes no reference to the cosmos or god,an account that is situated within a series of formal ahistorical proposi-tions, help answer questions about god, the cosmos, and the relationbetween them, questions raised by a freestanding proof for the eternityof the cosmos explicitly directed at an historical target, i.e. Atticus? Cluesfor an answer to this question lie in the striking similarities between godin Argument XVIII and the Self-Constituted in The Elements of Theologyas causes that are and are self-identical, between the cosmos in ArgumentXVIII and perpetual coming-to-be in The Elements of Theology as effectsproduced by what is self-identical, and in the analogous cause/effect rela-tion at work in both texts. Indeed, as I shall now argue, these clues sug-gest a close conceptual relation between these two works.

III. Conclusion: The Cause/Effect Relation Between God and The Cosmos

First the conceptual similarity of god and the Self-Constituted. InArgument XVIII, god, being divine and the best of causes, is uniform,unchanging and self-identical.56 In The Elements of Theology, The Goodis beyond being and cannot even be said to be self-identical; therefore,god cannot be compared to the Good, even though they both are causes.But the Self-Constituted always is and so has no becoming; because it isunchanging, the Self-Constituted must be simultaneously the whole ofwhat is, unmeasured by, or outside of, time. And god in Argument XVIII,as uniform, unchanging and self-identical, may be understood as likethe Self-Constituted, the second causal principle that is immediately sub-ordinated to the primal Good in The Elements of Theology.57

The cosmos, which comes to be completely and is and will be for alltime in Argument XVIII, is not outside of time and so is not eternal;being for all time, the cosmos is clearly temporal and is measured bytime. That measure is unlimited in both directions, meaning that the

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58 L/M 142.30-144.1.59 Dodds refers the opening words the perpetuity we spoke of to Prop. 48: All

that is not perpetual either is composite or has its subsistence in another and Prop. 49:All that is Self-Constituted is perpetual.

cosmos was ordered from unlimited time and will be ordered for unlim-ited time.58 Therefore, the eternity of the cosmos is not outside of time,like that of god, or the Self-Constituted; rather, the eternity of the cosmosconsists in coming to be perpetually (and being neither generated nor cor-ruptible in the sense of being without beginning or end). In short, withintime, the cosmos must be eternal and its eternity resembles that of themean, perpetual coming to be, in The Elements of Theology.

If we identify the cosmos of Argument XVIII with perpetual coming-to-be, then we must also identify the cosmos of Argument XVIII with themean between the eternal and the temporal in The Elements of Theology.Indeed, in light of Argument XVIII, the corollary to proposition 55 in TheElements may be read with a very concrete meaning: . . . the perpetuitywe spoke of was of two kinds, the one eternal, the other in time; the one[analogous to god] a perpetual steadfastness, the other [analogous to thecosmos] a perpetual process; the one having its being concentrated in asimultaneous whole, the other diffused and unfolded in temporal continu-ation (partasin); the one entire in itself, the other composed of partseach of which stands separately in an order of succession.59

In The Elements of Theology the Self-Constituted is eternal while itseffect, what depends upon another, is in time and this apparent differencepresents a challenge for Proclus. Argument XVIII rests on a cause/effectrelation between god and the cosmos and so they appear not as differentbut as alike, i.e. the characteristics of the cause are also found in the effect.But this difference, due to the different contexts of the two works, cannothide the fact that the same cause/effect relation is at work in both texts. Indeed,the two arguments are complementary and for this reason The Elementsof Theology suggests answers to the questions raised by Argument XVIII.

In Argument XVIII, what justifies calling the cosmos, which is an effectof god, a god and divine? In The Elements of Theology, the meanbetween the eternal and the temporal is like the eternal in one respect andlike the temporal in another. It is like the temporal insofar as it is notbeing but coming to be. It is like the eternal insofar as it is perpetually,i.e. always. Proclus designs Argument XVIII to prove that the cosmos,which becomes, is perpetually or always; his proof rests on what God and

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60 Cf. the address of the demiurge to the heavens at Plato, Timaeus 41A7-8: yeoyen, n g dhmiourgw patr te rgvn, di mo genmena luta mo ge mylontow. Proclus Argument VI (L/M 62) rests on this text.

the cosmos share in common via their cause/effect relation, i.e. how theyare like. Via their relation, they are like in at least one crucial respect:both god and the cosmos are eternal. Taking god as the cause and thecosmos as gods effect, the predicate eternal applies to both. Insofar asthe predicate eternal is the same and rests on a causal relation, the cos-mos and god are like: the predicate that attaches to god as a cause attachesto the cosmos as the effect. Consequently, in respect of this predicate,being eternal or perpetual, the cosmos is not unlike but like god and aslike can be called a god and divine. In short, the cosmos can be calleddivine because, via the cause/effect relation between them, god and thecosmos are both eternal.60

We also have here the answer to the second question raised byArgument XVIII: what does Proclus mean by the claim that the cosmos,being ungenerated and incorruptible, is a copy of the perpetuity of theeternal (mmhma . . . tw to anow dithtow)? In the Elements of Theology,he explains the mean between the eternal and the temporal, saying . . .in its perpetuity it imitates the eternal nature (t mson . . . t d emimomenon tn anion fsin). Again, likeness between cause and effectunderlies the notion of imitation. Imitation signals the causal relation ofan effect to its cause insofar as via their relation the effect is like the cause.The first part of Argument XVIII argues from the nature of the cause, god,to the necessary character of the effect, the cosmos. Because god, thecause, is unchanging and eternal, gods effect, the cosmos, must also beeternal. In his rejection of Atticus, Proclus turns to the cosmos moredirectly and we see not the relation of god to the cosmos but the relationof the cosmos to god. Imitation appears here. The relation of the cosmosto god is identical to that of the mean to the eternal nature: via the cause/effectrelation an effect becomes what its cause is, and in this precise sense aneffect imitates its cause. Furthermore, as the positive moment of thecausal relation, imitation also signals an indirect relation to the Good.When the cosmos imitates god, in respect to what it imitates it may becalled a copy of what god is: it is a copy of the perpetuity of the eternaland, by being a copy, the cosmos too must be eternal.

In The Elements of Theology, Proclus argues that the primal Good pro-duces as its immediate effect beings that are necessarily plural and lessunified than the Good itself (prop. 21). So while the primal Good is

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61 Dodds, p. 228; commentary on Prop. 53.

beyond being and self-identity, its first effect is Self-Constituted (prop. 43).The causal relation between any originative principle and the series gen-erated by it is always the same. In its turn, the causal relation betweenany being and its effect can also be understood according to the samecausal model. Consequently, by understanding the relation of the Self-Constituted as a cause to its effect, what depends upon another, we canalso understand the causal relation between god and the cosmos.

Dodds criticizes Proclus analysis of time and eternity. He regards it asan unfortunate development [that] may be merely the result of . . . apply-ing the same formula to all concepts indifferently.61 Alternatively, wemight understand Proclus as exploiting the power of this causal relationin new and penetrating ways that are neither formulaic nor indifferent.Indeed, his ways of exploiting this relation are exciting because (at leaston Proclus view), they exemplify fully the project of Neoplatonism, aproject that in Argument XVIII is at once textual and metaphysical andthat finds its ultimate tone of triumph in the ethical: honoring god andhonoring the cosmos because in the unity of their cause/effect relation bothare divine: both are perpetual, both are always and without fail.

Department of PhilosophyVillanova University

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