Energia and Kinesis in Metaphysics θ. 6.

24.

E N E R G I A AND KINESIS IN METAPHYSICS θ . 6.

rflr. 3.L. Ackrill has pointed out a difficulty in theAristotelian distinction between kinesis and energeia ujhichcannot be easily resolv/ed. This leads him to the conclusionthat "there is a serious confusion in Aristotle's expositionof the energeia-kinesis distinction." Aristotle, · heimplies, has used the linguistic data rather carelessly.A more careful investigation of these forms leads to a

2different distinction as shoiun by the recent ujork of Z. Uendler.

This conclusion appears attractive to those tuho approachAristotle as if he mere an early Ryle. Indeed Aristotledoes mention a linguistic criterion ujhen drau/ing the dist-inction; but Ackrill's discussion fastens onto it to theexclusion of all else. Aristotle certainly thought thatthe linguistic facts agree uiith and illustrate ( O L O V )his distinction. Nevertheless, it seems that the distinctionitself is made on ontological grounds; in terms of causes.In a fairly short paragraph in Θ. 6 terms signifying theend, τέλος, ου ενεκ,α, τελεία, ατελής, occur no lessthan eight times. It is, I think someuihat unfair to accuseAristotle of having failed to dram tuhat is obviously animportant distinction in his system because the linguisticfacts he appeals to ujill not, of themselves, drauj thedistinction for us.

The tense criterion used by Aristotle to support hisdistinction is simply that u/ith verbs signifying energeiaiit is possible to use ths perfect as soon as one can use thepresent. Thus, he says, one sees and has seen, understandsand has understood. On the contrary, in kinesis the presenttense is incompatible with the perfect: one cannot belearning and have already learned, etc. Ackrill discussesthis criterion in some detail and concludes, rightly I think,that Aristotle means to assert in this passage not onlythat, unlike kinesis-verbs, energeia-verbs in the presenttense are compatible luith the perfect tense, but that inthese verbs the present tense entails the perfect.3

Brought to you by | University of VirginiaAuthenticated | 128.143.23.241

Download Date | 10/5/12 6:56 AM

25.

Ackrill then looks at Ryle's well-known interpretation ofour passage only to reject it as incorrect; and indeed as notoo much an interpretation of the text ae * Bottoming of theAristotelian observation to make a more familiar point: thatseeing is not a process but an "achievement." There is noneed to examine Ackrill 's arguments against Ryle in detail.They seem to me quite conclusive. On the other hand, onefeels great sympathy for the Rylean interpretation because itis so obvious. For if the activity can be described withoutregard to the tense, (indeed the choice betiueen the "I see it"or "I have seen it" locutions is arbitrary in situationsujhere seeing is an achievement), then prima facie the "activity"is not a temporal process. Another may of stating the dis-tinction mould then be to contrast kinesis, where the end isdistant and must be reached through time, and energeia wherethe end is achieved instantaneously. But something which occursinstantaneously cannot start, stop or go on. Hence an energeia(achievement) is not a process.

Yet Aristotle, by including living well, and especiallyby the phrase εί δε μη, έ δ ε ι αν ποτέ παύεσθαι , makesit quite clear that he is speaking of a strange kind of activity,one that need not stop at any time, and not of achievementsonly (in Ryle 's sense).

Next Ackrill quotes and discusses Ethics. X, 4, whereAristotle contrasts pleasure with kinesis and says that pleasure,(which functions like energeia in the context), is something"whole and perfect"; and then adds that, while kineseiscannot occur otherwise than in time, one can have pleasure inthe "now", since τδ γ&ρ εν τω νυν όλον τι ι and pleasurehas-been shown to be όλον τι. Ackrill is rightly puzzledby the assertion that one can be pleased but not in time andthen, rightly again, points out that this new assertion, viz.that some energeiai need not occupy time, is not inconsistentwith the tense criterion of fileta. θ . 6. The latter remains "the basic rule for distinguishing between energeiai andkineseis. Some energeiai occur in time and others do not.But,while all kineseis last for a time, not all timeless events

4are energeiai. Therefore, the 'rule1 derived from the Ethics,



26.

'if Xing can occur not in a time it is not a kinesis,1 .cannot distinguish between energeia and kinesis. For, though

s .it rules out kineseis, it also rules out those energei^i"" tthat go on fot a time end late in evente that et· not tnetfleieTne tense criterion however remains effective even wi^h the

Ethics admission that some energeiai are εν τω νυν.

Yet this lumping of activities that can go on for atime and instantaneous achievements is very remarkable.Either Aristotle is after something quite strange, whichcannot be understood by the linguistic facts alona, orelse he is guilty of confusion. This confusion is due tohis failure to draw the Uendlerian distinctions betweenactivity, achievement and state. This is Ackrill's viewin the central point of the paper, mhich is to expose the"main and obvious difficulty" with Aristotle's distinction,and to uihich I now turn. ·

Tha difficulty is this: among examples of kinesis Aris-totle mentions tualKing and among examples of energeia hementions enjoying. Νοώ, if one applies the tenss criterion,it can be shown that enjoying is a kinesis and walking isan energeia; depending on further qualification, or lackof it, in the sentence. If I am walking from A to Β thenI cannot say that I have walked to Β until I actually reach3. But I may be walking with no particular destination inmind and in this case, walking being a homogeneous activity,there is no reason why I could not say "I have walked"at any time during my aimless walk. On the other hand,since enjoying is always enjoying something, if what isenjoyed is e.g. a symphony, then I cannot say "I haveenjoyed the symphony" u/ith respect to any time whatever.As in the case of 'walking from A to Β ' I can only say"I have enjoyed the symphony" when the symphony is over.Clearly, this is a question of alternative descriptions ofthe activity. But it does not seem correct to suggest,as nir. Crombie apparently does, that the distinction dependson which description one chooses, that "such a distinctioncan only apply to things in the world qua described in



27.

certain mayo." For, as Ackrill argues, Aristotle can avoidthe conclusion that walking is an energeia only by insistingthat in walking, a mode of locomotion, 'the whence and uihitherconstitute the form 1 (ειδ οπ οιό ν ) . In other words, the"full and proper description of what I have done is Ί hauewalked from A to Z.1" But then, by the same token, the fulland proper description in the case of enjoyment is "I have

•7

enjoyed hearing the symphony." Clearly, this turns enjoyment .

into a kinesis.

Ackrill then considers one or two ways in which Aristotlemight attempt to remove the difficulty and concludes that noneof them could succeed. He then quotes Vendler whose distinctionbetween what he (Vendler) calls 'activities' and 'accomplish-ments ' shows clearly "how unjustified Aristotle is in hisblanket classification of hearing, etc., as energeiai and walking,

getc., as kineseis." Under the blanket classification kindsof activities are mentioned: walking, hearing, etc. The properdistinction mould cut across these kinds and would depend solelyon whether the description is a 'proper' one; i.e. on whetherthe limit or accomplishment is included in the description(running versus running a mile).

It seems to me that the solution is to acknowledge thefailure of the tense criterion; but at the same time to insistthat the distinction depends not on the criterion, but rather,on the immanence of end. It is true that a complete and properdescription of what is going on must include the causes.Aristotle, speaking of walking mentions the form. But it isclear that the key concept here is that of end, τέλος , andnot ε ί δ ο ς as such. He is, after all, speaking of "actions"and he is speaking, in the ffletaphysics passage, at least, ofΐηβτέλος and the ου ένεκα . Now it is also true thatactions can be said to have a ' f o r m ' of their own: walking isnot building. And there is no need to know where you aregoing and ghat you are building to know that they are different.What then is the force of the ειδοποιόν ? Ackrill takes itagain as providing the complete description, as an individuatingform which distinguishes this walk, e.g., from Oxford to Reading,from any other walk and from sub-stretches or parts of thiswalk. It is this understanding of form as an individuating



2S.

feature (which must be included in the complete description)

that enables Ackrill to dr u a very close parallel between

walking and u/alking to Reading, and between enjoying and

enjoying the symphony,

It may seem strange that Aristotle, iuho was quite

convinced that there cannot be complete description in the9 τsense of individual definitions, would use ε ί δ ο ς in this

individuating sense. Still the Ethics passage is about

the difference between whole walks and parts of walks and

here the πόθεν ποΐ seems to be the determining factor.

Hjwever , if we try to read the ειδοποιόν in the light of

the "fistaphysics passage, i.e., with the emphasis on the

ποΐ, we might understand Aristotle to mean that a movement

cannot be understood except by reference to the end.

The movement of legs, the cutting of timber, etc., remain

unintelligible occurrences until unified, given form under

the concept of end. IL'a now begin to see the difference

between walking and enjoying. In a movement the fo rm, the10content so to speak, and the end coincide. The ' w h y 1

and "what 1 of my building is the house, the 'why 1 and 'what1

of my walk is Reading. In this way the end (ποί), the

key notion, also gives content and form to the activity.

(Compare Aristotle's other example, 'making thin': here,

unlike 'walking 1 , what the man is doing certainly cannot

be understood without reference to the end, the thin state).

This is obviously not the case with the mental activities

Aristotle mentions. Using the notion of the end, and

keeping in mind the Platonic distinction between things

good in themselves and good for the sake of something else,11 '~we can formulate another criterion by asking 'why '? In

kinesis the why is not only relevant but indispensable.

He who says he is running or pushing a cart without a

'what f o r 1 , a ου ένεκα, is saying something odd; whereas

he who is enjoying or hearing would be saying something oddwere he to give a reason.

If this is so then the case of the Oxford to Reading

walk is not analogous to hearing the Ninth Symphony; al-

though the tense criterion cannot, as Ackrill points out,



29.

distinguisii between them. For though Reading is the objectof my walk both in tha sense of formal determination and in

the sense of objective or ου ένεκα ι the Ninth Symphony isnot the oi e'vexa of heating» it ie the content. But supposemy reason, the why of my walk, is not to get to Reading, butto uiin a bat, or to exercise my legs, or to match the birdsalong the road. It is clear that whatever the end, theου ένεκα of walking is not the walking itself. And perhaps

'part of what Aristotle means by the itol being ειδοποιόν(ποΐ now understood in the sense of τέλος) is that theseother walks uiould be described and classified according to theirvarious ends. U/here getting to Reading was not the primaryend, the fact that I walked as far as Reading has no particularsignificance. In time, I may forget it mas Reading but still

remember the distance or the species of birds seen along theroad. The end makes it a bet-winning or a bird-watchingwalk. But hearing the symphony;(as opposed to going to theconcert or perhaps listening to the symphony) can have no endoutside the hearing and the enjoyment. The symphony, thewhat is enjoyed is now divorced from the end; and in thisrespect it is an incidental factor which functions a bit likethe Oxford to Reading 1 label in the bird-watching walk.

In other words, in cases where the what is not the ου ένεκα ,the relation between the activity and the what is contingent.

In energeiai the what is not the end and therefore the whatis not a necessary factor for the energeia to be what it is.In kinesis, on the other hand, the what tends to be defined

by the end and sines the end is distant and must be specified,both what and end must be, of necessity, included in the des-cription of the kinesis.

Indeed this is why Aristotle insists that while a move-ment must stop when the end has been achieved, energeiai haveno upper limit. For when the house has been built and whenI have arrived at Reading, my building and my walk have ended.But it would be odd to say, "my hearing (or my enjoyment) ofthe symphony has ended" when the symphony ends. Hearing is acontinuum; it goes on, it does not aim at anything. Thesounds of the orchestra, say in the Herodes theater in Athens,

are among countless other sounds that 'appeared1 in my hearingand .made my evening a pleasant one. I cannot speak of my



3Γ^U ·

'hearino of the oboes' or 'my hearing of the owl ' or of the'distant cough 1 and perhaps not even of my 'hearing of thesymphony . ' /hat is heard or enjoyed does not individuateacts of hearing or enjoying in the may that ends achieved

circumscribe ana define motion«.

Let us noui return to the difficult (for Aristotle)cases. Vendler ' s activity-verbs, far from being energeiai,are just partial descriptions. He is running, pushing acarr: though us seem to lack a limit here, the fact is thatj._e haven ' t been told enough. (Why on earth is he pushingthe cart?) A complete description mould include the end andso necessarily the limit. Of course Ackrill admits this much.

Tha real difficulty is that if me insist on a complete des-cription then me must include the what, the object of activi-

ties which seemed limitless to Aristotle, and the kinesis-

energeia distinction mould collapse. Nou/, however, uie canbe a little more careful rnith this "complete description"demand. It is clear that our d e m a n d f f o r the limits implicit

in reasons and ends is perfectly legitimate with respect toVendler ' s activities. But Aristotle claims that energeiaiare unlimited not because me do not knorn the main factor butbecause, knowing the main factor, me knou all there is to

knoiu. And indeed the trno queries, "Why is he pushing thecart?" and "What is he enjoying?" do not seem to be equallyvital. Indeed the latter cannot without considerableoddity, be put in the form of a direct question to the enjoyer.And of course, only some of the energeia verbs can take eventhis sort of dubious object. Aristotle's other examples ara

ευ ζην· and εύ&α ΐμονεi.V. Here the demand for an object to'complete the description1 is plainly silly. Saying, "he is

happy" is, unlike "he is pushing a cart," all that one needsto say. "He lives" is not an incomplete phrase for '^he liveshis life" (which according to the tense criterion mould turneven living into a kinesis). Living his life is eitherredundant or ' l ife' here is an artificial external limit havingnothing to do with the end. So too, the ' symphony 1 is anartificial label for a continuum of sounds. (The symphony

comes to an end but is not achieved: its end is cessation notcompletion). The demand for such a label is pedantic and

superficial. Suppose me see a man in deep contemplation or

prayer. The question, "What is he contemplating?" or "prayingfor" could only come from a curious tourist.



31.

To sum up: by 'complete description' of an action or

activity, Aristotle understands explanation. In kinesis me may

know what is going on, and what is being moved or pushed; butif me do not knoui the why we cannot have a complete pictureand cannct apply the tense criterion. Energaiai, on the other

hand , are self-explanatory. Some details may be missing but

the explanation is there and the tense criterion is successful.The tense criterion can only operate mithin a full description

but the full description is in fact.explanation. Thereforethe correct application of the tense criterion presupposes aprevious distinction between activities in need of explanationand self-explanatory ones. The distinction between energeiaand kinesis is ultimately based on the notion of immanent end

and the tuny-criterion.

Let us now see whether Vendler 's four classes could beaccommodated by the Aristotelian energeia-kinesis distinction.

(1) Achievements (seeing) are actualities' because

complete. IL'hat distinguishes them from the other actuality-class in Uendler ' s scheme, states, is that achievements do notgo on; since the continuous present is not used in English.This distinction cannot be taken very seriously from the Aris-

totelian point of view. If seeing means being aware by visualperception, then it plainly is something that can go on. IfI am looking at something for any length of time then I am alsoseeing it for that length of time. If seeing means discovering—the achievement sense—then it is the end-state, the actuality,at the end of a kinesis: the looking-for, searching. How longthis actuality-state lasts is irrelevant from the Aristotelian

viewpoint. Hence states and achievements cannot be distinguishedsafely; though we may group under 'states' those actualitiesthat go on and under 'achievements' the momentary ( εν τω νυν )ones.

(2) Activities (running, pushing a cart) are not actual-ities at all but incomplete descriptions of kineseis. Theyappear to lack limit because the object of the activity (boththe what and the why) are missing from the description.

(3) Accompl ishments are complete descriptions of kineseishaving the limits imposed by the object toward which the motion

is directed. Knowing the object we also understand that the

motion must stop once the end has been achieved. They are the



52.

paradigmatic cases of kinesis in contrast to ensrgaia.They logically imply a distant end, something to be accomp-

lished in time, and they must stop onca th.is and has been

reached.(4) States, insofar as they are actualities rather

than potencies, i.e., actualities that go on for a time, arenot to be contrasted with activities. States seem to beeither activities of a certain kind, viz. self-explanatoryones (energeiai), or states in the ordinary inactive-sense.Tha difference here can be brought out by the shift in usagef rom verb to adjective or noun and the corresponding shift in

terminology, ε νέργεια and ενεργεία δν .

So the Vendlerian distinction between achievement,

activity, and state, fails to distinguish energeiai fromincomplete kinaseis or inactive states. UJhile his activityand accomplishment, though generally kineseis, fail to showhoui they differ from energeiai. This is not surprising:Aristotle set out to establish a distinction mithin activity

not to enumerate ways of using verbs.

Still what is rather surprising is,this strange com-bination of activity and state; an achievement that goes onbeing achieved, an activity which is not a motion and whichdoes not lead anywhere. It is not, of course, accidentalthat all the energeiai mentioned by Aristotle are mentalprocesses. He speaks of seeing, thinking, understanding,

enjoying and being happy. It is these activities that aresupremely worthwhile and thus self-explanatory. Their"motion" is not true motion for it does not bring the end(cessation). Their end and their worth are immanent.Yet they are not mere states. This conviction runs throughancient thought , at least after Plato's Sophist. Conscious-ness seems to be above all, activity. But it is timelessactivity not self-defeating activity. Plato's objection tomotion in the early dialogues was, precisely, the fact thatphysical motion necessarily brings negation and destruction.But in the Sophist he sees a kind of motion peculiar to minds

which is free from defects. This is why he proposes as amark of reality (243c) the "power of being acted upon or of



33.

acting." Crudely put, what seems to be behind this criterion

is that a thing easily affected is not a durable and thus 'real'thing; but a mind unaffected by other minds or things is not amind at all. Receptivity, sensitivity, pliability are conditions

of mental motions which are not incompatible with reality and

value. Only then does he introduce motion in t_he perfectlyreal. (it is clear from the context that only the motion oflife and consciousness is posited.) The passage (248e-249a),naturally, became a Neoplatonic scripture. In Plotinus thisconception became, via Aristotle's eternally actual nous, that

12of a'boiling life« of the spirit, ζωη ύπερζέουσα» thoughin an entirely timeless realm. Aristotle's energeia is justthis activity of consciousness uihich is indifferent to the

passage of time because complete at every moment.

These remarks do not render the concept of energeia intelli-gible. They simply point to the historical framework mithinwhich the Aristotelian distinction ought to be understood, ifat all. They'seem to me more relevant to the distinction than

the contemporary investigation of the peculiarities of the

English language.

University of Calgary. P.S. IKlamo

Footnotes:

1. 3.L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Distinction Between Energeiaand Kinesis" in Mem Essays in Plato and Aristotle, edited by

R. Bambrough. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965, p.135.2. Ackrill quotes, u/ith approval, Vendler's paper as "Timesand Tenses." The correct title is "Verbs and Times" now inLinguistics in Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1967, pp. 97-121.3. Ackrill, op.cit. p.125.

4. Ackrill says, "....for the starts and terminations ofkineseis are not in a time—do not last for any time yetare not themselves energeiai." (p.130) One could argus aboutterminations (kineseis, Aristotle has just said in the Ethics,are made perfect in the final moment: they mould turn into

states, ενεργεία δντα), but one is uncertain about the starts.This may be all Ackrill 'needs.

5. I. Crombie. Review of "N'eiu Essays in Plato and Aristotle"in the Classical Review, N.S. U o l . X U I I , No. 1,..(1907), p.32.



34.

Croir.bie's other point, that enjoyment is not itself an activity

but is parasitic upon (τελειοί) an activity, does not really

holp. For the problem romaine uiith rflopout to hagiffnp thesymphony ujhich, like seeing, is presumably an energeia and

not something that completes an energeia.

Ethics, 1174 29-b5.

7. Ackrill, op. cit. p. 132.

B. Ackrill, ibid. , p. 135.

9. r.letR. 1040a 5-7, 1036a 5, 1039b 23-29.

10. Aristotle makes this point in a different context in

Metaphysics 1044b 1.11. · Aristotle in 6, does not use this criterion explicitly;

thinking, no doubt, that the tense 'criterion1 adequately

illustrates the point. But since the immanence of end is

the only metaphysical point made in the passage it is

possible that something like the ujhy-criterion is behind

tha whole discussion. Indeed, there is, a close connection

between them. One can say, Ί have seen' as soon as ha

says, Ί see1 because the end is realised in the act itself.

Since there is no distant end the question 'tuhy' is pointless.

12. Enneads. VI. 5.12, 9;VI7.12, 23. ; .

RECOLLECTION AND POSTERIOR ANALYTICS II, 19*

Ths last chapter of the Posterior Analytics has caused

soma difficulty even to sympathetic readers of the Stagirite.

They identify the second part of the following statement,

which is the second aporia, as referring to the Platonic2

doctrine of Recollection "u/hether iue develop cognitive

capacities ujhich me did not possess before or have alwaysry

possessed these capacities unawares." ( Α . Ρ ο . Π , 19 99b25-26)

* This paper was completed under a Faculty Research Au/ard oftha State University of N e w . Y o r k , Summer 1966. I am alsoindebted to Professor Joseph Owens C.SS.R. and Robert 3..TicLaughlin for their helpful comments on an earlier draftof this paper.



Energia and Kinesis in Metaphysics θ. 6.

Documents

Transcript of Energia and Kinesis in Metaphysics θ. 6.