OPIATE ENDS HOSTAGE CRISIS

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CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NOVEMBERS 2002 \ EDITED BY JANICE LONG & AALQ^ Λ^ Naloxone CF 3 CHBrCl Halothane CHEMICAL WEAPONS OPIATE ENDS HOSTAGE CRISIS Fentanyl used to incapacitate Chechens likely doesn't violate chemical arms ban ESPONDING TO A REQUEST for clarification by Rogelio Pfirter, director general of €^CH 2 CH 2 -V)< N H J_ ή CH2CH3 Fentanyl LETHAL RESCUE The fentanyl-based aerosolized opiate pumped into the Moscow theater held by Chechen terrorists eliminated resistance to Russian Special Forces, but it also caused the death of more than 100 of the 750 hostages. the Organization for the Prohi- bition of Chemical Weapons, Russian Health Minister Yuri Shevchenko revealed that an aerosolized opiate based on fen- tanyl was used to end the recent hostage crisis. The narcotic, nor- mally used as an anesthetic, killed at least 115 of the 750 people tak- en hostage by Chechen terrorists in a Moscow theater on Oct. 23. Although Shevchenko didn't mention use of any other agent, German doctors reported find- ing the anesthetic halothane in body fluid samples taken from two surviving German hostages soon after rescue. Halothane is often used with fentanyl in med- ical situations. Arms control experts say the use of fentanyl for law enforce- ment purposes probably doesn't violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Rus- sia has ratified. Its use, however, may widen existing loopholes in the 1997 treaty, which bans the use of chemical weapons in warfare. Russian officials initially re- fused to identify—even to med- ical personnel treating victims— the gas pumped through the the- ater's ventilation system, the con- centration deployed, or possible antidotes. While not condemn- ing the rescue operation, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Alexan- der Vershbow said that 'Svith a lit- tle more information, at least a few more of the hostages may have survived." Jean Pascal Zanders, director of the chemical and biological warfare project at Stockholm In- ternational Peace Research In- stitute, suggests several reasons for Russia's reluctance to reveal the toxic chemical used. In addi- tion to the still prevailing culture of secrecy, he says, "Russia may fear that knowledge of what is available to its special forces may aid future terrorists." Also, he adds, Russia "may fear accounta- bility under the CWC." Through trial and error, Rus- sian doctors found that naloxone, an opiate antagonist, reversed the effects of the then-unknown knockout gas. This fingered an opiate as the likely agent. As anesthetics, opiates are usually administered by injec- tion and are carefully monitored. Fentanyl, however, is a rapid, short-acting, inhalable narcotic painkiller. Fentanyl-like com- pounds can induce sleep, cause nausea and vomiting, and, at high concentrations, stop respiration and circulation. During the 1970s, in a program dubbed ARCADE, the Pentagon researched fentanyl and its chem- ical cousins as possible riot-con- trol agents, says Matthew S. Meselson, a Harvard University molecular biologist and a chem- ical weapons expert. Edward Hammond, director of the non- profit Sunshine Project, says, "The U.S. has been looking at opi- ates as so-called incapacitating chemical weapons since at least 1994." Meselson contends that Rus- sia's use ofa toxic chemical agent in what is considered a law en- forcement situation "is arguably not a violation of the CWC." But, he adds, "the law enforcement section of the treaty, Article 11.9(d), needs to be clarified." That section states that the use of toxic chemicals for "law en- forcement, including domestic riot-control purposes" is "not pro- hibited under this convention." Though the treaty doesn't define law enforcement, Meselson ar- gues that such actions "would re- quire applicable domestic law and the jurisdiction to enforce such law." Both conditions were met by the Moscow situation, he says. What is unclear is whether the Moscow crisis satisfied the con- dition for domestic riot-control purposes. Article II.7 defines a ri- ot-control agent as a chemical not listed in the treaty that produces rapid disabling effects that quick- ly disappear after exposure ends. Clearly, this was not the case in the Russian situation. At press time, hundreds of victims were still hospitalized, several in seri- ous condition. Zanders says the upcoming 2003 CWC Review Conference will likely have to "clarify the con- cepts of law enforcement as well asriot-control,peacekeeping, and antiterrorism activities that don't qualify as warfare but do require the use of nonlethal chemical weapons."—LOIS EMBER 6 C&EN / NOVEMBER 4, 2002 NEWS OF THE WEEK

Transcript of OPIATE ENDS HOSTAGE CRISIS

Page 1: OPIATE ENDS HOSTAGE CRISIS

CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING

NOVEMBERS 2002 \ EDITED BY JANICE LONG & AALQ^

Λ ^

Naloxone

CF3CHBrCl Halothane

C H E M I C A L W E A P O N S

OPIATE ENDS HOSTAGE CRISIS Fentanyl used to incapacitate Chechens likely doesn't violate chemical arms ban

ESPONDING TO A REQUEST for clarification by Rogelio Pfirter, director general of

€ ^ C H 2 C H 2 - V ) < NH J _

ή CH2CH3

Fentanyl

LETHAL RESCUE The fentanyl-based aerosolized opiate pumped into the Moscow theater held by Chechen terrorists eliminated resistance to Russian Special Forces, but it also caused the death of more than 100 of the 750 hostages.

the Organization for the Prohi­bition of Chemical Weapons, Russian Health Minister Yuri Shevchenko revealed that an aerosolized opiate based on fen­tanyl was used to end the recent hostage crisis. The narcotic, nor­mally used as an anesthetic, killed at least 115 of the 750 people tak­en hostage by Chechen terrorists in a Moscow theater on Oct. 23.

Although Shevchenko didn't mention use of any other agent, German doctors reported find­ing the anesthetic halothane in body fluid samples taken from two surviving German hostages soon after rescue. Halothane is often used with fentanyl in med­ical situations.

Arms control experts say the use of fentanyl for law enforce­ment purposes probably doesn't violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Rus­sia has ratified. Its use, however, may widen existing loopholes in the 1997 treaty, which bans the use of chemical weapons in warfare.

Russian officials initially re­fused to identify—even to med­

ical personnel treating victims— the gas pumped through the the­ater's ventilation system, the con­centration deployed, or possible antidotes. While not condemn­ing the rescue operation, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Alexan­der Vershbow said that 'Svith a lit­tle more information, at least a few more of the hostages may have survived."

Jean Pascal Zanders, director of the chemical and biological warfare project at Stockholm In­ternational Peace Research In­stitute, suggests several reasons for Russia's reluctance to reveal the toxic chemical used. In addi­tion to the still prevailing culture of secrecy, he says, "Russia may fear that knowledge of what is available to its special forces may aid future terrorists." Also, he adds, Russia "may fear accounta­bility under the CWC."

Through trial and error, Rus­sian doctors found that naloxone, an opiate antagonist, reversed the effects of the then-unknown knockout gas. This fingered an opiate as the likely agent.

As anesthetics, opiates are usually administered by injec­tion and are carefully monitored. Fentanyl, however, is a rapid, short-acting, inhalable narcotic painkiller. Fentanyl-like com­pounds can induce sleep, cause nausea and vomiting, and, at high concentrations, stop respiration and circulation.

During the 1970s, in a program dubbed ARCADE, the Pentagon

researched fentanyl and its chem­ical cousins as possible riot-con­trol agents, says Matthew S. Meselson, a Harvard University molecular biologist and a chem­ical weapons expert. Edward Hammond, director of the non­profit Sunshine Project, says, "The U.S. has been looking at opi­ates as so-called incapacitating chemical weapons since at least 1994."

Meselson contends that Rus­sia's use of a toxic chemical agent in what is considered a law en­forcement situation "is arguably not a violation of the CWC." But, he adds, "the law enforcement section of the treaty, Article 11.9(d), needs to be clarified."

That section states that the use of toxic chemicals for "law en­forcement, including domestic riot-control purposes" is "not pro­hibited under this convention." Though the treaty doesn't define law enforcement, Meselson ar­gues that such actions "would re­quire applicable domestic law and the jurisdiction to enforce such law." Both conditions were met by the Moscow situation, he says.

What is unclear is whether the Moscow crisis satisfied the con­dition for domestic riot-control purposes. Article II.7 defines a ri­ot-control agent as a chemical not listed in the treaty that produces rapid disabling effects that quick­ly disappear after exposure ends. Clearly, this was not the case in the Russian situation. At press time, hundreds of victims were still hospitalized, several in seri­ous condition.

Zanders says the upcoming 2003 CWC Review Conference will likely have to "clarify the con­cepts of law enforcement as well as riot-control, peacekeeping, and antiterrorism activities that don't qualify as warfare but do require the use of nonlethal chemical weapons."—LOIS EMBER

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NEWS OF THE WEEK