INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION:

• Injunction—court order that compels a party to act or refrain from acting in some specified conduct.

(a) Equitable remedy—court offers π non-monetary relief to satisfy damages.

1. Only granted in situations where monetary awards provide inadequate compensation. E.g.: π likely derives no benefit from money where a frequent trespasser refuses to discontinue unauthorized entry on π’s property after the award.

a. Even if π benefits from money, trespass alone lacks any objectively measurable value where no physical property damage accompanies the trespass.

PURPOSE:

• Injunction serves the following purposes:

(1) Deterrence—to resolve recurring offenses not easily treated with money.

(2) Restitution—to restore π’s prior condition but for the offense otherwise unattainable by money alone.

(3) Expedience—to prevent lawsuit with an order that ends violation.

(4) Mitigation—to prevent future harm by forcing ∆’s action/restraint;

(5) Enforcement—to enforce a right violated without punishment; e.g.: breach of contract.

T Y P E S O F I N J U N C T I O N :

Injunction subdivides analytically into two categories (categories overlap):

1. Effect: a) Mandatory—order to perform specific act—may include restoration of property.

a. Rare & difficult to obtain. E.g.: injunction for ∆ to remove encroachment—i.e., obtrusive garage wall that extends several inches onto π’s property without any showing of prescriptive easement (adverse non-possessory use) from ∆. Brown v. Nelson, 55 A.D.3d 317 (2008).

b) Prohibitory—order to refrain from a specific act. E.g.: an action to enjoin the existence of encroachments on disputed property, such as construction company depositing equipment on π’s home.

2. Duration: Time of potential operation in relation to lawsuit. c) Preliminary Injunction—temporary injunction issued before or during trial to prevent irreparable injury from occurring,

which expires no later than final judgment. Purpose: To preserve status quo—prevent ∆ from becoming insolvent or halt allegedly harmful actions—and obtain immediate relief; e.g.: preventing church cemetery owner from removing several trees, fence, and buried remains of deceased pets on disputed parcel by real property owner bordering cemetery. Walsh v. St. Mary’s Church, 670 N.Y.S.2d 220, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 01933.

b) Temporary Restraining Order—ex parte—for one party’s benefit without notice to opposing party—prohibitory injunction that orders removal of encumbrance on real property. E.g.: An injunction in quiet title action for adverse possession to enjoin homebuilder from demolishing wall and commencing construction on π’s property. Parker v. Top Homes, Inc., 58 A.D.3d 817 (2009).

E L E M E N T S O F I N J U N C T I O N :

Felix v. Brand Service Group LLC, 956 N.Y. S.2d 545 (2012)—Buyer seeks preliminary injunction against seller to rescind contract, preventing release of funds into escrow where seller misrepresented deposit amounts transferred into escrow. (1) Inadequacy of Legal Remedy—courts grant injunction only where money proves inadequate. E.g.: Insolvent ∆

obligor’s outstanding debts leaves funds in escrow account irrecoverable without injunction to prevent release of funds. Felix at 547.

(2) Irreparable Injury—But for the injunction, ∆’s insolvency, at risk of bankruptcy action from outstanding tax liability, π ineluctably suffers irreparable injury because ∆ lacks finances to repay. Id. at 547.

(3) Likelihood of Success—requires more than mere conjectural possibilities—E.g.: A mere conclusory showing that plaintiff “might” suffer liability by leasing property if tenant happened to suffer injury establishes no “imminent harm” sufficient for recovery but remains “remote or speculative.” County of Suffolk v. Givens, 967 N.Y.S.2d 387 (2013). a. Suffolk accurately reasoned that “might” logically presumes only possibility, not probable/likely success,

especially concerning some hypothetical, conceivable consideration not even existing at the time of π’s claim. b. Evidence that ∆ misrepresented gross receipts, false reports, under-reported income by two sets of financial

records accompanied by a fabricated 2008 profit & loss statement most strongly supports fraud likely sufficient to succeed on preliminary injunction. Felix at 547.

(4) Balance of Hardship—courts apply a balancing test to determine whether irreparable harm outweighs burden imposed by injunction. E.g.: Since ∆’s outstanding debt may prevent π from ever recovering, assuming π ultimately prevails, the irreparable financial harm outweighs any delay ∆ may experience in paying off debt as a consequence of injunction. Id. at 548.

C A U S E S O F A C T I O N :

• Trespass—a permanent injunction to deter recurring trespass—unauthorized entry unto another’s land—from future return, preventing subsequent repeated violation.

• Rescission of Contract—buyer seeks injunction that prevents release of funds in an action to rescind contract for fraud. Felix v. Brand Service Group LLC, 956 N.Y. S.2d 545 (2012).

a. Injunctions offer an effective remedy for creditor/debtor issues where defaulting debtor lacks finances to compensate creditor. 1. E.g.: Collections cases—Lien ordered to foreclose property—forcing sale—where creditor collects from obligor in satisfying debt—

often awarded by default judgment as a final recourse where defaulting debtor disregards numerous dispatched demand letters requesting payment and/or court appearance.

• Nuisance per se—To satisfy injunction, the challenged conduct must constitute a nuisance: (1) In any location; or (2) Nuisance in particular location regardless of measure to reduce impact on surrounding landowners. a. When economic benefit significantly surpasses damages from nuisance—e.g., property damage allegedly caused by pollution producing cement plant—courts generally remain reluctant to grant injunction, awarding permanent damages as preferred remedy. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970).

• Quiet Title Actions—establishing ownership by seeking to “quiet” the title claim of another(s). (1) Adverse possession—Order person to abandon property actually, exclusively, continuously, notoriously possessed before the statutory period expires (10 years in NY); a. Order seeking to prevent removal of fixtures from property, e.g.—trees, fence, and deceased pet remains on disputed parcel. Walsh v. St. Mary’s Church, 248 A.D.2d 792. (2) Easement—order to enjoin a party from interfering with dominant estate holder’s non-possessory interest where dominant estate holder’s benefit in using the easement significantly overrides inconvenience of easement extending into servient estate holder’s property. a. Manufacturer’s interest in 38 foot easement— necessarily used for loading products onto delivery trucks—which extends into another’s property—significantly outweighs inconvenience of restricted parking space, thereby permitting injunction against interference. Shanor Elec. Supply, Inc. v. FAC Continental, LLC., 905 N.Y.S.2d 383.

E X C E P T I O N S

• Though courts generally grant injunction, courts exercise discretion.• Courts may, sua sponte, deny injunction for any of the following reasons,

including, inter alia, if:

(1) Cost of restoration exceeds diminution in value—if cost to restore property exceeds value diminished, π may unjustly enrich since the diminution in value generally reflects actual damages where court proves caused reduced property value.

(2) Award for diminution in value adequately compensates π—If π receives a money award that satisfies the proven damages suffered for diminished property value, then injunction cannot apply also without unjustly enriching π’s interest at ’s detriment.

(3) Part of restoration requires performance which may instigate future disputes between parties.

a. Rationale: A reasonably foreseeable likelihood of lawsuit following injunction attenuates the argument that irreparable harm outweighs burdens absent injunction.

CREDITS:

• http://media.pennlive.com/opinion/photo/scales-of-justice-art-c061b98727a88b2e.jpg