Ennoia and ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge F. H. Sandbach

8/13/2019 Ennoia and in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge F. H. Sandbach

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Ennoia and in the Stoic Theory of KnowledgeAuthor(s): F. H. SandbachSource: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan., 1930), pp. 44-51Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/637056 .Accessed: 10/10/2013 03:49

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ENNOIA AND IIPOAHPI2 IN THE STOIC THEORY OFKNOWLEDGE.

THE starting-point of Plutarch's dialogue de communibus notitiis is a claim madeby the Stoics that Providence sent Chrysippus to remove the confusion surroundingthe ideas of 'vvowa conception) and

wp6g.teL(preconception) before the subtleties of

Carneades were brought into play.' Unfortunately our surviving information on thesubject is so much less full than could be desired that it has again returned to anobscurity from which there are only two really detailed modern attempts to removeit. The one, by L. Stein (Erkenntnistheorie der Stoa, pp. 228-276), is most unsatisfac-tory;2 the other, by A. Bonhbffer (Epiktet und die Stoa, pp. 187-232), though of thegreatest value in many ways, is vitiated by the fact that it constructs a system fromthe use of the words by Epictetus and then attempts to attach this system to the oldStoa in the face of the evidence of the doxographers, which is emended or violentlyinterpreted to suit Epictetus. Even if Epictetus were in general a good authority forthe technicalities of Chrysippus-and in the opinion of H. von Arnim he is not3-this would not be a sound method of procedure. The only safe way is to take first

the statements which can be attached to the Old Stoa, and having obtained ourresults from these, to see whether Epictetus does in fact agree.

Bonh6ffer contends that Kov4 vvota is equivalentto rrpd~X#l (though finally he

restricts it to the most general part of a preconception, that actually brought toconsciousness in the mind of every human being); and that rrpoXIpubEs, hich are'spermatically' inborn and develop independently of any sense-impressions, onlyoccur in the restricted field of moral conceptions and conceptions of the divine. Theunsatisfactory nature of this scheme is most easily shown by a piece of evidence withwhich he was not acquainted.4 This is from the work of Alexander de mixtione,SVF II. 473: Tb 8 aJrvcas

TL Samopa~s dEaL 7, JLEwS WrELp~raL sc. Chrysippus)WTLO-TOVO-OTaL cL~ WjV KOLV&)V EYYOL&W) J~cXLYT~CL E KPLT-qPLct r~~ chLX-qElcL ~yLcv 7j~ w~ap~i ri

4o0XrEWafELvacv'aS. If wpoXh5bgEsnd KOLvaV 'vvoLaL are equivalent, then Chrysippus

did not restrict them, whatever Epictetus may have done,5 to the moral andtheological field.

There is need, therefore, for a new consideration of this part of the Stoic theoryof knowledge, namely the conception, gvvota, and its subdivision rpo'Xrtt.I. The starting-point of the discussion must be the generally accepted identity ofKOLV1 vvota and wpo6Xrb

6 The evidence usually quoted consists of two passageswhich are supposed to show that preconceptions are universal and therefore KOLVCU

EvvoLaL. One is from Seneca, Ep. 117, 6: 'multum dare solemus praesumptioni(= rpoXAtet) omnium hominum et apud nos ueritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus

1 1059C: rav 7repi rds 7rpoX4?fELS KacL 7r9 zVolasrdpaXOZ dc?eXaw 7LZ7radrat KGa &opO cas Kc67rrVKaL

O-tLoEVOSELS TO OKELOV.

2 See e.g. the opinions of H. von Arnim,Deutsche Litteraturzeitung, 1888, p. i6; A. Bon-h6ffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, IV.-V.; E. Bevan,Stoics and Sceptics, p. 6.

3 SVF (=Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta) XVII.,Epictetus, Musonius, Seneca, 'ad Chrysippum

restituendum nullum fere usum praebent.'4 S VF was, of course, not available when he

wrote.

6 Evidence given later will show that therestriction does not hold even for Epictetus.

6 E.g. Zeller, Geschichte der griechischen Philo-sophie4, III. i. 76. (All following references toZeller are to this volume.) Ueberweg-Praechter,Geschichte der Philosophiel2, I. 418.

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F. H. SANDBACH 45

uideri'; the other is from Plutarch, comm. not. io6oa: '-~s vvolac Ki 7w-~

rpOh/ELS 7~KOLVa. . .. 4 iv VLcLXTR7a r7V aLpErLv . . . (the verb is lost in a lacuna).

The natural interpretation of these passages is that some wpoX35i/Ea are notuniversal. For if all

WpoXjbELare

universal, why should anyone take the trouble toadd 'omnium hominum' or i% KOLVaS? But these additions are not uncommon;Sextus, reproducing Stoic syllogisms, says EH'o-s ( YE KaRL rs KoLVa EvvoaF

KcLWrpoXThbEs rrvrov dvpirrop v

do--TL7rl(adv. M. IX. I24, SVF II. 1017). Plutarch

regularly uses the expression at KoLvaL rrpoIEL~s (IO4If, lo73d, Io74f). Epictetus(Diss. IV. i. 42) speaks of ra& wpoXAEL~~ r&S KOLvdS. Alexander de mixtione (SIVF II.475) shows that the theory of KPco-~L &' (XvOY is rapi 7& KOLVcL rrpoXpLb,. From suchpassages the natural inference is that just as of EvvocaL ome only were universal, soit was with wpoX'AELs; the non-universal preconceptions whose existence we shouldinfer, we actually find in Plutarch, comm. not. Io84d: XX& ca3ra t v rapa r& KOLV

L

/LadCovacL 7rpoX

.

eEs EKELva ('Sy rrapa 7rs 8la,l and Io8Ib: TEo-r rrCvT) rTL rrEpt rv

d~O'todKVKaL

o'OtfcT-ro&vav;roL;

Tapc7lTEO-Oap rPOXkbELS.It might be objected that Plutarch used the word in a popular un-Stoical way.But it is just from Plutarch's use of it in Io6oa and from a similar use in Seneca thatthe very idea has been drawn that for a Stoic all preconceptions were universal.Further, as far as I know, no ancient author ever suggests that there was anypeculiarity in the meaning attached to the word by Chrysippus; if there had been, itwould have been a likely ground for an attack in de communibus notitiis (cf. Io84f:VvoLcr oVrOGv wRap ii vvoios

VrrOTLrEVraL,and Io73c:

wpdLlO-,oLEcAXXo vvv q rTv aCIpE(oLV

au;7V E'XYXOIIEV OV;TE rrWLOvoOrrpc~ytacUtv

o OV';otLLXu7/CLEVOL VdOVOao'L rL

KOLVO.SEKo-Tpovo'EOaV

,vvo,;a;).

But we have still to reckon with the evidence ofEpictetus.

Diss. I. xxii.openswith the statement: rrpoXujEL;

KOLVaU lrw-'LVv pdrropLS

El'v.2The context shows that

he is thinking of the preconceptions of the good, the beautiful and other simple moralideas. As an example he quotes: &-

'rb 8&KcLOV KcaXdv(TT Kcl irpTrov.3 That hisphrase must be limited to such things he shows himself, for in other places he speaksof wpoXujbEL; which we cannot believe are universal, e.g. rrpd6Xryb 70-o

KvvouTo,(III. xxii. I). Epictetus' statement is, then, inconsistent with his own use of theword; there is no reason for believing it to be consistent with that of theOld Stoa.4

We thus see that the evidence by which it is sought to prove the identity ofrpd6Xrphb and

KOLV)VVOta is quite insufficient, and that some of it points to a directly

opposite conclusion. The interpretation of the doxographical evidence, which willbe considered next, is greatly simplified by the abandoning of this supposedequivalence.

1 Cf. the parallel expression in Io62a: o0L6vov r-aph r&s KOLV&S vvoaS cLtXoo0oV7wo'r&v X&Kar 7TitiarS KUKL

iT'JV.2 The same thing is implied in II. xi. 2 in asimilar context. Bonhbffer also quotes, in adifferent connexion (p. 220), Nemesius 203=deanima hominis, Migne, Vol. XL. 661, voULK'&

hi

Xi'yoev ivvolasrcs d~ds&iKT5Os irUL

irpooodaas,dis 7d

eiat Oebv. But the thoughts here are not so muchStoic as Platonic; the point under discussion istlvod/zr/o't

3 Cf. IV. i. 44.4 Bonh6ffer attempts (p. 198) to explain away

the inconsistency. He is not very intelligible,but seems to be driven here as elsewhere to theassumption that Epictetus did not always use the

word in its proper meaning.5 We may notice that when the context makes

the meaning clear i irpb6Xu~s is used to mean u

KOL1V rp6Xu9tas, e.g. Plutarch, comm. not. 1o75e:irpds rv 'E'riKovpov o0h8v droXEi7rovcL 7rG v payxCiro&w(dv oihevi,

ypa/incirwvWyttenbach) 1o6 io0 pei qeO

/oov rE s av

oUyXov7ra7y iv 7riV Oediv irp6Xutv (cf.

Io75a). This is exactly paralleled by the very

frequent use of i7 gvvota= oKOLV vvoLta (rap& 7rivvvodoiv EO7LY 1073d, Io77a, Io77e, etc., 7rs repi

OEV dvvolas 0lo76a, o-XyrXta iroteyv rdv 'EriKovpov

Xdoovo' Kai /L3iceoOact 7r ivvolaSIo82e). It is

probably this usage of irp6Xujts that accounts forthe persistence of the view that all preconcep-tions are universal.



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46 F. H. SANDBACH

II. Diocles Magnes (in Dio. L. VII. 54) defines rpd6Xrp s as a 'natural concep-tion of the general characteristics of a thing' (i'vvoLa vo-LKrj r-v KaLXov).1 It is thusopposed to the 1lov

rd6'oorLs,which was, according to the Stoics, the essence of a

definition.2 This, then, is onedistinguishing

mark of the preconception; it is anundeveloped conception, as opposed to the thought-out definition. For example theStoics said that all men preconceived the gods as immortal and blessed and benevo-lent;3 but their definition was a development of this: ^ov dO4varov XoyLKbV 7XELOV ;voEpov Ev EV&pLovli. KK~KO1

wravTO ,

dVETWIEKT7LKOVWpOVOy?TLKOV KOO'&Ouv

7E KRLL7V

V, K00L9) /(SVF II. 10o2I sqq.).Preconception is limited by Diocles to conceptions that are natural. What

these are we have to try to gather from a mutilated passage of Aetius (Plac. IV. 1=SVF II. 83): 6'ray

yE.vvyeO76 LvOpo(o,

EXE-T

q}fOVLK)V7pO

/xO'(TrrtEp

XapVrhv EVEpyovEl. drrTOYpa7V.

ESr070ro Jlav EKdO Trv

r'ovEvvoLv

EvarroypaT'rat.

'pJoJ,3

7r ,vaypcLsrp4

ow0,t

Jrv

alo'Oowv

ao'aOlEvo,yc;p TLvos otoV

EVKOV,rLEXOOrVTo acLVoT bLv7JJLJv EXov v . 'ral' 8E O/LOELSELS rwoXXaL Lvj fat 7EvouiVaL TOTE d fLEY

i'XELV ELLgrEplav E[LWEple yap ETL T 7TWvo6/oELv OVa rVrTwXv WrUO* *** 7 v8V EVVOLWv

at /LEV 4VOLKOJ~ lVOV7c(L K.Tc TOVU E p'17/LEVOVS 7pOrrOVS KL VErLTEXVTWS a E r)

*7fLETipas 8&XOKaXlaK KLL ErL/LEXELLS cVTcaL 1LLV OYV EVVOLCLL KcLXoVV7LL AdvOV, EKEVaL KaL

WpOXqjLELs.0 6E XdyOS KclO OV E71pocr op?urvLEdcL XOYLKOL EK 7TV 7tpOX 7EwV (Tp.X~r pO%(T

XEElJaLKL-

77-Vr-p&'rTv ~0popda. The plural Ipdrovs shows that something hasfallen out after rhXOos, nd it is supposed that originally the passage resembled onein Diocles Magnes (Dio. L. VII. 52=SVF II. 87): r1v yap voovLvEv i- cLvaL-V7rrpl~?rTocrv 8JO~1 7~~ KaO' 4L0L6np)a Ta bE KcL-3 cLvcLXoyW.V Ta 6 KcL7L ,LEa8crLOLv T(

Ka7OVOE'LV

d, Ka, ErV(V7VLwLV

(then follow examples), KaLKcXT- [JE7C(rCO'IV 1rvc

CSt

AK KLL 0 TOS * L 8tLVOELCLL &KCLLOV TL Kat WcO V Kcl KLT(T O E'OLV OLOY

aXELp. Here rwEpurrmoTo'corresponds to 4LsrEpla in Aetius,4 and the following modes

to those there omitted, but summarized as -rosEApy'~vov,

rpdnrovs.5 The two passagestogether give a perfectly consistent account of a preconception as the first conceptionof a thing, arrived at without special mental attention, and derived either directly or

1 A difficult phrase; Bonhbffer tries to connect

rd& Kca6Xov with conceptions not derived from

experience, as being less definite than those thatare. This is connected with his theory of therestriction of preconceptions to the moral field,which is, as we shall see, certainly false. Stein

(p. 511) gives the impossible rendering, 'dieiiberall waltende Weltordnung.'2 For the general idea of this distinction cf.

Galen in SVF II. 229: Pdpj@LE o0v acldts a-b rwv

&VVO7lzCTLKa

V 8pwv oi)s 0oV'Ca/ULEV

p/lYEvELEw 'TrXovWv UravrES ?vLOpWeot U'C$KOUCLY . .. o. o&

01E.LVO27rep L Sr7rpoJ0yoplas o06' 6povus dtoaov, dXX'broypag8r 7e Kal

irroT7r3ELtS' d6VOtdiELV.

SCf. Plutarch, comm. not. Io75e and Stoic. rep.

Io5Ie.

arepLzrr~cs'

is rather an obscure word; who-ever introduced it to Greek philosophy, it didnot remain the technical term of any one school.

It occurs in Epicurean doctrine (Dio. L. X. 32):drivoLcat ~raac 46rcT v alcCT ewvYyey6VacLt KCaT TE

repirr7WoLW KocL&vaXoyiav Kai 6t0o6r177-t Kal cr6veoftv,

cvJfpaXXoLdvovr 70ro Xoycoipo, and Sextus uses it

as if it were a generally accepted notion (adv. M.VIII. 56). Cicero appears to translate it by' usu'(Fin. III. 33, see below). It must be connectedwith

repairmrroWin the neutral sense ' meet with,'

and seems to have meant 'direct experience,' asappears from the non-philosophical examplesquoted in Liddell and Scott: Hippocrates 26, i,KaraTcLV Tdv XoyLtcYdv 6v rEp LK 71EptLrT&LOS

rodl'rat r7v CipXYv, lutarch, QN. 918c, ro6TWY 8&(certain cures) orTe ) wrpca

KraLErpirTWroS yyovPEv acTro0s (thewild beasts that

use them in case of need). To separate thephilosophical examples from these, and to makethe subject of the verb wreptrirW implied in

irplrrrwcrsnot the man but his cavraoLa, is un-

necessary, though done by Bonhoffer (' Anfall andie Sinne') and in the latest edition of Epicurus(' by the fitting of one experience on to another'C. Bailey, Epicurus, p. 415).5 The plural rp6rovr has also been explainedas meaning twgjlgv Kcdl tLprEplaV Diels, Doxogra hiGraeci, p. 400). Aetius is then committed to astatement of obvious incompleteness. The ex-

planation given above supposes no inaccuracies,and is in accord, for what that may be worth,with Cicero, Ac. II. 30 (= Antiochus, see Zeller,619, n. 2): 'cetera (sc. uisa) autem similitudini-bus (= KaO'6tot6rb77a) onstruit (sc. mens) quibusefficiuntur notitiae rerum quas Graeci tum ivvolastum 7rpoXCt/Ers

uocant.'



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ENNOIA AND IIPOAHXPIE 47

by some simple and unconscious mental operation from the data given by thesenses.

This straightforward interpretation could not be adopted by anyone who believed

preconceptions to be universally held. There must be many conceptions that cannotpossibly be universal, yet arise naturally from experience, and ought therefore,according to Aetius, to be preconceptions. Thus the champion of the rule thatpreconceptions are universal must assume, as Bonh6ffer does, that Aetius entirelymisses the difference between conception and preconception. On our explanation nosuch assumption is required.

III. Bonh6ffer had two other reasons for not accepting the evidence of Aetius:he supposed preconceptions to have been limited to fundamental ideas of morals andreligion, and he thought that they were inborn in potentiality, or 'spermatically' ashe put it.

There seems, as it happens, to be no case in which it can be shown that a

member of the Old Stoa spoke of a preconception of anything but the gods. Forpreconceptions of natural objects we have to go to Epictetus, who uses the phrasesprp6JrLs

4


6/9

48 F. H. SANDBACH

Chrysippus said of his account of good and evilXdXcra &rrew1EaL)rv EJlrbrToV

rrpoX?)Eov (SVF III. 69). All depends on what meaning we are to give to ~4vroS.The orthodox view is that it cannot mean 'inborn,' as this is contrary to all the other

evidence. Although i'ptwvro does frequently mean 'inborn,' there are a certain numberof cases where it means 'ingrown,'' ingrained,' as Isocrates 222A, Euripides fr. 377

(70-o rwovroie 'oTro3' 4I'vurov), or 'implanted,' as in James I. 21: &ioa'OE T-v

I't4vurovXoyov TV 3VVMEVOV o-rJrat -&s /v3~3tp

v. It is not necessary, then, to take

Ek'wov0oas meaning inborn. Further, as the following paragraphs will show, what

evidence we have on the origin of ideas of good does not in any way suggest thatanything inborn played any part. In spite of this, it is difficult to feel confident thatChrysippus did not mean 'inborn' when he wrote the word. But if he did, it wasbut a temporary aberration.

The other passage advanced in support of the idea that moral preconceptionsare in some way a priori and not derived from experience is the sentence of Diocles(see above): pWo-LKw~ ?VOE7tL KacLOv L KaL dyJYaO6v. onhiffer interprets this asopposing to the preceding modes of conception, which are all ultimately basedon sense, a natural mode not so based. This explanation leads at once to acontradiction with Cicero, Fin. III. 33 (SVF III. 72): 'cumque rerum notiones'(= 'vvota) in animis fiant, si aut usu (= KOaRT

rEplrrrwoov)liquid cognitum sit aut

coniunctione(=Ka-r ao'vO8~Erv) ut similitudine (=KaO' Afotor/7ra)

aut collationerationis (= iur' JvaXoylav), hoc quarto quod extremum posui boni notitia facta est.cum enim ab iis rebus quae sunt secundum naturam ascendit animus collationerationis, turn ad notionem boni peruenit. hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessioneneque crescendo (= aZr/tK;Ks) aut cum ceteris comparando sed propria ui sua etsentimus et

appellamusbonum.'

BonhSffer explainsthat this

passageof Cicero

refers not to the first conception of the good, to the rrpdA6X7s rdyaOo^, but to adevelopment of this conception. This is unconvincing in itself, and made impossibleby the similar passage in Seneca, Ep. 120, 4 sqq. Here on the question 'quomodoad nos prima boni honestique notitia peruenerit,' Seneca says 'nobis uideturobseruatio collegisse (sc. speciem uirtutis) et rerum saepe factarum inter se collatio:per analogian nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum iudicant.'2 In point of factthis passage of Cicero supplies the clue to the word qvo-tLJK in Diocles. First itmust be noticed that the sentence /o,-LKw9 8~VO6VO tIaLdV r KaLI yaO6v is introducedas a kind of postscript to the original list. Now the examples that Diocles givesunder the heading Ka7' ivaXoylav are as follows: K~a7'dvXoylav 6 aOV TtKWS LV iS~ Ttrv~; Kai K-6KXWo, LEUO7LKO); ~(i)S 0 HV7LctY~iOS, KcLL 70 KEV73POV 77jS 7?7SKLLT JvaXoylavEvorj7O rcb rv twtKpOT'PWV op aLtpmv.

But Cicero expressly guards against supposingthat the good is conceived by any of these methods (' crescendo' corresponds to theexample of the Cyclops, 'cum ceteris comparando' to the example of the small balls,and no one would suppose that the good was conceived by 'diminution '). Just so,whoever made the addition to the original list in Diocles noticed that the good,though conceived 'by analogy,' was not covered by any of the examples given;accordingly he supplied the sentence under discussion, meaning by uvo-tKJs whatCicero calls 'propria ui sua' (and later 'genere non magnitudine'). We recognizethe good through the force of its own nature.3

1 Whether called an hvvola or rrp6X'pis thething meant is the same (cf. Aetius, KEiVtLEKalurpoXkips, quoted at beginning of Section II.).The translations are those given by von Arnim.The index to SVF gives notitia=iirurjr y,

butthough it may sometimes bear this meaningCicero usually employs it as a synonymfor notio.

2 It is true that Seneca says: ' natura seminascientiae dedit, scientiam non dedit.' But in allthat follows no place is given to any inborn ideasin the formation of the conception of the good.The 'semina' seem to be the facts observed.

3 It may be noted that no trace of innate pre-conceptions is to be found in Panaetius' accountof the formation of moral ideas, reproduced by



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ENNOIA AND llPOAHPJIE 49

It must be admitted that when we come to examine Epictetus he can hardly beinterpreted otherwise than as believing in 'inborn' preconceptions, but it is notjustifiable to transfer this to the orthodox Stoics of the third century. Between

Chrysippusand

Epictetuslie the but

half-charted waters of the syncretism of thefirst century, the results of which we find in Cicero. Stoicism affects Platonism, asin Tusc. I. 57, where Cicero speaks in an account of the Phaedo of 'insitas et quasiconsignatas in animis (= Ivarr-cpayto-piras) notiones, quas

ivvoCa uocant'; andPlatonism gave to Stoicism a belief in inborn conceptions, as in N.D. II. 12: 'omni-bus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos . . Cleanthes quidemnoster quattuor de causis dixit in animis informatas deorum esse notiones.' The fourcauses are various classes of natural phenomena, but the inconsistency between thisand 'innatum' Cicero does not observe or else neglects.

The effect of Platonism on the mind of Cicero, or on that of the authors of hissources, is seen in the metaphors which he uses in speaking of conceptions, even

where he purports to be reproducing Stoic ideas. To Chrysippus a preconception,though it might be incomplete as an account of a thing, was perfectly clear as far asit went.' But Cicero, with memories of

dvctLvyo-Ls,used metaphors which imply that

the' notio' contains the whole truth but is but dimly seen, through being in dark-ness or covered up; Tusc. IV. 53: of all the Stoic definitions of bravery, 'quae nonaperit notionem nostram quam habemus omnes de fortitudine, tectam atque inuolu-tam ?' Off. III. 76: 'complicatam notionemn euoluere;' 8I: 'explica atque excuteintellegentiam tuam.'

V. So farrrpdt6X~b has been treated as if it were a technical term peculiar to theStoic school. In point of fact we are told by Cicero that the word was invented by

Epicurus for an idea which till then had no name (N.D. I.44).

This has been un-reasonably called into question, mainly on the ground that there is a difference inmeaning between the Stoic and Epicurean terms which makes an independent originprobable.2 The chief of these supposed differences are that the Stoic

rrpdXhbLis

common to all mankind, and that it is confined to moral and religious conceptions,whereas the Epicurean may be individual and is in no way restricted in subject.From what has been said above, it will be seen that this rests on a misconception ofthe Stoic

rpdkX~b.Also, had there been a difference in the meaning of the word as

used by Stoics and Epicureans, some ancient would surely have mentioned it. As itis, the word is constantly used in the disputes between all the schools, without anysuggestion that the parties meant different things by the term. What difference

Polybius VI. 6 (Schmekel, Die mittlere Stoa,p. 64 sqq.). This agrees with Cicero and Senecain making them rest on the observation of goodand evil actions, and ends airy KaXoOKac GLKaiOV

7rpr~77-rap' dv6pCirOLt KCL7&

r'LVVVOLca. Innate

preconceptions are equally lacking in the Posi-donian passage in Aetius, Plac. I. 6, headedrTb0ev OePv rvvotav eXa/ov &vOpworot

(SVF II. 1oog).Panaetius and Posidonius were both PlatonizingStoics, who, had their predecessors believed ininnate preconceptions, would scarcely havesuppressed the notion. A very similar account

of how early man won the conception of divinityis given by Dio Prus. XII. 27 sqq. Though theobservation of nature is the only method hementions, he does not hesitate to call the result-ing conception UC/Vros; cf. especially c. 39: rhVt4uvrov &iraccvw dvOpdj-rots ~7rivotcav acr&ov ,yvo-dv'qvl r&3v UpyvJ. Plutarch, comm. not. Io7oc-d,

may perhaps be relevant to this question. There

he enquires whether any theory has done greateroutrage to normal feeling than that of the Stoicsabout the good, KaL rauRa,

he continues, v 70ro?IrEpL dyaGiv KaZ KaKWV a pe7rGV e

Kai LEVcKTrwOiKELWV TE KaL dOXXorpiOv & OCVXXOV a6eL OEpp v [re]Kai /vxpwv XEVKWKVe KIa /.eXdYVo Oc/txOrEpOV eXELVTr7V fVdpYetav KeIVWV l~

Yp E0w V ELOLVcaLOavrrcitat ras aloi'O;cr't 6reto6&ot, raCra

8' dK rVj

dyaOrv-Gv 4v ZvLrhpVurov yXeLr'v yIveCvT.

ButI am uncertain of the meaning of the lastsentence, and uncertain whether Plutarch ishere confuting the Stoics out of their own mouths

or not.1 It must have been a cpavraaia KaraXrTLK'rK:cf. Antipater's use of the word ivcdpyeca, con-sidered below.

2 L. Stein, Epiktet und die Stoa, pp. 248-250.He also alleges that Cicero is an untrustworthywitness.

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50 F.H. SANDBACH

there is lies not in the meaning of the word, but in the accounts given of the originof the thing denoted. For Epicurus wp6r-l~ only

arises by the way of memory, bythe coincidence of several presentations of the same object: the Stoics, while retain-

ing this method, also introduced as possible waysof

forming -poXrjesthe other

simple mental operations, dva)oyla and the rest.In a passage already quoted Plutarch uses the phrase 7-v rEp; 7-s

spoXg#EL~KaL-dS IvvoLaS 7dpaXov deEXwv comm. not. 1o59c). The nature of this confusion can onlybe guessed, but the Epicurean origin of the word suggests that its first use by theStoics may have been in argument against the Epicureans.1 They used 'the pre-conceptions of all men' to support their own views on the nature of the gods. Thefirst Stoics probably denied that it supported Epicureans, and claimed that in fact itwas in accordance with their own views. If this line of argument is first attested for

Chrysippus, it is so obvious that it must have presented itself to his predecessors. Inthis way there would come into use a term, rpXrgS, for which no place had been

made in the Zenonian theory of knowledge. We can imagine Arcesilaus and hisfollowers turning on the Stoics and demanding from them definitions of this newterm, distinctions between it and the familiar EvvoLa.

A quotation from Cleanthes suggests another way in which difficulty may havearisen. Among the causes which he gave to account for the origin of the conception of the

gods we find ' tertiam quae terreret animos fulminibus, tempestatibus, nimbis, niuibus,grandinibus, uastitate, pestilentia,' and by many kinds of portents, 'quibus exterritihomines uim quandam esse caelestem et diuinam suspicati sunt.' It seems thatCleanthes is giving an historical account of the origin of the conception of the godswithout any idea that this primitive conception may be used as evidence of their

qualities.Thus he allows that men should think of the gods as terrible and harm-

ful.2 It is significant that no parallel to this argument of Cleanthes is found in anyother Stoic writer.3

VI. This discussion of the word wrpd6X?,

may be concluded4 by a considerationof an idea which has some points of similarity, namely, ivipypa. In Chapter 38 ofde Stoicorum repugnantiis, side by side with the 'conception' of the gods, we find an

vapyea appealed to. The fragment is from Antipater and runs as follows: 'Wewill give a brief account of the ivipyea which we have about God. We conceive ofa god as a blessed being, incorruptible and beneficent.' This EvdpypEa

tallies exactlywith the wrp6Xsb of a god.

The origin of the word appears to be, like that of wrp6dX)b, Epicurean. Epicurus

was of opinion that we must trust our gavrao-la because of their clearness.5 By atransference of meaning :vipyea was used to mean a favracria.6 As far as I know,

the word does not occur in any fragment of any Stoic earlier than Antipater,7 and it isat least possible that he is using the word because he is attacking the Epicureans for

denying beneficence to the gods.

1 The idea that it was borrowed to meet theattacks of the Academy seems less likely; for

they were concerned chiefly with the validity of

sense-impressions, in support of which precon-ception, and particularly the Epicurean precon-ception, based only on the accumulation of

sense-impressions, would have been of little orno use.

2 Cf. SVF II. 1115: 'phebv 'EriKovpov It?OXLoTa

diXEraL (sc. Xp6roL7ros)Ka ?p0rp 3 civaLpovGras

T7rVrp6VOaJ dCrb 7TV uVVOLWVjs Xopiev rEpt OleGv,

ElEpyE7LK)olj Kai ~LXav pc 7rovUr.LvooOlVTEs.3 A. C. Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and

Cleanthes, p. 284.

I have nothing to say on the subject of

7rp6Xprp/sas a test of truth. The correct inter-

pretation seems to me to have been given by E.Brdhier, Chrysipfe, p. o103.

5 Cf. Ep. ad Men. 123: OEol /EV yapErlv.l

d'apyfy yhp alb)Tv iYTLv' yVWGet.

6Usener, Epicurea 247=Sextus,

adv. M. VII.

203: T.1 ia/XvrcTaav

(V) K Vi pyELaV KaXrEL. Zeller,

III. i. 401, n. 3, calls this an 'eigentiimlicheBezeichnung.'

7 It is not entered at all in the Index to S VF.Yet E. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, pp. 35, 37, talks

of enargeia in explaining Zeno.



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ENNOIA AND HIPOAHPII 51

But at some time or another the Stoics did adopt the word just as they hadadopted pXpdXys; Posidonius uses the adjective hvapy~s (apud Galen H. et P., p. 400,Miiller), and in Plutarch comm. not. Io83c the Stoics appear as of Wp6d&KO07T vapy da0o70o. It was easy enough for the Stoics to adopt the word, because by AvipyEaEpicurus meant to denote just that quality of a xvrarcla which Zeno denoted by theword KaTaXyrW1LK4, that quality which makes a man feel certain of its truth. Epicurusexpressed this actively, making the presentation real enough to command belief;Zeno passively, making it real enough to be capable of being firmly grasped by themind.'

The words ivapy~s, ;vpyELa provide a good example of the way the schoolsborrowed one another's vocabulary, for not only did the Stoics take them from theEpicureans, but the later Academy took them over also; Philo of Larisa agreed thatsome things had this clearness and were certainly true, though he denied that clear-ness implied comprehensibility, as the Stoics maintained.2

F. H. SANDBACH.TRINITY COLLEGE,

CAMBRIDGE.

1 This interpretation of the word KaTraXryrTtKis well upheld by E. Brdhier, Chrysippe, pp. 8o-ioo. The famous phrase ~p6vov oxVyl

T( 7ptXvXa/pciveTrat s definitely put down to younger Stoics

by Sextus, adv. M. VII. 257, and is not applied toevery cavracila KacaXT7rTLK?, but to such as 'con-tain no obstacle.'

2 Zeller, p. 616, n. 2: Cicero, Ac. II. 34.

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