NOTE STRAT - MRO Aerospace - v2 - SIA Lab · operational business support with actionable...

σtrategic notes

December 2014

I n t e l l i g e n c e i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g

By Etienne Daum and Axel Dyèvre Translation by Ciarán Carey

Aerospace MRO

A key issue of capability-based planningof the Armed Forces

CEIS I 2013 I Aerospace MRO "2

Les notes stratégiques

Policy Papers – Research Papers

The content of this study does not reflect the official opinion of CEIS. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the study lies entirely with the author.


CEIS is a strategic consulting firm Our mission is to assist our clients in defining their strategies and developing their activities in France and abroad. In order to achieve this goal, we combine foresight approach and operational business support with actionable information to support decision-making and action. .

CEIS’ Defence and Security activity gathers sector-specific expertise and involves more than twenty consultants and analysts who have access to an international network of hundreds of experts and organisations.

Based in Brussels, CEIS - European Office advises and assists European and national, public and private actors in the development of their European strategies, in particular in the fields of defence & security, transport, energy and maritime affairs. CEIS - European Office also takes part in European research projects in these areas. To carry out all of its missions, the team relies on an extensive European network of contacts, experts and partners.

The DGA Lab (www.sia-lab.fr) has been implemented and is led by CEIS, with Sopra Group. This innovative concept of the French Ministry of Defence aims to identify, test, and demonstrate off-the-shelf technological bricks stemming from innovative SMEs and industrial players.


http://www.sia-lab.fr

The DGA Lab brings together end-users from the MoD and potential solution providers. It is also a space for brainstorming and discussion aimed at better understanding user needs and requirements as well as ensuring the suitability of the presented solutions.

Contact : Axel Dyèvre

[email protected]

CEIS 280, boulevard St Germain F-75007 Paris +33 1 45 55 00 20

CEIS - European Office Boulevard Charlemagne, 42 B-1000 Brussels +32 2 646 70 43

SIA Lab 40, rue d’Oradour-sur-Glâne F-75015 Paris +33 1 84 17 82 77

www.ceis.eu www.sia-lab.fr


mailto:[email protected]

http://www.ceis.eu

http://www.sia-lab.fr

Index INDEX 6 ....................................................................................................................................

FOREWORD 7 ..........................................................................................................................

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 .........................................................................................................

INTRODUCTION 12 ....................................................................................................................

AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL MRO MARKET 14 .....................................................................

TYPES OF ACTIVITY OF THE MAINTENANCE SECTOR 15 .....................................................................

THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CHECKS 18 .........................................................................................

MILITARY MRO 20 ......................................................................................................................

THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT 21 .................................................................................................

PARTICULARITIES OF MILITARY MRO 23 ........................................................................................

MRO, A FUNCTION AT THE HEART OF THE CAPABILITY-BASED PLANNING OF MILITARY FORCES 26 ...........

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTS OF “POTENTIAL” AND “AVAILABILITY” 28 ............................................

THE NEED TO TRANSCEND A PURELY THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION OF POTENTIAL AND AVAILABILITY 30 ...

IMPROVING AEROSPACE MRO: CHALLENGES 31 ....................................................................

AVOIDING DOGMATIC APPROACHES 31 .........................................................................................

THE TRAP LAID FOR MANAGEMENT BY SUSTAINABILITY 33 .................................................................

ACTIVITIES, A NEW FRAME OF REFERENCE TO MANAGE AVAILABILITY 35 ...............................................

THE CONCEPT OF ACTIVITY 36 ....................................................................................................

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE 37 ........................................................

AN ENGINEERING PROCESS TO OVERCOME SHORTCOMINGS IN PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE 39 .................

GLOBALISATION, SEGMENTATION AND “MAINSTREAMING” 39 ............................................................

DIFFERENTIATED APPROACHES OF INTEGRATION 40 .........................................................................

THE EXAMPLE OF SPECIFIC FLEETS AND TRAINING 42 .......................................................................

WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE WITH OUTSOURCING? 43 .....................................................................

INTEGRATING A LOGISTICS PROVIDER 44 ........................................................................................

BALANCING BETWEEN OPERATIONAL RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC RATIONALITY 45 ...............................

RECENT PUBLICATIONS 48........................................................................................................


Foreword “Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) is a battle which we cannot afford to lose.” General Jean-Paul Paloméros Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, NATO Former Chief-of-Staff, French Air Force October 2010

“Logisticians are people about whom we talk too little.” Gwendal Rouillard, Member of Parliament (France) Presentation to the Committee for National Defence and the Armed Forces, French Parliament, of the report on the French military posture in Africa

The issue of Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) in aerospace occupies minds and has occupied many column inches in a succession of reports, projects and audits produced by General Staffs of the Armed Forces, parliamentary commissions and Courts of Auditors, not to mention consulting firms.

Given both the importance and the complexity of the subject, it seemed useful to reframe the context, recall the concepts, definitions and fundamentals of MRO, without which a genuine understanding of the issue would be illusory.

The idea is to reframe MRO within an operational logic and the joint coherence of all of the Armed Forces. The objective is to understand the constraints and points of view of each actor.


Note on Translation

Given that this paper in its original form was largely based on the French experience of MRO, many of the terms and acronyms will be derived from the French language and more specifically from the terminology used by the French Ministry of Defence and the French Armed Forces.

Where possible, every effort has been made to translate these terms and acronyms into English using their nearest British or American equivalents. Upon their first appearance in the text, French acronyms will be explained and translated into English. Thereafter, we will continue to use the French acronym to denote primarily French concepts and entities, providing explanations where required, and we will also use international equivalents where appropriate.

Note on the Authors

Etienne Daum, Luc Viellard, Vincent Paternoga, consultants for CEIS, have originally written this paper in French.

This updated and English version has been written by Etienne Daum and Axel Dyèvre, consultants for CEIS, and translated by Ciarán Carey.


Executive Summary From all of the research and interviews conducted, key lessons learned have emerged.

Operational capability as a priority

First and foremost, however self-evident it may appear, operational capability must drive MRO and structural competencies. MRO must be integrated as early as the program design phase into any attempt to achieve greater operational capability.

In this respect, an MRO forward-planning exercise must be developed. The capability-based approach cannot do without a forward-planning exercise, as MRO is a major keystone of all capabilities. The industry must be associated with this forward-planning exercise.

In order to overcome teething problems in preventive maintenance and to resolve the problem of over-maintenance, new operating models must be invented for which the industry, associated to the forward-planning, can propose solutions, even if experimental.


Maintenance logistics constitute a critical field for the performance of aeronautical MRO in which margins of progress are substantial. Here too,

the role of the industry must be considered with the exploration of new models which should not rule out the possibility of global contracts.

Balance between Industries and Armed Forces

The technical availability of hardware and equipment depends on a balance between the industries and the Armed Forces. It is a case of monitoring the 1

performance of the ‘aviation MRO’ system as a whole. As regards the industrial pillar, the balance must rest upon:

• The private sector, within which manufacturers must transcend their economic models and genuinely take an interest in MRO, above all in going beyond the ten year lifespan of a programme (ref: the question of obsolescence) and in improving the quality of their services;

• The military aircraft MRO arm pillar, which is a necessary structure, notably for the taking into consideration of specific fleets and above all the maintenance of a bridge with the Level 1 maintenance level achieved by the Armed Forces. It too must improve its performance in the upgrade and availability of systems, subsystems, aircraft, etc.

The emergence of genuine overall project managers, covering all maintenance-related domains or even the entire hardware programme (design, development, production and service support) remains an area where improvement can be made. This modus operandi must be reconsidered, notably by learning lessons from the few attempts made on occasions when new aircraft were brought into service.

The question of outsourcing cannot be addressed globally as the specificities of each weapons system; their usage and their use in overseas expeditions are such that the possibilities for industrial action on site must be treated on a case-by-case basis.

Ultimately, the proportion of the industry in the MRO supply chain continues to grow as the Armed Forces change their vision in this field, adopting a more pragmatic posture even as further progress can yet be made.

Should they be private or State owned.1


Contracting strategy

Finally, any study of MRO entails questioning the contracting strategy of the Armed Forces:

• What is the contracting strategy?

• Does it cover all its needs?

• Do the Armed Forces have one single overall industrial strategy, which integrates the possession of hardware and not only its acquisition and the maintenance during its entire lifecycle time span of a corresponding Defence Technological and Industrial Base?

• Is the industry itself ready to contribute to a genuine dialogue on this overall industrial strategy?


In the end, capability-based planning and the physical-financial coherence which it implies must be at the very heart of any reflection.

Introduction “Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) is a battle which we cannot afford to lose.”

In this statement of October 2010 , General Jean-Paul Paloméros, NATO Supreme 2

Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT) and then Chief-of-Staff of the French Air Force, reinforced the message which he conveyed during his tenure as a Major-General in the French Air Force , a message which remains as topical as ever. 3

Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO), and above all aerospace MRO, constitutes a critical concern for the Defence Ministries and has done since the beginning of the 21st century, despite the efforts and reforms undertaken during that time.

This state of affairs affects three spheres: land-based, naval and aerospace systems respectively. Nonetheless, aerospace MRO is of particular importance in that it affects all three branches of the Armed Forces and in that it accounts for the majority of expenditure in systems and equipment maintenance.

French Experience

Today, drawing from the French experience of the Integrated Structure for the Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul of Defence Equipment (SIMMAD) and of the French Air Force Industrial Aeronautic Service (SIAé) during their formative years,

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/breves-migration/interview-du-general-palomeros2

Assistant Chief of Air Staff in the Royal Air Force.3


This concern is derived from the conjunction of two closely linked factors: the steep rise in maintenance costs & the reduced availability of equipment.

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/breves-migration/interview-du-general-palomeros

aerospace MRO has taken a leap forward in the form of the Executive Committee for Defence (COMEX) chaired by the Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian on 6 May 2014.

Firstly, there has been the adoption of a new form of governance in that the Chief-of-Staff of the Air Force is responsible for aerospace MRO on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Furthermore, and most importantly, the COMEX approved the direction and the levers of the optimisation of aeronautical MRO which this paper will return to after having studied the principles, actors and key issues at hand.

This set of challenges is not exclusive to France but also exists in many countries where Armed Forces are reassessing their modus operandi. These efforts are especially relevant in the field of Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul and lead to the implementation of innovative solutions to ensure the maintenance of better and more complex aircraft.

This food-for-thought paper addresses these issues, drawing notably from the example of the French Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces and seeking to identify possible lessons and best practices for their counterparts in other countries.


An overview of the global MRO market The MRO field encompasses maintenance and repair within the aviation market and several types of actors exist within this field: maintenance subsidiaries of airline companies (Air France KLM Engineering & Maintenance, Lufthansa Technik, Delta TechOps, etc), the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs, companies that produce aircraft or different systems or components of aircraft), or certain industry actors specialised in maintenance activities (SR Technics, Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Company – HAECO – one of the global business leaders, Aircraft Maintenance and Engineering Corporation – Ameco Beijing – a joint enterprise of Air China and Lufthansa, etc.). There are also public operators, integrated within the Armed Forces or derived from them: the French MoD Industrial Aerospace Service (SIAé ), the British Defence Support Group (DSG), the American Air Force Material 4

Command with the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex and the Ogden Air Logistics Complex, etc.

The global MRO market is currently experiencing strong growth, accentuated by developments in air transport, notably in Asia. The entry into service of numerous aircraft (single and twin-aisle airplanes, regional aircraft, turboprops, helicopters) currently in production will in itself create strong growth within this market for years to come, which will be sustained over time as these aircraft gradually age through operation.

The global MRO market expanded by 11% in 2012, rising from $50.9b in 2011 to $56.8b in 2012 . At this rate, the sector should see average growth of 3.1% up to 5

2023 . The amount of cumulative expenditure by operators should therefore reach 6

$76b within ten years, compared to $56.2b in 2013.

Service Industriel de l’Aéronautique4

Usine Nouvelle, June 2013.5

Team SAI, A time for Renewal, the Global MRO Forecast, 2013-2023, 2013 MRO Conference.6


Types of activity of the maintenance sector Line Maintenance 7

Line maintenance is performed on aircraft in operation and done so internally by most airline companies. It consists of routine inspections linked to the commercial operation of the aircraft and the repair of mechanical faults arising during flight-time.

Airlines often combine their needs in these maintenance operations, in particular for aircraft of the same type, and entrust this work to a partner airline. New, or recently-founded, airlines will frequently subcontract this maintenance work.

The majority (85%) of the cost of line maintenance is incurred by manual labour, given that spending on equipment is minimal for this type of maintenance. However, in recent years significant reductions in the cost of manual labour have been achieved by, for example, not using an engineer during routine inspections.

Source: J.M. Berger, Global MRO Market, Forecast & Trends, February 20-21, 20137


Figure 1 - 2013 Global Air Transport Fleet and MRO Market7

Airframe heavy maintenance 8

The introduction of the latest generation of airliners has profoundly altered the nature of this activity. Service intervals and types of maintenance have changed with these new aircraft. In other words, the intervals between overhaul are becoming longer and longer.

Since 85% of the cost of this type of maintenance is incurred by manual labour, the vast majority of major actors in this segment of MRO are based in low-cost areas (typically China).

Source : Aircraft Maintenance Repair and Overhaul Market Study, 2005 Glasgow International Airport8


Figure 2 - MRO expenditures by categories8

Engine maintenance

This is the most technical form of maintenance, involving advanced processes such as plasma jets. Engine manufacturers enjoy a considerable advantage in this field, given that they themselves have designed and built the aircraft engines which they maintain. Also, even though the MRO branches of certain airlines (such as Lufthansa Technik) do carry out a large part of this work, it is unlikely to be as profitable for them as for the engine manufacturers.

The OEMs provide 45% of the work and 35% is carried out by the airlines themselves. The remaining 20% is undertaken by subcontractors and independent companies. Engine manufacturers have sought to expand their market share of this type of maintenance given the profit margins which it generates for them. They also offer small airlines the opportunity to purchase engines on a distribution model (‘pay as you go’) according to the total completed flight-time.

Component and equipment maintenance

Most of this activity is carried out by the OEMs whose industrial tools, originally used for the production of systems and components, can easily be adapted to undertake maintenance on this hardware. The economies of scale thus created allow airlines to leave this work to OEMs, thereby sparing themselves from the need to acquire the tools and spare parts required to maintain a smaller amount of equipment. To keep matters simple, this maintenance work is increasingly carried out according to flight-time ‘by the hour’ contracts as for engines.

Modifications

Modifications are very diverse in nature, so no one factor can be said to represent a majority of the cost of this work. For example, the conversion of commercial aircraft into air freight transport aircraft remains a long and complex process, as the removal of in-flight entertainment systems and cabin fittings is expensive and very labour-intensive.


Due to the complexity of this work, aircraft manufacturers (who approve the procedures, processes and components for the conversion) tend to keep a limit on the number of MRO providers authorised to carry out these modification operations and this tight control also allows OEMs to maintain gainful profit margins. The main MRO companies are beginning to build workshops dedicated to this modification work with a view to eventually undertaking the majority of it.

The expected growth of the global MRO market could trigger a significant restructuring of the sector in both geographical and industrial terms. The Asia-Pacific region is currently strengthening its existing market leadership, which it has established thanks to its numerous actors in the highly labour-intensive and therefore expensive field of heavy maintenance. Furthermore, compared to other regions of the globe, the Asia-Pacific region will witness the greatest growth in air transport over the coming years and, by extension, will produce a considerable demand for the maintenance of aircraft gradually coming into service.

The different levels of checks Aircraft manufacturers impose regular and compulsory technical checks, named A, B, C and D respectively, on airlines according to a given number of hours of estimated flight-time and/or the lifetime of a given aircraft. The higher the letter, the greater the time between two checks. To these four types can sometimes be added pre-flight inspections by the pilot or the co-pilot to check that there is no visible external damage. These are known as ‘daily checks’ (or ‘visits’) although in reality they are not done daily but after 24 to 60 hours of flight-time.

The A-check occurs approximately every month or every 500 hours of flight-time. It usually takes place within an airport complex at night. The occurrence of the check varies according to the type of aircraft, the number of cycles (i.e. one take-off and one landing) or the number of hours of flight-time since the last check. The cabin is meticulously checked, the filters are tested and an oil change takes place.


The B-check occurs approximately every three months. This check also usually takes place within an airport complex at night. All systems are examined, as are the emergency equipment and the navigation blocks. However, the B-check is gradually being phased out and being replaced by both A- and C-checks.

The C-check occurs every twelve to eighteen months or according to a fixed number of hours of flight-time set by the manufacturers. This check lasts for one week and requires a lot of space, usually in a maintenance hangar, as the craft needs to be put out of service. The entire structure of the plane is examined with a fine tooth-comb. The cabin is scanned with ultrasound in order to detect cracks and the important parts of the engines and all the wiring are checked. All instruments in the cockpit must work perfectly.

The D-check is also known as the ‘overhaul check’ or ‘heavy maintenance check’. It occurs every four to five years. It requires more time and space than any other check and must take place within a maintenance hangar. It lasts at least two weeks, sometimes even as long as two to three months depending on the type, age and total flight-time of the aircraft. Airlines usually take the opportunity to install the latest updates available from the manufacturers. The aircraft is therefore grounded for a long time, during which all components are checked and repaired if necessary. A D-check of a jumbo aircraft usually comprises some 10-15,000 complex, precise and rigorously regulated tasks. The aircraft is entirely taken apart in order to systematically check all its mechanisms, down to the smallest fragments of its structure. This check costs several millions euros.


Military MRO 9

In the field of military MRO, spending reached $65b in 2011. This sector is of particular interest to providers of aerospace MRO because government contracts, like defence budgets, can be multi-annual in duration, providing businesses with a good economic visibility as well as a stable source of revenue. North America is the most important geographical region in terms of spending on military maintenance, followed by the Asia-Pacific region (23% of global spending). Support activities are the most common services (between 60% and 80%), above all line maintenance, followed by airframe heavy maintenance, component maintenance and engine maintenance respectively.

Source: Market Insight: APAC MRO Market Overview 2012-Frost Sullivan9


Figure 3 - Share of investment inMRO by geographic area (military aeronautics)9

The market for military MRO is therefore greater on a global scale than that of MRO for civilian aviation: $65b for the former against $50b for the latter.

This difference is due to the specificities of the military market vis-à-vis the civilian one: contrary to the civilian market, where there is a systematic attempt to strike a balance between reliability and control of operating costs, military aerospace must also incorporate the considerations of performance and obsolescence management, the latter being a major problem for air forces which continue to operate ageing aircraft (France being a prime example).

These notions are essential to understanding the particularities of military MRO vis-à-vis civilian MRO. Military aerospace must take into account several parameters “to find the right balance between equipment and the manner in which it used, according to our activities.” Armed Forces must link MRO with operational activity: 10

“MRO must absolutely be linked to operational activity: we must manage permanent missions, unforeseen missions, training, peaks of activity and crises which we must withstand over an extended period of time. This is a complex equation. There is danger in doing both too little and too much, with predictable consequences for the cost.” 11

The technological impact MRO is also expected to experience considerable change with the gradual integration of new technologies in modern aircraft. These changes will impact embedded systems as much as maintenance procedures and technologies.

Regarding embedded systems, aircraft currently in development or those most recently brought into operation are integrating several technologies designed to optimise their support. These technologies are characterised by the reinforcement of embedded sensors. By way of example, some industrialists are developing integrated management systems designed to optimise a certain form of predictive

Interview with General Denis Mercier, Chief-of-Staff of the French Air Force, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/le-mco-10

doit-etre-absolument-lie-a-l-activite-operationnelle Ibid.11


http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/le-mco-doit-etre-absolument-lie-a-l-activite-operationnelle

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/le-mco-doit-etre-absolument-lie-a-l-activite-operationnelle

maintenance. Examples include systems such as HUMS (Health and Usage 12

Monitoring Systems) which are being gradually deployed on several types of helicopters (H-60 Black Hawk family, EC145, CH-53E, etc).

These systems monitor and analyse usage data and the health of the engines, rotors and driveshaft in order to help operators plan their maintenance operations and reinforce flight safety.

Aircraft and engines manufacturers respectively are also putting into place such systems which should allow operators to optimise their maintenance. Rolls-Royce is one of these industrial actors and their new maintenance technologies recently - and unintentionally - made the headlines in the shape of Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 . 13

Indeed, the British engine maker runs an Operations Centre at its headquarters in Derby, England, which manages in real time its fleet of civilian aircraft engines. This engine fleet management depends on the transmission of data by twenty-five engine sensors within the EHM (Engine Health Management) system. This data is transmitted to the engines OEM by the ACARS system via VHF or satellite datalink 14

during the flight. This process allows Rolls-Royce and OSyS engineers to analyse 15

engine data through the former’s Operations Centre and to prepare any maintenance operations necessary once the plane is on the ground.

Furthermore, in terms of aircraft systems, aerospace OEMs now include Product Life Cycle (PLM) processes in their aircraft programs. These processes allow companies to manage the entire product lifecycle from design to dismantlement and recycling as well as maintenance procedures. With regard to ownership costs, these aircraft systems are conceived and developed to optimise and ideally reduce maintenance costs and procedures. It therefore becomes necessary to re-evaluate

http://utcaerospacesystems.com/cap/systems/sisdocuments/12

Health%20and%20Usage%20Management%20Systems%20%28HUMS%29/Health%20and%20Usage%20Management%20Systems%20%28HUMS%29.pdf

The last known transmission from MH370 was engine data which later informed investigators that the plane had been flying for 13

hours. Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System. Datalink system.14

Optimized Systems and Solutions. Subsidiary of Rolls-Royce plc specialised in optimised service solutions, notably predictive 15

maintenance.


http://utcaerospacesystems.com/cap/systems/sisdocuments/Health%20and%20Usage%20Management%20Systems%20%28HUMS%29/Health%20and%20Usage%20Management%20Systems%20%28HUMS%29.pdf




the training provided to maintenance technicians and to integrate ever more electronic and computer-based elements within that training. Training centres have responded to these developments by increasingly shifting from a ‘book-based’ model to a ‘computer-based’ model. New potentially game-changing technologies currently in development are likely to bring about major changes in this domain, concerning testing systems but more specifically on MRO operations such as the use of 3D printing in the repair of aircraft parts or components (airframes, engines etc).

Particularities of military MRO The very nature of the missions entrusted to military aircraft requires precise specifications according to the expectations of these missions: for example, high levels of flight performance and/or mission systems (weapons systems, etc), reliability, long endurance over the theatre of operations, etc. This operational aspect must also be managed in the context of the length of service of military aircraft. These often have much greater operational lifespans than civilian aircraft, from forty to fifty years in the Armed Forces compared to fifteen to twenty in commercial airlines.

For instance, the Mirage F1 which was withdrawn from service on 13 June 2014 first came into service in the French Air Force in 1973 (first flight in 1966), making an operational career of 41 years. The SA-330 Puma operated in Europe by France and United Kingdom, first came into service in 1968 but the withdrawal of this multirole aircraft is not scheduled until 2018 or even 2025 in the case of the RAF’s HC2 standard retrofitted Puma - in other words a fifty year operational career in France and sixty years in Britain.


With such a long operational lifespan, obsolescence management is a much more critical issue for military MRO than for its civilian counterpart.

Military MRO thus differs significantly from civilian MRO by the specificity of the operational aspects which determine the use and the specifications of the aircraft concerned. This does not, however, alter the fact that military and civilian MRO share several points of cross-pillar activity where development on one side could lead to similar consequences on the other. In the majority of cases, the manufacturers currently active on the civilian aerospace market are also present on the military market, either in the form of hardware developed specifically for either market or through adaptation of that hardware with a view to its introduction in the other market.

By way of example, the first operator of the CFM56, the most successful engine in commercial aviation history, was the US Air Force (USAF) with some 500 four-engine CFM56s - named F108s by the US Department of Defense (DoD) - in service (KC-135R/T Stratotanker, RC-135 aircraft family, E-3 Sentry, etc), not to mention other aircraft belonging to different DoD entities (US Navy E-6B Mercury TACAMO, US Navy and USAF C-40 Clipper, etc.). This cross-pillar activity is not without consequence for MRO, notably in terms of the cost of operations and spare parts, as the quantity of parts ordered can result in substantial economies of scale.

The integration to military aircraft of technologies derived from the civilian sphere can only reinforce cross-pillar activity between the two segments of aviation MRO. There are many examples which demonstrate this cross-pillar activity, not least the integration of technologies from the A380 into the A400M. As such, planes used for any purpose ranging from combat missions to ISR , SAR or MPA , increasingly 16 17 18

originate from the civilian sphere (business jets, regional or single-aisle airplanes, etc) having been modified to integrate systems for military missions. Other than the Boeing 707s and 767s which carry AWACS systems, we can also cite the 19

example of the P-8 Poseidon deriving from the Boeing 737 and modified by Boeing for the purposes of maritime patrol and anti-submarine activity, for which Boeing

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance16

Search And Rescue17

Maritime Patrol Aircraft18

Airborne Warning and Control Systems19


also develops a derivative MSA (Maritime Surveillance Aircraft). The latter integrates the P-8 mission systems in a modified version of the Challenger 605 Bombardier business jet, with lower ownership costs than the P-8. 20

Military MRO and the relative stability of the military market, in comparison with the volatility of civilian MRO, (e.g. multi-annual government contracts) represent good value for money for aerospace companies. The increasing outsourcing of certain military MRO activities, notably the maintenance of engines and components which could potentially experience global growth of between 4% and 6% by 2020, is one example of this fact and should not be overlooked.

Source : Aviation Week, 2013 Military Aircraft Forecast20


Figure 4 - Share of the global fleet of military aircraft20

MRO, a function at the heart of the capability-based planning of Military Forces

“Maintenance, repair and overhaul is a complex ensemble,” as was recently noted by Air Force General Guy Girier, Director of the French SIMMAD . As if to 21

demonstrate this complexity, it is possible to discern several different definitions of MRO within reports published by national parliaments or courts of auditors , for 22

example. In general, these definitions do not contradict each other but they do introduce ideas or semantic nuances which, to a layman, tend to complicate the understanding of the subject.

To simplify (or at least attempt to simplify), the following definition will be retained: Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) is the ensemble of tasks required to ensure the functioning and availability of equipment.

In order to set the parameters of that definition, it can be stated that MRO brings together the functions of maintenance, repair, logistics (supply, storage and distribution of replacement parts) or, in other words, aircraft or aircraft component support.

It is possible to widen the parameters of that definition - in order to keep sight of the overall coherence of MRO within the wider realities of defence ministries - by also including the financial aspect.

Finally, with regard to the aerospace dimension, MRO is closely linked to the function of navigability which establishes the capacity of an aircraft to take to the sky (regulation/flight security).

Therefore, in the case of aerospace, MRO: • Ensures the capacity of aircraft to take flight as well as the availability of

hardware and equipment;

Structure Intégrée du Maintien en Condition Opérationnelle des Matériels Aéronautiques de la Défense (SIMMAD), in charge of MRO 21

operations for all French military aircraft (as well as Gendarmerie and Civil Protection helicopters). Interview on 9 July 2014.The French Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes) has released in September 2014 a new report entitled "The operational 22

maintenance of military equipment: persistent difficulties, solutions for reinforcement".


• Is fully integrated with flight security

• Is characterised above all by the maintenance of equipment with important technological dimensions (electronic, avionics, surface/air radar, motors, ground/on-board armaments etc).

It contributes to the operational preparations of the forces (force generation, maintenance and upkeep) and to the fulfilment of operational tasks.

In budgetary terms, MRO comprises two elements:

• Maintenance planning systems : within these, those funds earmarked for 23

the acquisition of necessary tools and replacement parts, as well as maintenance services outsourced to industrial operators;

• Personnel: funds earmarked for the salaries of personnel assigned to maintenance (including personnel assigned to outsourced MRO project ownership).

A critical element of capability-based planning is that MRO must not be regarded as just another service but as an essential operational function.

The question of MRO requires a holistic analysis based on the fundamental mission of the Armed Forces, namely the fulfilment of the operational tasks entrusted to them. The fulfilment of these operational tasks depends on the stated objectives being consistent with the existing capabilities of the Armed Forces. This is the meaning of capability-based planning.

This capability-based planning is assessed on two levels: firstly, the close complementarity of the different capabilities necessary to the fulfilment of missions

Adapted from the French Ministry of Defence’s designation of this concept, l’entretien programmé des matériels (EPM) or, literally, 23

‘planned equipment maintenance’.


To understand the high stakes of MRO, one must keep sight of the ultimate objective of the Armed Forces: the conduct of operations

and, subsequently, the integrity of each of these capabilities. Each of these must comprise a body of troops possessing the requisite skills and training for the performance of necessary tasks, as well as being available in sufficient numbers for the fulfilment of the mission.

Consequently, MRO becomes one of the most critical elements of capability-based planning of the Armed Forces. This is why MRO must not be regarded as just another service - as has been the case for too long - but as an essential operational function. Some go even further and state that, quite apart from being an operational function, MRO is a science in and of itself.

Understanding the concepts of “potential” and “availability”

The concepts of potential and availability are key to the question of MRO and its challenges. To address these, it is necessary to first examine the distribution of a fleet of aircraft in the following defined states:

• The full fleet of aircraft, or the total number of purchased units;

• The working fleet, or ‘the line’, which is not composed of available aircraft but of those which are undergoing maintenance or modernisation and which may yet become available;

• The available fleet, or those aircraft ready to take to the skies; • The active fleet, or those aircraft currently being used to undertake and

complete missions.

Derived from the case of France, there are several forms of terminology which must be considered in order to understand the management of a fleet of aircraft.


The availability of hardware depends on the ability of the Armed Forces to procure and then maintain this hardware.

Potential

“Potential” is “the capability of utilisation of hardware or equipment at any given time”. As defined by the French Joint Glossary of Aeronautical Terminology , it is 24

denoted by the unit of usage (i.e. usually per hour). This capability can be enhanced by the performance of a maintenance operation. Those aircraft functioning at the top end of their full potential therefore belong to the working fleet.

Availability (and operational technical availability)

As regards “availability”, defined as the “aptitude of a product to be able to fulfil its necessary function, at any given time, in any given conditions and for any given period of time, taking into consideration the support system in place.” This aptitude is a function of the reliability, the maintainability and the support system of the entity; there are numerous methods of calculation by which a value denoting the availability can be reached. The choice of method depends on the system in consideration, its operational use and the use which is made of this value.

To this concept, one must add the concept of ‘operational availability ’: “For a 25

collection of hardware or equipment of the same type and of a defined structure, the ratio is expressed as a percentage of the quantity of hardware or equipment available at a given time in relation to the total quantity of hardware or equipment produced. The technical availability implies, at any given time, the possibility for a defined structure to efficiently engage its operational means for a given type of mission. At this stage of observation, only the functions essential for the fulfilment of the mission are taken into consideration. ” 26

PIA-7.2.6-1 réf N°200958/DEF/SIMMAD/DSMR/BRJ/NP, 6 August 2013.24

Ref: Disponibilité Technique Operationnelle (Operational Technical Availability), a term and acronym regularly used within the French 25

Ministry of Defence Ibid.26


The need to transcend a purely theoretical interpretation of potential and availability

The concept of availability must nonetheless be relativised. Indeed, operational contracts are structured by the quantity of means available and their associated potential. In external operations (OPEX), it is preferable to avail of seven planes with 100 hours of availability instead of one plane with the potential of 700 hours. In the case of the carrier-based early warning aircraft, the Grumman E-2 Hawkeye, the total fleet is three aircraft with, in theory, two E-2s available at all times. In order for the French Navy to fulfil its operational contract, the E-2s must be available while the aircraft carrier is at sea. When addressing the link between potential and activity, one must break down the activities in order to identify those levers likely to enhance the potential of the hardware.


Improving aerospace MRO: challenges MRO is a complex ensemble and therefore there are many possible means to improve its performance. It must be recognised that, however we choose to define the concept of performance, it has become illusory to surpass limits imposed by the finance available. This is why the first challenge of MRO is that of managing expenditure.

Avoiding dogmatic approaches The improvement of aerospace MRO is an overall objective upon which the relevant parties are in unanimous agreement. That said, some within the Armed Forces have expressed certain reservations on the specifics. While the goal is as laudable as it is absolutely necessary, great care must be taken against adopting too dogmatic an approach in seeking to make cuts. The experience of the last twenty years has illustrated the negative effects of such an approach on the Armed Forces. Furthermore, while the current model is obviously imperfect, it is the outcome of decades of work and it is necessary therefore to take into account the legacy of the past and allow organisations to stabilise and ‘digest’ change even as they make necessary adjustments in light of lessons learned from their experience.

Some also believe that, however real they may be, any savings made would not be as palpable as intended. They emphasise that the difficulties of MRO are largely due to the size of its budget (a budget which is not sufficient to achieve its objective and to run the system) on the one hand and, on the other hand, due to a dependence on an industry whose own costs are soaring because of reduced orders.

This pessimistic view of expected cuts is not one shared by all the actors. There are those who value performance more highly than efficiency and, according to them,


MRO has often been an adjustable variable within defence budgets

the latter implies making do with whatever resources are available whereas the former implies taking responsibility and ‘getting results’. The nuance may appear subtle but the detractors of an efficiency-based approach argue that it risks sending the Armed Forces into a downward spiral of cost-cutting with no regard for the operational contract.

However, other actors propose a notion of efficiency which would avoid this trap. At this point it is necessary to establish certain definitions of concepts which are fundamental to the matters at hand.

• Objective: a tangible or quantifiable result, to be achieved by an organisation before a set deadline and with appropriate resources.

• Performance: the level achieved by an organisation in terms, of cost, deadline and quality of service within the given field. Performance is defined by efficiency and effectiveness.

• Effectiveness: the capability to achieve an objective before a given deadline.

• Efficiency: the capability to achieve set objectives by optimising the resources employed to achieve them (link between the result and the cost of the means employed) or the capacity to optimise the use of resources by achieving the best result possible (even if the set objective is not achieved).

• Management (or stewardship): to decide and to act together in an increasingly successful manner. This undertaking implies a dialogue between different levels of responsibility within the organisation and uses tools such as command dialogue, internal testing and performance management.

These concepts can be organised in the following manner:


Upon reading this diagram, it may be possible to replace performance management (or stewardship) with governance and, moreover, pertinence can also be understood as feasibility or sustainability, the latter term being increasingly used to describe the capability (real or assumed) of resources to fulfil a mission (causality between supporting and operational functions).

The trap laid for management by sustainability The interest of this approach lies in the fact that efficiency is not defined solely by cost but is also related to different forms of resources (human, material, financial) which must be optimised as a whole. While most resources can ultimately be broken down according to costs, this approach requires that these costs be measured against their output and therefore keeps sight of the overall coherence of the organisation.


Many observers believe that governance, at least insofar as it has been exercised in recent years, broadly entails managing according to

sustainability rather than by efficiency.

Indeed, the costs of modern systems are such that it is not always financially possible to use them all: the desired airborne activity (operational and training missions, according to the criteria of activity per pilot per annum ) must often be 27

downscaled because of these constraints.

In other words, a sustainability-based approach entails trying to adapt the objective to reduced resources, which is precisely that which detractors of the efficiency-based approach are afraid of.

In many countries, governance, in recent years, has often meant managing more by sustainability than by a genuine budgetary efficiency.

However, the efficiency-based approach would actually be very different as it would entail finding a means to optimise resources to maintain the activity. The reality is rather more subtle as the two approaches can in fact compliment each other and create leverage on multiple levels. However, it is highly likely that the efficiency-based approach, as described here, would be difficult to sell to the financial decision-makers of the majority of western countries at the present time. It would be preferable to assert that efforts are being made to continue with the mission come what may, rather than defend an objective which the guardians of the nations’ purse strings would likely deem inadmissible.

In some respects, the difficulty of efficiency could be avoided and deemed a virtual non-issue, or at least a secondary factor. The increased operational performance of hardware, thanks to technological progress, should not be overlooked. In simple terms, fewer effectors are needed to produce the same effect. However, this ‘compensation’ in effectiveness only lasts while sustainability maintains this effectiveness.

Following the example of the naval sphere.27


Activities, a new frame of reference to manage availability

For now, availability constitutes the main frame of reference against which MRO is based and organised. However, in terms of improving the performance and maintenance of the entire system, some believe that a new approach to the concept of availability is required, namely that the notion of ‘maximum’ availability should be abandoned in favour of ‘sufficient’ availability.

When considered on the scale of a fleet, the notion of maximum availability is artificial. Indeed, using the greatest possible number of aircraft without reference to operational needs would mean financing the maintenance of aircraft which would ultimately carry out only a small number of sorties and this would not be conducive to fulfilling the operational contract.

In the case of ‘sufficient’ availability, a certain proportion of the fleet would be held in reserve in order to preserve its potential (and reduce maintenance requirements). The resulting financial surplus would be earmarked for the remainder of the fleet and used to augment its potential and by extension the number of sorties which they could carry out between each maintenance check. This concept of sufficient availability implies that the level of sufficiency would be determined on the basis of real operational needs and along strictly capability-based lines and, furthermore, that even at the point of acquisition a certain number of aircraft would be wrapped in cotton wool in order to guarantee the economic coherence of the exercise.


Moving from the objective of maximum availability to the objective of sufficient availability

The concept of activity The concept of activity can be divided into three categories:

• Operational action, for example the 150 hours of flight-time in the Sahel of three Dassault-Bréguet ATL2 maritime patrol aircraft;

• Operational preparation, within which the number of hours of flight-time allow for the supply of deployable crews and equipment through interviews and acquisitions. By way of example, establishing the qualifications for a patrol commander requires the assignment of four airplanes for this one task;

• Activity without operational surcharge. In the case of an operational mission, this entails the time of transit to the zone of action. For example, during Operation Harmattan in Libya (2011), this time was about 5 hours per mission for French aircraft. These hours of flight-time without added value (since no objective will be achieved other than simply moving the aircraft closer to the target) will be deducted as ‘pure loss’ from the operational potential ascribed by the Level 1 maintenance engineers. This implies that the activity itself must be optimised. Ultimately, it is preferable to accept the means which generate the least additional cost.


Lessons learned from the French experience

It is therefore necessary to think in terms of types of operating hours (both operational action and operational preparation) to arrive at the activity/cost ratio rather than thinking purely in terms of availability. By virtue of their precision, these performance indicators constitute the yardstick(s) used by the French Ministry of Defence to establish the availability of the Armed Forces in relation to operational contracts.

The French Navy takes a very similar approach but avoids using the term ‘activity’ to describe its use of aircraft as for them this term encompasses both training and operations . The pre-eminence of operations is such that it may sometimes prove 28

harmful to maintaining certain qualifications. For example, the ATL2 maritime patrol airplanes have a potential of 6,500 hours of flight-time per annum. However, within three months of Operation Serval in Mali, these planes carried out more than 3000 hours of flight-time and this made it impossible for pilots in France to conduct training exercises.

For its part, the French Army pushes the envelope as regards the distinction of overseas operations. Helicopter pilots from the ALAT Corps have a standard of 200 hours of flight-time, of which twenty are training flights (on a flight simulator). The required threshold to deploy a pilot on overseas operations is 140 hours while the latest French standards (LPM) imposed a target of 155 hours of flight-time per pilot.

As might be expected in a system under such constraints, the education and training of ALAT helicopters pilots is different to that of the two other French Armed Forces, notably as regards the resources devoted to this training (flight simulation and flights with weapons systems) and the pilots (divided into three ranks). The first rank of pilots carry out 140 hours of flight-time per annum and are the first to deploy

Interview on 20 June 201428


on overseas expeditions. The second rank comprises pilots with 120 to 140 hours of flight-time under their belts and who would be available for deployment after a short training course. The third rank comprises pilots who have seen less than 120 hours flight-time.

The General Staff of the French Army emphasises that it would be more logical to 29

run a system with two ranks but that budgetary pressures force them to deploy three ranks. A good balance would be a two-rank system with proper rotation of the helicopter fleet - between the available fleet and the working fleet respectively - and greater use of flight simulation. This is the type of organisation which the French Air Force is aiming for.

In the event of a failure on the part of the manufacturer, the working fleet will grow and the contract will not be fulfilled (in terms of number of guaranteed hours of flight-time). In the case of the ALAT, Tigers are earmarked for 400 flying hours over two years but that timeframe begins when the aircraft enters the workshop and not when it leaves. This means that if there are supply problems for example, the aircraft can remain in the workshop for up to eighteen months, leaving a mere six months to fulfil its potential of 400 hours.

There will therefore always be calendar-based guidelines and it is imperative to find a way to reschedule these interruptions in accordance with the life cycle of the aircraft. This is why it is essential to work with the manufacturers right from the start of a programme in order to revise the schedule of planned stops and maintenance checks.

That said, the concepts of activity and technical availability should not be considered as mutually incompatible. Activity must be prioritised on the home front (where operational conditions are more predictable) whereas availability is the key in overseas expeditions. The three Armed Forces are in agreement on this point.

Interview on 2 July 201429


An engineering process to overcome shortcomings in predictive maintenance

The arrival of a new generation of aircraft - such as Rafale fighters or Tigre helicopters for example - implies the adoption of new methods which, if misused or experiencing teething problems, will cause difficulties and therefore additional costs for the Armed Forces. This is the case with condition based-maintenance, otherwise known as predictive maintenance, which has replaced the previously standard approach of preventive maintenance. It is imperative to overcome these shortcomings by establishing adapted processes and best practices.

Globalisation, segmentation and “mainstreaming”

Improving the performance of aerospace MRO also entails examination and implementation of new contractual procedures. Several types of innovative contracts have been initiated in recent years and offer the possibility for a first phase of feedback in the debate on contractual strategy.

The debate relates to the range of MRO contracts and the role consequently given by the Ministry of Defence to private actors, OEMs or maintenance and logistics specialists respectively.

Three types of MRO contracts can be envisaged:

• Globalisation: an overall contract covering the entire maintenance of the aircraft (airframes, engines, systems)

• Segmentation into several contracts corresponding to the large units of an aircraft, type of equipment, etc.

• ‘Mainstreaming’: this refers to massifying, or bulk-ordering, contracts according to the quantity of a single item require by two or three of the Armed Forces.


Is it possible to envisage an overall contract to be the single MRO provider of an aircraft, awarded to the original manufacturer (OEM), thus ensuring both maintenance and associated logistics? In such a case the manufacturer would no longer restrict its involvement solely to the elements it produced and would hence become the project manager for the entire MRO. At this time, in France, this method has not yet been attempted on MRO for military aircraft. Originally envisaged for the A400M by the Airbus project team, this method was ultimately abandoned.

Original equipment manufacturers have nonetheless already made their entrance into the field of service support and associated logistics. For example, Dassault Aviation have done so in the context of their ‘Rafale Care’ contract, as has Thales on their Maestro contract. However, these are primarily logistics contracts on a door-to-door basis where the OEM collects the piece of equipment which is then reconsigned to the user at its base in France. While the method is generally regarded as relatively successful as regards customer service, the view from the Ministry of Defence is that it creates excessive segmentation of the system. Indeed, the method involves one contract per form of aircraft system or equipment and therefore does not facilitate overall coordination of weapons systems.

Differentiated approaches of integration The fact is that the Armed Forces and their Integrated Structure for the MRO of Defence Equipment (SIMMAD) have different visions of integration.

The French Army believes that full integration is neither desirable nor possible but that there would be scope for intermediate methods , not at the level of a complete 30

aircraft but entailing a federation of systems (airframe, engines, avionics, weapon systems, etc). The objective is to remain flexible and reactive when faced with a wide range of conditions during operational engagements. That said, while these measures would be feasible away from combat, they would not be applicable in a

Interview at the General Staff of the Army on 2 July 201430


theatre of operations, where each actor must retain control of its competences and where the industry should not be involved.

The French Air Force exercises similar caution, prioritising the ability to react which the Armed Forces should always possess. Unlike airline companies, the Armed Forces are not in a constant state of steady activity but instead are subject to sharp peaks of activity which are difficult to predict. The simplest solution to reactivity is the assembly of considerable reserves but a manufacturer would almost certainly have difficulty supplying reserves sufficient to meet the demands of the operational contract, at least not without severely damaging the financial viability of their original offer. The opposite solution, namely ‘just-in-time’ management, is equally difficult to envisage as manufacturers need time to scale up their production (up to two years in some cases).

In short, the Armed Forces’ ability to react comes at a cost and this elemental fact is difficult to reconcile with an attempt at genuine efficiency.

The French Navy also exercises caution but without in principle ruling out any possibilities . 31

For its part, the SIMMAD has chosen to mainstream numerous contracts in order to reduce the unitary costs of individual items of hardware and equipment. The view among certain senior officials with the General Staffs is that this approach is not without risk. In the event that a contract is cancelled or subject to a legal challenge, then not one but all of the Armed Forces would be forced to go without the equipment in question.

For the MRO of its ships, the Navy has, in the shape of the SSF, nonetheless opted to use an integrated project manager and 31

entrusted the manufacturer (i.e. DCNS) with ordering replacement parts and carrying out the work.


It’s important to avoid an excessively statistics-based approach to the payment of appropriations for contracts, without consulting the Armed Forces

for their feedback on their use of the hardware and equipment involved.

The example of specific fleets and training It is clear that the wholesale transposition of civilian methods to the military worlds is impossible given the different uses of aircraft. That said, global contracts could be appropriate to certain specific fleets, for example trainers’ fleets that use aircraft with relatively simple configurations and do so for pre-planned activities. HELIDAX and 32

CATS are held up as examples of this. 33

HELIDAX is overseen by the DCI group, associated to INAER, and relates to the basic training given to helicopter pilots of all three Armed Forces. CATS is overseen by Airbus Defense & Space and handles the flight training of student pilots of the French Air Force at Cognac and Avord and those of the Navy at Lanvéoc-Poulmic.

These are contracts for the supply of training flight-time. The approach taken seeks to focus resources on one part of the fleet in order to reach the objectives of the ‘operational contract’ by using detached parts of certain machines, rather than by seeking out the availability of each individual machine. Through this concept of ‘shop-airplane’, it becomes possible to own fleets where certain aircraft do not fly in order to keep the system running. This is a concept which some political decision-makers and budget managers find difficult to comprehend.

In addition, the French Air Force also recognises that this type of contract needs an acceptance that the provider revisits some of its planning requirements in order to guarantee the overall viability of the system, as much in operational as in economic terms. The Armed Forces must be able to adapt to their provider and this type of contract therefore entails a considerable degree of confidence and reciprocal attention between the two parties.

http://www.helidax.com/en/company/presentation/32

http://www.defenceandsecurity-airbusds.com/en_US/web/guest/cassidian-at-the-50th-international-paris-le-bourget-air-show33


The Armed Forces must also learn to adapt to their providers

Where to draw the line with outsourcing? Can we define a precise boundary between support activities which can and cannot be outsourced? Once again, the answer is not straightforward and as such we cannot accept the double systematic distinction of ‘home front/outsourcing vs overseas expeditions/public sector’.

The French Air Force sets out the argument that Level 1 maintenance is the overall set of resources (human, technical, procedural) which allows the Armed Forces to enjoy an operational autonomy - in other words the capability to project forces - which a non-state structure could not deploy for legal reasons (military status, crisis context) and for reasons of reactiveness, of competence and of cost. The Air Force thus distinguishes between ‘deployed’ Level 1 maintenance (exterior engagements such as overseas expeditions but also including missions on the national territory) and ‘reserve’ Level 1 maintenance, largely based domestically. The latter constitutes the pool of resources able to (re)generate deployed Level 1 maintenance along with associated processes (maintenance, force generation, training of personnel, acquisition and maintenance of skills etc). In short, a reservoir where savings cannot be made through outsourcing.

The Navy has opted for the following solution: aircraft at sea, carrying out combat missions (Super Etendard Modernisé, Rafale M) are maintained internally while the MRO of land-based aircraft carrying out support missions (e.g. Dauphin) is outsourced. By way of example, Sabena Technics is in charge of the maintenance of Falcon 50s . The French Navy specifies that fleets whose MRO is outsourced 34

must demonstrate higher levels of availability and for a lower cost . As for the 35

maintenance levels distinction, it is already evident that the boundary between this is in a state of flux. Although relevant to the Level 2 to 4 maintenance, some operations cannot be outsourced because they are carried out on vessels at sea.

http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2014/07/12/sabena-technics-remporte-le-marche-de-mco-des-avions-34

falcon-12172.htmlInterview on 20 June 201435


http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2014/07/12/sabena-technics-remporte-le-marche-de-mco-des-avions-falcon-12172.html

http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2014/07/12/sabena-technics-remporte-le-marche-de-mco-des-avions-falcon-12172.html

Conversely however, the Navy chose to seek assistance from the manufacturer to help with a maintenance operation on a M88 engine on a Rafale aboard an aircraft carrier at sea. This operation was carried out by remote maintenance and was only possible because the maintenance personnel of the air group possessed the requisite skills to carry out the tasks instructed by SNECMA technicians in France. It is therefore possible to reduce the footprint of State Level 2 to 4 via a remote device but only on the condition that the skills of the military personnel are consistent with the work required.

As for the French Army, it emphasises its requirement for maintenance personnel to be deployable at very short notice in ‘unstable’ operational theatres “to carry out maintenance duties up to Level 2 maintenance, all the while being able to contribute to their own security.”

Integrating a logistics provider While the three Armed Forces are in agreement in recognising that outsourcing MRO for overseas expeditions appears unlikely, it does not follow that a study of this option has been entirely ruled out. So even though the Air Force intends to keep hold of the necessary controls to ensure its MRO ‘reservoir’ capability, it is all the same possible to imagine a forward deployment of MRO service providers, albeit not in proximity to operational theatres. This solution is conceivable through the use of personnel signed up in the military reserve and who would therefore be called to active duty for the duration of their deployment. Nonetheless, several interlocutors within the French Ministry of Defence believe this scenario to be complicated and costly.

On the other hand, it would be desirable to explore the possibility of integrating a logistics service provider as close as possible to the user, on rear bases and/or close to the logistics rotations set up by the Ministry of Defence for each overseas expedition.


As for permanent overseas detachments, the issue of involving the manufacturer on-site depends on the quality of the connections between these detachments and the rest of the world. Their participation in logistical supply and maintenance seems feasible in permanent bases such as Abu Dhabi (UAE) but rather less so in Gao (Mali) on what one could call “Forward Advanced Bases”.

It would be necessary to explore in depth the possibility of integrating a logistics provider as close as possible to the user, at close quarters to the logistic system of rotation set up by the French Ministry of Defence for each overseas expedition.

Balancing between operational rationality and economic rationality

Outsourcing must also be analysed in terms of the compromise between the operational and economic rationality of the project, as much for the State as for the private service provider.

For some experts, outsourcing maintenance must be done on a case-by-case basis. As such, with regard for example to the lifespan of the training aircraft Alphajet and its obsolescence management, it was deemed more rational and more economical to keep the training function of this aircraft within the Air Force. It had been some years since the manufacturers had the necessary competence to ensure the maintenance of these aircraft. Furthermore, they would have had to recruit personnel for a limited timeframe (up to the withdrawal of service of the Alphajet) and consequently take responsibility for severance pay. The side effect of these constraints was to greatly reduce the forecast margins.

For Armed Forces, this maintenance ability throughout a programme’s lifespan is a guarantee of security in the management of obsolescence.

On the other hand, manufacturers are very relevant and very involved in ensuring the MRO of their hardware and equipment. They possess the full range of requisite skills and can even provide operational support up to a certain point. In this instance, it would be desirable to reflect on mechanisms for the transfer of competences


between private industry and State services during the lifespan of a programme via a technological partnership.

This partnership can also be achieved through pooling and/or integration approaches such as that of the French SYCOMORE system. SYCOMORE is a board of end-users and suppliers in the domain of military aerospace, including also representatives from manufacturers.

This board meets to discuss pooling and integration of resources, to anticipate supply problems and to agree on preventive measures. By the same token, in a more specific context of a crisis surrounding helicopter engines (premature wear of turbines blades by the sands of Mali ), there was a joint effort between the engines 36

manufacturer and the Armed Forces to put in place appropriate technical support and processes . 37

http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/20140625trib000836995/airbus-helicopters-quand-le-36

caracal-mord-la-poussiere-au-mali.htmlInterview EMAT on 2 July 1437


In conclusion, manufacturers can also play a role in Level 1 maintenance operations on the condition that they guarantee a level of performance

acceptable to the Armed Forces, above all as regards the quality of products delivered.

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