ΝΕΟΠΛΑΤΩΝΙΣΜΟΣ

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 DOI: 10.1163/156852807X229276

Book Notes*

Neoplatonism

Peter AdamsonKings College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK

[email protected]

Th is time I begin before Neoplatonism proper with a book on Hellenistic philosophy by the Phronesis Hellenistic Book Notes author, Christopher Gill.1 Th is lengthy study pursues four ambitious projects. First, chapters 1-3 survey some central themes in Stoicism and Epicureanism in order to establish G.s main thesis: that the Stoics and Epicureans shared a view of the self as a structured whole, and that they took this view to be Socratic. Th e psychological holism in question here is coupled with physicalist accounts of the soul, so that in fact G. often speaks of psychophysical holism. G. further associates this with what he calls the rich naturalism of the Stoics and Epicureans, meaning that they see physics, ethics and logic as mutually reinforcing and even fused (160-1, 186, 194). Th e Socratic holism of both schools manifests itself, for example, in the view that all human action is rational in the sense of proceeding on the basis of a belief. G. contrasts this holism to core-centred and part-based views, as found in Plato and Aristotle. On the core-centered view, only one aspect or part of the soul is my true self , and virtue consists in the domination of this part over the others. G. concedes however that more holistic remarks can be found in both Plato and Aristotle, especially in the Timaeus and Republic bks. 8-9. Th e second section of the book focuses on two narrower issues in Stoicism: the Stoic reception of the aforementioned resources in Plato for supporting holism (ch.5) and the Stoic theory of the

*) Book Notes discuss books on ancient philosophy that are sent to the journal for review. 1) C. Gill, Th e Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Th ought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. xxii+522. 84 ISBN 0 19 815268 X.

Phronesis 52 (2007) 403-425 www.brill.nl/phro

PHRO 52,4_f5_403-425.indd 403PHRO 52,4_f5_403-425.indd 403 10/9/07 10:44:11 AM10/9/07 10:44:11 AM

passions (ch.4). G. agrees with Teun Tieleman that Galen and Plutarch distorted Chrysippus theory of the passions by forcing it into a part-based psychology. Even Posidonius, despite his emphasis on aective motions, adhered to the holistic view, because these motions do not rep-resent a distinct part of the soul in which emotion is seated. Th e use of Tieleman in this chapter is a good example of G.s appealing strategy of following and building on the work of other scholars. In fact chapters 1-3 can protably be read as an overview of recent scholarship on Hellenistic ethics. In chapter 6, G. turns to a third project: extending the claims of an earlier book in which he held that the subjectivist notion of self is foreign to classical Greek thought.2 Here he argues that the same is true of the Hellenistic period. In this section G. adopts a more critical stance towards other scholars, arguing for instance against A.A. Long and Charles Kahn regarding Epictetan prohairesis, and Gail Fine regarding subjectivism in skepticism and the Cyrenaics. Th e last chapter takes up a fourth project: tracing the inuence of all these ideas in Hellenistic literature. In sum, G.s argument is wide-ranging and ambitious. Some may nd it too uncom-promising, and want to insist that there are core-centered elements within Stoicism, Epicureanism or both.3 But I was more troubled by a nag-ging thought that what G. presents as sides of a dichotomy holistic vs. part-based would better be described as two poles of a continuum. As G. himself suggests, there are tendencies towards both poles in Plato and Aristotle, suggesting that their views are to be located somewhere in between, even as they supplied ammunition for authors with views at either extreme. Still, I was largely convinced, and suspect that G.s frame-work will provide an important basis for future studies of Hellenistic thought.

Also devoted largely to philosophy before Plotinus is George Karamano-liss Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?4 K. devotes chapters to Antiochus, Plutarch, Numenius, Atticus, and Ammonius Saccas, and their diering attitudes towards Aristotle. He demonstrates that there was no orthodox middle Platonist attitude towards Aristotle. Even detractors views var-

2) See C. Gill, Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy and Philosophy: Th e Self in Dialogue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 3) Compare the recent study by R. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Indi-viduality, Life, and Death (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). 4) G. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 419. 53. ISBN 0 19 926456 2.

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P. Adamson / Phronesis 52 (2007) 403-425 405

ied: Atticus was hostile to Aristotle, Numenius merely indierent (128). K. is especially subtle on Antiochus and Plutarch. Rejecting the reductive idea of Antiochus as simply eclectic, he argues that Antiochus main con-cerns were ethical. He accepted the Stoic view that a robust ethics requires a robust epistemology, and believed that Platonism could best provide this, by explaining how humans could achieve total certainty (see e.g. 59, 71). Antiochus could thus forgive Aristotles rejection of Platonic Forms: the main thing was that Aristotles immanent forms provide a sucient basis for certain knowledge (63). Plutarch, by contrast, was more interested in metaphysics. He began a tradition of seeing Aristotle as basically Platonic, though often misunderstood by later Peripatetics. Th e chapter on Ammo-nius Saccas is necessarily more speculative, and takes more or less at face value evidence in Photius to the eect that Ammonius was unusually unencumbered by school allegiances: devoted only to philosophical truth wherever it could be found. After a brief look at Plotinus, the book reaches its climax in a long chapter on Porphyry. Not all the material here will be new to scholars (the section on the Categories for instance is fairly familiar), but some of it will, particularly a text from Porphyrys commentary on Ptolemys Harmonics about the underlying agreement of Plato and Aristo-tle regarding pitch. More generally, K. does three important things: he rejects evidence supposedly showing that Porphyry was ever heavily critical of Aristotle; he sets out Porphyrys philosophy as a systematic whole (the chapter is a good general overview of Porphyry, despite the focus on his attitude towards Aristotle); and he shows the relevance of earlier Platonism for understanding both Plotinus and Porphyry. For instance, K. traces the roots of Neoplatonist doctrines on the eternity of the cosmos and the soul as purely intellective these issues serve as leitmotifs for the study as a whole. Th is excellent book shows how a fundamental aspect of Neopla-tonism and especially Porphyrys philosophy the claim that Aristotle and Plato were in harmony grew out of the earlier Platonist context. In this respect it should be read alongside Zambons recent study of Porphyry, reviewed in my 2006 book notes.

Plotinus

Th ose book notes began with monographs devoted to Enneads I.1 and I.4 (by Aubry and Schniewind, respectively). By chance I have again received commentaries on these two treatises. Carlo Marzolos treatment of I.1 [53]



is very dierent from Aubrys.5 Following a translation and revised text, the bulk of M.s volume is a line-by-line commentary rather than a wide-ranging monograph. M. thus focuses more on the details of how to take the Greek (for comparison he frequently cites numerous previous transla-tions), and on parallels or relevant texts from other ancient authors. He especially emphasizes Alexander of Aphrodisias: not only Alexanders De anima, but also De mixtione for the question of how soul is mixed with body. M. also cites extensively from previous secondary literature. Th e result is a useful collection of references for readers of I.1, rather than a sustained philosophical interpretation of I.1. But that is to some extent found in the more discursive introduction, which situates I.1 relative to Platos Alcibiades I and other Plotinian treatises especially the immedi-ately previous treatise in chronological order, II.3 [52]. M. also rightly emphasizes the dialectical structure of I.1, which he compares to a Platonic dialogue (48). For a philosophical analysis of the psychological issues, the reader can turn to the preface by Cristina DAncona, who argues persua-sively that it is misleading to think of Plotinus simply as a dualist. Th is would be to underestimate the extent to which the body depends on soul to be a body at all; for it is soul that imposes eidos on matter (12).

Kieran McGroartys study of I.4 [46] likewise provides a translation fac-ing the Greek text and a line-by-line commentary.6 Th e translation is gen-erally ne, despite an occasional habit of following the Greek syntax too closely, e.g. ch.2, last sentence, and ch.8, rst sentence. (I have a few other quibbles, for instance the translation in ch.1 of eupatheia as good experi-ence. Plotinus refers even to plants as capable of eupathein, and ch.2 sug-gests that one can have a pathos without experiencing it.) Th e main value of the book lies in the detailed commentary. In contrast to Schniewind, M. gives us a very otherworldly and uncompromising Plotinus. Whereas Schniewind sees I.4 as highly structured, with sections tailored to progres-sively higher levels of attainment, M. sees the treatise as hammering home a single message: that only union with nous can be constitutive of eudai-monia. Nothing at the empirical level can either contribute to eudaimonia or detract from it. Th is stark reading of Plotinus has several problems, not

5) C. Marzolo, Plotino. Che cos lessere vivente e che cos luomo? I 1[53] (Pisa: Pisa Univer-sity Press, 2006), pp. 208. 18. ISBN 88 8492 367 0. 6) K. McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia. A Commentary on Ennead I.4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. xxiii+236. 50. ISBN 0 19 928712 0.



always fully solved in M.s commentary. For one thing, Plotinus of course thinks we are all always united with nous thanks to our undescended souls. Are we not all therefore always happy, whether we know it or not? M.s reply (147, 171) is that we count as happy only once we have achieved awareness of this union with intellect. After that, we are puried and have achieved the rank of a spoudaios, from which we cannot fall (121). Th is is rather more puzzling than M. admits. It is hard to see why attaining conscious awareness of nous is crucial, but maintaining it is not: Plotinus explicitly denies in I.4 that the impairment of the spoudaios, e.g. by magic or drugs, aects his eudaimonia. More problematically, M. often seems to assume that the spoudaios will simply lose interest in the lower world after having puried himself (e.g. 135: why the spoudaios should bother with other people is not at all clear to me, though M. is more nuanced at 193-4). More charitable and faithful to the text (especially ch.15) would be to say that the spoudaios motivation for all levels of virtue is never lost, even though his eudaimonia would not be impaired if exceptional external circumstances prevent activity in accordance with practical virtue. Regard-ing Plotinus likely sources, M. stresses the inuence of Epictetus much more than other commentators have done (see 56-7, 61). Usually M. is sure-footed with previous thinkers, though he seems to me to misunder-stand Aristotles point that one would not be virtuous if one slept through life: he infers, unwarrantedly, that Aristotle did not believe the spoudaios was eudaimn while asleep (139). Finally I note M.s emphasis on the biographical context of I.4, which was written towards the end of Plotinus life, during illness. M. thinks this led Plotinus to adopt a more favorable stance towards suicide (see the appendix on this topic, 205-7).

Th e volume Studi sullanima in Plotino is divided into two halves.7 Th e rst half is devoted to close readings of passages in the Enneads, especially parts of IV.7 [2] where Plotinus attacks earlier theories of soul. Th ere are for instance discussions of IV.7.8, on whether the soul is a harmony (this by the late and great Matthias Baltes, to whom the volume is dedicated); of IV.7.8.1-23, on materialist, especially Stoic theories of soul; and of IV.7.85.25-50, in which Plotinus attacks the Aristotelian theory of soul as entelecheia. A particularly interesting piece in this rst half is by the vol-umes editor, Chiaradonna. He focuses on Plotinus discussion of Stoic

7) R. Chiaradonna (ed.), Studi sullanima in Plotino (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005), pp. 414. 50. ISBN 88 7088 482 1.



theories of mixture in IV.7.82, arguing against previous interpreters (espe-cially Drrie) that Plotinus is not here simply following an earlier bit of Platonist school diatribe. Rather Plotinus method is highly subtle and dialectical, drawing on Aristotelian premises (the components of a total mixture remain potentially present) to show that the relation between soul and body cannot be a Stoic krasis. Th e second half of the volume mostly situates aspects of Plotinus psychology relative to earlier and subsequent authors. For instance there is an interesting discussion by Mnnlein-Robert of Longinus attack on materialist theories of soul, which like parts of Plotinus IV.7 is preserved in Eusebius. Zambon contributes one of the better explanations I have seen of the philosophical motivations behind the Neoplatonist doctrine of the soul vehicle (ochma) Zambon shows how these vehicles allowed Neoplatonists to reconcile the Platonist the-ory of a separate soul with the Aristotelian doctrine that ties soul more closely to body. Th e vehicles are also supposed to make it easier to explain how soul can gradually ascend towards a closer relation to the intelligible realm. Zambon points out (321) that it is therefore unsurprising that Plo-tinus, who believed the soul always remains united to nous, dispensed with vehicles in his system. Th is leads very nicely into the next piece, Dillons brief but useful discussion of Iamblichus criticisms of the undescended soul. Rounding o the volume is a longer study by Catapano, which traces an argument for the immortality of the soul that the entire soul perceives pain although only a small part of the body is aected from Carolingian texts back to numerous works by Augustine, and thence to Plotinus, pos-sibly by way of Porphyry. In all, this volume is well worth the attention of anyone with an interest in Plotinian psychology, and especially of those interested in how Plotinus responds to earlier theories of soul.

Proclus and Syrianus

Another collection of papers devoted to a single Neoplatonic author is Proklos: Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik.8 As the title indicates the volume is divided into three sections, which in theory deal with Proclus method-

8) M. Perkams and R.M. Piccione (eds), Proklos. Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 431. 139/$180. ISBN 90 04 15084 6. Th e papers are all in German or English.



ology, psychology, and metaphysics. But in fact these categories are fairly loose and the volume has pieces on a wide range of topics using a wide range of approaches. Th e result is a somewhat uneasy compromise between a collection of specialist articles and an overview of the main topics of Proclus philosophy, as a companion-style volume might provide. Th us some papers deal with issues that are largely familiar to specialists. Still, they mostly do so in an unusually clear and comprehensive way: I would especially praise Horns opening piece, which explains what is distinctive about Proclus brand of Neoplatonism; Opsomers systematic and thor-ough treatment of irrational souls in Proclus; Abbate on the theological context of Proclus reading of the Republic; and Roth on the sense in which the physical cosmos is generated. Other papers have a more argumentative focus or deal with less familiar topics. For instance van den Burg argues that the Cratylus commentary was written in preparation for the theologi-cal speculations of the Platonic Th eology. Two other highlights from the strong opening section are Martijn on the method of the Timaeus com-mentary, and Mnnlein-Robert on aporetic commentary (i.e. structur-ing the commentary by means of aporiai and solutions) in Longinus and others, and on Proclus rather dismissive assessment of Longinus as a thinker. In the metaphysics section I especially appreciated Helmigs dis-cussion of enmattered form, which according to Proclus remains undi-vided even though, by breathing forth, it gives rise to divided qualities in bodies. Also good is dHoines piece on whether there are Forms of artefacts, which traces the issue forward from Plato and Aristotle (includ-ing On Ideas) to Syrianus and Proclus. I found a piece by Bechtle on the Athenian Neoplatonists attitude towards mathematics interesting, though rather tetchy towards other scholars (he chastizes them for importing modern ideas about mathematics into the ancient context). Similarly I found the concluding piece by Halfwassen, on the transcendence of the One, helpful in its discussion of the Platonic sources but unnecessarily insistent that Plato really did think many of the things Proclus says he did. Th e papers often resonate nicely with one another, even across the three sections. Th us for instance Helmigs paper is interesting to read alongside discussions of the lower parts of the soul by Opsomer and Perkams (who emphasizes Proclus original idea that the souls parts are substantially distinct). Steels discussion of self-constituting entities connects to other papers in various interesting ways. For instance Roths treatment of the generation of the cosmos shows why a physical object



cannot be self-constituting, and Steels well-taken words of warning about the dierences between Christian and Proclan Neoplatonism (235) reso-nate nicely with Schfers rather idiosyncratic piece on relations of proces-sion and reversion in Proclus and the Pseudo-Dionysius. In all, the volume will be protably consulted by scholars of Proclus, while the less initiated will gain from it a good understanding of some major issues in Proclus (though its price will make it less useful in this regard than it might other-wise have been).

Lets now turn back from Proclus to his teacher, Syrianus, about whom I have two books to discuss. Th e rst is from the Ancient Commentators Project (for more volumes from the Project, see further below), and is a translation by John Dillon and Dominic OMeara of Syrianus commen-tary on Metaphysics M and N.9 Dillon adds a useful introduction. Syrianus here adopts a uniquely hostile stance towards Aristotle, who in this part of the Metaphysics attacks a version of Platonism which identies Forms with numbers. According to Syrianus, in M and N Aristotle indulges in controversy rather than exposition (see 184). Th is point is crucial, because Syrianus seems to approve of the doctrines presented by Aristotle in expository contexts. Indeed he argues throughout that Aristotles state-ments elsewhere commit him to Platonist views. For instance, Aristotle accepts the causal ecacy of separate forms, as is clear from earlier parts of the Metaphysics itself (80). So despite initial appearances, Syrianus does not depart completely from the Neoplatonist thesis that Aristotle and Plato are in agreement. As for the specic issue of Form and number, Syrianus main strategy is to dierentiate between divine, intelligible numbers and uni-tary numbers that are immanent in the lower realm. Only the latter are quantitative, being made up of units that serve as their matter: these undierentiated units become number by receiving form from intelligible causes. Syrianus denies repeatedly that Aristotles puzzles about number are in any way relevant for divine number. On the other hand he often concedes that Aristotles puzzles are genuine when applied to unitary num-ber, though puzzles that can be solved (for a good example see 128). One might wonder how Syrianus can claim that divine numbers and unitary numbers are in some shared sense numbers, since the former are not even quantitative. Syrianus never really addresses this issue directly. But it seems

9) J. Dillon and D. OMeara (trans.), Syrianus: On Aristotle Metaphysics 13-14 (London: Duckworth, 2006), pp. 240. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3574 3.



possible to piece together what his answer would be: for instance, both kinds of numbers possess equality and inequality (103) and some degree of multiplicity (161). It strikes me that there is room for further work on Syrianus philosophy of mathematics, which will be facilitated by Dillon and OMearas clear translation and helpful notes.

Syrianus commentary is also the subject of an important new mono-graph by Angela Longo, which focuses on the commentary to book .10 L. explores in particular Syrianus treatment of axioms, especially the prin-ciple of non-contradiction (hereafter PNC), and the way that Syrianus accomodates Aristotelian dialectic and rst philosophy within a Neopla-tonic system. Regarding the PNC, L. notes a text (in Met. 65.20-24) that could tempt one to think that Syrianus anticipated Lucasiewiczs distinc-tion between three types of PNC, logical, ontological and psychological. But L. argues that this is not Syrianus point. Indeed, for Syrianus these dierent versions of the PNC cannot be disentangled from one another. Syrianus is, however, unique in the ancient tradition in that he does recog-nize more than one version of the PNC. For he distinguishes the principle that two contradictories cannot both be true from the principle that two contradictories cannot both be false (130). But how do we know, or defend, the truth of the PNC and other axioms, given that they are inde-monstrable? In fact, for Syrianus as for Aristotle, we must grasp the axioms in a way superior to the way we grasp what is demonstrated (since, famously, we demonstrate what is less well-known on the basis of what is more well-known). Syrianus argues that this can only be the case if we take the axioms directly from nous he argues against the view (which L. calls hyper-Aristotelian, 193) that the axioms could somehow be taken induc-tively from sensation. Furthermore, Syrianus argues that Aristotle himself should be committed on epistemic grounds to a Platonic scheme with intermediary separate entities the mathematicals, for instance and above these the pure simple intelligibles (cf. my remarks above on the com-mentary to M and N). Th ese latter, shows L., are what are properly grasped in rst philosophy, which is thus able to provide all other sciences with their foundations. Others have therefore said that Syrianus conates Aris-totles rst philosophy with Platonic dialectic, as presented in the Repub-lic. But L. points out that Syrianus in fact recognizes more than one type

10) A. Longo, Siriano e i principi della scienza (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005), pp. 450. 31. ISBN 88 7088 451 1.



of dialectic. For in his system there is also a dialectic inferior to rst phi-losophy, and limited to the level of discursivity. In an interesting passage (in Met. 63.21-32, see 257.) Syrianus describes this more Aristotelian type of dialectic as having some traits in common with sophistry for example both operate at the level of mere opinion. In all, L.s book signicantly advances our understanding of Syrianus, and conrms the subtlety of his stance towards Aristotle. Sometimes Syrianus criticizes him openly (for instance regarding the question of separate substances), but sometimes he adopts an Aristotelian framework within his broader Pla-tonist perspective (for instance with the treatment of dialectic and the axi-oms). Also worth mentioning is Jonathan Barness typically graceful introduction (in English), which discusses the extent to which later Neo-platonists were interested in logical questions for their own sake.

Late Ancient Logic

I have in fact received a striking number of contributions on logic in the late ancient tradition. Rick Kennedy deals with dialectic, and in par-ticular the reasonableness of belief based on authority.11 Th e book is wide-ranging, beginning with Aristotles Topics and following the tradition all the way to the 20th century (much of the volume deals with the 18th-19th centuries). K. supplies a useful overview of texts devoted to the topic of dialectical (or as he says reasonable) belief. He is right to note the importance of text-books, by authors like Boethius and Cassiodorus, in the medieval period. But his discussion is to some extent vitiated by a surprising omission that begins already with Aristotle: the relationship between dialectic and demonstation (or as K. might put it, between rea-sonableness and certainty). K. says nothing about the fact that beliefs grounded in authority are meant to lead us to beliefs grounded in rst principles. While this is not the only role played by dialectic in Aristotle, no discussion of this tradition should simply contrast dialectical and phil-osophical beliefs as if they were antithetical. It is not unconnected to this that K. misdescribes the attitude of medieval philosophers towards rea-sonableness, on the assumption that they use either authority or reason. He says, in a telling remark, that philosophers have naturally tended to

11) R. Kennedy, A History of Reasonableness: Testimony and Authority in the Art of Th inking (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2004), pp. 277. 50/$75. ISBN 1 58046 152 2.



explore the power of their own minds rather than social arts of reasonable-ness (72). Another lapse regards the Stoic theory of assent, which K. strangely takes to defend a tolerant attitude towards uncertain beliefs (20). Still, the project envisioned here is a worthwhile one, and K. shows com-mendable ambition in discussing such a vast historical range of texts.

At the more formal end of historical logic, we have a collection of papers (mostly previously published) by John N. Martin.12 Th ese papers pursue a variety of topics, such as a semantics for understanding the Boethian claim that God knows timelessly. But the dominant theme is that of scalar predicates. Th ese are adjectives which have an ordering such as cold, cool, lukewarm, warm, hot. M. is especially interested in the various ways such predicates may be negated, including hypernegation and privative nega-tion (e.g. not warm can mean both more than warm and less than warm). He argues that scalar logic sheds light on some distinctive Neoplatonic claims, especially negations regarding transcendent principles (the via negativa literally becomes progressive steps of inference in scalar logic, 66). Particularly suggestive is the idea of treating existence itself as a scalar predicate (see especially ch.3). Th is approach produces some nice insights. For instance, the higher something is up the scalar order, the more deter-minate it is, so that hypernegation in fact makes the rst principles more, not less, concrete (see 40). However it is unclear whether the book is pri-marily an eort to understand Neoplatonism (vii). Closer to the mark, I think, would be that M. gives highly technical formalizations of certain linguistic structures under the inspiration of Neoplatonic texts.

Rounding o this group of books on late antique logic, two volumes by Ian Mueller complete the translation of Alexanders commentary on book 1 of the Prior Analytics in the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series. Th e rst volume, on 1.23-31,13 mostly compares direct categorical syllogisms to other argument forms, for example hypothetical syllogisms and syn-thetic syllogisms (which concatenate a string of premises to reach their conclusion). Alexander agrees with Aristotle that such argument forms add nothing to the power of standard Aristotelian syllogistic. So Alexander must claim that Stoic innovations in logic, for instance their treatment of hypothetical reasoning, can be translated back into Aristotles logical

12) J.N. Martin, Th emes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 218. 49.95. ISBN 0 7546 0811 5. 13) I. Mueller (trans.), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.23-31 (Lon-don: Duckworth, 2006), pp. 192. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3407 0.



terminology and method. Another key topic is how to discover syllo-gisms by collecting the consequences and antecedents of both the subject and predicate in the desired conclusion. As M. points out (22), Aristotles technique really presupposes that one already knows the way in which [the subject] and [the predicate] are related to all the other terms. So it is unsurprising that, in what is perhaps the most eye-catching chapter (ch.31), Aristotle and Alexander see Platonic division merely as a defective version of this technique. It explores only the possible consequents of the relevant term (e.g. rational for human), and gives no way of choosing between them (for instance if we divide rational from non-rational, one must know by means other than division that human belongs under the former, not the latter). Alexander (126) goes so far as to suggest: none of [Aristotles] pre-decessors knew anything about syllogisms or concerned himself with them. (Some ancient Platonists held the reverse: that Aristotles logic is entirely, albeit implicitly, present in Platos dialogues.) Th e second volume covers chapters 32-46.14 Major topics here include the substitution of terms in logical arguments, including Aristotles use of variables (letters) to stand in for terms; the workings of hypothetical arguments; and a long nal chapter on negation. Again, Alexander repeatedly criticizes the Stoics. For instance, regarding substitution of terms, he complains that they stick closely to the way things are expressed and not to what the expressions mean(65). Another point of dispute emerges in the last chapter, over the question of negations applied to non-existing subjects.

Th e Commentary Tradition

Staying with the Commentators series, I turn to Catherine Osbornes translation of the opening sections of Philoponus commentary on the Physics.15 Th is includes passages (notably one on whether creation ex nihilo is possible) that bear on the contrast between this commentary and Philo-ponus works against the eternity of the world. In her introduction O. argues that the contrast is not so great as has been supposed: Philoponus remarks in the commentary are most frequently non-committal, and

14) I. Mueller (trans.), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.32-46 (Lon-don: Duckworth, 2006), pp. 165. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3408 9. 15) C. Osborne (trans.), Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 1.1-3 (London: Duckworth, 2006), pp. 152. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3409 7.



when he does take up a position of his own it is often dierent from Aris-totles. Furthermore, passages which seem to acknowledge such things as a heavenly fth element which Philoponus famously rejects in Against Aristotle can be at least partly explained by the dialectical context, in other words by saying that Philoponus is here trying to argue from within Aristotles own position. Other important sections of the commentary translated here include Philoponus attempt to explain why Aristotle says, at the beginning of the Physics, that the universal is prior for us; usually he says that the particular is prior. Philoponus solution invokes the notion of an indeterminate particular. Th is intriguing idea could perhaps be applied in explaining other aspects of Aristotelian epistemology, such as the initial acquisition of concepts. More than half of the volume deals not with these methodological issues, though, but rather with the Eleatics. Philoponus believes that Aristotle has fundamentally misunderstood Par-menides project. Th e latters identication of being with a simple one is in fact to be understood as applying only to the intelligible world. (It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Philoponus introduces this interpretation just after reaching Aristotles suggestion that, for Parmenides, the one might be substance alone by itself, with no attributes distinct from the substance.) Finally, it is worth dwelling on Philoponus allusions to Plato in this part of the commentary: not only to the passages from the Sophist where the Stranger discusses Parmenides, but also to the Timaeus. Philopo-nus in fact groups Timaeus himself in with other Pre-Socratic theorists regarding the number and nature of the principles of the physical world.

Also important for the question of the worlds eternity, and Neopla-tonist interpretations of the Timaeus, is R.J. Hankinsons translation of Simplicius commentary on De Caelo I.10-12.16 Two things make the vol-ume particularly interesting. First, it gives us a chance to see what com-mentators made of Aristotles infamous arguments in De Caelo I.12 to the eect that the eternally existent exists necessarily. Simplicius discussion of this is detailed and often forbiddingly dense, and readers will be grateful for the guidance H. provides in his many notes to the text. Second, this volume includes numerous passages in which Simplicius quotes and criti-cizes Alexander. Simplicius antipathy to Philoponus (who is not men-tioned at all in this part of the commentary) is well-known, but his attitude

16) R.J. Hankinson (trans.), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10-12 (London: Duckworth, 2006), pp. x+134. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3232 9.



towards Alexander is also important, and rather more nuanced. While Simplicius clearly respects Alexander, he is at pains to correct Alexanders interpretation of the Timaeus. Simplicius of course adopts the orthodox view that Plato only seems to be committed to the temporal generation of the world. Furthermore, he claims, Aristotle was well aware of Platos true doctrine: he cites Aristotles lost epitome of the Timaeus in a not very per-suasive attempt to show this (7). Less striking but also important is the fact that Simplicius has a dierent understanding of the argument of I.12. Whereas Alexanders interpretation of the argument is quite convoluted, Simplicius thinks the necessity of the eternal can be easily proven by invoking the principle of plenitude (see especially 51 and nn. 324, 327). In fact, Simplicius thinks the doctrine of I.12 to be so obviously true that he raises the question of why Aristotle went to such lengths to prove it! Here we may pause to draw a sobering lesson about supposed self-evidence, since most philosophers would now say that this same doctrine is obviously false.

I have received a further volume of translation from this same commen-tary, devoted to the end of De Caelo II, by Ian Mueller.17 (Th ese volumes by Hankinson and Mueller complete the translation of Simplicius com-mentary on books I-II; Muellers translations of III-IV are forthcoming.) Th e highlight of this volume is probably Simplicius commentary on De Caelo II.12, which includes a wealth of information about ancient plane-tary theory, especially the views of Eudoxus, Callippus and Sosigenes, who is quoted at length. Simplicius not only reports these theories, but also evaluates their success in preserving both the phenomena and Aristo-tles theory that the heavens move with a simple motion around the center of the universe (which conicts with the theory of eccentric spheres, 48). Th e commentary to II.13-14 meanwhile deals with the question of the earths location and shape. I was struck by Simplicius brief reections on what seems to be a use of the principle of sucient reason (at De Caelo 295b29-35). Simplicius remarks that it is perfectly possible for a free agent to choose between equally desirable objects (uniformity does not prevent choice, 77). As in the commentary on I.10-12, we see Simplicius some-times distancing himself from Alexander (e.g. on whether the elements

17) I. Mueller (trans.), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 2.10-14 (London: Duck-worth, 2005), pp. ix+189. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3342 2.



have soul, 29-30), quoting lost works of Aristotle (from On Prayer to show that Aristotle may have believed that god transcends intellect, 26), and above all seeking to harmonize Plato with Aristotle, by claiming that Aris-totle takes issue only with the surface meaning of the Timaeus and other dialogues (e.g. at 56-8).

Th e growth of interest in ancient commentaries makes Reading Plato in Antiquity a timely publication.18 Unsurprisingly Proclus looms large in this volume, but the coverage starts much earlier with papers by Tarrant and Dillon, on the Old Academy and Middle Platonists respectively. Dillon makes a self-consciously modest case for the originality of Middle Platonic readings of Plato, concentrating largely on the Timaeus. Tarrant argues, persuasively to my mind, for an early linking of the idea of common notions (ennoiai) with the theory of recollection. Two more papers, on Apuleius and Galen, ll out the period before Plotinus. Finamores paper is a useful survey of Apuleius Platonic metaphysical views, while Rocca concentrates on Galens use of the Phaedrus. Th e bulk of the volume, though, concerns Neoplatonism, especially Plotinus and Proclus. Th is focus on Plotinus and Proclus is not surprising but is slightly regrettable. For instance there are no contributions devoted specially to Olympiodorus, though he does gure alongside other Platonists in some articles. Th e pieces vary in degree of detail and specialization. Some papers provide useful overviews of major aspects of the tradition: for instance Brisson on the types of virtue, Phillips on evil in Plotinus (a familiar enough topic, but with an unusual stress on the Platonic texts behind Plotinus view), and at the end of the volume a survey of the reception of Proclus (often mediated by the Pseudo-Dionysius) in Byzantium. Others argue for very specic interpretive points. One that stood out for me was Martijns piece on Proclus understanding of the statement that the Timaeus cosmogony is a likely story (eiks mythos). She argues that for Proclus eiks would have had largely a positive signicance, i.e. tting or probable. He accom-modates any pejorative connotation by saying that the Timaeus account is tailored to the imagistic nature of human cognition and the physical cosmos itself. Th is interpretation of the Timaeus as devoted specically to physics is also well explored here by Cleary. Th ough all the pieces are

18) H. Tarrant and D. Baltzly (eds), Reading Plato in Antiquity (London: Duckworth, 2006), pp. ix+268. 50. ISBN 0715634550.



well-presented, I found a few less convincing. For instance I think that van den Bergs thesis of the centrality of theurgy in Proclan puricatory theory is not really troubled by the considerations presented by Baltzly, even if Baltzly is right to say that the removal of false belief through rational inquiry is a necessary condition of such purication. Might not this simply be an earlier stage in the same process? I also wonder whether the local concerns of Proclus Alcibiades commentary, which dominates Baltzlys discussion, skew Proclus view to some extent. Sumis piece consists of a detailed reading of Enneads VI.2.22 on the production of species out of the megista gn; dogmatic assertion tends to take the place of argument in this oering. Th e Neoplatonism section is rounded o by a nice contrast between Sorabji, who discusses how Neoplatonists dealt with conicts between Plato and Aristotle, and Gerson, who endorses the Neoplatonic thesis that Plato and Aristotle are much more in harmony than is generally thought today. Th anks to the greater detail of his examples, Sorabjis article is the more persuasive; very little of what Gerson says about Plato and Aristotle is uncontroversial, and he has no space to argue eectively for his claims here.19 On a more general note, I was struck by the fact that the Phaedrus is the most prominent dialogue in the volume apart from the Timaeus. (Buckley contributes a good, albeit somewhat speculative, piece arguing that the Phaedrus is used by Proclus to structure his assessment of previous Platonist authors.) Th is is one of several salutary general points to emerge from the volume as a whole regarding ancient perceptions of Plato, and which aspects of his corpus they emphasized. To judge from the con-tributions here epistemological issues, and hence dialogues like the Th e-aetetus and doctrines like recollection, seem to dominate the Platonist tradition before Plotinus. Th is impression would be even stronger had the volume included a study of the anonymous commentary on the Th eaetetus. Other dialogues, especially those we now think of as early Socratic dia-logues, are all but absent. It is telling that the volumes index locorum has no entries at all for such works as the Euthyphro or Apology to say nothing of the Charmides or Laches while only Tarrants piece on the earliest ancient readers needs to mention the Meno. Th is is one way in which the ancients view of Plato was very dierent from our own.

19) But for a more elaborate defense see L.P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).



Latin Philosophy

Simon Harrisons Augustines Way Into the Will provides a careful reading of one of Augustines most philosophically interesting and oft-studied works: On Free Choice of the Will (De libero arbitrio, hereafter LA).20 LA is stan-dardly read in the light of Augustines dispute with the Pelagians, who held that it is within our own power to be good. Parts of LA have seemed to many including the Pelagians themselves to fall short of Augustines mature insistence on the absolute need for grace to rectify the will. Mod-ern scholars often take the early parts of the work (or at least book 1) more or less faithfully to report discussions Augustine had at Rome, and to pres-ent views that are unusually close to Pelagianism. Augustine himself tells us that books 2 and 3 were completed later, after his move to Hippo (see 18). Despite this H. urges us to read LA as a unied work with a single theological and philosophical outlook. Against Peter Browns idea that book 1 is more optimistic than book 3, H. suggests that the three books of LA have an increasing level of complexity, which accounts for the more nuanced (and hence more apparently pessimistic) passages in book 3. He also argues that, since the Renaissance, a close tie between the text and the Rome discussions has been imposed by identifying the interlocutor of LA as Evodius. But in fact, argues H. (ch.3), the original published version of LA almost certainly would have had no clues as to the identity of the interlocutors, and Evodius name is never mentioned in LA itself. Th is is a nice point, but it does little if anything to undermine the idea that the early sections of LA are based closely on actual discussions at Rome, albeit perhaps not exclusively with Evodius. Th e larger claim could then stand, that the content and context of LA book 1 are very dierent from books 2 and especially 3. Th is leads me to another unusual feature of H.s inter-pretation: unlike most philosophically-oriented readers of LA, he places relatively little emphasis on book 3. His key text is rather I.12, in which Augustine convinces Evodius to take his possession of a will as a necessary starting-point of the discussion, rather than its conclusion. H. convincingly places this in the context of cogito-like arguments in Augustine, and shows that elsewhere our certainty that we will is closely allied to our cer-tainty that we are alive (74). H. thus reads LA as having an epistemological

20) S. Harrison, Augustines Way into the Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 191. 45. ISBN 0 19 826984 6.



point at its core: my will is inalienably present to me, and absolutely certain and undeniable (127). However this does not necessarily mean that, as the Pelagians claimed, Augustine is committed to the idea that the power to be good is equally inalienable; for the will in question here is prior to and distinct from any capacity to act well or badly (125). I wonder, though, whether the mature Augustine could think that there was any sort of will as untrammeled by sin as the will of LA 1 seems to be. Here it would have helped had H. said how this will-prior-to-action relates to the will-involved-in-action. Th is might have led him to a deeper discussion of the threat of necessity in book 3 and, perhaps, to the admission that book 3 does take up the issues of freedom and evil from a signicantly dierent (and not just more advanced) perspective than books 1 and 2. On the other hand, I was persuaded by H.s point that in LA Augustine moves gradually from an ordinary language use of terms like voluntas towards a more technical use. Th is is just one respect in which H.s strategy of read-ing LA on its own terms, and not through the lens of later developments, has great merit.

Mark Vesseys collection of articles in the Variorum series is not really aimed at a philosophical readership, but rather pursues the notion of late antique literature.21 Still, V.s attention in several articles to delineating a late antique period has implications for the history of philosophy. Often by means of reviews or overviews of other scholarly works, V. argues per-suasively against a radical break between antique and medieval literary practice. Particularly noteworthy is ch.11, on Peter Browns contribution to the notion of the late antique. Th is and several other pieces in the middle of the volume would be of most potential interest to readers of Phronesis, since they focus on Augustine. Th ough Augustine is here treated more in a literary than a philosophical fashion, I was interested by V.s informative discussion of the immediate reception of Augustines teaching on free will (ch.7). Ch.5 is also of some philosophical interest: it deals with Augustines epistemology and doctrine of textual exegesis (how does learn-ing from revealed Scripture relate to our learning from God as the inner teacher?), and with Jeromes inuence on these elements of Augustines thought.

21) M. Vessey, Latin Christian Writers in Late Antiquity and their Texts (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. xii+338. 60. ISBN 0 86078 981 0.



Arabic Philosophy

I have received several volumes that make important contributions to our knowledge of the reception of Greek philosophy in Arabic. Particularly fundamental is of course the form in which Aristotle reached the Arabic world. So the publication of a long-delayed translation of the Arabic Nico-machean Ethics is very much to be welcomed.22 Th e translation and intro-duction are substantially those of the late D.M. Dunlop. Th e editors of the present volume have re-edited the text of the unique manuscript, which was discovered in two pieces in Fez earlier this century. Th eir edition sup-plants the 1979 edition of Badawi. Th e Arabic translation, which appar-ently was the one used by such philosophers as al-Farabi and Averroes, is interestingly dierent from the Greek text, especially in its inclusion of the so-called seventh book, a summary-paraphrase of Aristotles treat-ment of the virtues. But the other ten books in the Arabic version (of which book 6 is mostly missing) constitute a competent translation of the Ethics, probably executed by Ishaq b. Hunayn. Ishaqs Greek Vorlage will have been slightly earlier than any of our Greek manuscripts, although Dunlop does not see the Arabic as suggesting signicant emendations. His lengthy introduction is an invaluable (though on a few points somewhat outdated) overview of the Ethics in the Arabic tradition, and the relation-ship of this translation to other Arabic works based on Aristotles ethical thought. Th ese include the Alexandrian summaries, which are preserved in Latin and in quotations in some Arabic sources. Dunlop argues that this text (like the seventh book) goes back to a Greek original, possibly by Nicholas of Damascus.

Also important for the Arabic reception of Aristotle is a magisterial three volume study by Maroun Aouad, one of the worlds leading scholars of Averroes, devoted to the latters Middle Commentary on Aristotles Rheto-ric.23 A.s treatment of this commentary is exhaustive, not to say exhaust-ing: it consists of three thick volumes, which includes not only a new edition, with French translation and commentary, but also numerous

22) A. Akasoy and A. Fidora (eds),Th e Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. xvi+624. 210, $284. ISBN 90 03 13647 4. 23) Averros (Ibn Rushd), Commentaire moyen la Rhtorique dAristote ed. and trans. M. Aouad (Paris: Vrin, 2002), pp. x+501 (vol.1: General Introduction); pp.353 (vol. 2: Edi-tion and Translation); pp. vi+450 (vol. 3: Commentary to the Commentary). 98. ISBN 2 7116 1610 X.



indices and thematic overviews of the commentary in the rst volume. As a middle commentary, Averroes work consists of an elaborated para-phrase of the Rhetoric. Th is is in contrast to long commentaries which comment at length on the source text in lemmas, and short commentar-ies which simply epitomize the text (there is also an extant Short Commen-tary on the Rhetoric by Averroes). Th is format allows Averroes to make good on his view that rhetoric must be suited to the society in which it is practiced, by giving many examples drawn from Islamic society. When discussing the use of rhythm in rhetorical speech, for instance, Averroes gives examples drawn from prosody, grammar, Arabic literature, the secre-tarial arts, the Koran, hadith, and Arabic poetry (cf. vol.1, 174). Of par-ticular interest are remarks showing how Averroes integrated his expertise in Islamic law (he was a chief qadi, or judge, in Cordoba) into his reading of the Rhetoric. I would note Averroes development of the theme of writ-ten vs. unwritten laws; the latter may with some caution be described as natural laws, and are discussed well by A. at vol.1, 120. Also notewor-thy are Averroes views on how rhetoric is integrated into Aristotles logical corpus; he and other Arabic authors follow the Greek tradition that the Rhetoric and Poetics belong to the Organon. Again, A.s super-commentary and thematic summaries give the reader plenty of context and analysis of this and other aspects of Averroes Commentary. A. has certainly produced the denitive study of this commentary. It should be consulted by anyone doing work on Averroes and anyone with an interest in the reception of Aristotles Rhetoric.

I conclude by surveying two collections of essays with broad historical range. Th e rst is a special issue of Mlanges de lUniversit Saint-Joseph,24 devoted to the Greek Strand in Islamic Political Th ought and constitut-ing the proceedings of a conference held in Princeton in 2003. In fact, only two-thirds of the 21 papers are devoted to the core topic of the Islamic reception of Greek political philosophy, with articles at the beginning on Greek philosophy and at the end on Byzantium and the Latin medieval tradition. Several of the articles discuss imperfect regimes, as classied in both Platos Republic and Aristotles Politics. Al-Farabi, who unsurprisingly is the pivotal gure in the volume as a whole, was particularly interested in this topic and drew especially on the Republics presentation of the

24) E. Gannag, P. Crone et al. (eds), Mlanges de lUniversit Saint-Joseph 57 (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 2004).



imperfect regimes. So did Averroes, as we see in a paper here by Aouad. (Islamic political philosophy is unusual in that it is inuenced as much by Plato as by Aristotle. Th is is true of no other area of philosophy in Ara-bic, since relatively little was known of Plato in this tradition apart from versions of the Republic and Laws.)25 Th e volume includes four papers on al-Farabi, with one by Crone specically on the topic of imperfect regimes. Two others, by Gannag and Lahoud, make use of a fruitful sug-gestion which seems to have originated with Fritz Zimmermann, that al-Farabis treatment of religion as a politically useful substitute for phi-losophy parallels his treatment of grammar as a culturally specic substi-tute for logic. But the most provocative paper on al-Farabi, indeed in the volume as a whole, is that of Gutas. He argues that the Arabic word madan, though it does render the Greek politikos, does not mean what the English word political means. Rather, it means strictly pertaining to a city (261). Because for al-Farabi, the ideal city is ruled by someone with a perfected theoretical intellect, it follows that for him political philosophy is subordinated to theoretical philosophy. Th is strikes me as quite right though I think Gutas underestimates the relevance of the Greek Neopla-tonist tradition for this intellectualist approach to practical philosophy.26 A similar impression of the dependence of Islamic political philosophy on Greek metaphysics and epistemology, rather than on concrete political proposals from Greek texts, is also given by two pieces on the religious grounding of political authority in the Shiite tradition (Walker and Baoni). Some of the best papers, it should be mentioned, consist of scholarly textual criticism rather than discussion of these broader themes. I would particularly single out van Bladels impressive piece about the pseudo-Aristotelian Secret of Secrets. Th is is one of two learned pieces on Persian inuences in Arabic texts (the other is Zakeris). A real virtue of this volume is that it unusually devotes considerable space to both the Persian and Syriac traditions, alongside the better-known Greek and Ara-bic ones.

25) See further F. Rosenthal, On the Knowledge of Platos Philosophy in the Islamic World, Islamic Culture 14 (1940), 387-422. An exception is Galens paraphrase of the Timaeus, which was translated into Arabic. 26) At 278 n.41 Gutas criticizes a recent volume which in fact lends signicant support and context for his own thesis: D. OMeara, Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).



My second historical miscellany is a Festschrift for Denis OBrien.27 It covers the same broad range of topics as OBriens own research, and then some: its purview stretches from the Pre-Socratics to the Arabic and Hebrew philosophical traditions. But the center of gravity is Plato and Neoplatonism. Th e volume begins with a charming apologia pro vita sua by OBrien (worth reading if only for the wry remarks about French academic culture) and a short tribute to OBriens scholarship by Dillon. Th e rst pieces are on the Pre-Socratics: Frere contributes a good study of the idea that God is spherical, and encourages us to take this quite literally in the case of, for instance, Xenophanes. Brancacci deals with a parallel between the musical thinker Damon and Platos Republic. Plato is the focus of the next seven papers. Th e quality is uniformly high in this section, but I would single out three pieces in particular. First, Khn uses the Th eaetetus refutation of Protagoras to help explain why the Form of the Good might be epistemically crucial in the Republic; his key insight is that the ascrip-tion of goodness inevitably requires an assertion of reality as opposed to appearance. Second, McCabes witty piece on the Euthydemus draws some deep lessons about reading Plato from some unpromising-looking soph-isms in that dialogue. Th ird, Rowe discusses several passages in Plato that uphold metempsychosis. His idea is twofold: that we should take these passages fairly seriously and not just write them o as mythic, but also that the importance of metempsychosis is that we are already becoming bestial in our current incarnation if we live in the sort of way that will doom us to a (literally) bestial next life. Th e Neoplatonism section features several insightful pieces briefer than a typical journal article. OMearas elegant formal analysis of a Plotinian argument for the necessity of evil is a genuinely helpful addition to the extensive literature on this topic. Dillon surveys the way that Empedocles cosmic cycle (a favorite topic of Denis OBrien) was seen in the Platonist tradition. Particularly interesting here is the idea that a non-literal reading of this cycle may have developed along-side non-literal readings of the Timaeus, which of course emerge very early in Platonist circles. And Gersh collects passages where Plotinus uses meta-phors drawn from music. Th e payo here emerges on the last page: Ploti-nus seems to reach for musical comparisons most often when describing the logos of the cosmos, and not higher orders of reality. Another brief

27) J. Dillon and M. Dixsaut, Agonistes: Essays in Honour of Denis OBrien (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. lxviii+289. 60. ISBN 0754653528.



piece by Smith usefully presents some Neoplatonist ethical material from the 10th-11th century Muslim author Miskawayh. (Here I did have a res-ervation: Smith tends to assume that this material recapitulates a Greek source or sources. Certainly Miskawayh is not the most original thinker, but neither does he refrain from reworking and going well beyond his sources. A good example is his use of Plotinian materials in the less-studied Fawz al-asghar.) Steel presents an overview of ancient judgments (often by rhetoricians) on Platos style, before discussing Proclus defense of the style used in the Parmenides. Th e modern reader may be surprised to learn that this dialogues style is in fact exquisite. For one thing, its simplicity corresponds to the simplicity of its subject, namely the divine. For another, the spare style shows that Plato is using a direct dialectical method to discuss the divine, as opposed e.g. to a mythic or oracular method. Steel ends with criticisms of other scholars: he argues that Gersh underestimates the extent to which Proclus sees this dialectical style as capable of standing on its own, while Sara Rappe is chastized for denying that Proclus reads the Parmenides as anything but pure rational argument. Th is critical attitude towards other scholarship is of course not out of place in a volume dedi-cated to Denis OBrien. Hopefully my summary has conveyed something of the richness of the Festschrift, though I have not even mentioned a pro-vocative piece by Goulet (who makes a clever, and to me attractive, sugges-tion about the notorious textual problem in Diogenes Laertius regarding the (in?)corporeality of the Stoics principles), the articles on Augustine, or the translation of some pseudo-Empedocles from Hebrew, which form the conclusion to the volume.


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