ΧνΠ - EUDORUS OF ALEXANDRIA AND EARLY IMPERIAL PLATONISM

MAURO BONAZZI

I

In the period between the first century BC and the first A D , Greek philosophy underwent many decisive changes. The Academy and the Lyceum closed, Aristotle's school treatises were put again into circulation, there was a revival of interest in Pythagoreanism with the emergence of a remarkable corpus of pseudepigrapha. And, above all, Platonism turned dogmatic. Unfortunately, our knowledge of those events is scant. We know the names o f many philosophers, but the almost complete loss of the relevant literature prevents us from assessing the value of their contribution. This problem is particularly delicate in the case of Platonism: we do not know whether this 'turn to dogmatism' arose from within the Academy, as by a sort of parthenogenesis, or whether it grew from outside, as a con­sequence of the new exegetical freedom provided by the closing down of such an authoritative cenfre as the Academy.

In this context Eudorus appears to be a pivotal figure. He was in contact with important Academics of his time,' and he is called 'Academic' in his turn by some sources;^ yet he was from Alexandria, and he was interested in Pythagoreanism and Aristotelian philosophy as well. Such is the popularity of Eudorus that almost everything wTitten in this period was sometimes attributed to his pen, a tendency criticized by John Rist with the label of 'Paneudorism'.^ Regrettably, the fragments referring explicitly to

' Strabo's testimony that Eudorus accused Ariston of plagiarism (17.1.5) confirms his knowledge of Antiochus' pupil, and may induce one to suppose his acquaintance with other Academics as well, for instance Dion, who was a considerable public figure at that time; cf J. Dillon, 'Eudore d'Alexandrie', in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, ed. R. Goulet (Paris 2000) vol. Ill 290. Since Strabo (65 BC-19 AD) refers to Eudorus as living 'in his time' (kath' hemas), we probably cannot think of him as active much before the middle of the first century. Cicero's apparent unawareness may provide a further argument ex silentio.

' Stobaeus, Anth. 2.7.2, p. 42.7 Wachsmuth; Anonymous, intr Aral 1.6, p. 96.24 Maas; Simplicius, In Cat. 187.10, corresponding to Τ 1, 11, and 16 of the collection of fragments by C. Mazzarelli, 'Raccolta e interpretazione delle testimonianze e dei frammenti del medioplatonico Eudoro di Alessandria', Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 77 (1985) 197-209, 535-55. On the meaning of 'Academic', cf M. Bonazzi, 'Un dibattito tra Academici e Platonici sull'ereditä di Platone. La testimonianza del commentatore anonimo al Teeteto', in Papiri filosofici. Miscellanea di studi IV, Studi e testi per il Coφus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini 11 (Florence 2003) 55-59.

' J. Rist, review of H. Tarrant, Scepticism or Platonism? The philosophy of the Fourth Academy (Cambridge 1985), Phoenix 40 (1986) 468.

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" From the above-mentioned reference by Strabo, we gather that Eudorus also wrote a book on the Nile flood, which confirms a strong interest in scientific matters, cf. Achilles Tatius, Intr. Aral. 13, p. 40 Maas, and Anonymous, Intr. Aral. 2.2, p. 142.19 Maas (= Eudorus, Τ 10 and 12 M[azzarelli], n.2, above) for astronomy; Achilles Tatius, Intr Aral. 6, p. 96, 24 Maas (= Τ 11 M.) for geography.

' Stobaeus, Anth. 2.7.3f, pp. 49.8-50.10 Wachsmuth.

* So tentatively D. E. Hahm, 'The ethical doxography of Arius Didymus', in ANR^V II 37.4 (1990) 3003; see now D. Sedley, 'The ideal of godlikeness', in Plato 2: Ethics, politics, religion, and the soul, ed. G. Fine (Oxford 1999) 309-28.

^ T. Göransson, Albinus. Alcinous, Arius Didymus (Göteborg 1995) 186-91, 219-27. Similar problems are raised by Stobaeus, who is less a compiler than an anthologist, claiming for himself freedom to arrange his material, cf J. Mansfeld and D. Runia, Aeliana. The method and intellectual context of a doxographer. I. The sources, Philosophia antiqua 73 (Leiden 1997) 196-271. Not less Important is the continuous process of abridgment and paraphrase which affected texts such Stobaeus' anthology over the centuries, though there is no ground to suspect any intentional alteration of the content.

him are just a few (22), and it would be difficult to credit Eudorus as the inventor, the protos heuretes of Imperial Platonism, whatever protos heuretes might mean. Of Eudorus' works we know only one by title, A division of philosophical discourse, and we find him commenting on such different texts as Plato's Timaeus, Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics, and Aratus' Phaenomena.^ It is not much, but in this scanty evidence there are nevertheless sufficient clues to suggest that the significance of the role he played in the development of Platonism must not be undervalued. In this paper I shall concentrate on his views on the principles of metaphysics.

But before proceeding to the analysis, there is another topic which deserves attention, the supposition that Eudorus was responsible for what was to become for centuries the standard Platonist treatment of'assimilation to God (homoiosis theoi)' as a formulation of the puφose of life (the telos). This attribution is based on one passage of Stobaeus' Anthologium, traditionally considered of Eudorean provenance. According to that text, 'assimilation to God' is the telos not only for Plato, but also for Socrates and Pythagoras; Plato, however, made the formula more precise by defining it according to the parts of philosophy: in the way appropriate to physics in the Timaeus, ethics in the Republic, and logic in the Theaetetus.^ Assimilation to God, therefore, means contemplating and following the cosmic order {Timaeus), escaping from the world of the senses {Republic), using the mind {Theaetetus).^ On the basis of these Platonic references (in the following sentence the Laws too are introduced) a formal definition is constructed of one of the most distinctive docfrines of Platonism. The importance of this text cannot be denied. But how sure is its attribution to Eudorus? It is a widespread opinion that Stobaeus was quoting Arius Didymus who was in his turn quoting Eudorus. Recently, an incisive monograph by Tryggve Göransson has challenged both the identification of Didymus with the Stoic Arius of Alexandria, himself supposedly identified with Augustus' court philosopher, and the legitimacy of the attribution to Eudorus of a larger part of the text.' In embarking upon the topic, 'Didymus' says that he will proceed 'according to the

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' Stob. Anth. 2.7.2, p. 45.7-10 Wachsmuth.

' Stob. Anth. 2.7.2, p. 42.5-6 Wachsmuth.

Stob. Anth. 2.7.2, pp. 42.7-45.7 Wachsmuth. C f A . A . Long, 'Arius Didymus and the exposition of Stoic ethics', in On Stoic and Peripatetic ethics. The work of Arius Didymus, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh (New Brunswick 1983) 54, reprinted in A. A . Long, Stoic studies (Cambridge 1996) 127.

" The relation between Eudorus and Stobaeus is more complicated and raises other questions which there is not space to consider here. On the theme of "assimilation to God' see also Harold Tarrant, 'Moral goals and virtues in Middle Platonism', below 419-30.

Simplicius, In Phys. 181.7-30 = Eudorus, Τ 3-5 Μ .

arrangement which seems best to me' , ' and earlier he had spoken of different texts and authors, and not only of Eudorus.' Moreover, as far as regards the assumption that at least the Platonic doctrines derive from him, it should be observed that Eudorus' articulation of ethical issues which we find in this same section of Stobaeus' Anthology is clearly neither designed for, nor especially suited for, an account of Platonic ethics.'" Even though these observations do not exclude in principle that Eudorus might still be the source, they make it difficult to attribute the telos definition to Eudorus on the basis of Stobaeus alone.''

II

One of the longest and probably the most important of Eudorus' fragments comes from the Neoplatonist Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Discussing Aristotle's statement that 'all thinkers make the contraries principles' (Phys. 188al9-26), the Neoplatonist mentions the theories of some of Aristotle's predecessors (Parmenides, Thales, Anaximenes, Democritus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras), and then focuses his attention on the Pythagoreans, whose docfrine of principles is explained with recourse to Eudorus:'^

The Pythagoreans put as secondary and elementary principles not only of physical things but simply of everything which is after the one (called by them principle of all things) the opposites; below these, which are not properly principles, they ranked also the two series. Eudorus writes on them: 'It must be said that the Pythagoreans postulated on the highest level the One as principle of all things, and then on a secondary level two principles of completed things, the One and the nature opposed to this. And there are ranked below these all things that are thought of as opposites, the good under the One, the bad under the nature opposed to it. For this reason these two are not regarded as absolute first principles by these philosophers; for if each is principle of a different set, they are not universal principles of all things, as the One is'. And again he says: 'And for this reason, in another way they said that the principle of all things is the One, in so far as matter and all beings are derived from it. This is also the God above'. And then Eudorus, being more exact, says that they set the One as principle, and states that from the One come the elements, which they call by many names: 'Then 1 say that the

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followers of Pythagoras leave the One as the principle of all things, but in another way they introduce two ultimate elements. They call these two elements by many names: the first is called ordered, definite, known, male, odd, right, light; its opposite is unordered, indefinite, unknown, female, left, even, darkness. So as principle there is the One, and as elements there are the One and the indefinite Dyad, both Ones being in turn principles. And it is clear that the One that is principle of all things is distinct from the One opposed to the Dyad, which they also call Monad'.

(Simplicius, On Aristotle 's Physics 181.7-30)

According to Eudorus the 'Pythagoreans' postulated two levels of principles: 'it must be said that the Pythagoreans postulated on the highest level {kata ton anotato logon) the One as principle of all things, and then on a secondary level two principles of existing things, the One and the nature opposed to this' (11. 10-13). Later the highest One is called 'the God above {ho hyperano theos; 1 19)', while the other two principles are specified as 'Monad' and 'indefinite Dyad' (11. 26-30). Below the Monad and the Dyad are ranked 'all the things that are thought of as opposites, the good under the one, the bad under the nature opposed to it' (II. 13-15, 25-27).

This doctrine is presented as a genuine account of ancient Pythagoreanism, but it is neither genuine nor ancient. Rather, it is indebted to some of the most important tenets of the Old Academy of Plato's immediate successors, of Speusippus and Xenocrates. In particular, it is indebted to the introduction of the pair o f Monad-Dyad, the character­ization of the second principle as 'indefinite Dyad', the systematic development of the series of paired principles {systoikhiai). Modem scholars have shown that during the fourth century BC ancient Pythagoreanism was progressively assimilated into the Academy." Considering themselves as the heirs of this philosophical tradition, Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and their pupils reinteφreted and modified ancient doctrines according to their requirements. In Eudoms we can detect elements and clues of this Academic Pythagoreanism, which took the place of the original Pythagorean doctrine. We know from Plutarch that Eudoms was acquainted with the early Platonists, at least with Xenocrates and Grantor.

But important as it is, the Academy alone does not suffice to explain some of the most distinctive and striking details of Eudorus' account. Both Academic and Pythagorean philosophy are basically dualistic systems, while Eudorus introduces a single principle above the pair of the Monad and of the Dyad. As Jaap Mansfeld has observed, this One-God above the series of paired principles (systoichia) can be paralleled neither from the Old Academy nor fi-om the Pythagorean texts which are securely datable before Eudorus." In other words, in Eudoms the legacy of Pythagorean and Academic

" W. Burkert, Lore and science in ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge, Mass. 1972) 15-96.

"* De an. procr 1012d = Eudorus, Τ 6 M.

'•̂ J. Mansfeld, 'Compatible alternatives: Middle Platonist theology and the Xenophanes reception', in Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman world, eds R. van der Broek, T. Baarda, and J. Mansfeld (Leiden 1988)92-117(99-100).

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philosophy consists more in the reception of conceptual and terminological material than in an attempt at loyal renewal. Mansfeld then detected a probable source for Eudorus in Aristotle's discussion of his pre-Socratic predecessor Xenophanes in Metaphysics I. Indeed, in the fifth chapter Xenophanes (who was easily traceable to the Pythagorean tradition) is credited with the thesis that the One as principle is God.'* Eudorus however is not just an historian of philosophy, but an original philosopher.'^ Certainly, the importance of the practice of 'doing philosophy by doing history of philosophy' (which is distinctive of this age) and of Aristotle's doxography cannot be denied. Yet, there are other texts which have to be assumed as influencing Eudorus' account.

Scholars have only seldom paid attention to the distinction between principle, arkhe, and element, stoikheion, in this text. As will emerge below, Aristotle had provided an analysis of elements and principle. Elements are for Aristotle internal constituents, whereas principles are ultimate explanatory factors. Given this distinction, in his view, one must take into consideration that a proper account of principles requires more than an account of the elements only. Simplicius speaks of one principle {arkhe) but also o f secondary and elementary principles, arkhai deuterai kai stoiokheiodeis; Eudorus defines the 'One above' as principle of all things, arkhe ton panton (1 11), while in Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 181.7-30, quoted above, Monad and Dyad are first called arkhai (1 12), but then specified as stoikheia (II. 24, 27). Being each of them the principle of one set o f the opposites, they cannot be common principles of everything (II. 15-17). Therefore, they are called supreme elements, anotato stoikheia (1. 23).

One text which can help us grasp the meaning of the distinction is Plato's Timaeus. Strange as it may seem, a similar, even though implicit, distinction appears in this dialogue as well. At Timaeus 48b5-c2, Timaeus is represented by Plato as stating that the four traditional elements - fire, air, water, earth - are usually considered as principles, but that 'they should not even be ranked as syllables' (48b8-cl). Exploiting the double meaning of the word, stoikheion meaning both element and letter, the four 'elements' are at once denied the status not merely of principles, but also of first stoikheia. This allusive statement identifies, within the broad class of principles, the specific group of stoikheia. As Aristotle's pupil Eudemus of Rhodes said, Plato was the first to define stoikheia as the principles of bodies.'* Later on, Plato represents Timaeus as returning to this point: the four elements are defined as bodies having depth, and depth is reduced to surface, and surface to triangular planes: 'this we assume as the principle of fire and of the other bodies [ . . . ] ; the principles yet further above (anothen) these are known to God and to such men as God favours' (53c4-d7). The last sentence, with its reference to God, indicates that there are even more ultimate (anothen) principles. And while Timaeus in Plato's dialogue, and modem scholars, stop at the triangles, many imperial philosophers, belonging to Eudorus' own philosophical context, did not hesitate to go further in the process of reduc­tion until they reached these more ultimate principles/elements, the ultimate constituents

Cf. Mansfeld, 'Compatible alternatives' (n.l5, above) 103-04, on Arist. Metaph. 1 5 986b24-25.

" Cf J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, (London 1996, 2nd edn) 119 n. I ; cf. also H. Tarrant, Plato's first interpreters (London 2000) 73.

Simplicius, In Phys. 7.13-14 = Eudemus fr. 31 Wehrli.

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" Further evidence is provided by On the generation of the soul in the Timaeus I0I2E, where we read that the numbers are the product of the mixture of the One and Multiplicity, called also - with reference to the Pythagorean tradition - Monad and indefinite Dyad. This statement is attributed to Xenocrates, but Plutarch makes it clear that he is using Eudorus as a source ( I 0 I 3 B ) , c f H. Cherniss, Plutarch's Moralia (Cambridge, Mass. 1976) vol. XIII .I 164-65 n. (c ) , and F. Ferrari and L. Baldi, Plutarco. Lagenerazione dell'anima w / T i m e o (Naples 2002) 230-32 n, 29.

W. Burkert, Lore and science (n.l3, above) 24.

^' Cf e.g. J. Dillon, 'The riddle of the Timaeus: is Plato sowing clues?', in Studies in Plato and the Platonic tradition. Essays presented to John Whittaker, ed. M. Joyal (Aldershot 1997)40-41.

From Plutarch's On the generation of the soul in the Timaeus (10! 3A-B) , we gather that Eudorus agreed with Xenocrates and Grantor that, even though Plato's account of the creation must not be

of which bodies are built up. The reduction inoves from sensible bodies to solid figures, from solid figures to plane figures, from plane figures to lines, from lines to points, from points to the Monad and the Dyad. In several Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, notably in Alexander Polyhistor's Pythagorean memoirs (ap. Diogenes Laertius 8.24-25) and in the Life of Pythagoras preserved by Photius (Bibl. 439al9-24), the process of reduction leads to the two principles of the Academic-Pythagorean tradition, the One-Monad and the Dyad. Not less important is the evidence of Plutarch of Chaeroneia, a philosopher supposed to have been influenced by Eudorus, who in the third Platonic question (1002a) develops the system of derivation in both ways, and who in The obsolescence of oracles (428e-f) characterizes the One and the Dyad both as more ultimate principles (anothen arkhai) and as stoikheia.'^ This interpretation of Plato's Timaeus singles out the pair of One-Monad and Dyad as the first anothen constituents (termed both arkhai and stoikheia), from which bodies derive and of which they are built up.""

But this is not the whole story. To a theologically-minded reader the reference to God's knowledge in 53d6-7 is not to be disregarded. On the contrary, this reference to God, who is easily equated with Plato's divine Demiurge (30a, c, d, 34a), introduces an­other causal level, an external one. And if Monad and Dyad, taken individually, are partial causes, Plato's demiurgic God is the common cause of generation: things being in a chaotic condition, 'God began by giving them a distinct configuration by means of shape and numbers' (53b). In spite of the terminological lack of precision (but Timaeus' account is said by Plato to be only probable) we can distinguish between two different levels, one transcendent and the other immanent, in other words, between the real principle and the more ultimate elements, between God, who is external, and the pair of Monad-Dyad, which is internal. It is true that the Demiurge is not explicitly called a principle, but it is nevertheless clear that insofar as he is the artificer, he is a principle. In Plato's Philebus, whose resemblance with his Timaeus hardly needs pointing out,"' two different principles are said to pervade the physical world, the Limit and the Unlimited, and the cause of their mixture is presented as a principle (23c 1), which is separate (23d9-10), and which is termed God (23c9). Just to quote a parallel from a first century text, such is the evidence provided by Pseudo-Timaeus' On the nature of the universe and on soul (God figures as the principle of the best, and the stoikheia of the bodies derive from form and matter; 205.8 and 215.16-216.14 Thesleff)."

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taken literally, nevertheless the world must be said to be in some way 'created' (geneios). As John Dillon has rightly observed (Middle Platonists, n.l7 above, 132), this implies that the world must be taken to be dependent on a external cause, to wit, God. Such is also Philo's position in his treatise On the creation of the world 7-9, again in relation to Plato's Timaeus and Phiiebus, cf Philo of Alexandria. On the creation of the cosmos according to Moses, intro., trans., and comm. by D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, I (Leiden 2001) 110-23. It is worth noticing that in Philo we also find the formula hyperano theos; cf De post. Caini 14, Congr. 106, Leg. all. 3.175.

" P. L. Donini, 'Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la fomia sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in etä postellenistica', in ANRWW 36.7 (1994) 5026-5100 (5080-82).

M. Bonazzi, 'Eudoro e il Timeo di Platone (a proposito di Simpl. In Phys., p. 181, 7-30)', in Arrhetos Theos. L 'ineffabilitä del prima principio nel medio platonismo, ed. F. Calabi (Pisa 2002) 30-33.

M. Baltes, 'Numenius von Apamea und der platonische Timaios', Vigiliae Christianae 29 (1975) 241-70 (258), reprinted in M. Baltes, ΔΙΑΝΟΗΜΑΤΑ. Kleine Schriften zu Plato und zum Piatonismus (Stuttgart 1999) 1-32 (19-20).

If this inteφretation is correct, two points at least are worth stressing. We may detect in Eudorus a first statement of the reversal between the Demiurge/God and the Platonic Forms: in contrast with the view of the Timaeus, the Demiurge/God is above the Forms. Secondly, and still more important, such a reversal seems to presuppose in some way the 'doctrine of three principles' (God, Monad, Dyad in Eudorus corresponding to God, Forms, matter in Plato and to efficient cause, formal cause, material cause in Aristotle), which is distinctive of Middle Platonism. And this inteφretation is the fruit of a reading o f the Timaeus, which is at the same time literal and 'creative', in agreement with the exegetical principle of imperial Platonism 'from what is written to what is not written'. It was first suggested by Heinrich Dörrie that the new beginning in Platonism stemmed from the renewed concern with the exegesis of dialogues such as the Timaeus and the Phiiebus. To this extent, the importance of Eudorus' contribution must not be under­valued.^"

Regrettably, not even reference to Plato's Timaeus solves all the difficulties. The reversal between Forms and Demiurge can hardly be based on this dialogue alone. This is one of the most serious difficulties for Middle Platonists, as the evidence of Numenius, two centuries later, still shows. More broadly, the same objection applies to the docfrine of the three principles. And, even if ancients were ready to read into Plato an analysis of the notions of principle and element (c f e.g. Eudemus, Pseudo-Timaeus), one must admit that on this issue Plato's Timaeus is far from being exhaustive. Following a remark of Matthias Baltes, we can then consider the Timaeus less the starting point than a text for confirming a docfrine which borrowed from other material as well.^' Our task is to detect what traditions have to be assumed as influences upon Eudorus' inteφretation of the Timaeus. Putting Eudorus in his ovm context, we will be able better to understand the reasons which lead to the revival of Platonism.

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III

In the first century BC, Stoicism was still a leading and highly-respected philosophy.^* It is not by chance that Eudorus is also associated in the surviving evidence with the Stoics, Panaetius, Posidonius, and Posidonius' pupil Diodorus of Alexandria." This is very inter­esting, because Stoic physics provides a detailed analysis of principles (God and matter) and elements (the four elements). But this Stoic doctrine provoked constant objections fi-om Platonists, fi-om Plutarch to Plofinus, fi-om Alcinous to Calcidius: Stoics fail to define what a principle or element is. This criticism applies in particular to the most important of the principles, God: since God, for the Stoics, is coφoreal (God is called intellectual body, soma noeron, or intelligence in matter, nous en hulei)^* he cannot be a proper principle, because body is composed of form and matter, while a principle must necessarily be simple; 'therefore it must be accepted that he is incoφoreaΓ.^' Still worse, the Stoic doctrine of God is not only internally incoherent but also impious.™ The impiety consists in believing that world-order is guaranteed only if God, the active principle, is immanent in the world, as if he could give order only fi-om inside. Stoics start from correct premises (the presupposition that a single world-order exists) but end in mistaken con­clusions (the world-order is guaranteed by an immanent God, who is also coφoreal, and who is therefore equated with matter, as if he moved through it like seed passing through genitals: Calc. In Tim. 294). On the other side, for Platonists, the rejection of God's im­manence and coφoreality need not by any means imply that the kosmos lacks order, since there are immanent causes as well. This is precisely what in our period the Platonist Plutarch objects to in the Stoic Posidonius. Posidonius failed to notice that God uses 'the limits of the bodies for the shaping of matter by bounding and circumscribing its dispers-iveness and incoherence with the surfaces made of the triangles fitted together'." There are limits, surfaces, triangles - i.e. the concrete constituents of form and order in matter -and there is God, who is cause of this process. So far as this polemic is concerned, Plutarch's position is not different ft-om the position held by Eudorus in his Pythagorean account. This affinity is further stressed by the common reference to the Timaeus.

On this issue, Platonists are in shaφ contrast with Stoics. In the context of first century BC philosophy this is not without importance. Modem scholars have recently suggested that Plato's Timaeus paved the way for Stoic physics. The Stoic doctrine of principles emerged, via Aristotle's successor Theophrastus, or via the Platonists Xenocrates or Polemon," from a dualistic inteφretation of the Timaeus, which reduced Plato's

Cf. e.g. Cicero, De fin. 3.74 and 5.74.

" Achilles Tatius, Intr. Aral. 2, p. 30 Maas; 6, p. 96, 24; 13, p. 40, 25 {= Eudorus. Τ 9-11 Μ.).

Plutarch, De comm. not. 1085B.

^' Alcinous, Didask 10 166, 5-10 Hermann; Plutarch, De comm. not. 1085C.

'" Calcidius, In Tim. 294; Plutarch, De Ε 393D-E.

" Plutarch, De an. procr. 1023C, trans. Chemiss.

For Theophrastus, cf G. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and providence. Stoic and Platonist readings of Plato's Timaeus (Tumhout 1999) 44-52; for Xenocrates, H. J. Krämer Platonismus und

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hellenistische Philosophie, (Berlin 1971) 108-31; for Polemon, D. Sedley, 'The origins of Stoic god', in Traditions of theology. Studies in Hellenistic theology, its background and aftermath, eds D. Frede and A . Laks, Philosophia antiqua 89 (Leiden 2002) 41-83, and J. Dillon, The heirs of Plato. A study of the Old Academy (347-274 BC) (Oxford 2003) 166-74.

" M . Crubellier, 'Metaphysics A 4', in Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda, eds M. Frede and D. Charles (Oxford 2000) 137-60 (142-44).

cosmology to a two-principle structure, assigning the active role to the divine demiurge and the world-soul taken together, and the passive role to matter. This theory dominated the field during the Hellenistic centuries. Against this background, Eudorus' doctrine appears as one of the first attempts to break with this tradition, with the aim of promoting a turn (or a return) to a transcendent principle. And the contrast is not only with Stoicism. It is controversial whether Antiochus' physics are of Old-Academic, Peripatetic, or Stoic inspiration, but if this reconstruction is correct, Antiochus' alleged contribution to the renewal of Platonism would be undoubtedly restricted. For it is unquestionable that when Antiochus speaks of a positive material force immanent in the world and ordering a passive matter, he is sfill working within a Hellenistic fi-amework (Cicero, Academica 1.24). It is well known that Antiochus argued against Academic scepticism in favour of a systematic foundation of Platonism (described as a most perfect system of thought, perfectissima disciplina, in Cicero, Lucullus 15). But his 'turn to dogmatism' lacks what more deeply distinguishes Platonism, a move towards a transcendent principle.

IV

Stoicism appears, therefore, mainly as a polemical target for Platonism of our period. We must turn elsewhere to find positive impulses stimulating the Platonist revival. In the field of philosophy, one major event of the early Imperial age is the renewed circulation of Aristotle's school treatises (though, of course, this does not imply that during the Hellenistic centuries Aristotle was not read), which raised a new and intriguing set o f problems. In the case of Aristotle's Metaphysics, which, together with his Categories, were to play a prominent role, what attracted most attention was the problematic relation between the divine and transcendent principle, God, and physical causes. Such an interest applies to the more specific issues we are dealing with. In Metaphysics XII , chapters 4 and 5, Aristotle had provided a detailed analysis of the concepts of arkhe, principle, and stoikheion, element. Element is a notion Aristotle clearly distrusts, at least when he deals with Metaphysics or 'first philosophy'. A theory of principles reduced to a theory of first elements can hardly explain the causes of reality." At the most, one can say that elements are the immanent constituents of things themselves, i.e., that they can be equated with a sort of immanent cause, but this conception does not solve any of the many philosophical difficulties that Aristotle wants to tackle. The obvious target of Aristotle's complaint is Plato, along with Plato's Academy, as we see from Metaphysics I 6 and 9, where similar objections occur (c f also De gen. et corr. II 8-9). Such a conception of principles as elements fails to explain the interaction between the elements themselves, so that it cannot be inteφreted as a proper causal theory of the generation of beings. In Metaphysics XI I

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" Cf. fr. 7 Drossaart Lulofs: ' I f somebody wishes to make a division of principles, he will divide . . . into immanent and external. And he will know that principle and cause are more universal than the elements when he makes examination'.

Cf. P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronilios bis Alexander von Aphrodisias (Berlin 1973-2001) vol. 1 160; P. L. Donini, Le scuole, I'anima. I'impero: la fdosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino (Torino 1982) 213; H. B. Gottschalk, 'Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century A D ' , in ANRWW 36.2 (1987) 1107.

Moraux, Aristotelismus (n.35, above) vol. I 204-05, and R. W. Sharpies, 'Aristotelian theology after Aristotle', in Traditions of theology, eds Frede and Laks (n.32, above) 1-40 (17).

Simp, in Cat 159.30 = Τ 14 M.

Aristotle provides his own solution: 'since not only what is present in something is cause, but also something external, i.e., the moving cause, clearly principle and element are different' (1070b22-24). Aristotle takes the view that the actuality of things (both in the sense of their coming to be and of their essential unity) is produced not so much by their internal constituents, as by the action of one external moving cause, which conveys form. Therefore, this cause is definitely not an element, but the proper arkhe. This external cause, which will be later specified as God, is first and common to all things, insofar as it is the ultimate cause of all movement (1072b35), since the existence of everything in the world depends on its action.

Aristotle's statements did not fail to attract the attention of his adherents in our period. Thus Nicolaus of Damascus was involved in an analysis of the concept of principle, distinguishing between principle and element, the first being external and more universal, the second immanent:''' the investigation of principles culminates in theology, which 'suφasses, as regards honours, all others' (fi-. 5). Similarly, Boethus of Sidon seems to have stressed the importance of theology in the context of his realistic inteφretation of the categories.^' Xenarchus of Seleucia, by contrast, is reported as arguing against the tendency to mix physical explanation and transcendent causes.''^ The scarce evidence we have nonetheless outlines a lively context of discussions. It is not implausible that, like others, Eudorus was interested in these debates.

That Eudorus knew Aristotle's treatises is beyond doubt. We have, preserved by the Neoplatonist Simplicius, nine passages in which he tackles Aristotle's Categories. According to this Neoplatonist, Eudorus is one of its ancient inteφreters (tous palaious ton kategorion exegetas)?'' Eudorus was acquainted with Aristotle's Metaphysics as well, as we know from the Aristotelian commentators Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias. Following Aspasius, Alexander reports a textual emendation by Eudorus to Met. A 6, 988a9-ll:

We are investigating the principles and causes of the things, and this is what Plato stated about principles. 'It is evident, from what has been said, that he has used only two causes' (988a8). Of the four causes that Aristotle himself listed, Plato, he says, used only two, the material and the formal. The Forms and the Ideas are, in his view, causes capable of providing the form, as in fact the One in turn is the

M A U R O B O N A Z Z I : EUDORUS OF A L E X A N D R I A 375

cause of form for the Forms and Ideas themselves; in the Ideas the Dyad has the role of matter.

In some manuscripts there is recorded this reading: 'the Forms are the causes of the essence for the other things, and, for those who know, the One even for matter'. By this reading it would be stated even for those who do not know Plato's doctrine about the principles that the One and the underlying matter are principles, and that the One is cause of the essence for the Idea too. The first reading, however, is better, insofar as it makes it clear that the Forms are cause of the essence for the other things, and the One for the Forms. Aspasius reports that the other is the more ancient reading, and that this latter reading was a change by Eudorus and Euharmostus.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Metaphysics 58.25-59.8^'

The importance of the Aristotelian passage should not be undervalued. In it Aristotle takes issue with Plato's doctrine of principles. Regrettably, Alexander's manuscript is corrupt, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the value of Eudorus' intervention, that is what his emendation consisted in. According to Theiler and Dörrie, Eudorus modified the text with the aim of finding in Aristotle a confirmation of the 'Pythagorean doctrine'."' But Paul Moraux, followed by Mansfeld (and persuading Dörrie), suggested convincingly that we owe to Eudorus the restoration of the authentic Aristotelian text!"" Who is right is an open question. But, if Moraux's proposal is correct, as it seems to be, it follows, against Moraux, that Eudorus' attitude to Aristotle is far from being only polemical. Of the 22 extant fragments which belong explicitly to Eudorus, 10 deal with Aristotle, displaying competent knowledge of the Aristotelian corpus as well as knowledge of the issues debated among Peripatetics."" A more plausible hypothesis may lead us to see Eudorus as a first proponent of the tendency of reclaiming Aristotelian doctrines for Plato and Platonism, a tendency which is common to many subsequent Middle Platonists (notably Plutarch, the anonymous Theaetetus commentator, and Alcinous).'*^ Such an hypothesis is further confirmed by, and in its turn explains Eudorus'

•'̂ = Eudorus, Τ 2 M.

" W. Theiler, 'Philo von Alexandria und der Beginn des kaiserzeitlichen Platoni-smus', in Parusia. Studien zur Philosophie Piatons und zur Problemgeschichte des Piatonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger, ed. K. Flasch (Frankfurt am Main 1965) 207; H. Dörrie, 'Der platoniker Eudoros von Alexandreia', Hermes 79 (1944) 25-39; reprinted in H. Dörrie, Platonica minora (Munich 1976)297-309(306-07).

P. Moraux, 'Eine Korrektur des Mittelplatonikers Eudoros zum Text der Metaphysik des Aristoteles', in Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben. Festschrift für Franz Altheim zum 6.10.1968, ed. R. Stiehl and H. E. Stier (Berlin 1969) vol. II 492-504; c f also G. laksetich, 'Eudoro e la 'Metafisica' di Aristotele', Quaderni difilologia classica 4 (1983) 25-30 (28-29).

Moreover, in the excerpts on Aratus' Phaenomena, and in the book on the Nile it is also possible to find many references to Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition - as shown by P. Moraux himself, Aristotelismus (n.35, above) vol. II 516.

Plutarch, De an. procr. I023E; Anonymous, In Theaet. 68.1-15; Alcinous, Didask. 159.42-44; Atticus, fr. 2.136-38 des Places.

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Simplicius, In Cat. 174.14-16 = Eudorus, Τ 15 M: 'Eudorus is critical, asking why, although the relative is contrasted with the per se, Aristotle discusses the relative, but makes no further mention of the per se'. Conventionally this text is taken as referring to the intelligible, but one cannot exclude that Eudorus was simply interested in observing that Aristotle considered the relative as a category and neglected the per ie. 1 am grateful to Riccardo Chiaradonna for prompting me to think further about these issues.

T. A. Szlezak, Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien (Berlin 1972) 16-18, 105, 155. It should be observed that nothing in the surviving fragments authorizes one to believe that Eudorus aimed to completely reject the Aristotelian categories. An interesting example is in Simplicius, In Cat. 206.10-15, where Eudorus' proposal of inverting the order of quality and quantity hardly means an abolition of the categories in general.

An interesting parallel, which stresses the relationship between Plato and Aristotle on God in a way similar to Eudorus, is provided by Aötius II 7.31-32 Diels: 'Plato affirms that God is the one. the single-natured and self-natured, the monadic, true being, the good [ . . . ] . Aristotle says that the highest God (anotato theos) is a separate form, mounted on the sphere of the whole", cf R. W. Shaφles, 'Aristotelian theology' (n.36, above) 15-16.

position on Aristotle's Categories as well. Criticisms of Aristotle for not giving due importance to the intelligible world"" do not imply that Aristotelian categories have to be rejected, but show that these categories must somehow be integrated within a Platonic context."'' In the same way, the possibility of Aristotelian influence must not overshadow the fact that Plato (following Pythagoras) was the first to point out the importance of the transcendent and divine principle.''^

V

Eudorus is not the only philosopher belonging to Pythagoreanizing Platonism who is interested in Aristotle. We find a similar concern in Pseudo-Archytas' On principles, a treatise which has been claimed for Eudorus. Even without supporting this attribution, the similarities of Pseudo-Archytas' treatise to Eudorus' account preserved by Simplicius have been noticed by several scholars. At the beginning of the Pseudo-Archytas fragment we read that 'there are two principles of reality, the one containing the series of ordered and determined things, the other containing the series of unordered and undetermined things' (19.5-7). As in Eudorus (Simplicius, In Phys. 181.25-26), the first two pairs of the paired principles, systoichia, are ordered-unordered, tetagmenon-atakton, and definite-indefinite, horiston (in Eudorus horismenon)-ahoriston (in addition, cf. pseudo-Timaeus, De nat. mund. 206.13-15). And, again as in Eudorus, the two principles, viewed in their own right, are causes respectively of good and bad (11. 15-17). But above these two principles, which are equated with Aristotelian form and matter (11. 18-20), it is necessary to postulate a third principle, which could bring them together (11. 23-24). This principle, first in power and superior to the others, is God (II. 24-25). The result is a system articulated on two levels, immanent (form and matter, presiding over the two series of paired principles) and transcendent (God, mover and demiurge). The doctrine outlined by Pseudo-Archytas exhibits an undeniable resemblance to Eudorus' Pythagorean account. But while in Eudorus we have detected a Platonic background, Pseudo-Archytas combines

MAURO BONAZZI: EUDORUS OF ALEXANDRIA 377

De nat. mund. 206.13-17 Thesleff, with commentary of B. Centrone, 'The theory of principles in the Pseudopythagorica', in Pythagorean philosophy, ed. K. Boudouris (Athens 1992) 90-97 (92-93).

" As already suggested by J. ΡέρΙη, Theologie cosmique et theologie chretienne (Paris 1964) 24-25, commenting on De gen. et corr. II 9.

"" 1 wish to thank Frederick Brenk, John Dillon, Pierluigi Donini, David Runia, and David Sedley for many helpful suggestions and remarks. T o the kind attention of Bob Shaφles and Richard Sorabji I owe further suggestions which have improved the text both in content and in style

concepts coming from Plato's Timaeus with others of Aristotelian provenance. In this treatise we find combined what in Eudorus was separated among different fragments: Platonic and Aristotelian themes within a Pythagorean framework. Once again, it is worth noticing the parallel with the above-mentioned pseudo-Timaeus, who presents, in his turn, a doctrine of three principles which combines Plato and Aristotle."'

But what is most important is that this combination is not a mere juxtaposition, as if Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies were equivalent. The notions and the terms employed by Pseudo-Archytas are clearly of Aristotelian derivation, yet the system does not fit into an Aristotelian scheme: form and matter are set as metaphysical principles, and the mover does not act on the heavens but on the two metaphysical principles. All these concepts clearly fit into the Platonist theory of principles. Aristotle's philosophy becomes a tool to discuss philosophical issues, related not to Aristotle's but to Plato's philosophy. More precisely, it seems that such docfrines as that of the first mover and the theory o f causes provided a major contribution to the development of a theological inteφretation of the Timaeus. If this is correct, it is not mistaken to conclude that an appreciation of Platonism must take into account the exfraordinary role played by Aristotle's meta­physics."'

Whether Pseudo-Archytas' On principles is of Eudorean provenance is not important. What needs to be sfressed is the interaction between Pythagoreanism, Platonism, and Aristotelianism that we find both in Eudorus and in the Pythagorean apocrypha. And, most of all, what is really striking is the constant presence of Aristotle in such documents. Beside the texts we have dealt with, there is no lack of other evidence. In the above-men­tioned anonymous Life of Pythagoras Aristotle is reported to be the tenth diadokhos (suc­cessor) of the Pythagorean school, after Archytas and Plato. At the opposite extreme, in the sixth century A D , the Neoplatonist Elias opened his commentary on Categories with the claim that Aristotle is an 'authentic Pythagorean', Pythagoreios kat' aletheian. This concern to appropriate Aristotle within a Pythagorean framework has not yet received the attention it deserves. But however scanty, the extant evidence suffices to prove the intellectual liveliness of the philosophical milieu in which Eudorus developed his own form of Platonism."**

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