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Tlie Postures of the Post-1983 Parliannontary Parties

with respect to Laicism

A Thesis

Submitted to the Department of

Political Science

and

Public AdministrationV

Bilkent University

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by

Simten Cosar

September 1991

’ v \ f .,('t C - '

•А?9ГС69-

1 : !

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is full,

adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of

Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Prof. Dr. Metin Heper

i .

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully

adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of


Dr. Omer Faruk Genckaya

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully

adequate, in .scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of


Dr. Muberra Yuksel

ÖZET

Laiklik ilkesi Türkiye’de bir sorunsal olmaya devam

etmektedir. Bu durum gerek Osmanli devlet sisteminden Türkiye

Cumlıuriyeti’ne aktarilan degerlei'in - bunicirin arasinda toplumsal

öneme sahip olan Islami da sayabiliriz-, gerekse Türkiye

Cumhuriyeti’nin kurucularinin Atatürk devrimlerini

gerçekleştirirken izledikleri "tepeden inmeci" politikanin bir

sonucudur.

1980 sonrasinda siyasal ve devlet seçkinlerinin din konusuna

geleneksel yaklasimlarinda önemli değişiklikler olmuştur. Benzer

değişiklikler, her iki grubun Kemalist ilkelerin ve özellikle

"laiklik" ilkesinin koruyuculuğu rollerinin algilanmasinda da

gözlenmektedir. Bu bağlamda siyasal elitin kurumsal temsilcisi olan

siyasal partilerin laiklik anlayisinin incelenmesi sorunun

anlasilraasina isik tutacaktir.

Bu çerçeve içerisinde, bu calisma 198.3 sonrasi parlamenter

partilerin genel ideolojilerine göre laiklik konusundaki görece

durumlarini aciklamaya calismaktadir.

Elde edilen bulgulara göre, laiklik ilkesi tura parlaraenter

partilerin gerek programlarinda, gerekse parti delegelerinin

parlamento konusmalarinda genis yer kaplamaktadir. Bununla

birlikte, partilerarasi farkliliklar daha cok bu prensibe

yöneltilen değişik bakis acilarindan ortaya cikmaktadir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank all of my friends who have contributed to my

study in one way or another.

I would like to express my special gratitudes to Dr. Omer

Faruk Genckaya who helped and oriented me with valuable

suggestions.

I should also express my thankfulness to Prof. Metin Heper for

his encouragements in this study.

CONTENTS

Chapter One : INTRODUCTION

1. The Issue of Laicism in Turkey

2. The Concept of Laicism

3. Interpretation of Laicism in Turkish Context

a. The Evolution of Laicism in Turkey

b. Laicism in the 1980s

4. Problems of Laicism : The Case of Turkey

a. Structural Problems

b. Anti-laic Groupings

5. Scope of the Study

Chapter Two : METHODOLOGY

1. General Standing of the Parties

a. Economic Policy

b. State Figure as Perceived by the Parties

c. Religiosity

2. The Understanding of the Principle of Laicism

a. Nationalism

b. Laicism

3. Research Questions

4. Data

Chapter Three : FINDINGS

1. The Understanding of Laicism

2. National Education

3. Concern with Anti-Laic Movements

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a. Presidency of Religious Affairs

b. Reactionary Movements

Chapter Four : An Evaluation of the Findings


2. National Education

3. Anti-laic Movements

a. The Presidency of Religious Affairs

b. Reaction

Chapter Five : Conclusion

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.The Issue of Laicism in Turkey

The 1990s seem to be the years of laicism. But, this term does

not necessarily presume a positive trend since it alludes to the

increase in the questioning of the appropriate practice of laicism

within Turkish context.

It can be argued that this problem had long been nurtured by

the inherent tendency of the Turkish society toward religion as a

value system - as far as the lower and lower-middle class are

concerned - which had been on the agenda of Turkish politics long

before the 1980s. However, the developments, which can be claimed

to have lighted the spark, have taken place not only at the

societal level, but also at the level of state and political elite.

At the state level, the post-1980 military regime tended to

resort to traditional and religious values to provide for national

unity. It even approved religious instruction in primary and

secondary schools with the task of holding an eye on religious

affai rs.

Along with the changes in the attitude of state elite, the

political elite of the 1980s approached to religious issues in a

more or less harmonious manner irrespective of their announced

ideological posture. This is most evident in the programme of the

Turkish United Communist PartyH), whereby it refers to religion in

a sympathetic tone, within the framework of the national coalition

it presupposes.

The change at the level of political elite has been further

evinced by the fact that the governing party (Motherland Party)

throughout the 1980s have embodied four tendencies within its

platform, including the Islamic faction.

In a way, the tendency on the part of the post-1980 political

parties to refer to a wide portion of the society has led them to

act as catch-all parties, thus preparing the ground for an intra

party conflict different from the one based on right-left issues.

Together with the acceleration in the activities in relation to

religious issues at the societal level, this conflict was turned to

be one between "laicism" and "religiosity".

The reflections of the changes - mentioned above - at the

societal level have been manifested by a number of events, the most

prominent of which has been the popularity of Islamic thought

across the youth, especially in the universities, by the activities

of the orders. One can say that, this expansion is the starting

point of the chain reaction which has led to major political

conflicts; thus the problem of "turban" which had long dominated

the Turkish politica,! scene.

A more contemporary issue is the terrorist activities of the

post-1983 era directed against the prominent supporters of the

principle of laicism; e.g.the assassination of Muammer Aksoy, Turan

Dursun, Bahriye Ucok and Cetin Emec. It is not certain whether the

anti-laic groups are responsible for these assassinations or not,

but these events, nevertheless raise the question of whether the

Turkish laicism is facing a potential danger.

As it was indicated above, the post-1980 state elite gave

support to Islam as a possible cure to left-right cleavages. In a

way they tried to strengthen Turkish nationalism with the help of

Islamic values presumably entrenched within Turkish society

throughout the history. However, this effort was radicalized under

the notion of Turkish-Islam Synthesis, which in turn exacerbated

the inherent conflict between the terms "Turk" and "Muslim".

Moreover, such developments in the post-1980 Turkey, as the

spread of orders throughout the society in addition to publicly

held worship, an immense increase in religious publications^^),

usurpation of religion for political goals as well as the

unprecedented increase in the number of Religious High Schools

(Imam Hatip Liseleri) which is accompanied by a parallel increase

in the number of their graduates, can be counted in this respect.

1980s are significant to study in relation to the principle of

laicism since religious values no longer display their credibility

only among the lower and the lower-middle strata, rather what can

be observed is the appearance of an economically powerful nascent

Islamic bourgeoisie. As a matter of fact the economic

liberalization of this era has led to the expansion of an Islamist

economic sector as well as to the ascendancy of this sector in the

political arena(3) which gives a hint in the analysis of the new

trend common to the post-1983 parliamentary parties with respect to

laicism, that is flirting with Islam. Thus, it may not be wrong to

state that 1990s are fertile to hot debates about laicism and to

searches in order to achieve the consolidation of this principle in

the Turkish context, in the real sense.

2. The Concept of Laicism

Laicism is rather a vague concept to delineate, since it means

different in Turkish polity from its original meaning in French.

The problem also arises when the task of differentiating between

secularism and laicism is at hand.

From a historical perspective, the term of laicism is mainly

used in the Catholic societies with the initial meaning of

publicization. In its more contemporary form, laicism simply means

giving the people - who have no religious status - a superior role

in worldly and even in religious a f f a i r s . I n other words it

simply meant the freing of secular from the the religious in

societies where religion had an overwhelmingly predominant posture.

Secularism, on the other hand, has been in the agenda in

places where Christianity other than Catholicism is widespread. As

different from laicism, secularism has been used to refer to

modernization, with a wider understanding.(s)

Within the framework of laicism, there are four basic

interpretations with different perspectives

i. From a philosophical perspective , laicism simply means

that the foundation of knowledge is totally on rational grounds.

ii. From a sociological perspective, laicism necessitates the

minimization of the role of religion in societal life.

iii. From a political perspective, laicism simply means the

foundation of the state authority and the political power on the

people - i.e. the ruled - rather than on spiritual grounds.

iv. And finally, laicism in legal terms means the foundation

of the positive law of the state on rational grounds rather than on

religious principles.

3,Interpretation of Laicism in Turkish Context

Although the above definition seems to be sufficient to give

us an idea about laicism, when applied in different contexts, it

becomes a difficult concept to work with. The best example is the

case of Turkish Republic which tried to adopt this concept as its

raison d’être. The fact that Turkey has a totally different

historical background from the countries which witnessed the birth

of laicism(^l caused a lot of problems in practice. As a matter of

fact, it can be said that the practice of laicism in Turkey has the

implications of both laicism and secularism, since it has prepared

the grounds for state supervision on religious issues, while

forming one of the basic principles on which the modernization of

Turkish society is based -i.e. the predominance of worldly issues

in politics, economy, education and family relations as well as in

sexual life.(^) However, throughout the study one comes across

subsequent use of the term" laicistn" rather than "secularism" as

aresult of the wide usage of the former in Turkey, in this context.

Before going deep into the problems and the evolution of

laicism in Turkey , a brief look at what laicism means for the

Turkish Republic, i.e. for M. Kemal Atatürk, is necessary.

In the analysis of Kemalist laicism the fact to be kept in

mind is that there was a constant rejection of Ottoman theocracy

and hence laicism, as a principle, was a turning point in the all-

out transformation in the system, rather than a mere change in the

positioning of the state with respect to religion.

In the initiation of the principle of laicism, the founders of

Turkish Republic relied heavily on rationalism and hence rejected

the determinitive role of religion in social, political, economic

and educational institutions, basing their arguments on the

requirements of modernization.(3)

As a matter of fact, laicism in Turkey has been achieved only

to the extent of political and legal grounds. Besides, the

proponents of this principle based their arguments on the

philosophical perspective. But, whether it accomplished the working

of the sociological aspect has been a matter of question throughout

the history of the Turkish Republic and especially in the last

decade.

Atatürk, by laicism, simply pointed at the necessity of

leaving religion to the sphere of individual con s c i e n c e . Th u s ,

he tried to show the difference between being faithful and

regulating the life and the universe according to religious values.

His insistent rejection of the politicization of religion is

inherent in this respect. In a way by laicism, he meant a value

system independent of religion(s) in the society,

When the practice of laicism is concerned one gets a sense of

slight shift from its rhetoric, which may again be attributed to

the special conditions under which The Turkish Republic has adopted

this principle.

One major factor in the Turkish practice of laicism is the

constant reference to the notion of nationalism in order to give

support to the former, simply because the founders of the Turkish

Republic tried to build up a Turkish spirit in order to fight back

the "traditional Islam-Ottoman foundation"(^2), which assured an

effective role in the society. Behind all these, was the attempt to

establish a political unit which depends on nati< lal rather than

religious bonds.

Another significant point in the case of Turkey, is the

overtly strict control of the state over religious affairs. This

has to do with the elitist approach of Turkish bureaucracy with an

emphasis on education to bring the Turkish people to the level of

political participation; and until that level is reached to

safeguard them. Thus, the Kemalist laicism built up an

administrative mechanism which gave the state the opportunity to

interfere with the functioning of religious institutions. (^̂

strong state hand in religious affairs is most visible in the

functioning o f the Presidency of Religious Affairs which has a

restricted field of action, i.e., just in relation to religious

beliefs and under state supervision. This tendency on the part of

the state elite to have control over religion may be attributed to

the concern about any possibility of the abuse of the peoples’

religious beliefs as an extension of the aspiration for the

laicization of not only the state or the politics, but also of the

society. Thus, the Turkish State also assumes the role of the sole

guarantor of freedom of faith and conscience.

Finally, the principle of laicism in Turkey is widely referred

as an alternative to Islam which has a potential for

ideologization. This can be attributed to the fact that, Islam as a

religion does not acknowledge the separation of religious issues

from either politics or worldly affairs and that it automatically

tends to regulate all the spheres of social, political and private

life.

a. The Evolution of Laicism in Turkey

The claim that political power in the Ottoman Empire was

legitimized both by tradition and by religion^^^) does not rule out

the effective control of the Ottoman statesmen over religion. As a

matter of fact, the Sultan had full control over both the executive

and the judicial issues, while the slaves (kuls) -responsible for

the judicial functions- were supposed to refrain from interfering

with each others’spheres of a c t i o n . gut, this control did not

prevent the intertwined character of the post of the head of the

state with that of the leader of the congregation. This fact can be

attributed to the incorporation of ulema into the State

bureaucracy.C ^ ) Thus, as the instrument of social order statecraft

had possessed two sanctions : the authority and the power of the

ruler and the divine reason -i.e., Shari’ah, whereby the ulema

emerged as one of the politically influential groups in the capital

possessing the authority to express and apply Islamic commands. C l

The conjunction of religious and secular elements in the

Ottoman ruling tradition was very well manifested by the right of

the Sultans to enact laws which might have been in conflict with

the Islamic law.C^) Called as Islamic/Imperial laws these were

derived directly from the sovereign will of the ruler.c®) On the

other hand, it was generally the state which made use of religion

for the sake of loyalty and obedience of the Muslim population that

the enactment of imperial laws was justified on the grounds that

they were necessary for the well-being of the Islamic community; a

fact which indicates the dependence of the legitimacy of political

action on religion. This is directly linked to the social and

political stratification of Ottoman Empire on religious grounds,

especially until nineteenth century.(20)

The first signs of laicization in the Ottoman State can be

found in the Westernization attempts of Selim III Era (1789-1807),

whereby a sense of the essentiality of rapid and progressive change

dominated the scene. Although Selim III aspired, first and

10

foremost, the modernization of the Ottoman military along with the

Western standards; he nevertheless introduced sciences, training

procedures and uniforms of Europe which have led to multi

dimensional reactions - both at the state and societal level - to

culminate in an uprising by the Janissaries in 1807, to which

joined the ulema and the masses. ( 2 1)

The extensions of the initial attempts of Selim III era were

to emerge later in the Tanzimat period within the structure of an

imperial rescript (1839). Although the disregard of religious and

imperial laws was severely condemned in the rescript, (2 2) -jt, in

essence, contained radical principles.

To begin with, as parallel to the ideas of equality before the

law and the security of life , honor and property for all subjects,

discrimination on religious grounds was ruled out.(23) Besides,the

secularization of public institutions led to the removal of the

barriers to non-Muslims in entering public service and later the

politics.(24) The modernization attempts were also visible in the

education sphere that special secular schools were established with

the mere aim of moulding out a body of Westernized civil

servants.(2s)

This period also witnessed the first use of the notion of

”0smanlilik"(26), in order to impose the feeling of unity upon the

peoples. But here one major drawback should not be neglected that,

in this period state administration was still declared to be

dependent upon the rules and regulations which would be established

11

on the basis of Shari’ah. <27) addition to this drawback, the

lack of appropriate cultural and social milieu(28) prevented the

Ottoman Empire to complete this modernization process. The

testament was to be the major concern of the Turkish Republic.

The last attempts in the Ottoman era, in the way of

laicization can be seen in the thirty year reign of Abdulhamid

(1876-1909), After the unsucessful experience of the first Ottoman

constitutional government wwhich had ended in 1878, the Sultan was

forced to restore it in July 1908.(29) within the framework of the

new constitution the Sultan no longer acquired the absolute power,

especially after the elction of the Chamber of the Deputies

(December 1908). In this instance, the Committee of Union and

f'ogress (CUP, an underground organization) should also be

mentioned as a "behind the scenes” actor.(̂ o) However, this was a

brief and relatively unsuccessful period of laicization process, to

last only till the dissolution of the CUP in 1918, which would lead

a political vacuum to be filled by the restoration of Sultan-

Caliph’s absolute power.(3i)

The period between 1919-1922 were the years of the "War of

Independence", whereby the ideology of nationalism would provide

not only national independence against imperialism, but also the

rational grounds on which the principle of laicism was to be

based.(32) on the other hand, the- same period also bore the

implications of the problématique relation between the terms

"nationalism" and "religion" which would be inherited by the newly-

12

born Turkish Republic.(33)

Single party period, in the Turkish Republic, was

characterized by the measures taken to consolidate the Kemalist

principles. Laicism had a significant role among the other

principles, since it was perceived to be the building stone of the

grounds on which the legitimacy of the State lies.(34)

This period was also marked with considerable resistance

coming from within the ranks of the GNA, represented by those who

were assumed to be among the supporters of Atatürk, but who were at

the same time loyal to the institution of the Sultanate and the

Caliphate. But, this resistance did not prevent the founders of the

Republic to pursue their "strict secularization programme(35)".

A chronological ordering of the major steps in the laicization

programme of the single party period may well illustrate the

radical nature of those measures especially when the Islamic

tradition , so deeply entrenched within the society is taken into

account.

Beginning with the 1921 Constitution, the fact that

sovereignty was vested in the hands of the nation signified the

acceptance of a thought which had formed the laic state notion in

the French and American Revolutions.<36)

The abolition of Sultanate (1 November 1922) and the

establishment of Republic (29 October 1923) were two radical steps

in the practice of laicism. Aside from that, the abolition of the

Caliphate (1 March 1924) signified the destruction of a political

13

rather than a religious problem in the establishment of the

superiority of the notion of sovereignty of nation over the notion

of "Theocratic State" (Din Devleti).

In 1924, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was founded as

merely an agency of public service and not the supreme spiritual

body of a religious community, whereby it was presumed that noone

would be authorized to interfere with matters of individual

conscience,l

With the Constitutional amendment of 1928, two articles which

were in total controversy with the principle of laicism were

abolished. Thus, this amendment outlawed both the statement that

"religion of the Turkish State is Islam" and the article which

attributed the Grand National Assembly the function of running the

government in accordance with the prerequisites of the Shari’ah

order.

The Constitutional change made in 1937, included the principle

of laicism into the body of the principles of the Turkish Republic.

In the following year, the establishment of political parties

on religious grounds was declared to be illegal. This measure

further strengthened the earlier ban on the abuse of religious

sentiments for political ends.

In addition to these constitutional amendments, to spread the

practice of laicism, the founders of the Republic introduced a

radical education policy out of which came the abolition of

medreses and the initiation of the Law on Unification of Education

14

(Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu,1924). In 1928, Latin Alphabet, by which

the underlying aim was to loosen ties with the Ottoman-Islam

tradition, was adopted. Furthermore, the main transformation in the

education policy was the outlawing of religious instruction in the

primary and the secondary education which accompanied the closing

down of the Religious High Schools, in the early 1930s. This

mentality assumed that religion as a private value system should be

shaped by the necessities of a democratic national culture and

those of science and technology.(3S)

Accordingly, the coming years would witness the extension of

this education policy by means of the entrenchement of the notion

of nation into the minds of the people in order to replace the

feeling of congregation and thus the Islamic tradition extending

throughout the Ottoman Era.

Actually, all the other reforms of the single party period

were to accomplish the consolidation of the principle of laicism

both politically, societally and culturally. Besides, the

authoritarianism of the single party period eased the initiation of

the reforms from above and hence succeeded in the

institutionalization of laicism at the level of polity.<39)

The strict secularization programme of the single party period

showed a slight decline in the political liberalization atmosphere

during the period of transition to multi-party politics(1946-1950).

Both the governing party (Republican Peoples Party, RPP) and the

main opposition party (Democrat Party, DP) displayed a rather mild

15

posture with respect to religious affai rs. This was further

evinced by the foundation of eight political parties with explicit

religious themes in their programmes, ( ^) Besides, the new

atmosphere which made the governing party - proclaimed to be the

loyal guardian of Kemalist principles - run into a competition with

the other parties, led to a softening in its radical posture with

respect to laicism. l''̂ )

Democrat Party, on the other hand, was careful not to

disregard the official constraints on religious issues while

building up the image of the defender of religious sentiments of

the people -a factor which supplied it with sufficient propaganda-.

Following the first competitive elections in Turkish politics,

1950s were the years of the DP government which displayed a more

tolerant attitude toward Islam, when compared to the single party

period. As a matter of fact, this era ended the phase of militant

secularism in Turkey. It should also be mentioned that the relative

freeing of the Islamists in the political sphere in the post 1945

years which were marked with the popularity of democratic values in

Turkey has helped them to criticize the Turkish practice of laicism

on the grounds that it had led to the crushing of the "national

conscience" of the Turkish people.

Despite constant attacks by the RPP on the opposition with the

accusation that Kemalist principles were being neglected, the DP

government transformed Imam Hatip courses into regular Imam Hatip

Schools, gave an end to the ban on cal1-to-prayer in Arabic and

16

provided for religious programmes in the state radio. All these

measures signified a religious stimulation, but did not reach to

such extents as to split away from the principle of laicism. (‘*̂ 1

This was evident in the enactment by the parliament under the

dominance of the DP deputies which banned the exploitation of

religion for political propaganda.

At the societal level, 1950s also witnessed the growing effect

of the rural areas on Turkish politics and hence of the priority of

traditionalism over national ism. This was accompanied by the

reactivation of religious orders with an increasing electoral

influence. This may also be seen as a motive for the governing

party to rely on religious issues in order to consolidate its

authority and hence there is the politicization of religion.

Interestingly, after the 1960 military intervention, the

military paid special attention to avoid an anti-religious public

image. On the other hand, while returning to multi-party politics

in 1961, the military arranged an intra-party meeting whereby the

decision for not to abuse religion for political ends was enforced

upon the p a r t i e s . O n e major drawback to this decision was

present in the 1961 Constitution itself, which allowed for genuine

political association and thus which led to the mushrooming of

organizations including the religious ones into the political

arena. The 1960s also witnessed significant increase in the number

of pilgrims as well as those who are on fast. Besides, there was a

corresponding increase in the membership to orders and to other

17

religious organizations. One should also mention about the

reservation of special departments in the parliament and in the

government bureaus to worship.

From 1965 onwards, with the end of the coalition governments

laicism reappeared as an important political issue. The Conference

on "Divinity and Laicism", (1966) whereby harsh criticisms against

the practice of laicism took place, further signified this fact.

In this period, the traditional posture of the RPP and of the

main oppositionary party (Justice Party, JP) - which replaced the

DP - did not change. The statements of the leaders of both parties

indicated this situation very well. The leader of the RPP, Mr.

Inonu attacked the reactionary movements while Mr. Demirel, the

leader of the JP, was talking more about religious freedom and

accusing the government - though not overtly - of political

repression with the claim that the government perceived even the

practice of religious freedom as a reactionary movement.

It should also be noted that, in late the late 1960s the role

of religion in political arena was extended. In this respect, one

major development came about with the participation of Alevis in

multi-party politics by their own party (Türkiye Birlik Partisi,

The Union Party of Turkey, UPT), rather than within the body of the

RPPor the Turkish Labor Party (TLP) which had long been the

case.(48) Moreover, this time it was not only the rumors of 1950s -

about the links between the DP and the Nurists-, but the

Suleymanists as well as Nurists had been unionized and began to

18

affect the politics. The initiation of the notion of Turk=Islam

Synthesis by a group of professors and politicians in their fight

against Marxism and socialism further exacerbated the conflict-

prone relation between the principle of laicism and religion. As a

matter of fact, such activities would extend throughout 1970s with

the task of establishing Islamic political institutions,

The unionization of religion was not only at the political

level, but also at the societal level. The fact that the first

boycott of the Turkish universities was in the name of "turban"(15

April 1968) and that the so-called "Bloody Sunday" event was an

outcome of the clash between the leftist and Islamist groups

further illustrates the societal reflections of the politicization

of Islam.(5°)

The most prominent example of Islamic political institution,

the National Order Party (NOP), which was founded under the

leadership of Necmettin Erbakan(1971), was banned by the military

government of 12 March 1971 with the accusation of exploiting

religion for political goals. But, in a rather short period of

time, National Salvation Party (NSP), under the same leadership

compensated for the NOP and gained a considerable place within the

post 1973 coalition governments. The party with its official

ideology of "National Outlook"(Mi 11i Gorus) stressed a break from

Westernization and a turn to Muslim world in order to achieve

rapid industrialization. (5̂ ) It was very well established at the

societal level by means of its bonds with the Naqshiband order. It

19

had a youth organization (Akincilar), an affiliated labor union

(Hak-Is Confederation) as well as a newspaper (Mill! Gazete) which

symbolized an effective patronage network. As far as the

composition of both parties is concerned, we see that they

represented mainly the declining petty bourgeoisie of Anatolia,

which was no longer abided by quietism and thus wanted material

salvation.(^2)

Within this schema it should also be included that the

National Action Party(NAP), under the leadership of Alparslan

Turkes; pursued a policy of compromise with Islam, thus forming one

wing of the movement which represented Islam in politics.

To sum up, 1961-1980 period in Turkey witnessed an escalation

of the role of religion in social, political and educational

spheres. This was due to both the economic factors - i.e. the

problems of rapid economic development^> - and the evolution of

democracy, the abuse of religion being one of its shortfalls. The

increased role of religion let it out of the confines of the

individual sphere into all spheres of societal life, a tendency

dating back to the Ottoman -Islam tradition. From this viewpoint,

one can say that especially beginning with the 1970s the grounds on

which the Turkish practice of the principle of laicism rested began

to disintegrate.

20

b. Laicism in the 1980s

1980 military intervention and the era opened with it has

been marked with significant changes in the issues related to the

principle of laicism especially with respect to the attitude of the

military. In addition to a milder approach to Islam, the post-1980

military regarded the official religious instruction as a means of

coping with the fundamentalist movements as well as the extremist

ideologies. Besides, the military was more congenial on the issue

of the societal significance of religion than the post-Ataturk

state elite had ever been.i^^l

Briefly, it is argued that along with the change in the

perception of Kemalism - a technique rather than a political

manifesto-,(5®1 laicism has also been reinterpreted by the post-

1980 military with particular attention on the traditional and

social role of r e l i g i o n . on the other hand, it continued to

reject the politicization of religion and took severe measures to

prevent any such possibility. The outstanding one of these measures

was the restriction on the organization and the activities of

political parties and voluntary associations, that political

parties were banned from establishing affiliated organizations at

the societal level and from forming organic ties with interest

groups (See 1982 Constitution, Articles 68,69). Additionally, the

voluntary associations were also banned from engaging in political

activity. In this context it should also be mentioned that the

measures designed against the establishment and/or administration

21

of the institutions with the aim of basing the social, economic,

political or legal structure of the State on religious principles,

were further intensified, as materialized in Article 163 of Turkish

Criminal Code.^^s) Thus, the penalty for such acts was increased

from 2-7 years to 8-15 years of heavy imprisonment in 1983.

With respect to this issue, the closing years of 1980s have

also witnessed an atmosphere of hot debate in the name of basic

rights and liberties. Introduced first by the rejections to the

Articles of 141 and 142 of Turkish Criminal Code, which outlaw both

the foundation of institutions and propogandizing with the aim of

destroying a social class and/or any existing economic and social

system in the Turkish Republic and which subject any such action to

serious penalties including the death penalty; this debate in the

name of basic rights and liberties came to embody the concern with

Article 163. This, in turn, paved the way to a new sphere to focus

on, since it supplied the Islamist figures with the opportunity to

extend their claims on the abuse of "laicism" as a principle to

supress the freedom of religion and faith.

Despite all these measures embodied within the articles of the

1982-Constitution and other post-1980 legislations; the basic

aspiration of the military for a fresh start to democracy was not a

success, that the traditional link between the old and the new

parties continued. As a matter of fact, this period is marked with

two general tendencies as far as the party formation is concerned.

First of all the parties which were established at first hand, were

22

merely of a pro-September 12 era pholosophy. Secondly the coming

years witnessed the rise of such parties which were essentially the

inheritors of the pre-1980 period.

On the other hand, the era between the years 1983-1986 can be

termed as a consolidation period whereby the subsequent rise and

decline of various parties as well as frequent inter-party

transfers were observed.

Initially, the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) was founded

under the leadership of ex-army general Turgut Sunalp which was to

be followed by the Populist Party (PP), under the leadership of

Necdet Calp. The two parties can be referred to as merely

instruments for the experience of transition to democracy, since

the first used to be a devoted adherent of the September 12 era,

while the latter assumed the status of a loyal opposition which was

in line with the interests of the military.

The Motherland Party (MP), on the other hand, can be claimed

to have initiated a clear picture of catch-all party model into

Turkish Politics, that it embodied four divergent tendencies within

its structure : the Republicans, the pro-JP figures, as well as the

ex-members of both the NSP and the NAP. Moreover, the party did not

lose its prominent status within the political sphere, despite the

emergence of such extreme right-wing parties as the Welfare Party

(WP)(®1) and the Nationalist Work Party (NWP) which in a way posed

a threat to the Islamic and neo-fascist support base of the party.

Besides these three parties of the post-1983 era, the Social

23

Democracy Party (SDP) of Erdal Inonu and the Great Turkey Party

(GTP) -established by the prominent members of the defunct JP and

which preceded the foundation of the True Path Party (TPP) in June

1983- were two additional, but numerically ineffective actors in

the political arena. The coming years would witness the merge of

the PP and SDP into Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP,

November 1985) as well as the transfer of the NDP deputies to

either the MP or the TPP ranks, as a result of its self-dissolution

on 4 May 1986.

In the meantime, there has emerged such parties to be

established on a temporary basis, like the Free Democracy Party

(FDP,1986) -to be dissolved in November 1986, resulting in a deputy

transfer to the ranks either of the MP or the TPP-, the People’s

Party -which had a two-days life-, and the Citizen Party -a six-

month personal party of Vural Arikan-.

To conclude with, it can be said that the period that is

analysed (1983-1987), was a trial period not only on the part of

the military, but also on the part of the post-1980 political

parties. As a reflection, in this period, the GNA witnessed a huge

wave of party transfers which far exceeds those in the previous

multi-party period (1946-1980). (^2) jh-js should give an idea about

the ideological commitment of the party deputies, since a number of

the transfers happened to be not only among the right-wing or the

left-wing, but also across the right-centre-left dimension.

24

4. Problems of Laicism: The Case of Turkey

Turkey has its unique problems with respect to the

consolidation of the principle of laicism. The underlying reasons

can be classified into two categories :


b. Anti-laic Groupings


Turkey is a special case in the practice of the principle of

laicism. Its speciality begins with the fact that it is the only

Muslim country which took such a radical step in the problematic

relation between the religion and the State. Some might perceive

this task as relatively easier since in the antecedent Ottoman

tradition the decisions of the administration had a slight priority

over the religious authorities. However, this did not mean an

overall dominance. Instead, the resort to religion by the

administration, in order to provide public support both showed and

increased the critical role of religion in the society.

As a matter of fact, Islam is referred not just as a religion;

but also as a means of social identity, that in addition to its

regulatory function with respect to the relation between God and

the man, it also designs how the relations among men should be. AS

a result of the intertwined nature of religious institutions with

the political, legal and educational units, it describes the

25

general features of an ideal society, protects the individual,

provides the path to be followed in worldly issues, shapes the

ideological and cultural values for the society and through the

orders compensates for the intermediary structures between social

and political spheres. )

When the fact that in Turkey the traditional style of life has

its inherent links with religion, is added to this picture, the

structural problem of laicism in Turkey becomes c l e a r e r . T h e

main evidence for the existence of such a problem is that, during

the years of the "War of Independence" the shared belief among

almost all parties was that the main goal of the liberation

movement would be the salvation of the Sultanate and the Caliphate.

This belief had caused problems in the process of establishing a

government detached from the Ottoman Empire. Even the so-called

"westernizers" were those who aspired a constitutional regime

together with the Sultan and the Caliph.!®®)

As far as Kemalism and the way the founders of the Turkish

Republic tried to adopt laicism are concerned, one comes across two

outstanding theses :<®7)

i. Kemalism failed by suppressing the ideologies which had the

potential to fight back Islam -as an ideology.

ii. Kemalism failed to play against Islam as a rival ideology.

This viewpoint is based on the argument that the extremely elitist

attitude of the Kemalist elite toward the society decreased the

possibility of closing the gap inbetween. Besides, the practice of

26

the principle of laicistn only to the extent of politics further

exacerbated this situation and gave the proponents of anti-laicism

a chance to strike the principle from within.

Accordingly, the Republican elite managed to shape the

mentality of the educated segment of the society; but they had

never been so successful with respect to the villages and those

living in the countryside, as a result of the limited opportunity

for e d u c a t i o n . A n extension of this problem is very well

manifested, when the Republic had tried to adopt the family

structure according to Swiss Civil Code. The adoption was overtly

successful. But, the inter-family ties continued to be based on

authority, and religion continued to be perceived as a security

mechanism.i

As far as the practice of laicism is concerned, Ataturk had

put forth a series of administrative mechanisms which enabled the

state to interfere with the religious institutions directly. This

provides an explanation to the question why in Turkey there has

never been a complete separation of state affairs from the

religious affairs, that although the state 'refrains itself from

theological principles it acts as a supervisor over religious

issues with the proclaimed task of preserving freedom of faith and

worship. This critical relationship between the freedom of religion

and the separation of the realm of religion from the state has been

the main factor leading to the abuse of the notion of laicism by

the proponents of anti-laic movements, who base their arguments on

27

the grounds that state should also leave religion to its own

sphere. From a different perspective, it can be said that the

incorporation of religious institutions into the state structure

works in the way that can ease the permeation of the state by the

proponents of anti-laic movements.

A more up-to-date problem, as far as the consolidation of the

notion of laicism is concerned, has been the unprecedented economic

and social changes, that the widening of the gap between the rich

and the poor drew the latter to religion. However, the revival of

Islam took place not only among the poor, but also made itself felt

among the rich as symbolized in the emergence of Islamic

enterprises, thus the emrgence of a new Muslim bourgeoisie with

ample room for political maneouvering. Moreover, the accompaniment

of political discontinuities to the changes at the economic level

has helped the searches for alternatives to the laic structure of

the Turkish Republic.

b. Anti-Laic Groupings

The problem of laicism in Turkey has been as much a result of

the claim that religious freedom is not practiced in full, as of

its indigenous contradictions. Besides, these shortfalls have been

abused by the proponents of anti-laicism who believe that the main

reason behind the contemporary problems of Turkey is the imposition

of Westernized laic political structure and the resultant

divergence from Islamic roots. Their main task is to give an end to

28

such Western, and especially American, values as laicism, freedom

of morality, sexual freedom, materialism and the particular place

given to the individual within the social structure. < ^) In a way,

they accuse Kemalist reforms of destroying religious institutions

and cultural values and of making up of an elite totally distinct

from society and thus which have no opinion about the latter’s

preferences.( )

The Islamic movement in Turkey, which outstandingly leads the

anti-laic activities, pursues a revolutionary strategy aspiring a

society which is mainly Muslim. The Islamic groups certainly

believe in the impossibility of the existence of any domain of life

independent of the influence of Islam. But, on the other hand, they

do not deny the necessity of technological development any more.

Rather, they put emphasis on the prerequisite that technological

development should be limited in accordance with the requirements

of the "Muslim society".(73)

The Islamic movement in Turkey can roughly be categorized as

follows ;(74)

i. Traditional Islamic groups

ii. Fundamentalists

Both the traditional and the fundamentalist Islamic groups

sincerely believe in the unpopularity of the practice of laicism

among the majority of the Turkish population and thus, are

committed to the establishment of an Islamic State, though through

different methods.

29

More specifically, the traditional Islamic groups try to

permeate the state and all the secular institutions from within

rather than pursuing a once-and-all revolutionary strategy, which

can be interpreted as the tendency to acquire legitimacy for the

time-being. This strategy is very well acknowledged by the fact

that in Turkey considerable number of the prominent members of

Islamic groups are positioned in secular professions. The Ministry

of Justice, the Ministry of Education as well as the State Planning

Organization make up good examples in this respect, as far as the

civil bureaucracy is concerned.

Fundamentalists, on the other hand, mainly organize in orders

which are the mere unifying force behind the "Volk Islam".

These illegal institutions spread their anti-laic ideas by means of

their journals. They are also in constant competition with the

state-controlled Presidency of Religious Affairs.(̂ 6) sharing

almost the same ideology and the strategy with the other

fundamentalists abroad, they support the policy of radical change

in the laic structure of the Turkish Republic. As an extension of

this posture, they severely reject any bases of authority, other

than the God and the Prophet Muhammed.

As a matter of fact, the reflections of the objectives of the

fundamentalists at the institutional level can be found within the

structure of the Rabitat-ul Alem-ul Islam ; as giving an end to the

Western influence on the polity, economy and culture of the Muslim

world, rejecting that kind of nationalism which is incompatible

30

with the principles of Islamic State, consolidating Shari’ah in

each and every Muslim society, establishing Islamic State which

would unite all the Muslims of the world.

The credibility of the threat posed by the Islamic trends

against the principle of laicism may also be attributed to the

revival of Islam which began with the transition to multi-party

politics and which continued to occupy the scene throughout the

decades with an accelerating fashion. This revival is partly due to

the continuation of the feeling of congregation even under the

Republican regime. This is clear in the resort to religious

rhetoric by the traditional socio-economic sectors when they face

the danger of both economic and social extinction as a result of

lacking behind modernization and Westernization,This is the

time when religion begins to play its role as a security mechanism.

To sum up one can argue that, there are a number of factors

which either directly or indirectly affected the rise of Islam as

an ideology to its peak, especially in the late 1970s and

throughout the 1980s. Late 1970s were the years when political and

social crisis has reached its limits as a result of the terrorism

by the activities of the extremist groups, with the accompaniment

of Islamic Revolution in Iran and the acceleration in the

fundamentalist movements in the Middle East as two, more or less,

effective outside developments, which would coincide with the

ideological vacuum of the 1980s and hence reinforce the moulding of

Islam as an alternative ideology.(8°)

31

However, when the issue turns to be the question of whether

there is a real danger of an Islamic revolution in Turkey, one gets

the sense that it is destined to attract negative responds. This

can be attributed to the seemingly widespread agreement about the

fact that the notion of laicism as well as the mechanism of a laic

order has been entrenched within Turkish democratic regime!®''! and

guaranteed both by the Civil Code and by the Turkish Military which

still perceives itself as the main guardian of Kemalist principles.

Nevertheless, it should not be neglected that the "War of

Independence" was not of a religious nature and thus the Turkish

Republic was built merely upon national values which were tried to

be freed from religious sentiments.

5.Scope of the Study

This study aims to give a brief picture of the post-1983

pariiamentary parties in relation to the accelerating debate on the

issue of laicism in Turkey. Political parties are important in this

case, since -as indispensable elements of the democratic political

system- they continue to be the most« outstanding actors of

organized political contest in Turkish politics. Consequently, the

political parties can be termed as crucial elements through which

one can penetrate the policy making and policy implementation

processes. Furthermore, the emergence of a party elite as different

and vis-a-vis the traditional state elite in the post-1983 era

enhanced the key positions of political parties in the state

32

affairs, even in the way that some of the state policies -including

those in relation to the principle of laicism- have been

reformulated by the party elite, despite resistance from the state

levels.

The study consists of five chapters, including the

introduction whereby an insight to the term laicism with respect to

both its literary meaning in general and its Turkish version are

given. Additionally, the first chapter contains a historical

backdrop of the issues related to laicism since the foundation of

the Turkish Republic up to the 1980s. Ottoman past is also briefly

mentioned to clarify why laicism in Turkey had followed a different

path. The first chapter ends with the problems which put the

consolidation of laicism in Turkey into difficulty.

The following chapters focus on the parliamentary parties more

comprehensively. Hence, the second chapter contains an analysis of

party programmes in order to get a clearer picture for making

comparison in relation to their manifest ideological preferences as

well as to their reference to the principle of laicism within the

context of their programmatic commitments.

In Chapter III the relevant statements made by the party

deputies on the basis of the Records of the GNA are analysed.

Chapter IV provides an evaluation about the postures of the

parliamentary parties as regards to the issue of laicism.

Finally, Chapter V contains conclusion whereby an overall

discussion on the basis of the information gathered throughout the

33

study is made.

34

NOTES AND REFERENCES

(1) Amerikan G1z11 Belgelerinde : Türkiye’de İslamcı Akimlar.

(Istanbul : Beyan Yayınları, Ağustos 1990), p.85

(2) Server Tanllli, İslam Caglmı'za Yan1t Verebilir m1?,______

(Ankara: Say Yayinlari, Nisan 1991), p.221.

(3) Amerikan Gizli Belgelerinde, op.cit., p.83.

(4) Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, (Dogu-Bati

Yayinlari, 1973), p.16,

(5) Ibid.

(6) Mustafa Erdoğan, "Laiklik ve Turk Uygulamasi

Üzerine Notlar", Türkiye Gunlugu, 13, Winter 1990, p,54.

(7) In those countries where the notion of laicism has first

emerged, the mechanisms of the state and the religion were

institutionalized in separate bodies, whereas in the Turkish

case religion used to be incorparated into the state structure

as a result of the significant role it played at the societal

level as a value system.

(8) Berkes, op.cit., p.20.

(9) Ozer Ozankaya, Türkiye’de Laiklik : Atatürk Devrimlerinin

Temeli, 4̂ *̂̂ ed. (Istanbul : CemYayinevi, 1990), pp.168-171.

(10) Ibid.


(12) Ibid., p.526.

(13) Amerikan Gizli Belgelerinde, op.cit., pp.29-30.

(14) liter Turan, Westernization and Secularism in______

35

Contemporary Turkey, Occasional Paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft

und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany, May 1989 p.8.

(15) Halil Inalcik, "Traditional Society (Turkey)," in

Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Dankwart A.Rustow

and Robert E. Ward, eds. (Princeton : Princeton University

Press, 1964), p 4.

(16; Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in

Turkey," in State, Democracy and the Military rTurkey in the

1980s, Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. (Berlin Walter de

Gruyter, 1988), p.121.

(17) Inalcik, op.cit., pp.3,6.

(18) Turan, op.cit., p.8.

(19) Inalcik, op.cit·, 18.

(20) Turan, op.cit., pp.18-19.

(21) Inalcik, op.cit·, pp.10, 11, 12.

(22) Ibid., p.17.

(23) Ibid., p.19.

(24) Turan, op.cit., p.20.

(25) Inalcik, op.cit., p.22.


(27) Ibid., p.208.

(28) In the Ottoman era the masses were, most of the time,

subject to domination by ayan, as well as by agas and the

clerics who found it to their advantage to keep the populace

attached to the traditional institutions (See Inalcik, p.24).

36

As far as the intellectual level is concerned, the nascent

Ottoman-Turkish intellegentsia -i.e. Young Ottomans- who

aspired the preservation of the Islamic-Turkish culture,

formed one of the main blockades to the modernization attempts

of this period (See inalcik, p.23).

(29) İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics : The

Case of Turkey," Government and Opposition, Autumn 1983,

Vol.18, 4, p.425. See also Feroz Ahmad, "Politics and Islam in

Modern Turkey," Middle Eastern Studies, Winter 1991, p.3.

(30) Ahmad, Ibid.

(31) Ahmad, op.cit., p.6.

(32) Muzaffer Sencer, "Din Devlet IIiskileri/Din ve Toplum,"

Cumhuriyet Donemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol.2-3, 1983 ed.,

p.564.

(33) Ahmad, loc.cit.

(34) Ozankaya, op.cit., p.193.

(35) Toprak, op.cit., p.123.






(41) The RPP government enacted laws for the establishment of

Imam Hatip Courses and Faculty of Theology within the body of

Ankara University. Furthermore, the government allowed for

37

religious instruction in the primary education and let the

reactivation of the orders. All these simply represent a

slight reversal from the measures taken to consolidate the

principle of laicism in Turkey.

(42) Amerikan Gizli Belgelerinde, loc.cit. See also Ahmad,

op.cit., p.10.


(44) Ibid., p.10.


(46) Serif Mardin, "2000’e Dogru Kultur ve Din", Türkiye

Gunlugu, 13, Winter 1990, p.10. See also Ahmad, op.cit.,

pp.10-11.

(47) Mete Tuncay, "Din-Devlet Iliskileri/Laiklik," Cumhuriyet

Donemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vo1.2-3. 1983 ed. p.576.

(43) Amerikan Gizli Belgelerinde , op.cit., p.35.

(49) Amerikan Gizli Belgelerinde, op.cit.,p.24.

(50) Tuncay, op.cit., pp.576-577.



(53) Tuncay, op.cit., p.578.

(54) 1960s witnessed an accelerated process of change with

rapid growth and industrialization which in turn caused

great dislocation throughout the society. The political

reflections of this era can be seen in the fragmentation on

the right as well as in the change of the policy of the RPP

38

which ended its links with the military bureaucratic elite.

(See Ahmad, p.14) This situation would culminate in the

coalition governments of the 1970s in which the NSP gained a

prominent place.

(55) Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, Walkington,

England : Eothon Press, 1986), p.134.

(56) Metin Heper, "State and Society in Turkish Political

Experience" Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin eds. (1988), p.8.

(57) Metin Heper, "The State, the Military and Democracy in

Turkey", Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol.9,

No.3, 1987, p.61.

(58) Article 163 of Turkish Criminal Code confines the penalty

for propogandizing through religious means to such goals as

the achievement of political ambition and personal interest.

(59) The annullment of Articles 141,142 and 163 of Turkish

Criminal Code was published in the "Official Newspaper" (Resmi

Gazete) on 12 April 1991, under Article 23 of "Law Against

Terror" (Terörle Mücadele Kanunu).

See Ozankaya, op.cit., p.7, and Ahmad, op.cit., p.9.

(60) For the details on the post-1983 political parties inter

alia., see Ustun Erguder, "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in

Turkey," in Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey, Ergun Ozbudun

ed. (Ankara : Turkish Political Science Association, 1988) and

liter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-

1983 Turkey," in Heper and Evin eds.

39

(61) Welfare Party was founded on 19 July 1983 and

appearantly took over the mentality of the "National Outlook".

One can say that the WP displays no such outstandingly

religious posture as far as its programme is concerned. On the

contrary, both in the party programme and in the speeches of

its prominent members the loyalty to Kemalist principles and

thus to the principle of laicism is taken as the starting

point. However, the inherent Islamic tendency specific to the

party should also be noted.

(62) Omer Faruk Genckaya, "The Impact of Organizational

Attributes on Legislative Performance: A Structural-Functional

Analysis of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 1983-1987",

Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Boğaziçi University,1990),

pp.52-53.

(63) Ibid.

(64) Serif Mardin, Din ve ideoloji, 3 *̂̂ ed., (iletişim

Yayinlari, 1986), pp.60-67,110.

(65) Dogu Ergi 1, Atatürkçü Toplum ve Siyaset Felsefesi_______

Acisindan Laiklik, (Ankara : Adalet Matbaacilik Ltd., January

1990), p.41.


(67) Ibid., p.111.


(69) Mardin, op.cit., pp.25-26,58.


40

(71) Amerikan Gizli Belgelerinde, op.c i t., p. 17.

(72) Ibid., pp.63-64.

(73) Ozankaya, op.clt., p.51.

(74) Amerikan Gizil Belgelerinde, op.cit., pp.69-90.

(75) Ibid., p.71.

(76; Ibid., p.76.

(77) Nokta Dergisi, 16 June 1985, pp.30-31. See also Server

Tanilll, op. clt., p,209; Bahriye Ucok, RGNA, Vo1.38, Sess.86,

(April 1987), p.547.

(78) Mardin, op.cit., p.111.

(79) Ergll, op.cit., p.43.

(80) Amerikan Gizil Belgelerinde, op.cit., pp.49-54.

(81) Doğu Ergil, "Cumhuriyetin Ana Siyasal Felsefesi :

Laiklik," Gunes Gazetesi, February 15̂ ^̂ , 1991, p.11.

41

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

In order to delineate the postures of the post-1983

parliamentary parties as regards to laicism, one must define the

relative positions of each and every party on the ideological

spectrum according to their programmatic commitment.

Parliamentary parties relatively have more opportunity for

direct participation in the policy making and implementation

procedures -either at the government or at the opposition level-,

when compared to the political parties outside the parliament.

Aside from that, they gain an overwhelming prominence at the level

of political participation in Turkish context as a result of the

low level of organization -numerically insufficient and

functionally ineffective- at the other societal sectors.

Therefore, here only those parties which have been able to form

parliamentary groups during the course of 17̂ ·̂ GNA (1983-1987), are

taken as units of analysis, -i.e. the Populist Party (PP), the

Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP), the Democratic Left Party

(DLP), which are presumed to reside on the centre left, and the

Nationalist Democracy Party, (NDP) the True Path Party (TPP) and

the Motherland Party (MP) on the centre and/or centre-right of the

ideological spectrum, on the basis of the image they draw in their

programmes.

The data and the interpretations in this study are specific to

42

the period between 1983-1987, which can be refered as a transition

period. This period is also significant to study since the

parliament has begun to embody such deputies with low level of

seniority among the ranks of mostly the new established political

parties.

Taking the party programmes as basic reference sources for

their manifest ideology, in the following paragraphs the general

standing of the parties in relation to their position on the right-

centre-left dimension, is presented. Later on, the approaches to

the principle of laicism within the same framework, are analysed.

However, it should also be noted that party programmes do not

necessarily represent the actual posture of the parties. Rather,

they are seen more as instruments to attract as much electorate as

possible(2), which in turn increases the possibility of bias in the

analysis.

1.General Standing of the Parties

In this section three criteria will be the main focus of

attention in finding out the differences among the parties as a

result of their ideological preferences^^) along the right-centre-

left dimension :

a. The Economic Policy as Stated in the Party Programmes

1. State-Run Economy : The state is perceived not only as

a regulator, but also as an active partner in the

running of the economy; with an overall dominance.

43

ii. Free Market Economy : The state is seen just as a

supervisor in the conduct of free-competition and

hence it is expected to refrain from interfering with

the conduct of market operations in the way of

constraining, organizing or facilitating any

individual initiative.

b. State Figure as Perceived by the Parties^'·)

i, A Dominant State Figure in the Societal Life

ii. Priority to the Promotion of the Individual

c. Religiosity(S)

i. Emphasis on the Importance of Spiritual Values in

Public Life

ii. Tendency to Link the Religious Values with the

Nationalistic Posture

The underlying reason in choosing the above mentioned criteria

lies in the fact that the main divergence among the parties -as far

as their programmatic rhetoric are concerned- comes about, firstly,

in relation to the economic policies offered.

On the other hand, the issue of "State figure" is significant

in the sense that the historical background which proceeded the

establishment of Turkish Republic had one of patrimonial state

system which necessitated the presence of a strong state over and

above the society. Moreover, the founders of the Turkish Republic,

despite the proclamation that it was established on the grounds of

national sovereignty, initiated a totally dominating state figure

44

with the aim of consolidating the new system. Thus, state in

Turkish context, -both at the societal and institutional level- has

been one of a respected figure, while holding the ropes in its

hands.

It should be clear why religiosity has been one of the major

issues in this study; that the standing of each and every party in

this respect provides the researcher with additional information in

the way of getting an insight to their relative postures as regards

to laicism.

a. Economic Policy

To begin with, all the three parties which assume a left-of-

centre position -i.e. the PP, the SDPP and the DLP- tend to give

support to state planning in the economic sphere. However, they

differ in relation to the nature and extent of the state’s role in

the running of the economy.

In this context the PP has the most extreme disposition that

it holds the state responsible for the task of directing the

economy to the advantage of the society.

As parallel to the PP, the SDPP, too, approves the

essentiality of state planning in almost all sectors ranging from

agriculture to transportation and foreign trade, while severely

rejecting private entrepreneurship in energy production as well as

in the exploitation of natural resources. However, it should also

be noted that the party -not surprisingly- avoids any extreme

disposition and hence its reference to the state differs among

various spheres of economic activity -i.e. as an actor in the

industrial sector, and/or as a catalyst in the market

operations. <>

The other extreme figure within the left-wing is the DLP,

whichy totally condemns both the state-run and the free market

economy.Moreover, the party refers to the notion of invisible

hand as the instrument of monopolistic capital which can attract

state support by means of pacification of the public s e c t o r . A s

an extension of the proclaimed tendency of the party to approach

each and every issue from a democratic and liberitarian

perspective, in the party programme, an all-out domination of the

importance is given to the public sector. Thus, the state is

perceived just as an instrument in the economic sphere which would

handle the regulation of the economy through public participation

and to the benefit of the society.

One significant point in the party programme is the weighty

presence of the reference to the necessity of long range economic

planning under state supervision, but of course, by means of

democratic and active public participation. Accordingly, the

programme presupposes that the targets of the planning be

designated at the centre and together with the participation of

economic and social public organizations as well as organizations

of the private sector and local administrative units. H D

To sum up, one can say that the parties of the left-of-centre

46

share in common the acceptance of the necessity of planning for

the development and improvement of Turkish economy. On the other

hand, the point they differ is the role they attribute to the

state, which also signifies their relative dispositions. Thus, the

PP gives the ropes totally to the state , which "acts to the

benefit of the societyC· ̂ . The SDPP, on the other hand, tries to

follow a milder path by viewing the state either as the dominating

unit -e.g.in energy production, exploitation of natural resources-

or as an intermediary according to the nature of economic activity

in question. Lastly, although in the programme of the DLP there is

an excessive reference to the state in all the spheres of economic

activity; it is not regarded as the prime actor, rather as an

instrument in the practice of the planned economy by extensive

public participation.

When the right-of-centre parties are concerned, namely the

NDP, the TPP and the MP, one can grasp that all favor the free

market economy which would be accompanied by a decreasing state

hand in this sphere. Thus, there is no divergence among the three

parties from the shared belief that the portion of the State

Economic Enterprises in the economy should be reduced to a minimum

possible and that the state should act just as a regulator of

economic policy and economic growth, whereby the private

enterprises would rise as the main a c t o r s . on the other hand,

all the three parties approve planning in the economic sphere which

would harmonize social and economic development without initiating

47

constraints on the functioning of the f ree-market. (^ )

More specifically, the NDP views the state as a supplementary

institution that would regulate and/or guide the economy whenever

private initiative is incompetent and adopts the rhetoric that is

common to the right wing, that the state should regulate the

general economy while supporting the free market operations.(^^)

The TPP, on the other hand, proclaims a mixed economic

understanding while attributing the state a regulative and

supportive role in the economy of the country.

The MP, not unlike the other two right-of-centre parties,

support state hand in the socio-economic development of the country

to the extent that it has the responsibility to see to it that the

statusquo is maintained, without interfering in the details of the

market operations. (^ >

One can grasp that it is impossible to observe that much

divergence among the rhetoric of the right-wing parties as in the

case of left-wing, that all the three give priority to private

entrepreneurship with a visible tendency to decrease the role of

the state in the functioning of the economy, to that level where it

would not act as an active partner.

b.State Figure as Perceived by the Parties

When the issue is the perception of the main role of the state

one can notice that the parties tend to give priority to the

function of the state either in relation to the preservation of law

48

and order or in the promotion of the individual -i.e., guarantee of

basic rights and liberties. One shared point among almost all the

parties is the reference to the Declaration of Universal Rights and

Liberties in their programmes that they all announce their loyalty

to its articles.

In the programmes of both the PP and the SDPP there is an

outright tendency to adopt a middle-way in relation to the role of

the state, that the promotion of the individual is viewed as a

prerequisite for the guarantee of law and order in the society.

Nevertheless, it should not be neglected that the SDPP seems to

give more weight to the former, which is very well manifested in

the party programme, that the state as an institution is presumed

to exist for the society and not vice-versa.(^^)

However, the DLP, displays an outright commitment to the well

being of the citizens which far exceeds that in both the PP and the

SDPP. As a matter of fact in the party programme the key words are

liberty and democracy and that the party approaches almost every

issue from this perspective. Hence, throughout the party programme

one can witness excessive reference to individual rights and

liberties as well as to justice and equality as the means for their

preservation.(15) Meanwhile, it is declared that the party espouses

a notion of state which is under the domination of the society and

not vice-versa.(20) This specific approach to the state is very

well illustrated by the emphasis put on the participation of the

peoples in the democratic system as a prerequisite for the

49

preservation of internal security as well as of peace and

consensus. (21)

Consequently it can be argued that although they vary in their

intensity, all the left-of-centre parties tend to give priority to

the promotion of the individual and thus they prefer to view the

state as a mechanism in the service of the individual. Relatedly,

they share almost the same rhetoric which points at the necessity

of liberating the individuals from any societal, economic and

cultural repression and at the condition that individual rights and

liberties should not be restricted except for such compulsions as

societal security and wel1-being.( 2 2)

For the right-of- entre parties, the functions of the state in

relation to the provision of law and order gain priority over such

issues as the basic rights and liberties of the individual. All the

three parties in question seem to be more prone to give

acquiescence to the possibility of constraints on the latter, when

compared to the left-wing parties. Here, it should not be

misunderstood that the left-wing parties totally condemn any kind

of constraint on individual rights and liberties(23)^ whatever its

reason is. However, the point the two sides differ can be found in

their preferences of the themes on which they put emphasis.

In this respect, the main example can be found in the

programme of the NDP, that while the party confirms the

indispensability of the freedom of press for the full practice of

democracy, it still does not refrain from putting it under the

50

constraints of state control. Besides, the main focus of attention,

in the context of basic rights and liberties of the individual, is

the conditions under which their restrictions are legitimized; and

not the immunity they should have from the measures taken to ensure

law and order.(̂ 4) jhis tendency to legitimize the restrictions on

individual rights and liberties, with the claim that one of the

basic functions of the state is to provide and preserve the law and

order has its parallels in the programmes of both the TPP and the

MP. However, it should not be neglected that both parties

frequently refer to the necessity of safeguarding the full practice

of individual rights and liberties within the framework of a

democratic s y s t e m . jn this respect the TPP takes an outstanding

posture with the presumption that there can be no tolerance to the

abolition and/or restriction of any freedom under the pretext of

preserving domestic security.(26) on the other hand, in the case of

the MP, one comes across an ambiguous tone adopted in the party

programme, as displayed in Article 2;(2^) that while emphasizing

the notion of a strong state over and above the nation with the

proclamation that the wealth of the nation is a means for the

welfare of the state and not vice-versa; the party in the very same

article does not refrain from constant reference to the notion of

"State for nation".

To conclude with, one can claim that it is hard to observe

considerable divergences across right-centre-left dimension in

relation to the way the parties view the "State figure" in the

51

programmes. As a matter of fact, there is an outright tendency to

avoid a trade-off between the two relevant viewpoints -i.e,, State

as the guardian of law and order in the society, first and

foremost, or of the basic rights and liberties of the individuals.

Nevertheless, it can be admitted that there is a slight difference

on the part of the left-wing parties, that they seem to put more

emphasis on the immunity of the individual rights and liberties

from possible constraints, when compared to the right-wing parties.

c. Religiosity

As it is stated beforehand, religiosity, embodied within the

party programmes, will be assessed by means of the reference of the

parties to the societal significance of religion and the tendency

to link religious values with the notion of nationalism.

Not surprisingly, all of the three left-of-centre parties

refer to religion only within the context of the principle of

laicism and/or when the issue is the basic rights and liberties of

the individual. Hence, the parties do not display even the

slightest concern about the societal role of religion, at the same

time refraining from making use of spiritual terms in relation to

national values. On the contrary, they prefer to approach the

notion of nationalism from a "Kemalisfl^s) perspective and hence

view it as an instrument to unite the Turks around one shared

national goal, despite different social and ethnic characteristics.

As a matter of fact, one can say that the left-of-centre

52

parties tend to refer to religion more within the context of basic

rights and liberties of the individual, while constantly pointing

at the necessity to prevent the differences in religious beliefs

from leading to a discrimination at the national level as well as

to avoid the exploitation of religion for political goals.(29)

As far as the centre and/or right-of-centre is concerned,

there is a slight tendency to refer to religion more as an

indispensable element of Turkish nation and/or Turkish culture.

This tendency is very well illustrated within the programme of the

NDP. Although the party seems to adopt a nationalistic posture

which is totally in line with Kemalist principles, alongside with

the claim that the differences in faith should not give harm to

Turkish identity,(20) the ambiguity of what the party means by

Turkish culture dominates the whole programme. One can even claim

that the NDP, though covertly, forms a link between religion -i.e.,

Islam- and Turkish culture in the section whereby the main concern

is the education of the Turkish workers abroad.(2 1 )

The tendency, inherent in the programme of the NDP, to

associate spiritual values with national ones becomes more

appearent in the case of the TPP.(22) jhe programme contains an

article on such notions as "the shared holy values" as well as on

"the national and spiritual values" which again point at the

outright tendency of the party to view the "shared spiritual

values" as one of the building stones of Turkish culture.(23)

However, it should not be neglected that the party still refers to

53

the necessity of avoiding the abuse of differences in religion with

the aim of disrupting national unity.(34)

The MP, on the other hand, displays an overwhelmingly

religious tone, when compared to the left-wing and even to the

other two right-wing parties. This particular posture can be

attributed to the embodiment of four different tendencies in the

foundation of the party,(35) which makes it more receptive to

religious concerns. Thus, throughout the party programme there is

considerable use of spiritual terms, not less frequently than the

reference to "national values",(36) which signify the tendency of

the party to acknowledge the inherent relation between these two

separate notions.

Finally, it can be said that the right-of-centre parties

prefer to adopt a more or less religious rhetoric -in terms of the

importance given to the spiritual well-being of the society- which

can be attributed to the social strata they are addressing. The

left-of-centre parties, on the other hand, prefer to view religion

within the context of individual rights and liberties, without

giving priority to religious freedom. This can be interpreted as an

attempt to harmonize their position on the left with the aspiration

to form a support base as wide as possible.

2. Understanding of the Principle of Laicism

This section specifically focuses on the approach of the

parties to the principle of laicism. However,at first hand, the

principle of nationalism, which is often intertwined with the

54

former, is evaluated for the sake of a better understanding of the

parties’ relative positions in relation to laicism. .

a. Nationalism

Within the framework of the programmes, there is a commitment

by all the pariiamentary parties to the principle of nationalism.

This can be attributed to the fact that notion of nationalism and

hence nationalistic values have been very well structured in

Turkish society. Aside from that, the overall commitment to this

specific principle is partly a result of the Law on Political

Parties (1982), which imposes the precondition that the political

parties must conduct their activities in accordance with Kemalist

principles, regardless of their ideological preferences.(^7)

However, it should also be noted that each and every party displays

a different nationalistic posture. In this respect the tendencies

can be counted as follows :

i. Nationalism is perceived as loyalty and respect to the

customs and traditions that have been shaped in the Republican

period.

ii. The national values and sentiments of the Turkish people

are perceived to have been inherited from the Ottoman period.

As in line with the first approach, the programme of the PP,

contains considerable emphasis on the need for modernization

attempts to preserve national identity alongside with the

implication that the party bases nationalism on the unity of

55

language, unity of ideals and on the preservation of Turkey’s

political and economic rights and b e n e f i t s . T h u s , in the party

programme there is no reference to the Ottoman background as

forming one of the main tenets of Turkish nationalism.

The SDPP, in its programme refers to nationalism as one of the

principles of Kemalism which should be taken as a guide in the

pursuit of the objectives of the party, regarding both the

individual and the society. Relatedly, the party states that its

understanding of nationalism aims at strengthening national unity

of the Turkish people, despite differences in thought, social

strata and ethnicity. Besides, not unlike the PP, the SDPP too,

points at the major goal of the Turkish nationalism as being the

modernization of Turkish society.

The programme of the DLP contains such notions as

"humanitarian nationalism" or "international nationalism", which do

not give a clear idea about what the party refers to as the shared

values of the Turkish nation. Nevertheless, there is a

reference to the particular prerequisite of nationalism that there

should not be any distinction based on race, religion, native

language or on region. On the other hand, almost the same emphasis

is put on the historical and cultural tradition of Turkey as

forming the grounds on which the national identity of the Turks are

b u i l t . ) Besides, the party makes a clear distinction between the

Turkish culture and the Ottoman background, as parallel to the

proclamation that it adopts a nationalistic posture in line with

56

Kemalist principles and hence which is interlinked with democratic

rights and 1 iberties. ('•2)

This particular interpretation of Turkish nationalism is

further strengthened with the reference to those values that

extended from the Ottoman past into the Republican Turkey as an

obstacle in the enhancement of the Turkish culture. ('•3)

Thus, as far as the party programme is concerned, the DLP

assumes almost the same posture with the other two left-of-centre

parties, in relation to what it means by "Turkish nationalism”.

The NDP, on the other hand, possesses a totally nationalistic

rhetoric with its proclaimed loyalty to "the nationalism of

Ataturki^'* 1". Besides, the party refers to such notions as

"cultural nationalism” and "the shared history" as the main aspects

of Turkish nationalism, while claiming that it takes the

Constitution as its main reference point in this context. ( )

Hence, the somewhat ambiguous tone adopted by the party in its

reference to the cultural values of the Turkish people makes it

hard to point out the grounds on which the party bases the culture

of the Turkish people, i'*®)

The programme of the TPP is also filled with an all-out

commitment to the use of nationalistic terms, but there is no

clearly defined understanding of what makes up the national

identity of the Turkish people. Thus, although there is the weighty

existence of such terms as "national unity", "national will",

"national faith”, "national needs", "national interest", "national

57

history", there is no corresponding reference to the grounds on

which Turkish nationalism should be based. Besides, the ambiguity

about the fundamental principles that make up the Turkish nation

makes itself felt even in the article on Turkish national ism. )

Nevertheless, one can claim that the party shows tendency to take

Ottoman past into consideration, on the grounds that there is

excessive reference to the "shared national, historical and

spiritual values of the Turkish nation^'*®)".

Not unlike the TPP, in the programme of the MP, there is a

widespread use of nationalistic terms. In this respect, one

significant factor is the reference to national and spiritual

values simultaneously, which can be attributed to the

embodiment of four tendencies within the party structure. This

specific posture further confirms the claim that the party tends

to identify nationalistic sentiments with religiosity.

In conclusion it can be stated that, almost all the parties

concerned in this study ensure their commitment to nationalism in

accordance with Kemalist principles, and hence to the preservation

of Turkish culture and tradition. The difference arises when the

issue is the interpretation of "the essence" of Turkish culture

and tradition. While the PP, the SDPP and the DLP identify their

posture as parallel to the first a p p r o a c h , t h e parties which

stand on the right-of-centre display an ambigious posture, making

it difficult to understand the grounds on which they base the

fundamentals of the Turkish culture. In other words, while

58

declaring their commitment to Kemalist nationalism - which clearly

excludes Ottoman tradition- they also refrain from totally

rejecting the significance of the Ottoman-Islam tradition for the

shared values of the Turkish people.

b. Laicism

It is, again, hard to point out differences among the relevant

parties as regards to what they mean by laicism. Like in the case

of nationalism, all the parties display an outstanding commitment

to the principle of laicism. This can, again, be attributed to

legal impediments as well as to the legacy of Kemalist reforms

which are presumably entrenched both in the society, and mainly at

the state level. However, their postures show differences according

to their reference points. Thus, within the confines of the party

programmes there are two distinguished tendencies :

a. Constant reference to laicism as a guarantee for the

preservation of freedom of religion and faith.

b. Perception of laicism mainly as the fundamental principle

of the Turkish Republic.

It must not be too difficult to predict that almost all the

parties put emphasis on the freedom of religion and faith as one of

the main prerequisites of the principle of laicism. In this respect

the parties also tend to hold the state responsible for such a

task. Thus, despite their acknowledgement of the necessity that in

a laic system the religious affairs should be separated from those

59

of the state, the parties, without exception, give ample room to

state maneouvering in the sphere of religion, -a kind of double

track policy which can be attributed to the unique practice of

laicism in Turkey.

Hence, the programmes of the PP, the NDP and the DLP, have

almost the same rhetoric in relation to the principle of laicism,

that they all severely condemn the abuse of religion for political

means, while admitting the necessity of the state supervision in

the pursuit of religious affairs.(S2 ) However, there is no concern

with this issue beyond that point, which can be helpful in finding

out differences among their postures. Nevertheless, the reference

to laicism as the basic principle of Turkish Revolution, of

national unity and of civilization in the statements of Mr. Ecevit,

the leader of the DLP, builds up a more or less distinct image for

the party, despite its programme.(^3)

On the other hand, the three major parties in the 17̂ ^̂ GNA -

i.e., the SDPP, the TPP, the MP-, show at least slight differences

in the rhetoric adopted as regards to the principle of laicism.

First of all, the emphasis on the state’s role as the guardian

of the freedom of religion and faith as well as in the prevention

of the abuse of religion for political ends has a considerable

weight in the programmes of all the three parties. (S'·) Despite this

point of agreement in the programmatic rhetoric, the main

difference arises in the reference to the function of the state,

that the MP regards the state as a regulative instrument in the

60

practice of compulsory religious instruction in primary and

secondary s c h o o l s , without any concern about the laic state

notion. Aside from that, the party views the principle of laicism

from the point of freedom of religion and faith and nothing beyond

that.(5 6 ) On the contrary, both the SDPP and the TPP have a

classical reference to the notion of laic state in their programmes

as :(57)

In a laic state religious affairs are separated from

state affairs and freedom of religion and faith is under

state’s guarantee.

In the comparision of the references of the parties to the

principle of laicism -as far as the party programmes are concerned-

the issue of compulsory religious education provides considerable

insight. In this respect too, there is no worthwhile concern on the

part of the PP, the NDP and the DLP; except for the proposal by Mr.

Ecevit for the adoption of religious courses on rational grounds

and parallel to philosophical training.(55)

However, the main divergences appear among the other three. In

the programme of the SDPP, the idea of laic education dominates the

scene while there is no reference to compulsory religious

instruction.(5̂ 1 Just in contrast to this stand, the MP emphasizes

the indispensability of religious instruction under state

supervision in the primary and secondary education for bringing up

generations with high morality, as well as the necessity of the

enhancement of the promotion of moral and theological studies.

61

The programme of the TPP, on the other hand, contains no

direct reference to the issue of compulsory religious instruction.

However, the programme embodies such phrases which signify the

commitment of the party to the adoption of a national education

policy, which would spread secular thoughts throughout the

s o c i e t y . B u t , it should not be neglected that the TPP, in its

programme, tends to use the terms of "national" and "moral" values

simultaneously,which raises doubts about what the party refers

to as laic education.

To sum up, the analysis of party programmes provide the

researcher with valuable data about the relative postures of the

parties vis-a-vis the principle of laicism only to the extent that

constitutional,legal and electoral concerns permit the parties to

adopt such a rhetoric which symbolize their actual ideological

preferences. Above all, the legal impediments -as mentioned above-

are one of the main restrictions on the party rhetoric which

prevent the expression of extreme versions of the principle of

laicism. Moreover, the fact that the post-1983 political parties

are more likely to be catch-all parties, rather than displaying a

marginal ideological commitment, should also be taken into

consideration. When the impact of the Republican ideas which are

presumably protected by the state elite and entrenched within the

society is added to this picture, one comes across the necessity to

resort to the additional sources. Thus, in this study, the

following chapters embody the extension of the relevant analysis

62

with the guidance of the data gathered out of the party programmes

and on the basis of the parliamentary records.

3.Research Questions

It is obvious that programmatic commitment of the political

parties provide a subtle idea about their manifest ideology on

laicism and relevant issues as in the case of other programmatic

statements. Therefore, this study intends to shed more light on the

understanding of laicism by the parliamentary parties in the 17^^

GNA. In this context two subordinate objectives are also taken into

account :

a. To delineate the variations in the understanding of laicism

in the same block of the political parties as well as between the

blocks;

b. To find out the deviations from the manifest ideology in

general and from the understanding of laicism stated in the party

programmes.

In this respect the following questions will be the main point

of attention throughout the analysis :

1. Is there any relation between the general manifest ideology

of the parties and the individual speeches made on laicism and on

relavant issues?

2. To what extent the programmatic commitment of the parties

become a binding factor for individual deputies of the respective

parties?

63

4.Data

In the analysis, the main sources will be the Records of the

General Floor of the 17̂ *̂ GNA in the period between 24 November

1983-16 October 1987.

The subject matters of the analysis will be taken out of the

parliamentary talks on laicism, national education, annual

budgets,religious issues -namely talks about the Presidency of

Religious Affairs, religious education and "reaction"-.

In this context the concern will be with individual speeches

made out of agenda, individual speeches made on behalf of the

respective parties, general debates, written and oral questions and

the answers to these questions and parliamentary investigations.

As a supplemantary data it would be appropriate to give a

general picture of the analysed parliamentary speeches made by the

deputies of the relavant parties :

On laicism :

PP 2 deputies, 3 speeches

SDPP 2 deputies, 5 speeches

DLP 3 deputies, 4 speeches

NDP 3 deputies, 3 speeches

TPP 5 deputies, 9 speeches

MP 8 deputies, 22 speeches

On National Education

PP 4 deputies, 5 speeches

64

SDPP 8 deputies, 10 speeches

DLP 2 deputies, 3 speeches

NDP 6 deputies, 7 speeches

TPP None

MP 11 deputies, 13 speeches

On Anti-Laic Movements :

Presidency of Religious Affairs :

PP

SDPP

DLP

TPP

MP

Reaction :

PP

SDPP

DLP

NDP

TPP

MP

2 deputies, 5 speeches


None

None





1 deputy, 1 speech



Proposals for General Debates on Reaction :

RGNA, Vol.20, Sess.22, (30 October 1985)

PP 4 deputies

NDP 2 deputies

Independent 3 deputies

RGNA, Vo1.24, Sess. 64, (23 January 1986)

65

SDPP 5 deputies

Independent 6 deputies

Proposals for Parliamentary Investigation on Reaction :

RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 80, (24 March 1987)

by Aydin Guven Gurkan (SDPP)

RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987)

by Sabri Irmak (DLP)

RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987)

by M. Seyfi Oktay (SDPP)

RGNA, Vol.39, Sess. 92, (21 April 1987)

by Aydin Guven Gurkan (SDPP)

66


(1) Joseph Lapalombara ed. Politics Within Nations, (N.J :

Prentice Hall Inc., 1974), pp.545-553.

(2) See page 2.

(3) Here, what Is meant by Ideology Is clusters of covariant

attitudes, opinions and beliefs about major political

questions, desired organization, scope and purpose of a

government that constitute a system on which political groups

base their activities. The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political

Thought, David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connoly,Alan

Ryan, eds. (United Kingdom: Basil Blackwell Ltd.,1987),

"Ideology," p.236.

(4) Here one comes across the problematic situation that

almost all the parties, whole-heartedly acknowledge their

commitment to the principles put forth In the Declaration on

Human Rights and Liberties, while at the same time, avoid

total rejection of the necessity of a dominating state figure

over the society to provide law and order. Thus, what Is tried

in this section is to delineate the nuances in the respective

party programmes.

(5) As far as the religiosity is the issue, the concern will

be on the statements which contain expressions either

appreciating or promoting Islam and Islamic activities, like

religious instruction, the satisfaction of the spiritual

needs, etc.

67

(6) Programme of the PP, (1983), p.8.

(7) Programme of the SDPP, (1985), pp.29-43. See also Ibid.,

p.17.

(8) Programme of the DLP, (1985), p.70.

(9) Ibid., p.73.

(10) Ibid., pp.65,75.

Ml) Ibid. , p. 98.

(12) The PPP, p.8.

(13) Programme of the NDP, (1983), p.13.

Programme of the TPP, (Ankara : Pan Matbaaci1ik,1985),

Article 30.

Programme of the MP, (Ankara ; Tisa Matbaasi, 1983),

Articles 10 and 16.

(14) The TPPP, Article 23.

The MPP, Articles 8.

The NDPP, p.13.

(15) The NDPP, loc.cit.

(16) The TPPP, loc.cit.

(17) The MPP, Articles 10, 11.

(18) The PPP, p.27,31,42. See also the SDPPP, pp.9-10, 22,24,

62.

(19) The DLPP, pp.14-16.

(20) DLP Election Declaration, (1987), p.111.

(21) The DLPP, p.18.

(22) The SDPPP, p.9.

68

(23) The most prominent example is the statement within the

DLP programme which puts reservation on the freedom of

expression in times when the publications provoke the use of

violence and/or separationist movements.

(24) The NDPP, p.5.

(25) The TPPP, p.76.

The MPP, pp.84-86.

(26) The TPPP, p.77.

(27) The MPP, loc.cit.

(28) The PPP, p.2.

The SDPPP, p.13.

The DLPP, p.38.

(29) The PPP, p.32.

The DLPP, pp.14,15.

DLP Election Declaration, p.87.

The SDPPP, pp.14,23.

(30) The NDPP, pp.3,4.

(31) Ibid., pp.10,23.

(32) The TPPP, Articles 1, 6, 10 and 11.

(33) Ibid., Articles 10 and 43.

(34) Ibid., Article 6.

(35) Political Handbook of the World, ed. Arthur S. Banks,

(New York, CSA Publication, 1989), s.v. "Turkish Political

Parties", p.624.

(36) The MPP, Articles 1 and 21.

69

(37) "Turkey 1983", Editorial, Turkish Daily News Almanac,

June 1983, p.187.

(38) The PPP, p.2.

(39) The SDPPP, pp.13-14.

(40) The DLPP, pp.15-16.

(41) Ibid.

T42) Ibid., p.58.

Statement by Bulent Ecevit, (November 1989), p.39.

(43) Ibid., p.44.

(44) The NDPP, p.3.

(45) Ibid., p.4.

(46) Ibid., p.10.


(48) Ibid., Articles 1, 10, 11 and 43.

(49) The MPP, Articles 21 and 26.

(50) See page 53.

(51) See page 6.

(52) The PPP, pp.3, 32.

The NDPP, p.4.

The DLPP, pp.14-16.

(53) The DLP Election Declaration, p.87.

(54) The MPP, Article 6.

The SDPPP, p.23.

In this context it should be noted that the TPP displays

an exceptional posture, by refering to religious freedom more from

70

the perspective of basic rights and liberties of the individual

(See the TPPP, Articles 2, 3, 4, 13.)

(55) The MPP, Article 6.

(56) Ibid.


The SDPPP, p.24.

(58) DLP Election Declaration, p.87.

(59) The SDPPP, p.50.

(60) The MPP, Article 21,


(62) See page 55.

71

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS

This chapter is composed of an analysis of the excerpts from

the pariiamentary records in the 17̂ ^̂ GNA, with the aim of giving a

brief picture of the parliamentary postures of the post-1983

parties as regards to the principle of laicism. Thus, the speeches

of the deputies of the Populist Party (PP), the Nationalist

Democracy Party (NDP), till 1986, and the Social Democratic

Populist Party (SDPP), the True Path Party (TPP), The Democratic

Left Party thenceafter,(1) will be included in the study. The

Motherland Party (MP) will be the point of concern throughout the

whole period.

The analysis will mainly dwell on the understanding of the

principle of laicism, on the way the parties refer to anti-laic

movements in Turkey, on the ideas stated by the parties about the

question of the national education policy. The reason behind the

selection of these three content categories lies in the divergence

among the parliamentary parties as regards to the interpretation of

laicism, which in turn affects their respective viewpoints about

the societal role of Islam in Turkey and hence about the course of

national education; as well as in the way how each and every party

perceives the official status of the Presidency of Religious

Affairs as an institution. The aim is to form the grounds on which

the argument as regards to the relative posture of the parties with

72

respect to the recent discussions about the practice of laicism in

Turkey, can be built. Besides, this would be helpful in getting an

insight into this specific issue in addition to the analysis of the

party programmes.

Before going deep into individual rhetoric, it should also be

mentioned that such an analysis is prone to the risk of over

generalization. Nevertheless, the statements that are taken into

consideration are selected on the basis of whether they embody the

common features that are widespread within respective party ranks.

1. The Understanding of Laicistn

This section will embody the issue of how the parties perceive

laicism and relatedly, the way they refer to the linkeage between

Islam and the Turkish nation.

The main problem in the parliamentary records stems from the

fact that there is no shared interpretation of laicism among the

parties. It can be argued that this arises as a result partly of

the dilemma inherent in the structure of the 1982 Constitution,<2)

and partly of the tendency of the parties to preempt the

possibility of attracting the distrust of the electorate of which

majority is Muslim.(3)

In this section the main reference points will be Article(s)

2, 10 and 24 of the 1982 Constitution.

To begin with, the basic characteristics of the Republic are

described in the constitution as follows ;

73

Article 2. The Republic of Turkey is a democratic,

secular and social State governed by the rule of law;

bearing in mind the concept of public peace, national

solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to

the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental

tenets set forth in the Preamble.

In the case of basic rights and freedoms. Article 10 of the

1982 Constitution contains parallelity to the rhetoric adopted in

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights :

Article 10. All individuals are equal without any

discrimination before the law, irrespective of language,

race, color,sex, political opinion, philosophical belief,

religion and sect or any such considerations.

No privilege shall be granted to any individual, family,

group or class...

And finally, in conjunction with the main issue of this study,

the 1982 Constitution reserves a special article on the Freedom of

Religion and Conscience and the status of the state in this

respect:

Article 24. Everyone has the right to freedom of

conscience, religious belief and conviction.

Act of worship, religious services and ceremonies shall

be conducted freely,provided that they do not violate the

provisions of Article 14. (̂ 1

No one shall be compelled to worship or participate in

74

religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious

beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because

of his religious beliefs and convictions.

Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be

conducted under State supervision and control.

Instruction in religious culture and moral education

shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and

secondary schools. Other religious education and

instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own

desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of

their legal representatives.

No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or

religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in

any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or

political influence, or for even partially basing the

fundamental, social, economic, political and legal order

of the State on religious tenets.

To begin with, the fact that the same PP deputies who had been

concerned with the issues related to the principle of laicism can

also be seen within the structure of the SDPP with almost the same

rhetoric, acknowledges the paral leiity among the parties which can

also be observed in their programmes. Thus, the deputies of both

parties prefer to refer to the principle of laicism as the

foundation of Kemalist thought and of Turkish National

R e vo l ut i o n . As i d e from that, they also put emphasis on the

75

notion of the laic state, whereby religion is perceived just as a

matter of conscience and thus it is provided with protection.!®)

In this context, the statements by M. Seyfi Oktay and Erdal

Inonu worth attention, since they very well represent the general

atmosphere in both the PP and the SDPP as regards to what they

understand from the principle of laicism :

On the other hand, laicism is the end of the struggle

which caused centuries of fragmentation within Turkish

society, despite the existence of unity of language,

unity of blood and even unity of religion to a great

extent. Besides, laicism is the beginning of the unity of

education and of cultural unity; the strongest of all.!"̂ )

Not unlike the PP and the SDPP, the DLP too, perceives the

principle of laicism as a means for the consolidation of national

identity and national conscious and as the guardian of

democracy.!^) Aside from that, in his statements Edip Özgene among

the DLP ranks reflects the critical posture of the party in

relation to the way the principle is widely used :

..., when laicism and tolerance are concerned, the issue

is mainly related to respect for religious belief.

However, the prerequisite that the faithful individuals

should also refrain from interfering with those who have

different and/or no religious belief(s) is neglected.

To sum up,it can be said that there is a shared interpretation

of laicism among the left-wing parties which prefer to view the

76

concept as the basis of democracy and Turkish national identity.

More specifically in the words of Erdal Inonu, one can observe the

emphasis on the fact that Turkish customs and traditions have been

shaped in the Republican era on the basis of Kemalist

principles.

As far as the right-wing parties are concerned there is an

apparent shift in the rhetoric adopted; that the issues turn to be

related to the freedom of religion and faith which signifies the

weighty presence of the religious tone in the statements of the

deputies.

To get an insight into the posture of the NDP, a look at the

statement by Abdurrahman Demirtas -which also represents his

fanaticism- seems to be sufficient :

Our religion, Islam, orders "tesettür"(religious

wearing). Our country is an Islamic country. We are all

Musiims."(1 2 )

On the other hand among the ranks of both the TPP and the MP,

there is an outright concern for the necessity of religion in order

to preserve national values, national unity and solidarity as well

as an insistence on Turks being all Muslims,(i^) which, in a way,

hints the tendency on the part of the same parties to view religion

as one of the basic cultural values of Turkish nation :

The regulations of the State should not rely on religious

principles. The principle of laicism necessitates this.

However, it should be taken for granted that certain

77

rules and regulations be in line with the preferences of

the majority of the nation.

Consequently, as put forth in the words of Kazim Oksay, who

claims that faith is an indispensable need of every society and

thus the state is obliged to provide it, the deputies of both

parties tend to hold the state responsible in the realm of

religion.( ̂5)

More specifically, the words of Ascioglu roughly summarizes

the posture in the MP ranks as regards to the principle of laicism:

Every individual has the right to believe, to worship and

hold religious ceremony; and to express and spread his

thoughts and belief.

While none of the deputies, whom we take into consideration

refer to the principle of laicism on Kemalist grounds, there is

only one exception among the TPP ranks, whereby the freedom of

religion and faith were seemingly taken as just one of the aspects

of the principle of laicism :

The principle of laicism,..., is one of the most

important fundamentals of the modernization attempts of

the Turkish nation. From a scientific perspective this

principle also provides guarantee for freedom of

religion, conscience and worship.

Laicism in Turkish Republic is a Constitutional

principle. Thus, it is neither a term which can be

abused, nor a political discourse. Rather it is a

78

legal concept of which boundaries and content are very

well delineated.( ̂̂ )

2.National Education

In the case of national education, the main focus of attention

is the debate on compulsory religious instruction.

Although the deputies of the PP continuously point at the

indispensability of the adoption of a national education policy

along secular lines,c®) one can not observe such harsh criticisms

directed against Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution as in the case

of its inheritor. However, the psoture of the party makes itself

felt in the severe rejection of Bahriye Ucok to the proposal of

giving Arabic the status of second language. In her rejection Mrs.

Ucok blames the initiators of such a proposal, for carrying the

intention of destroying the very basis of Kemalist reforms.C

This criticism is further strengthened in the words of Musa Ates -

within the context of Koran courses- who severely attacks worship

in Arabic.(20) The posture of the party becomes clearer with the

concern about the "unnecessary" increase in the number of the

Religious High Schools when compared to the requirement of the

Faculties of Theology.(2^) Aside from that, the SDPP deputies lead

the way with ongoing attacks on the incompatibility of compulsory

religious instruction with the essence of the principle of laicism,

while pointing at the possible social distortions which can come

about as a consequence of such an impartial outlook.(2 2) ;

79

The adoption of compulsory religious instruction has

caused drawbacks for respect for religious beliefs. Is it

not against the freedom of conscience to force our

citizens -who possess different religious values to take

these courses.i23>

On the other hand, the DLP displays an outstandingly divergent

attitude from the rhetoric it used to adopt in its programme and in

the case of the interpretation of laicism. Thus, in the statements

of the DLP deputies religion is considered as a cultural phenomenon

of the Ottoman-Turkish tradition and given an equal weight in the

society, as much as science and technology.(24) Although these

statements can partly be attributed to the individual tendencies of

the deputies, they nevertheless, indicate a paradox as regards to

the fact that religion as a superstructura! issue on the one hand;

and science and technology as material issues have been put into

the same category. Thus, one can comfortably claim that the DLP,

though not overtly, tends to give acquiescence to compulsory

religious instruction.

The traditional shift in the rhetoric, when we turn to the

right-of-centre appears in this context, too. The NDP, by sincerely

praising Article 24 of 1982 Constitution, affirms its pro-

constitutional posture.(25) Aside from that, almost all the

deputies approve the necessity of religious education both for the

well-being of the society and for the preservation of loyalty to

national values.(26)

80

The MP, on the other hand, seems to be committed to pointing

at the significance of religion and thus the indispensability of

religious education.(2̂ ) In this context, the statement by Mehmet

Ali Doguslu gives a brief summary of how almost all the MP deputies

perceive a well-designed education policy :

..., what makes up a nation are such important factors as

language, religion, culture, country, flag,... It is a

well-designed education policy which teaches such factors

to the young generations in the most proper way and

directs and affects the future expectations of either the

society or the individuals.)

However, it should also be noted that Osman Isik is the only

deputy to be cited in relation to the commitment to Kemalist

principles in the pursuit of national education policy.(29) Aside

from that Metin Emiroglu confirms the loyalty of the MP government

to the ultimate goal of adopting a totally laic education

policy.(20) But, this exceptional posture can be attributed to the

status of Mr. Emiroglu in the time of his post as the Minister of

National Education.

3.Concern with Anti-Laic Movements

This section deals with one of the hottest issues of the post-

1980 era, which is still on the agenda as a result of the

increasing concern about the unique case of laicism in Turkey;

Islam being a societally determinitive factor.

81

As in the case of interpretation of laicism, there is no

shared reference to the threat posed by the anti-laic movements.

a.Presidency of Religious Affairs

This section dwells upon the statements regarding the

perceptions of the parties of the responsibilities and the

authorities of the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

Article 136. The Department of Religious Affairs, which

is within the general administration shall exercise its

duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance

with the principle of secularism, removed from all

political views and ideas, and aiming at national

solidarity and integrity.

The main figure in the PP ranks is Bahriye Ucok, when the

issue of anti-laic movements and the official status of the

Presidency of Religious Affairs is in question. Mrs. Ucok

constantly directs attention to the usurpation of this institution

by those groups which opt for the establishment of Shari’ah to

replace Turkish Republic. Furthermore, she also refers to such

publications of the institution which are totally against Kemalist

principles and hence the laic state notion.(^i) it is not only the

warnings of Mrs. Ucok, but the PP as a whole tends to draw

attention to the deficient practices in the conduct of the Koran

courses, on the grounds that they are not in line with Turkish

National Education as well as in the sales of Korans which have not

82

been approved by the institution.(^2)

In the case of the SDPP,in addition to Mrs. Ucok, Ismet

Turhangil appears as one other significant figure by drawing

attention to the publications of this institution which do not go

well with the principle of laicism.i^s)

When we turn to the right-of-centre, we see that both the NDP

and the MP prefer to point at the presumed tasks of the Presidency

of Religious Affairs,(̂ 4) the same time stressing its importance

as an institution in the development of the Turkish Republic and

thus the necessity for the betterment of its working conditions.

Aside from that, the same parties seem to be devoted to avoid any

possible partisanship "which would pose a deadly threat to the very

existence of the Presidency of Religious Affairs." )

In this context, one can present the statement by Mehmet Zeki

Uzun to shed light on the general atmosphere dominant among the

right-of-centre parties :

... taking such precautions as to ensure the loyalty of

Muslim citizens to national ideals and to prevent the

abuse of faith and divergences of faith,..., to enlighten

our citizens, who are abroad, about religious matters, to

preserve their loyalty to national goals and to protect

them from the influence of extremist trends as well as

from the abuse of religion.(36)

83

b.Reactionary Movements

In this context, the SDPP deputies adopt a prominent rhetoric

with constant warnings about the threat posed by reactionary

activities led either by foreign or domestic forces. Besides, all

the deputies who put forth ideas about this specific issue come up

with the claim that reaction in Turkey has been reinforced by the

MP government.(37) jp this respect, the accusation stated by M.

Seyfi Oktay against the government in the way of enacting such laws

and regulations which contradict with the notion of democratic

state and hence which pave the way for the establishment of a

theocratic order, very well illustrates the general trend within

the party. (38) Yet, the party does not suffice with domestic

threats to the principle of laicism, but it also attacks the

government as regards to its passivity in the face of such hostile

treatment coming mainly from Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia which in a

way condemn Kemalist thought and principles; (39) especially in

relation to the issue of Rabita.

Aside from that, the SDPP deputies also tend to give support

to the claim that anti-laic movements have gone beyond the concern

with freedom of religion and thought and thus turned into one of

rapid institutionalization even at the state level:(^°)

Those who held such declarations in the Faculties of

Theology in the post-1980 era containing the idea that

the War of Independence had been an artificial one and

that the "real war” will be that of Islam, are today

84

placed in the highest ranks of the state mechanism.^l

In Turkey, the anti-laic activities have exceeded the

level of faith and thus turned into political

organizations with the ultimate goal of establishing a

state based on Shari’ah.<̂ 2)

Contrary to the SDPP, -which tends to refer to reaction as an

extension of religiosity- the DLP adopts the following rhetoric as

represented in the words of Nuri Korkmaz :

According to the DLP, reaction -in the real meaning of

the word- does not have a direct linkeage with religion

and/or religiosity. Reaction, according to our viewpoint,

is a matter of taking Turkey away from laicism and

democracy and thus pushing it into the darkness of the

Ottoman period.(̂ 3)

On the right-of-centre of the political spectrum, the tendency

is to view reaction as a secondary issue, that all the three

parties tend to be cautious in order not to annoy the Muslim

population with "exaggerated warnings" about the spread of

reactionary activities,

More specifically, Haydar Koyuncu, in his statement, gives a

brief picture of the posture of the NDP, in relation to the

discussions about reactionary activities. Mr. Koyuncu points at the

democratic atmosphere in Turkey as realized in the full freedom

given to anti-nationalistic and anti-Islamic groups, while stating

85

the necessity not to label the activities of "our Muslim

population" as reaction, (‘•s)

In this context, the deputies of the MP display a commitment

which far outweighs that among both the TPP and the NDP ranks; not

only in terms of the amount of parliamentary speeches, but also

when the issue is the intensity of the concern -within the party-

with the misinterpretation of religiosity as reaction, i“*®) Here,

the interpretation of laicism by Mehmet Budak, which is termed to

be "specific to Turkey"('’̂ i serves as an enlightening document in

relation to the general disposition of the party :

Every understanding which refuses to accept the adoption

of Western thought as a whole; that is not only with

respect to science and technology, but also with respect

to its culture, life style and morality and which

additionally states the necessity of the preservation of

the values which belong to the East and especially to the

Islamic World.

It would be explanatory to conclude this section with the

statements of some MP deputies which symbolize the general tendency

not only among the party ranks, bi also throughout the right-of-

centre bloc across the political spectrum.

Firstly, in the case of the perception of reaction :

Reaction is not a source of serious threat for the time

being. However, there is a potential threat of reaction

and it is under control. ... The laws and the security

86

forces of Turkey are competent enough to deal with such

activities. )

We do not agree with the idea that the reactionary

activities have reached to such extent as to replace the

laic Turkish Republic v ith an Islamic State. It is

acceptable that there is a potential threat of reaction.

The best way to cope with this problem,..., is to see to

it that the freedom of religion and conscience is in full

practice.

On the other hand, as a defense to the claims about the

government’s receptivity to reactionary activities :

It is just a fantasy to state that the government has

been indifferent to reactionary activities.(s°)

87


(1) 26 September 1985; the SDP and the PP sign a protocol to

merge into the SDPP.

2 November 1985; the PP changes its name and becomes the

SDPP.

3 November 1985; the SDP dissolves itself and joins the

SDPP.

4 May 1986; the NDP dissolves itself.

28 September 1986; the TPP and the SDPP win seats in the

pari lament.

(2) Article 24 has contradictions not only within itself but

also with the other articles of the Constitution; mainly with

Articles 2 and 10.

(3) Frequent reference to the estimate of 99.9 % of Turks

being Muslims by almost all parties confirms the particular

concern for the religious electorate.

See also RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (12 December 1984) p.31.

RGNA, Vol. 22, Sess. 43, (13 December 1985),pp.332,342.

RGNA, Vol. 36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987), p.47.

(4) Article 14. None of the rights and freedoms embodied in

the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating

the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and

nation, of endangering the existence of Turkish State and

Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of

placing the government or the State under the control of an

88

individual or a group of people, or establishing the hegemony

of one social class over the others, or creating

discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or

sect,or establishing by any other means a system of government

based on these concepts or ideas.

(5) See M. Seyfi Oktay, RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30 October

1985) p.25.

(6) See Erdal Inonu, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January

1987), p.56. See also Oktay, Ibid.,p.70.

(7) See M. Seyfi Oktay, RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30 October

1985), p.25. See also Inonu, loc.cit.

(8) RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 35, (8 December 1986), p.186.

(9) Durcan Emirbayer, RGNA, Vol.38, Session 86, (7 April

1987), p.564. See also Nuri Korkmaz, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56,

(20 January 1987), p.59.

(10) RGNA, Vol. 38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987), p.562.

(11) See Inonu, loc.cit.

(12) RGNA, Vol.7-2, Sess. 7, (9 October 1984), p.147.

(13) See, Turgut Sera Tirali,RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April

1987), p.552. See also Kazim Oksay,RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40,

(12 December 1984), p.35; Ismail Dayi, RGNA,Vol.22, Sess. 43,

(13 December 1985), pp.326,329,335; Ilhan Aras, RGNA, Vol.10,

Sess. 40, (12 December 1984), p.31; Hüsamettin Cindoruk, RGNA,

Vol.33, Sess. 35, (8 December 1986),p.221; Koksal Toptan,

RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987), p.47; Mehmet Budak,

89

RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30 October 1985) pp.491-492.

(14) Hasan Celal Guzel, RGNA, Vol.37, Sess. 69, (25 February

1987), p.132. See also Oksay, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (12

December 1984), p.35.

(15) RGNA, Vol.35, Sess.54, (14 January 1987), p.650. See also

Ascioglu, RGNA, Vol.3, Sess. 53, (17 April 1984) p.279; Koksal

Toptan, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987), p.47.

(16) RGNA, Vol.3, Sess. 53, (17 April 1984), p.279.

(17) See Sabit Batumlu, RGNA, Vol.41, Sess. 108, (20 May

1987), p.98.

(18) See Necati Cengiz, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 43, (15 December

1984), p.261.

(19) See Bahriye Ucok, RGNA, Vol.2, Sess. 38, (28 February

1984), p.160.

(20) See Musa Ates, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (12 December

1984) , p.33.

(21) See Hilmi Nalbantoglu, RGNA, Vol.19, Sess.10, (1 October

1985) , p.222.

(22) Inonu, RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 35, (8 December 1986), p.187.

See also Oktay, Ibid., p.218.

(23) Inonu, Ibid.

(24) Edip Özgene, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987),

p.562. See also Emirbayer, Ibid.

(25) Aziz Kaygisiz RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 43, (15 December 1984),

p.307. See also Haydar Koyuncu, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (12

90


(26) See Koyuncu, op.cit.,p.28. See Also Abdurrahman Demirtas,

RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 43, (15 December 1984), p.294.

(27) See Mehmet Bagceci, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 43, (15 December

1984), p.281. See also Vehbi Dincerler, Ibid., p.308; Dayi,

RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (15 December 1984), p.24; Oksay,

Ibid., p.39.

(28) RGNA, Vol.23, Sess. 50, (20 December 1985), p.423

(29) RGNA, Vol.10, Sess, 43, (15 December 1984), p.332.

(30) Ibid., pp.463-464.

(31) See Ucok, RGNA, Vol.3, Sess. 67, (17 May 1984), p.662.

(32) See Fahrettin Uluc, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess.40, (12 December

1984) , p.22. See also Ucok, RGNA, Vol.15, Sess. 83, (9 April

1985) , pp.17-18.

(33) RGNA, Vol.22, Sess. 43,(13 December 1985), pp.322,325.

(34) See Dayi and Koyuncu, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (12

December 1984), pp.26,29.

(35) .See Dayi and Koyuncu, Ibid., pp.24,35. See also Oksay,

RGNA, Vol.22, Sess. 43, (13 December 1985), pp.336,338.

(36) RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (12 December 1984), pp.43-45.

(37) See Bahriye Ucok, RGNA, Vol.21, Sess. 38, (5 December

1985), p.362. See also Tevfik Bilal, RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 33,

(3 December 1986), pp.131-132; Aydin Guven Gurkan, RGNA,

Vol.38, Sess. 80, (24 March 1987), p.17.


91

(39) See Ucok, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987), p.550.

(40) See Oktay, Ibid., p.218 and RGNA, Vo1.36, Sess. 56, (20

January 1987), p.38.

(41) See Ucok, loc.cit.

(42) See Oktay, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987),

p.70. See also Bilal, RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 33, (3 December

1986), p.131.

(43) See Nuri Korkmaz,RGNA, Vo1.37, Sess. 75, (11 March 1987),

p.468.

(44) See Yildirim Akbulut, RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30 October

1985), p.19. See also Toptan, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56,

(20 January 1987), pp.48,50,; Demirtas, Ibid., p.69; Tirali

and Kasikci, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987) ,

pp.553,558.


(46) See Hakki Artukarslan, RGNA, Vol.4, Sess. 71, (29 May

1984), pp.67-68. See also Guzel, RGNA, Vol.37, Sess. 69, (25

February 1987), pp.126-128.

(47) RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30 October 1985), pp.23-24.

(48) Guzel, Ibid., p.130.

(49) Kasikci,RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987), p.554.

(50) Oksay, Vol.35, Sess. 54, (14 January 1987), p.649.

92

CHAPTER IV

AN EVALUATION OF THE FINDINGS


This section aims to compare and contrast the interpretation

of laicism by the relevant parties as materialised in the speeches

of the members of the parliament. Aside from that, respective party

programmes will also be taken into account as reference points.

As far as the understanding of laicism is concerned the

widespread rhetoric that has been adopted by the relevant

parties is that religion should not have an active role in the

conduct of the sta · affairs and that it should not be abused for

political interests. Aside from that, there have been two general

reference points used by the parties when this principle is at

hand:

i. The belief that the nature of the laic state

necessitates the guarantee of religion and faith of all

individuals, first and foremost, and that is what Article 24 of

1982 Constitution is supposed to achieve.

ii. The idea that laicism, in theory, should guarantee not

93

only the freedom of religion for the Muslims, but also the freedom

of non-believers. This viewpoint became more apparent after 1986

and mainly in the speeches of some prominent DLP and SDPP

deputies.< ̂ >

One shared point among these perspectives is the claim that

they are both in line with Kemalist principles , of course

according to their respective supporters. But, it should be kept in

mind that especially the first case is open to diversive

interpretations.

In the speeches of the PP deputies there is a frequent

reference to laicism as the basis of Kemalist reforms. This posture

has been best exemplified in the statement of M. Seyfi Oktay :

laicism is the basic qualification of Kemalist thought

and of Turkish National Revolution.(2)

As a matter of fact, it can be said that, the PP used to adopt

a "Kemalist" rhetoric when laicism is the issue. However, it should

not be ignored that the PP also embodies such figures as Ibrahim

Ural who takes an exceptional posture within the party as regards

to his thoughts about the responsibility of the state for

religious and moral training not only in-school, but also out-

school . (2)

One can say that in its relatively short period of

parliamentary life, the PP had formed the grounds on which the SDPP

would emerge and function as one "extreme partner" within the

diversive structure of the parliament.

94

Hence, the statements of the SDPP deputies, contain almost the

same rhetoric as regards to what laicism "really" means, while

following the path of the PP with a totally "Kemalist" posture as

displayed in the frequent attempts to bring the matter into the

attention of the pariiament.)

As far as what laicism means to the SDPP is concerned, Erdal

Inonu, leader of the party, gets into the picture as the main

representative figure of the distinct posture of the party when

compared to the other parliamentary parties. As a matter of fact,

he is the first deputy who avoids the use of the cliche definition

of laicism -i.e. the separation of religion from state affairs.

Instead, he mentions about the insufficiency of such a definition

in practice as a result of the regulatory function of Islam^^) in

all the spheres of society. What Mr. Inonu refers as ’’laicism of

the Turkish Republic" is, forming a balance between state and

religion, which would reduce Islam to the individual sphere and

hence ensure the control of all the activities beyond that level by

means of the rules and the regulations of the state.Relatedly,

Mr. Inonu declares the disposition of his party as being respectful

to the faith and religion of each and every individual as far as

they pose no mass threat which exceeds the boundaries of individual

faith and worship and thus, which turns into a political action.

The posture of the SDPP is further clarified in the statements

of M. Seyfi Oktay who claims that Article 24 of the 1982

Constitution contrasts with the principle of laicism. He bases his

95

argument on the grounds that the related article paves the way for

the adoption of an "ummetci" education policy under the regime of

an anti-laic government; since it could not set up objective

qualifications for religious education.(s> In a way he blames both

the state and the government for not acting impartially as regards

to different belief systems.

Thus, this specific posture as represented by the SDPP forms

one of the main divergences from both the MP and the TPP which tend

to refer to Article 24 of 1982 Constitution and hence to laicism

mainly from the perspective of religious freedom with a

conscious/unconcious implication that the only religion in Turkey

is Islam. As a matter of fact what the SDPP seems to oppose is this

double standard.

As a last point the concept of "national ideology", initiated

by the SDPP, should also be taken into account, which corresponds

to "laic Turkish Republic" at the institutional level. This notion

is one additional factor which sets the SDPP apart from the MP and

the TPP which frequently refer to the customs and traditions of the

Turkish nation as old as a thousand years -Islam being the

fundamental characteristic.(^ A s parallel to Inonu’s idea that

the customs and traditions of the Turkish nation are shaped in the

Republican period(^i), the notion of "national ideology" signifies

the importance given to laicism as one prerequisite for the

transformation of the Turkish State from the traditional Ottoman

State system into a "Modern Republ ic". ( ^) This notion also

96

contrasts with that of the "ideology of the TurksC^)"

introduced in the words of Ayhan Sakallioglu (NDP), which also

encompasses spiritual terms as complementary factors to national

values.

As parallel to the SDPP, the DLP deputies criticize the

ignorance of the rights of the non-believers when laicism and

tolerance are the issue. C “*) Additionally, the DLP deputies too,

perceive laicism as the main factor in the shaping of the identity

and consciousness of Turkish nation and as a guarantee for the

survival of Turkish democracy.cs)

In the case of the right-of-centre parties, the NDP sides with

the MP till 1986 and the TPP thenceafter as the second major right-

wing party in the parliament. With the self-dissolution of the NDP

we see a transfer of the party deputies to either the MP or the TPP

ranks. This should help us understand the more or less similar

posture of these parties when laicism is concerned.

Although the general tendency among the NDP ranks is to refer

to laicism as the separation of religion from state affairs, one

also comes across some exceptional statements which interpret

laicism as a means for the protection of state from destructive

religious t r e n d s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , it is a fact that religious

rhetoric, in the interpretation of laicism, far outweighs the

nationalistic features -in the sense that can be observed in the

statements of the SDPP deputies.(^ T h u s , in general, the NDP has

a one sided approach to laicism which tends to refer to all Turks

97

as just Muslims, ignoring the existence of any religious

minority.C81 As an extension of this tendency the NDP deputies,

unlike those of the SDPP, approve Article 24 of the 1982

Constitution as a positive step in the preservation of the

religious freedom.(^81 Hence, while the party adopts its own

interpretation of laicism as the non-interference of religion to

state affairs; it, on the other hand, acknowledges the

responsibility of state for the handling of religious affairs.(2°)

Thus, there is no significant shift from the party rhetoric adopted

in the programme -i.e. the statements of the NDP deputies confirm

the pro-constitutional posture of the party as well as its tendency

to hold on to the centre on the political spectrum.

Taking Article 24 as the guarantee for freedom of religion and

conscience, the TPP totally rejects the claims put forth both by

the DLP and the SDPP deputies that Article 24 is incompatible with

the principle of laicism as well as with Article 2 of the

Constitution.(21) Instead, the party totally agrees with the view

that laicism does not require indifference of the state to

religious issues. On the contrary, it holds the state responsible

for educating the Turkish society about "its" religion.(22)

It should also be added that there is a widespread preference

among the TPP deputies to refer to laicism at the institutional

level, with their main reference point being 1982 Constitution.

Thus, the party as a whole ignores the sociological aspect of

laicism, that this principle forms one of the building stones of

98

the Turkish nation alongside with the values created in the

Republican era.^^s) Rather, there is a general tendency within the

party to admit the impossibility of the existence of a laic nation

-despite a laic state- and that Turks are all devout Muslims. (2·*)

As a matter of fact it can be said that what the TPP understands as

laicism works more to the advantage of the Muslim population of

Turkey, which,not unlike the NDP, regards the notions of

"Muslim" and "Turk" as identical.

Before dealing with laicism as interpreted by the MP, it

should be noted that, like any other party in the parliament the MP

appears to be the most devoted guardian in preventing any possible

abuse of religion for political interests.

The interpretation of laicism by the MP deputies is not much

different from that of the NDP and the TPP. Thus the general

tendency among the party ranks is to refer mainly to the protection

of freedom and faith and to regard Article 24 of 1982

Constitution as the main instrument for such an end.i^s)

In this respect, while admitting the necessity of the

separation of religion from state affairs, the MP deputies

insistently hold on to the belief that the state is under full

responsibility of educating the people in accordance with the

prerequisites of their religion; i.e. Islam.(2®) Thus, it would not

be irrational to state that the MP, like the NDP and the TPP, also

prefers to regard Islam as the religion of the society and thus

takes actions in the way that would make the Muslim majority to

99

express and spread its value system. On the other hand, the party

whole-heartedly supports Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution

as one of the main barriers against an abuse of religion and

against the disruption of laicism. As a matter of fact, the

speeches of the deputies do not possess considerable contradiction

with the party rhetoric adopted in the programme. Instead, they

provide a clearer picture of the divergent posture of the party in

this respect.

The one sided approach of the MP to the principle of

laicism becomes significant in the statements of the

deputies about the vitality of the social function that Islam

performs in Turkey -i.e. as a conjunctive factor in harmonizing

the national and spiritual values of the Turkish people. (27) ^ot

unlike the NDP and the TPP, the MP refers to Islam as one of the

components of the Turkish culture which was assumed to be shaped

throughout almost a thousand years.(2S) In this respect we see a

commitment in the MP ranks - which far outweighs that in the NDP

and the TPP- to ensure the belief that the survival of the Turkish

society without Islam is impossible.(29)

In this context it should also be noted that the MP suffers

from the dilemma common to both the NDP and the TPP and which

mainly arises out of the tendency to refer to Islam as the one and

only religion in Turkey. Thus, while acknowledging the

fundamentality of the guarantee of state for religious freedom

on the one hand, it gives support to compulsory religious

100

instruction in primary and secondary education; in a way

completely bypassing the very same freedom of the religious

minorities and of the non-believers. This dilemma becomes more

apparent in the words of Ismail Dayi who states the "philosophy”

of the MP as ;

a place where no call to prayer is heard does not

worth living.

2.National Education

The discussions in this context mainly revolve around the

issue of compulsory religious instruction in primary and secondary

education, and relatedly around the principle of "unity of

education”. As a matter of fact, it is in this sphere that the

significance of Islam as a regulatory force in society comes

into the scene, especially in the statements of the deputies.

The discussions about National Education are important in the

sense that the -somewhat- blurred reference to laicism which

provides almost all parties with a more or less laic image,

becomes more diversified with the posture that the parties

took with respect to the compulsory religious instruction under

state supervision as guaranteed by Article 24 of the 1982

Constitution.

As a matter of fact, one can say that the PP puts emphasis

on the necessity of the renovation and modernization of the

education system in order to bring up such generations in

101

accordance with the notion of laic state and hence with the

principles of Atatürk,

The posture of the SDPP in the context of National

Education is summarized to be "in line with the prerequisites of

laicism".(32) jhe rhetoric of the party -as a legacy of the PP-

is predominantly nationalistic in nature and as far as the

education is concerned the whole emphasis is put on the necessity

of a laic and democratic system to ensure the consolidation of

positive sciences.(33) Besides, the SDPP puts forth an extremist

attitude by its reference to compulsory religious instruction

in primary and secondary education as a destructive practice for

the very nature of laicism.(34)

In a way, like in the context of "What Laicism Is" the SDPP

continues to assume almost the same path that the PP had once

followed in relation to the pursuit of National Education policy,

with a much more clearly diverged standing when compared to the

other parliamentary parties, especially in the case of the

compulsory religious instruction.

Although the DLP displays almost the same posture as regards

to Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution, when the practice of

National Education policy is at hand, there is an ambiguous tone

adopted : On the one hand the DLP deputies criticize the dichotomy

created by the contention between the theological and modern system

in the education policy and hence the trade-off between science and

religion. On the other hand , in total contrast to the postures of

102

the PP and the SDPP, which severely criticize the "unnecessary”

increase in the number of Religious High S c h o o l s , they put

emphasis on a modernized supervision system for Koran courses just

to ensure the full spiritual satisfaction of Turkish youth.

The inconsistent posture of the party becomes clearer in the

statements of Edip Özgene, who refers to "our" Ottoman-Muslim

tradition as an instrument for curbing out any contradiction

between religion on the one hand; and science and technology on the

other.(37) In this sense, the party deputies put forth the most

extreme example in relation to the divergence from the image which

is tried to be built in the party programme.

As in the party program of the NDP, in the speeches of its

deputies one comes across a nationalistic rhetoric,(3S) especially

when the pursuit of National Education policy is at hand. However,

it should be kept in mind that the deputies tend to refer to

religiosity and nationalism as complementary terms.

The main distinctive feature of the party makes itself felt in

the speeches of its deputies who give support to the post-1980

education policy -in total contrast with the three left wing

parties- especially as regards to the Article 24 of the 1982

Constitution. Thus, unlike the left- wing parties which claim that

post-1980 period witnessed disruption of the principle of unity of

education, the NDP praises the same era on the grounds that a

totally unified National Education policy, in line with Kemalist

principles has been achieved.(39)

103

The statements of the NDP deputies, about the National

Education policy have the weighty existence of a concern for

religious education as a means for the preservation of national

unity. In this context, there are even complaints about the

insufficiency of the attention given to religious education -i.e.

the insufficient amount of Koran courses and Religious High

Schools- and hence such ideas that there should be cooperation

between the Ministry of National Education and the Presidency of

Religious Affairs.

The distinct posture of the party -when compared to the left-

of-centre parties- resides in the tendency to view the Turkish

people as being all Muslim. As a matter of fact, the party rhetoric

signifies the priority given to religious instruction as the first

and the most important issue of National Education. ) It should

be noted that, this is a totally new dimension in the party

rhetoric, since in the party programme -despite the ambiguous tone-

we can not observe such weighty presence of a concern for religious

education.

The TPP displays almost an identical posture with the NDPl^^i,

that while pronouncing a sincere aspiration to spread the principle

of laicism by means of the pursuit of a laic National Education

policy,('*3) the statements of the deputies of the party are filled

with constant emphasis on the societal significance of Islam and

hence the necessity of a proper religious education under state

supervision for the spiritual well-being of "our Muslim

104

people". ('♦'*)

Aside from that, the paradox that can be observed among the

right-of-centre as a result of the functional incompatibility

between the commitment to the consolidation of laicism at the state

level on the one hand and the commitment to Islam as the religion

of the society on the other -and hence the acception of compulsory

religious instruction- becomes even more apparent among the MP

ranks; partly as result of the cleavages within the party that

arise out of the existence of different tendencies within the party

structure.(̂ 5) As a prominent manifestation of this paradoxical

disposition, the party never gives up its emphasis on how it mainly

perceives education, thus as a means for the consolidation of

religious prerequisites and hence for the preservation of national

identity and national unity of the T u r k s , a t the same time

declaring its loyalty to the adoption of a totally laic education

policy, On the other hand, this paradoxical situation has its

reflections in the image that the party builds for itself; that is

one of nationalistic-religious character. This peculiar standing is

very well illustrated in the words of Metin Emiroglu, who states

that the aim of compulsory religious courses is not only to provide

the people with sufficient instruction and moral values; but also

to deepen Kemalist thought with a religious and moral

perspective.

The pronounced education policy of the MP, as bringing up

totally conscious and faithful generations within a laic order.

105

also hints the support of the party to Article 24 of the 1982

Constitution. In this respect, we should also mention about the

unique

approach to compulsory religious instruction as paving the way for

the full-practice of unity of education on the grounds that there

would, no more, be dichotomy between those who learn religion and

those who do not.(^^l

To sum up it can be said that the MP displays a double

standard in its attitude in relation to national education -which

is the case, though in varying degrees, for both the NDP and the

TPP- that while proclaiming a totally laic posture, it simply

ignores the existence of religious minorities and/or non-believers

under the name of freedom of religion and faith.

3.Anti-Laic Movements

The issue of anti-laic movements is significant in the sense

that it very well illustrates the diversified nature of the

parliament as regards to what each and every party perceives as

laicism and/or anti-laicism. In this respect the parliament

resembles a debating ground on which the governing party (MP) is on

the defense of its policies which are accused of paving the way for

the acceleration of anti-laic movements initiated by both the

domestic and the foreign sources. In a way the related speeches are

just in a dialogue form where the opposition constantly puts forth

106

proposals for further discussions about this specific issue.

In this context, first the PP and then the SDPP present

proposals coming after one another which point at threats directed

against the notion of laic state as well as against its

p r e s e r v a t i o n . O n the other hand, the opposition on the right-

of-centre -the NDP and then the TPP- follow a different path in

attacking the MP, that they choose to blame the government for the

abuse of religious beliefs of the Turkish people. Surprisingly, the

DLP displays almost the same posture in this respect.

In the following paragraphs, the responsibilities and the

authorities of the Presidency of Religious Affairs -as far as the

domestic aspects of anti-laic movements is concerned- will be

discussed. Additionally, "Rabita and "turban" will be the main

issues in the context of reactionary movements directed by both the

foreign and domestic sources. Not surprisingly, each and every

party has its own interpretation of the respective issues.

a. The Presidency of Religious Affairs

In this context, what the PP does is to bring forth the

inefficiency in the functioning of this institution which,

officially, is expected to see to it that the religious issues not

contradict with the principle of laicism.

Among the SDPP ranks, there is -not surprisingly- a

paral leiity to the PP. However, when compared to the latter, the

party puts forth a much more hostile disposition; that most of the

107

deputies draw attention to such excerpts t'rom the publications of

the institution which are overtly against the principle of

1 a i c i sm. (5 1

On the other hand, the NDP deals with the Presidency of

Religious Affairs from a completely different perspective. Besides

the outstanding commitment to keeping the activities of the

institution distinct from the political concerns, the party mainly

touches upon such issues as the improvement of the conditions of

the Religious High Schools, as well as achieving an increase in the

weight of Islamic sciences within the services of the

institution.(52)

The posture of the MP, in relation to the claims about the

functioning of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, is more in a

defensive mode and that there seems to be no intention among the

party ranks to agree with even a possibility of

corruption/inefficiency in the administration of this "holy"

institution in relation to either the accusations about the

conscious/unconscious anti-laic activities within its structure, or

the claim that there is a necessity to increase the quality and

quantity of the religious services o f f e r e d . j n this respect the

statement of Kazim Oksay, who assumes the responsibility for the

activities of the institution for the respective period, worth

attention .-(5̂ )

In the term of my ministry maximum concern and attention

have always be given to the preservation of stability in

108

the services of the Presidency of Religious Affairs as

well as to keeping the religious services out of the

sphere of political concerns.

In a way, in the perspective through which the MP views the

status and the present situation of the institution, one can see

the implications of the widespread tendency to use religiosity and

nationalism interchangeably and to refer to the former as a factor

strengthening national conscious. Thus, there is the belief about

the presumed goal of the Presidency of Religious Affairs to bring

up faithful generations that are loyal to their national values,

in Turkey as well as abroad.

b."Reaction"

As regards to the issue of reaction there are two parties

outstandingly involved in the subsequent debates :

On the one hand there is the SDPP bringing forth the threat of

reaction throughout the country and the necessity of taking

precautions and the MP constantly rejecting the existence of such a

threat for the time being, while claiming total control against any

future risk, on the other. The other parties mainly take place

inbetween these two prominently extreme dispositions.

In this context, the main attention will be on the warnings

initiated by the parliamentary parties as regards to anti-laic

movements whereby one gradually realizes that the warnings turn

into accusations against the governing party, of giving the chance

109

to both domestic and foreign centers, for the abuse of religion in

the way of disrupting the principle of laicism and hence destroying

the Republic.

As a matter of fact, in the records of the 17^h GNA, one comes

across subsequent preliminary discussions on the proposals for

general debates which have been, in turn, rejected by the

majority.(56) In this respect, it should also be added that the

right-of-centre parties in the opposition -initially the NDP and

then the TPP- mould out such an image as if they perceive reaction

just as a tool of the opposition and not as a serious threat to be

avoided for the sake of the Turkish Republic.

While pointing at the ultimate goal of the reactionary

activities as to bring up a generation which would be against

Atatürk and his principles, the PP, from the very beginning adopts

a hostile posture against the government with the accusation that

the latter gives ample room for the disruption of the principle of

laicism.(57) in this respect, in one of his speeches Mr. Oktay

rejects the possibility of unawareness of the government of the

threat and thus relates to its indifference to the "distorted’

understanding of laicism which even accepts and defends the "laic

status of the Ottoman Empire".(58)

The posture of the SDPP is almost identical with that of the

PP; but this time severer and clearer in its statements. The same

deputies - mainly Bahriye Ucok and M. Seyfi Oktay - continue to

bring the threat posed by the anti-laic movements to the attention

110

of the parliament while at the same time attacking the MP with an

increasing intensity. The SDPP does not suffice with warnings

and/or proposals for more serious precautions; but draws attention

to concrete examples for such crucial issues as "Rabita" and

"turban".

To begin with, the party constantly points at the tendency to

initiate activities against laicism and Kemalist principles, to

which it refers as the first step for the foundation of a religious

state -i.e. which is based on Islamic principles- in Turkey.<S9)

Besides, the party deputies subsequently put one of the most

popular issues of the day into the agenda when reaction is

concerned, that is the activities of the orders. In this respect

the party overtly accuses the MP of the initiation of reaction as a

direct extension of the recruitment of members of the orders (e.g.

Nakşibendi, Suleymanci1ik. Nurculuk) to state services, including

the military and the security forces.

Insofar as the domestic reflections of reaction are concerned,

the most outstanding issue is "turban", which has been a "hot

potato" both at the parliamentary and the societal level,

especially beginning with 1987. The SDPP views the issue as an

extension of the militant tendencies within the structure of the

orders with the ultimate aim of disrupting the laic state

n o t i o n . T h e party deputies also initiate proposals for further

parliamentary discussions about those organizations with an anti

democratic standing and which pose threat to the material and

111

spiritual well-being of Turks abroad. While pointing at the

insufficient organization of the state -both in quality and

quantity- in order to fight back destructive trends, the party

refers to the incident of "Rabita" as merely an anti-laic activity,

even implying that it has been supported by the MP government and

even by the state.

To sum up, the SDPP views reaction as a regime question,(®3)

on the grounds that it contains such anti-laic movements which

exceed the level of individual worship and which turn into a

mechanism of societal manipulation.

As parallel to the PP and the SDPP, the DLP raises the same

issues with constant attacks on the government, in relation to

anti-laic movements led by both the domestic and foreign

c e n t r e s . 1

As a conclusion, one can say that the parties which reside on

the left-of-centre in the political arena take such a posture that

they even find it unnecessary to discuss whether there is a problem

of "reaction" or not. Rather, what they put forth as the main theme

of discussion is the question of how to cope with those reactionary

activities so as to avoid them from further spreading throughout

the country and thus from leading to the destruction of the laic

state notion.

The right-of-centre parties in the opposition, the NDP and the

TPP, do not display such a prominent posture as regards to the hot

debate about the existence of reaction. Rather, what is at hand, in

112

the case of the NDP, does not exceed a number of insignificant

questionings by a few deputies which mainly revolve around the

procedural i s s u e s . A s a matter of fact, what the NDP refers as

worthwhile is not reaction, -in fact there is a general tendency

within the party to refer to this specific issue as an exaggerated

problem(®7)- but the performance of religious services in their

full-capacity, or the guarantee of the well-being of the"Muslim

Turks ' abroad; which, in a way, signifies a paral leiity with the

MP(68)^ when the question of reaction is at hand.(®^)

The TPP does not display a considerably different attitude in

this respect that in the rhetoric of the party -as reflected in the

statements of its deputies- there are almost identical motives with

that of the The opposition, instead, comes mainly in

relation to the accusation directed against the MP of defending

neither laicism nor the freedom of thought and belief as a result

of the pursuit of a double-track policy.

Before concentrating on the parliamentary posture of the MP as

regards to the anti-laic movements, the nature of the pariiamentary

talks should, once more, be delineated; that they are more of a

dialogue type between the SDPP and the MP; the former always in a

questioning position and the latter always on the defense, refusing

almost all the claims about the seriousness of the threat posed by

such activities. The MP also rejects the accusations as regards to

Islamic institutionalization within the state mechanism(̂ ''i, as

well as the claim that the issue of "turban” has an ideological

113

origin, while refering to it as a minority problem which can easily

be handled by means of respect for freedom and faith.

Furthermore, the party declares that such warnings about the

deepening of reactionary activities in Turkey are just tools of

leftist provocation -"which views all religious performances as

reaction"- aimed at weakening the linkeage between the state and

the faithful citizens, >

The defensive posture of the party becomes clearer with the

issue of Rabita, that while giving the image of not taking the

matter seriously, ( ) it refers to the financial support from the

organization as a matter of emergency for the preservation of the

national and the moral values of the Turks abroad, in a time when

the state was incapable of providing a full-capacitated education

programme for the Turkish immigrants. Besides, one gets a sense of

appraisal for Rabita among the ranks of the party, in direct

contrast to what Mrs. Ucok lists as the ultimate goals of this

institution. As an extension of this posture, the party also

refuses such claims that the Turks abroad are under the influence

of such organizations which are against democracy and the principle

of laicism.

Moreover, the dilemma inherent in the MP rhetoric makes itself

felt in this context too, that while accepting the potentiality of

the danger posed by the anti-laic activities in Turkey,(^7 ) the

party constantly rejects the necessity of handling further

parliamentary discussions about this issue , with the claim that

114

the government has full control over the situation.

Finally, one can say that as far as the anti-laic movements

are concerned, there is a distribution of role among the

parliamentary parties: The PP and its inheritor, the SDPP,

constantly attack the government with concrete evidenceC^®) as

regards to the reactionary activities in Turkey and accuse the

latter for its receptivity. On the other hand, the opposition on

the right-of-centre prefers to blame the government for the pursuit

of a double track policy. Hence, the MP stays as the accused while

adopting an almost indifferent posture in the face of such

accusations, alongside with a predominantly nationalistic-

conservative rhetoric.

115


(1) See M. Seyfi Oktay, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January

1987), p.70. See also Edip Özgene, RGNA Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7

April 1987), p.562.

(2) RGNA, Vol.20, Sess, 22, (30 October 1985), p.25.

(3) RGNA, Vol.2, Sess. 40, (February 1984), p,341.

(4) See ismet Turhangil, Muzaffer Yi İdi rim, A. Askin Toktas,

Abdullah Cakirefe and Veysel Varol,RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30

October 1985), pp.15-16. See also Halil Ibrahim Karal, Bahriye

Ucok, Hüseyin Avni Guler, Askin Toktas, RGNA, Vol.24, Sess.64,

(23 January 1986), p.554; M.Seyfi Oktay RGNA, Vol.36, Sess.

56, (15 January 1987), p.37; Aydin Guven Gurkan RGNA, Vol.38,

Sess. 80, (24 March 1987), pp.16-18; RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86,(7

April 1987), pp.541-568.

(5) It should be noted that all of the right wing parties in

the parliament refer to Islam, and thus Muslims while talking

about freedom of religion and faith.


(7) Ibid., p.186.

(8) RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 35, (8 December 1986), p.218. See

also RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987), p.38.

(9) Ibid.

(10) See also, Kazim Oksay, RGNA, Vol.22, Sess. 43, (13

December 1985), p.335; Hüsamettin Cindoruk, RGNA, Vol.33,

Sess. 35, (8 December 1986), p.221; Recep Ercüment Konukman,

116

RGNA, Vol.9, Sess. 36, ( ), p.75.


(12) See Oktay, Ibid., p.217.


(14) See Edip Özgene, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987),

p.562.

Г15) See Nuri Korkmaz, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January

1987), p.59. See also Durcan Emirbayer, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess,

86, (7 April 1987), p.564.

(16) See Rifat Beyazit, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30 October 1985),

p. 19.

(17) See Haydar Koyuncu, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (10 December

1984), p.28. See also Abdurrahman Demirtas, RGNA, Vol.7-2,

Sess. 7, (October 1984), p.147.

(18) See Koyuncu, loc.cit.

(19) See Koyuncu, Ibid.,p.26.

(20) See Koyuncu,RGNA, Vol.22, Sess. 43, (13 December 1985),

p.321.

(21) See Koksal Toptan, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January

1987), p.48. See also Turgut Sera Tirali, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess.

86, (1987), p.552.

(22) See Toptan, loc.cit. See also Hüsamettin Cindoruk, RGNA,

Vol.33, Sess. 35, (8 December 1986), p.222.

(23) See page 6, paragraph 2.

(24) See Cindoruk, op.cit., p.221. See also Tirali, loc.cit.__

117

(25) See Kazim Oksay, RGNA, Vol.7, Sess. 15, (October 1984),

pp.491-492.

(26) See Pertev Ascioglu, RGNA, Vol.3, Sess. 53, (April 1984),

p.279. See also Oksay, RGNA, Vol.35, Sess. 54, (January 1987),

p.650, Mehmet Budak, RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30 October

1985) , p.23.

(27) See Oksay, RGNA Vol.22, Sess. 43, (13 December 1985),

pp.335-336.

(28) See Oksay, Ibid. See also Ismail Dayi, Ibid., pp.326,335.

(29) See Ismail Dayi RGNA, Vol.30, Sess. 40, (10 December

1984), p.24. See also Oksay, Ibid., p.35; Dayi, RGNA, Vol.22,

Sess. 43, (13 December 1985), p.326.


(31) See Necati Cengiz, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess.43, (15 December

1984) , p.261.

(32) See Erdal Inonu, RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 35, (8 December

1986) , p.202.

(33) See Salih Alcan, RGNA, Vol.23, Sess. 50, (20 December

1985) , p.405.

(34) See Inonu, RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 35, (8 December 1986),

p.187. See also Oktay, Ibid., p.218.

(35) See Bahriye Ucok, RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 30, (26 October

1986) , pp.7-8.

(36) See Ozgenc, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987),

pp.561-562-563.

118

(37) Ibid.

(38) As a matter of fact, none of the relevant parties

attempts to give up such a rhetoric.

(39) See Aziz Kaygisiz, Vol.10, Sess. 43, (15 December 1984),

p.307. See also Haydar Koyuncu, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (12


^40) See Koyuncu, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (12 December 1984),

pp.26-28.

(41) Ibid.

(42) This can be attributed to the huge transfer of the NDP

deputies to the TPP.

(43) Programme of the TPP, (Ankara : Pan Matbaacilik, 1985),

Article 38.

(44) See Tirali, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 56, (7 April 1987),

p.552. See also Toptan, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January

1987), p.47.

(45) Vehbi Dincerler is one of the marginal figures among the

party ranks, who has attracted immense attention as a result

of his ideas about the instruction of evolution theory. It

should also be noted that later on Mr. Dincerler defends his

ideas -in addition to his proposal for the teaching of

creation theory- on the grounds of Kemalist thought. (See :

RGNA, Vol.14, Sess. 82, (4 April 1985), p.426. See also RGNA,

Vol.10, Sess. 43, (13 December 1984), pp.308-310.

(46) See Oksay, RGNA, Vol.10, Sess. 40, (12 December 1984),

119

p.35. See also Mehmet Budak, RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30

October 1985), p.23; Mehmet Bagceci, RGNA, Vol.lO, Sess. 43,

(13 December 1984), p.281; Mehmet Ali Doguslu, RGNA, Vol.23,

Sess. 50, (20 December 1985), p.423.

(47) See Osman Isik, RGNA, Vol.lO, Sess. 43, (12 December

1984) , p.332. See also. Metin Emiroglu, RGNA, Vol.23, Sess.

50, (20 December 1985), pp.463-464.

(48) See Emiroglu, RGNA, Vol.27, Sess. 85, (March 1986), p.94.

(49) See Hasan Celal Guzel, RGNA, Vol.37, Sess. 69, (25

February 1987), p.129.

(50) See footnote 5, Chapter 4.

(51) ismet Turhangil and Bahriye Ucok, RGNA, Vo1.22, Sess. 43,

(13 December 1985), pp.322,325,343.

(52) See Rifat Bayazit, RGNA, Vol.19, Sess. 20, (23 October

1985) , pp.641-642. See also Koyuncu, RGNA, Vol.lO, Sess.40,

(12 December 1984), pp.26-27,29.

(53) See Dayi, RGNA, Vol.lO, Sess. 40, (12 December 1984),

pp.24,26. See also Oksay , Ibid., p.35.

(54) See Oksay, Ibid.

(55) See Oksay, Ibid, See also Ilhan Aras, Ibid., p.32; Dayi,

Ibid., p.24; Mehmet Zeki Uzun, Ibid., pp.43-45; Dayi, RGNA,

Vol.22, Sess. 43, (13 December 1985), p.327.

(56) See Coşkun Bayram RGNA, Vol.24, Sess. 62, (21 January

1986) , p.474. See also Ucok, RGNA, Vol.28, Sess. 95, (April

1986), p.93; Oktay, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987),

120

pp.37-38; Metin Ustunel, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 62, (10 February

1987), p.354; Hasan Celal Guzel, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 80, (24

March 1987), pp.16,18; Vecihi Atakli, Ibid., p.59.

(57) The main reference point of the party is excerpts from

some of the published religious books which contain anti-laic

themes. (See : Yilmaz Demir, RGNA, Vol.14, Sess. 74, (19 March

1985) , p.151. See also Cüneyt Canver, RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 34,

I'A December 1986), p,154.

(58) See Oktay, RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30 October 1985),

p.25.

(59) See Oktay, RGNA, Vol.21, Sess. 39, (December 1985),

p.460. See also Oktay RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 December

1987), p.70.

(60) See Ucok, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987), p.550.

See also Cüneyt Canver, RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 34, (4 December

1986) , pp.154,215; Oktay, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January

1987) , p.38; Tevfik Bilal, RGNA, Vol 33, Sess. 33 (3 December

1986) , p.132; Enver Ozcan, RGNA, Vol.40, Sess. 102, (13 May

1987) , p.276.

(61) See Ucok, RGNA, Vol.41, Sess. 107, (18 May 1987), pp.7-9.

(62) See Aydin Guven Gurkan, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 80, (24 March

1987), p.17. See also RGNA, Vol.39, Sess. 92, (21 April 1987),

p.312.

(63) See Oktay, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987),

p.72.

121

(64) See Inonu, Ibid., p.56.

(65) The case of the State Planning Organization is the most

outstanding example that the party bases its argument on. See

RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987), p.565.

(66) See Bayazit, RGNA, Vol.14, Sess. 71, (12 March 1985),

pp.10-12. See also Vol.14, Sess. 81, (3 April 1985), pp.406-

407.

(67) See Koyuncu, RGNA, Vol.22, Sess. 43, (13 December 1985),

p.320.

(68) This paral leiity is also appearent in the rhetoric of the

two parties that they both proclaim to be nationalistic and

conservative.

(69) See Abdurrahman Necati Kara’a, Vol.19, Sess. 9, (26

September 1985), pp.181-182. See also Mahmud Altunakar, RGNA,

Vol.19, Sess. 13, (8 October 1985), pp.287-289.

(70) Thus, the party puts overwhelming emphasis on religious

sentiments by excessive reference to religious terms. (See

Cindoruk, RGNA, Vol.33, Sess. 35, (8 December 1986), p.221.

See also Toptan, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987),

pp.48,50; Tirali, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987), p.553.

(71) Hasan Celal Guzel, RGNA, Vol.37, Sess. 69, (25 February

1987), p.129.

(72) Instead, the party refers to the issue of "turban" as

identical with wearing headscarf and thus as an extension of

tradition. (See Demirtas, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January

122

1987), pp.63,65.)

(73) See Guzel, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987), p.543.

See also Nuh Mehmet Kasikci, Ibid., p.547.

(74) See Guzel, Ibid.

(75) i.e., activities for the establishment of Shari’ah order

in Muslim countries, supporting those publications which

defend Shari’ah.

See Guzel, Ibid., p.546. See also Kasikci, Ibid.,

pp.555-556.

(76) See Topcu, RGNA, Vol.39, Sess. 92, (21 April 1987),

p.311.

(77) See Guzel, RGNA, Vol.37, Sess.69, (25 February 1987),

p.130. See also Kasikci, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April

1987), p.554.

(78) It should be kept in mind that both parties base their

claims on the excerpts from publications of the Presidency of

Religious Affairs, other religious books and on the data they

acquire from the press.

123

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

It can be said that an overall evaluation provides a totally

confusing· picture of the hot debate on what could be called a

threat to the basic principle of Turkish Republic, i.e., laicism.

Although each and every parliamentary party proclaims its

commitment to laicism, the fact that there is no shared

interpretation of this principle excludes the possibility for a

point of agreement within the parliament in this respect.

The reflections of this problematic situation at the

constitutional level is also present within the structure of the

1982 Constitution; which is the main source of reference for the

right-of-centre parties in the identification of their laic

standing. In this respect, it would not be wrong to state that

Article 24 has contradictions both within itself and with the other

articles of the constitution, mainly Article 2 and Article 10.

Although presented under the topic of Freedom of Religion and

Faith, Article 24, in a way, legitimizes the constant reference to

Islam as the religion of all Turks,-which has been adopted by

mainly the right-of-centre p a r t i e s . T h i s article can also be

interpreted as limiting the freedom of religion and faith of those

citizens who belong to religious minorities as well as of the non

believers, Thus, one can even claim that it puts the Muslim

1 2 4

population of Turkey into a pri\'ilegV:;d position ivhich is totally

aga i n s t iv li a t A r 11 c J. e 10 s u g'ge s t s . ̂ '

This dilemma within the constitution has its reflections at

the party level, that while refering' to the right to learn and

teach one’s religion as one of the main prerequisites of the

freedom of religion and faith, the right of-centre parties,

consciously or unconsciously, simply ignore the existence of the

other belief systems in Turkey. This posture can very well be

interpreted as an extension of the tendency to merge the notion of

nationalism with religiosity.

The left-of-centre parties, with the exception of the DLP

which, in a way, shows the same tendency with the right-of-centre

parties in this respect- try to identify their laic posture with

constant reference to such terms as "Republican Tradition" and

"National Ideology".^^^ Thus, they present a completely different

viewpoint by excluding Islam from the national values of the

Turkish people.

This study has taken into account four distinctive, but

complementary approaches to the principle of laicism as its basic

reference p o i n t . A s it was stated in the first chapter, it seems

that laicism in Turkey has been consolidated only to the extent of

political and legal spheres. It can be claimed that the

philosophical perspective has been out of question at the level of

political parties, especially in the last decade.

1 2 5

Movvever, the crucial point which may be helpful to get an

Insi-g'ht to the divergences among the parliamentary parties with

respect to the understanding of laicism, lies in the interpretation

of this principle from the sociological perspective. This

perspective also explains the incompatibility of religion with the

principle of laicisin in the Turkish case; since Islam has an

influentiaJ regulatory function in the society and since laicism

necessitates the minimization of the role of religion in societal

life,iS) and since that is what Atatürk perceived as the essence of

laicism. In this context, one more unique feature of the Turkish

case should also be mentioned; that is, the traditional elitist

approach which brought the strict state control over religious

affairs. In a way, this elitist tradition can be interpreted as

paving the way for the post-1980 milieu whereby the state control

over religion turned into a totally different practice when

compared to its proclaimed objective.

Additionally, one can say that in the statements of the

deputies of mainly ri ht-of-centre parties, there is an implicit

tendency to regard laicism only at the individual level by refering

to this principle as a guarantee for the freedom of religion and

faith. As an extension of this tendency, the same parties

constantly emphasize the significance of religion (i.e., Islam) for

the Turkish s o c i e t y , a n d thus reverse what laicism in Turkey had

been put forth to accomplisli : to transform religion into the

individual sphere. In this context, the DLP,-as an exception within

9 6

the left-of-centre- should also be mentioned tliat, while displayin|

almost the same posture with the PP and the SDPP when the

interpretation of laicism is the i s s u e · ' t h e party puts forth a

somewhat inconsistent attitude which is symbolized within the

statements of its deputies signifying· the reference to Islam as the

religion of the Turkish people. )

Finally, one can say that none of the parties, except for the

PP and the SDPP, has a compatible interpretation of laicism with

what was stated in the beginning of this s t u d y . A s a matter of

fact, the three right-of-centre parties simply do not take into

account the sociological perspective while refering to Article 24

of the 1982 Constitution as their main support base. This

complexity can be attributed to the uniqueness of the Turkish case;

not only as a result of its Ottonian-Huslim heritage -which has been

frequently referred by the DLP, the NDP, the TPP and the MP-, but

also the elitist approach adopted to counterbalance the

considerable influence of this past. And hence. Article 24 of the

1982 Constitution is a prime product of this fact.

127


(1) See pp.71-72.

(2) Here the DLP should also be added to the category of the

political parties which tend to use the terms "Turk" and

"Muslim" interchangeably.

(3) See p.72.

(4) See Oksay, RGNA, Vol.35, Sess. 54, (14 January 1987),

p.649. See also Demirtas, RGNA, Vol.7-2, Sess.7, (October

1984), p.147; Tirali, RGNA, Vol.38 Sess. 86, (7 April 1987),

p.552.

(5) See p.95.

(6) See pp.4-5.

(7) Here the claim that Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution

and the support given to it has distortive implications for

the philosophical aspect of the principle of laicism gains

credit.

(8) See pp.5-6.

(9) Here it can be said that, the attempt that has been

initiated in the Republican period to decrease the societal

significance of Islam with the mere support of nationalism has

been so reversed in the rhetoric of the MP that Islam turned

out to be one of the fundamental characteristics of Turkish

nationalism.

(10) The DLP appears to be on the side of the SDPP in

rejecting Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution on the grounds

128

that it is incompatible with the principle of laicism.

(11) See Ozgenc, RGNA, Vol.38, Sess. 86, (7 April 1987),

p.563. See also Emirbayer, Ibid., p.562.

(12) See Inonu, RGNA, Vol.36, Sess. 56, (20 January 1987),

p.56. See also Oktay, RGNA, Vol.20, Sess. 22, (30 October

1985), p.25.

129

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