“What were the reasons for the dissolution of former Yugoslavia?

What was the role of rival national identities in the process?”

Module Convenors: Christina Koulouri, Panteion University, Athens

and Athena Leoussi, University of Reading, UK

George Limantzakis

* Turkish Studies Graduate, Holder of ΜΑ Degree on European & International Relations,

PhD Candidate at the Faculty of History & Political Science at Panteio University

Athens, June 2014

2

Table of Contents

Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3

Was Yugoslavia an artificial state or a political evolution? ……………………………. 4

Interethnic tensions test the unity of the new state ……………………………………… 5

Socialist Yugoslavia accommodates nations on a federal basis ……………………. 7

Political Background: Structural Problems and Underlying Tensions ……………. 8

The ’74 Constitution: Solution or a new phase of the Yugoslav Problem? ……. 9

Economic Background: Growing Disparities, Less Solidarity ………………………… 10

Death of Tito sets the centrifugal tensions loose ……………………..……………………. 11

Reform in Eastern Europe further undermines Yugoslav Unity ……………………… 12

Contending strategies fuel and fueled by nationalism …………………………………… 12

Multi-party elections won by nationalists set a new basis ……………………………… 14

Intervention against Slovenia & Croatia …………………………………………………………. 15

The Bosnian War and the end of the federation …………………………………………….. 17

Conclusion ……………………..……………………..……………………..…………………………………. 18

Annex I: Maps ……………………..……………………..……………………..………………………… 19

Annex II: What’s the most proper term to describe what happened in

Yugoslavia? Was it dissolution, disintegration or a series of secessions? ……. 21

Bibliography ……………………..……………………..……………………..………………………………. 22

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“Yugoslavia is the country with seven frontiers,

six republics, five nations, four languages,

three religions and two alphabets, but one boss”

Introduction

The present paper has been written and presented in the framework of a post-

graduate module on European Identities in Panteio University during the Spring

Semester of 2014. Its purpose is to shortly examine and explain the reasons for

the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the role of rival national identities in this

process. Since the subject is quite large by definition, the present analysis will

mostly focus on the background upon which the disintegration of the Yugoslav

state took place -especially from the ’60s on, while examining the differing ways

in which its constituent peoples envisioned the common state and its purpose.

Unfortunately, due to the restricted time available and the limited volume of this

paper, the role of rival national identities is not analyzed as extensively as the

author would like, and emphasis is put mostly on how they interacted with each

other, rather than on how, when and by whom they were influenced. In this

context, one should consider this paper to serve mainly as a short analysis of this

large issue, to which much more could and should be added.

The question can also be hardly specified in terms of time, as Yugoslavia

was an amalgam of regions and peoples with very different historic experiences

from the beginning: Slovenia and Croatia had been for long dependencies of the

Austrian Habsburgs, and actually Croatia-Slavonia was an autonomous region of

Hungary between 1868 and 1918. Bosnia-Herzegovina had been an Ottoman

province for more than four centuries before its annexation by Austria in 1908,

whereas Serbia and Montenegro had been historic kingdoms whose independence

was recognized only during the Berlin Conference in 1878. About one third of

Ottoman Macedonia, later defined as Vardar Macedonia, became part of Serbia

after the Balkan Wars of 1912-3, and later a distinct republic within the socialist

Yugoslavia.1 Although most of these areas were populated by Slavic peoples who

had significantly interacted with each other throughout centuries, bridging their

cultural differences, social practices and political goals in a common state would

prove a major challenge for both the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1944) and

Socialist Yugoslavia (1944-1992), with differing results.

1 Please note that the use of the term “Macedonia” and its derivatives at the present paper

do not imply recognition of the former Yugoslav republic under its constitutional name

(“Republic of Macedonia”) and serve only reference purposes.

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Was Yugoslavia an artificial state or a political evolution?

Before we proceed with examining which were the reasons for the dissolution of

Yugoslavia, we most probably need to examine which was the driving force in

creating this state in the first place. The creation of the Yugoslav state has often

been connected to the notion of Yugoslavism (Jugosloventsvo), a term designed

to refer to the cultural unity of all the South Slav peoples of southeastern Europe,

whose political union it advocated. The idea was introduced in the late 19th

century by two Croatian Catholic Bishops, Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo

Rački, who used it to describe a supranational cultural patriotism, aiming to unite

South Slavs on the basis of common origins and cultural ties.2 Although the term

became popular by the turn of the century, the movement found little support

outside Croatia, while at the same time facing strong competition from other

nationalist movements, such as Serbian nationalism.

Serbs were initially not interested in the idea, seeing little benefit in a joint

movement with the Croats and the Slovenes of Austria-Hungary. However, Serb

foreign minister Ilija Garašanin cooperated with Strossmeyer in the late 1860’s on

a program aiming to create “a Yugoslav state free from Austria or Turkey”, and in

this context Serbian policy gradually shifted into seeking not only to unite all

Serbs in one state, but to unite Yugoslavs, emulating in a way Piedmont’s leading

role in the unification of Italy (Risorgimento).3 The idea was also adopted by

Croat nationalists, who envisioned it as a means to achieve the unification of

Croatian lands (Slavonia, Dalmatia and Istria) divided under Austria-Hungary,4 as

well as by Slovene politicians, such as Anton Korošec, who endorsed the idea of

Yugoslav unification as a means to free Slovenia from Austrian rule and promote

its Slavic identity, which was considered to be under threat.

2 By mentioning “common origins” the bishops made reference to the mass move of both

Croats and Serbs towards more or less the same areas they now inhabit in the Western

Balkans, back in the 9th century, while also putting great emphasis on their common

language. L. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 1995, p.4-5. For more, see Ch. Jelavich, “The Croatian

Problem in the Habsburg Empire”, Austrian History Yearbook, 1967, pp. 83-115.

3 These ambitious projects were however a far cry from Serbia’s actual potential to pursue

them, as shown during the Bosnian Crises of 1877-8 and 1908. S. Pavlowitch, A History of

the Balkans, 2000, p.179.

4 Sharing the same ideas did not restrict these groups from calling on each other for

assistance; quite the contrary. Noticeably, Ljudevit Gaj, one of the major figures of the

Illyrian movement (later considered ethnic Croatian) had repeatedly appealed to Serbia -

along with Dalmatia and Russia- for moral and financial support. F. Eterovich & Chr.

Spalatin (ed.), Croatia: Land, People, Culture, University of Toronto Press, 1964, p. 24.

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These variant interpretations of Yugoslavism soon created two major

internal divisions within the movement, with one faction promoting a centralized

state and the assimilation of all ethnicities into a single Yugoslav nationality, and

another supporting a decentralized federation that would preserve existing

identities, opposing the idea of centralization that was deemed as effectively

favoring Serb hegemony. Although evident, this difference in interpretations and

political goals was not clarified enough by the time of the Corfu Declaration (20

July 1917), when Dalmatian Croat politician Ante Trumbić, head of the Yugoslav

Committee, and Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić agreed on the foundations of

the post-war common state, which would be called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats

and Slovenes (Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca) and governed under the

Serbian House of Karađorđević.5

Interethnic tensions test the unity of the new state

After the end of World War I and the proclamation of the new kingdom on

December 1st 1918, merging the Yugoslav peoples into a single state became a

fait accompli and the new challenge was to make them work as one in a

functional state.6 Since Serbia already had a government, military, and police

force, many Serbs saw fit that she would form the nucleus of the new state.7 This

was not the case though for many Yugoslav and Croat nationalists, who favored

giving more rights to ethnic groups and even self-administration to some “historic

entities”, in a way that would resemble the administrative structure of the Dual

Monarchy.8 The issue continued to cause considerable strife in and out of the

5 Pašić was initially hostile to the idea of Yugoslav unity, preferring an enlarged Serbia over

a unified Yugoslav state. His objections were related to the agreements he had made with

the Entente powers, according to which Serbia would annex all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, half

of Dalmatia (up to Split), all of Vojvodina and most of Slavonia (almost as far as Sisak).

For more, see D. Djordjević, The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914-1918, 1980, p.68.

6 The new kingdom was made up of the formerly independent kingdoms of Serbia and

Montenegro (whose union is known as Ujedinjenje) and a substantial amount of territories

that were part of the Dual Empire, among which Croatia-Slavonia, Vojvodina, Carniola,

part of Styria and Dalmatia, as well as the crown province of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Such expectations were reinforced by the demographic factor, as Serbs were the

majority ethnic group in the new state. According to I. Banac, the population of Yugoslavia

in 1918 was divided into 38,8% Serbs, 23,7% Croats, 8,5% Slovenes, 6% Bosnian

Muslims and 4,8% Slavomacedonians. The National Question in Yugoslavia, 1984, p.58.

8 Many Croatian politicians actually expected Yugoslavia to evolve into an improved version

of Austria-Hungary, where Croatia would play the role of Hungary. S. Pavlowitch, A History

of the Balkans, 2000, p.369.

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parliament, until King Alexander sought to resolve the political crisis by assuming

dictatorial powers on 6 January 1929, renaming the country “Kingdom of

Yugoslavia” (Kraljevina Jugoslavija) and pronouncing that there is one single

Yugoslav nation with three tribes.9 Alexander also changed the internal division of

the country, creating nine new banovinas (provinces) named after rivers, in a

way that no ethnic group would constitute the majority in them.

Political change after King Alexander’s assassination in 1934 brought an

end to this policy, although the designation “Yugoslav” continued to be promoted

and widely used.10 Interethnic tensions continued to trouble the kingdom until

1939, when a consensus was reached between Yugoslav prime minister Dragiša

Cvetković and Croat politician Vladimir Maček regarding the creation of a new

ethnic Croatian Banovina (Banovina Hrvatska), which would function as a distinct

Croatian state within Yugoslavia, in a way that many Croatian politicians had

lobbied for since 1918. The agreement had come late though, as war was once

again imminent in Europe. In April 1941, Nazi Germany invaded and

dismembered Yugoslavia, establishing the Independent State of Croatia

(Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) as a puppet state under the fascist organization

Ustaše and their Poglavnik, Ante Pavelić, and “restoring” the independence of

Serbia and Montenegro, while other areas were annexed to Italy, Hungary or

Bulgaria.11 Twenty years after its establishment, Yugoslavia had ceased to exist

and borders in the Balkans were redrawn according to different national interests,

those of the Nazis and their revisionist allies.

9 In this context, “Yugoslav” was imposed as an ethnic designation on all Slav subjects,

and the state motto became “One nation, one king, one country” (Jedan narod, jedan

kralj, jedan država), imitating other totalitarian regimes of Interwar Europe. S. Pavlowitch,

A History of the Balkans, 2000, p.393.

10 Alexander was assassinated along with the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou during

an official visit to Marseille, made in order to strengthen ties between the two countries,

which were already members of the Little Entente. The assassin, Vlado Cernozemski was a

member of the pro-Bulgarian VMRO, which at the time cooperated with the Croatian

Ustaše, led by Ante Pavelić. S. Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans, 2000, p.397.

11 More specifically, Italy annexed the area around Ljubljana, parts of Dalmatia east of

Zadar/Zara and up to Split, as well as the area of Kotor in Montenegro. Hungary annexed

the areas of Prekmurje and Medmurje along its western border with Yugoslavia, as well as

Baranja and Bačka, whereas Bulgaria annexed parts of southeastern Serbia and most of

Yugoslav Macedonia. Montenegro became nominally independent (although a de facto

Italian protectorate), and Serbia -including Banat- came under German military command.

For more, see J. Tomasevich, “Yugoslavia during the Second World War”, in W. Vucinich,

Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment, 1969, pp. 59–118.

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Socialist Yugoslavia accommodates nations on a federal basis

The division of Yugoslavia -and especially the creation of an ethnic Croatian state

under Nazi auspices- led to the resurgence of older ethnic divisions, and even so

once Croatian Ustašas started promoting harsh persecutions against ethnic Serbs

and other minority groups.12 Ethnic divisions were also evident among resistance

groups, with the pro-Serbian royalist Četniks -led by Draža Mihailović- being one

of the most important, rivaled only by the Communist-led Yugoslav Partisans

under Josip Broz Tito. Although the Partisans soon found themselves fighting

against both the Četniks and the Nazis (which eventually even cooperated), they

were really effective in promoting a common vision for post-war Yugoslavia,

propagated under the slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” (Bratstvo i Jedinstvo) and

aspiring to organize the post-war state as a federation of six republics.13

By the end of the war, the Partisans had managed to liberate Yugoslavia

with minor foreign assistance and win popular support that led to taking over

power, as the old elites were divided and had either been destroyed by the Nazis

and their collaborators, or by their ideological allies and civil war.14 As a result,

Partisans won 88% of votes in the 1945 elections and were now free to

implement their program. Yugoslavia thereafter applied strictly the Soviet model

(including the nationalization of banks, factories and businesses, collectivization

of farms and persecution of the opposition), which they modified only in the

nationalities policy field: According to the new 1946 Constitution, the peoples of

Yugoslav Macedonia and Montenegro, as well as the Muslims of Bosnia-

Herzegovina, were to be recognized as distinct nations, a decision that would

reduce interethnic tensions within the country for a couple of decades.15

12 The Ustaše began as a conservative Catholic fascist movement that functioned as a

terrorist organization prior to World War II, supporting not only the creation of an ethnic

Croat state, but also its expansion up until the Drina and the outskirts of Belgrade. Once

on power, the Ustaše emphasized the need for a racially “pure” Croatia, and to that end

they promoted genocide against Serbs, Jews and Roma people. J. Tomasevich, War and

Revolution in Yugoslavia: Occupation and Collaboration, 2001, pp. 351-352.

13 Yugoslav Communists believed that organizing the state under the domination of one

nation had proved highly problematic in the Interwar period, therefore they aimed to

replace politics based on national identities with loyalty and identification with the new

Yugoslav state. M. Bokić, Main reasons that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 2011, p.6.

14 S. Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans, 2000, p.466.

15 These three nations, along with the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would be hence

recognized as constituent nations (narodi) of Yugoslavia, enjoying a different status from

minority groups such as the Hungarians and Albanians, which were considered nationalities

(narodnosti) because they already had nation-states outside Yugoslavia.

8

Tito refused however to be put under strict control from Moscow, and this

resulted to his split with Stalin and to Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the COMINFORM

in 1948. As Yugoslavia subsequently found itself economically and politically

isolated from its former allies, it sought its own -later called the “third”- road to

socialism by embarking on a series of fundamental reforms. In this context,

decentralization was further promoted, resulting in the fragmentation of the

Yugoslav political structure into six republic and two provincial communist parties.

Each enjoyed a monopoly over its own territory and later even held veto powers

over federal organs’ decisions. This was labeled liberalization at the time, but it

worked against Yugoslav unity on the long run, as each republican communist

party slowly started to identify with traditional national goals, reviving pre-

socialist demands and slogans.16 Other reforms were related to the establishment

of a new unique economic system and the policy of Non-Alignment, which

became equally important elements of socialist Yugoslavia.17

Political Background: Structural Problems and Underlying Tensions

The first serious political crisis in post-war Yugoslavia came about in 1966, when

Alexander Ranković, Head of State Security since 1944 and a close friend of Tito,

was removed on accusations that he planned to overthrow him. The move

signaled a shift from centralist policies, and opposition groups in favor of further

liberalization, political and economic reforms started becoming vocal. This was

particularly the case in Croatia, where a growing student movement called for

cultural autonomy, further decentralization and the recognition of Croatian as a

separate language from Serbian.18 Although reactions were initially downplayed

and underestimated, the situation became worrying after some demands were

adopted by local Croatian Communist Party members, such as Savka Dabčević-

Kučar and Mika Tripalo.19 This forced Tito to play the “outer threat” card and

16 M. Bokić, Main reasons that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 2011, p.7.

17 The Yugoslav administrative model of state organization and its mixed economic system

have often been described as a success, as also shown by the country’s steady growth

through the ’50s and ’60s and the political stability it enjoyed until the early 1980s. M.

Bokić, Main reasons that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 2011, p.8-9.

18 Some of the demands went as far as suggesting the reformation of Yugoslavia as a

confederation, or Croatia to be given a distinct seat from Yugoslavia at the United Nations,

as Ukraine and Belarus already had, although being part of the Soviet Union. S. Ramet,

Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 1992, p. 197.

19 Many attempted to disassociate the movement from party politics by just calling it

Masovni Pokret (Mass movement) and later Hrvatsko Proljeće (Croatian Spring), so as to

resound the Prague Spring and its unfortunate end brought about by Soviet intervention.

9

appeal to the republics to remain united, arguing that should there any conflict

occur in Yugoslavia, Moscow would seize the opportunity to invade, as had

already happened in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).20

Unrest in Croatia coincided with the party leadership of Kosovo officially

asking that it became a republic, a demand rejected on the grounds that its

majority population (Albanians) already had a “mother state” outside Yugoslavia,

and there was no provision for provinces becoming republics in the constitution.

Tensions also became evident at the event of the Macedonian Orthodox Church

unilaterally announcing its autocephaly in 1967, a fact that caused friction with

the Serbian Orthodox Church, which refused to recognize it.21 In the face of

growing disobedience and unrest, Tito eventually approved the right of central

authorities to intervene “if a danger for the Communist system should occur”, and

the movement in Croatia was decisively cracked down.22 Although Tito later

adopted many of its demands, the suppression of nationalists by the regime had

the negative side-effect of identifying nationalism as the primary alternative to

communism, therefore making it a strong underground movement.23

The ’74 Constitution: Solution or a new phase of the Yugoslav Problem?

Claiming he had acknowledged the need for change, Tito embarked on a

constitutional reform, whose named goal was the genuine decentralization of the

decision-making process, but without the mobilization of national groups.24 In this

context, the 1974 Constitution reinforced centrifugal dynamics in Yugoslavia by

expanding the representation of republics and provinces in all electoral and policy

forums, while vesting them with a series of veto rights in important matters.

Handing over that much power to the republics would later prove a significant

problem (especially in times of crisis), as each one of the republics was now in

position to block the others from taking decisions contrary to its interests, even if

20 B. Jelavich, History of the Balkans, p.392.

21 The Serbian Holy Synod denounced the decision and condemned the Macedonian clergy

as schismatic. The Macedonian Church remains to this day unrecognized by the Ecumenical

Patriarchate and all other Orthodox churches, in defense of the Serbian opposition.

22 For more on the “Croatian Spring” and its abrupt end, also see A. Cuvalo, The Croatian

National Movement 1966-1972, New York, 1990.

23 D. Jović, Yugoslavia: a state that withered away, 2009, p.21.

24 Granting more authority to the republics would allow Tito to counter-balance elites by

playing off one with another, while at the same time they could always be accused for

threatening state unity, if their policies were evaluated as supportive to nationalist

movements. M. Bokić, Main reasons that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 2011, p.7.

10

those coincided with federal ones. Additionally, Vojvodina and Kosovo, formerly

part of Serbia proper, became autonomous provinces enjoying many of the rights

republics had, simulated largely with them, but without being declared as such.25

As a result, the reform caused great resentment among Serbs, who viewed it as

the implementation of a policy “a weak Serbia for a strong Yugoslavia” at best, or

a “division of Serbia” (Podela Srbije) and an attempt to undermine their position

within the federation. These reactions led the leadership of SR Serbia to decide

not to ratify the new constitution along with the rest of the republics, and to put

forward a demand for its revision as soon as 1977.26

Economic Background: Growing Disparities, Less Solidarity

In the meanwhile, Yugoslavia had become dangerously vulnerable in the

economic field by the early ’80s, as economic interaction with the West had

opened up Yugoslav markets sooner than the rest of Central and Eastern Europe.

Back in the ’50s and ’60s, Yugoslavia had used this advantage to get easy loans

and cover its trade deficit, but as time went on Western trade barriers started

influencing negatively the country’s economic growth, undermining the country’s

ability to finance technological revitalization and boost its exports.27 At the same

time, the “Yugoslav way to socialism” -also known as the self-management

system- seemed to be reaching its limits, as public enterprises (usually managed

by well-connected party members) produced huge debts which the state offered

to cover in the name of maintaining social peace.28 This practice might have

worked for some time, but contributed to a constant rise of inflation, which was

hard to manage after some point.

As a result, Yugoslav foreign debt grew massively and reached 20 billion

USD by 1981. Belgrade managed to renegotiate it, in exchange for market

liberalization and severe austerity measures. Transition towards an even partially

25 In this context, the government of SR Serbia was restricted in making and carrying out

decisions that would apply to the provinces without the approval of their leadership, while

the autonomous provinces also obtained a vote in the Yugoslav Presidency (9 members in

total), which would not be necessarily cast in favor of SR Serbia.

26 The demand was rejected by the other republics, and Tito’s advanced age was enough

reason for Belgrade to slow down reforms so as to earn more time. S. Biserko, The

Dissolution of Yugoslavia as a subject of analysis and research, p.3.

27 The 1973 Oil Crisis further exacerbated the situation, as Yugoslav enterprises started

falling behind in competitiveness compared to the West, despite mass export subsidies. L.

Cohen, Broken Bonds, 1995, p.45.

28 M. Bokić, Main reasons that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 2011, p.7.

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market economy would prove a major challenge though, as it implied a high level

economic expertise and knowledge, which the Yugoslav Communist leaders did

not possess, and in fact was even contrary to their ideology up to that time.29

Furthermore, the lack of coordinating the economic policies of republics and their

ability to efficiently defend their interests -as being vested with veto powers-

would soon become an unsurpassable problem, as there were no institutional

mechanisms to arbitrate and settle differences between republics, “that had

become in all but name independent states”.30 The issue of growing disparities

and economic inequality between republics and autonomous provinces would

further exacerbate the situation, as their inability to agree on a common interest

resulted in rising tensions, mutual suspicion, claims of disadvantage and the

reinforcement of secessionist tendencies.31

Death of Tito sets the centrifugal tensions loose

As the economic crisis intensified and citizens throughout the country increasingly

blamed the establishment for Yugoslavia’s ills, the League of Communists also

suffered a crisis of legitimization.32 The rapid loss of the Party’s legitimacy and its

vanguard role took place all around Yugoslavia, but was most evident in the

republics of Slovenia and Croatia, where the League’s appeal almost completely

evaporated. Tito’s death on 4 May 1980 led to a further decline of Party influence

among the masses, as the main figurehead of the regime for decades was no

more, and unifying symbols became gradually less visible.33 The adoption of the

“collective leadership” system, consisting of year-long presidencies (on a rotation

basis out of the eight leaders of the republics and provinces) would prove highly

ineffective, as it created a power vacuum that encouraged further differentiations

among and within republics. As a result, it became more evident that republican

elites saw differently the goals of socialism and of the federal state, and to that

29 M. Bokić, Main reasons that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 2011, p.7.

30 B. Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The tragic death of Yugoslavia, 1994, p.11.

31 D. Jović, Yugoslavia: a state that withered away, 2009, p.15.

32 This has been described as having two dimensions: a vertical one, as party members

and citizens lost confidence in the party elite’s capacity to resolve the country’s difficulties

and maintain cohesion, and a horizontal one, as each of the eight republican and provincial

parties grew more autonomous and unwilling to implement the countrywide decisions that

had been agreed upon on the federal level. L. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 1995, p.47.

33 As Milošević later mentioned, “Even before Tito’s death, the system didn’t function. Tito

did. After his death, however, nothing has functioned and nobody has been able to reach

agreement on anything”. L. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 1995, p.52.

12

end they had started behaving more as representatives of their national group,

abandoning pro-unity mottos and positions.34

Reform in Eastern Europe further undermines Yugoslav Unity

Internal factors were also reinforced by external ones in accelerating the

dissolution of Yugoslavia. The reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the

Soviet Union (Glasnost and Perestroika) in the late ’80s and the shift of balance

caused in international politics contributed in a way to accelerating events, as

Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance of an intermediary between the Eastern

and Western blocs.35 Consequently, the country also lost the Western economic

and political support it enjoyed for decades, and increasing pressure from the IMF

to reform its economy and institutions soon made it impossible for Yugoslav

reformers to manage transition through rising social disorder. The collapse of

communism throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union further undermined

the country’s ideological basis, encouraging anti-communist and nationalist

forces, mainly in the republics of Croatia and Slovenia. And as the three main

pillars of Titoism (“Brotherhood and Unity”, self-Management and non-Alignment)

had come under dispute, the threat of a potential Soviet invasion, used in the

past to forge Yugoslav unity, wasn’t effective any more in the Gorbachev era.

Contending strategies fuel and fueled by nationalism

Once the economic crisis had turned political, the key actors in defining the way

ahead would prove to be the three most economically influential republics, those

of Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, which also happened to see themselves as the

original founding nations of Yugoslavia.36 In Serbia, Slobodan Milošević rose to

power by exploiting ethnic nationalism as a political resource, calling for reforms

that would reassert the control of Serbian republican authorities over the

autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. He called his campaign the

34 As prospects for the continued legitimacy and survival of the League of Communists

diminished, members of each regional communist elite became increasingly focused upon

their own survival and only secondarily concerned with cross-regional party unity.

35 Despite Yugoslavia’s non-aligned stance and extensive trading relations with the EC and

the US, the Reagan administration targeted its economy according to a 1984 National

Security Decision Directive (NSDD 133) titled US Policy towards Yugoslavia. A censored

version declassified in 1990 mentioned “expanded efforts to promote a 'quiet revolution' to

overthrow Communist governments and parties”, with the aim of reintegrating the

countries of Eastern Europe into a market-oriented economy.

36 S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, 1995, p.63.

13

“Anti-bureaucratic revolution”, rallying support under the motto “Strong Serbia,

Strong Yugoslavia”, which was successful among Serbs, but alienated Bosnian

Muslims, Croats, Albanians and Slovenes, as it reminded them of the Serb

hegemonic political affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and of Ranković’s

policies.37 The protests, called “Rallies of Truth”, were successful in overthrowing

the governments of Vojvodina and Kosovo by late 1988, as well as that of

Montenegro in early 1989, replacing them with allies of Milošević, thereby

creating a dominant voting bloc within the Yugoslav Presidency Council. It

therefore became more and more evident that popular protests moved by

nationalist rhetoric allowed elites to survive at the cost of undermining the unity

of Yugoslavia. Another significant milestone of Serbian nationalism was the highly

controversial Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (1986),

condemned at the time even by Milošević.38 Although fear of Albanian nationalism

and economic grievances were definitely important catalysts for the upsurge of

Serbian ethnic consciousness in the late 1980s, much of the existing literature

supports that nationalist rhetoric derived from a general and long-standing

dissatisfaction with the course of Yugoslav political development and its

pluralizing tendencies, which were blamed for the country’s difficulties.39

Trends were different, however, in the republics of Slovenia and Croatia,

where identification with Central European culture and multiparty democratic

traditions was stronger than in Serbia. Furthemore, the advent of anti-communist

opposition in Eastern Europe had intensified the already existing pressure for a

fundamental transformation of the Yugoslav regime, and repelled by Milošević’s

nationalist populism, Slovenian and Croatian reformers were accelerating efforts

to institutionalize political pluralism both within and outside the League.40 This

37 The use of popular slogans such as “Oh Serbia in three parts, you will be whole again”

(oj Srbijo iz tri dela, ponovo ćeš biti cela) did not help much in appeasing non-Serbs. A.

Nenadović, Politika in the Storm of Nationalism, 1993, p.23.

38 The SANU Memorandum, as it also became known, claimed to promote solutions on how

to restore Yugoslav unity, although it accused Tito of subjugating Serbia to Croatia and

Slovenia, and ethnic Albanians of committing genocide against Serbs in Kosovo. The

Memorandum was harshly condemned by the League of Communists and the government

of Serbia, led by Ivan Stambolić at the time. S. Ramet, Serbia Since 1989, 2005, p.321.

39 A particular focus of discontent was the 1974 constitutional arrangement, which had

reduced Serbia to one player in a game of eight, by establishing parity representation of

its two autonomous provinces in federal decision-making.

40 Demands for reform were often connected to claims that Slovenia had a quite large

contribution to the federal budget in relation to its influence on federal decision-making,

while at the same time many among the Slovene intellectual elite accused Serbs of being

14

divergence in strategies among republics led to holding the extraordinary 14th

Congress of the League of Communists in January 1990, where the Serbian and

Slovenian delegations disagreed not only about the future of the League and of

Yugoslavia proper, but even about the way of voting. Eventually, frustrated at

losing every vote on its proposals, the Slovenian delegation made a dramatic exit,

with the Croatian delegation following suit. This effectively marked the end of the

all-Yugoslav party, as the event -along with external pressure- caused the

adoption of multi-party systems in all republics.

Multi-party elections won by nationalists set a new basis

The first multi-party elections held in Yugoslavia in 1990 were overwhelmingly

won by opposition nationalist platforms in most republics, except for Serbia and

Montenegro, where re-branded Communist parties controlled by Milošević and his

allies were victorious. Particularly the victory of non-communist forces in Slovenia

and Croatia created a new political situation, since the principal theme of the

electoral contest was their future relationship to Yugoslavia.41 Although most

parties argued in favor of re-establishing Yugoslavia as a confederation, the

concept of disassociation (razdruživanje) had also become common, used to

describe the dissolution of the common state on the basis of mutual

understanding, if not agreement.42 In October 1990, the leaderships of Croatia

under Franjo Tudjman and Slovenia under Milan Kučan presented a common

proposal on the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation. According to it,

the Yugoslav republics were to become subjects of international law. There would

be no central government and no capital city, but there would be, on the other

hand, a common market, and a kind of a monetary union.43

Once the proposal was officially made public, the main issue was to sound

out the opinions of other republics. In this field, the Slovenes were frustrated to

up to Greater Serbian designs. L. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 1995, p.83 and D. Jović,

Yugoslavia: a state that withered away, 2009, p.18.

41 Slovenia rejected proposals for a new constitution along centralist principles and

president Kučan stated that there could be no way ahead without democracy and equality.

V. Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, 1994, p.143.

42 V. Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, 1994, p.147.

43 It was evident that the two republics took as a model the European Community, and the

preamble referred directly to it. Tudjman later explicitly argued that Yugoslavia should

transform into a kind of “Europe in a miniature”, with a unified market-oriented economic

space, founded on national states who would be exercising their own sovereignty V. Meier,

Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, 1994, pp. 157.

15

realize that except for Croatia, the other republics were hesitant to move towards

a confederal structure, preferring to explore all other options before conceding to

the dissolution of Yugoslavia.44 As expected, Milošević rejected the proposal

outrightly, arguing that if Slovenes and Croats claimed a right to self-

determination, then ethnic Serbs in other republics should also enjoy the same

right. Both sides continued to exchange similar inflammatory statements and

tensions continued to rise, especially after the Croatian Sabor voted in favor of a

new constitution on 22 December 1990 that changed the status of ethnic Serbs in

Croatia, from a constituent nation (narod) to an ethnic minority (manjina).45 The

very next day, Slovenia held a referendum on independence, whereas Croatia

followed with its own on 2 May 1991. Since both resulted in overwhelming

majorities in favor (88.5% and 93.2% accordingly), the two republics went ahead

declaring their independence on 25 June 1991, looking to the EC for recognition.

Intervention against Slovenia & Croatia

Belgrade was now directly challenged either to acknowledge the new situation, or

intervene. Circles within the still influential Yugoslav Army (JNA) clearly favored

the second option, and the army mobilized against Slovenia on 26 June. The war

would not last though for more than ten days (27 June-7 July), as the army was

not interested in keeping by force a republic with almost no Serbs. Although such

a stance was welcomed by Ljubljana and most Western governments, at the

same time it proved that the actual intension of the leadership in Belgrade was

not to restore Yugoslavia, but to actually reform it as a Greater Serbia. In this

context, it became evident that the true prize for the Serbs and actual test on

Yugoslav unity would be Croatia, where a sizeable Serb minority (12% of its

population before the war) inhabited the areas of Krajina and Eastern Slavonia.

By early July, the European Community pressured parties to agree on a

three-month moratorium on independence, during which the Yugoslav Army

would complete its pull-out from Slovenia and negotiations for a new Yugoslav

44 Serbia was clearly and uncompromisingly in favor of a tight federation and Montenegro

was much about the same line. Bosnia still wanted in principle a federal state, though

under certain conditions: the army should be depoliticized and all human rights and the

rights of republics should be guaranteed. Bosnia would happily remain in such a state,

even if Slovenia should leave. Macedonia would gladly stay in Yugoslavia, whether it be

federal or confederal. V. Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, 1994, p.170.

45 Another source of discontent was the fact that Serbs held a disproportionate number of

official posts in Croatia, creating a perception that Serbs functioned as guardians of the

communist regime, which restricted the expression of their distinct ethnic identity.

16

settlement would take place under British diplomat Lord Peter Carrington.46

However, European mediation did not bring about the desired result, as the

committee formed under Robert Badinter, President of the Constitutional Council

of France, claimed on 29 November 1991 that Yugoslavia was “in the process of

dissolution” and each republic was free to declare independence.47 Milošević

rejected the outcome, arguing that if republics were given a free hand in leaving

Yugoslavia, the same should apply in relation to Serbs living in these republics,

which should be free to unite with Serbia.48

Since no consensus regarding the future of Yugoslavia was achieved, each

side felt free to follow its own plans, even if that included the use of force.

Nationalist propaganda would play a major role in encouraging violence as a

means of settlement, as stereotypes of World War II depicting Croats as fascist

Ustaše and Serbs as royalist Četniks were broadly reproduced, often combined

with claims that the other side would readily engage in oppression and atrocities,

as had happened in the past. The first clashes took place between Croatian police

and Serb paramilitary forces in late March 1991 near the Plitvice Lakes, and by 1

April 1991 Serbs in Croatia declared SAO Krajina would secede from Croatia.49 As

conflict soon escalated into the Croatian or “Homeland War” (Domovinski Rat),

the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army shelled Dubrovnik and overrun big parts of

Slavonia, where ethnic tensions had also exploded into violence.

46 These were the terms of the so called Brijuni Agreement, which was recognized by

representatives of all the Yugoslav republics. S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and

Dissolution after the Cold War, 1995, p.200.

47 The Arbitration Commission, as it was called, handed down fifteen Opinions on “major

legal questions” raised by the situation in Yugoslavia. Among others, it mentioned that

“Boundaries between Yugoslav republics may not be altered except by agreement freely

arrived at” and “Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers

protected by international law”. A. Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration

Committee”, European Journal for International Law, 1992, vol. 3, p.178-185.

48 Carington responded by putting the issue to a vote, in which all republics -including

Montenegro- agreed in dissolving Yugoslavia. However, after intense pressure from Serbia

Montenegrin President Momir Bulatović changed his position into opposing the dissolution.

L. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 1995, p.96.

49 Similar statements were made by Serbs who formed the SAO Western Slavonia and the

SAO of Eastern Slavonia after Croatia’s declaration of independence, on 8 October 1991.

These three Serb-controlled regions would combine into the Republic of Serbian Krajina

(RSK) on 19 December 1991, a short-lived state which functioned in these areas until

Operations “Flash” and “Storm” took place in May and August 1995 accordingly, resulting

in a mass exodus of the Serb population towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.

17

The Bosnian War and the end of the federation

The situation would be far more complex in Bosnia, as its mixed population of

Muslim Bosnians (Bosniaks), Serbs and Croats could hardly agree on the

republic’s future status. Bosniaks mainly supported Alija Izetbegović and his party

SDA, which aspired to create a unitary independent Bosnian state under Bosniak

control.50 Bosnian Serbs objected the idea however, and on a referendum they

held in November 1991 they voted in favor of remaining in a common state with

Serbia and Montenegro.51 To that end, they proclaimed a separate Serb Republic

(Republika Srpska) on 9 January 1992 which was considered unconstitutional by

the Bosnian government, which held another referendum for independence on 29

February-1 March 1992, boycotted in turn by Bosnian Serbs.52 The result was a

series of bitter wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991-1995), which cost

the lives of about 140,000 people and the displacement of 4 million others.53

As a consequence of this series of events, the use of the term secession

became gradually less popular and most would now describe what happened to

Yugoslavia as dissolution.54 This may indeed be the most proper term, although

Serbia and Montenegro insisted on using the Yugoslav name and insignia for

almost a decade after the Yugoslav Wars, claiming their common state reformed

into a state union (državna zajednica) was the legitimate successor to the former

socialist Yugoslavia. No matter the acceptance of this claim, eventually all former

Yugoslav republics became independent, as Montenegro also held a referendum

in May 2006, and by a small margin decided to leave the union with Serbia.55

50 The concept of a distinct Bosniak identity was favored during Austro-Hungarian rule as a

means to deter Serbian and Croatian irredentism and preserve the territorial integrity of

Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was at some extent also the reason for its resurgence in the

’80s, with the extra aim of preserving and protecting the rights of ethnic Bosnian Muslims.

51 In the meantime, Milošević and Tudjman held talks on how to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina

into Serb and Croat administered territories, which led though to no result.

52 According to the results published by the Bosnian government, the turnout was 63.4%,

and 99.7% voted in favor of independence. The result did not meet the two-thirds majority

requirement the government had set, and soon disagreement escalated into conflict.

53 Former Yugoslav Macedonia was the only republic that managed to leave the federation

without military conflict, only to be driven into a long diplomatic dispute with Greece over

its name and the use of national symbols.

54 For more on which term is more appropriate, see Annex II at the end of this paper.

55 Kosovo was the last administrative unit of the former Yugoslavia to declare its

independence on 17 February 2008, although the legality of this declaration has been

disputed as contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Therefore, Kosovo enjoys

partial recognition to this day and its status is considered to be pending.

18

Conclusion

Yugoslavia was conceived from its beginning as a political experiment, often seen

by its constituent political units as an umbrella state, through which different pre-

existing nations (later defined as its tribes: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) could

materialize their -often diverging- objectives and defend themselves against

existent or perceived outer threats (such as Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria during

the Interwar period, or the Soviet Union during most of the Cold War).

Differences proved hard to bridge during the first Yugoslavia though, as

interethnic tensions and disagreements in relation to the state’s structure and

nature led to continuous political and social strife, which was eventually restricted

by King Alexander, but cost him his life in 1934.

The pattern of having one man holding the country together repeated

itself in post-war socialist Yugoslavia, as Josip Broz Tito managed to effectively

suppress nationalist tendencies by creating a multilateral political system, where

the Montenegrin, Slavomacedonian and later Bosniak identities were recognized

as distinct nations with their own home-republics. This helped to create and

preserve a delicate balance between the “older” ones, which were susceptible to

confrontation and continued to challenge the existence of a common Yugoslav

identity. Tito attempted to enhance the effectiveness of this system by delegating

more federal authorities to the republics, but this worked against Yugoslav unity

in the long-run, as it led to the formation of new political elites with national

characteristics and a vested interest in further promoting them, as a means to

obtain more power within their republic and the federation.

Consequently, governance on a federal level became rather complicated

and ineffective, while republic elites formed sharply divergent ideas concerning

the way they should react to developments within and outside the country and

confront the delegitimization of the regime. Under augmenting economic and

social pressure, the Party eventually split into a liberal faction (represented

mainly by Croatia and Slovenia) that supported a decentralized federation, and a

conservative faction (led by Serbia’s Milošević) that supported a centralized

federation under Serb control. These visions proved hard to reconcile though, and

the result was the violent end of the federation, which disintegrated into six new

independent states. To some extent, Europe faces today some of the questions

Yugoslavia did. In conditions of crisis, could or can its constituent parts agree

effectively on a common vision? Can they materialize the motto of unity in

diversity, and if so in what way? And last but not least, on which parties does it

mostly depend on to show the road ahead? Yugoslavia was put to the test twice

and failed. Let’s hope Europe will manage better the same challenge.

19

Annex I : Maps

Map 1. Yugoslav banovinas drawn by King Alexander (1929) and the Banovina of Croatia

according to the Cvetković-Maček agreement (purple line, 1939)

Source: http://history-of-macedonia.com/2013/10/10/vardarska-banovina-xartes-

diplomata/

Map 2. Yugoslavia dismembered after the Nazi invasion (April 1941)

Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fascist_occupation_of_yugoslavia.png

20

Map 3. Front lines during the Yugoslav Wars (1991-1995),

shadows of purple represent areas under Yugoslav Army and later Serb control

Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_war_in_Yugoslavia,_1993.png

Map 4. The successor states of Yugoslavia today

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_United_Nations

#mediaviewer/File:Former_Yugoslavia_2006.svg

21

Annex II:

What’s the most proper term to describe what happened in Yugoslavia?

Was it dissolution, disintegration or a series of secessions?

The events that led to the end of the Yugoslav state under the form and extent it

had up to 1991 created a series of legal and political issues that still preoccupy its

successor states. One of these is whether the whole process was or should be

considered a dissolution of the federal state, its disintegration or a series of

successive secessions from it. The first acts of this process, namely the

declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia (25 June 1991) were

initially considered secessions from the common state, but later on -and

especially during the Conference on Yugoslavia (August 1991)- it became evident

that the republics of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were also considering

independence, which they eventually declared on 8 September 1991 and 3 Μarch

1992 accordingly, both with significant complications.

Since four out of the six in total republics had seceded by spring 1992, the

alternate use of the terms “dissolution” and “disintegration” became gradually

more commonly accepted by the international media and academics to describe

the situation, although the remaining republics -namely Serbia and Montenegro-

insisted there still was a common state, which they named “Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia” (Republika Federativna Jugoslavija). Its authorities claimed it was the

legitimate successor to the former socialist Yugoslavia, therefore its membership

at the United Nations was to continue automatically. The Security Council

considered however that this view “was not widely accepted” and that Yugoslavia

had ceased to exist (Resolution 757/1992).56 To this end, the Security Council

recommended that the Federal Yugoslavia cease participation and apply as a new

member (Resolution 777/1992).

Despite the resolution, the offices and flag of Yugoslavia at the UN

headquarters continued to be used as before until 23 June 2000, as the UN

Secretariat allowed the mission to operate and accredited representatives of the

FRY to the SFRY mission. From that date on, the Security Council forbid the Serb

and Montenegrin representatives to participate meetings under the name

“Yugoslavia”, therefore forcing Serbia and Montenegro to apply as a new

member. The new Yugoslavia was eventually accepted as a new member by

Resolution 5512 of November 1st 2000, and shortly after all former republics

signed an agreement on the succession of the former Yugoslavia on 29 July 2001.

56 The original draft, prepared by the US Delegation asked the General Assembly to

confirm that “Yugoslavia was to be extinguished” from the UN, but the term was removed

in order to gain Russian support and the resolution remained open to interpretation.

22

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