Risk and Bluff in chess - Vladimir TukMakov

Vladimir Thkmakov

Risk & Bluffin Chess

The Art ofTaking Calculated Risks

New In Chess 2015

© 20 1 5 New In Chess

Published by New In Chess, Alkrnaar, The Netherlands www.newinchess.com

All rights reserved. Ν ο part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission from the publisher.

Translated by Steve Giddins from the original book Risk i Blef v Shαkhmatαkh (20 1 5) .

Cover design: Volken Beck Supervisor: Peter Boel Proofreading: Rene Olthof Production: Anton Schermer

Have you found any errors in this book? Please send your remarks to [email protected]. We will collect all relevant corrections on the Errata page of our website www.newinchess.com and implement them in a possible next edition.

ISBN: 978-90-569 1 -595-7

Contents

Explanation of Symbols ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 6

From the Author ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 7

Introduction ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 1 2

Chapter 1 Mikhail Tal: The Start of a New Era ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 23

Chapter 2 Bluff in the Openingo ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 49

Chapter 3 The Madness of the Brave ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 8 2

Chapter 4 The Logic of the Irrational ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 124

Chapter 5 By Right of the Strong ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 144

Chapter 6 Masculine Desperation ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 15 7

Chapter 7 In the Grip of Passion ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 186

Chapter 8 When a Win is the Only Acceptable Result ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 196

Chapter 9 The Last Chance!o ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 209

Index of Games ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 2 2 2

5

Explanation of Symbols

The chessboard

with its coordinates:

6

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

a b c d e f g h

Ο White to move 8 Black to move Φ King 'iV Queen 1::r Rook � Bishop tb Knight

! !

??

!?

?!

;t + ± +

+-

-+

00

#

good move excellent move bad move blunder interesting move dubious move White stands slightly better Black stands slightly better White stands better Black stands better White has a decisive advantage Black has a decisive advantage balanced position unclear mate

From the Author

Ίf you wαnt to show your opponent thαt 2χ2=5, you still need to understαnd thαt in reαlity 2χ2=4, αnd thαt you αre tαking α risk.'

Mikhail Tal

Bluff is a term in card games. It is an integral part of poker, and makes the game attractive to millions of followers. Both in cards and in life generally, bluff is based on the fact that the opponent does not have complete information about your real possibilities. In poker, the players are only sure of the value of their own hand, and can only judge the rest on the basis of indirect signs. In life even more is unknown.

Mistakes in opening preparation. Or a risky sacrifice from a simple oversight. Only the players themselves know the truth about what happened. By way of illustration, here are two remarkable examples, which could have graced this book but which, alas, failed to pass the strict criteria for inclusion. The first was played in a World Championship match and played a significant role in the history of chess.

Game1

Anatoly Karpov (2720) Garry Kasparov (2701) Moscow Wch m 1985 (16)

1 .e4 c5 2.lbf3 e6 3.d4 cxd4 4.lbxd4 tbc6 5.%5 d6 6.c4 lbf6 7.lb1 c3 a6 8.tba3

8 ... d5!? An astonishing opening discovery by Kasparov! This position had been seen hundreds of times before, but at the time the idea to sacrifice a pawn here seemed totally new.

Later, however, it was found that as early as 1965, Peter Dely had already played this amazing pawn sacrifice in the Hungarian championship against lM Karoly Honfi. The eventful game petered out into a draw.

9.cxd5 exd5 1 O.exd5 lbb4 1 1 .�e2 In Game 1 2, faced with a surprise, Karpov had played the safest move 1 l .�c4, but his opponent demonstrated a convincing way to equalise: 1 l . .. �g4 12 .�e2 �xe2 13 .�xe2+ '5'e7 14.�e3 tbbxdS and a draw was agreed within a

7

Risk & Bluff in Chess

few moves. His opponent would naturally have been fully armed against this latest try.

1 1 ... �c5?! This ambitious but risky decision would undoubtedly have been prepared at home. The more cautious ll . . . ..te7 12 .�f3 .tfs would have given Black chances to equalise, but with no winning chances. Kasparov is in aπ extremely aggressive mood.

1 2.0-0?! Black's 1 1th move was a complete surprise to Karpov aπd, true to himself, he chooses the safest liπe. But White had available a much stronger move, which would have placed his opponent's idea in doubt. n . .te3! i!.xe3 1 3.1i'a4+ lbd7?! (stronger is 13 ... �d7! 14.'ifxM 'ti'b6 1 S .�xb6 �xb6 aπd the bishop pair gives Black reasonable chances of saviπg himself) 14.'ti'xb4 (14.fxe3!) 14 . . . ..tcs 1 S .�e4+ �f8 16 .0-0. Karpov demoπstrated all of this when he was already ex-World Champion, iπ a game agaiπst John van der Wiel (Brussels 1 986) . Admittedly, he did not manage to win this game either - this variation really was aπ unlucky one for him!

1 2 ... 0-0 1 3.�f3 �f5

8

Black has superb piece play for the sacrificed pawπ, and Kasparov goes on to wiπ in a very striking manπer.

1 4.�g5 .:r.ea 1 5. 'ii'd2 b5 1 6 . .1:r.ad1 tbd3 1 7.tlJab1 h6 1 8.�h4 b4 1 9.ttJa4 �d6 20. �g3 .:r.ce 21 .b3 g5 22 . ..bd6 'ifxd6 23.g3 tbd7 24.�g2 'iff6 25.a3 a5 26.axb4 axb4 27. 'ifa2 �g6 28.d6 g4 29. 'ifd2 Φg7 30.f3 'ifxd6 31 .fxg4 'ifd4+ 32. Φh1 ltJf6 33 . .1:r.f4 ltJe4 34. 'ifxd3 ltJf2+ 35.:Xf2 �xd3 36 . .1:r.fd2 'ife3 37.:Xd3 .l:r.c1 38.ltJb2 1i'f2 39.tbd2 :Xd1 + 40.ltJxd1 .l:r.e1 + 0-1

This looks like a classic example of bluff in the opening. Kasparov played 1 1 . . . �cS with a confideπt look, couπting on the surprise value, and it worked. Without knowing the truth, it would be easy to assume that his team had scrupulously worked out all the details aπd analysed in detail all the possible risks. The bluff worked to perfectioπ and one can only feel pleased with oneself. But the reality is rather differeπt. Ιπ their preparatioπs, Kasparov and his team had completely overlooked 12 .�e3! , and Black was just lucky that his opponeπt took him at his word. So, sad as it was, Ι had to reject this example. However, this is not aπ uπusual story and we will have to return to

it agaiη later ση. It is quite likely that if Kasparσv had seeη the strσηgest reply iη his preparatiσηs, it wσuld alsσ have σccurred to Karpσv at the bσard. Over the bσard, the players fiηd themselves eηgaged iη a highly eηergetic mutual activity, where ideas seem to cσmmuηicate themselves frσm σηe player to aησther. Withσut a sigηal frσm his σppσηeηt, White did ησt seek a refutatiση, aηd limited himself to the simplest decisiση. But this is aησther, aηd very iηterestiηg story.

The secoηd example lσst to this bσσk cσmes frσm deep iη the eηdgame.

Game 2

Fabiano Caruana (2773) Magnus Carlsen (2843) Sao Paulo/Bilbao 2012 (1)

ο

Δ Φ

The Nσrwegiaη had already speηt a lσηg time squeeziηg blσσd frσm a stσηe, iη his customary maηηer, ie. realisiηg a very small pσsitiσηal advaηtage. Just wheη it seems White has sσlved all his prσblems, there fσllσwed the uηexpected

79.:Xe4 It is very difficult to give this mσve a defiηite assessmeηt. Οη the σηe haηd, it places White ση the edge σf defeat,

From the Author

but ση the σther, it wiηs him the game. After the calm 79.<.t>cl ! it wσuld be very hard fσr Black to streηgtheη his pσsitiση. Νσw, hσwever, the value σf every mσve iηcreases sharply.

79 .. . dxe4 80.f5! Carlseη's task wσuld have beeη rather simpler after 80.<.t>e3 1::f.b2; σr 80.d5 .J::tbs .

80 ... �g2? The mσve which misses the wiη. The desire to advaηce the kiηg is quite uηderstaηdable, but it was esseηtial first to activate the rσσk. 80 .. . .1::tb2! wiηs iη all variatiσηs: 8l .d5 (8I .f6 <.t>g2! 82 .f7 (σr 82.<.t>e3 .1::txc2 83.�g5 c3 84.<.t>xe4 Ir.e2+ 8S.<.t>fs c2 86.f7 1:ίf2+ 87 . .if4 cl iV 88.f8"iV l:Ixf4+ 89.gxf4 g3) 82 .. . .!::tb8 83 .<.t>e3 (83.�e7 <.t>f2) 83 . . . 1:ίf8 84.<.t>xe4 �xf7 8S .<.t>ds c3 86.<.t>c4 <.t>f3-+) 8 1 . .. 1:ίb5 82 .<.t>e3 .l::txdS 83 .<.t>xe4 .I::!'.d2-+. Alsσ gσσd is 80 .. . 1:ίbl ! . The variatiσηs here are ησt very cσmplicated: 8 1 .[6 (8I .<.t>e3 1:tel+ 82.<.t>d2 (82.<.t>f4 e3 83.f6 <.t>g2 84.<.t>e4 e2 8S.<.t>e3 c3 86.f7 �fl 87.<.t>xe2 �xf7 88 .<.t>d3 �f3+ (88 . . . <.t>f3 89.<.t>xc3 <.t>e4)) 82 .. . 1:ίfl 83 .f6 <.t>g2 84.<.t>e3 .!::f.el+ 8S .<.t>d2 <.t>f2 86.f7 c3+) 8 I . .. <.t>g2 82 .<.t>e3 1:lel+ 83 .<.t>f4 e3 84.<.t>e4 e2 8S .<.t>e3 �cl 86.<.t>xe2 z:f.xc2+-+ 87.<.t>di �c3. Black shσuld wiη iη all cases.

9


81 .�3 .C.b2? One move earlier, this move would have won, but now it is the decisive mistake. There was still a draw after 8 1 . .. 1::f.bl ! 82 .Wxe4 .J::f.cl 83 .f6 �xc2 84.Wd5! c3 85 .Wc4 I:f.cl 86.f7 .Jd.fl 87.Wxc3 Ι:ίχf7. The same position could be reached with the more effective 8 l . .. �b3+ 82.Wxe4 1:lc3.

82.d5 :Xc2 83.d6 Surprisingly, there is no way to save the game.

83 ... c3 84.d7 .C.d2 85.dθ'it' :Χdθ 86 . .txd8 h4 87.gxh4 g3 θθ.fβ c2 89 . ..td2 e3+ 90 . ..txc2 e2 91 . .b5

Black resigned.

Here also, the situations seems clear enough. White, fed up with passive defence and not believing he could hold the game, decided to bluff his opponent, and it worked brilliantly. In reality, though, as Caruana himself admitted, he thought that his passed pawns and active king would give him counterplay. This indeed happened, but only as a result of Black 's weak play. Bravery and enterprise brought White his reward, but can we really say this was a case of deliberate risk? It seems to me that we cannot. Thus another apparently convincing example was lost to this book.

As we have seen, then, the presence of outward signs of bluff is not sufficient. The reality can turn out to be an elementary oversight or an incorrect assessment of the position, rather than a carefully-thought out decision to bluff. The ideal situation is to have the player's personal confirmation of what he was thinking, preferably signed in triplicate and officially notarised! Alas, though, this is unrealistic. Partly, this is because some of the players involved in the examples given are no longer around to answer our questions. And partly, it is because people inevitably tend to

embellish their thoughts and feelings. Even so, in many of the examples given in this book, we do have such personal

confirmations from the players. Ι should like to thank my many colleagues, who greatly helped me with their recollections or striking episodes in their chess careers. This expression of gratitude may serve as a kind of replacement of the usual bibliography, which you will find lacking in the back of this book.

Ι should especially like to thank Mark Dvoretsky and Adrian Mikhalchishin, who generously shared examples from their own widely-drawn card indexes of positions. Those remarkable players Lev Psakhis, Veselin Topalov, Shakhriyar Mamedyarov, Teimour Radjabov, Pavel Elianov, Alexander Moiseenko and Andrey Volokitin not only recalled games of their own, which were relevant to our theme, but also tried their hardest to reconstruct the precise psychological circumstances of their decisions. And, of course, Genna Sosonko, as always, dredged up from the depths of his memory several fascinating stories. Α number of the striking examples of bluff have appeared in various articles and books and have become part of folklore, and they too find a place in the pages of the present volume. Sometimes the moves seem so eloquent to the author that he has independently interpreted the players' intentions. Ι hope Ι will not be judged too severely for such lese-majeste.

The examples have been split into chapters, but this is sometimes somewhat arbitrary, since many of the examples have features which could make them belong

1 0

From the Author

to several different chapters. Some games are given in full, others only as fragments, where they have relevance to a certain theme. This decision is also the author's own and reflects his tastes and interests. In general, Ι should like to caution readers that my book does not pretend to any special scientific value. Risk and bluff in chess is more of aπ emotional concept than a scientific one. The author has not concealed his own emotions.

Many diagrams have been formulated as a test. In this way, the book can also be seen as a textbook for trainers and players.

In conclusion, Ι should like to say a few warm words of thanks to my tireless assistant, without him this work would probably never have seen the light of day. As in my previous books, Ι call him my Silicon Friend, or SF. But Ι now look on him as something of a different personality from that in my previous books. Α certain irony and scepticism on my part has given way to respect and understanding. This is not only because he has grown stronger over the years, but also because Ι myself have changed. When you work with someone for a long period of time, you start to appreciate not only that person's obvious achievements, but also certain inevitable weaknesses, which we all have. We expect the same attitude from our readers - demanding, but at the same time, understanding. Because we understand that nobody is proof against mistakes.

Vlαdimir Tukmαkov Odessα, Ukrαine, April 2 Ο 1 5

11


lntroduction

Risk is an essential component in any game - its nerve and drive. Chess, one of the most remarkable of all games, is no exception. Throughout time, there have been players who preferred the storm to the calm. But when we speak of carefully calculated risk, used as a technique, as part of a player's style, then there are far fewer such players.

The first who comes to mind is Emanuel Lasker, who viewed chess as first and foremost a game. The legendary World Champion did not give great attention to the opening, but in the middlegame he was prepared to exploit methods which astonished both players and experts alike. Sometimes, his methods seemed so at odds with established understanding that his contemporaries saw them as deliberate provocation or even bluff. However, it was rare that one of his risky ideas was placed under serious doubt.

What was the secret of his successes? Let us try to see, with the help of the following example:

Game 3

Emanuel Lasker Frank Marshall United States Wch m 1 907 (2)

ο

How should we assess this position?

The then World Championship candidates Tarrasch and Janowski were by no means the last people to claim that White's position is extremely difficult. Lasker, however, both during the game and in subsequent discussions, considered that his position was perfectly defensible. Looking at the diagram with

1 2

the eyes of a modern grandmaster, the chances of the two sides look roughly equal. Lasker took a decision which both his own generation and later observers considered extremely risky.

1 8.'ifg4+! SF, however, thinks this move is the strongest and does not see any particular risk. One might well ask how one can argue with the cold and emotionless computer. But even what seems to me to be the most natural continuation, 18 .1::f.fel gS! 19.'ifh2 fS , looks very suspicious to the human player, yet here too, the computer sees nothing to be afraid of.

1 8 ... f5 1 9 .... xg7 .:[g8?! But this natural move is clearly not best. He should have played 19 .. . t2Jd2! 20.t2Jxd2 �g8 2 I .t2Jf4! (a good zwischenzug, although even with the direct 2 1 .'iig3 �xg3 22.fxg3 , which is indeed what Lasker had intended, White should hold) 2l . . . 'ifd6 22 .'fff7 'ifxf4 23 . .ίd.adl r!g6 after which there is 24.g3 ! .

Δ Δ Δ CiJ 1:,

analysis diagram

Forcing Black to repeat the position after 24 . . . �xg3+, for if 24 .. . 1:ίdg8? 25.�hl . 24.�hl 'i:Vgs 2S.g3 tt:Jes 26.�b3 'ifhs is dangerous.

20.1/fhβ tbd2 Now this move is not so effective. Admittedly, even after 20 . . . 1::f.g6 2 l .'irνf4 .ί:ιdg8 22 .lLJh4 lLJgS 23 .�hl White retains the advantage.

21 .11fxd2 11fxf3 22.g3 h5 23. 'iff4 'ifd5 24.1Σfe1 1Σde8

Nor does he get anything from 24 . . . h4 2S .'i:Vxh4 l:lh8 26.'i:Vf6 1:lxh3 27.'i:Ve6+.

25 . .:Xe8+ .:Χeθ 26.1Σe1 1Σe4 27.'ifg5

The further course of the game is not of any special interest from the viewpoint of our subject. Lasker easily realised his advantage.

What conclusions can we draw from looking at this example? From the viewpoint of the modern player, influenced by his unceasing work with the ruthless computer, Lasker's play does not seem that risky. Yes, he went in for a very committal decision, but it was dictated by the logic of the struggle. SF also confirms that there was not a single moment when White was ever worse. On the other hand, Black's play can be criticised in many ways, but

Introduction

that is another subject. In general, the impression one gets from this example is that two players of different classes were facing one another. And with all due respect to Frank Marshall, this is exactly what chess history confirms. So, the phenomenon of Lasker can be easily explained: he was head and shoulders above most of his rivals, in his understanding of the game. Moves which his contemporaries considered to be bluffs or tricks were in most cases simply the objectively best moves in that concrete position. In reality, the first great player to use risk and bluff as a way of confusing and disorienting his opponents was Alexander Alekhine. Several of his decisions, even to this day, astonish one by their courage and paradoxical nature.

Game 4

Alexander Alekhine Aaron Nimzowitsch Bled 1931 (6)

1 .e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.tbc3 �b4 4.tlJe2

Alekhine comments: Ά completely harmless move, but Ι chose it because Ι know that in such positions, Nimzowitsch often displays excessive greed, for which he ought to be punished '. Both in his moves and in his comments, one detects a certain chutz-

1 3

Risk &. Bluff in Chess

pah, which is an essential part of successful bluff.

4 ... dxe4 5.a3 bc3+ 6.tίJxc3 f5

And here is that 'excessive greed' of which Alekhine spoke. The natural 6 .. . lt::Jc6 leads to a roughly equal position, but how bad is the text move?

7.f3!? 7.kf4!? lt::Jf6 8 .f3 0-0 (8 . . . exf3 9.'ifxf3 'iVxd4? I O.lt::JbS+-, Alekhine) 9.fxe4 lt::Jxe4 IO .lt::Jxe4 fxe4 1 l .'ifd2 lt::Jd7 happened in a previous game ThomasNimzowitsch, Marienbad 1925. Black has adequate play, but White also has nothing to complain about. However, the World Champion is after more.

7 ... exf3 8. 'ifxf3 1i'xd4

9.1i'g3! After 9.lt::JbS!? Black has the possibility of 9 .. . 'ifh4+ (the other defence is 9 . . . �eS+!? I O.�e2 lt::Ja6) IO .g3 'ife7.

9 ... tbf6! The most active continuation. Other moves lead to a worse game for Black. For example, 9 . . . lt::Jc6 IO .lLJbS 1Ve4+ 1 1 .ke3! or 9 .. . lt::Je7!? I O.�e3! 1Vf6 1 1 .0-0-0! .

1 0.1i'xg7

The position has become much sharper. How should Black play?

1 0 ... 1i'e5+! Alekhine regarded this as the losing move, and suggested as strongest IO .. . l:tg8! 1 I .'ifxc7 lt::Jc6. This position is certainly unclear, but the move in the game is also very reasonable. Thus, Nimzowitsch's 'greed' is perfectly justifiable, although Alekhine's confidence in his own assessment is also quite correct. Without this, risk and bluff are much less effective.

1 1 . ..te2 :ga Worse is 1 1 . . . lt::Jg4 12.�xe5 lt::JxeS 13 .�f4±.

1 2.1i'h6 :g6 12 . . . 1:txg2? 13 .�g5! lt::Jbd7 14.0-0-0 leads to a quick collapse.

1 3.1i'h4 .td7!? He loses after 1 3 .. . 1:f.xg2? 14.kf4+.ί:lxe2+ 1 S .lt::Jxe2 1Vxb2 16 .1::f.d1 lt::Jbd7 1 7.1::rg 1 , but 13 . . . l:tg4!? was a possible alternative.

1 4.--tgS!

White's initiαtive αssumes α threαtening chαrαcter. Does Blαck hαve α sαtisfαctory defence, or hαs the criticαl moment αlreαdy pαssed?

1 4 ... ..tc6? Extremely optimistic! Black plans to develop his knight to d7 and defend everything, but there is already no time for such comfortable development. He should have played 14 .. . tί'Jc6! with a fully defensible position, for example 1 5 .0-0-0 0-0-0 16.�h5 (16.:r.he1 ! ? h6! 1 7.�xh6 tί'Jg4! 1 8 . .ixg4 l:ιxg4 19.Vi'xg4 fxg4 20.1:lxe5 tίJxeS=) 16 .. . tί'Jxh5! 1 7 . .i.xd8 'iff4+ 18 .�b1 'ifxh4 19.�xh4 k1xg2 20.:r.hg1 1:f.g6 and Black does not stand worse.

1 5.0-0-0 .b:g2 Nor is he saved by 1 5 . . . tί'Jbd7 16 . .ί:rhel+.ie4 (16 .. . 0-0-0 1 7.�h5 �xgS 1 8 . .!::rxe5 �xhS 1 9.'iνd4) 1 7 . .ihs (1 7 . .if3 !?) 1 7 . . . tί'Jxh5 18 .'iνxh5 tί'Jf6 19.�xf6 'ifxf6 20.tί'Jxe4 fxe4 2 1 .Vi'b5+!+-.

1 6 . .1:r.he1 .te4 1 7.-thS! tbxhS 18 . .1:r.d8+ 'ίtf7 1 9.1Wxh5 1 -0

If 1 9 .. . �g7 20.tί'Jxe4 fxe4 2 1 ..ih6++-.

Maybe the pawn sacrifice in the opening should not be ascribed to bluff -Alekhine considered this the strongest and most principled decision and not risky at all. However, one cannot but be amazed at his consistency, uncompromising play and absolute confidence in

Introduction

himself, qualities which are extremely important in such play. Boundless confidence in oneself and one's ideas is a highly important element in attacking play. As we will see later on, this frequently has a demoralising effect on the opponent.

Even more paradoxical is the opening idea seen in the following game.

Games

Alexander Alekhine Max Euwe The Netherlands Wch m 1935 (7)

1 .e4 e6 2.d4 dS 3.lίJc3 .tb4 4.tlJe2 dxe4 5.a3 .te7 6.tbxe4 lίJc6

Whαt move hαd never been plαyed in this position?

7.g4?!

1 5

Itisk & Bluff in Chess

One of the most shocking moves ever played at such a high level! How does such an idea come about? Let us try to reconstruct the process. In the fifth game of the match, Alekhine played in 'normal' style: 7 . ..ie3 tbf6 8 .t2J2c3 0-0 9.t2Jg3 b6 10 . ..ie2 ..ib7 1 1 .0-0 and did not obtain anything from the opening. The more extravagant 7.f4 tbf6 8 .VWd3 tbxe4 9.VWxe4 VWd5! also delivers no advantage. The move 7.g3 looks reasonable, but then there is 7 . . . e5 8 .d5 t2Jd4 9.t2J2c3 (an interesting possibility is 9.t2Jxd4 VWxd5 10 . ..ig2 VWxd4 1 1 .VWxd4! exd4 12 . ..if4 with sufficient compensation for the pawn) 9 .. . f5 and Black is fine. In this context, one can see how the idea might come about of taking control of the square f5 . Admittedly, the origins of such a committal move were probably also influenced by non-chessboard factors, namely Alekhine's successful start in the match, and the resulting over-confidence.

7 .. . b6?! Euwe reacts on analogous lines to his play in Game 5. In general, the play of the Dutch champion was characterised by a certain stereotyped manner of taking decisions, which may also have influenced his opponent's choice of seventh move. 7 . . . e5 !? 8 .d5 t2Jd4! 9.t2J2c3 !? (9.t2Jxd4!? VWxd5 10 . ..ig2 VWxd4 1 1 .VWe2 was also possible, with definite compensation for the pawn) 9 . . . t2Jf6 10.t2Jxf6+ ..ixf6 1 1 . ..ig2 h5 was quite possible, but even simpler was 7 .. . t2Jf6! 8 .t2Jxf6+ ..ixf6 9 . ..ie3 h5! 1 0.gxh5 VWd5 with excellent play for Black.

8 . .tg2 .tb7 9.c3 tί::Jf6 10.tb2g3 0-0!?

1 6

Not a bad decision, although many commentators criticised it. It was safer to put the king on the other wing: l O . . . VWd7!? 1 l .h4 (1 1 .g5 tbxe4 12 .t2Jxe4 0-0-0 is equal according to Alekhine) 1 1 . . . 0-0-0.

1 1 .g5

Δ �I

Again the most energetic and risky decision. Admittedly, the quiet l l .t2Jxf6+ ..ixf6 1 2.0-0 was only good enough for equality.

1 1 ... tlJxe4 1 2.tlJxe4 ι;i;>hθ Preparing .. . f7-f5 . However, it was better to attack the centre by means of 1 2 ... e5! 13 . ..ie3 (13.d5?! tba5 14.h4 VWd7) 13 ... exd4 14.cxd4 tba5 and Black has no problems.

1 3. 'ifh5! 'ifeθ?! Continuing with his plan consistently, but here 1 3 . . . e5! 14.dxe5 tbxe5 15 .0-0 VWd5 was a better decision.

However, whαt is wrong with the text? After αll, the threαt of 14 .. . f5 is extremely unpleαsαnt, αnd it is not cleαr how to prevent it.

1 4.tbf6! Black had probably overlooked this blow!

1 4 ... bf6 Worse is 14 . . . gxf6?! 1 S .gxf6 tΔaS (IS . . . �xf6 16 .�e4+-) 16.i.xb7 tΔxb7 1 7.�f3! (discovered by SF) 1 7 .. . tL:JaS 1 8 .fxe7 �xe7 19.�h6 1:f.g8 20.0-0-0 with advantage to White.

1 5.gxf6 gxf6 1 6. 'ifh4 'ifdθ 16 . . . �e7? 1 7.i.e4+-.

1 7.�f4! e5 1 8.�g3 f5!? 1 9.dxe5 Here, we can sum up the results of White's opening strategy: it has proved itself completely. The resulting position is clearly in his favour. The remaining adventures in this game are another subject, and although we will give the game to the end, we will do so with only brief comments.

1 9 .. . .1:[g8!? 20.�f3? Out of a wide choice of possible continuations, White does not choose the most successful. Other options include 20.�xd8!? 20.'iVhS!? and 20.�h3 !?, whilst SF suggests the rather non-human move 20.�gl.

20 .. . 'ifd3! An excellent resource, which, however, he does not exploit to the full.

Introduction

21 .�e2

21 ... 'ii'e4? After the strongest move 2l .. .'�c2! it would already be White who would have to seek salvation.

22. 'ifxe4 fxe4 23.�h4!? 23.0-0-0! was even stronger.

23 ... h6 23 . . . �g7! .

24.0-0-0 :Seθ 25.�f6+ 'ith7 26.f4!+- exf3 27.bf3! tbas 2B.bb7 tbxb7 29.:d7 tbcs 30.:Xf7+ 'itg6 31 .:Xc7 tbd3+ 32.'itb1 'itfs 33 . .1:[d1 tbxes 34 . .1:[f1 + 'ite4 35.:Xa7 tbc4 36 . .1:[d7 'ite3 37 .:e1 + 'itf3 38. :Χeθ :Χeθ 39 . .1:[d4 tbe3 40 . .1:[h4 1 -0

Even today, 80 years later, Alekhine's play in this game looks ground-breaking. After all, only in the 2 1st century have such daring raids with the g-pawn become almost standard, in many different openings. As for Alekhine's contemporaries, one only has to look at the reaction of Salo Flohr, one of the strongest players of that time and a spectator of this game. Άfter 7.g4 Ι could not believe my eyes. Ι have never seen such a move in all my life. Ι annotated all of the games for a leading Dutch newspaper. Without any particular thought, Ι described the move 7.g4 as a bluff, and

1 7


criticised it sharply. The next day, Ι was visited by Lasker, whσ was attending the match. He lectured me alσng the lines σf 'Ύσung man, just because yσu have never played such a brave mσve as 7.g4, that dσes nσt give yσu the right to criticise Alekhine in such terms. Υσu are still tοσ yσung to understand Alekhine's deep idea." '

Α remarkable σbservatiσn. At the time, Flσhr was 27, certainly a mere yσuth by the standards σf the time. But when dσ yσu take risks, if nσt when yσung? Alas, the Czech GM lacked the nerve and imaginatiσn σf his σlder and mσre famσus cσlleagues, as well as the desire and ability to take risks. It is nσ cσincidence that he remained in the shadσw σf the twσ great Wσrld Champiσns, thrσughσut his career.

«Pawns don't move bαckwαrds!» It is perfectly clear that the fσurth Wσrld Champiσn was nσt in the slightest bit intimidated by such ancient shibbσleths. The absence σf stereσtyped and rσutine play in his style makes him σne σf the mσst striking figures in the history σf chess. The fσllσwing game is aπ example σfhis creative and absσlutely fearless apprσach. Α risky piece sacrifice, undertaken at the very start σf the game, nσt σnly brings him success in this game, but effectively decided the σutcσme σf the entire Wσrld Champiσnship match.

Game 6

Alexander Alekhine Max Euwe The Netherlands Wch m 1937 (6)

Befσre this game, the match scσre was 3-2 in favσur σf Euwe. Alekhine needed to win at all cσsts. It happened, as if

1 8

σrdained by a magic wand. And it prσved decisive, as it bσσsted Alekhine ση the σne hand, and demσralised his σppσnent ση the σther. And the rσle σf magician was played by Alekhine himself.

1 .d4 d5 2.c4 c6 3.llJc3 dxc4 4.e4 e5 5 . .bc4!?

Whαt is this? Accurαte cαlculαtion or bluff? Was this sαcrifice necessαry?

It is a brilliant find by Alekhine, especially when σne cσnsiders that White had the perfectly gσσd and sσlid alternative S .lLJf3 exd4 6.�xd4 'ifxd4 7.lLJxd4 bS 8.a4 b4 9.lLJd1 �a6 10 .�e3 (IO . .if4 lLJf6 1 1 .f3 �cs n.tt:Jfs Ο-Ο 13 .1::f.c 1 c3! 14.bxc3 g6 1 S .lLJg3 tt:Jfd7!= Kasparσv-Hίibner, Belfσrt 1 988) 10 .. . tt:Jf6 1 1 .[3 (Alekhine) . Here, White is taking πσ risk, but neither dσes Black have any special prσblems. In additiσn, after s .tt:Jf3 the decisiσn ση the sacrifice cσuld have been pσstpσned σne mσve, until after the natural reply S . . . exd4. Hσwever, White did nσt bσther torturing himself with dσubts, but simply burnt his bσats at the first σppσrtunity.

5 .. . exd4 After S .. . 'δ'xd4 Alekhine was prepared to continue 6.'δ'b3 'iνd7 7.�g5! fσllσwed by r!d1 . White's initiative is becoming threatening

6.lL!f3!

Any other move would have been α moral capitulation at this stage! Now what should Black play?

It is obvious that the capture on c3 is the most principled reply, especially as White has no forced win in sight. On the other hand, it is also obvious that the opponent will have analysed the consequences of the acceptance, in detail, in the quiet of home. The fact that he has chosen this sacrifice in preference to a quieter line suggests that he has looked at all the nuances and likes the results. Consequently, Euwe decides not to take the piece. However, it often happens that the desire to answer one surprise with another leads to a serious mistake, which is what happens here. In contemporary chess, the fact that analysis is done with computers makes this a typical situation. The best advice is to trust one's intuition. Euwe, on the other hand, preferred logic and knowledge over intuition . . .

6 ... b5? And this is the result! But let us try now to analyse the situation not ση the basis of general considerations, as above, but with hard cold variations. After 6 . . . �c5 , declining the sacrifice altogether, White has 7.tbe5!? (the quiet

Introduction

7.tbe2 is also fine, as is the sharp 7.0-0 dxc3 8 . .ixf7+ We7 9.�b3 tbf6). So the sacrifice needs to be accepted. After 6 . . . dxc3 7.�xf7+ We7 8.'iYb3 . . .

How should Black defend?

In his annotations, the winner gave the results of his home preparation: 8 .. . tbf6 9.e5 tbe4 1 0.0-0! tba6 (10 .. . 'ifb6 I l .'ifc4! cxb2 12 . .2.xb2 �xb2 1 3 .'it'xe4 Φχf7 14.tbg5+ Φe8 1 5 .'il'f4 1i..e7 (15 . . . .id7) 16 .'iff7+ Wd8 1 7.1:ladl+ i.d7 18 .tbe6+ Φc8 19.'ii'xe7 'ifxe5 20.l::i.fel 'it'f6 (20 . . . 'ifa5 2 1 .tbc5 1:ld8 22 .tbe4) 2 1 .J::f.xd7 tbxd7 22.'iid6+-) l l .'iVc4 tbac5 1 2 .i.g5+! tbxgS 13 .tbxg5 with a dangerous, probably winning attack. This is a striking piece of analysis, considering that it was done solely with head and hands! It is understandable that the human analyst does not look seriously at the capture on b2, since this brings the white bishop into the attack, which is illogical. However, SF does not concern itself with such human considerations as logic, and only worries about concrete variations: 8 . . . cxb2 ! 9 . .ixb2 'it'b6! ιo.i.a3+ (10 . .ixg8 1Σχg8 l l .'ifxg8 Vib4+ 1 2 .ti:Jd2 'ifxb2 1 3 . .1:Σbl 'ifc2+) lO . . . cS l l .�xg8 I:f.xg8 1 2 . .ixc5+ (1 2 .'ifxg8 'ii'aS+) 12 . . . 'it'xc5 1 3 .0-0

19


13 . . . 'iνh5! ! .

� Δ tLJ Δ Δ Δ

This hard-to-see move, which is at the same time the only move, could easily have been missed in the old days, but SF deals with such problems with no difficulty at all. (Editor's Note: It is only fair to point out that all of this analysis, starting with 8 . . . cxb2 and including 1 3 . . . 'i:VhS! ! , was found by a Soviet amateur called Goncharov, shortly after the match was played, and was published in the Soviet journal 64, issue 9/1938! ] (Other moves do not help: 1 3 . . . �h8 14 . .1:f.fcl 'iνb6 15 .1:lxc8 'iνxb3 16.axb3±; 13 ... tt:Jc6 14.'lWxg8 h6 I S .�abl) 14.'ltxg8 �e6 lS .'iYh8 tt:Jc6 Black's advantage is indisputable, although the battle is not over yet. So, it turns out that Alekhine's fantastic idea has a hole in it, and strictly speaking, was incorrect. But let us fantasise a little. How would he have played, if he had known of the final analysis of his idea? Ι am convinced that he would not have changed his play and would have mated his opponent in the same way as in the game. The only difference would have been aπ additional degree of conscious risk (bluff, if you prefer). After all, the Russian champion was a true player! Ι also do not doubt that Tal would have done the same. But what

20

decision would you have taken, dear reader?

7.ttJxb5! Euwe had missed this rather simple move. We have already discussed such type of mistakes.

7 ... .b6 8.'Wb3! This is the strongest continuation of the attack, but it was also possible to play 8.'ltxd4 'ltxd4 9.tt:Jfxd4. Not settling for anything less than the maximum, Alekhine conducts the game to its logical outcome.

8 .. . 'We7 After 8 .. . i..xb5? 9.�xf7+ Φd7 IO.tt:Jxd4! White's attack is irresistible.

9.0-0 .bbS 1 Ο . .bbS ltJfβ Not IO .. . cxbS? I I .'i:Vds.

11 . ..ic4

One would be happy to give up a piece for such a position, but here we have material equality. The outcome of the game is effectively decided.

1 1 ... ltJbd7 1 2.ttJxd4! .l:.bθ 1 3.'Wc2 'Wc5 1 4.ltJf5

14.tt:Jxc6? �c8. 1 4 .. . ltJe5 1 5 . ..if4!

Bringing the last piece into play. Less clear is I S .tt:Jxg7+?! Φd8 1 6.�dl+ Φc7.

1 5 ... ltJh5 1 6 . .bf7+! �xf7 1 7.'Wxc5 .bcs 1 8 . .be5 .l:.b5

1 8 . . . �be8 19.�d6.

1 9 . ..td6 .tb6 20.b4 .:l.dθ 21 . .:1.ad1 cs 22.bxc5 .txcs 23 . .:1.d5 1 -0

Α brilliant game. Admittedly, Black's defence was clearly not worthy of the status of the game, as Euwe turned out to be completely unprepared for such a sharp turn of events.

In his attitude to risk in chess, Alekhine was somewhat ahead of his time. Of course, deliberate risk-taking is also featured in some of the games of other leading players in the world. Even Botvinnik, the very antithesis of his predecessor as World Champion, occasionally would take non-standard and risky decisions, in order to change the course of an unfavourable battle.

Game7

Mikhail Botvinnik Samuel Reshevsky The Hague/Moscow Wch 1948 (4)

ο

White's position is not very pleasant. With his last move 25 ... !:ί.α6, Reshevsky created the threat of 26 .. . tt:Je5 , against which it is not so easy to defend. Admittedly, as usual, the Arnerican grandmaster was in time-trouble, which allowed Botvinnik to change the outlines of the position sharply. Try to find the best decision for the World Champion.

Introduction

26.tDd5!? tίJxe4 27 . .:1.e2 f5 28.g4!? It was this unexpected pawn thrust on which White had placed his hopes.

28 ... -tcs

Black's eyes glaze over at the choice facing him, and Reshevsky just could not understand what his opponent was playing at. But refuting White's idea is not so easy. After the intended 28 . . . tt:Je5 White wriggles out: 29.tΔxe5 �xeS 30.gxf5 �xd4 3 I .fxe6 I:txe6 32.1Ixd4 .ί::!.xcl+ 33 .�g2. Black should play 28 . . . tt:Jg5 ! . White ends up a pawn down in all variations and would face a difficult battle for a draw: 29.1:rxe6 (29.�d3 tΔxf3+ 30.�xf3 fxg4 3 1 .hxg4 tt:Jes+) 29 . ..tbxf3+ 30.�g2 tt:Jxd4 3 I ..i::rxd4 fxg4 32.hxg4 �f7+. However, calculating such tactical variations in time-trouble is extremely difficult.

29.gxf5 'ifxf5? Panic. He already lacked the time to calculate such a simple variation as 29 . . . �xd4! 30.fxe6 �xf2+! 3 1 .Ilxf2 (3 1 .�g2 .l:i.xe6) 3 I . .. tt:Jxf2 32 .�xf2 (32.Iιel tΔd3) 32 . . . �xe6. In the final position, only Black can play for a win.

30.'ifxe4 In the variation 30.�xc5 .i:rxc5 3 1 .tΔe7+ �h7 32.tΔxf5 Black has the deadly reply 32 . ..lbc3! .

30 ... 'ifxh3

2 1


30 .. . .!:ιg6+ 3Η�ϊ'h2 .id6+ 32 . .if4. 31 .tbh2?!

White was also in time-trouble! 3 I .t2Jf4 'iVg4+ 32 .Whl immediately ends the game.

31 ... :cc6? After the correct move 3 I . .. ifhS! the time-trouble fever would have continued, although now White's advantage is not in dispute.

22

32.tbf4 Black resigned.

Admittedly, such cases have only aπ occasional character, and depend strongly on the specific situation. That is, until the appearance of a new hero, barely ten years later, who completely overturned the accepted view of what was acceptable in chess!

Chapter 1.

Mikhail Tal: The Start of a New Era

The results of the 24th USSR Championship were a sensation. Fearlessly battling his more experienced opponents, the young master from Riga, Mikhail Tal, was part of the leading group. And a direct attack in the final round, against grandmaster Alexander Tolush, brought him the gold medal.

Most observers assumed Tal's success was one of those fluke results which happen, albeit rarely, even in the national championship. The following championship, which was also a zonal tournament for the World Championship, would restore the natural order, it was felt. Few expected the young master to repeat his success. Indeed, in summing the various participants' chances, grandmaster MarkTaimanov even promised to eat his hat, ifTal did so. Whether he carried out his promise, Ι do not know, but the miracle happened: by winning an improbably dramatic game against Spassky in the final round, Tal again won the championship.

However, the sporting result was not even the main factor. What astonished and amazed was the play of the young grandmaster. His games were characterised by a total absence of conventional chessboard logic, with intuitive, uncalculated sacrifices of pawns and even pieces, and total chaos on the board. But time after time, in the most surprising fashion, he escaped from the most difficult positions, as his opponents made sometimes incomprehensible mistakes.

23


Gameβ

Mikhaii Tal Efim Geller Riga ch-URS 1958 (12)

1 .e4 e5 2.lLif3 llJc6 3.i.b5 a6 4.i.a4 lLif6 5.0-0 i.e7 6.1Σe1 b5 7.i.b3 0-0 8.c3 d6 9.h3 lL\as 1 O.i.c2 cs 1 1 .d4 i.b7 1 2.b4 cxb4 1 3.cxb4 llJc4 1 4.lLibd2 d5 15.exd5 exd4 1 6.lL\xc4 bxc4 1 7. 'ifxd4 bb4

Black's threat is obvious. Which rook move would you play?

Black has successfully solved his opening problems, and in Tal's place, many grandmasters would happily have acknowledged as much.

1 8 . .:.b1 !? But not Tal himself! This move with 'the wrong rook' made a profound impression on both the spectators and his opponenι This exchange sacrifice changes the nature of the game at its very roots. The natural 18 .I::f.dl 'ifxdS! (18 ... �xd5 19.'ifh4 is less clear) 19.1::tbl 'ifas 20.'ifxc4 �xf3 2 1 .gxf3 ..ta3! led to equality.

1 8 ... be1 1 9 . .:.Xb7 .:.eβ!? Α difficult decision, which cost Geller a great deal of time and effort. 19 .. . �a5 looks more natural, and after 20.d6! (20.�a3 'iYxdS) 20 . . . 1::tb8 2 l ..l::.xb8

24

il'xb8 22.�g5 �d8 23 .'ifh4 leads to equality in a rather convoluted way after 23 .. . h5!? (23 . . . h6 24 . ..txh6 gxh6 2S .'ifxh6 'ifxd6 26.tbg5 �b6 27.�h7+ = is more obvious) 24.�xf6 �xf6 2S .'ifxh5 g6 26.�xg6! fxg6 27.il'xg6+ �g7 (27 ... <iith8=) 28 .t2Jgs 1::tf6 29.'ifh7+ <iitf8 30.d7 'ifd6 3 1 .'ife4 'ifxd7 32 .tbh7+ <iiff7 33 .'ifxc4+ 1::te6 34.tbg5+ <iitf6 3S .tbxe6. This variation is quite forcing, although long. Also very interesting is 19 . . . Vi'xd5 20.il'xd5 tbxdS 21 .tbxel k1fb8 and also 19 . . . �xf2+ 20.<iifxf2 Vi'xdS, in both cases with approximate equality

20.d6 'ifcβ

With his Jast move, Black attacked the rook. Where should it move to?

21 .i.g5?! Α move which caused a sensation among the players and spectators, but the position did not by any means require such drastic measures. The natural 2 1 .1:ίc7! Vi'e6 22.1::txc4 l::tad8 23.�f4 guaranteed White a small advantage.

21 .. . .:.e2 The shock produced by Tal's play even affected the objectivity of the analysts sitting at home. This is what grandmaster Boleslavsky wrote in the tournament bulletin: 'Ίaking the rook was too risky,

as in this case, White's attack would become irresistible.' Our trusted SF is less emotional: 2 l . .. 'irfxb7! 22.�xf6 .a'.e6! 23.�e5 (23.d7 gxf6 24.d8'iV+ 1:1xd8 2S .'irfxd8+ Wg7-+; 23.�xg7 'ifa7!-+) 23 .. . 'ifa7! 24.�h4 h6! 2S . ..id4 �b8 26.d7 ..ias and White's attack comes to nothing. So, the rook sacrifice was not really correct, it must be said. But one has to sympathise with Geller and Boleslavsky, who came under the effects of the young genius' play. The person Ι really feel sorry for is SF, who cannot experience such emotions at all!

22 . .1:.c7 'We6 23.tbxe1 .:X:e1 + 24. Φh2 .1:.d8 25 . .b:f6

Δ

How should Blαck plαy?

25 .. . gxf6??

Δ Δ Δ Φ

�

How can one explain this ludicrous oversight? Of course, Geller saw the simple variation 25 . . . 'irfxf6 26 .�xf6 gxf6 27.d7 Wf8 28.�xh7 l:!eS 29.Wg3 We7 30.1:f.xc4 1:f.xd7 with a probable draw. But in the course of the seismic changes affecting the position, he lost control over things, and in addition, he very much wanted to win this game from the viewpoint of the tournament situation. And when one very much wants what is not possible, such dramas sometimes occur.

Chαpter 1 - Mikhαil Tαl:rhe Stαrt of α New Εrα

26 . .1:.e7 'ifxd6+ 27.'ifxd6 .:X:d6 28 . .:X:e1 .1:.d2 29 . .1:.c1 .:X:f2 30.i.e4 .:X:a2 31 . .:X:c4 a5 32 . .1:.c8+ Φg7 33 . .1:.c7 1 -0

Naturally, such unusual play, together with the young player's almost demonic appearance, captured the imagination of the public, who lapped up each new success by their hero. But it was not only the spectators and his opponents who fell under the influence of the young firebrand. The atmosphere of the entire tournament seemed to be changed by the fl.uid chess fever. What had happened to the staid, almost prudish atmosphere, which was normally characteristic of the USSR Championship!? This, for example, is how one of Tal's contemporaries and rivals, Boris Spassky, played:

Game9

Boris Spassky lsaak Boleslavsky Riga ch·URS 1958

ο

White hαs sαcrificed α pαwn, but hαs obtαined reαl compensαtion, in the shαpe of the open g-file αnd initiαtive in the centre αnd ση the kingside. But Blαck hαs nothing much to complαin αbout either, αnd the stαge αppeαrs set for α tense bαttle with uncleαr chαnces. How should White develop his initiαtive?

25


24.liJxe6?! Lightπiπg from a clear sky! White had some solid alterπatives, such as 24.�h3!? e5 25 .t2Jfs or 24.f5 eS 25.t2Je6 �xe6 26.fxe6 1:te8 27.1:lf5 1:rxe6 28 .�fl ! with fully sufficieπt compeπsatioπ for the pawπ iπ both cases.

24 ... .b:e6 25 . ..td4? Απ iπaccurate executioπ of aπ already dubious idea. 25 .f5 �c8 26.�d4 would at least have preveπted the black couπterplay which arises iπ the game.

25 ... d5! 26.-tes Now after 26.f5 there follows 26 . . . tt:Jxe4! 27.t2Jxe4 dxe4 28 .�xe4 �dS aπd White has πο compeπsatioπ at all for the piece.

26 .. .'ife7 27.exd5 liJxdS 28.lLJe4 c3! 29.liJxc3 liJxc3 30 . ..txc3 ba2! 31 .'iff3

3l .. . �e3+ was the threat.

31 ... 'iff7?? Iπcredible! Boleslavsky igπores practically the oπly threat! The simplest wiπ was 3 I . . .'iYd6 or 3 I . .. 'iνe6 32.f5 �dS.

32.bg7! bg7 33.:Xg7+ 'ifxg7 34.:Xg7+ :Xg7 35.b3

Now the draw becomes uπavoidable. 35 ... .:tf8 36. 'ird5+ �hθ 37. 'ird6 .:tgf7 38.'ife5+ �gθ 39.'ifg5+ �hθ 40.'ire5+ �gθ 41 .'ifg5+ .:tg7 42.'ird5+ �hθ %-%

26

Game1 0

Boris Spassky Alexey Suetin Riga ch·URS 1958

ο

At first glαnce, White hαs α clear positionαl advantage. How can he reαlise it?

39.liJxf6!? But what is this, aπd why? Oπly a more serious examiπatioπ of the positioπ coπviπces οπe that, with πormal meaπs, White is ποt wiππiπg: 39.t2Je7+ �xe7 40.ii'g8+ �h6 4l .dxe7 'i:Yc6 42.�b8 �g6 43 .'iνxa7 <it>f? 44.�xb6 �xe7. Or 39.'iνc7 'iνxc7 40.dxc7 �f7 4I .t2Jc3 �d6 42.t2Jb5 �e6. Ιπ both cases, White has oπly a symbolic material advantage. Consequently, Spassky resorts to bluff.

39 .. . �xf6 40.'irg8 ..th6?? And this bluff works immediately! As so often happens, the last move before the time-control proves to be a fatal mistake. The natural desire to defeπd the pawn has tragic consequences. Had Suetin had more time, he would probably have found the variatioπ 40 . . . �g7! 4I .�d8+ (the surprising line 4l .�xg5+! �g6 42.�f6! ! �xf6 43 .'i!Yd8+ �g6 44.�h4 �f6! 45.�h5+ �g7 46.g5 , with a probable draw, is ποt for a practical game) 4l . .. �f7 42.'i:Ye7+ �g8 43.�xg5 �c6 and only Black can have wiππiπg chances.

41 .'ifh7! After this quiet move, it is all over.

41 ... ..tf8 42 . ..bg5+! 'iii>xg5 43.'ifg8+ 'iii>h6 44.'ifxf8+ 'iii>h7 45.'ife7+ 'iii>hθ 46.'ifxe5+ 'iii>gθ 47.'ifg5+ 'iii>hθ 48.'ifd8+ 'iii>g7 49.'ife7+ 'iii>hθ 50.g5 'ifcθ 51 .'iff6+ 'iii>gθ 52.'ifg6+ 'iii>hθ 53.'ifh6+ 1 -0

Of course, luck smiled on Boris in both of these examples. But fate turned its back on him at the decisive moment, when he was playing for a win against Tal in the very last round, and ended up missing even the draw, and with it, a place in the interzonal tournament. It was very obvious whose side Caissa was on in those days.

David Bronstein has always tried to avoid well-trodden paths. In the following game, extreme risk almost cost him a full point.

Game 11

Bukhuti Gurgenidze David Bronstein Riga ch·URS 1958 (16)

•

What should Black do?

The assessment of the diagram position depends largely on the consequences of the tempting move 19 . . . 1::th6 .

Chapter 1 - Mikhail Tai:The Start of α New Era

1 9 ... f5!? But Bronstein plays differently. Why? After all, the variation 19 . . . .ί::rh6! 20.'iVxf7 'iVd8 ! (now there is the deadly threat of 2 1 . .. l::tg7) 2 1 .tbcS! (the only move) 2 1 . .. 1::rg7 22.tbxe6 l:lxf7 23 .tbxd8 tbxd8 is fairly simple. Admittedly, after 24.tbd4 White has two pawns and definite compensation for the pawn. Το Bronstein, Black's advantage seemed too little here. One cannot exclude the possibility that his decision was also affected by the electric atmosphere of the entire tournament.

20.exf5 1Σh6 21 . 'ifxf7 'ifdθ 22.fxe6 Now 22.tbcS no longer works because of 22 . . . 1::rg7 23 .lbxb7 (23 .tbxe6 1::txh2+ 2Htii'xh2 'iVh4+ 2S .ι;t>gl l:txf7 is completely bad for White) 23 . . . 'iVb8.

22 ... ..be6 23.'ifxb7 'ifh4 24.'iii>g1 tΔe7?

After this poor move, Black's entire conception, starting with 19 ... fS, falls to ruins and the advantage passes to White. Admittedly, the correct 24 ... .tc4!! is not so easy to find. Unlike Tal, the rather nervous and short on confidence David Bronstein often faltered partway to his goal. Let us continue this variation: 2S.'iVxc6 (2S.1::td2 dS) 2S ... he2 26.h3! (White loses after 26.j_xe2 'iVxh2+ 27.ι;t>f2 'iVg3+ 28.ι;t>gl 1::th2) 26 ... .txdl 27.1:hdl 'ifxh3 and White faces a difficult defence.

25.lbbd4 ..tcs 26. 'it'b4 ..tg7 27.'ife1 ?!

Significantly stronger was 27.�e4! �xh2+ 28 .ι;t>f2 'ifh4+ 29.g3. The further course of the game falls outside the scope of our discussion and so we give it with only brief comments.

27 ... 'ifxh2+ 28.c;i;>t2 ..tf6?! 28 . . . j_xd4+! 29.1::txd4 'iVh4+ 30.g3 'ifh2+ 3 1 .ι;t>e3 tbfS+ 32.ι;t>d3 tbxd4 33 .'ifc3!;!;;.

27


29.'ίte3 tbf5+ 30.tbxf5 .bf5 31 . .1:[h1 ?!

31 .�b4! �xc2 32.1:f.hl±. 31 . . . 'ifxh1 32. 'ifxh1 :Xh1 33.:Xh1 .bb2 34.'ίtd2 .ba3 35.:S1 ..tc5 36.:Xa6 :ee 37.:Sθ ..te3+ 38.'ίtd1 :Χaθ 39 . .baθ ..tg4 %-V2

Tal played the interzonal tournament in the same enterprising and risky style, not letting the temperature of his play drop, from the first round to the last. Without regard to his tournament position, he plunged without hesitation into complications, teetering on the brink of what was permissible and occasionally overstepping it. Since this book is not just a monograph on the eighth World Champion, the author faced a difficult choice: which games from the tournament should he include in this chapter? After long consideration, Ι settled on two. The first was played at the very beginning of this marathon distance, when everything was still very unclear and the battle for the qualifying places was only just beginning.

Game 1 2

Mikhaii Tal Miroslav Filip Portoroz izt 1958 (5)

ο

28

It is obvious thαt Blαck hαs solved α!Ι his problems. In αddition, it is White who hαs difficulty finding α sαtisfαctory move. Fortunαtely, Filip offered α drαw αt this moment, thereby relieving his opponent of his sufferings. Except thαt, rαther thαn grαb the drαw offer strαightαwαy, Τα! begαn to think .. . Whαt wαs the Mαgiciαn from Rigα thinking αbout?

28 . ..ixh6! In fact, it is effectively the only way to continue the game. If 28.�e3 tbxe4 29.�[3 l::f.xdl 30.1:f.xdl 1:f.xdl+ 3 1 .'iVxdl tbf6 the game would quietly move into the phase of Black realising his material and positional advantage. But what kind of courage and confidence must a player have, to turn down a draw in such a position!

28 .. . gxh6 29. 'ifxe5 ..te7! Despite the opinion of many commentators, the best move! After the widelyrecommended 29 .. .'ife7 30.�f4 tbh7 White obtains sufficient compensation for the pawn: 3 1 .1:f.xd7 1:f.xd7 32.e5! f6 33.e6.

30.:d4! :Xd4! 31 .cxd4 'ίth7 32.:d1

• i

Δ

Suddenly Blαck hαs problems. How should he solve them?

32 ... tbeθ?

Τοο passive! The resource 32 .. . 'ii'g7! 33.'ii'f4! (33 . .tlg1? .id6!) 33 . . .'�'g5 34.'ii'xg5 hxg5 35 .e5 Φh6 36.exf6 �xf6 was hard to find at the board, but superior moves to the text included both 32 . . :ife8 and 32 .. . tbd7. However, in all cases, a tense position would remain and the outcome would be unclear.

33.f6! Another surprise!

Δ

33 ... liJxf6? Up to now, Black has defended very well, but in time-trouble, he is unable to find the best defence: 33 . . . ..ixf6! 34.'ii'f5+ Φg8 35.e5 'i:fe7 36.l:tgl+ �f8 37.'ii'h7 'i:fe6, although here too, the battle is not over: 38 .tlg8+ cJi;e7 39.'ifxh6 l:txd4 40.exf6+ cJi;d7 with a very sharp position, where anything could happen.

34. 1i'f5+ Φhθ 35.e5 All is well that ends well!

35 ... 'it'g7 36.exf6 .hf6 37.:g1 ..tgS 38.f4

Black resigned.

The second was played right at the finish, and Tal was already virtually guaranteed a place in the precious top six.

Chαpter 1 - Mikhαil Tαi:The Stαrt of α New Εrα

Game 1 3

Mikhaii Tal Oscar Panno Por1oroz izt 1958 (17)

D

Α fαntαstic opening stαge is not over yet. White hαs α number of promising continuαtions. Which one did Ταl choose?

1 4.e5?! Misha remains true to himself, immediately launching a tactical battle. Even so, it was more in the spirit of the position to play the prophylactic 14.b3 ! , limiting the scope of the black knights on the queenside.

1 4 ... dxe5 1 5.l2Jxe5 Of course, White did not decide on the advance of his e-pawn just for the sake of the variation 1S .dxe5 'irfxd1 16 .J:ιxd1 tbac4 1 7.-ic1 .Άb7.

1 5 ... liJbc4 Α perfectly good move. Another decent possibility was 1 S . . . ltJdS.

1 6.1i'd3 f5 The move 1 6 . . . g6 looks more natural. Tal was intending 1 7 . .Άh6 (more solid is 1 7.tbxc4 tbxc4 1 8 . .ih6 with approximate equality) , but then Black has the promising exchange sacrifice 1 7 . . . cxd4! 1 8 . .ixf8 .ixf8 because on 19.lLJxf7 there is the strong retort 19 .. .'iff6! and Black stands extremely well.

1 7 . ..tb3 f4!?

29


ΙfΡaηησ had seeη eveη part σf the cσmiηg cσmplicatiσηs, he wσuld prσbably have settled fσr a quiet liηe such as 1 7 . . . t'Δxb3 18 .t'Δc6 'li'd7 19.t'Δxe7+ 'iνxe7 20.axb3 t'Δxe3 with equality.

1 8 . ..td2 tlJxb3

Does White have anything other than the natural queen recapture ση b3?

1 9.tlJc6! Eveη Tal wσuld ησt have fσuηd it easy to decide ση such a mσve, as Black gets tσσ maηy pieces fσr the queeη. But ση the bσard we get a pσsitiση σf total chaσs, where the future Wσrld Champiση felt like a fish iη water! White avσided the baηal 19.'iνxb3 because σf 19 .. . i.f6, but 20.t'Δa3 ! (weaker is 20.t'Δxc4?! bxc4 2 1 .'ifxc4+ Wh8) guaraηteed him equality: 20 . . . �xe5 2 1 .Ώ:χe5 �e6! 22 .t'Δxc4 i.xc4 23 .'iff3. Ι am almσst certaiη that Mikhail Tal subcσηsciσusly created difficulties fσr himself iη this pσsitiση, just because σf a desire to avσid this blσσdless draw, eveη thσugh such aη σutcσme perfectly well suited his tourηameηt pσsitiση.

1 9 ... tlJxa1 20.tlJxd8 ..tts Mσre eηergetic thaη 20 .. . �xd8 2 1 .b3 i.fs 22.'iνf3.

21 . 'it'f3 1:axd8 22.:Xe7 .bb1 23 . ..txf4 :Xd4

30

'Black has a material advaηtage, but Ι lσve to play pσsitiσηs iη which the σppσηeηt's pieces are iηactive' (Ίal).

24.'it'g4!? Alsσ gσσd is 24.�g3 with the pσssible vanatωη 24 .. . �g6 25.i.e5 t'Δxe5 26.'ifxe5 i.f7 27.''ifxc5 l:ιdl+ 28.Wh2 �xa2 29.1:hg7+! Wxg7 30.'ifg5+ Wh8 (30 . . . 11t>f7 3 1 .'ifh5+) 3 1 .'1Ve5+ lίt>g8 32.'iνg5+, but the text leaves bσth players with greater pσssibilities.

24 ... -tgβ 25. 'it'eβ+ ..tf7 26. 'it'fS tlJc2! 27.b3 ..tgβ

It seemed to Black that this was fσrciηg a draw. He already lacked bσth the time aηd the eηergy fσr the mσre complicated play which arises after 27 . . . 1:1dl+!? 28.Wh2 t'Δd2 29.�xd2 l:!xd2 30.'iνxc5 h6.

Is there any alternative to the draw for White?

28.:Xg7+! By cσηtrast, Tal lacked ηeither time ησr eηergy, aηd he alsσ had aη uηlimited will tσ wiη, hσwever risky it appeared frσm the side. 28.'iνe6+ i.f7 29.'iif5 leads tσ repetitiση.

28 ... ιitxg7 29 . ..thβ+ ιitxh6 30. 'it'xf8+ ιitgS 31 .bxc4 bxc4 32.g3

Temptiηg, but it was alsσ wσrth cσηsideriηg the mσre subtle 32 .Wh2! i.e4 33.g4! σr 32.f3 !? .ifs 33 .Wf2.

32 ... �e4 33.h4+

And here, an interesting try was 33 .f4+! Φg6 34.g4 h6 3S.�e7! .

33 . . . 'ίir>g4 34.'ίir>h2 ..tf5 35.'it'f6! In time-trouble, Tal continues to ratchet up the pressure. Black had been counting on 35 .[3+ Φχf3 36.�xf5+ Φe3 when he is not in danger of losing.

35 .. . h6 36. 'it'e5 .:f.e4 In time-trouble, there is no time for subtleties such as 36 . . . .Άd3! 37.�[6 .Άfs.

37. 'it'g7+ 'iir>f3 38. 'it'c3+ tlJe3 Perfectly possible, but more exact is 38 .. . Φχf2! 39.�xc2+ Φf3 with an unavoidable draw.

39. Φg1 ! ..tg4 40.fxe3 h5 The last move of the time-control, and Black manages to avoid the variation 40 . . . 1:1xe3? 41 .�f6+ Φe2 42.�fl+ Φd2 43.�[4 with inevitable material losses. It seems Black has succeeded in defending, but even so,

Ταl finds α wαy to continue the bαttle. How?

41 . 'ife1 ! .:.Xe3? Black's very next move after the time control, played out of inertia, turns out to be a serious mistake. Admittedly, it needs both time and a clear head to realise that after 4l .. . �e6! 42.e4 c3 43 .�xc3+ Φχe4 we reach a drawn fortress.

42. 'iff1 + Φe4 43. 'it'xc4+ 'ίir>f3 44. 'it'f1 + 'ίir>e4 45. 'it'xa6 'ίir>d4?


The decisive mistake. He could retain good drawing chances with 4S . . . .a'.xg3+! 46.Φf2 .a'.f3+! 47.Φg2 .a'.d3 48 .�c4+ �d4 49.�xc5 1::ί.d2+.

46. 'it'd6+ Φc4 47.a4! This pawn decides the outcome of this titanic struggle.

47 ... .Ι:Σ.e1 + 48. 'iir>f2 .:f.e2+ 49. 'ίir>f1 .:f.a2 50. 'it'a6+ Φd4 51 .a5 c4 52. 'it'b6+ 'ίir>d5 53.a6 .:f.a1 + 54. 'iir>f2 c3 55.a7 c2 56.'it'b3+ Φd6 57.'it'd3+ 1 -0

As we see, the tournament situation had no effect at all on the process of Tal's decision-making. We will meet this phenomenon plenty more times in the games of the Riga genius. Of course, one cannot say that he was not bothered about where he finished in the tournament. It is just that the events in the game he was engaged in playing at a given moment were so interesting and absorbing to him, that he would forget about pragmatic tournament considerations. In fact, such an attitude, where non-chess factors are completely excluded from one's mind, is extremely important for the taking of risky decisions. In his best years, Misha would take risks without any fear at all, completely unaffected by any other circumstances than the logic of the chessboard struggle.

In the Candidates' tournament, Tal was already one of the favourites, but this responsibility, which is so difficult for some players to bear, has no effect on his play. Of the many notable games he played in Yugoslavia, Ι have selected just two, both against the ex-World Champion Vasily Smyslov. The first has been analysed for over half a century by many leading grandmasters and many

3 1


programs, but to this day, there have still not been any definite conclusions drawn. One can only sympathise with Tal's opponent, who had to resolve at the board matters which have proved insoluble even to generations of armchair analysts. In this game, Smyslov found the right moves for a considerable time, just on intuition, but in the end, the tension his opponent created on the board proved too much.

Game1 4

Mikhai/ Ta/ Vasily Smyslov Bled-Zagreb-Belgrade ct 1959 (θ)

1 .e4 c6 2.d3 d5 3.llJd2 e5 4.tl:Jgf3 llJd7 5.d4 dxe4 6.ltJxe4 exd4 7. 'ifxd4 tl:Jgf6 θ.�g5 �e7 9.0-0-0 0-0 1 0.llJd6 'ifa5 1 1 .�c4 b5

Almost αll White's pieces αre pointing αt the enemy king. Which continuαtion do you think is the most effective?

1 2.�d2! We will give the microphone to Alexander Koblents, Tal's second at the tournament and an observer of events: 'Nobody in the hall saw this move coming! White intends to transfer the bishop to c3 , whilst the g5-square is freed for the queen.' It is certainly a surprising move. But even now, looking at

32

the diagram, it is hard to imagine that g5 will be a square for the white queen. Probably only Tal could picture this.

1 2 ... 'ifa6 Όη 12 . . . 'i:Yc7 Ι would probably not have been able to restrain myself from my hobby of showing that a rook is stronger than two pieces: 1 3 . .Άχf7+ .tt.xf7 14/Δχf7 �xf7 15 .t2Jg5+ �g8 16.I:f.hel ' - Tal. It is certainly true that this 'hobby' is not shared by all, but White has a solid alternative: 1 3 .lLJf5 .Άc5 14.'i:Yh4! , developing an attack in analogous fashion to the game.

1 3.tl:Jf5! �dθ! Stronger than the natural 13 .. . .Άc5, after which White's idea works even better: 14.'ifh4 bxc4 1 5 . .Άc3 ! 'ifxa2 16 .1:f.xd7! .Άb4! 1 7 . .Άχb4 .Άχd7 18 .t2Jh6+ �h8 19 . .Άc3 with a very strong attack.

1 4.'it'h4! Not 14 . .Άb3 c5.

1 4 ... bxc4 15. 'ifg5 Fantasy becomes reality: the queen has reached g5!

1 5 ... tl:Jh5 On 1 5 . . . t2Je8 Tal gives the following striking variation: 16 .'i:Yxd8 'ifxa2 1 7 . .Άc3 (the prosaic 1 7.'i:Ya5, with an obvious advantage, was too boring for him) 1 7 . . . t2Jef6? 18 .1:f.xd7! .Άχd7 19.lLJh6+ �h8 20.'ifxf6! . Of course, this line is quite cooperative, but even after the superior 1 7 . . . lLJc5 1 8 .lLJe7+ �h8 19.lLJg5! White has an attack. On 1 5 ... g6 the future World Champion was intending 16 .lLJh6+ �g7 1 7 . .Άc3 'ifxa2. In his notes, Tal gives the following way to strengthen the attack: 1 8 .lLJh4! (interestingly, many years later, and with the help of SF, Kasparov suggest as strongest 18 .lLJg4, but his analysis missed the relatively

simple 1 8 .. . Φg8! , reqUinng White to force a draw: 1 9.ti:Jh6+ Φg7 20.ti:Jg4. Kasparov also missed the more ambitious 1 8 .. . ti:Je5!?. We will leave the analysis of this line to the newer, improved version of SF) 1 8 .. . 'iνal+ 19.Φd2 'ifa6 20.ti:J4f5+ Φh8 2t .Φe2! l::te8+ π.Φfl 'with strong threats'. This is certainly the case, but any modern programme easily finds improvements for Black. However, it is not our task to seek the final word in scientific truth. It is much more interesting to look at how one of the greatest geniuses amongst all chess players took decisions!

1 6.llJh6+ The immediate 16.�xh5? is easily refuted by 16 . . . ti:Jf6! (also very strong is 16 ... 'ifxa2!) 1 7.�g5 ..txf5 1 8.�xf5 g6.

1 6 ... �hθ 1 7. 'ii'xh5

tLJ Δ Δ Δ

:Μ

White's threats look extremely unpleasant. Does Black have any counterplay?

Α bit of time, plus the rapid development of technology, appears to put everything in its place in this head-spinning position.

1 7 ... 'ifxa2!? Both Tal himself, and many commentators, considered this to be the decisive mistake. However, the passage of time has corrected this excessively categorical assessment.

Chapter 1 - Mikhail Tal :rhe Stαrt of α New Era

Perfectly possible was 1 7 . . . ti:Jf6!? 18 .'tic5! ti:Jd7 19.'ifd6! .!tf6! (a serious improvement on Tal's 1 9 . . . gxh6? 20.'iνxh6) 20 . .!tg5 'ifxa2 2 1 ..!txf6 gxf6 22.1:1hel l::tb8! . Had this position arisen in the game. Ι think we can be sure that Tal would not have settled for the tame 23 .�a3, to which SF appends a zero evaluation. Any result is possible in this crazy position. 1 7 . . . .!tf6!? is also a serious alternative to the text: 1 8.ti:Jxf7+ (this was Tal's fall-back move. During the game, he intended 1 8 . .!tc3 .!txc3 19.ti:Jg5, missing the unexpected 19 . . . ..txb2+! (the nice line calculated by Tal, 19 . . . g6 20.ti:Jhxf7+ 1:1xf7 21 .ti:Jxf7+ Φg7 22.�f3 .!tf6 23 .ti:Jd6 �xa2 24.ti:Je8+ Φf7 25.l:rxd7++-, is far from forced) 20.Φχb2 �b5+ 2 1 .Φcl gxh6 22 .'iVxh6 �f5 and Black defends against all the threats) 1 8 .. . Φg8 19.ti:J7g5 h6 20.ti:Je4 'ifxa2 21 .ti:Jxf6+ ti:Jxf6 22 .'ifa5 'ifxa5 23 . .!txa5 .!tg4 24.1:1d6 with some advantage.

1 8 . ..tc3

How should we assess this position? What should Black play?

1 8 .. . llJf6?? One can only guess how the game would have ended, had Smyslov not made this oversight. Black had seen

33

Μ &. Bluff in Chess

this move from afar, missing a striking refutation. In reality, things are far from hopeless for Black, and he even has two ways to continue the battle: Α) 1 8 . . . �f6! 1 9.lbgs (also inter

esting is 1 9.tbxf7+ '1!tg8 20.tb7g5 ii'al+ 2 1 .'1t>d2 �xc3+ 22 .bxc3 tbf6, with equality) 19 . . . �xg5+ 20.ii'xg5 f6 2 1 .ii'hs tbes (21 . . . gxh6 n.Iιhel ! with aπ attack) 22.1:lhel �e6 23.!:!.xe5 ii'al+ 24.'1t>d2 .!::!.ad8+ 25.'1t>e3 ii'xdl 26 .ii'xdl J:lxdl 27..l::txe6 gxh6 28 . .i:!'.xc6 and the resulting endgame should be drawn; Β) 1 8 . . . �c7 ! .

analysis diagram

This completely unexpected resource is also perfectly valid. White has a guaranteed draw: 1 9.tbxf7+ (19.g3 !? tbf6 20.ii'h4 is more in Tal's style) 19 . . . '1t>g8 20.tbh6+ '1t>h8, but Ι doubt the game would have ended so prosaically.

1 9.'ifxf7! Now it is all over!

1 9 ... 'ifa1 + 20.<Ji>d2 :Xf7 21 .ltJxf7+ Φgθ 22.:Xa1 �xf7 23.lC.e5+ Φe6 24.ltJxc6 lC.e4+ 25. <Ji>e3 .ib6+ 26 . .id4

Black resigned.

The following game was played in the last cycle. The battle for first place had

34

reached its climax. Smyslov was out of the running, and this factor might have been expected to give him a psychological advantage. Certainly, in the opening, White's play was nervous and impulsive. Black's play, on the other hand, was faultless, up to a certain moment.

Game1 5

Mikhaii Tal Vasily Smyslov Bled·Zagreb·Belgrade ct 1 959 (22)

D

With his lαst rnove 23 .. . f6! Blαck creαted the threαt of 24 ... g5. In αddition, the c2-pαwn is hαnging. White's position evokes serious doubts. How cαn he sαve himself?

24 . .ie4! True to himself, Tal worries more about pawns than pieces.

24 ... g5 25. 'iff5 bh6 26. 'ifxf6+ At first glance, the following looks like a more promising line: 26.l::rh3 ii'g7 27.ii'xf6 ii'xf6 28.l::txf6 �g7 29.�xh7+ '1!tg8 30.�xd6, with three pawns for the piece, but 30 . . . �f8 ! 3 1 .l:rf6 �xdS! underscores Black's advantage.

26 ... .ig7 27. 'iff5 ti)g6 28.,:[h3 bb2 29. 'ifxg6 :e7

With accurate play, Black has repulsed all the threats and the outcome of the game seems decided.

However, Tal continues to pose problems, notwithstanding everything.

30.J:.h6 J:.gθ 31 .... f5 .tcθ 32 .... f3 g4 33.1!Vd3 .tes

Black has an extra piece and all the threats have been repulsed - isn't the game over?

34.c4 bxc4 35.bxc4 J:.eg7 36.c5! The last resource comes into the game!

36 ... dxc5 The calm 36 . . . ife7 is not a time-trouble move.

37.d6 1!Va7 38 . .td5 J:.dθ 39 .... e4 .td4 40 . ... f4

.i. .l

With minimα] forces, Τα] hαs creαted tension on the boαrd. With one's flαg hαnging, it is not so eαsy to mαke the correct decision. Whαt is this?

40 ... J:.gd7?? Losing in a surprising way! Admittedly, finding the only move 40 .. . ifd7! in time-trouble is not so simple.

Chαpter 1 - Mikhαίl Tαl :The Stαrt of α New Εrα

41 .J:.f6! Surprisingly, this modest move decides the game at once. The time-control is passed, but there is no saving the position. Smyslov resigned. Of course, the ex-champion certainly did not deserve to lose this game, but once again, Tal's amazing resourcefulness and belief in himself came to his rescue.

Undoubtedly, both the course and the result of this game were affected by the shock effect produced on Vasily Vasilievich by his previous encounters with Tal. Their fantastic battle in the second cycle was examined above. Tal's miraculous escape from an absolutely hopeless position is given below, in the final chapter Ίhe Last Chance'. The intuitive style of the older former World Champion, based on common sense, was generally a good weapon against the Rigan's unpredictable escapades, but in this tournament, it did not work . The Candidates' tournament was also passed in a single breath, and before Tal lay the dream of every player - a match for the World Championship. He faced the Patriarch of Soviet chess - Mikhail Moiseevich Botvinnik. There was a great gulf between the two players, in terms of both age and match experience. On the stage of the huge theatre, in such unaccustomed surroundings, it was easy to lose one's nerve, in every sense of the word. If the unique match atmosphere was something Botvinnik was used to, then for the young challenger, it was an entirely new position that he had to get used to. In this situation, the first game was of special significance. The preparation, the game itself and the result to a large extent predicted the outcome of the entire match.

3 5


Game1 6

Mikhaii Tal Mikhail Botvinnik MoscowWch m 1960 (1)

1 .e4 This move cannot have come as a surprise to Botvinnik - his young challenger had announced it straight after winning the Candidates'.

1 ... e6 2.d4 d5 3.llJc3 .tb4 4.e5 c5 5.a3 .bc3+ 6.bxc3 'ifc7 7.'ifg4 f5 8.'ifg3 �7 9.'iVxg7 :Ζ.gθ 1 0.'ifxh7 cxd4

Both Botvinnik's favourite French Defence and this particular position were easy to predict. Can you guess the challenger's next move?

1 1 .ς,fiιd1 !? The history of this far from obvious move is quite obscure.

One of the legends, propagated by Tal all his life, has it that the move 1 l .ς,fiιd1

36

was spotted by Tal's trainer Alexander Koblents, in a chess magazine which was lying randomly ση the floor, and that this happened literally half an hour before the start of this game! And it seems the challenger, without looking at any of the numerous tricky variations, just said Έxcellent, Ι will play it!'. This is a lovely story, fully supporting the legend of the Riga Magician, but such stories rarely pass the test of common sense. l l .ς,fiιd1 !? was introduced into practice by Gligoric, in a game against Petrosian. This was at the 1959 Candidates' tournament, the very event won so famously by Tal! It is simply impossible to believe that such a striking novelty could have gone unnoticed by him. The truth remains a secret, but the paradoxical king move fully accords with Tal's playing style. In addition, he had played all of his opening moves quickly and confidently, thus implying to his opponent that this was not improvisation, but deep and careful home preparation. The 'normal' move is 1 l .lLJe2, which also leads to a complicated, but more predictable position: 1 1 . .. lLJbc6 1 2.f4 .Άd7 13 .W'h3 dxc3 14.'ifxc3 0-0-0 1S .g3 .Άe8 16 . .Άg2 .Άhs with a good game for Black, as for example in R. Byrne-Botvinnik, Monte Carlo 1968.

11 ... .td7!? Botvinnik also turns out to be prepared for this turn of events, and is the first to deviate from the source game. Petrosian played 1 l . .. lLJbc6 1 2.lLJf3 lLJxeS?! (12 . . . dxc3!?) 13 . .Άg5 lLJSg6 and after 14 . .Άχe7?! lLJxe7 1 S .cxd4 .id7 equalised, but Black would have faced greater problems after 14 . .Άf6! .

1 2. 'iVh5+ tbgβ

1 2 . . . �d8 is interesting, as Botvinnik played against Tal in Game 12 of their return match. That game went 1 3 .tΔf3 'ifxc3 14.�a2 tΔbc6 15 .If.b2 �c7 16 . .a'.b5 .a'.h8 (16 . . . a6!? 1 7 . .ib2 axb5 1 8 . .ixc3 dxc3� Nakamura-Berg, Bermuda 2003. The move 16 . . . 'ifal ! ? has not yet been tried in practice) 1 7.'ifxh8 �xh8 1 8 . .ib2 'ifxf3+ 19.gxf3 . Although Black has fully adequate compensation for the exchange, Tal went on to win.

1 3.tbe2 d3 The logical follow-up to l l . .. �d7. Even so, Botvinnik spent 37 minutes on the move, which suggests some uncertainty.

One can only guess at which point Botvinnik's preparation ended. Maybe it was as early as White's 1 2th move? But more likely, the character of the position was not to the World Champion's liking, as he generally preferred clearer play. Instead of the move in the game, it was worth considering 1 3 . . . dxc3!? or 13 . . . tΔc6!?.

14.cxd3 b4+ 1 5.�e1 'ifxe5 The more interesting 1 5 . . . tt:Jc6, sacrificing a second pawn, was more in the spirit of Tal than Botvinnik!

1 6.�g5! tbc6 1 7.d4 'ifc7 White's problem remains his development lag and the insecurity of his king.

Chαpter Ι - Mikhαi] TαJ:The Stαrt of α New Εrα

Tal solves this problem extremely elegantly, bringing his rook into play in an unusual manner, whilst his king remains in the centre.

1 8.h4! e5

• .I

Trying to exploit the αbove-mentioned drαwbαcks in the white position. Quiet plαy with 18 ... tt:Je7 19.1:f.h3 0-0-0 20.1:Ie3 Jeαves White with the αdvαntαge. Now whαt shou]d he plαy?

1 9 . .1:h3! Non-standard positions usually require non-standard measures!

1 9 . . . 'iff7 After 19 . . . f4, Tal's recommendation 20.'ifg4 is not so good, because of 20 . . . 'iff7 2 1 .h5 tΔf8, but a very strong reply is 20.dxe5! 'ifxe5 2 I .�d2! followed by bringing in the queen's rook. Or 19 .. . e4 20.lΔf4 'iff7 2 I .l:t.bl and the position is prospectless for White.

20.dxe5! tbcxe5 21 . .:r.e3 �d7 22 . .1:b1 b6 23.llJf4

In a surprising fashion, all the white pieces have achieved harmony, whilst his king in the centre turns out to be perfectly safe.

23 ... .1:ae8 24 . .1:b4 �c6 25. 'ifd1 Το complete the picture, the queen returns to her starting position! Lacking such a sense of beauty, SF suggests as strongest the line 25 .tt:Jxg6 tt:Jxg6

3 7


26.i.d3. Οηe caηησt but agree with this, whilst alsσ regrettiηg it.

25 ... tlJxf4 26.:Xf4 lίJgβ 27.1:[d4 :Xe3+?!

Alsσ bad is 27 .. . f4 28.Ιιχe8 l::!:xe8+ 29.�d2! but the immediate 27 ... �c7 was sσmewhat mσre teηaciσus.

28.fxe3! rtJc7 29.c4! Decisively σpeηiηg all the liηes aηd diagσηals.

29 ... dxc4 30 . ..bc4 'ifg7 31 . ..bg8 'ifxgβ 32.h5 1 -0

Of course, such a victory iηspired the challeηger aηd gave him cσηfideηce aηd courage. But mσst impσrtaηt σf all, the game shσwed that it is bσth pσssible aηd ηecessary to remaiη true to σηeself, aηd that Tal's play - relaxed, risky aηd attackiηg - cσuld succeed eveη agaiηst the Wσrld Champiση.

Eveη sσ, Bσtviηηik quickly pulled himself tσgether aηd started to take the iηitiative iη the match. The turηiηg pσiηt came iη Game 6.

Game17

Mikhail Botνinnik Mikhaii Tal Moscow Wch m 1960 (6)

•

This position, which αrose before Blαck 's 2 Ist move, is not thαt simple, but nor is it so explo-

38

sive. Admittedlγ, 22.g4 is α threαt, but this could be met in vαrious wαγs. Which would γοu prefer?

21 ... ltJf4!? Αη iηcredible decisiση! It is all the mσre surprisiηg, because the lσgic σf the pσsitiση is far frσm requiriηg such extravagaηt measures. The simple 2I . . . ti:Jf6 leads after 22 .g4! .td7 (here the piece sacrifice 22 .. . i.xg4 23 .hxg4 ti:Jxg4+ H.�gi ti:Jxe3 25.fxe3 is wσrth much less) 23 .�gi to a quiet pσsitiση, with sσme space advaηtage tσ White. The dariηg text mσve chaηges the situatiση fuηdameηtally.

22.gxf4 The shσck was sσ great that Bσtviηηik ηeeded Ι Ο miηutes to decide ση this fσrced mσve!

22 ... exf4

23 . ..id2?! This ηatural mσve cσst the Wσrld Champiση aησther 10 miηutes. Hσwever, here his task was rather mσre difficult. Cσrrect was 23.a3 ! 'W'b3 (23 . . . 'W'a5 24 . .td2±) 24.i.xa7! (Ι suspect that Bσtviηηik did ησt cσηsider such direct mσves ση priηciple) 24-... .tes (24 .. . 1::f.a8 2S.ti:Jb5!±). leadiηg to aη extremely coηfused situatiση, where it is far frσm simple fσr White to fiηd the cσrrect mσve: 25 .f3 ! (this uηaesthetic mσve is

nonetheless strongest. Clearly weaker is 2S.j_f3? 1::ίa8! and the bishop on a7 is suddenly lost. Interesting is 2S .�gl !? so as to meet 25 ... 1::ίa8 with 26.j_fl ! . Black does better to play 25 .. . b6 with doubleedged play) 25 . . . b6 26.a4! (the only way to extricate the trapped bishop on a7. 26.'iνdl allows the totally unexpected queen sacrifice 26 ... 'iνxb2! 27 . .ί:!:a2 nxc3 28.1:d.xb2 .ί:d.xcl 29.'iνd2 j_xb2 30.'iνxb2 �bl 3 I .'iνf6 1:ίc2 32.'iνd8+ and White has to force perpetual check) 26 . . . .ί:Ιb4 27.t2Jdl ! l:ίxcl 28.1::i.xcl 'iixa4 29 . .1:f.c7 and White's advantage finally assumes a stable character; It only remains to add that the immediate capture on a7 is weaker: 23.j_xa7 'iνas 24.j_b8 �es 2S .�gl bS 26.j_xd6 �xd6+.

Returning to the game, how can Botvinnik's inaccuracy be exploited?

23 ... 'it'xb2? Tal seriously examined, and even wrote on his scoresheet, the significantly stronger move 23 . . . j_e5! . The analysts, including SF, assess the consequences differently, but the very latest verdict is in Black's favour: 24.f3 (24.j_f3 'iνxb2 2S.t2Jdl 'iνa3 ! 26.l:rxc4 1:lxc4 27.'iνxc4 'iixf3 is clearly in favour of Black) 24 .. . 'iνxb2 2S.t2Jdl (2S . .ί.:f.abl j_xbl 26.l;lxbl 'iic2 27.I:i'.cl 'iνfS+) 2S . . . 'iνxal !

Chapter Ι - Mikhail Tai:rhe Start of α New Era

(SF's improvement. 25 .. . 'iνd4?! 26 . .!:txc4 .ί:Ιχc4 27.1::f.cl 1:txcl 28.�xcl 'iνxdS 29.t2Jf2 is unclear at best) 26.1:!.xal �xal and the crazy activity ofthe black pieces more than compensates for the material deficit.

24.:ab1 f3! Yet another resource which Black had foreseen. The immediate 24 . . . j_xbl 25.�xbl 'iic2 26.j_e4! f3 27.'iνel 'iνxd2 28 .'iνxd2 j_xc3 29.'iνe3 I:f.e8 30.1::txb7 �exe4 3 I .'iνxf3 I:f.f4 32 .'iνe3 �eS 33.�g2 was bad for Black.

25 . .:Xb2? rired by the numerous shocks, Botvinnik hurries to exchange queens, but here the exchange is in no way a saving resource. Admittedly, even in the most ideal of frames of mind, the variation 2S.j_xf3 ! �xbl 26 . .ί:Ixbl 'iic2 27.j_e4! (here White has a draw if he wants it: 27.1::tcl 'iνb2 28 . .ί:rbl) 27. . . 1:lxe4 28 .t2Jxe4! �eS+ (28 ... 'iixbl 29.t2Jxd6 .ί:Ιf8 30.'iιfe6+ �h8 3 I .t2Jf7+ l::ίxf7 32.'iixf7 'iifs 33 .V!Vxf5 gxfS 34.�g3 is also bad for Black) 29.�g2 'iixbl 30.t2Jxd6! was extremely complicated.

25 .. . fxe2

How should we assess this highly non-standard position?

39

Risk & BJuff in Chess

Black has just one pawn for the piece in the endgame, yet White's game is completely hopeless.

26.1Σb3 1Σd4! 27 . ..te1 ..te5+ 28.Φg1

Δ i Δ ii.

At this moment, something very unusual happened in the playing hall. The excitement of the players was transferred to the audience, and at the request ofBotvinnik's second, the game was moved into a separate room.

28 .. . ..tf4! Tal was later to lament bitterly the fact that he did not find the more crushing finish 28 .. . �xc3! 29.�bxc3 .t1dl 30.1::f.c7 �f4 3 1 .1:ίe7 J::f.xcl 32.�xe2 �d3 33 .�e6 �e5 and explained this by the sharp change in circumstances. But the line chosen by him is also quite sufficient to win.

29.llJxe2 .ΣΣχc1 30.llJxd4 30.tbxcl !ιdl .

30 ... 1Σχe1 + 31 . ..tf1 ..te4-+ 32.tbe2 ..tes 33.14 ..tf6 34.1Σχb7 ..bd5 35.1Σc7 ..ba2 36.1Σχa7 ..tc4 37.1Σa8+ Φf7 38.1Σa7+ Φeβ 39.1Σa3 d5 40.Φf2 ..th4+ 41 .Φg2 Φdβ 42.liJg3 ..bg3 43 . .hc4 dxc4 44. Φχg3 Φd5 45.1Σa7 c3 46.1Σc7 Φd4 0-1

If one speaks of the change in chess, which occurred around the end of the 1950s, then Black's 21st move in the

40

above game symbolises it completely. The shocking knight jump to f4 marked a new era in chess, which began to value not only deep strategical ideas and faultless technical realisation of an advantage, but also semi-correct sacrifices and daring attacks. Meanwhile, Mikhail Tal, after seizing the world title, became a kind of unofficial patent-holder for this kind of play, not only for himself, but also for his followers. Following the example of his comrade, Boris Spassky started to play more aggressively and riskily. At the same time, the new star Leonid Stein was developing, a player who had previously been criticised for being too lighthearted and risky in his play. The strict positional approach had not lost its value, as Botvinnik demonstrated a year later in his return match against Tal, but play still became richer and more diverse. It was the Patriarch himself who cooled the ardour of the hotheads, who were keen to follow the new school blindly. It turned out that, to play like Tal, even enormous natural talent was not enough. Without fantastic energy and fireworks, the attack would fail, and it would be easy to put one's finger on the weaknesses in the risk-taker's ideas. Because of his health problems, Tal was never again able to scale the very heights of world chess, but to the end, his best games were remarkable for their fantasy and his absolute contempt for danger. The examples of his games, given below, are widely known and have been analysed many times. But just as with great pieces of music, different conductors unveil new subtleties and unexpected contents, so it is with Tal's games. New interpretations can be uncovered, which have been missed by previous commentators.

Game1 8

Mikhaii Tal Lajos Portisch Bled m 1965 (2)

1 .e4 c6 2.ttJc3 d5 3.llJf3 dxe4 4.llJxe4 .tg4 5.h3 bf3 6. 'ifxf3 llJd7 7.d4 llJgf6 a . .td3 llJxe4 9. 'ifxe4 e6 1 0.0-0 .te7 1 1 .c3 llJf6 12.'ifh4 llJd5 13. 'ifg4 .tf6 1 4.r:.e1 'ifb6

Which plan would you prefer in Tal 's place?

White has an extremely comfortable position: two bishops and a mobile pawn phalanx. Admittedly, Black's position is very solid and a win for White will require great patience and calmness. These qualities were not always Tal's strongest point. Even so, the operation undertaken by the ex-World Champion is astonishing in its recklessness.

1 5.c4?! ' "Correct" (possibly even without the quotation marks) now was the cautious 15 .a3, hoping somehow to exploit the bishop pair in a lengthy battle. But Ι decided to play more sharply, because Portisch feels less at home in such positions' (Ίal).

1 5 ... llJb4 1 6.:Xe6+! The point ofTal's idea! In any other case, White's previous move would simply be weak. But Portisch was shaken not only by the sacrifice, but also by the speed

Chapter 1 - Mikhail Tal:The Start of α New Era

with which Tal played it. In such situations, additional psychological pressure is always useful.

1 6 ... fxe6 1 7. 'ifxe6+

What is the strongest defence?

1 7 ... �8?! The worst of the three possibilities. Objectively the strongest move is 17 . . .'.tid8! , requiring White to force a draw: 18 .'iνd6+ Φe8 19.'i!Ve6+. This was the reply Tal himself was most worried about. But during the game, he was convinced that his opponent, wlιo was well-known for his principled play, would not settle for a draw when he had an extra rook. The most beautiful variations arise after 1 7 . . . �e7. White had prepared this: 18 .�g6+! Φd8 (he loses after 1 8 ... hxg6 19.�g5 'ifc7 20.t1e1) 1 9.�[5 "iVxd4 20.�f4 with an extremely dangerous attack for White. Admittedly, the combined efforts of the analysts found a way of saving the black position: 20 .. . 1:f.e8 21 .1:i.e1 g6! 22.�g4 t2Jd3 23 .t1e4! 'ifxf2+ 24.Φh2 'ifgl+! 25.Φχg1 �c5+ 26.�e3! t1xe6 27 . .a:xe6 a5. SF only confirms this verdict.

1 8 . .tf4 .:Ζ.dθ The only move, Bad is 1 8 . . . 'iνd8 19.1:te1 1l..e7 20.�b1 with an irresistible attack for White.

4 1


1 9.c5! tbxd3 20.cxb6! Tal's own comments to this move are extremely interesting: Άt first, Ι was ready to force a draw here with 20.jιh6, after which the only defence is 20 .. . 'ttxb2 (worse is 20 .. .'iYc7 2I .'ifxf6+ �g8 22.jιxg7) 2 I .'ifxf6+ �e8 22.'tte6+. But not every pawn gets the chance to reach a7! Therefore White again decides on a rather adventurous, but not losing queen capture.' From these words it is quite clear that Tal was not just some sort of machine, calculating tens of moves ahead, but just a human with fears and doubts. He was also a genius, with fantastic intuition!

20 ... tbxf4 21 . 'ifg4 tαl5 22.bxa7

SF is more optimistic in its assessment. In its opinion, White's chances are superior, but Black can hold with the best defence. What is that?

22 .. . �e7? Portisch had actually seen the strong move 22 . . . g6! after which White needs to show extremely inventive play: 23.1:ίel �g7 24.h4 h5 25 .a8'iν 1:ίχa8 26.'iYd7+ �h6 27.'ifxb7 and in this non-standard position, White's chances are superior.

23.b4! Portisch: 'Checks from the heavy pieces are not dangerous here, but Ι had missed this quiet pawn move.'

42

23 ... :&8 24 . .:.e1 + �d& 25.b5! .:.Xa7?

The decisive mistake! After 25 ... 1:ίhd8 26.b6! ti:Jxb6 27.l:rbl White still has to demonstrate how to convert his undoubted advantage.

26.1Σe6+ �c7 27 . .:.Xf6! 1 -0

If in the above game, Tal's play was risky, but still within the bounds of the permissible, then his approach in the next example is hard to describe as anything other than 'hooliganism' - a favourite word of Tal's, meaning play that was risky to the point of being a bluff Probably, he just enjoyed shocking his solid and very correct opponent.

Game 19

Lajos Poήisch Mikhaii Tal Amsterdam izt 1964 (2)

1 .ttJf3 ttJf& 2.g3 d& 3.d4 g& 4 . .tg2 .tg7 5.0-0 0-0 6.c4 .tg4 7.ttJc3 'ifcθ 8.1Σe1 .ΣΣeθ 9. 1i'b3 ttJc& 1 O.d5 ttJaS 1 1 .'ifa4 b6 12.tαl2 .td7 1 3.'ifc2 c& 1 4.b4

Is 14 . . . ti:Jb7 necessary?

1 4 .. . tbxc4?! Α typical Tal decision! Ι suspect such piracy would not enter the head of Magnus Carlsen, for example. After

the Όnly move' 14 .. . t2Jb7 Black retains a somewhat passive, but perfectly playable position: 1 5 . .ib2 c5 1 6.b5 (16.a3 cxb4 1 7.axb4 a5) 16 .. . t2Ja5.

1 5.llJxc4 cxd5 1 6.tba3 d4?! Black plays the game in a highly aggressive manner! It looks more level-headed to play 1 6 . . . a5!? 1 7.b5 �[5 18 .�b3 (1 8 .�d2!?) 18 . . . t2Je4 19.t2Jxe4 dxe4 20.�e3 (20.�b2 �e6) 20 . . . a4 2 l .�c2 �xal , but level-headed players do not reach such positions.

1 7 . .ba8 'ifxaθ 1 8.lbcb5 11c8 1 9.'ifd1 lbe4 20.f3

For the moment, Portisch retains full control over the position. Also possible was 20.t2Jxd4 t2Jc3 2 l .�d3 e5 22.t2Jb3 d5 with what looks like a nice position for Black, if one forgets for the moment that he is a rook down!

20 ... a6 One gets the impression that Tal's main task in this game was to surprise his opponent on every move. Objective stronger was 20 .. . d3 but after 2I .l:ιbl ! (stronger than 2l .�xd3 �xal 22.fxe4 �f6) 2 1 . . . 1:rxcl 22.1:rxcl d2 23.fxe4 dxcl� 24.'iVxcl 'ifxe4 25 .'ti'f4 White's task is simplified.

21 .llJxd4 'ifdS Or 2 I . .. t2Jc3 22.�d3 e5 23 .t2Jb3 e4 24.�xd6+-.

22.�e3 11c3 23.t2Jdc2

Chαpter 1 - Mikhαil Tal :The Stαrt of α New Εrα

White has retained an extra rook, all of his pieces are defended, and on top of that, the knight on e4 is hanging. But Tal carries on the battle as if nothing was amiss.

23 ... 'iff5 24.g4 The immediate 24.�d4 was also good.

24 ... 'ife6 25.�d4

Now, on top of everything, α rook is hαnging. Can the reαder think of αnything else except to resign?

The next move is just astonishing in its equanimity.

25 ... h5!! Of course, the exclamation marks have nothing to do with the chess strength of the move - after all, Black no objectively good moves in this position. But one cannot but applaud Tal's belief in himself and his pieces. And they, like loyal soldiers, are ready to lay down their lives for their commander!

26 . .bg7 hxg4! 27.t2Jd4 He could have continued gathering in the harvest: 27.�xc3 g3 28 .'iVd4 gxh2+ 29.�hl t2Jg3+ 30.�g2 �h3+ 3 I .�f2 e5 32 .�xd6 and Black just has nothing with which to continue the fight.

27 ... 'ifdS 28.fxe4 'ifxe4 29.lt:\f3 The first sign of panic, although it does not in itself spoil anything. Black has no chances at all after 29.�h6 or 29.'ifd2.

43


29 ... '1fe3+ 30.Φh1 �cβ

Δ φ

Despite his huge mαteriαl deficit, Τα! hαs mαnαged to creαte some quite serious threαts. Does White still hαve α pαth to victory?

31 . .:r.f1 ?? Portisch's first real mistake proves decisive. He could have wοπ with both 3l .'iνd4 1::f.xa3 (3 1 . .. gxf3 32 .'iνxc3 'iνf2 33.l:ιgl �e4 34.e3) 32 . .!:f.acl �b7 33 .'iνxe3 aπd 3 l .ιi:Jc2 'iff2 32.kd4.

31 ... :Xa3?! The other capture was stroπger: 3 1 . .. gxf3 ! aπd after the forced 32.exf3 ι;t>xg7 33 .ιi:Jc2 �xf3+ 34.1::f.xf3 �xf3+ 35 .'iνxf3 l::txf3 Black is ποt riskiπg defeat.

32.'1fc1 ?! Α mistake iπ returπ. He should have played 32.1::f.cl ! gxf3 33.exf3 �xf3+ 34.'iνxf3 'ifxf3+ 35.1::f.xf3 1::f.xf3 36.�d4!. Ιπ view of the threat of mate, Black loses the b6-pawπ - 36 ... f5!

37.�xb6 ι;t>f7! aπd the battle is far from over.

32 ... gxf3 33.'1fxc6 'lfxe2 34 . .:r.g1 Φχg7

White still has aπ extra rook, but has completely spoilt his positioπ, aπd iπ additioπ, Portisch had hardly aπy time left. Fortuπately for him he has a perpetual attack οπ the queeπ.

35.:Se1 'ifd2 36 . .:r.d1 'ife2 37 . .:r.de1 'ifd2 %-%

It is difficult to describe such aπ escape other thaπ as witchcraft, but this is far from beiπg the oπly such case iπ Tal's practice. Οπe oπly has to recall his game agaiπst Smyslov from the 1959 Caπdidates' tourπameπt, or the games examiπed above agaiπst Ρaππο aπd Filip. Eveπ today it seems straπge, but iπ those days, such positioπs were usually resigπed, so saviπg them was eveπ more uπusual. Miracles happeπ, of course, but oπly extremely rarely, aπd usually both players are surprised by such thiπgs. But here we have a player, who, without formally breakiπg the laws of the game, regularly refutes the regular impressioπs aπd stereotypes. Το the uπbiased observer, it seems obvious that this could hardly be maπaged without iπterveπtioπ from οπ high, or, at the very least, hypπosis.

Ιπ the last rouπd of the Caπdidates' tourπameπt iπ Yugoslavia, Pal Beπko, after losiπg his three previous games agaiπst Tal, eveπ came to the board for their last game weariπg dark glasses! But the light-hearted geπius respoπded to this by himself dοππiπg a pair of outside suπglasses. Iπcideπtally, amidst the farce, Beπko's 'defeπce' did ποt work aπd oπly Tal's geπerosity saved half a

point for the Hungarian - in an absolutely winning position, Tal offered a draw, which guaranteed him victory in the tournament.

But, joking aside, it was extremely hard to explain the incredible metamorphoses which regularly occurred in the games of the 'Riga Magician'. This is especially true of the young Tal, who, at moments of extreme tension, wore an almost demonic look, and would frequently glance at his opponent with his striking black eyes, which was extremely difficult to withstand. This certainly affected his opponents. But the real secret of his success was that he understood the value of the pieces rather differently from the norm. He gave them not a permanent value, but a temporary one, depending on the situation on the board. He had a subtle feel for nuances that others missed altogether, and from the side, it appeared that material had no significance for him at all. When in an equal position, he sacrificed a pawn or piece, or when he played a position with an uneven material balance, his remaining pieces acquired a completely different value, and operated with a harmony that only he could achieve. It is no coincidence that many of his sacrifices, which his contemporaries regarded as sheer bluff, are shown by SF to be completely correct. And even when he did bluff, a position which his opponent thought could be won however he wanted, turns out to hinge on one or two only moves. Even the best grandmasters in the world were often unprepared for such a transformation in the position. From the outside, it looks like witchcraft, but Tal's pieces


operated according to rules which were somewhat different from those governing his opponents'. They seemed to acquire extra energy permanently, and develop new powers and possibilities. This secret generator was a unique feeling for the hidden dynamics of the pieces, an unrepeatable sense of the harmony of chess. Here is another example of Tal's magic.

Game 20

Mikhaii Tal Bent Larsen Bled m 1965 (6)

1 .e4 tbf6 2.e5 tbd5 3.d4 d6 4.tbf3 dxe5 5.tbxe5 e6 6. 'iff3 'iff6 7. 'ifg3 h6 8.tlJc3 lbb4 9 . ..ib5+ c6 1 0 . ..ia4 tbd7 1 1 .0-0 tbxe5 1 2.dxe5 'ifg6 1 3. 'iff3 'iff5 1 4. 'ife2 ..ie7

Whαt should White plαy?

In the diagram position, nothing radical has happened. We face an unhurried positional battle, with some advantage to White - at least, that would be the normal development of events.

1 5.a3!? Α move that is not entirely simple to understand. Tempting is 1 5 .f4 0-0 16.a3 lLJdS 1 7.l2Je4 bS 18 . .tb3 and Black has some problems.

1 5 .. . tbd5 1 6.tbb5!!

45


Lightning from a clear sky! Instead of a comfortable advantage, we get complications - Tal in his element!

1 6 ... cxb5 Forced. After 1 6 . . . 0-0 I 7.lbd4 �h7 18 .c4 lbb6 19.i.c2 Black's position looks simple terrible.

1 7.1Wxb5+ �d8 1 8.c4

This is the position Τα! was aiming at, when he sacrificed the piece. How should Black play?

1 8 ... 'ifxe5? And this is the result. Such a sharp change in the situation is hard to deal with even for the strongest players of the world. Tal saw the strongest defence 1 8 . . . t'bb6! and intended 19.�a5! �c7! (worse is 19 ... i.d7 20 . ..te3! ..txa4 2 I ...txb6+) 20.c5 �b8 2 l .cxb6 axb6 22.'ii'bs t:l:as 23.�b3 with good attacking prospects. After 1 8 . . . lbf4? White had prepared a surprisingly beautiful variation: 1 9.1::tdl+ Wc7 20.l:f.d7+ ..txd7 2l .�xd7+ Wb8 22 .�xe7 �xeS 23 .i.e3! lbg6 24.�xf7 �f6 2S . ..te8! ! �e7 26.�xg6 .ί::i.xe8 27 . ..tcS! �d7 28 . ..td6+ Wc8 29.c5 and Black is helpless.

1 9.cxd5 ..td6 20.g3 'ifxd5 21 . 'ife2 The black king in the centre and lines open for attack - what else does Tal want?

21 ... �e7 22.J:.d1 1Wa5

46

23.'ifg4! Broad and sweeping, but SF's first choice also. 23.1::ld4! followed by 24 . ..td2 was also good.

23 ... 1Wf5 24.'ifc4 'ifcS 25.'ifd3 1Wd5?

The last mistake, but the computer defence 2S .. . .ί::i.d8 ! 26 . ..te3 'ii'as 27 . ..tb3 1:1d7! is hard for any human player to find. Admittedly, even this position is unlikely to find too many players willing to play it.

26. 1Wc3! Aes 27. 1We1 'ifcs 28.Ad2 �6 29.J:.ac1 'ifb6 30.j.e3 'lfa6 31 .'ifb4!

The white queen does a huge amount of work in this game!

31 ... b5 32.bb5 'ifb7 33.f4 j.bθ 34 . ..tc6! 1 -0

In this game, Tal's creative approach is revealed very vividly. In the diagram position, the majority of strong players, without much serious thought, would settle for the fairly simple and obvious positional plan. Even more than that, this was the correct decision in this position. Did Tal realise this? Undoubtedly! However, instead he preferred to take the game into unpredictable complications, eschewing the 'playing for two results', so beloved of most pro-

fessiσηals, aηd iηstead σptiηg fσr total σbscurity, where the result will depeηd ση a siηgle σηly-mσve. This is what σηe might call the σbjective picture.

Hσwever, there is aησther explaηatiση fσr White's appareηtly spσηtaηeσus decisiση. Ιη the first case, we wσuld reach a fairly baηal aηd staηdard type σf pσsitiση, where it wσuld be relatively easy fσr Larseη to defeηd himself. Tal's decisiση leads iηstead to a completely irratiσηal pσsitiση, where the Daηe's head wσuld be spiηηiηg. The geηeral rules, by which strσηg players geηerally σperate, are ησt applicable here. The priηcipal rσle is played by the ability tσ appreciate the cσηcrete factσrs σf this uηique pσsitiση. Ιη 'playiηg by the rules', Tal was a strσηg player, but just σηe σf maηy, whereas wheη it came to 'playiηg the exceptiσηs', he had ησ equals. Αηd wheη his uηique geηerator σf eηergy iη his pieces gσt to wσrk iη such pσsitiσns, the result was an unrepeatable magic iη chess.

Ησw shσuld we assess Tal's cσntributiση to the develσpment σf chess? There is ησ dσubt that the game changed in a majσr way after him, aηd ησt just in terms σf its inner content. With the advent σf Tal, chess became significaηtly mσre pσpular in the wσrld, and the ηames σf the leading players became knσwn σutside the ηarrσw circle σf chess prσfessiσηals. Misha was nicknamed bσth the Mσzart and the Paganini σf chess, by jσurηalists. He himself, coηtiηuing the musical metaphσr, cσmpared himself to Imre Kalman, the king σf σperetta. He regarded his play as belσηging to a light genre, althσugh behind the apparent

Chapter 1 - Mikhail TaJ:rhe Start of α New Era

lightness there lay aη enσrmσus quaηtity σf wσrk. There is much in cσmmσn between music and chess aηd it is ησ surprise that amσng musicians, σne finds many chess lσvers.

But if σne carries this parallel further, theη Ι am remiηded σf Elvis Presley. Of cσurse, this cσmparisσn is very conditiσηal. The kiηg σf rσck and rσll was wσrshipped by milliσns, whereas Tal was knσwη to a far smaller ηumber σf peσple. But, takiηg into accσunt the specifics σf each prσfessiση, we caη say that bσth became famσus well σutside the circle σf eveη recσgnised celebrities. Being σf a similar age, bσth went frσm σbscurity tσ wσrldwide fame with astonishing speed. Bσth Presley and Tal were expσηents σf σthers' creatiσηs - it is well-knσwη that Presley never wrσte a single sσηg, aηd Misha ηever spilled much blσσd wσrking ση σpenings. Α special eηergetic drive, exhibited by bσth σur herσes, captivated the viewers, whσ became almσst cσ-actors in the eveηts uηfσlding befσre them. Ιη chess, at any rate, nσthing similar had ever happened befσre Tal. Finally, bσth burned themselves σut in their private lives, as in their creative σnes. Everythiηg ηew and creative which they achieved came iη a shσrt, coηcentrated periσd. Misha was just 23 when he became the yσungest-ever Wσrld Champiσn, aηd Elvis became the king σf pσp music at rσughly the same age. And althσugh Tal lived much lσnger than many predicted, he achieved almσst all his greatest mσments iη his yσuth, like Presley. Mσst σf all, thσugh, he chaηged chess fuηdamentally!

47


48

Conclusion Can one draw anything instructive from the Tal games examined here, and the author's modest commentary thereon? Especially given that the games are very well-known , and the little that is new in the comments here are largely due to the efforts of SF?

The main advice Ι would like to give my dear readers is: on no account try to play like Tal ! As it says in the warnings that usually accompany magic tricks or acrobatic displays, ' do not try this at home! ' .

Of course, one can mimic the outward appearance of a piece of genius, but even then, it will just be a pale imitation or copy. It is like those TV shows , where people appear on stage, doing impersonations of a famous singer - it is much easier to get the outward appearance looking right than to recreate the authentic sound. Νο matter what level you are at, you should play ' your kind of chess ' , the chess that you understand, the chess that corresponds to your character and temperament.

This does not mean that you should always avoid any kind of risk or bluff in your games. The most important thing is to suit your play to your abilities, to ' cut your cloth according to your pocket' , as they say. Otherwise the result is predictable and, Ι am sorry to say, is not going to be good. But familiarity with the genius of a Tal brings not just aesthetic pleasure, but also widens the horizons of what you can achieve. One might only have the painting talent of an amateur, but it does no harm to know the work of Rembrandt and Picasso. You do not have to play an instrument at the level of a professional orchestra, but a familiarity with the world's leading musicians will improve your modest playing. Consequently, Ι would urge everyone not to limit their knowledge of the play of the ' Mozart of chess' to those few examples in the present book. And if you are one of those who prefer unpredictable complications and tactical battles to a quiet and logical positional game, then this recommendation can be transformed into an absolute requirement !

Chapter 2

Bluff in the Opening

The opening is the most predictable part of a chess game and therefore is the part to which most time is devoted when working on chess. Sometimes, this goes too far, and more time is spent on opeπings than is πecessary, to the detrimeπt of other aspects of preparation. Because predictability is actually just aπ illusioπ. Our aπcieπt game is too deep and too maπy-sided to be reduced to a few easily-predicted moves.

Although the role of opeπiπg preparatioπ is very importaπt, eveπ the stroπgest players have approached it (aπd do approach it) differeπtly. Some will devote mouπtains of time and eπergy to the search for the absolute truth. Οπe strikiπg example of such a player was Lev Polugaevsky. Others try to escape as soon as possible from what they regard as the most boriπg part of chess, aπd start thiπkiπg for themselves. This was Tal's approach to opeπiπgs, and even more so, that of Boris Spassky.

Ιπ our day, the situation has chaπged radically. There is aπ old saying that 'God made everybody differeπt, but Coloπel Colt made them all the same ' . This refers to the Wild West of America, whose life chaπged radically with the appearance of a simple aπd conveπieπt form of haπdguπ. Ιπ chess, the role of the Colt 45 is played by SF. The latter has effected a complete revolution in chess. With the aid of computer databases aπd the unflappable engine assistant, opening preparation has become much easier. On the other hand, the illusion of ultimate truth beiπg available has become eveπ stroπger. The role of risk iπ openiπg preparatioπ has also chaπged coπsiderably.

Ιπ this chapter, we will examiπe some examples of bluff in the opening, both from the era of 'workiπg by hand' , aπd from more contemporary chess.

49


We will start will an old and unique case of collective bluff. In the 14th round of the interzonal tournament in Gothenburg 1955, the vagaries of the draw threw up a three-board match between the USSR and Argentina. Keres, Geller and Spassky faced respectively Najdorf, Panno and Pilnik. What could the black players play against the powerful Soviet trio? The Argentinians' choice fell on a sharp variation of the Najdorf Sicilian. This line requires extremely energetic play from White, involving sacrifices. But collective analysis showed that, even in this case, Black's defensive resources appeared adequate. It is a rare thing when opening preparation achieves 100 % success for one side or the other, but that is what happened here!

Game 2 1

Paul Keres Miguel Najdorf Gothenburg izt 1955 (14)

1 .e4 c5 2.tbf3 d6 3.d4 cxd4 4.tlJxd4 ttJf6 5.tbc3 a6 6.�g5 e6 7.f4 �e7 8.'iff3 h6 9.�h4 g5!?

Α novelty at the time, and the result of collective work by the Argentinians.

1 O.fxg5 ttJfd7

The criticαl position of the entire variation. Which continuation seems the most principled for White?

50

1 1 .tlJxe6! This tempting sacrifice was played in all three of the above-mentioned games. It was not a surprise for the Argentinians, and they had already analysed the consequences deeply before this - or, at least, so it seemed to them. Geller was the first to decide on the sacrifice, and his example was soon followed by Spassky and Keres .. . However, the text is far from being obligatory, and another good line was l l .'iVhs tbes 12 .�f2 �xg5 1 3 .h4 followed by long castling, which was later seen in practice.

1 1 ... fxe6 1 2. 'ifh5+ 'itfθ

Δ Δ �

How should White continue the attack?

1 3.�b5! The Argentinians had even analysed this strong move, which was chosen by all three Soviets. It is probably strongest, although White later tried 13 .�c4 tbe5 14.�g3! lbbc6 15 .gxh6. This position needs further computer and analytical testing.

1 3 .. . '1tg7 The young Panno followed the path planned at home: 1 3 . . . tbe5?, but ran into a response from Geller which he had not foreseen: 14.�g3! , after which he was already busted (probably, as was often the case in the pre-computer era, the

analysis had only considered the automatic 14.0-0+ �g8! 1 5 . .ig3 (SF suggests as strongest 1 5 .l:ιf6!? .ixf6 16.gxf6 but after 16 .. . �h7 the attack comes to nothing) 1 5 . . . hxg5, winning) Α few more moves were played in the game: 14 .. . ..txg5 1 5.0-0+ �e7 16.�xe5 �b6+ 1 7.�hl dxe5 18 .'iνf7+ �d6 19.1:f.adl+ after which everything is clear.

analysis diagram

The more experienced Najdorf and Pilnik quickly realised what was going on and tried to correct their analysis. Their choice 13 . . . �g7 is certainly stronger, but it does not solve Black's problems. After the Argentinian fiasco, the main line for Black became 13 ... 1:f.h7, which was soon found by analysts, and first employed in practice by Fischer. 14.�g6 (there have been more practical tests of 14.0-0+ �g8 1 5.g6 1:f.g7 16 .1:f.f7 �xh4 1 7.'iνxh6 1:1xf7 1 8.gxf7+ �xf7 19.�h7+ as suggested by Keres in his annotations to the game, but White does not have more than a draw. However, the resources in this position have not yet been exhausted) 14 .. . �f7 1 5.'iνxh6+ �g8 16 .'iνg6+ I:f.g7 1 7.�xe6+ �h8 and Black defends successfully (GligoricFischer, Portoroz Interzonal 1 958). In my view, there are still some unanswered questions in this line as well.

Chapter 2 - Bluff in the Opening

1 4.0-0 lίJe5 15.i.g3 ttJg6 After 15 .. . �g8? White wins with 16 . .ixe5+ dxe5 1 7 . ..te8 ! whilst after 1 5 . . . t2Jbc6? the simple 1 6.Jtxc6 decides.

1 6.gxh6+ :X:h6 1 7.:f7+ <ίtxf7 1 8. 'ifxh6 axb5 1 9.:f1 + <ίteθ 20. 'ifxg6+ <ίtd7 21 .:111 llJc6 22.tα:l5! :X:a2

Accepting the sacrifice is even worse: 22 .. . exd5 23.�xd6+ �e8 24.'iνg6 �d7 25 .exd5 1:f.xa2 and now the simplest is 26.dxc6+ bxc6 27 . .id6.

23.h4 Amazingly, the game Spassky-Pilnik had followed this game right up to this fatal point. The future World Champion played more subtly: 23.h3, after which Black was obliged to play 23 .. . 1:f.xb2 (Pilnik followed Najdorf's example: 23 .. . �h8? 24.lΔxe7 tΔxe7 25.'ifg5 with a quick win for White) 24.�h2! (essential prophylaxis! Things are not entirely clear after the direct 24.tΔxe7 tΔxe7 25 . ..th4 �c6! 26.1:f.xe7 .t:f.xc2) 24 ... 1:f.bl 25 .tΔxe7 tΔxe7 26 . ..th4 �c6 27.1:f.xe7 with a winning attack for White.

23 ... 1i'h8? Now too, 23 ... 1:1xb2 was more tenacious, although it does not change the result: 24.h5 l:txc2 25 .h6 and White wins.

24.tbxe7 tbxe7 25.'ifg5 1 -0

In this case, group hypnosis led to a complete rout, as the illusionist himself fell into a trance. Of course, it is a case which belongs to the realm of amazing stories, but even from such stories, one can draw valuable lessons. It seemed as though the Argentinians did everything correctly - they played the opening quickly and in union, in their outward appearances demonstrating absolute confidence in the quality of

5 1


their aπalysis aπd iπ the fiπal outcome. But it is precisely this team approach that was, iπ my opiπioπ, the key mistake. The choice of such a sharp variatioπ was aπ extremely risky οπe, aπd ποt the sort of positioπ which a player who has ποt played it before is likely to uπderstaπd very easily. Απd bluff should be iπdividual, ideally aimed at a coπcrete oppoπeπt. Whereas here, the gauπtlet was throwπ dowπ iπ froπt of three great attackiπg players, aπd this oπly served to mobilise them to maximum effort. Απd this is ποt eveπ meπtioπiπg the fact that the hoπour of Soviet chess was at stake. Thus, iπ this iπstaπce, the opeπiπg bluff proved aπ iπcorrect decisioπ, aπd led to a well-deserved catastrophe. The opeπiπg bluff proved sigπificaπtly deeper aπd more justified iπ the followiπg game.

Game 22

Genna Sosonko (2575) Eugenio Torre (2535) Tilburg 1 982 (9)

1 .d4 dS 2.c4 c6 3.llJf3 ll:Jf6 4.ll:Jc3 dxc4 s.a4 ..tts 6.ll:Jes e6 7. f3 i.b4 8.e4 ..txe4 9.fxe4 ll:Jxe4 1 0. 'iff3 'ifxd4 1 1 . 'ifxf7 + �dβ 1 2 . ..tgS+

By the 2 1st century, this position had lost all its topicality, but at the tirne of this

5 2

garne, the theory of the variation was just beginning and still contained many secrets. Which of the two possible replies would you choose?

1 2 ... �c8!? Α move which Black played after loπg thought. Όfficial theory' coπsiders that the variatioπ 12 .. . lt:JxgS 13 .'ifxg7 �xc3+ (13 . . ."iVe3+!? 14.Φd1 �f8 1 S .lt:Jxc4 was seeπ as far back as Euwe-Alekhiπe, Amsterdam 1936. Iπstead of the correct 1S . . . 'ifcS! Alekhiπe played 1S . . ."iVf4?. However, this did ποt affect the result of the game, which eπded iπ a draw by perpetual check iπ a few moves) 14.bxc3 'ifxc3+ IS .Φe2 'iVc2+ 16 .Φe3 't!fe4+ 1 7.Φd2 'iνf4+ 18 .Φc2 't!ff2+ leads to a draw.

analysis diagram

But this verdict was based οπ a siπgle game, aπd the whole variatioπ, as we have said, was oπly just gaiπiπg popularity. Sosoπko, meaπwhile, had played his opeπiπg moves at blitz speed aπd it was ποt clear what this sigπified - was he happy with perpetual, or did he have a bomb to explode, which would fuπdameπtally chaπge the assessmeπt of the variatioπ? Ι myself twice got iπvolved iπ this liπe. Ιπ 1987 agaiπst Oll Ι made a draw with my haπds trembliπg, but two

years later, against Stanislav Savchenko, Ι was already totally sure of my knowledge of the line.

1 3.1i'xe6+ t:Δd7 Nothing is changed by 1 3 .. .';itc7 14.iff7+ Φc8 1 5 .�f5+ tbd7 (1 5 . . . Φc7? 16 .�f4+-) 16 .�xd7+.

1 4.1i'xd7 + 'Wxd7 15.tbxd7 tbxc3 1 6.bxc3 .bc3+ 1 7.�d1 .ba1 1 8.t!Jc5 b6 1 9.ltJe6

In fact, all of this was known (Borisenko-Aronin, Lvov 195 1) . In his preparation, Genna had subjected this position to serious analysis, and was happy with the results.

All that remained was to entice his opponent into the desired variation. Torre believed the bluff . . .

1 9 .. . b5 The above-mentioned game went 19 . . . h6 20.�[4! and White was better.

20.i.e2 a6 21 .:t1 h6 More precise is 2 l . .. �a7, bringing the rook into the game.

22.i.h4 12 . .ie3!?.

22 ... �d7? Only this move finally tips the scales in White's favour. After 12 . . . 1:1a7! the whole battle lies ahead.

23.lbc5+ �d6? And this is already the decisive mistake! The least of the evils was 23 ... 'it>c7

Chαpter 1 - Bluff in the Opening

14.1::tf7+ ς!;>d6 (14 .. . \t>b6 25 .tbb7!) 25.tbb7+ ς!;>e6 26.1:Σe7+ Φfs 17.tbd6+ �g6 28.�[3 although even here, the black king is not to be envied.

24.ltJb7+! <it;ιeS Or 24 . . . \t>c7 25.1:Σf7+ <itιb8 26.tba5.

25.i.g3+ <it;ιe6 26.i.g4+ <it;ιe7 27.i.d6+ �eθ 28.i.h5+ <it;ιd7 29.:e1 1 -0

Here, the task is rather more difficult to unravel. Probably Torre, who frequently played the Slav as Black, was not surprised by the variation chosen by his opponent. He probably remembered theory's official verdict. But his recollection was hazy and he could not be sure he had everything spot on. Added to that, his opponent, a well-known theoretician, was playing very confidently. Should he be trusted or not? If there had been alternatives, which appeared satisfactory for Black, then Torre would probably have played one of them, but as it was, he was forced to enter the long and forcing main line. And Genna's calculations proved correct. Incidentally, such instances are very common in contemporary chess. Practically always, the side faced with a surprise in the opening has a good way to equalise or even obtain the advantage, but the greatest difficulty in such cases is the breadth of choice. One never knows in which line the opponent is waiting with his new idea. Quite often, the attempt to avoid danger and choose the safest line is what leads to difficulties. We will see many examples of this in what follows.

In the following game, Bent Larsen demonstrated a surprisingly subtle opening bluff. It must be said that the

53


Dane always played with uncompromising courage and it is this quality which did much to make him one of the strongest grandmasters in the world. Of course, balancing on the precipice is a dangerous occupation, especially when you are facing Mikhail Tal. Even so, the gauntlet was thrown down in front of the greatest genius of combinative play.

Game 23


1 .e4 lbf6 2.es tats 3.d4 d6 4.lbf3 dxeS 5.lbxe5 tbd7

Should White sαcrifice ση f7?

6.�c4? Tal thought for 50 minutes over this move! What produced such an unexpected reaction as early as move 6? Let us ask the 'guilty party' himself: 'The move 5 . . . lt:Jd7 looks at first to be totally impossible, because of the sacrifice on fl. Ι saw this at once, as, of course, did Larsen. So the psychological problems began. Common sense suggested it made no sense to go into a variation which the opponent had prepared, but my heart would not accept this - after all, it is not every day that you can force the enemy king to e6 as

54

early as move 7.' After long doubts and worries, Tal refrained from the sacrifice!

It is clear that this was not Tal's day -when the great genius of intuition starts talking about 'common sense'. . .

What was the cause of the ex-World Champion's doubts? And what would have happened if he had decided on the sacrifice? Let us look at the variations: 6.lt:Jxf7! �xf7 7.�h5+ �e6.

analysis diagram

8 .g3 ! (this is the continuation that White believed to be the most promising. 8 .c4 lt:J5f6! (8 . . . lt:Jb4 was rejected by Tal because of the variation 9.�d2 (even stronger is 9.a3!) 9 . . . lt:Jc2+ IO .�dl lt:Jxal l l .'f:fdS+ �f6 12 .�g5+ �g6 13 .�d3+) 9.d5+ �d6 I O.c5+! (weaker is I O.'iνf5 lt:Jc5 l l .�f4+ e5) I O .. . lt:Jxc5! (ral thought IO .. . �xc5? was possible,

but σver the bσard he wσuld prσbably have fσund the refutatiσn: I l ..Άe3+ ςt>d6 12 . .Άf4+ e5 13 .dxe6+) I l ..Άf4+ ςt>d7 12 .�b5+ c6 13 .dxc6+ bxc6 14.�xc5 �b6! dσes nσt bring White any special dividends) 8 .. . b5 ! .

analysis diagram

This is the defensive resσurce that bσthered the ex-Wσrld Champiσn. By strengthening the pσsitiσn σf the knight ση d5, Black makes his pσsitiσn hard to break dσwn. If 8 .. . tlJ7f6 9 . .Άh3+ ςt>d6 I O.'�Ve5+ ςt>c6 I l ..Άg2 ςt>b6 (I I ... b5 1 2.a4!) 12 .c4 e6 13 .cxd5 White regains the piece favσurably. Tal again: Όnly abσut twσ hσurs later, when the pσsitiσn ση the bσard was quite different, did it σccur to me that the pσsitiσnal mσve 9.a4! is very strσng, after which Ι think White's pσsitiσn is preferable.' SF σnly cσnfirms this cσnclusiσn: 9.a4! c6 I O.axb5 (alsσ interesting is ΙΟ . .Άh3+ ςt>d6 I I .tlJc3 ! with aπ attack) IO ... g6 l l .�e2+ ςt>[7 12 .bxc6 tlJ7f6 13 . .Άg2 with a continuing attack, with material equality. Νσt σnly did he waste time and energy, but the internal uncertainty affected White's later play. He went ση tσ play passively and deservedly landed in a lσst pσsitiσn.

6 .. . e6 7. 1Wg4 h5!? 8. 1We2 tίJxe5 9.dxe5 .td7 1 0.0-0 .tcβ 1 1 . .J:r.d1


1We7 1 2.ltJc3 tίJxc3 13.bxc3 gβ 1 4.a4

The σppσnent wσuld face greater prσblems after 14.�b5 �xb5 1 5.�xb5+ c6 16 .�b3!.

1 4 .. . a6 1 5 . .J:r.b1 1Wc5 1 6 . .te3? 1Wxe5 1 7.f4 'ii'f5 1 8 . .td3 'ii'g4 1 9. 'ikf2 .te7 20 . .td4 0-0 21 . .te2 'ii'f5 22 . .td3 1Wg4 23 . .te2 'ii'h4 24.g3 'ii'h3 25 . .tf3 .J:r.ad8!?

Larsen, by cσntrast, plays with freshness and purpσse. Tempting was 25 . . . .Άχf3 26.�xf3 b6.

26.bc6 bxcβ 27 . .te5 'ii'f5 28. 'ii'e2 .tdβ 29 . .J:r.d3 be5 30.fxe5 :Xd3 31 .cxd3 .J:r.d8 32 . .J:r.d1 c5 33.c4 'ii'g4 34.1Wxg4 hxg4 35.�2 .J:r.b8 36 . .J:r.d2 ιιtί>g7 37.ιιtί>e3 g5 38.d4 .J:r.b3+ 39.� cxd4 40.:Xd4 ιιtί>gβ 41 .:Xg4

The ending is very difficult fσr White. Had the pσsitiσn been played ση withσut a break, Ι have ησ dσubt what the result wσuld have been, but in thσse days, games were adjσurned and by the day σf the resumptiσn, twσ new peσple toσk their places at the bσard. With sσme help frσm his σppσnent, Tal managed to save the game.

41 ... .J:r.b2+ 42.ιιtί>g1 �5 43 . .J:r.d4 ιιtί>χe5 44 . .J:r.d7 f5 45.:Xc7 ιιtί>e4 46 . .J:r.d7 .J:r.c2 47 . .J:r.d6 e5 48.h4 gxh4 49.gxh4 :Xc4 50.h5 �3 51 . .J:r.d3+ ιιtί>g4 52.h6 .J:r.c7 53 . .J:r.d6 e4

55


54. Φ1'2 a5 55.J:.g6+ �h5 56 . .l:.a6 f4 57 . .1:.e6 .l:.c2+ 58.�e1 .l:.c1 + 59.�d2 .l:.h1 60.J:.xe4 �g4 61 .J:.e6 �g3 62 . .1:.f6 f3 63.�e3 .l:.e1 + 64.�d3 J:.e7 65.J:.g6+ Φ1'4 66 . .1:.f6+ r.fί>g3 67 . .1:.g6+ Φ1'4 68 . .1:.f6+ �g4 69.r.fί>d4 r.fί>g3 70 . .l:.g6+ Φh3 71 .J:.g7 .l:.xg7 72.hxg7 f2 73.g8\i' f1 \i' 74. \i'e6+ Φh4 75.r.fί>c5 \i'b1 76. \i'c4+ r.fί>g3 77: \i'c3+ Φ1'2 %-%

This surprisiπg opeπiπg experimeπt justified itselfo Could Larseπ really have thought that his fearless oppoπeπt would refraiπ from the kπight sacrifice?! Απd that haviπg doπe so, he would speπd the rest of the game bemoaπiπg the fact to himself?! Or that such aπ optimist would coπclude that Black's defeπsive resources after the sacrifice were sufficieπt? Ι suspect that the truth lies somewhere iπ the middleo From the first few games of the match, the Daπe seπsed that his powerful oppoπeπt was ποt iπ his best form, aπd therefore was ποt full of self-beliefo Απd theπ, of course, οπe caπ sοοπ coπviπce oπeself that the risk of provokiπg the sacrifice is worth takiπgo It would be iπterestiπg to kπow whether Larseπ would have played 5 ο ο .ι�:Jd7 agaiπst the Tal of 1959 - 1960 viπtage!?

Some players, eveπ amoπgst the very greatest, are characterised by aπ extremely πarrow opeπiπg repertoireo Such aπ approach allows a player to aπalyse typical positioπs scrupulously aπd delve very deeply iπto all the variatioπs of his choseπ opeπiπgo But at the same time, it eases the oppoπeπt's task of prepariπgo The youπg Robert Fischer was οπe such playero Of course, his kπowledge was extremely deep, but

56

ποt limitlesso Απd ifhis oppoπeπt maπaged to fiπd a good πovelty, he could be sure that the surprise effect would work, as Fischer always chose the most priπcipled coπtiπuatioπo Ιπ the followiπg game, Fischer's oppoπeπt was so keeπ to spriπg a surprise that he eveπ chose aπ opeπiπg he had ποt played beforeo

Game 24

Robert Fischer Viktor Kortchnoi Curacao ct 1962 (5)

1 .e4 d6 2.d4 li:Jf6 3.liJc3 g6 4.f4 ..tg7 5.li:Jf3 0-0 6 . ..te2 c5 7.dxc5 \i'a5 8.0-0 \i'xc5+ 9. r.fί>h1 liJc6 1 0.tt:Jd2

50 years ago this position was quite current. Kortchnoi: 'Jn general in those days, Ι did not play the Pirc, and the various lines were quite unknown to me, but Vasiukov (Kortchnoi's second at the event, edo) persuaded me to risk it, saying "Fischer is bound to play this way!" Fischer did not let me down.' So what was the opening idea that persuaded Kortchnoi to bluff?

10 .. . a5! This novelty is the basis for the whole adveπtureo Theory previously coπsidered that White had a clear advaπtage after 1 0o o olt:Jd4 1 l .ltJb3 lt:Jxb3 l2oaxb3 or 10o o o�e6 1 l .ltJb3 'iVb6 l2 og4o

1 1 .llJb3 Here, I l .t2Jc4 looks very strong for White, but after l l . .. �g4! (the consequences are less clear after l l . .. t2Jg4 12 .t2Jd5! tbf2+ 1 3 .�xf2 'ifxf2 14.�e3 'ifh4 I S .t2Jcb6 �b8 16.t2Jxc8 1:1bxc8 1 7.g3 'ifh6 18 .f5 gS 19.'ifd2 and White has a dangerous initiative for the sacrificed exchange) 12 .�e3 'ifhs 13 .�xg4 tbxg4 14.h3 bS ! (the immediate 14 . . . t2Jxe3 is also possible) I S .Φgl t2Jxe3 16.'ifxh5 gxhS 1 7.t2Jxe3 a4 Black is completely ΟΚ.

1 1 .. .'ifb6 1 2.a4 llJb4 1 3.g4? The opening bluff brings fantastic dividends! Without delving into the subtleties of the position, Fischer plays routinely and falls into the trap set for him. After 13 .t2Jd2 play would only be beginning.

1 3 ... .bg4! Equally good was 13 ... t2Jxg4.


1 4 . .bg4 llJxg4 15.'ifxg4 llJxc2 1 6.llJb5

Playing va-banque with 1 6.t2Jds 'ifxb3 1 7.t2Jxe7+ Φh8 1 8.f5 tbxal 19.f6 is easily repulsed: 19 . . . �xf6 20.I:I.xf6 I:Ife8 2 I .t2Jd5 "ii'c4! 22.t2Jc3 t2Jb3 followed by .. . tbcs .

16 . . . llJxa1 1 7.llJxa1 'ifc6!

How should we assess this unusual position?

With roughly equal material, the decisive factor is the many weaknesses in the white position. In addition, his pieces are completely uncoordinated.

1 8.f5 'ifc4 1 9.'iff3 'ifxa4 20.llJc7 'ifxa1 21 .llJd5?

Greater practical chances were offered by 2 1 .tbxa8 �xa8 22.fxg6 fxg6 23 .'iff7+ (the assessment of the position is not changed by 23.'ifb3+ Φh8 24.'ifxb7 �g8 ! 2S .'ifxe7 'ifbl) 23 . . . Φh8 24.'ifxe7 'ifbl 2S.'ifxb7 1:le8 and again, Black should win with accurate play.

21 . . . :Se8 22 . .tg5 'ifxb2 23 . .be7 After 23 .t2Jxe7+ �xe7 24.�xe7 �a8 the march of the a-pawn decides.

23 ... .te5 Black has a large material advantage. The rest is simple.

24 . .1:.f2 'ifc1 + 25 . .1:.f1 'ifh6 26.h3 gxf5 27 . .bf8 :Χfθ 28.llJe7+ ς,phs 29.llJxf5 'ife6 30 . .1:.g1 a4 31 . .1:.g4 'ifb3 32. 'iff1 a3 0-1

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How does one decide on such opening improvisation? Fischer was well aware of his opponent's opening repertoire and knew that the Pirc was not part of it. And had he been a little more experienced, he would probably have avoided the line he usually played and chosen a reserve line instead. But in those days, the American was too straightforward to think of such things. It was only some years later that he started thinking of the psychological factor. Kortchnoi, on the other hand, was always very emotional and could be convinced of anything. Thus arose this particular opening bluff.

Black also chose what was for him a completely new opening scheme in the following example. This game, and the one which follows it, are precious memories for me. Those who are familiar with my previous books will be familiar with these games. Under one heading or another, Ι show them in each new book. During the Tata Steel tournament 2014, on an excursion round the famous Rijksmuseum, we came across an unknown figure, in the picture by Rembrandt called The Night Watch. Compared with the proud figures of the main characters in the picture, it is quite modest and would probably have remained unnoticed, but it turns out to be the painter himself, who as it were autographed his picture by including himself in his epic work. So, such vanity is not unique to my humble self. By way of further justification, Ι can add that, unlike other examples, here there is nothing that needs to be guessed at. The emotions and experiences which Ι went through during my preparations and the game itself are fully consistent with what Ι have described.

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There in Wijk aan Zee Ι experienced a form of authorial pride. Α Dutch amateur, unknown to me, one of the participants in one of the numerous amateur groups, proudly told me how he had won in 19 moves in the same exotic variation, which we are now about to examine. This small episode reminds me of something else. This opening bluff, which later became quite popular, had a painful birth. After losing the first game of the mini-match with white, Ι was obliged to win the second game. But how could Ι produce a fighting position? After a long and fruitless search for ideas, Ι suddenly hit upon this extravagant combination of moves. There was little time left before the game, so Ι didn't have much of a choice to make.

Game 25

Smbat Lputian (2590) Vladimir Tukmakov (2565) Tilburg 1994 (3)

1 .d4 cs 2.d5 f5!?

We have a bizarre hybrid of the Benoni and the Dutch - a very dubious cocktail, possibly even fatal. But in the situation Ι was in, taste was not important.

3.llJc3 The most principled reaction to Black's dubious idea is 3.e4!? fxe4 4.ti:Jc3 ti:Jf6

S.g4!? (also interesting is S .f3 exf3 6.tbxf3 with full compensation for the pawn), as occurred in the game of my above-mentioned Dutch friend and colleague. He played S ... g6. Stronger is S ... h6 6.h3 d6, as in a game between two much more well-known players (Seirawan-Mamedyarov, Ningbo Wch-tt 2013).

3 ... tbf6 4 . .ig5 After 4.g3 g6 S.�g2 .ig7 the game assumes the outlines of the Leningrad Dutch.

4 ... 'ifb6!? 5 . .bf6 In the game which served as my introduction to this line, play continued s.'i!Yd2 h6?! 6 .�xf6 'iνxf6 7.0-0-0 with aπ obvious advantage to White, Alburt-Levitt, New York 1994. Ι was preparing to play differently: S . . . 'ii'xb2!? 6.1:tbl 'ii'a3. Somewhat slower, although also perfectly playable, is s .libl .

5 ... 1i'xf6 S .. . exf6 was also worth consideration.

6.e3 g6

Sornewhat rnore accurate is 6 ... d6. Why?

7 . .ic4 Ι was more afraid of 7.d6! exd6 (7 .. . 'i!Yxd6 8 .'ii'xd6 exd6 9.lbbs �d8 10.0-0-0 did not suit Black's sporting ambitions) 8 .tbf3 tbc6 9.�c4.

Chapter 2 - BJuff in the Opening

7 ... d6 B.tbge2 tbd7 9.tbf4 tbes 1 0.1i'e2!?

lO .�bS+ �f7 is not dangerous for Black. Α highly unusual position arises after 10.�e2 gS !? l l .liJhS �f7 12 .l2Jb5 �d8, but any departure from routine equality suited me in this game.

1 0 ... .ih6!? So as after I O . . . .tg7 not to have to worry about the consequences of l l .h4.

1 1 .h4 ο-ο 12.a4 tbxc4 After 1 2 .. . �d7 there is the unpleasant 13 .�b5.

1 3. 1i'xc4 b6 1 4.g3 Lputian plays strictly positionally. Sharper was 14.h5! ? gS 1 S .tbe6 �xe6 16 .dxe6 f4 with double-edged play.

1 4 ... a6 1 5.0-0 .id7 We have reached a complicated position, with mutual chances - exactly what Black was striving for, when he chose this exotic opening.

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The remainder of the game is given only with brief comments.

1 6. tlJe6 .C.fb8 16 . . . �xe6?! 1 7.dxe6 favours White.

1 7 . .C.fb1 Sensible caution. 1 7.tbc7 .a'.a7 18 .tbxa6? I:ίba8 is totally bad, and nor can White be happy with 1 7.e4?! bS 18 .axb5 axbS 19.I:I.xa8 �xa8 20.tbxb5 'iνxb2.

1 7 ... �7 1 8.tbf4 .C.b7! Preparing . . . b6-b5 . The immediate 1 8 . . . b5!? provokes a premature crisis: 1 9.axb5 �xbS! (stronger than 19 . . . axbS 20.l:!'.xa8 1::ί.χa8 2 l .tbxb5) 20.'iνa2! (20.tbxb5?! axbS 21 .l:ιxa8 bxc4 22.1:lxb8 �xf4 23.exf4 'iνd4 would suit Black fine) 20 . . . �d7 2I .'iVaS with the initiative for White.

1 9.'ifd3 .C.c7 20 . .:.a2 ..tg7 21 .�g2 .C.cc8 22. 'ife2 ..th6

Ι did not immediately find the correct plan: 22 .. . �g8!? followed by . . . 'iνf7 and . . . �eS.

23 . .C.ba1 �g8! 24 . .:.a3 'iff7 25. �g1 ..tg7 26 . .C.b3 .C.cb8 27. 'ifc4 ..te5!? 28. 'ife2?! .:.a7?! 29. �g2 h6

Preparing to open a second front. 30 . .C.h1 .:.aa8!?

30 . . . g5?! 3 l .hxg5 hxgS 32.tbe6 would give White some long-awaited counterplay.

31 . 'ifd3 ..bc3?!

.1 .1

Α responsible decision!

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32 . .:Xc3 ..ba4 33.g4?! Significantly more dangerous was 33 .e4!. The e-file is more important for the attack than the g-file!

33 .. . ..tb5 34. 'ifd1 fxg4 35. 'ifxg4 �h7 36 . .C.h3 .C.g8 37.tlJe6?

Stronger is 37.e4!. After the text move, the advantage finally swings over to Black.

37 .. . 'iff5! 38. 'ifxf5 gxf5+ 39.�3 .C.g4! 40.tbf4 ..td7

Time-trouble is over and the game enters the phase of realising the advantage.

41 . .:.a3 a5 42.c4 �g7 43 . .C.h1 ? The final mistake. More tenacious is 43.l:r.g3.

43 ... e5! 44.dxe6 ..tc6+ 45.tbd5 .:Xc4

The rest is fairly simple.

46 . .C.d3 .C.e8 47 . .C.g1 + �h7! 47 . . . �f8? 48.J::!g6 .

48.�e2 .:Xe6 49.�d2 .:Xh4 50.tbf4 .C.f6 51 .�c3 0-1

Even so, it is perhaps not correct to apply the term bluff to this game. Certainly, the combination of cS and fS in the opening is risky, but there seems to be no direct refutation of it, at least from the human point of view. In the next example, the price of the risk in the opening was significantly greater.

This game is also distinguished from the previous one in that the critical decision was taken at the board, rather than in home preparation. Mind you, the sporting circumstances certainly assisted with the bluff Before the last round, Ι was trailing Veselin by half a point, and only a win would allow me to overtake my rival and win the tournament. Things were also helped by the fact that Ι underestimated my opponent, as at that time, Topalov was only known to a very small circle of people.

Game 26

Veselin Topalov (2460) Vladimir Tukmakov (2535) Palma de Mallorca 1992 (9)

1 .d4 llJfβ 2.c4 gβ 3.llJc3 d5 4.cxd5 llJxdS 5.e4 llJxc3 6.bxc3 .tg7 7 . .tc4 0-0 8.llJe2 llJc6 9.0-0 e5 1 0.b3

In connection with the following sacrifice, this is the most principled continuation, but other moves seen here include I O . .ike3 and I O.d5 li:Ja5 1 I ..ikd3.

1 0 ... .1:r.e8 1 1 .bf7+! At first sight, a strange decision - White plunges into complications, when it is his opponent who needs to win. But for the moment, the game is just following known lines.

1 1 ... 'ifiιxf7 1 2. 'iνb3+

Wαs the move 12 . . . .ike6 necessαry?


This position had been reached twice in my games, which Topalov undoubtedly knew. The development of events fully suited his tournament position.

1 2 ... 'ifiιf6?! My previous games went 1 2 . . . jιe6 13 .d5 li:Ja5 14.dxe6+ .tlxe6 1 5 .'ifa4 c6 16 .�ad1 'ifc7 1 7.c4! (stronger than 1 7.�d3 Φg8 1 8.c4 jι[g 19.Z;lfd1 �f6 20.[3 jιxa3 2 I ..ί::rxa3 b6= Volke-Tukmakov, Groningen 1990) 1 7 . . . \t>g8 1 8.li:Jc1 jι[g 19.jιxf8 (even stronger is 19 . .ikb2) 19 . . . 1:lxf8 20.li:Jb3 li:Jxb3 2 l .axb3 b6.

analysis diagram

Campos Moreno-Tukmakov, Osuna 1991 . Black must fight for equality. Analysing the last game, Ι glanced briefly at the king move, which looked ridiculously dangerous, but Ι did not see a direct refutation. It was hard to imagine a better chance to test it out. Taking a deep breath, Ι went for it!

1 3.f4?! The most natural continuation of the attack, which did not cost my young opponent very much time. In my preparation, Ι had not bothered looking at anything else. However, SF has a different opinion: 1 3 .1:lad 1 ! poses Black much more difficult problems. Things look extremely dangerous after both 1 3 . . . .ikd7 (now the following line seems very unattractive:

6 1


1 3 . . . exd4 14.tbxd4 'ifd7 (even worse is 14 . . . �d7 I S .tbxc6 bxc6 16 . .!::i.d3) IS .tbbs

analysis diagram

I S . . . tbaS (relatively best. Totally bad is I S .. .'iνf7 16 .c4!) and now White has a pleasant choice between 16 . .!::i.xd7 tbxb3 17 . .!::i.xc7 tbd2 18 .tbd6 �e7 19.1:1xe7 �xe7 20.1:1'.dl �xc3 2 I .tbb5+ or the more primitive 16.'δ'a4 'ifc6 1 7.'ifxa5) 14.dxe5+! l::f.xeS (14 . . . tbxe5 I S .f4 is totally bad for Black) I S .f4! 1:1'.xe4 16.tbg3 �e3 1 7.f5 ! with a winning attack for White. In this case, we can say that the dubiousness of Black's opening idea has been demonstrated.

1 3 ... ..th6

White has many tempting ways to continue the attack. Which would you choose?

1 4.fxe5+ Topalov played this natural move quickly, although White also had at least

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two other tempting tries. The first of these is 14.dxe5+!? �g7 IS .fS! ? ( 15 .1:1'.adl 'ifh4!) IS ... tbxeS 16.f6+ Wh8 1 7..!::radl .Άd7 1 8 .f7 .ί::rf8 1 9.'iνxb7 (Black's task is eased after 19.�xf8 'ifxf8 20.'ifxb7 'δ'cS+ 2l .�hl l::rf8) 1 9 .. . �e3+ 20.�hl cS 2 l .c4 1:1'.b8 22 .'ifxa7 (Black is clearly better after 22.�b2 �d4 23.jιxd4 cxd4 24.'iνxa7 'i:Vb6!) 22 . . . 1:1'.xf7! .

analysis diagram

This counter-sacrifice solves all the problems. 23.1:1'.xf7 tbxf7 24.'iνxd7 'i:Vxd7 25.1:1'.xd7 1:1'.bl+ 26.�cl tbeS 27.�dl tbg4 and White must fight to save himself. More tempting is 14.d5!? tbaS I S.fxeS+ �g7 16.'i:Va4 with undoubted compensation for the piece. Of the many replies - 16 .. . b6, 16 .. . c6, 1 6 . . . �g4, 1 6 . . . �e3 - it is not easy for Black to choose the best.

1 4 ... <itg7

Now how should we develop the initiative?

1 5.J:ιf6?! 1 5 . .J::tf6 looks energetic - White prepares to double rooks on the f-file, whilst after 1 5 . . . �h8 there is the nice idea 16 . .icl .ig7 1 7.i.g5 - but in reality, it slows the tempo of the attack. The other rook move 15 .1:ίf7+? is weaker still: 1 5 . . . �h8 after which there is a threat of 1 6 . . . i.e6, and the apparent activity turns out to be a loss of tempo. More dangerous is 15 .'ii'f7+ �h8 16.lLJf4 so as to meet 16 . . . .tg4 by increasing the pressure with 1 7.l:tf2 . But the most unpleasant move for Black to face is the paradoxical IS .i.cl ! , exchanging the chief black defender. After 1 5 . . . i.xcl 16 .l:taxcl lLJa5 1 7.�f7+ �h8 (possibly a better try is 1 7 . . . �h6 1 8.d5! ? .ig4 19.lLJd4 1::f.f8 20.'tixf8+ "iνxf8 2 I .l:txf8 l:txf8 22 .e6 and now only the decisive 22 . . . c5! relieves Black of all troubles) 1 8 .lLJf4 and White has a dangerous attack.

15 ... .tg4! 1 6.J:ιf7+ 16 .�xb7 tt:Jxe5 1 7.dxe5 .ie3+ 18 .�hl .ixe2 offers White nothing.

1 6 ... 'ίfί'h8 1 7.'ifxb7

Δ Δ Δ .t

Δ

1 7 .. . tbxe5?!

tLJ Δ Δ φ

Tempting, but not strongest. Black was right to avoid 1 7 .. . i.xe2? 18 .'iνxc6! 'iνh4 19 . .ie7! but unfortunately, Ι missed the subtle 1 7 . . . �g8! 18 .1::f.xc7 lLJa5 19.'iνd5+ �xd5 20.exd5 .ixe2 and the black

Chαpter 2 - BJuff in the Opening

pieces are clearly stronger than the white pawns.

1 8.:Xc7?! Better chances of a successful defence were offered by 1 8.dxe5! i.e3+ 19.�hl l:tb8 20.�a6 l:tb6 2 I .'iνc4 .te6 22 .'ifxc7 i.xf7 23 .�xf7.

1 8 ... tbd7 1 9.-tdβ J:ιcθ?! Missing the moment to go over to a decisive counterattack: 19 . . . 1::f.b8! 20.'tixa7 Ilb2 2 I .lLJf4 �h4! 22.d5 (22.1:tfl .ixf4 23.i.xf4 i.f3!) 22 .. . 1:txe4 23.1:tfl l:tbl ! .

20.lbg3! :Xc7 21 .bc7 1Wg5 22.h3 Remarkable calmness! The king obtains a bolt hole on h2 and the game continues.

22 ... 1We3+ 23.'ίfί'h2 'ifxc3 24.J:ιf1 .teβ 25.d5 .tgθ 26 . .tf4?!

The exchange of dark-squared bishops significantly eases Black's defence. He should not have scorned the pawn: 26."iνxa7 i.g7 27.i.a5 �c8 28.i.d2 and although Black has the better chances, the main battle lies ahead.

26 ... .hf4 27.:Xf4 tlJfβ! 28.1Wa6 'ίfί'g7 29.1Wxa7+ .tf7 30.tlJe2?

The last mistake, although even after the more tenacious 30.'iff2 �e5 Black's victory is only a matter of time.

30 ... 1We5 31 .'ίfί'g1 :e7 32.1Wd4 'ifxd4+ 33.tbxd4 :Xe4 0-1

The ending is completely hopeless for White.

As well as the interesting and unusual (to my biased eye!) chess content, there is also one very interesting psychological moment. For such a sharp and risky decision as 1 2 . . . �f6, there was just far too little time for analysis. The decision was improvisation, although Ι was aware of the dangers. It is quite possible that, had Ι examined the consequences ofBlack's 1 2th move more carefully and

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deeply, Ι wσuld have refraiηed frσm such a risky course. Αηd had Ι dσηe sσ, my σppσηeηt wσuld prσbably haνe seηsed my iηterηal uηcertaiηty aηd, as a result, the σutcome σf the game could have beeη quite differeηt. Dσ yσu remember the game Karpσv-Kasparσv, giνeη iη the Iηtrσductiση? The idea σf traηsfereηce σf thσughts betweeη the twσ players iη a chess game is extremely impσrtaηt. Thus, as the sayiηg gσes, igησraηce is bliss, aηd the less yσu wσrry abσut, the better yσu sleep. Αηd the σppσηeηt usually sleeps tοσ!

Ιη the game just imagiηed, the sacrifice ση f7 was a pseudσ σηe. But it is σfteη a real sacrifice, althσugh the coηsequeηces are ησt always σbviσus.

Game 27

Wang Hao (2752) Anish Giri (2734) Beijing 2013 (7)

1 .d4 d6 2.e4 llJf6 3.llJc3 e5 4.llJf3 llJbd7 s . .tc4 exd4 6. 'ifxd4 .te7

This position hαd not been seen αt top level in recent times, but then in 2013, it twice αppeαred in gαmes by the Serbiαn GM Ivαnisevic. Isn't there α hidden drαwbαck to this opening scheme?

7.bf7+!?

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Fσr Waηg, this was just imprσνisatiση, aηd he decided ση the bishσp sacrifice after a 20-miηute thiηk. But the mσνe had beeη met previσusly iη the games σf lesser-kησwη players.

7 ... rjjxf7 8.llJg5+ rjjeθ Of course, 8 . . . �g6? 9.f4 is bad, althσugh it has beeη played several times.

9.llJe6 c5 Strictly the σηly mσve fσreseeη by White. Iηterestiηgly, Giri kηew abσut the sacrifice ση f7 aηd eνeη partially prσvσked his σppσηeηt iηto it, cσηsideriηg it dubiσus. Or, to be strictly truthful, he believed SF, which at first assesses White's idea rather sceptically. Ιη reality, thiηgs are far frσm sσ simple.

Δ Δ Δ φ _g

Where should the queen now go to?

1 0.'ifd1 ! This far frσm σbνiσus mσνe is the strσηgest reply. The queeη is ready to come iηto the attack νia g4 σr hS.

10 ... 'ifb6 1 1 .llJxg7+ rjjf7 12.llJf5 .tfθ!

It is impσrtaηt to keep this defeηsive piece ση the bσard. After 12 .. . tbe5 13.tbxe7 �xe7 14.�g5 White's iηitiatiνe becσmes daηgerσus. Fσr example, 14 . . . �e6 I S .f4 tbf7 16 . .txf6+ Φχf6 1 7.�d2 aηd the black kiηg feels fairly uηcσmfσrtable iη the ceηtre σf the bσard.

13.0-0 d5?! The start of a series of strange decisions, which quickly bring Black to disaster. He should have played 13 . . . .tf.g8! 14.lLJdS 'i!Vc6 and White still has to show the correctness of his sacrifice.

1 4.llJxd5 llJxd5 1 5. 'ikxd5+ �eθ? Why not 1 S . . . 'iνe6! ? The position after 16.'i!Vd3 t2Jf6 1 7.1:f.el 1:f.g8 remains unclear for the moment.

1 &.-tgs 'ifg&? Losing a tempo, which in such a position is tantamount to resigning. Of course, 16 . . . 'i!Vc6 1 7.'ifd2 does not relieve Black of all his problems, but this is still how he had to play.

1 7.J:ad1 .:l.gθ Alas, he cannot play 1 7 .. . 'ifxg5 1 8 .t2Jd6+.

1 8.f4 a5 Such moves are hard to comment on, but there was no saving the game anyway. 1 8 . . . h6 19.e5! hxgS 20.e6 is completely hopeless for Black.

1 9.e5 W'xf5 20. 'ifxgθ J:a6 21 . .:l.fe1 .:l.g6 22.e6 1 -0

In the good old days, when odds games were common, masters would often give odds of the f7-pawn. In modern chess, players quite often sacrifice a piece for the sake of this pawn. In the above game, after the sacrifice, a new game essentially starts, with a non-standard material balance, and rather confused criteria for evaluating the position. Players who are imaginative, energetic and who like to attack are totally comfortable in such positions. In this case, the sacrifice had an improvised character and it came as a surprise to Black, which only increased its effect. The variant on the same idea, seen in the next game, was known long ago.


Game 28

Veselin Topalov (2700) Vladimir Kramnik (2751) Linares 1999 (θ)

1 .e4 e5 2./bf3 /bf6 3.llJxe5 d6

Why put α diagram here? Is it just to draw the reader's attention to the move 4. t2Jc4, as well as the traditional 4.t2Jf3 ?

4.llJxf7?! Νο, not only that!

It turns out that there is also this possibility! This move was introduced into practice largely by the Latvian master Alvis Vitolins. Although it did not bring him any great personal success, it is seen from time to time in tournament play. But this was the first time it was seen at such an exalted level.

4 .. . �xf7 5.lbc3 c5!? Faced with a surprise, Kramnik decides to avoid a natural development of

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events, although any of the normal moves are perfectly reasonable here:

Α) S .. . �e7 6.�c4+ �e6 7.�xe6+ Φχe6 8 .f4 Φf7 9.d4; Β) S . . . c6 6.d4 �e7 7.�c4+ dS; C) S . . . �e6 6 .d4 Φg8.

6.�c4+ �e6 7.be6+ �xe6 8.d4 Else 8 . . . ltJc6.

8 ... 'itt7!? Black plays for quick development. After 8 . . . cxd4 9.'ifxd4 ltJc6 I O.'ifc4+ the black king experiences definite inconvenience.

9.dxc5 tbc6 1 0. 'ife2! Although after 1 0.cxd6 'ifxd6 (10 . . . �xd6 is also possible) formal material equality is re-established, Black's advantage in development plays a more important role.

1 0 ... 'ifd7 1 1 .�e3 dxc5 1 2.f4

We can draw certain conclusions as to the results of the opening experiment. For his sacrificed piece, as well as two pawns, White has a certain degree of piece activity and a mobile pawn phalanx. It is interesting, but not enough. Admittedly, there is also the time factor, which should not be underestimated. Veselin plays quickly and confidently, which cannot be said of Vladimir.

1 2 .. . :ea 1 3.e5 tbg4 It was worth considering 13 . . . ltJd4.

1 4.%Σd1 'iff5 1 5.0-0 h5! 1 6.�c1 !?

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White tries to complicate the game as much as possible. 16 .h3 ltJxe3 1 7.'ifxe3 1:lh6 eases Black's task.

16 ... ttJd4 1 7. 'ifc4+ �g6 White's task would be more difficult after 1 7 . . . 'ife6!? 1 8 .'ifd3 'ifa6! .

1 8.h3 llJh6 1 9.lbb5 a6 Of course, 1 9 . . . 'ifxc2?? 20.1:lxd4 is bad, but 1 9 . . . l2Jxc2!? was perfectly possible.

20.tbxd4 cxd4 21 . 'ifxd4 .:Σcθ?! Here too, it was perfectly possible to steal a pawn: 2 l . . . 'ifxc2 22 . .1:tf2 (22.'ifb6+ 'ifc6) 22 . . . 'ifc6 23 .'ifd3+ ltJfS 24.�e3 �e7 and White faces a difficult battle for a draw.

22. 'ifb6+ �h7 23. 'ifxb7 But now, the worst is behind him.

23 ... :Xc2 24.�e3! 24.'ifxa6? could lead to an immediate collapse: 24 . . . �c5+ 25 .Φhl ltJg4!.

24 ... 'ifg6 25.%Σc1 ! :Xc1 26.:Xc1 llJf5 27 . .tf2 h4

We have a position of dynamic equality. 28.%Σc7 tbg3 29.�h2 llJf1 + 30.�g1 'ifb1 31 .bh4 �C5+!

The most elegant decision! In view of the variation 32 . .Uxc5 ltJg3+ 33 .Φh2 (33 .Φf2?? ltJe4+-+) 33 . . . ltJfl+ a draw was agreed. The immediate 3 l . .. ltJg3+ is met by 32 .Φh2 (32.Φf2 ttJfs).

Using such a sacrifice in a game of such importance is a clear case of bluff Kramnik had undoubtedly not analysed this sacrifice seriously. And quite right! White's threats are not concrete, so it is relatively easy for Black to defend. In reality, play proceeded for two results, with no chances of Topalov winning. So Ι see little point in opening bluffs of such a character. Black 's task was much more difficult in another game between the same opponents.

Game 29

Veselin Topalov (2700) Vladimir Kramnik (2795) Wijk aan Zee 2008 (9)

1 .d4 d5 2.c4 c6 3.tlJf3 tlJf6 4.tlJc3 e6 s . .tgs h6 6 . .th4 dxc4 7.e4 g5 B . .tg3 b5 9 . .te2 .tb7 1 0.0-0 tlJbd7 1 1 . tlJeS .tg7

At the moment this game was played, the diagram position was one of the tabiyas of the Aηti-Moscow Variation. This made a!J the more shocking the bomb which was now exp!oded between these two bitter opponents. What was it?

1 2.tlJxf7!? White usually chose 12 .t2Jxd7 t2Jxd7 13 .�d6 or 12 .�c2.

1 2 ... �xf7 1 3.e5 tlJdS The principled reply! 1 3 . . . :lf8 14.exf6 t2Jxf6 promises White a lasting initiative, for just a pawn.

1 4.tlJe4 �e7 1 5.tlJd6 'ifb6 1 6 . .tg4 :Sfθ

Black's position is unenviable, and not just because the problems he faces are very complicated. He would like to get out ofhis opponent's home preparation, but this decision requires very strong nerves and a lot of time. Α few days later, Ljubojevic successfully employed against Ίimman the line 16 .. . 1:ιhg8 1 7.�c2 t2Jf8. Also interesting

Chapter 2 - B!uff in the Opening

is 16 . . . hS 1 7.�xhS .a'.af8 18 .�g4 �h6, Shirov-Karjakin, Foros 2008.

1 7.'ifc2

rhus far events have fo!Jowed Topa!ov's home preparation. Which continuation wou!d you choose for B!ack in this position?

1 7 ... 'ifxd4? Kramnik falls into the main line. After intensive investigations, it can be said that the following line is strongest: 1 7 . . . I:ίhg8! 1 8 .�adl cS 1 9.�g6 t2Jc7 20.t2Jxb7 cxd4! 21 .�e4 d3 22.1::rxd3 ! ? (22.b3!?) 22 . . . cxd3 23.�b4+ tι:Jcs 24.t2JxcS aS 2S .�a3 �d8 with a very sharp position, in which any result is possible. Admittedly, in the game Bromberger-Sandipan (Zurich 2009), in which this all happened, White then erred badly: 26.t2Jb3+? (correct was 26.t2Jxd3+ b4 27.�b3 with an unclear position) 26 . . . b4 27.�xaS �xaS 28 .tΔxaS .i:IdS and Black won.

1 8.'ifg6 'ifxg4 1 9.'ifxg7+ �dθ 20.tlJxb7+ �cθ 21 .a4!

White was still following his analysis. 21 ... b4 22.1:.ac1 !?

Somewhat more accurate was 22.t2Jd6+! 'it>d8 (after 22 . . .':J;;c7, a very strong reply is 23 .I:!'.adl ! .i:lfg8 24.�f7 �f8 25 .�g6 ltfg8 26.�bl with a large advantage) 23.1:!'.acl ! .

22 ... c3

67


The followiπg liπe does ποt iπflueπce the positioπ iπ a priπcipal way: 22 . . . 1:f.fg8 23 .'iνf7 1::f.f8 24.t2Jd6+ Wc7 2S .'iνg6 1:ίhg8 26.'iνbl with advaπtage to White.

23.bxc3 b3 24.c4 .Σ:fgθ 25.tbd6+ rt;c7 26. -.ι7 .:ιs

Obviously, Topalov's opening surprise has been crowned with complete success. All that remains is to find the most accurate decision here. What is that?

27.cxd5!? Ιπ aπ attempt to eπd the game spectacularly, Topalov misses the prosaic 27.h3 ! 1:f.xf7 28 .hxg4 l2Jf4 29.l2Jxf7 l2Je2+ 30.Wh2 lbxcl 3 1 .1:f.xcl .

27 ... .:Xf7 28 . .:Xc6+ rt;bθ 29.llJxf7 At this momeπt, Kramπik had oπly 5 miπutes left οπ the clock. His πext move, which effectively loses the game, was played quickly.

29 ... .:e8? With so little time, it was extremely difficult to fiπd the saviπg liπe: 29 .. .'iVe2! 30.1:f.c3 (ποt 30.l2Jxh8 'ifxfl+ 3l .Wxfl b2 ποr 30.1:ίbl 'iνa2) 30 . . . b2 3 1 .1:1b3+ Wa8 32 .l2Jxh8 l2Jc5 33.1:f.xb2 (33 .l:Xb4 aS 34.1:f.b5 l2Jxa4; 33 . .tf.bs l2Jxa4) 33 .. .'ii'xb2 with aπ uπclear positioπ.

30.tbd6 .Σ:hθ 31 . .Σ:c4! -.e2 32.dxe6 There is πο saviπg the game.

32 ... ttJb6 33 . .Σ:b4 rt;aθ 34.e7 tbdS 35 . .:Xb3 l2Jxe7 36 . .Σ:fb1 tbds 37.h3

68

hS 38.ltJf7 .:cs 39.e6 a6 40.llJxg5 h4 41 .i.d6 .Σ:gθ 42 . .Σ:3b2 ... d3 43.e7 ltJf6 44.i.e5 tbd7 45.ltJe6 1 -0

This game caπ be seeπ as a classic example of opeπiπg bluff iπ a moderπ settiπg. Ιπ a well-kπowπ positioπ, White fiπds a surprisiπg tactical idea, aπd theπ sets SF to work, with the help of which the positioπ is subjected to a scrupulous aπalysis. If the level of risk appears reasoπable, the bomb caπ be exploded. The psychological effect puts extra pressure οπ the oppoπeπt, aπd so it is very hard for him to survive the situatioπ. Of course, it is much easier to describe such a sceπario thaπ to briπg it off iπ practice. Maπy factors have to come together for such aπ eπterprise to succeed. Ιπ this case, Topalov was lucky -both the quality of his home aπalysis, aπd his memory, did ποt let him dowπ, aπd his exploitatioπ caπ be coπsidered practically faultless.

Οπe should also ποt forget the coauthor of the idea, Ινaπ Chepariπov, whose idea the sacrifice was, aπd who did most of the aπalysis. We will show aπother example of similar creativity by the youπg Bulgariaπ graπdmaster, but this time iπ his οwπ practice.

Game 30

lvan Cheparinov (2678) Emil Sutovsky (2660) Poikovsky 2013 (9)

1 .ttJf3 ttJf6 2.c4 g6 3.ttJc3 dS 4.cxd5 llJxdS 5. •b3 ttJb6 6.d4 i.g7 7.e4 i.g4 8.i.b5+ c6 9.ltJg5 0-0 1 0.i.e2 be2 1 1 .llJxe2 ttJa6 1 2.-.h3 h6 1 3.ltJf3 hS

This was all eπtirely predictable. The Grίiπfeld is Sutovsky's favourite, iπdeed,

almost his only defence to l .d4. With his last move, he departed from the line which had brought him a beautiful victory in a previous game: 13 .. . 'iνd7 14.'iνh4 h5 15 .h3 c5 16 .g4 cxd4 1 7.gxh5 d3 1 8.hxg6 fxg6 19.ltJg5 1:tf6 20.ltJf4 'i:!fd6 2 1 .'iνh7+! (this move, shown by SF, changes the assessment of the position fundamentally. In the game, White played much worse: 2 1 .z:i.gl? and after 21 . . . ltJc4! 22.ltJd5 ltJb4! Black launched a decisive attack, FressinetSutovsky, Istanbul Olympiad 2012) 2 1 . .. '\t>f8 22.0-0! and White wins in all variations: 22 . . . e5 (or 22 . . . ltJc4 23.e5! ! ltJxe5 24.�el ! 1:ίd8 25.1:1xe5 'iνxe5 26.ltJxg6+ z:i.xg6 27.'iVxg6) 23 .ltJfe6+ 1:txe6 24.ltJxe6+ 'iVxe6 25.f4!.

1 4 . .C.g1 !? White has also tried the immediate 14.g4. After 14 . . . hxg4!? (14 . . . 'iνd7 15 .1:tgl transposes into a position from the main game) 1 5 .�xg4 ltJd7 (Black has other good moves as well, but it is not part of our task to explore this opening variation in detail) 16.e5 ltJb4 1 7.0-0 a complicated position arises (Navara-Hammer, FIDE World Cup, Troms0 2013) . The quiet 14.0-0 'i:Vd7 is not in Cheparinov's style at all.

1 4 ... tαl7

On which side should Blαck play?


1 5.e5!? Α new move, certainly prepared at home. 15 .g4 ltJf6 16 .ltJg5 hxg4 1 7.1:txg4 'i:Vc8 18 .f3 1:ίd8 19.e5 ltJxg4 20.fxg4 f6 2 l .'ifh7+ '\t>f8 22 .�xg6 fxg5 23 .e6 '\t>g8 24 . .i.xg5 .i::r.d5 25 .'iff7+ '\t>h8 26.'iVh5+ led to a draw in the game Yakovenko-Sutovsky, Russian Team Championship 2013.

1 5 . . . ll:!b4 It is only at this point that our opening duel really begins, and in which SF and the human memory play the decisive role.

1 6.g4 lL!c2+ 1 7.�1 lL!xeS! 1 8.lL!xe5 ..be5 1 9.gxh5! 'ifcθ! 20 . .C.g4! 'iffS! 21 .dxe5 .:Sdθ 22.hxg6

So far, the duellists and their seconds (named above) have been at their best. Which is the only correct move here?

22 ... .C.d1 +? What misled him - SF or his memory? Α nice draw results from 22 . . . fxg6! 23 .ltJf4 1:ίdl+ 24.'\t>e2 (also possible is 24.'\t>g2 �e4+ 25 .f3 ltJel+ 26.'\t>g3 1:ίd3 27.�xg6+ 'i!Vxg6+ 28 .tt:Jxg6 1:tfxf3+ 29.'\t>g4 1:txh3 with a complicated, but roughly equal endgame) 24 ... 1:tel+ 25 .'\t>d2 1:ίd8+ 26 .'\t>c3 tt:Jxal 27.1:txg6+ ifxg6 28.ltJxg6 1:txcl+ 29.'\t>b4 .!::i.d4+ 30.'\t>a3 ltJc2+ 3 1 .'\t>b3 ltJal+. Surpris-

69


ingly beautiful, but one needs to be able to remember it!

23. 'itg2 lbe1 +? And this is already the decisive mistake! After the strongest line 23 . . . fxg6! 24.'ii'b3+! 1:ίd5 25 .'iνg3! lLJxal 26.lLJf4 'ii'e4+ 27.Φh3 'ii'xe5 28.tt'Jxg6 Vi'xg3+ 29.Φχg3 1::tc5 30.tt'Jxf8+ Φχf8 Black has good chances of saving the game. But going over to independent play in such a situation is extremely difficult, and finding the best decision in such a case almost impossible.

24.'itg3! Cheparinov, ση the other hand, copes with the analogous task superbly. The text is strictly the only move. After any other king retreat, 24 . . . tt'Jd3+! decides.

24 ... 'fff3+ 25. 'ith4 11Vxf2+ 26. 'itg5! Again the only move! After the natural 26.tt'Jg3 fxg6 27.1:ίχg6+ Φf7 it is White who must look for a way to save himself, whilst the variation 26.Vi'g3 Vi'xe2 27.gxf7+ Φχf7 28.Ir.f4+ Φe8 29.l:ιxf8+ �xf8 30.�h6+ �[7 3 1 .l::txdl Vi'xdl leads to an equal endgame.

26 ... f6+ 27.'ith6 This surprising king raid crowns a remarkable game!

27 ... f5 28 . .C.g3! 'iνxe2 29.'itg5! The white king finds the strength for yet another step!

29 ... .C.f7 30.gxf7 + 'itxf7 31 . 'ifxf5+ 'iteθ 32 . ..if4 :Xa1 33.e6 1 -0

If we speak of opening risk in this game, then it applies to both players. Of course, both Sutovsky and Cheparinov are great specialists in the field of «advanced preparation», as they demonstrated this time too. Α draw was the limit of Black's dreams, whilst this was a guaranteed minimum for White.

70

Naturally, the human memory is not infinite and in situations of extreme tension, all manner of mistakes can occur. But it is no coincidence that it was Sutovsky's memory which let him down. The task facing Black was significantly harder, it seems to me. The collision seen in this game is not such a rare thing in contemporary chess. More and more players are trying to solve all problems at home, using the huge power of SF. In this book, we will not debate the pros and cons of this approach. However, from the viewpoint of opening risk, doing a massive amount of home analysis just to secure at best a forced draw seems a bit like using a field gun to shoot sparrows. Going into a mass of complicated forcing lines, knowing that your opponent can force a draw ifhe finds the only correct line, is perfectly reasonable, so Ι completely agree with Cheparinov's approach, but not with Sutovsky's.

On the subject of computer-based preparation, it is impossible to ignore the following famous game. In the notes, the opening occupies a disproportionate amount of space, which is not typical of this book. But the opening battle is effectively the whole of the content of this dramatic game.

Game 31

Vladimir Kramnik ('2770) Peter Leko ('27 41 ) Brissago Wch m 2004 (θ)

1 .e4 e5 2.ll:\f3 liJc6 3 . ..ib5 a6 4 . ..ta4 ll:\f6 5.0-0 ..te7 6 . .C.e1 b5 7 . ..ib3 0-0 8.c3 d5 9.exd5 ltJxd5 1 0.ltJxe5 lZ:\xe5 1 1 .:Xe5 c6 1 2.d4 ..id6 1 3 . .C.e1 1i'h4 1 4.g3 1i'h3 1 5.:e4 g5 1 6.'iνf1 !?

'Takiπg iπto accouπt Leko's kπowledge of popular variatioπs, we had prepared a rare, half-forgotteπ liπe' (Bareev, οπe of Kramπik's secoπds iπ this match, iπ the book From London to Elista).

1 6 ... 'ifh5 'Leko thought for almost aπ hour, decidiπg whether to choose the middlegame that he could ποt remember or the eπdgame that he didπ't kπow'. Now dozeπs of games have beeπ played iπ this eπdgame, iπcludiπg maπy at the very top level: 1 6 . . . 'iνxfl+ 1 7.<it>xfl .tfs 18 .tbd2 (Black maπaged to hold the positioπ after 1 8.f3 h6 19.tbd2 .txe4 20.fxe4 tbc7 2I .<it>g2 c5 22.e5 .te7 23 .tbe4 cxd4 24.cxd4 a5 iπ Aπaπd-Svidler, Saπ Luis 2005) 1 8 ... h6 19 . .!::rel .l::rae8 20.tbf3 �h3+ 2 I .<it>gi .tg4 22.tt:Jes f6 23 .ti:Jd3 Άfs 24 . .!::rdl �g4 25.J::f.d2 aπd iπ this iπterestiπg fashioπ, White maπaged to preserve his material advaπtage aπd later eveπ wοπ the game, VolokitiπPoπomariov, Foros 2006. Οπe certaiπly caππot describe Leko's task as easy, but his choice surprised Kramπik, whose team had expected the eπdgame.

1 7.lbd2 ..tfS

1 8.13! Strictly, oπly this move caπ be coπsidered to be origiπal work by Kramπik's team. 18 .�xd5, 18 .1:1el aπd 18 .�dl ,


seeπ before, had all beeπ rejected for various reasoπs.

1 8 ... lLJf6 1 9.1:.e1 ?! The startiπg of a fatal plaπ. As aπ alterπative, οπe caπ suggest 1 9.a4!?, which featured iπ two games from the Tal Memorial 2006: 1 9 . . . tbxe4 20.tbxe4 'iνg6 2I .tbxd6 (2I .tbxg5!?) 2 I . .. 'iνxd6 n . .txg5 'ifg6!? (22 . . . nfe8 23 . .!::rel 'iνg6 24 . .te7 .l::ra7 25 .Άcs .l::raa8 26 . .te7 .l::ra7 27.�c5 led to a draw iπ the game Shirov-Leko) 23.'iνcl .td3 24.axb5 axb5 25 . .!::rxa8 .!::rxa8 26.<it>f2 aπd eveπtually White wοπ iπ the game ShirovAroπiaπ. Although White's possibilities iπ this liπe have ποt yet beeπ exhausted, the aπalysts switched their atteπtioπ to 19.'iνg2!? 'iνg6 20 . .I::re3 1::rae8 (20 ... tbd5 2 I . .I::rel .l::rae8 22.'iff2? tbf4! was successful for Black iπ Shomoev-Grischuk, Sochi tt 2008, but stroπger for White is 22.tbe4 g4 23.�c2) 2 I .tbe4 tbxe4 (the experimeπtal 2 I . .. ti:Jd5?! 22 . .txd5 cxd5 23 .tbxd6 �xd6 24 . .!::rxe8 Irxe8 2S . .txg5 led to aπ obvious advaπtage to White iπ Aπaπd-Aroπiaπ, Moπaco rapid 2007) 22.g4 tbg3!? (also iπterestiπg is 22 . . . �xg4!? 23.fxe4) 23 .hxg3 .td3 (the ecceπtric 23 .. . .tbi was seeπ iπ the game Aπaπd-Aroπiaπ, Wijk aaπ Zee 2007) 24 . .td2 .l::rxe3 2S . .txe3 .l::re8 26 . .!::rel c5 aπd Black maπaged to hold iπ Svidler-Aroπiaπ, Liπares 2007.

1 9 ... :aes 20 . .:Xe8 .:Χeβ 21 .a4!? Coπtiπuiπg to follow his iπteπded liπe. Equality results from 2 I .tbe4 tbxe4 22 .fxe4 .l::rxe4 23.�d2 .te6 24 . .txe6 l::txe6 25 . .!::re l .

21 ... 'ifg6! Eveπ this stroπg move was ποt a surprise for Kramπik. The previous moves had ποt cost him much time, whereas Peter was already iπ serious time-trouble.

7 1


How should White p1αy?

22.axb5?! Coπtiπuiπg quickly aπd coπfideπtly. Vladimir kπew of the existeπce of a fallback variatioπ: 22 .tbe4 tbxe4 23.fxe4 .txe4 24 . .txg5! bxa4! 2S . .tc4 .tds 26 . .txd5 cxdS 27.'iif6 with equality, but decided to follow the priπcipled path. The competeπt opiπioπ of SF did much to support him iπ his decisioπ.

22 ... ..td3

23.'iff2? The decisive mistake - both iπ aπalysis aπd iπ the game. It was still ποt too late to decide to recheck his traiπers' work and take the oπly correct decisioπ: 23.'i!Vdl! .te2 24.'itel (the same thiπg results from 24.'iic2 .td3 2S.'iidl) 24 ... .td3 25.'iidl with a repetitioπ of moves. But it is practically impossible to stop iπ such a situatioπ, siπce hesitatioπ would oπly

72

eπcourage hope iπ aπ oppoπeπt who is almost kπocked out. Paradoxically, the correct psychological tactics actually briπg White to a catastrophe.

23 .. . 1Σe2! 24. 'ifxe2 He is ποt saved by 24.bxa6 1:ίχf2 25 .'�xf2 'iihS 26.<;t>gl .txg3! 27.hxg3 'iih3 28.a7 'itxg3+ 29.�hl g4! 30.a8'ii+ �g7 aπd White is defeπceless. For example, 3 1 .r.:!.a7 'iiel+ 32.Wg2 gxf3+ 33 .tbxf3 'i!Vfl+ 34.Wg3 lbhS+ 35 .�h4 'ifhl+ 36 .<;t>g4 'i!Vg2+ 37.Wxh5 'i!Vh3+ 38.'it>gs 'i!Vg3+ 39.�hs .tg6#.

24 .. . be2 25.bxa6

Δ ·�

How should one αssess the resulting position? Whαt should Blαck plαy?

25 ... 'ifd3!! The oπly move, radically chaπgiπg the assessmeπt of the positioπ. SF, haviπg supported White all the way up to here, ποw, with a total abseπce of loyalty, thiπks for a while aπd switches its support to Black! With horror, this was observed by Kramπik's secoπd, Svidler, who had prepared the variatioπ, whilst Vladimir himself also realised the awful truth, as he sat at the board aπd thought for the first time iπ the game. Απ iπcredible situatioπ - the trapper is trapped iπ a variatioπ he has himself prepared! The preparatioπs were uπdoπe by just a few extra secoπds'

thought, which is all that is needed at this point, for the truth to be revealed!

26.Φ1'2 Other continuations are equally bad: 26.a7 'ire3+ 27.�g2 .ixf3+! 28.tt:Jxf3 'f!ie2+ 29.�gl tt:Jg4 30.a8'iY+ �g7 3I .'f!ixc6 (3 I ..ixg5 'iff2+ 32.Whl 'f!ixf3+ 33.�gl 'iYf2+ 34.�hl Vlixh2#) 3 I . .. Vlif2+ 32 .�hl "'t!Wfl+ 33 .tt:Jgl tt:Jf2#.

26 ... .bf3! 27.t2Jxf3 ltJe4+ 28.�e1 t2Jxc3!

The final blow! Peter, who had gone through so much in this game, was not going to allow the precious victory to elude him.

29.bxc3 'ifxc3+ 30.Φ1'2 'ifxa1 31 .a7?!

The line 3I ..ixg5 'iYxa6 32 . .idl offers some illusions of salvation, but there is no doubt that White's fortress would soon be broken down.

31 ... h6 32.h4 g4 0-1

Up to a certain moment, both sides played impeccably. Kramnik and his team had prepared very well and posed his opponent serious problems. In addition, the psychological battle was also ση a high level. White played quickly and confidently, his appearance conveying his confidence in the correctness of his analysis. Leko, in his turn, was also at his best. Despite great psychological


pressure, and at the cost of an enormous amount of energy, he coped with his very difficult chess task. Right to the very end, Vladimir continued playing the role of the confident favourite, but then a technical fault occurred, leading to the drama. Of course, SF has become much stronger since the time of this game, and the chances of such a turn of events occurring today are much smaller. However, from the point of view of the subject that we are concerned with, Kramnik has nothing for which to reproach himself. He did all he could to win, but disappointments also occur in chess. They are an inextricable part of the game. From the viewpoint of the faultless modern-day opening preparation, the opening duels of the 20th century masters look rather old-fashioned, but what enormous amounts of energy and emotion they put into them!

The prehistory of the following game is rather interesting. Ljubomir Ljubojevic was leading the tournament at this stage and had every chance to reach the Candidates' tournament. David Bronstein, by contrast, was languishing in the middle of the table and only a powerful finish could enable him to improve his position significantly. Thus, the scenario was obvious - White would strive for a win at all costs, whilst Black would be more cautious. However, the very first moves of the game refuted this prognostication.

Game 32

David Bronstein (2585) Ljubomir Ljubojevic (2570) Petropolis izt 1 973 (1 1 )

1 .e4 llJf6 2.e5 lbds 3.d4 d6 4.c4 liJb6 5.f4 dxe5 6.fxe5 c5 7.d5 e6

7 3


8.tίJc3 exd5 9.cxd5 c4! 1 0.lbf3 �g4 1 1 .'ifd4 bf3 1 2.gxf3 �b4 1 3.bc4 0-0 1 4.1:r.g1 gβ!

Black launches himself into the battle as if a win was his only hope! But the truth is that Ljubojevic never could play for a draw. However, he knew this variation like the back of his hand. In particular, here is how elegantly he played the white (!) side after the mistaken move 14 . . . ii'c7?. The game only lasted a few more moves: 1 5 .e6! f6 16 . .th6 ii'xc4 1 7.1:f.xg7+ ι;t>hs 1 8.l:ιg8+! ςt>xg8 19.ii'gl+ with inevitable mate (Ljubojevic-Honfi, Cacak 1970). Ljubo also knew what the best defence was, as we see above.

1 5.�g5 1Wc7

In this very shαrp position, White hαs severαl possibilities. Which would you choose?

1 6.�b3!? Bronstein chooses the most principled, but also the riskiest continuation. It was possible to avoid the sacrifice with the aid of the unexpected 1 6.1:t.g4!?, but in this case, Black has no problems: 16 . . . tbxc4 1 7.d6! ? (1 7.ii'xc4 'ilfxe5+ 18 .ςt>f1 .txc3 19.'ifxc3 tbd7 is safe for Black) 1 7 .. . �xc3+! 1 8.1i'xc3 ii'b6! 19.ii'xc4 'iVxb2 20.1:f.dl ii'xe5+ and now White's best is 2 l .'ife4, retaining sufficient activity for equality.

74

Significantly more interesting is 16 . .te2!? .tcs 1 7.'ifd2 1i'xe5 (1 7 . . . �xgl? 18 .�f6) 18 .1:f.g3 ! with mutual chances.

1 6 ... �c5 1 1.1Wf4 The game takes an unexpected turn after 1 7.d6! �xd4! (1 7 .. . 'iYc6 1 8.'iνf4 .txg1 1 9.e6 is very dangerous for Black) 1 8.dxc7 .txg1 1 9.cxb8ii' �axb8 20.0-Ο-Οοο. Although the queens have left the board, White retains full compensation for the sacrificed exchange.

1 7 .. . bg1 1 8.d6! The strongest move in the position. But Bronstein increased its unexpectedness by offering a draw! Maybe this paradoxically contributed to his success? Α couple of months later, Ljubojevic had to defend this position again. White was clearly not up to the task and lost very feebly: 1 8 .ςt>e2? 'iνc5 19.l:txgl 1i'xg1 20.�f6 'iνg2+ 2 1 .ςt>e3 'iνxb2 n.ςt>d3 tb8d7 23.tbe4 1:t.ac8 24.1i'h6 tbxe5+ 25.ςt>e3 1:f.c3+ (0- 1 , GheorghiuLjubojevic, Manila 1 973). In our day, when information travels around the world in seconds, such a situation is impossible to imagine!

1 8 ... 1Wc8?! Like all his earlier moves, the Yugoslav played this very quickly. Bronstein had only about 5 minutes left ση his clock, which was obviously insufficient in such a sharp position. It is understandable that Black wished to avoid the tempo-loss after 1 8 . . . 1i'c5 19.tbe4 but then 19 . . . 1i'd4! 20.!1d1 'iixb2 2l .tbf6+ (21 .e6 tb8d7 22.e7 'ifxh2 23 .exf8'iV+ 1:t.xf8 24.1i'xh2 .txh2 was seen in the game Gruenfeld-Ljubojevic, Riga izt 1 979, which the Yugoslav once again won!) 2 1 . . . ςt>hs 22.Ιιd2 'ifal+ 23.1:f.d1 ii'b2 24.1:f.d2 led to a draw. However, one cannot doubt that the mercurial Ljubojevic would have rejected this line,

even if he had seen it. Black is playing only for a win!

1 9.Φe2? The cause of this inaccuracy was something quite different - a catastrophic shortage of time! After the strongest line 19.0-0-0! White no longer has the threat of 20.lLJe4, but in return, after 19 .. . lLJ8d7 (ση 19 .. . 'ifcs there is the very unpleasant 20.e6) 20.1:ίxgl lLJcS 2 1 ..!:f.dl ! lLJxb3+ 22.axb3 his king i s safe and he can quietly develop his attack.

1 9 ... .tc5? Continuing to move at blitz speed, Ljubojevic did not even attempt to delve more deeply into the position. But with the white king on e2, 1 9 . . . 1!fcS! was now very strong! For example, 20.e6 (on 20.lLJe4 there is the very unpleasant 20 .. .'iVbS+! and Black wins: 2 H iid2 lLJc4+ 22.�xc4 'iνxb2+ 23 .�d3 'iνxal 24.lLJf6+ �h8) 20 . . . 'iνf2+ 2 1 .�d3 lLJ8d7! 22.exd7 tι:Jxd7 23 .lLJe4 'iνd4+ and White stands badly.

20.tbe4 llJSd7 21 .1:1c1 1i'c6

You are in desperate time-trouble, and 22 .. . �bS+ is threatened. What do you do?

22 . .:.Xc5! The only correct reply!

22 ... tbxc5 23.tlJf6+ c;i;ιhθ 24.1i'h4 Now Black's position is so hopeless that the time factor ceases to be so important.


White's moves are sufficiently obvious that he can play them automatically.

24 ... 1i'b5+ 25.Φe3 h5 26.tbxh5 1i'xb3+ 27.axb3 ttJd5+ 28.Φd4 tbe6+ 29.Φχd5 tbxg5 30.tlJf6+ c;i;ιg7 31 .1i'xg5 1:1fd8 32.e6 fxe6+ 33.Φχe6 .:.ιs 34.d7 as 35.tlJg4 .:.S6+ 36. Φe5 1:1f5+ 37 .1i'xf5 gxf5 38.d81i' fxg4 39.1i'd7+ Φh6 40.1i'xb7 1:1g6 41 .f4 1 -0

Α remarkably surprising game and a no less dramatic finish! Black's risky opening choice was, strangely enough, completely correct. Ljubo has never been noted for his caution and cold-bloodedness, but on the other hand, he is superb in tactically complex positions. His very fast play must also have made a considerable impression on his suffering opponent. Everything went as might have been expected, but the sudden and unexpected draw offer deprived Ljubo of all of his sense of caution. He doubtless thought it was a last desperate chance for an opponent who had already 'shot his bolt'. In reality, once he realised that there was no possibility of compromise, Bronstein played on with desperate ingenuity and courage. Had the Yugoslav kept a clear head, he would have been able to find his way through the complications, especially as he had so much time on the clock. True bluff is always accompanied by excitement, but this must be kept under control. Defeat in this game had far-reaching consequences. Α distraught Ljubo collapsed at the finish of the tournament and never did reach the Candidates. Two subsequent victories in this same variation were only slim consolation for him. The lesson is clear: never let the excitement get the better of you!

75


ln all of these examples examined so far, one player (or both) has, at an early stage, wrenched the game out of normal channels and headed into tactical complications. In such situations, the value of each move rises sharply, and the player who is better prepared for such a turn of events gains the advantage. The term Όpening bluff' has silently acquired the meaning of precisely this kind of turn towards tactical complications. But no less interesting is the opposite approach, when the risk does not take such an obvious character. This next example is a kind of treat for true gourmets.

Game 33

Curt Hansen (261 5) Viktor Kortchnoi (2645) Malmί:i 1996 (5)

1 .d4 tiJf6 2.c4 e6 3.tiJf3 b6 4.g3 .tb7 s . .tg2 �e7 6.tiJc3 tiJe4 7.�d2 fS θ.dS tiJa6!?

This is whαt Viktor Kortchnoi wrote about Blαck's lαst move: 'Ι have to αdmit that Ι was bluffing in the opening. It is well-known that after 8 .. . �f6 9.'ii'c2 White obtαins the advantage, so Ι came up with the idea of the knight move to α6, so thαt after 9.'ii'c2 Ι could play 9 . . . t2Jb4 or 9 ... t2Jαc5.' And now the question: whαt exactly was the bluff in the greαt grandmaster's ideα?

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9.0-0 White plays the most natural move, and Black breathes a sigh of relief. But previously, Kortchnoi had run into an unpleasant surprise in this position: 9.dxe6! . This move becomes possible only because of the experimental knight jump to a6. Of course, he had prepared an improvement: 9 . . . t2Jac5! (9 ... dxe6 IO .'ii'a4+ 'ii'd7 1 I .'ii'xd7+ Wxd7 1 2 .t2Jxe4 .i.xe4 1 3 .t2JeS+ WcB 14 . .i.xe4 fxe4 1 5 .0-0-0 had occurred in the above-mentioned game and Black had eventually lost this unpleasant endgame in Alterman-Kortchnoi, Beer-Sheva 1992) I O.exd7+ 'ti'xd7 1 1 .�e3! (weaker is 1 I .'fi'c2 t2Jxd2 12 .'ti'xd2 'ii'xd2+ 1 3 .Φχd2 t2Je4+!+) 1 1 . . . t2Jxc3 1 2 .'ii'xd7+ t2Jxd7 1 3 .bxc3 .i.f6 and Black is hanging on, but a draw is the limit of his dreams. Kortchnoi was very much hoping that this would not happen in the game, and he was proved right!

9 ... 0-0 1 O . .:l.c1 .tf6 1 1 .a3 c6! This break was Kortchnoi 's whole idea. Standard measures such as 1 1 . . . exd5 1 2.cxd5 cS 13 .dxc6 dxc6 14.�f4! or 1 l . .. t2Jac5 1 2.Μ t2Jxc3 1 3 . .i.xc3 t2Je4 14.�xf6 'ii'xf6 15 .'ii'd4! do not achieve full equality.

1 2.dxe6 dxe6 1 3.1i'c2 cS 1 4 . .:1.fd1 1i'e7 1 5.tiJe1 tiJxd2 1 6.bb7

16 .1:ίχd2!?. 1 6 ... 1i'xb7 1 7.1i'xd2 .:l.adθ 1 8.'ife3 'ife7

One should not overrate the results of the opening experiment - Black has only achieved solid equality. But if one adds to this the positive emotions that come from a successful bluff (even if not such a serious one) , the chances of a successful outcome to the game are increased.

1 9. 'iff3 ltJbB! 20.ttJd3?!

Α significant inaccuracy. He should have exchanged all the rooks: 20.tίxd8 tlxd8 2 1 ..Ud1 . But how can White's mistake be exploited?

20 ... .ixc3! Α concrete decision! By exchanging off his lovely bishop, Black firrnly seizes the initiative.

21 .bxc3 Να better is the capture 2 1 .1:1xc3 e5 after which 22.e4? tbc6 23 .'iνg2 t2Jd4 24.Whl f4 leads to a large advantage for Black.

21 ... e5 22.e4 ltJc6 23.tbe1 fxe4 24. 'ffxe4 'iff7! 25. 'ffe2

After 25 .t2Jd3 a very strong reply is 25 . . . �f3! 26.'ifxf3 z:ιxf3 27.tbb2 l:ιxdl+ 28.t2Jxd Ι tίd3.

25 .. . .:.Xd1 26 . .:.Xd1 liJaS As a result of White's 21st rnove, the square d4 is not available to the white knight, but in return, there is now a weakness ση c4.

27.lbg2 tbxc4 28.tbe3 tbxa3 29.c4 b5! 30.:1.d5

30.cxb5 t2Jxb5. 30 ... tbxc4 31 . .:.Xc5 tbxe3 32. 'ifxe3 a6 33 . .:.Xe5 'iff3

The position is technically winning for Black, and realising his advantages is not usually a problern for Kortchnoi.


Nor is this garne an exception. 34. 'ifb6 h6 35.:1.e7 'ifd1 + 36.'ίtg2 'ifd5+ 37 . ..t>g1 :l.cβ 38.:1.e1 'ifc6 39. 'iνd4 'ifb7 40.h4 b4 41 . ..t>h2 b3 42.:1.e2 :l.c1 43. 'iνdβ+ ..t>h7 44. 'ifd3+ g6 45.f3 b2 46.h5 b1 'if 47.hxg6+ ..t>g7 48. 'ifd4+ Φχg6 49. 'ifd6+ 'ίΡ17 50. �h3

And White resigned.

What is special about this game? It is cornpletely devoid of the outward effects, which were typical of the previous exarnples in this chapter. And in what did Black's risk-taking really consist? In an inferior, but objectively defensible endgarne? In reality, what Kortchnoi showed here was piloting of the highest class. After delving deeply into the nuances of the position in his preparation, he thought up a far frorn obvious irnprovernent, and with its help favourably solved his opening problerns. Then he outplayed his opponent frorn an equal position -the rnark of a great rnaster!

It rnay seern that such an approach is rnore characteristic of the previous century, whereas the rnodern fashion if rnore for 'rnove by rnove' battles. Avoiding the rnain line given by SF can often result in irnrnediate defeat. We have already exarnined several exarnples of this in the present chapter. But history advances by rneans of spirals. And the strongest players of today, led by Magnus Carlsen, are turning back to the earlier approach, where the hurnan cornes up with the initial idea, and SF just follows along behind.

Here are two typical exarnples, taken frorn the last Candidates' tournarnent.

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Game 34

Veselin Topalov (2785) Vladimir Kramnik (2787) Khanty-Mansiysk ct 2014 (6)

1 .d4 tiJf6 2.c4 e6 3.tiJf3 d5 4.tiJc3 i.e7 5.i.f4 0-0 6.e3 tiJbd7 7.c5 tiJhS 8.i.e5!?

This is not actually a novelty, but it is a pretty rare move all the same_ At grandmaster level, 8 .�d3 is almost exclusively played.

8 ... c6 9.i.d3 g6 9 ... [6 10.�g3 fS was seen a century and more ago! Although this was in a World Championship match, both sides' play is not above criticism. After l l .lLJgS? t2Jdf6? (Steinitz-Chigorin, 1 7th match game, Nuremberg 1896) White eventually won. Had Chigorin found the simple l l .. _l2Jxc5! , the outcome would probably have been different.

The text move is probably strongest and was probably foreseen by Topalov in his preparation. Try to guess what he had in mind.

1 0.h4!? This is a real novelty! The move is shocking in its paradox. What is the move - the start of a kingside pawn storm with g2-g4 or just preparation of a retreat for the bishop to h2?

1 0 ... f5

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Kramnik decides it is the first and so with his last move, he radically stops the advance of the g-pawn. He could also have killed two birds with one stone: lO . . . tiJxeS! l l .lLJxeS f6 1 2.tiJf3 e5! after which the only one likely to have any problems is White.

analysis diagram

However, the surprise factor proved decisive in this game. Topalov's bluff worked 100%.

1 1 .i.h2! Now the dark-squared bishops survives, as if by a miracle, and is a serious bone in Black 's throat.

1 1 . . . b6?! Α further inaccuracy. Black had a pleasant choice between taking the pawn with l l . . . �xh4!? 1 2.ifc2 �[6 (although in this case, after 1 3 .0-0-0 White has excellent attacking prospects), or the double-edged l l . . . f4! ?.

1 2.b4 f4 Now 12 . . . �xh4 is already too dangerous because of 13 .bS! �b7 14.'ti'a4.

1 3.0-0 a5? Continuing his series of unsuccessful moves. Good or bad, he had to take the pawn with 1 3 .. . �xh4.

1 4.b5! Kramnik must have underestimated this move.

1 4 ... bxc5 15.bxc6 tiJb8 16.i.b5! i.a6

Probably the decisive mistake, although Black's position is already extremely dangerous.

1 7.a4 'ifc8 1 8.dxc5! Even stronger than the natural 1 8 .lLJeS, which was also good.

1 8 ... ltJxc6 1 9.ltJxd5 exd5 20. 'ifxd5+ �hθ 21 . 'ifxc6 'ifxc6 22 . .b:c6 :Scθ

The lesser evil was 22 . . . �xfl 23 . .ixa8 �a6.

23 . ..tb5 .b:b5 24.axb5 .b:c5 25.:Xa5 fxe3 26.fxe3 .b:e3+ 27.�h1 J:c2?

He could retain some saving chances after 27 . . . t2Jf6.

28.J:b1 Now it is all over.

28 ... J:fc8 29.:Sa1 ..tb6 30 . ..te5+ �gθ 31 .:&6 ..te3 32.b6 J:c1 + 33.:Xc1 :Xc1 + 34.�h2 J:b1 35.g4 ..tf4+ 36.�g2 .b:e5 37.ltJxe5 llJf4+ 38.�3 llJe6 39.b7 J:b3+ 40.�2 J:b2+ 41 .�e3 1 -0

Starting from his 1 5th move, White effectively had already begun the process of realising his advantage (which he managed almost faultlessly, by the way). But how did Topalov manage to get a substantial advantage so quickly, in a quiet opening, against one of the world's best-prepared players? After all, the game did not feature any spectacular sacrifices or extreme complications. The game was effectively decided by a paradoxical opening idea, which, strictly speaking, was not fully correct. But the surprise factor is so great in modern-day chess that such bluffs are usually very effective.

The following game had great sporting significance. The ex-World Cham-


pion was confidently leading after the first cycle, and Aronian needed a win at all costs. Declining to go down well-known variations, from the early moves, he headed into unknown and risky waters.

Game 35

Levon Aronian (2830) Viswanathan Anand (2770) Khanty-Mansiysk ct 2014 (θ)

1 .c4 c6 2.llJf3 d5 3. 'ifb3!? In his previous white game in this tournament, against Andreikin, Aronian played 3 .g3 , allowing 3 . . . dxc4. He was probably not satisfied with the results of the opening from that game, although he may just have wanted to get away from theory as quickly as possible in this highly important game.

3 ... d4!? 4.e3 c5

Cαn one justify the queen's position ση b3 somehow?

5.'ifb5+?! This idea looks dubious just at a glance! In addition, such play is not at all in Aronian's style. White probably decided on this bluff at the board. It is a case where creative principles have to be sacrificed for sporting considerations.

5 ... llJc6 6. 'ifxc5 e5 7. 'ifb5 a6 8.'ifb3

79

R.isk & Bluff in Chess

19.f4!? leads to a sharp position with mutual chances. Even more in the spirit of the position was 19.a4!?. Certainly, here too Black retains positional compensation for the pawn, but a long and complicated battle would lie ahead, with an unpredictable outcome.

8 .. . ..ic5

Α strange game, which raises many questions. What was the point ofWhite' s third move? Το defend the pawn? But isn't it dynamic positions with lively piece play which are the Armenian's trademark? It seems to me as though the queen check, followed by capturing on c5, was not home preparation, but ΟΤΒ inspiration. The resulting position cannot have given Aronian any very positive emotions, and he would probably have been quite happy to switch colours with his opponent. This led to him agreeing a draw in a position where Carlsen would have been rubbing his hands with glee. It is clear that in this game, the opening bluff was not a well-thought out decision, but a chance idea. As a result, it was almost doomed to failure.

Black has excellent compensation for the pawn, and now he could pose his opponent more serious problems with 8 . . . tbf6! 9.exd4 (9.d3 �b4+ 10.�d2 .ixd2+ l l .tbbxd2 dxe3 1 2.fxe3 tbg4! does not solve the problems) 9 ... e4 10.d5 exf3 l l .dxc6 ..tcS! . Anand's move is less principled.

9.d3 ltJf6 1 O.e4!? 0-0 1 1 . .te2 ..ib4+ 1 2.ltJbd2 a5 1 3.0-0 ttJd7 1 4.'iνd1 ..id6 1 5.llJe1 ltJcS 1 6.ltJb3 ltJa6 1 7.ttJd2 ttJcs 1 8.ltJb3 ttJa6 1 9.ltJd2?!

Draw agreed.

80

Conclusion What is meant by opening bluff in today's chess? Most often, it is when, in preparing for a concrete game with a concrete opponent, the player decides on an extremely risky continuation , in full awareness of the possible consequences. But like everything totally pure and distilled, this rarely happens in real life. In the Introduction , we gave the famous game KarpovKasparov, in which a common sense interpretation would suggest exactly this unique form of opening bluff. Alas, things turned out to be much simpler and more understandable from a human viewpoint. The team simply blundered in their analysis before the game, and as a result of this blunder, a true chess masterpiece ended up being born. One is reminded of Anna Akhmatova's lines: Ίf only you knew what trash gives rise I Το verse, without a tinge of shame' .

In our day, such a situation is simply impossible. SF points out 1 2 . �e3 !

instantly, as its first line. It is impossible to miss the move, unless one deliberately decides to ignore the computer, which is not going to happen. Such opportunities for computer preparation are now available not j ust


to the world's top players, but to any amateur who is not afraid of technical progress. As a result, it is much more difficult now to surprise an opponent. On tl1e other hand, if you do manage to catch someone out, the effect of the surprise is all the greater. After all, the opponent has the same information sources and databases as are available to you, so he can see the same moves and the same computer assessments of the resulting positions. Consequently, tl1e first reaction to a surprise in the opening is usually the standard one: Ί have probably looked at this, but have forgotten it' . However, once it proves impossible to drag anything up from the memory, the panic starts. Νο doubt the opponent has penetrated the secrets of the position more deeply than you, and he is armed to tl1e teeth against every possible continuation and remembers every variation perfectly. Meanwl1ile, you are forced, like a blind man, to grope around for the correct continuation, which the opponent already knows.

So how should one retain a cool l1ead in such situations? The main thing is not to panic. Every cloud has a silver lining. The opponent l1as played a new move in a position which you have analysed in depth with the computer? Well, surely then, his move does not feature among the first tlπee choices of the computer, else you would remember it. So, that means the novelty is almost certainly not so deadly, and he is relying mainly on the effect of surprise. Therefore, forget about SF, switch on your own brain at once, and react in accordance with your own understanding of the game, your own style and your own mood at the moment in question.

Of course, there are some variations, in which the price of each move is unusually high, and knowing tl1e correct answer is better than stumbling around in the dark. And, if you are stupid enough to like such exceptional variations, then there is sometimes a price to play for tl1is pleasure. Countless hours spent in front of the computer screen, countless more learning numerous computer variations, which often have internal logic to them. But even fulfilling all these conditions cannot guarantee you will never be caught by surprise. In double-edged forcing positions, the danger multiplies many times over.

However, even here, there is no sense in losing your head. If a desperate opponent sacrifices two pieces in a well-known variation, and then six moves later plays a move you have not seen before, there is no need to resign. More than likely his novelty simply means that, with the help of SF, he has found another, less obvious way to equalise, as that is the logical outcome of all ultra-sharp opening variations. So, search, and the draw will be your reward for passing the examination. However, periodic defeats resulting from such an approach are inevitable. After all, man is not a computer, and memory lapses are unavoidable. But this author will not accept any complains from his readers on this score - you have been warned!

8 1


Chapter 3

The Madness of the Brave

In this chapter, we will focus on positions in which there is absolutely no necessity for risky action. Indeed, typically, there is a quiet and natural plan which stands out on the surface. But for unknown reasons, the player ignores the standard logic and takes aπ unexpected decision, sharply changing the material balance on the board. Mikhail Tal frequently used such a device, and we will start with a famous example from his play. Ι would remind you that this was played in the penultimate, 27th round of the Candidates' tournament, and had enormous sporting significance, in terms of the battle for first place.

82

Game 36

Robert Fischer Mikhaii Tal Bled-Zagreb-Belgrade ct 1959 (27)

1 .e4 c5 2.tbf3 d6 3.d4 cxd4 4.tbxd4 tbf6 5. tbc3 a6 6 . .tc4 e6 7 . .tb3 b5 8.f4 b4 9.tba4 tbxe4

In those long-lost days, this was all virgin land, in which the first furrows were just being made. But even in those circumstances, the choice of such a sharp line was a huge risk, especially taking into account the tournament situation at that moment.

1 0.0-ο g6 1 1 .f5! gxf5 12.tbxf5 .:.gs White has a very dangerous attack, for just one pawn. Things are completely bad for Black after 1 2 . . . exf5 1 3 .'ifdS na7 14.'ifd4. But the text is also extremely optimistic. There were better chances of a successful defence after 1 2 . . . 'ifc7!? 13 .'ifd4 l::f.g8 or 12 . . . d5.

1 3 . .td5! .:.a7 The only move! It is hopeless after 13 . . . exdS 14.'ifxd5 �xfS lS . .t:ίxfS .!::l.a7 16.'ifxe4+ �e7 1 7.'it'xb4 1:f.e2 1 8 .1:tf2 ! . Black is a pawn down with a bad position.

1 4.be4?! The variation pointed out by Fischer, 14.i.e3 tbcS (the inventive defence 14 . . . it.b7 is insufficient because of 1 S .c4!) l S .'ifhS 1:f.g6 (1 S . . . tbxa4

Chapter 3 -The Madness of the Brave

16 . .Άχa7 exdS 1 7.1:f.ael+) 16 .1:f.ael , is very convincing. White has a very strong attack and he has only sacrificed one pawn. For example, 16 . . . 1:f.c7 1 7.'ifxh7 tbxa4 1 8.it.h6! 1:f.xh6 19.tbxh6 'ifh4 20 . .Άχe6.

1 4 ... exf5 1 5.bf5 White has a pleasant choice - there were also lS .it.dS!? and 1S .i.f3 !?.

1 5 ... .:.e7 1 6.bc8 The first step in the wrong direction. Stronger was 1 6.c3 i.b7 1 7.i.h3.

1 6 ... 'ifxc8 1 7 . .tf4?! And this is the second! The quiet continuation 1 7.c3 'ifb7 18 .1:f.f2 promised White a comfortable advantage, with no risk. But one should not forget that this calm diagnosis is the result of analysis by dozens of people, over more than half a century.

1 7 ... 'ifc6 1 8.1!Vf3

Δ Δ Δ �

Can the knight sacri/ice be accepted?

18 ... 'it'xa4! Extremely risky, but at the same time, the only choice for Tal. Exchanging queens into a slightly worse ending would be a betrayal of himself. Fischer, by contrast, considered accepting the sacrifice to be suicide, so his opponent's choice came as a great shock.

1 9.bd6 'it'c6 20.bb8 'ifb6+ 21 .'iiί>h1 'it'xbθ

8 3


Δ Δ Δ :t;t

During the game, both players were in doubt that White's attack should be decisive. The main question was in the details - which of the two natural continuations - 22.'ifc6+ or 22.1:tae1 - leads to victory? It was just at this moment that the following pantomime took place: 'First Fischer wrote down the move 22.1:tae1! , which is undoubtedly strongest, but he wrote it not in his usual descriptive notation, but in algebraic, and, moreover, in Russian script! Αηd he quite openly allowed me to see his scoresheet' - Τα!. Do you agree with this assessment of the critical position?

22.1!fc6+!?

Tal passes this theatrical exam! What should he do? Ί could see that Fischer very much wanted to know my opinion ofhis decision, so Ι just got up from the board, walked around, exchanged a joke with another player, whilst glancing at the

84

demonstration board, and then, with a satisfied look on my face, Ι returned to my seat. Ι noted how Fischer was watching me the entire time, rather than calculating variations. Once again, Fischer stared at me (Ι just did nothing), and then... picked up his pen, crossed out his intended move, and gave the queen check! ' One of the greatest psychological duels in chess. One must recall that in 1959, Fischer was very young, only a junior actor at a provincial theatre company, as it were. Α decade or so later, he had become a world-famous actor! As for the pure chess aspects of this drama, it was only many years later that the truth was uncovered, with SF taking a significant part in the affair. Thus: 22.1:tae1 ! ? Φd8! 23.1:tdl+ (after 23.1:txe7 �xe7 24.'iVdS+ .id6 2S.l:rf6 Black defends successfully with the aid of 25 .. . 1:ίg6!) 23 . . . Φc7 24.'iVf4+ (24.1:td4 'ifb7) 24 . . . Φb7 25.1:td6 'ife8 ! (Fischer gave 25 . . . 'ifc7 26.'ifxb4+ Φc8 27.l::rxa6 'ifb7 28.'i:Vxb7+ Φχb7 29.1:taf6 1:tg7=) 26.'iff3+ (26.'iVxb4+ 'ifbs 27.'ifxb5+ axbS+) 26 . . . 1:te4 27.1:tf6 Φb8 and White must fight for a draw. Thus, 22.1:tael was not as strong as Tal thought during the game.

22 ... :d7 23.:Se1 + Also insufficient is 23.1:tadl? 24.'ifxd7+ 'iVxd7 25.1:txd7 26.1:ίχf7+ id..e7 27.�xh7 �c8, 23.�xf7? 'i:Vd6 is even worse.

23 ... �e7 24 . .:Xf7?

'ifb7! Φχd7 whilst

Only this move can be considered a serious mistake. Black's task is much more complicated after 24.'iff6! Φd8 (24 . . . �f8 2S .'ifxa6) 2S.'ifxf7 1:te8 26.'ifxh7 with a double-edged position.

24 ... '1tt>xf7 25.1!fe6+ 2S.'ifxd7 'ifd6! .

25 .. . �f8 26.1i'xd7 'ifd6 27.1i'b7 .Z:.g6 28.c3 a5 29. 1Wc8+

Black 's position is technically winning. Stronger, in Fischer's opinion, was 29.cxb4 �xb4 (29 . . . axb4 30.a3 bxa3 3 1 .bxa3 �xa3) 30.'tWf3+ �g7 31 .'tWe2 .id6.

29 .. . �g7 30.'ifc4 ..idθ 31 .cxb4 axb4 32.g3?

More tenacious is 32 .�e4 .ic7 33 .�e7+ Φg8 34.�e8+ �f8 35 .'tWe4.

32 .. . 1Wc6+ 33 . .J:te4 'ifxc4 34.:Xc4 .Z:.b6! 35.�g2 'ίtf6 36.�3 �e5 37.�e3 ..ig5+ 38.�e2 �d5 39.�d3 ..if6 40 . .Z:.c2 ..ie5 41 . .Z:.e2 .Z:.f6 42 . .Z:.c2 .Z:.f3+ 43.�e2 .Z:.f7 44.�d3 ..id4 45.a3 b3 46 . .Z:.c8 ..ixb2 47 . .Z:.d8+ �c6 48 . .Z:.b8 .Z:.f3+ 49.�c4 .Z:.c3+ 50.�b4 �c7 51 . .Z:.b5 ..ia1 52.a4 b2 0-1

Tal's rniraculous escape had far-reaching consequences for chess history: he won the Candidates' tournarnent, and then the World Charnpionship itself. As for the garne itself and its interest for our therne, the psychological battle, so beautifully described by the winner, certainly played its role in the result of the garne. But the rnain thing, in rny view, is that even in his best years, Bobby strove to avoid wild cornplications and preferred sirnple and clear decisions. Misha, on the other hand, felt like a fish in water in such cornplicated positions. Thus his bluff (and, as shown, the serious risk) had serious justification.

Indirect confirrnation of the Fischer approach to chess is provided by the following garne, even though it was played long before anyone in the chess world had heard of the Arnerican.

Chapter 3 - The Madness of the Brave

Game 37

Leonid Shamkovich Vladimir Simagin Leningrad 1951

1 .d4 li::!f6 2.c4 g6 3.liJc3 d5 4.li::!f3 ..ig7 5.1i'b3 dxc4 6.'ifxc4 0-0 7.e4 ..ig4 8 . ..ie3 li::!fd7 9. 'iVb3 ..ixf3 1 0.gxf3 liJc6 1 1 . .Z:.d1 e5 1 2.dxe5 liJcxe5 1 3 . ..ih3 liJxf3+ 1 4. �e2 li::!fe5 1 5 . ..ixd7 liJxd7 1 6.'iVb5 c6 1 7.'ifxb7 .Ζ:.bθ 1 8.'ifxd7 :Xb2+ 1 9.�1

What should Black play? After the exchange of queens, α draw is inevitable.

However . . . 1 9 .. . 'iff6!?

19 . . . 'tWxd7 20 . .1:lxd7 .ixc3 2 1 .1::!.xa7 �e8 22.1:ta4= occurred in a garne EvansFischer, US Charnpionship, New York 1962/63. It seerns that the future World Charnpion, who usually eschewed risk, did not even consider the dubious-looking piece sacrifice.

20. liJa4? As often happens in such situations, the sudden change in the garne produces rnistakes. However, the following analysis shows that the sacrifice has a full right to exist. The rnost natural reply 20 . .id4 leads to equality: 20 . . . �f3 (or 20 . . . �h4 2 I .ti:Jds cxdS 22 . .ixb2 �xb2 23 .'tWxd5 �h3+

85


24.Φe2 'ifg4+ =) 2l .�gl .1::f.c2 22.1:tg3 ! 'iνhl+ 23.�gl 'iif3 . Less clear are the consequences of 20 . .1::f.d3!? 'iff3 !? (20 . . . l:tc2!?) 2l .Φgl ! (21 . .1::f.gl? .Άχc3 ! 22 . .1::f.xc3 1::tfb8! 23 .'iixc6 .l::i.d8!) 2 1 . .. 1:1c2 22.�xa7 'iff4 23 . .ie3 'ifh4. Even here, Black has fully adequate compensation for the piece.

20 ... .:.Xa2 It is not clear exactly what Shamkovich missed, but after this simple move, White's position collapses.

21 .ltJc5 2l .Φg2 .1::f.xa4.

21 ... 'iff3 22. �g1 ..thβ! 23 . ..td4 'ifxd1 + 24.�g2 'ifd2 25.'ifd6 ..te3 26.tαl7 1i'xf2+ 27.�h3 ... g2+

White resigned.

Grandmaster Simagin was well known for his non-standard thinking aπd highly interestiπg decisions. Admittedly, his sportiπg results fell significaπtly short of his creative achievemeπts, but in this case, the risk proved justified and brought him a well-deserved success. Several talented masters, amoπg them none other than Mikhail Tal, developed uπder his influeπce, which gave them aπ extra stimulation to improve. Leoπid Stein was one of the most strikiπg representatives of this new wave.

Game 38

Leonid Stein Salo Flohr Kieν ch·UKR 1 957

1 .e4 cβ 2.d4 d5 3.ltJc3 dxe4 4.tbxe4 tαl7 5 . ..tc4 ttJgfβ 6.ttJg5 eβ 7. •e2 'ife7 8 . ..td2 bβ 9.0-0-0 ..tb7 1 0.tlJ1 f3 hβ

86

In this position, typical for the 4 .. . t2Jd7 CaroKann, the only thing that rαises any eyebrows is the odd position of the queen on e7. Does this give White additional possibilities?

1 1 . ..tb4!? The normal continuation was l l .t2Je4 t2Jxe4 12 .'it'xe4 t2Jf6 13 .'ifh4 with some advantage. But if you examiπe sacrifices, then aπother interestiπg possibility is l l .t2Jxe6!? fxe6 1 2 .t2Jh4! (weaker is 1 2 . .ixe6 0-0-0) 1 2 . . . Φf7 1 3 . .1::f.hel t2Jd5 14 . .id3! with obvious compeπsatioπ.

1 1 ... c5 The only reply! Takiπg is bad: l l . .. 'iνxb4 12 .t2Jxf7 'iνxc4 (12 . . . Φχf7 1 3 .'ifxe6+ Φg6 14 . .iild3+ Φhs ιs .'ifh3#) 13 .'5'xc4 Φχf7 14.t2Je5+ t2Jxe5 1 5 .dxe5 t2Jd5 16.'5'g4 b5 1 7 . .1::f.d3 aπd the queeπ is much stroπger than Black's three pieces.

1 2.dxc5 bxc5 1 2 . . . hxg5 13 .c6 'ifxb4 14.cxd7+ t2Jxd7 1 5 . .ixe6 0-0-0 16 . .ixd7+ Φc7 does not solve the problems, because of the reply 1 7.t2Jd4! wheπ the piece caππot be takeπ: 17 . . . 1:1xd7 1 8 .t2Jb5+ Φd8 19 . .ί:!χd7+ Φχd7 20.1:ldl+ and Black loses. Otherwise, White has an extra pawn and aπ uπstoppable attack.

4J Δ Δ Δ Wi Δ Δ Δ

Φ 1d 1d

But what should White do now, when he has two pieces attacked?

1 3 . .b:c5! An essential continuation of the combination.

13 ... liJxc5 Of course, not 1 3 .. . 'ifxc5? because of 14.tΔxf7 ! with a crush.

1 4.lLJe5! White also had to see this strong move, when he played l l .�b4.

1 4 ... l2Jfd7? Good or bad, the move 14 ... hxg5! was essential, after which the price of every move for both sides increases sharply. Let us try to continue the variation: 15 .�b5+ tt:Jfd7.

Δ Δ Δ Ψιi Δ Δ Δ Φ 1d 1d

analysis diagram

Α) The incautious 16.tt:Jxd7? now even loses after 16 . . . 0-0-0!;


Β) Butperfectlypossiblewas 16 .�xd7+ tt:Jxd7 17.�xd7 'iVb4 (1 7 . . . ii'xd7 takes play into the main line) 1 8.a3 ii'b6 19.�xf7 with double-edged play; C) 16.�xd7! (most unpleasant for

Black!) 16 .. . tt:Jxd7 1 7.�xd7+ '>t>d8?! (more cautious is 17 .. . ii'xd7 18 .tt:Jxd7 '>t>xd7 and Black holds: 1 9.!Idl+ �d6 20.'iib5+ �c6 2 l .�xg5 �hd8! 22 .ii'xg7 '>t>e8) 18 . ..tc6! (after 1 8 .t2Jc6+!? .ixc6 19 . ..txc6 �b8 20.�dl+ '>t>c7 2 1 .ii'e5+ \t>xc6 22.'ifxb8 White's activity is sufficient for equality) 1 8 . . . \t>c?! (Black loses after 18 . . . \t>c8 19.�b5 �b8 20.�d7+ '>t>c7 2 1 .'iia5+ \t>d6 22 .b4! .id5 23 .�e1) 19.�xb7 �b8! 20.t2Jc6! ii'e8 2 l .t2Jxb8 '>t>xb7 22.�dl ! '>t>xb8 23.Ιιd3! and the logical outcome of the complications is an endgame with an extra pawn for White, which is reached after 23 . . . .ί:ίh4 24.�b3+ �b4 25 .�e5+ '>t>b7 26 . .U.xb4+ �xb4 27.�e4+.

1 5.lL\gxf7 liJxeS Weaker is 1 5 . . . �h7 16 . .ib5 �c8 1 7.b4.

1 6.liJxe5 1i'g5+ The best. 1 6 ... Vi'f6 1 7.�h5+ \t>e7 18 .t2Jc6+! �xc6 19.'ifxc5+ '>t>f7 20.�xc6 loses quite simply.

1 7.f4! 1i'xf4+ 18.�b1 �e4! Once again the only defence. After 1 8 . . . �d6, both 19.'iih5+ and 19 . .ib5+ win.

Δ Δ 1d

White hαs several ways to develop his αttαck. Which would you prefer?

87


1 9.'ifh5+?! The natural move, but it loses a large part of the advantage. The correct plan was the non-trivial 19.�bS+! �el 20.tbd7! - this unexpected move decides the game at once.

1 9 ... g6

.! . ... .! .t. •

Find the best continuation for White in this position.

20 . .tb5+ Stein's desire to simplify the variations he has to calculate is understandable. But objectively stronger was 20.tbxg6! , after which Black loses after both 20 ... �xc2+ 21.'.�ixc2 "iVxc4+ 22 .�bl 'i!Ve4+ 23.�al 'iifs 24."iVxfS exfS 2S .lbxh8 and 20 .. . �xg6 2 l ."iVxg6+ 'iνfl {2l . . . �e7 22.1:ίhfl) 22.�bS+ �el 23 .'i!Vg3. The only defence is 20 . . . "iVgS! . Now White needs to show exceptional bravery: 2 l .�bS+! (2l ."iVxgS hxgS 22 .lbxh8 �g7 is insufficient) 2l . . . �f7 22.tbeS+! (he loses his advantage after 22 .lbxh8+ �g7) 22 .. . �f6 23.1:lhfl+ �xeS 24."iνh3! with a strong attack. Of course, it is easier to offer advice with SF running beside you than to take such decisions at the board, with the clock ticking.

20 ... Φe7 21 .tlJxg6+ ..bg6 22.'ifxc5+

88

22.'iixg6? 'i!Vgs. 22 . . . Φf7 23.'ifc6 'We4 24.'ifd7+ Φgθ 25 . .td3 'Wg4 26.h3 'ifg5 27.'Wxe6+ j}_f7 28.'Wc6 .l:tbθ 29.'it'c7 .l:tb6

Black has managed to evade the direct threats and the position has balanced out, but White continues to play for a win, out of inertia .

.� Δ Δ Δ

ςt( �

30 . .tc4?!

Δ Δ

�

30.'iνxa7 'i!VcS looks dangerous, but 30.b3 or 30.1::f.hfl were both very solid.

30 ... .1:th7 31 . .1:thf1 .l:tf6 32.:Xf6 'ifxf6 33 . .1:tf1 ??

Α terrible mistake. 33.a3 retains dynamic equality.

33 ... 'it'xf1 +! 0-1

Α dramatic game! Unfortunately, Stein never entirely succeeded in ridding himself of the impulsiveness and instability which affected him in his youth, and it was these weaknesses that prevented him from fully realising his colossal natural talent. Tal's triumphant march to Olympus also gave confidence to Stein, who understood that he could also be successful without having to abandon his natural style, despite the criticism from others. Stein's trademark was sharp, dynamic positions, in which both his fantasy and his pieces had full scope.

Game 39

Nikolay Krogius Leonid Stein Kiev RSFSR-UKR 1960

1 .d4 tί:\f6 2.c4 g6 3.tί:\c3 �g7 4.e4 0-0 s . .te2 d6 6.tί:\f3 e5 7.d5 h6 8.0-0 tί:\h7 9.tί:\e1 tί:\d7 1 O.tί:\d3 f5 1 1 .f3 f4 1 2.b4 :11 1 3.c5 tί:\df6 1 4.c6 bxc6 1 5.dxc6 .te6 1 6.b5 �fθ 1 7.tί:\b4

We hαve α cornplicαted, typica] King's Indiαn position. Whαt plαn would you choose for Blαck?

The multi-purpose move 1 7 . . . h5 most accords with the character of the position. However, with an unexpected central breakthrough, Stein provokes an immediate crisis.

1 7 .. . d5!? 1 8.tί:\bxd5 One of the points of similar sacrifices is that the character of the position changes sharply, and the value of each move greatly increases. Thus, here White must choose between three roughly equivalent continuations. As well as the move in the game, both 1 8 .exd5 �c5+ ( 18 . . . .ixb4 1 9.dxe6) 1 9.Φhl �fs 20 .lt:Jd3 (20.'ifb3? lt:JhS !) 20 . . . �d4 21 . .ib2 and 1 8 .lt:Jcxd5 .icS+ 1 9.Φhl ltJhS 20 .'iνel are quite good.

1 8 ... �c5+ 19.'iii>h1 tί:\h5 20. 'We1

Chαpter 3 - The Mαdness of the Brαve

Ξ 'iV • i i Ξ �

Δ .t i i Δ .t tLJ l �

Δ i !Ι] Δ

Δ iι Δ Δ Μ iι � Μ φ

Whαt hαs Blαck αchieved with his sαcrifice, αnd how shou]d he continue?

20 ... tί:\g3+!? Α typical King's Indian approach to the position! Νο half-measures, do or die! Α quiet continuation such as 20 ... lt:J7f6 2 1 .�c4 favours White.

21 .hxg3 'Wg5 22.g4 h5 23.g3! hxg4 24.'iii>g2 :ate 2s.�d2

Black has no obvious threats, so a natural developing move should not usually attract criticism. But in reality, the only way to retain the advantage was with the far-from-obvious 25 . .ί::r.hl ! , for example 25 . . . lt:Jf6 (25 . . . gxf3+ 26.�xf3 .ig4 is bad because of 27.�xg4 'ifxg4 28.1:th4) 26.lt:Jxf4! gxf3+ 27 . .ixf3 �g4 28 . .ixg4 lt:Jxg4 29.lt:Jh3 'iνhs 30.�d2 and Black 's attack runs into a dead end.

However, now Blαck hαs α difficu]t choice. How should he continue?

89


25 ... 'ifh6? Freeing the square gS for the knight. But in the process, the queen moves from the epicentre of the battle, which proves the more important factor. He should have played 2S . . . gxf3+! . Best is 26 . .!::!.xf3 ! (the natural 26 . .Άχf3 is met by 26 .. . .Άg4, after which White loses in the event of 27.Ψ!fe2? (relatively best is 27.::thl .Άχf3+ 28.Φχf3 fxg3+ 29.Φe2 .ί::rf2+ 30.Φd3 .!:I8f3+ 3H!;>c2 although even here, 3 l . . . g2 guarantees Black the advantage) 27 ... ikh3+ 28 .Φhl tbf6! , decisively bringing the rook to the h-file) 26 . . . Ψ!/g4! with sufficient counterplay, for example: 27.Ψ!/hl tbgs 28 .1:lxf4 Ψ!/h3+ 29.Ψ!/χh3 .Άχh3+ 30.Φh2 exf4 3 l .gxf4 ike6! . The resulting very sharp position is hard to assess.

26.:h1 The most natural continuation, and not bad, but even stronger was 26.fxg4! tbgs 27.Ilhl Ψ!/g7 2s . .Άd1 ! .

26 . . . 'ifg7 27.gxf4 exf4 28.:d1 Non-standard positions, as a rule, require non-standard decisions! The unexpected 28.tba4! .Άd4 29 . .Άc3 .ΆxdS 30.exd5 �e8 3 l .Ψ!/d2 I:!.xe2+ 32 .Ψ!/χe2 ikxc3 33 . .ϊ::!.afl ! retains the advantage.

28 ... g5! Now the position again becomes razorsharp.

90

29.e5! 'Wxe5? Α serious mistake, which could have had a decisive effect on the result of the game. It was essential to play 29 .. . gxf3+! 30 . .Άχf3 g4 3l ..Άe4 f3+ 32.Φfl g3 ! . The following long variation i s almost forced: 33 . .Άχh7+ Ψ!lxh7 34.Ψ!/χg3+ Ii'.g7 3S.tbe7+! ikxe7 36.�xh7 .Άc4+ 37.Φf2 .ΆcS+ 38 . .Άe3 ikxe3+ 39.Φχe3 l:Ixg3 40.tbe4 Φχh7 4l .tbxg3 .ΆxbS 42.l:ιd7+ Φg6 43 .1:lxc7 f2 44 . .!::!.xa7 flΨ!/ 4S.tbxfl 1:rxfl=.

30.fxg4? Α mistake in return! 30 . .Άd3 ! gxf3+ (30 . . . Ψ!/d6 3 l ..!:f.h6!) 3 l .Φfl wins.

30 .. . 'Wxe2+! 31 . 'ifxe2 3l .tbxe2! .ΆxdS+ 32.Φfl .Άxhl looks very dangerous for White, but 33 .ikb4! equalises the chances: 33 ... f3 34 . .Άχc5 fxe2+ 35 .Φχe2 1:1e8+ 36.ike3 �f3+ 37.Φd3 .Άxdl 38 .Ψ!/xdl 1:1d8+ 39 . .Άd4 .tlf4 40.Ψ!ib3+ Φf8 41 .Ψ!/a3+ Φe8 42.Ψ!/χa7.

31 ... f3+ 32.'ifxf3 :Xf3 33.:ht1 ? Only the cold-blooded 33 . .Άel ! retains chances of a successful defence.

33 ... ..bg4 Now White cannot avoid material loss.

34.ltJe4 ..th3+ 35.'iith2 :Xf1 36.:Xf1 ..txf1 37.ttJxc5 :t2+ 38.'iitg1 :Xd2 39.ttJxc7 ..th3 40.a4 :g2+ 41 .'iith1 tlJf6 42.a5 tlJg4 43.ltJe4 :e2 0-1

As these last two games have shown, Stein's great qualities were his imagination and his outstanding intuition. They often predominated in the taking of responsible decisions. As a result, he played many striking masterpieces, but occasionally suffered shameful lapses. Over the years, Stein never lost his love of risk, but he gathered the necessary experience. Bluff needs to be undertaken with a cool head. The following game is a good example of the play of the mature Stein.

Game 40

Leonid Stein Vlastimil Hort Los Angeles pff 1968 {2)

1 .e4 c6 2.d3 d5 3.tαl2 g6 4.g3 i.g7 5.i.g2 es 6.liJgf3 tι:Β7 7.0-0 0-0 θ.c3 tαl7 9.b4 b6 1 O.i.b2 i.b7 1 1 . .:e1 .:es 1 2.i.h3 'iic7 1 3.exd5 cxd5 1 4.c4 d4 1 5 . .:tc1 f5 1 6. i.g2 i.f6 1 7.c5 b5 1 8.tlJb3 i.d5 1 9.a4 a6 20.tlJa5 tlJc6 21 .axb5 axb5

Black 's position looks magnificent: α strong pawn centre, superbly mobilised pieces, and at the same time White's main trump, the passed pawn ση cS, is securely blockaded. Can White somehow sharpen the situation?

Understanding that normal means do not lead to anything positive, Leonid


Stein decides to change the position sharply.

22.tlJxe5?! Certainly, the 'normal' 22.t2Jxc6 �xc6 23 .'iνe2 i::i.eb8! 24 . .!:i.al .l:ta4 offers few prospects. However, the other central blow 22.t2:Jxd4!? was stronger and leads to unpredictable consequences: 22 . . . .ixg2 23 .t2:Jxb5 'i:Vb8 24.'iνb3+ c;t>h8 2S .t2:Jxc6 �xc6 26.t2Jd6. White's pieces have come alive noticeably, but it is very difficult to assess at the board whether his initiative is worth the sacrificed material. Analysis shows that chances are equal. Here is a sample variation: 26 . . . .!:i.f8 27.f4!? (or 27.'tWc4!? .!:i.a4 28.�c3oo) 27 . . . exf4 28.gxf4 :la4 29 . .!:i.e7 'i:Vxb4 30.t2Jf7+ c;t>gs 3ιt2Jh6+ c;t>hs=. As a result of the sudden transformation of the position, the value of each move has increased sharply. After Black's inaccuracies, Stein's risk-taking proves completely justified.

22 ... t2Jxb4? Significantly stronger was 22 . . . .!:i.xe5! 23.1:f.xe5 �xg2 24.�b3+ c;t>g? 25.1:f.e6 t2:Jxa5 26.bxa5 �c6 and all the possible penetration squares in Black's camp are securely protected. It would be extremely hard for White to develop his initiative.

23.tlJxd7 'it'xd7 24.c6 'it'f7 25 . .:Χeθ+ .:Χeθ

9 1


26.lί:b7!? Sensing his opponent's uncertainty, Stein plays for the maximum. Νο doubt his decision was infiuenced by Hort's time-trouble. It was also possible to play more solidly: 26.�xd5!? tt:JxdS (bad is 26 ... 'ii'xd5? 27.c7 :cs 28.iί.a3 tt:Ja2 29.t1c5) 27.t1cs tt:Jc7 28 .tt:Jb3 or 26.'f:!Vd2 �xg2 27."ifxb4 "iνdS 28."iνb3. In both cases, White has a minimal advantage, but it is significantly easier for Black to defend.

26 .. . �e5? Once again, Black's choice is unfortunate. He should have played 26 . . . �e7! .

27 . .ixd5 'ifxd5 28 . .1:.c5 'iff7 29.'iff3!

In the space of just seven moves, the position has changed as if by a miracle - the passed pawn has become a tower of strength, the white king is not threatened at all, and just one single pawn remains of Black's formerly mighty pawn centre!

29 .. . g5 30.c7 Even stronger was 30.tt:Jd8! "ife7 3 I ."ifxf5 tt:Jxc6 32.1:rxc6 'iνxd8 33.t1e6 �g7 34.t1xe8+ 't:!Vxe8 3S ."iνxg5 but White was also short of time by now.

30 ... g4 31 . 'ifd1 ..bc7 32. 'ifd2 It was perfectly possible to take the pawn with 32.�xd4.

32 ... �6? And Black should now defend it: 32 ... �e5! , retaining chances of saving the game after 33 .'t:!Vxb4 't:!Vxb7 34.1:Σχb5 �c6. The scales finally tip decisively in White's favour.

33 . .:.Xb5 lίJxd3 34. tαl6 35.'ifg5+ ι.fίιhθ 36.'iff6+ 37.'ifg5+ ι.fίιhθ 38.lίJxe8 39. 'ifxf5 tbe5 40 . .:.Xb6 41 .Cίtg2 'ifaθ 42.'iff6+ 43. 'ife6+ Cίthθ 44. 'ifc6

92

'ifd7 ι.fίιgθ

'ifxeθ tbf3+ ι.fίιgθ

1 -0

Α sharp game with great sporting significance! Thanks to this victory, Stein obtained excellent chances of reaching the Candidates' tournament. But this dream of his life was destined never to be fulfilled, and the blame lay with another, less successful bluff. In the final round of the match-tournament playoff, he again faced Hort with white. The Czech needed to win at all costs, but in the better position, he suddenly offered a draw. Of course, Stein should have accepted, but in this case, his fate would have depended on the outcome of the game Hort-Reshevsky. The former would have been playing for nothing, whereas the American would have been able to reach the Candidates by winning. Conspiracy theory triumphed over common sense. Leonid decided not to risk any suspicions, and to decide his fate with his own hands. He declined the draw offer and went on to lose . . .

In this chapter, we cannot possibly overlook one of the most striking figures of the 1960s and 70s, Bent Larsen. This is a player who could never resist risk! It was in his blood, and his games are generally strewn with sharp changes of course and unexpected, paradoxical decisions. The reader of this book has already had the opportunity to become acquainted with his creativity. It seems to me that, like many others, Larsen fell under the magic of Tal. Indeed, it was impossible not to catch this virus of magic and absolute freedom on the chessboard! Admittedly, in Larsen's games, one does not feel that sense of natural harmony which one finds in Tal's play. Larsen's decisions often look very far from arising naturally out

of the demands of the position, and instead are often strange-looking and paradoxical. However, like Tal, he loved to break the generally-accepted rules of the game, but his 'hooliganism' had what one might call a more intellectual character. If the Riga Magician played like he breathed, then the Prince of Denmark played like he thought.

Game 41

Bent Larsen Theo van Scheltinga Beνerwijk 1964 (θ)

ο

The diαgrαm position is quite difficult to αssess. Who stαnds better? How should White continue?

White's extra pawn does not really play any role and can be left out of account. But what strikes one most about the position is the difference between the activity of various white pieces -the queen and rook are super-active, whilst his other pieces are fairly useless. Clearly, the same issue struck Larsen. Objectively, he assessed his position as practically lost, but such was the strength of his optimism that he thought only in terms of winning.

28.c4! An amazing resource! Admittedly, things are not so bad for White after


other, more natural continuations: 28 .'�f2!? �g4 29.'ii'h6 'ii'f7 30.!Ixg7+! 'ii'xg7 3 1 .'ii'e6+ 'ii'f7 (3 1 .. .'�;>h8 32.h4) 32.'ii'h6 and Black must repeat moves, to avoid worse. Or 28.'ii'h6!? 'ii'f7 29.1::f.xg7+! 'ii'xg7 30.'ii'e6+ Φh8!? (30 . . . 'ii'f7 3 I .'ii'h6) 3 1 .'ii'xd5 .ί:lad8 32.'ii'xb3,

analysis diagram

with a very sharp position. However, it is the uncompromising move found by Larsen which changes the pos1t10n fundamentally and requires an extremely accurate reaction from Black.

28 ... .b:c4? Larsen's opponent proves not to be up to the problems he faces, and he loses without much of a fi.ght. He should have preferred a different capture: 28 . . . dxc4!. After the strongest reply 29.d5! (weaker is 29.�c3 �g4 30.'ii'h6 f4! 3 l .exf4 �xh6 32.l:i.xe7 gxf4 and in a sharp endgame, Black's chances are superior) 29 . . . �g4 30.1::rxg7+! Φχg7 3 1 .'ii'g3 it is not obvious whose attack is the more dangerous. Larsen himself was afraid of 28 . . . 1:lac8 29.cxd5 �c2 30.�c3 ϊ::i:xc3 but SF proves to be a greater optimist even than the Dane: 3l .bxc3 �d3 32.l:tel ! b2 33 . .!:ihs bl'ii' 34.�xbl �xbl 35.d6 'ii'd8 36.'ii'g3 g4 37/Δf4 and White

93


dominates. One only has to compare this position with the initial one.

29.l2Jf4!! Α brilliant blow, which is the logical follow-up to the previous one!

29 ... gxf4 30. �2! Now the light-squared bishop cannot reach g4, and Black has no other defenders.

30 ... fxe3+ 31 . ..be3 f4 32 . ..id2 �7 32 . . . 'irfgs 33.1:1gl 'irfxgl+ 34.\!txgl is also completely hopeless.

33. 'Wh5+ �e6 34. 'Wg4+ Black resigned.

The following game is a remarkable example of Larsen's creative creed: no compromises.

Game 42

David Bronstein Bent Larsen Amsterdam izt 1964 (19)

1 .d4 l2Jf6 2.c4 g6 3.l2Jc3 ..ig7 4.e4 d6 5 . ..ie2 0-0 6 . ..ig5 c5 7.d5 e6 8.l2Jf3 h6 9 . ..if4 exd5 1 0.exd5 ΙΣeθ 1 1 .l2Jd2 l2Jh5 1 2 . ..ig3 ..ig4 1 3.0-0 l2Jxg3 1 4.hxg3 ..ixe2 1 5.l2Jxe2

This famous game has been annotated by many well-known grandmasters, including both of the players. It is included in this book not only because it is a great example from both the pure chess and the dramatic angles. From the viewpoint of risk, which is our main theme, it seems to me that the commentators have got it wrong. It seems superficially that it was Bronstein who took the risks and stirred up all the trouble, whilst Larsen played the passive role. But the reality is the complete opposite - it was the Dane who drew the fire on himself and subjected himself to great danger.

94

1 5 ... ..ixb2!? There was no need to take this pawn. The simple I S . . . tbd7 would have ensured Black a comfortable game without any risk. However, Larsen, who had already practically assured himself qualification for the Candidates, was thinking only of victory.

1 6.1Σb1 Bronstein, by contrast, had a lot to lose. Therefore, before plunging into the complications, he first offered a draw.

1 6 ... ..ig7 And was refused!

1 7.1Σxb7 llJd7 1 8.llJf4 llJb6!? Here it was still not too late to return to safe waters: 1 8 . . ."ifc8 19.l:Ibl tbf6.

1 9.1Σe1 ..ic3!?

Continuing to play with fire. 19 .. . 'ii'c8 20.Iibe7 Ihe7 2 1 .1he7 �f6 would still have rnαintained cornfortαble equality. Now how can White disturb his opponent's serenity?

20.llJe4! An effective way to continue the attack! But no less striking is the other rook sacrifice, which is preferred by SF: 20.J::ίe6! fxe6 (after 20 ... .ixd2 Black must show accuracy to maintain the balance: 2 l .�al ! tΔd7! 22.tΔxg6 ςt>h7 23.'iνbl fxg6 24.'ifxg6+ ςt>hs 2S.�f7 �f8 26.�xd7 'iνxd7 27.J::ίxd7 J::ίad8 28 . .l:ιxa7=) 2I .'iνc2 l:Ie7 22.tΔxe6 Vi'e8 23.l:ιxe7 'iνxe7 24.�xc3. The powerful knight on e6 promises White at least sufficient compensation. Ι suspect, however, that Larsen did not look so far ahead in his calculations, but relied more on instinct and his natural optimism.

20 ... .be1 Bronstein described this move as reckless courage. But Larsen did not enter this whole risky line, in order to back out at the last moment. 20 .. . .ig7 was probably objectively the best and safest decision. The game would most probably have ended with a draw by repetition, and then it would not have appeared in this book!

21 .llJe6! .bf2+!

Δ Δ .t Δ

'iY φ

Probably only at this moment did the Dane realise the full extent of the danger he had taken ση. This strictly only move cost him 20 minutes. Both 2l. .. fxe6 22.'ifg4 and 2l. .. �c8 22.tΔf6+ ςt>hs 23.J::ίxf7 Iose. Now White has several possibilities. Which would you choose?


22.<ίtxf2 Bronstein, by contrast, despite having a much more difficult choice, spent only six minutes on this committal move. Of course, being a rook down, he wanted to recover part of the material. Α safer way of doing so was 22.tΔxf2 fxe6 23 .'iνg4 'iνgs (the same result comes from 23 .. . �[6 24.tΔe4 'iffs 2S.'iνxf5 exfS 26.tΔf6+) 24.tΔe4 'ifxg4 2S.tΔf6+ ςt>[g 26 .tΔh7+ with perpetual check. But if one shakes off material considerations altogether, then White has three paths at his disposal. The first leads to quick defeat: n.ςt>hl? .ixg3 23.tΔxd8 l:Ixe4. The second looks dangerous, but analysis does not confirm this fear: n.ςt>fι .id4 23 .tΔxd8 I:txe4 (23 .. . J::ίaxd8 24.'iνf3 fS 2S.'iνf4 l::Ixe4 26.'ifxh6 tΔd7 27.'iνxg6+) 24.tt:Jxf7 tΔxc4 2S.tt:Jxh6+ ςt>h8. In all cases, White's activity suffices for a draw. Black expeήences greater problems after π.ςt>h2! but even in this case, he can avoid catastrophe: 22 ... �d4! 23.tΔxd8 (the assessment of the position is not changed by 23.'iVf3 J::ιf8 24.tΔxd8 .!:Lιxd8) 23 ... Ld8 24.'iYfl ! fs 2S.'iff4 J::ίd7! (2S ... lhe4 26.'iνxh6 tΔd7 27.'ifxg6+ .ig7 28.'iνgs l;lee8 29.J::ίxa7 is worse) 26.J::ίxd7 tΔxd7 27.'iνxd6 fxe4 28.'ifxd7 J::ίeS.

analysis diagram

Δ Δ Φ

95


Although SF insists for a long time that White has the advantage, Black's trumps (his mate threat and the passed e-pawn) turn out to be sufficient for a draw.

22 ... fxe6 23.'ifg4 :[fθ+ 24.'ifi?g1 :[fβ

Black has come out of the complications with α

large material advantage. But is the game over?

25.'ifh3?? Surprisingly, this move, which effectively loses the game, took Bronstein only 2 of his remaining 1 8 minutes. Admittedly, in those days there was no time increment, and there was still a long way to go to reach the time control. 25 .dxe6 is obvious, but on closer examination, there is the unpleasant 25 .. . 'iff8! (25 . . . h5 26.e7! 'ifxe7 27.l:ιxe7 hxg4 28 .tt:Jxf6+ Φf8 29.�b7 tt:Jxc4 30.�d7 leads to a draw. 25 . . . tt:Jxc4 was recommended by Larsen as strongest, but does not survive SF's critical gaze: 26.e7 �fl + 27.Φh2! 'iVe8 28.'ife2 l:rf5 29.g4 �f7 30.gxf5 �e8 3 l .fxg6 'iife6 32.'iffl !+-) followed by 26.e7 l:rfl+ 27.Φh2 'iffs 28.Yi'xf5 �xf5 . Only late that night did Bronstein find 29.l:t.xa7! ! 1::f.b8 30.�b7 .l::!a8 with a draw, but by then the zero was already up in the tournament table.

25 ... 'iff8! Now the game ends quickly. As sometimes happens, after accurately cal-

96

culating lots of long and complicated variations, the grandmasters overlook something quite simple.

26. tLJgs :11 + 21. 'ifi?h2 :ts 28. t2Jxe6 :hs 29. 'ifxh5 gxh5 30. t2Jxf8 :χfθ

White resigned.

In looking at this game, Ι have the impression that the Dane did not bother himself over much about individual moves, or with trying to penetrate very deeply into the labyrinth of variations. In his best years, his intuition and optimism were his main weapons, and the specific problems which inevitably arose were solved as and when they came up.

Α total optimist by nature, at the board Larsen believed in the possibilities of his pieces. But whereas in his game, Tal worshipped the all-conquering god of combinations, the Dane preferred strategic risk. It is fascinating to watch the clash of these two opposite philosophies. As a rule, the meetings between these two players were highly interesting.

Game 43

Mikhaii Tal Bent Larsen Eersel m 1969 (6)

The previous day, Larsen had lost a game which would have knocked anyone off balance (see Game 95). How would he react in such a difficult psychological situation?

1 .e4 c5 2.tlJf3 dβ 3.d4 cxd4 4.tlJxd4 tlJf6 5.t2Jc3 t2Jc6 6 . .tg5 eβ 7. 'iVd2 �e7 8.0-0-0 0-0 9.f4 tlJxd4 1 Ο. 'ifxd4 •as 1 1 . .tc4 .td7 12.'ifi?b1 .tcβ 13.:hf1 hβ 1 4 . .th4

Alreαdy with his opening choice, Lαrsen demonstrαtes to everyone, especiαlly his opponent, that he is fαr from demorαlised by his defeαt in the previous gαme. In αddition, he tαkes the very risky decision to play on his opponent's home turf. Everyone knows that positions with opposite-side cαstling αre Τα! 's meat αnd drink. What would you now plαy in Blαck's position?

1 4 .. . 'it'h5!? This is a very Larseηesque solutioη to the positiση. There was ησthiηg at all wroηg with the staηdard 14 ... bS. White has a far frσm simple chσice. He gets ησthiηg frσm the sharp lS .eS dxeS 16.fxeS 1:ίad8 (16 . . . 1:ίfd8 1 7.'iνf2) 1 7.'iVgl .J::ίxdl+ 18 .1:ίxdl bxc4 19.exf6 �a3! 20.fxg7 1:ίb8 2 1 ..i:ld8+ 1:ίχd8 22.�xd8 'iVxd8 23 .bxa3 'iVb6+ 24.iV'xb6 axb6, ησr frσm the eveη mσre aggressive lS .�dS tbxdS (15 . . . exd5 16 .eS;;!;;) 16 .exdS �xh4 1 7.dxc6 b4 18 .t2Je2 �f6. Meaηwhile, after the quiet 15 .�d3 b4 16.t2Je2 1:ίad8 Black is alsσ fiηe. Maybe Larseη waηted to limit his oppoηeηt's choice - after the text, the game takes ση a mσre fσrciηg character.

15.g3 g5! This lσσks very extravagaηt aηd risky, but Black prσbably toσk this decisiση ση the previσus move. The less committal 15 .. . e5!? 16.'ifd2 exf4 1 7 . .ie2 f3 1 8 . .Άχf3 'ti'eS was alsσ perfectly pσssible.


1 6.fxg5 hxg5 1 7.:Xf6 ..bfβ 1 8. 'it'xfβ gxh4 19.gxh4 ..th7

Black's pσsitioη is extremely daηgerσus: his kiηg is expσsed aηd lσoks virtually defeηceless. At the same time, White has aη almost free attack, ησr should we forget exactly who it is that is attackiηg! Sσ what is this ση Black's part - bluff or a calculated risk?

20.e5 The mσst cσηsequeηtial way to develop the attack. Nσthiηg real is prσmised by 20.1:ίχd6 'iVg6 2 1 .'iff2 1:ίad8 with aη equal game, but the prσphylactic 20.a3 was wσrth cσηsideriηg, gσiηg σver to lσηger-term play . But Tal cσuld ησt wait to turη the match iη his favσur, a factor that Larseη dσubtless toσk iηto accouηt wheη thiηkiηg about the previσus game.

20 ... dxe5 21 . .1:tf1 Fσrtuηately fσr Black, 2 1 .�d3+ e4 dσes ησt work fσr his σppσηeηt. If the pawη were ση a3, the game wσuld be σver at σηce, whereas ησw 22.t2Jxe4 is uηfortuηately impossible because σf mate iη σηe. As is well-kησwη, 'chess is the tragedy σf σηe tempσ'.

21 ... 'it'gβ 22. 'it'xe5 f5! After this strσηg mσves, the scales start to tip towards Black.

23 . ..td3

97


Once again, the prophylactic 23 .a3 offered better chances. But Tal, as usual, is thinking only of attack.

23 ... 11ff6 24.11fe3 :Sdθ 25.tbe2 a6! Preparing 26 ... �b5.

26.tl:\f4!? 26.a3 ! .

26 . . . e5 27.tl:\h3 e4 28.tlJQ5+ fίiίιhθ 29.11fe2 Wh6 3Q.j_c4 f4

White's situation has become critical. The passed e- and f-pawns threaten to sweep away everything in their path.

But it is hopeless?

31 .tl:\f7+? Without the knight, White has almost no chance. Nor was 3 l .lbe6 any better: 3 1 . .. f3 32.'iVel 'i!Yd2! (the most exact! Black should exploit the white king's lack of luft. Less convincing is 32 . . . 1::f.de8 33 .lbxf8 �xf8 34.'iVg3) 33 .'iYxd2 �d2 34.lLJxf8 e3, Black's powerful passed pawns decide the outcome of the game. More practical chances are offered by 3l .Vi'g4!. For example, 3l . . . e3 32.lLJf7+ �xf7 33.�xf7 f3 34.'iVfs f2 35.'iνe5+ Φh7 36.h5!.

31 ... :Xf7 32 . ..bf7 f3 33.11fc4 11ff6 Even stronger was 33 .. . �b5! 34.Vi'c7 'iVd6.

34. 1i'b3 11fd4 35.a3 e3 36 . .J:r.c1 e2 37.11fe6 11ff4 38.11fe7 11fxc1 + 39.fίiίιa2 11fg1 ! 40.11fxd8+ fίiίιh7 41 .j_c4 0-1

98

In this game, as in the match as a whole, Larsen came out on top, and this was far from being a coincidence. Both players' approaches require enormous energy and emotional expenditure, and the tension was so great that Tal's dubious health was inevitably unable to sustain him at the highest level throughout the match. For Larsen, these were the years of his greatest successes. It seemed as though the tide had turned and could never be reversed, but the reality proved otherwise. After years of enormous successes, Larsen was crushed in his match with Fischer, after which he started a gradual, but irreversible slide. Tal, on the other hand, to the surprise of a great majority of onlookers, started playing a different kind of chess, more pragmatic and energy-saving, and as a result, he returned to the elite of world chess. This is a fascinating theme in itself, but one for another book!

Viktor Kortchnoi occupies a special place in chess. Exceptionally emotional, explosive and unpredictable in real life, so in chess too, he recognizes no authorities or rules. In my view, Tal played aπ important role in his chess fate. Viktor could by no means be described as a supporter of, or apologist for, the combinative style. On the contrary, he is a great master of defence. It was a matter of honour for him not to stand with the winning side, but to support 'the resistance', to show that sacrifices and attacks are not all there is to chess. It is no coincidence that he was Tal's most difficult opponent. On the other hand, he was so contrary and multifaceted that one can find in his games examples of every genre.

Game 44

Viktor Kortchnoi (2640) Jozsef Pinter (2570) Beer-Sheva 1988 (2)

ο

rhe positioπ looks perfectly good for White, so his decisioπ seems rαther strαπge αt first sight. However, let us heαr whαt Kortchπoi himself sαys: 'rhe kπight is heαdiπg viα h6 to fS, απd Blαck plαπs to pressurise the d4-pαwn and grαduαlly seize the iπitiαtive.' And απ eveπ more importαπt thought: Ίπ α prαctical gαme αgαiπst α humαπ oppoπeπt (ποt α computer, Ι emphαsise!) with limited time, the surprise elemeπt plαys απ importαπt role. Ιπ eαch iπdividuαl case, αdmittedly, οπe must αssess the elemeπt of risk.' Give α11 these hiπts, Kortchπoi 's choice is predictαble. Whαt wαs it?

26.:Xe6!? In fact, Ι have the definite impression that the idea of this sacrifice just grabbed Kortchnoi and he lacked the strength (or the desire) to resist it, inventing the purely chess justification later on. After all, in his long chess career, there are numerous examples of his winning similar positions by purely technical means.

26 ... fxe6 27 . .th3! tbfβ Kortchnoi considered this natural knight retreat to be virtually the decisive mistake. But even after other con-

Chαpter 3 - The Mαdness of the Brave

tinuations, White has fully adequate compensation for the sacrificed material: 27 . . . 'ifa5 28 . .ic3 'ifhs 29.1::f.e4 tbf6 30.1::f.eS �h7 3 l ..ixe6+ �h8 32.'ifa4!? or 27 .. . tbh6 28 . .ixe6+ tbf7 (28 .. . 1::f.f7 29.�xg6 1::f.e8 30.d5) 29.'ifxg6. Also interesting is 29.h5! ? gxh5 30.1::f.eS.

28.be6+ J:.f7? ln reality, it is this move which is the cause of Black's defeat. 28 ... �h7? is also bad because of 29.h5! tbxhS 30.1:1e5 tbf6 3 1 .1:Ig5+-. The best defence, pointed out by SF, consists of 28 . . . �h8! 29.'ifxg6 'ifd8 ! (a hard move to find!) 30.d5 �e8 and Black holds, for example: 3 1 .h5! 'ifxg6 32.hxg6 1::f.e8 33 .�g2 1:Ixe6 34.dxe6 1:rb7=.

29.'it'xg6 1Σb8 He also loses after 29 . . . .!::f.e8 30.dS cxdS 3 l .�xf6.

30 . .ia1 ba3 Such moves are usually the result of there being nothing better, in which case they are understandable. 30 . . . .ί:te8 3 l .d5 cxdS 32.�xf6 1::f.xe6 33.1::f.xe6 'ifxc4 and White's win is only a matter of time.

31 .d5 Now it all ends quite quickly.

31 ... �8 On 3 l . . .'ti'e7 the simplest line is 32.h5! , underlining Black's complete helplessness.

32.-tes cxd5 33.bc7 34.h5

:Xc7 1 -0

For Kortchnoi a game of chess is not just about the pieces, but is first and foremost about the opponent who sits opposite him. Consequently, the psychological aspects of the battle are extremely important for him. All of this is clear in the game just examined.

99


Elements of bluff play an important role in chess. Factors affecting a decision at the board can include a poor tournament position, dissatisfaction with the character of the position, or simply one' s particular mood. In any case, a sudden turn in a position, a zigzag, gives the game dram and entertainment.

In the following game, a quiet opening does not appear to foreshadow any great shocks. But, as a rule, if you look for trouble, you will find it! Valery Salov, one of the strongest GMs in the world in the 1980s-90s, was regarded maiπly as aπ outstaπding positional player, but he also had a great feel for the dyπamics of the game.

Game 45

Valery Salov (2645) Alexander Beliavsky (2640) Linares 1 991 (1 1 )

ο

By αccurαte plαy, Blαck hαs neutrαlised his opponent's eαrly initiαtive αnd the gαrne seems to be drifting towαrds α drαw. Whαt do you think of the piece sαcrifice?

1 8 . ..bf6!? Salov is ποt prepared to settle for such an outcome to the game aπd tries to exploit the active positioπ of the rook on c4.

1 00

18 ... gxf6 19. 'Wxf6 J.eθ 20 . .z:r.g4+ J.g6 21 .h4!?

Super-aggressive! It is temptiπg to play 2l .�e4 .ig7 22 .'iVg5 but after 22 . . . e5! (thiπgs are very daπgerous for Black after 22 .. . h5 23 .'ifxg6 hxg4 24.f3 ! aπd he comes uπder a stroπg attack) 23 .1:f.cl (the endiπg after 23.�xg6 'ifxg6 24.'ifxg6 hxg6 25 .1:f.xg6 e4! 26.dxe4 l:td2 is clearly iπ Black's favour) 23 . . . l:r.d6 offers White oπly miπimal chances of aπ attack.

21 ... J.g7 22. 'WgS hS?! There was πο πeed for such radical measures. Black is quite safe after either 22 . . . I:tf8 !? 23.�e4 1:f.f6 24.h5 h6 25 .'ifh4 �[5 or 22 . . . 1::i.d4 23.h5 (23 . .ie4 'ifd8!) 23 . . . l:txg4 24.'ifxg4 �f5.

Now how should White continue?

23.'Wxg6?! Α bit too artful! Objectively, it was stroπger to play the calm 23.1::f.c4! e5 24.�xb7! with approximate equality: 24 .. . .ixd3! 25.�xc8 �xc4 26 .bxc4 l:txc8 27 . .1:f.dl .

23 ... hxg4 24.J.e4 .z:r.c7! 25.�g2 Alas, he has to resort to positional measures. Ιπ this situatioπ, 25 .f3? l:tf7! plays iπto Black's haπds.

25 ... .z:r.f7 26.h5 .z:r.t6 27.1i'xg4 �7 Despite Black's serious material advantage, the battle is far from over. The

presence of opposite-coloured bishops makes it difficult for Beliavsky to simplify the position. At the right moment, the white passed pawns can become strong, whilst the black king is rather riskily advancing towards the scene of the action. Safer was 27 . . . Φh8.

28.f4 ..th6 29 . ..tg6+ �θ?! Α serious inaccuracy! More consistent and stronger was 29 . . . Φe7!? and it is hard for White to get his pawns moving: 30.�h4! �d6! 3 1 .e3 eS! . Another possibility was 29 . . . Φg7!?.

30 . .J:.f3?! Salov misses his chance: 30.�h4! eS! (the strongest! 30 . . . .ig7 3 1 .g4 Φe7 looks too passive, whilst 30 . . . Φg7? 3 1 .g4! IldS really is dangerous) 3 1 .fxe5 fιxfl 32 .e6! �d6 33 .Φxfl and, as they say, play is for three results.

30 .. . 1i'b4?! More accurate is 30 . . . �d6.

31 . 1i'h4! �g7 32.e4! Not 32 .g4? .ixf4 33 .g5 1:rff8.

32 ... e5!? Α highly interesting endgame arises after 32 . . . �d2+ 33 . .i:if2 �xd3 34.�xf6+ Φχf6 35.e5+ Φe7 36 . .ixd3 1:lxd3 37.g4 .if8 38 .g5 bS . The chances of the two sides are probably about equal.

33.fxe5 1i'd2+ 34.�h3 .J:.xf3 35.1i'xd8

35 ... 1i'g5?

Chαpter 3 - The Mαιlness of the Brαve

lt is hard to retain one's objectivity and self-control in severe timetrouble! He should have made a draw with 35 . . . 1:lxg3+! 36.Φχg3 �f4+ with perpetual check.

36. 'ifd7+ �gθ?? Losing at once. Absolutely the only move was 36 . . . Φf8 37.�c8+ Φg7 38 .�xb7+ Φfs 39.�b8+ Φg7 40.�xa7+ Φfs 4l .�b8+ (41 .�xc5+? �e7oo) 4l .. . Φg7 42.�c7+ Φf8, although White is not obliged to settle for perpetual check, but can play for a win with 43.e6! J:lfl 44.�d6+ �e7 45 .e5 ! .

37.1i'h7+ 1 -0 Mate is unavoidable: 37 . . . Φf8 38.�h8+ Φe7 39.�e8#.

Naturally, a sudden change from a quiet position to one where practically every move could be decisive, is a very effective device. And the side which initiates such a transformation has a psychological advantage. But is everyone willing to part with material to bring this about? In one's youth, there is usually greater willingness to take risks. The thirst for battle carries one away, energy overflows and one fears nothing. This is especially so when the player sitting opposite is the reigning World Champion.

Game 46

Garry Kasparov (2847) Teimour Radjabov (2624) Linares 2003 (2)

1 .e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.ttJc3 lLJf6 4.e5 lLJfd7 5.f4 c5 6.lLJf3 ttJc6 7 . ..te3 a6 8.1i'd2 b5 9.a3 1i'b6 1 0.lLJe2 c4 1 1 .g4 h5 12.gxh5 .J:.xh5 1 3.lLJg3 .J:.h8 1 4.f5 exf5 15.lLJxf5 lLJf6 1 6.lLJg3 lLJg4 1 7 . ..tf4 ..te6 1 8.c3 ..te7 1 9.lLJg5 0-0-0 20.lLJxe6 fxe6 21 . ..te2

1 0 1


The assessment of this position is extremely important for απ understanding of what follows. Who stands better and what plan should Black choose?

The young Radjabov unquestioningly assessed it as not being in his favour, and so began looking for a way to change the situation radically.

21 ... lbgxe5!? Risky, but a t the same time, the logical decision. It seemed to Black that he was losing strategically, and so Teimour seeks his chances in complications. However, the assessment of the position is not actually as clear-cut as it seemed ten years ago. Admittedly, the direct 2 1 . .. 1:lxh2? is refuted most easily of all by the simple 22.1:txh2 tt:Jxh2 23.';t>f2! and the intrepid knight is lost. Another risky-looking move is 2 1 . . . tt:Jxh2!?. Admittedly, in his notes, Kasparov considered this move to be the most principled, and supported this view with variations: 22.tt:Jh5 (22.0-0-0 b4! 23.axb4 a5 24.bS 'fi'xbS 2S.tt:Jhs a4 26.1:txh2 tt:Jas 27.1it>bl tt:Jb3 28.'ifc2 a3 with a very dangerous attack) 22 .. . tt:Ja5! 23.1:ίbl tt:Jb3 24.'iνe3 g6 25.1:txh2 gxh5 26.�xhS with approximately equal chances. In a practical game, it would be very difficult to decide on the capture on

1 02

h2, but Black also has at his disposal the much more 'human' move 2 1 . .. tt:Jh6! 22.0-0 (22.0-0-0?! a5) 22 ... tt:Jas 23 .'li'c2 tt:Jb3 24.!1adl and here the modest move 24 . . . g6! promises Black a balanced game, because he would like to establish his knight on f5, whilst 25.'ii'xg6 1:tdg8 26.'iVc2 Q\fs is dangerous for White. Another interesting option is SF's recommendation 2 l . . . gS!?, for example 22.�xg4 (the variation 22.�xgS �xg5 23.'iVxg5 1:thg8 24.'ii'd2 tt:Jcxe5 25 .dxeS 'iνf2+ 26.�dl d4 is dangerous for White) 22 . . . gxf4 23.'ii'xf4 (23.�xe6+ �b8 24.tt:Jf5 �g5!) 23 ... �b8! with an unclear position.

22.'ife3! The correct practical decision! It is too dangerous to play 22 .dxeS? d4 23 .tt:Je4 (23.cxd4 tt:Jxd4) 23 ... tt:JaS ! 24.�dl dxc3 25.'ife3 (2S .'ifxc3 l::td3) 25 . . . 'ii'xe3+ 26 . .Άχe3 cxb2 27.l:!.bl c3! . The line 22.�xeS tt:JxeS 23 .dxeS is better, but here too, Black retains good attacking chances: 23 . . . �cS 24.�f3 (24 . .Άg4 .Άe3 25.'ii'g2 d4) 24 . . . 1:thf8 2S.1:tfl .Άe3 .

22 ... ttJd7?! Τοο modest! Black had at least two interesting ways to develop the initiative. The first is 22 .. . �d6!?, after which White, in his turn, faces a diffi.cult choice: 23.�g5! (other options

include 23.0-0-0 lLJd3+ 24.�xd3 �xf4 25.'iVxf4 cxd3 with approximate equality, and 23 .dxe5 �c5 24.'iVf3 �hf8! (stronger than 24 . . . g5 25.�d2 1:ldf8 26.'iVg4 lbxe5 27.'iVxg5) 25.'iVg4 �f2+ 26.'ί!;>d2 d4 and Black has an extremely powerful attack for the piece) 23 .. . 1::tde8 24.dxe5 �c5 25.'iicl �f2+ 26.'i!td2 d4 with a very sharp position, which is hard to assess. The second decision is simpler: 22 .. . l2Jd3+!? 23.iιxd3 cxd3 24.'iVxe6+ 'i!tb7 25.0-0-0 �hf8 with definite compensation for the sacrificed material.

23.'ifxe6 i.h4

The position hαs become much shαrper. Which continuαtion should White prefer?

24.'ifg4? Trying to play more solidly. More principled and stronger was 24.'iVxd5! taking the important central pawn. Black's compensation is clearly insufficient: 24 ... l2Jde5 (or 24 ... l2Jf6 25 .'iVf5+ 'i!tb7 26.0-0-0±) 25 .'iVg2! (less clear is 25 .'ii'e6+ l2Jd7 26.d5 lbe7) 25 . . . l2Jg6 26.iιd2.

24 .. . g5! 25.i.d2 .:.deθ!? Black also has fairly comfortable play after 25 . . . l2Ja5 26.0-0 (not 26.0-0-0? �xg3! 27.'iνxg3 1:ίde8! 28.�fl lbb3+ 29.'i!tbl 'iVg6+ 30.'i!ta2 'ifc2) 26 ... l2Jb3 27.1::tadl l2Jxd2 28.�xd2 'i!tb8.


26.ο-ο-ο tbas

In whose fαvour is this position, αnd whαt should White play?

27 . .:.df1 ?? White finally loses control over the game. After the correct 27.'i!tbl ! the outcome would remain totally unclear.

27 .. . tlJb3+ 28.�d1 bg3! 29 . .:.f7 Α sad necessity. 29.hxg3 ii'g6! 30.�cl 'iVbi 3 I .ii'xg5 lbxcl 32.'ifxcl "ife4 loses quickly.

29 ... .:.ds 29 . . ."ifc6!?.

30.bg5 30.'iVxg3 'iVg6.

30 ... 'ifg6 31 .'iff5 3 I ..l:ιf5 1::tde8.

31 ... 'ifxf5 32 . .:.xt5 .:.dfθ! 33 . .:.Xf8+ After 33.1::txd5 the phlegmatic 33 . . . 'i!tc7 is good.

33 ... tlJxf8 Black's extra piece decides.

34.i.f3 34.h4 lLJh7 35 .1::tgl l2Jxg5 36.hxg5 �f2 is also hopeless.

34 ... i.h4 35.i.e3 tlJd7 36.bd5 .:.es 37.i.h6 tlJdcS! 38.i.f7 .:.e1 39.i.h5 tlJd3 0-1

Garry, who is used to imposing his will ση opponents, was clearly out of sorts in this game. Fortune favours the

1 03


brave! Admittedly, bravery needs to be accompanied by mastery as well, which it seems to me is not a bad description of the younger generation.

Not long after, the 16-year old Teimour took the following scalp. Another top GM was beaten in the same brave and risky manner.

Game 47

Viswanathan Anand (2774) Teimour Radjabov (2648) Dortmund 2003 (2)

1 .e4 c5 2.ttJf3 ttJc6 3.d4 cxd4 4.ttJxd4 e5 5.ttJb5 d6 6.c4 Jie7 7.b3 f5 8.exf5 Jixf5 9.Jid3 e4 1 0.Jie2 a6 1 1 .ttJsc3 Jif6 1 2.0-0 ttJge7 1 3.a3 0-0 1 4.1Σa2 'ifa5 1 5.b4 'ife5 1 6.J:ιe1

It is quite hαrd to αssess the position. The black pieces αre more hαrmoniously plαced, but the pαwn on e4- rαises certαin concerns. How should Blαck play? The time fαctor becomes criticαl. Of all the possible continuαtions, Rαdjαbov chooses the most energetic, but αt the sαme time, αlso the riskiest.

1 6 ... b5!? White's positional threat of 1 7.i.g4-could have been met directly with 16 . . . "iVe6 or indirectly with 16 .. . 1::f.ac8 1 7.i.g4- t"Δd4- 18 .i.xf5 'tixfS 19.t"Δxe4-

1 04

1:f.xc4- 20.t"Δbd2 .l:ic7, in both cases with a quiet and roughly equal position. Now, however, the game turns sharply into tactical waters.

1 7.cxb5 axb5 1 8.Jixb5 1 8 .t"Δxb5 is pretty much equally good, after which 1 8 . . . t"Δxb4- 19.axb4-1:f.xa2 20.�c4-+ <it>h8 2 1 .�xa2 'iVxbS 22 .'ifxd6 leads to some advantage for White. More interesting is 1 8 .. . d5!? with compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

1 8 ... ttJd4!? Again the most risky decision. It was worth considering 1 8 . . . 'iνe6!? because the direct 1 9.�xc6 t"Δxc6 20.�d5 fails to 20 . . . t"Δxb4-! . Better is 19.1:1c2 with complicated play.

1 9.Jif1 It is difficult, especially during a game, to assess the consequences of the forcing operation 19.i.c4-+ dS 20.t"Δxd5 t"ΔxdS 2 1 .i.b2 <it>h8! 22.�xd4 'iνxd4 23 .'ifxd4- i.xd4- 24-.i.xdS 1:f.ae8 25 .1:f.d2 �b6, and even the two extra pawns do not guarantee White the advantage.

1 9 .. . d5 20.J:ιd2 Jie6

21 .f4!? 21 .�b2 looks more natural, although the resulting wild complications are very hard to judge over the board:

Α) 2 1 . .. �[4- 22.t"Δxe4 dxe4- 23.�xd4-�xd4- 24-.1:f.xd4- "iVxf2+ 2S.<it>hl and here Black holds with the aid of 25 . . .

e3! 26.1:te4 U.ad8 27.'flle2 tbf5! 28.l:ιxe6 tbd4; Β) 2 l . . . Θec6!

analysis diagram

22.b5 (it looks more cautious to play 22 .ltJb5 Vi'f4 23 . .ixd4 Θχd4 24.Θχd4 �xd4 25 . .!:ιχd4 'fllxf2+ 26.\thl but here the energetic 26 . . . .ig4! 27.l:ιd2 �xdl 28.l:ιxf2 1:ιχf2 29.1:ίxdl e3 retains the initiative for Black) 22 . . . �f4! 23 .bxc6 �e5 24.Vi'h5 g6 25 .tbxd5! (25 .'i!fxe5 'ifxe5 26.tbb5 tbf3+ 27.gxf3 'ifg5+ 28 .\thl 1:ιχf3 29.ltJd4 .ig4! is too dangerous for White) 25 . . . .ixd5 26.'ifh3.

21 ... 'ifxf4 22 . .l:r.f2

Δ

It seems as though White has finally seized the initiative. But has he?

22 ... 'ifxf2+! ! Lightning from a clear sky! White is better after both 22 . . . 'ifh4 23.nf4 'S'g5 24.1:ιfxe4 and 22 . . .'ii'b8 23.l:ιxf6 .U.xf6 24.'ifxd4 ltJfs 25.�c5±. Better is


22 . . . �g4 23.l:ιxf6 .l:ιxf6 24.Vi'xd4 !taf8, but here too, White's chances are superior: 25 .ifdl ! 'iig6 26.�e3.

23. 'ίtxf2 lLJbS! The only way! . Significantly weaker is 23 . . . Θc2 24.�gl ! �d4+ 25 .'it>hl Θxel 26 .'ifxel �f2 27.'ifdl , or 23 . . . .ih4+ 24.Wgl .if2+ 25 .�hl �xel 26 .�xel , and White's material advantage decides.

24.'ίtg1 ! tiJxc3 25.tiJxc3 .bc3

26.�5 After such a shock, it is hard to retain one's self-control. Black also has sufficient counterplay after 26 .1:ιe3 .ie5. Relatively best is 26.�d2 �d4+ (worse is 26 . . . .ixd2 27.'S'xd2 1:ιχa3 28 .�b2) 27.�e3 .ixe3+ 28.1:txe3 although in this case too, the position is completely unclear: 28 . . . ltJf5 29.U.h3 (29.l:lel %;lxa3) 29 ... d4.

26 ... i.xe1 27. 'ifxe1 llJfS 28.�2 .l:r.acθ 29 . .b4 .l:r.f7 30.h3

The natural reaction. Anand tries to secure his king, but now Black gets a new entry square. Both 30 . .Άb3 and 30.�dl were worth considering.

30 .. . h5! 31 .b5?! It was essential to play 3 1 .-id 1! h4 32 . .Άg4.

31 ... h4 32.�e5 d4! 33.b6 He is not saved after 33.'ii'xe4 Θe3! (33 . . . :i.cl+? misses the win: 3Hii'h2

1 05


t2Je3 35 .'ifxh4! l:lffl 36.'ftd8+ .!::!.f8 37.'ifxd4 lLJfl+ 38.�g1) 34.'ftxh4 1:f.f1+ 35.�h2 lLJfS! 36.�g5 �cc1 .

33 ... e3 34. ιii(h2 d3 35. 'tlfb4 e2 36.�c3

Or 36.�b3 �xb3 37.b7 �xb7 38.'ftxb7 �e6 39.'iYb6 �dS 40.'iνa5 t2Je3-+.

36 ... :Xc3 37. 'tlfxc3 tlJg3 38.b7 :Xb7 39.'tlfa5 :bθ 0-1

Α strikiηg wiη! But, abstractiηg from the emotioη, Ι have tried to aηalyse both games from the poiηt of view of our choseη theme. Ιη ηeither case did the opeηiηg seem to promise such dramatic developmeηts. The iηitiative lay with the favourite, who was playiηg White each time. The sharp chaηge iη the ηature of the positioη did ηοt alter is assessmeηt, but the psychological iηitiative shifted to Black. Αηd it turηed out that eveη the best players iη the world react badly to such stress. Of course, to achieve success, οηe ηeeds belief iη oηe's abilities, aηd decisiveηess. The game with Αηaηd was a particularly good example of the correct approach iη such situatioηs.

Paradoxically, it seems easier to decide ση such dramatic actioη to seize the iηitiative, wheη οηe is playiηg with black. Very few top players today will eηgage their oppoηeηts from the first moves as White. The followiηg game is a rare aηd at the same time strikiηg example

Game 48

Andrey Volokitin (2594) lgor Khenkin (2627) Germany Bundesliga 2003/04 (5)

1 .e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.ttJc3 dxe4 4.llJxe4 �f5 5.tiJg3 �g6 6.lb1e2 e6 7.h4 h6 8.lbf4 �h7 9.�d3!?

1 06

Αη uηexpected decisioη. Temptiηg is 9.c3, but Aηdrey decides ηοt to lose time ση such trivia as defeηdiηg pawηs.

9 ... 'tlfxd4 1 0.�e3 'tlfd6

Whαt does White hαve for the pαwn? Only superior development. But Blαck hαs α very solid position, αnd he needs only α few simple moves for the development fαctor to ceαse to be relevαnt. Does White hαve αt his disposαl αny sort of rαdicαl meαsures?

1 1 .llJxe6!? Α completely uηexpected aηd very strikiηg decisioη, all the more so because Volokitiη had a wide choice. All the ηormal moves, 1 l .�e2, 1 1 .'iνf3, aηd 1 1 .0-0, would, at best, have giveη oηly moderate compeηsatioη for the sacrificed pawη. Now, however, the stakes rise sharply!

1 1 .. . 'tlfxe6 The most ηatural aηd at the same time the stroηgest reply. Black does ηοt equalise after either 1 1 . . . �xd3 1 2 .t2Jxf8 'iνb4+ 13 .'iνd2! (weaker is 13 .�d2 'iνe7+ 14.�e3 �b4+) 13 ... t2Ja6 14.0-0-0 �xd2+ 15 .�xd2 �c4 16 .t2Jd7, or 1 1 ... fxe6 12 .'�fh5+ �d8 13 .0-0-0 t2Jf6 14.�f7.

1 2.bh7 :Xh7 13.'tlfd3!

Black still hαs α solid position, αnd now αη extrα piece αs well. Cαn the sαcrifice reαlly hαve been correct? And if not, then where do we look for the refutαtion?

1 3 .. . tt:Jf6?! The most natural move, but, surprisingly enough, also a mistake. The strongest move was the paradoxical 13 . . . g6!. After a possible line such as 14.0-0-0 �e7 1S .l:the1 tLJd7 16 .�f4 �dS! 1 7.�a3 �cS we reach a situation where White's attacking potential is running out and Black's material advantage becomes the decisive factor. Another move which was better than the text is 13 .. . �h8 with the possible continuation 14.0-0-0 tLJd7 lS .�hel 0-0-0 1 6.�gS �xel 1 7.�xe1 hxgS 1 8 .hxgS tι:Je7. White faces a battle for equality.

1 4.0-0-0 tt:Jbd7 1 5 . ..td4! Now it unexpectedly turns out that the knight on f6 becomes a target. The threat is 1 6 . .i:ίhe1 , whilst after 1 5 . . . 0-0-0 there follows 16.�xf6.

1 5 ... 0-0-0! Even so! Bad is 1 S . . . �xa2 1 6.1:ίhel+ (a transposition results from 16 .�xf6 tι:Jxf6 1 7.1:lhel+ �e7) 16 . . . �e7 1 7.�xf6 tι:Jxf6 18 .I:rxe7+. Somewhat better is 1 S ... �b4!? 16.c3 �d6 1 7.�he1 �eS 18 .tLJhS! (also good

Chαpter 3 - The Madness of the Brαve

is 18 .�xeS tLJxeS 19.�d4 t2Jfd7 20.f4 f6 2 1 .fxeS tLJxeS 22 .�e4 nh8 B.tLJfS) 1 8 .. . g6 (or 1 8 . . . tLJxhS 19.�xeS tL:!xeS 20.�xh7 We7 21 .�e4 f6 22.g4±) 19.�xeS tL:!xeS 20.tι:Jxf6+ �xf6 2 1 .�d4.

1 6 . ..bf6 'ifxf6 1 7.'ifxh7

Now it is αlreαdy White who hαs α mαteriαl advantage. But αre things so cleαr?

1 7 ... .b3! It is hard to resist such a move! White is clearly better in the variation 1 7 . . . �xf2 ?! 1 8.�d3 �xg2 19.tLJfs but a tempting move is 1 7 . . . g6! and the queen on h7 experiences considerable anxiety. However, everything ends happily: 1 8 .tι:Je4 �f4+ 19.tLJd2 �f6. The attempt to avoid the inevitable only prolongs the game after 20.c3 �g7 2 I .t2Je4 �f4+ 22 .tLJd2 �f6.

1 8.c3 g6?! Now this move only exacerbates Black's problems. He had two reliable courses to equality: 1 8 . . . �xf2!? 19.bxa3 �xg3 20.�d3 �xd3 2 I ..I;lxd3 l:le8 and 18 .. . �xc3+!? 19.�c2 �xb2+ 20.Wb1 �xc2+ 21 .Wxc2 �f6.

1 9.�b1 ! .:hs 20.tt:Je4! Khenkin had clearly underestimated this move.

20 ... 'ife5?! Of course, Black did not particularly wish to go into aπ inferior end-

1 07


game with 20 . . . 1:txh7 2I .lt:Jxf6 lt:Jxf6 22.bxa3, but this would in fact have given chances of saving the game after 22 .. . lt:Je4. Things are worse for Black in the middlegame.

21 . 'ifxf7 'ifxe4+ 22. �a1 'ife7 23. 'ifxg6 .tc5 24 . .1:he1 ± 'Wf6 25.'ifg4

Even stronger was 25.l:te8+! l::f.xe8 26.'iνxe8+ 'i:Yd8 27.'i:Ve6.

25 .. . 'iff7 26 . .1:e5!?

Δ Δ

26 ... .tb6! Taking the pawn is dangerous: 26 . . . .ixf2?! 27.�[5 'i:Ve6 28 .'i:Yg7 'i:Yxf5 29.'iνxh8+ 'iff8 (29 . . . Φc7 30.'ifxh6) 30.'iνxf8+ lt:Jxf8 3 U :�fl .ics 32.�[6 and Black cannot hold the endgame.

27.h5 �c7? But now Black misses a study-like chance: 27 . . . .ixf2! 28.1:tf5 'iνe6 29.'i:Yg7 'iνxf5 30.'ifxh8+ 'iff8 (30 ... <it>c7 3 l .'iνxh6±) 3 l .'iνxf8+ lt:Jxf8 32 .1:lfl .ics 33.1:f.f6 Φd7 34.1:txh6 <it>e7. By comparison with the previous variation, Black has lost a tempo, but it is precisely the presence of the pawn on h5 that deprives White's rook of operating space. However, White manages to save himself with a series of only moves: 35.1::ίh8 <it>f7 36.h6 ii.e7 37.h7 <it>g7 38 .l:i.g8+ <it>xh7 39.l::tg3=.

28 . .1:f5! Now it is all over!

1 08

28 .. . 'ife6 28 . . . 'iνe8 29.'iνf4+ <it>c8 30.1:f.f7+-.

29.'ifg6! 'ife2 29 .. . �xg6 30.hxg6 is also completely hopeless.

30.'ifd6+ 1 -0

Playing in such a way requires a special emotional mood. Doing it too often is bad for your rating!

The following game shows a slightly different psychological picture.

Game 49

Shakhriyar Mamedyarov (2646) Alexander Khuzman (2577) Warsaw 2005 (3)

ο

The diαgrαm position αrose from α vαriαtion of the Nimzo-Indiαn Defence, which, αlthough not α mαin line, periodicaJJy αttrαcts αttention from elite GMs. In pαrticulαr, it wαs seen in the mαtch Aηαnd-Cαrlsen. The first impression is thαt Blαck is αbsolutely fine - White's extrα pαwn is weαk αnd the blαck knights hαve excellent secure outposts. Mαmedyαrov goes for αη αttempt to chαnge the position completely. Try to guess whαt he plαyed.

1 5.tlJd4! Α complete surprise! The knight offers its life, in the cause of improving the white pawn structure. After the natural

1 5 .tt:Jg3 the position would be roughly equal.

1 5 .. . 0-0-0 Played after long and tortuous thought. In the event of 15 ... exd4 16.cxd4, White has only two pawns for the piece, but the absolutely wonderful pawn phalanx and the bishop pair promise him sufficient compensation.

1 6.tlJb5 liJxb5 1 7 . .bb5 Φc7 1 8.Φe2 ..te6

If you compare this with the initial position, then its character has not changed fundamentally. Black stands very solidly, but the psychological blow inflicted by the shock move 1 5 .tt:Jd4 has not passed. The strength and time spent calculating and assessing the variations may have its say later on.

1 9 . ..te3 ..tc4+ 20 . .bc4 21 . .J:r.b4 l2Jxe3 22.Φχe3 23 . .J:r.hb1 Φc6 24 . .J:r.1 b2 25.Φe2 Φχc5

l2Jxc4 .J:r.d7

.J:r.hdθ

It was possible to stick to waiting tactics, but Khuzman tries to provoke the crisis at once.

26.:Xb7 Φc4 27. Φ1'2 Φχc3 28. Φg3 g6 29.a4!

The pawn is heading for a6, ensuring control over b7.

29 ... f5 30.exf5 gxf5 31 .a5 a6 32.:Xd7 :Xd7 33 . .J:r.b6

33 .. . .J:r.g7+?


In time-trouble, Black tries to stick to passive defence, but this proves insufficient. He should have sought counterplay with 33 . . . e4! 34.\!tf4 (of course, not 34.1:txa6? e3) 34 . . . \!td3 35.l::tb3+ \!tc4 36.1:te3 .ί:f.f7.

34.Φ1'2 .J:r.g6 34 .. . �a7 35.\!te3 is too passive.

35.h4 It turns out that the black rook cannot stay on the sixth rank. The a6-pawn is doomed.

35 ... Φd2 35 . . . f4 36.h5 1:tg5 37 . .ί:f.h6 1:tg7 38.�xa6 is also unpromising.

36.h5 .J:r.g5 36 . . . 1:txb6 37.axb6 e4 loses by force: 38 .fxe4 fxe4 39.b7 e3+ 40.\!tf3 e2 4l .b8� el� 42.'il'b4+ \!tdl 43 .'it'xel+ \!txel 44.g4.

37.h6 Now the game cannot be saved.

37 ... e4 38 . .J:r.d6+ Φc3 39.:Xa6 Φd4 40 . .J:r.d6+ Φe5 41 . .J:r.d7 1 -0

In this case, White's attempt to sharply change the position with a piece sacrifice was met poorly. But the decisive factor was the distant psychological effects of the action. The psychological stress undoubtedly has an influence on Black's condition. In addition, maintaining the status quo on the board required a great deal of time and strength.

Therefore it is not surprising that, having solved some serious problems, Alexander was eventually unable to cope with some relatively simple ones. The bluff used by Mamedyarov, as a lever with which to unbalance the position, proved an effective weapon. It did not lead to immediate success, but it nevertheless determined the final result.

1 09


In the final part of this chapter, we present some games from recent years. Special place goes to the following.

Game 50

Hikaru Nakamura (2778) Vladimir Kramnik (2797) lstanbul οΙ 201 2 (9)

ο

The position is completely equal and the players had already repeated moves twice. Nobody doubted thαt the game would be drawn, but does White hαve any wαy to continue the fight?

23.tl:Jb1 ?! What is this! ? Ι have never seen a more shocking move in my life, and Ι have seen a fair bit! 23 .jιb4 ends the game in a draw at once.

23 ... b5 Α somewhat strange decision. However, it soon becomes apparent that Nakamura's very committal move is not so easy to exploit. The only weakness on c3 is solidly defended. Mind you, it is also not clear what active plan White has. But Kramnik was now full of desire to punish his opponent for his 'incorrect' play, which is probably just what the American had counted on.

24.h4 llJc6 25 . ..tcs 'ifbβ 26. Wfe2 tl:Ja5 27. ttJd2

Strangely, White's rather devious strategy works.

1 1 0

He only needs to plαy 28.tΔb3, after which Blαck's problems will become αcute. How does Blαck stop this?

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, Kramnik's next move is perfectly logical.

27 .. . .:.X:c5!? 28.dxc5 Wfcβ More accurate is 2 8 . . . 'ifc7, defending c7 in advance, which proves significant in the variation 29.tΔb3 tΔc4 30.a4 bxa4 3 1 .1:ίχa4 jιbs.

29.tl:Jf3 In his turn missing a chance to exploit Black's inaccuracy with 29.tΔb3 tΔc4 30.a4.

29 ... 11fxc5 Black has a pawn for the exchange and well-coordinated pieces, so chances are roughly equal. But the tone of the game is clearly being set by White.

30.tl:Jh2?!

After the 'correct' 30.α4 tbc4 3I .axb5 �xb5 32.tbd4 �e8, Blαck would hold the position without trouble. Nakamura, however, continues to rock the boαt. Is this α risky decision?

30 ... �g7 The uπdefeπded pawπ could very well have beeπ takeπ: 30 . . . 'il'xc3! 3 1 .tbg4-�d2! (also good is 3 1 . .. �g7 32 .1:lacl 'il'd4 33 .1:1edl 'il'b6) 32 . .!:redl tbc4. Ιπ this case, White might have had reasoπ to regret his extremely artful play.

31 .h5

31 ... g5? But this is a clear mistake. Now, too, he should have played 3 1 . .. 'il'xc3 ! although here it is less good thaπ οπ the previous move. 32 . .a'.acl 'il'd4 33 .tbg4- leads to a complicated game, with mutual chaπces.

32.h6! Α move which Kramπik had clearly overlooked. Suddeπly it turπs out that Black's kiπg has far too few defeπders.

32 ... �xh6 33.'ifh5 ..ig7 34.'ifxg5 tlJc6 35.tfjg4 'ife7 36. 'ifxe7 t:Δxe7 37.a4!

Ενeπ without queeπs, the positioπ will be iπdefeπsible.

37 ... d4 38.axb5 bb5 39 . .:Xa7 d3 40 . .:Xe7 d2 41 .:td1 ..ie2 42.ltJe3 be5 43.c4

White's material advaπtage determiπes the outcome of the day.


43 ... h5 44.:ta7 h4 45.:ta2 bd1 46.t:Δxd1 hxg3 47.fxg3 bg3 48.c5 f5 49.:ta7 e5 50.c6 e4 51 . ..ih3 :tcθ 52.:ta6 :tfθ 53.:ta5 f4 54.�1 e3 55.�e2 :tf6 56.:ta8+ �g7 57.:ta7+ :tf7 58.:tb7 �6 59.�3 :te7 60 . .:Xe7 �xe7 61 .c7 e2 62.c8llJ+ �6 63. �xe2 �e5 64.lί:\b6 �d4 65 . ..ig2 Ae1 66.tbd5 �e5 67.lί:\b4 ..ih4 68.tbd3+ �5 69.�xd2 �g4 70.�e2 ..if6 71 .lί:\1f2+ �g3 72 . ..if3 ..idθ 73.ltJe4+ �h4 74.ttJe5 ..ic7 75.ttJQ6+ �h3 76.ltJe7 ..idθ 77.lί:\f5 ..ib6 78. �1 �h2 79 . ..ig4 f3 80.lί:\h4 1 -0

This time, the logical course of the game was disrupted ποt by a sacrifice or aπ irreversible pawπ thrust, but by a modest kπight move. However, it looked so ugly that it was precisely its uπaesthetic appearaπce which produced the shock οπ the woπderfully aπd classically chess-educated former World Champioπ. It is ποt aπ accideπt that he played the coπcludiπg part of the game so poorly. Fraπkly, Ι do ποt kπow aπyoπe iπ the world elite who would have decided οπ such a kπight move. Ι would remiπd you that this all happeπed πear the eπd of the Olympiad iπ Istaπbul, aπd the result ofthe game determiπed the USA's match victory over Russia. Το what exteπt was the result caused by the sportiπg factor, or is it the computer iπflueπce, aπd the fact that aesthetics simply do eπter the machiπe's calculatioπs? Certaiπly, SF does ποt regard the shockiπg kπight move as too bad. Probably the Americaπ graπdmaster took the psychological effect iπto accouπt. Whatever the case, the bluff worked brilliaπtly.

1 1 1


The following game developed according to an entirely different scenario.

Game 51

Magnus Carlsen (2835) Veselin Topalov (2770) Wijk aan Zee 2012 (1 1 )

1 .e4 cS 2.tbf3 dβ 3.�b5+ tbd7 4.c3 tbfβ 5. W'e2 aβ 6.b4 W'c7 7.0-0 eS 8.d4 bS 9.�c2 cxd4 1 0.cxd4 �e7 1 1 .ltJc3 0-0 1 2.�g5 hβ 13.�h4 �b7 1 4.1:.ad1 .:.Scθ 1 5.�b3 1Σfe8 1 6.dxe5 dxeS 1 7.�g3 �fθ 1 8.h3 lbbβ

In whose fαvour is this position? Whαt should White plαy?

1 9.tbh4?! This move proves the prologue to boundless complications, which make this game one of the most striking of recent years. After the 'normal' 1 9.1:1cl or 19 . .Άh4, the position remains roughly equal, and it is unlikely that the game would have made it into this book.

1 9 ... lίJc4 20.tbf5 Having said Α, he must say Β. After 20.t:rcl , there is the very strong 20 . . . .Άb4! , attacking the e4-pawn, and the complications after 2 I .tΔdS tΔxdS 22 . .Άχc4 bxc4 23 .exd5 .ixdS clearly favour Black. SF's shameless recommen-

1 1 2

dation of 20.tΔf3 can only be regarded as a total humiliation.

20 ... tbxb2

After the gαme, Mαgnus αdmitted thαt he hαd missed this move, when plαying 19.tΔh4. Not only shαmeful defeαts, but sometimes αlso stunning mαsterpieces result from bαnαl oversights! However, beαutiful words αre not enough -whαt should White plαy?

21 .�h4! Α fantastic move! With both his appearance and, especially, his moves, Carlsen shows everyone that he did not lose the b2-pawn, but sacrificed it! In that sense, 2 1 .1:ίcl would be a criminal admission. The only alternative to the text was 2I .tΔxh6+!? gxh6 22 . .Άh4, which was objectively the strongest.

analysis diagram

However, paradoxically, Black's defence is easier in this line: 22 . . . �e7 23.�xf6

�xf6 24.'ifg4+ �h8 25.1:1d7 'ti'xc3 26.�xf7! (weaker is 26.1:lxb7 l:rc7 or 26.l:ιxf7 �g8 27.'iYfs �g7 28.1:hb7 t2:Jc4) 26 ... 1:red8 27.1:hb7 l:rc7 28.'ifg6 �g7 and White faces a difficult fight for a draw. Without regard to his material losses, White throws everything ση the fire, in the search for an attack.

21 ... ttJxd1 22 . ..bf6! ttJxc3 23. 'it'g4

White is α rook down, but his remaining pieces are threatening the enemy king. In practice, the position is not so easy to defend, especially when the opponent's appearance exudes confidence. Try to find the best defence for Black.

23 ... ..be4?! Not the optimal choice. Of course, with the cold-blooded SF by one's side, it is easy to find the strongest line: 23 ... l:re6! , after which the white attack can be beaten off in all variations. Thus: Α) 24.�xg7 is unsatisfactory:

24 .. . �h7! 2S.�xe6 fxe6 26.�xf8 l:rxf8; Β) 24.t2:Jxh6+ is only a little better:

24 . . . �h7 2S .tt:Jxf7 'iYxf7 26.�xe6 'ifxf6 27.'ifhS+ (27.�xc8 �xc8 28.'iνxc8 t2:Je2+ 29.�h2 'tif4+ 30.�hl t2:Jg3+) 27 .. . 'ifh6; C) More serious problems are posed

by 24.�xe6 fxe6 2S .t2:Je7+ �h8 26.'ifg6! . Then there is the defence 26 . . . �xe4! 27.'iYxh6+ �h7 28.t2:Jxc8 'δ'χc8 29.�xe5 t2:Jxa2;

Chapter 3 - The Maιlness of the Brave

D) Finally, 24.tt:Jxg7 is met by 24 .. . 1::!xf6 2S.t2:JhS+ �h8 26 .t2:Jxf6 �g7 27.'iffs �xf6 28.'ifxf6+ �g8 29.ifg6+ �f8 30.'δ'χh6+ �e8.

analysis diagram

However, it is almost impossible to calculate all these complicated variations during a game. Α more 'human' move is 23 . . . �h7, but even in this case, White has a way to keep great tension in the position: 24.t2:Jxg7! (the strongest continuation of the attack. After 24.�xg7 there is the very strong 24 ... l:re6! (24 . . . 'iVc6!? 2S.�xf8 'δ'f6 is also good) 2S.�xe6 fxe6 26.�xf8 1:txf8, whilst 24.t2:Jxh6 fails to the cold-blooded 24 . . . �xh6!) 24 .. . �xe4!? (24 . . . t2:Je2+!? 2S .�h2 t2:Jd4 is interesting) 2S .tt:Jxe8 l:rxe8.

analysis diagram

In this apparently hopeless position, White turns out to have the unlikely

1 1 3


resource 26.1::f.d l ! ! mainta1n1ng the intrigue. For example: 26 . . . .ig6 27.1:rd7 t2Je2+ 28.Wfl ! (28 .Wh2 h5!) 28 ... t2Jg3+! 29.fxg3 'ifcl+ 30.We2 h5 3 I .'ti'f3 and it is far from clear whose king is in the greater danger.

24. tillc:hβ+?! Extremely tempting, but not the best move! He should have played 24.t2Jxg7! Wh7 25 .t2Jxe8 Irxe8 26.1::f.dl ! ! , taking the game into the variation given above.

24 ... 'ίth7


25 . ..bf7?! In such crazy positions, it is impossible to calculate everything, so one must to some extent rely on intuition. As the result of the game shows, Magnus' intuition did not let him down, but objectively it was stronger to play 25.t2Jxf7! , which poses Black very serious problems. Firstly, he must find the only move 25 .. . �d5! , defending against the horrible threat of 26.�h5+. Secondly, after 26.�c2+ Black must decide on 26 . . . t2Je4! because the natural 26 . . . e4 leads to a draw in the most surprising fashion, after correct play on both sides: 27.t2Jg5+ Wg8 28.�xc3 �xc3 (an equally beautiful variation is 28 . . . �d6 29 . .1:ldl ! 1::f.xc3 30.1::f.xd5 'δ'χd5 3 l .�h5 �f5 32.g4 'ti'xf2+ 33 .Wxf2 �c5+

1 1 4

34.Wg2 1:1xc2+ 35 .Whl �cl+ 36.Wg2 1::f.c2+) 29.�[5 g6 30.�xd5+ Wh8 3 I .�b3 �g7 32.t2Jf7+ Wh7 33 .t2Jg5+ with perpetual check. Thus, only with 26 . . . t2Je4! can Black retain the advantage: 27.�xe4+ �xe4 28.t2Jg5+ Wg8 29.t2Jxe4 �f7. One hardly needs to say that such variations bear little relation to reality and that over the board, anything could happen!

25 ... 1!Vxf7? And here is the indirect confirmation of my words! It seems that there was nothing forcing Topalov to such extreme measures. Even more than that, if one thinks seriously about the position, then White has no actual threats, even though his pieces are grouped around the enemy king. In such positions, especially with a shortage of time, it is very hard for a human player to retain his self-control.

It is another matter for the machine, though! It suggests 25 .. . �d3! which guarantees Black an advantage, even with unhumanly accurate play: 26 .Whl ! t2Je2! 27.�g8+ Wh8 28.�d5 t2Jf4 29.t2Jf7+ Wg8! 30 . .ixe5 (30.�b3 �c4) 30 . . . 1::f.xe5 3 I .t2Jxe5+ t2Jxd5 32.�e6+ Wh7 33 .t2Jxd3 'iνc6. This is better than the more easily understood line 25 . . . 1:f.e7 26.�xe7 'δ'χe7 27.'iνxc8 t2Je2+! (27 .. . gxh6 28.'iνxc3

'ifxf7 29.'ifxe5) 28.'1t>h2 '>t>xh6! where things are less clear, and many times better than 25 .. . gxf6?? 26.'iνg8+ '>t>xh6 27.'ifh8+ 'ίt>gS 28.'ifh5+ 'ίt>f4 29.g3#. But one can understand Topalov: after the exchanging operation undertaken by him, Black obtains a material advantage, and it seems that he escapes all the threats. Unfortunately for him, this turns out not to be quite the case.

26. ttJxf7 gxf6

Black has α mass of pieces for the queen, and the knight ση f7 is in · real danger. Is Carlsen in trouble?

27.14! This is the move Black had missed ( or underestimated) .

There is no time even to think of capturing the apparently cut-off knight on f7, and the battle rages with renewed strength.


27 ... .tg6 28. 'ifh4+ 'iftg7 29.fxe5 !Ce4 30. :Xf6! .tc5+ 31 . 'ifth2 ttJxf6 32. 'ifxf6+ 'ifth7 33.tίJQ5+ 'ifth6 34.liJe6!

Possibly the most appropriate outcome of this fantastic game was a draw after 34/Δf7+ 'ίt>h7 3S .t2JgS+, but Carlsen wanted more!

34 ... :Xe6 35. 'ifxe6 .:.ee 36. 'iff6 iιe7?!

τiredness and time-trouble have their say. It was perfectly possible to keep the pawn: 36 .. . a5! .

37.'ifxa6 b4 38.'ifc4 .tfθ 39.g4 'ifth7 40.e6! .td6+ 41 .'iftg2 iιe7 42. 'ifc7 'iftgθ 43.'iftg3 'iitfθ 44. 'iff4+ 'iftg7

45.'iVd4+? Carlsen also errs. He should have played the immediate 4S.h4!.

45 ... 'iftgθ 46.h4 .:.dθ 47. 'ifc4? He could still retain winning chances with 47.�a7! .!:Id3+ 48.'1t>f4 '>t>f8 49.h5.

47 .. . .td3? An incomprehensible decision! The tempting 47 . . . 1::f.d3+ 48.'1t>f4 1ιd6+ 49.'1t>g5 '>t>g7! ensured a draw: SO.hS 1ιe7+ S I .'>t>f4 1ιd6+.

48.'ifc6 .tb1 ? And this is already the decisive mistake! Significantly more tenacious was 48 . . . '1t>g7.

49.h5

1 1 5


49.'ii'b7 �d6+ SO.Φh3 1::!.f8 S l .e7 wiπs more quickly.

49 ... .b:a2 50. 'ife4! �hβ 51 .h6 .i.f6 52.e7 1:.e8 53. 'iff4 .i.g7 54.hxg7+ �xg7 55.g5 �gβ 56. 'iVf6 1 -0

Α stuππiπg aπd dramatic game! Απd it scarcely matters that White's desperate attack resulted from aπ oversight οπ his part. After all, chess is played by humaπs, who are always goiπg to make mistakes. What matters more is how οπe reacts to mistakes. Α weak character takes it badly, aπd the staπdard of his play usually deteriorates, but to the stroπger characters, such lapses oπly serve as a motivatioπ. This game is a woπderful example. After his mistake, Carlseπ played as if he did ποt for οπe secoπd doubt the correctπess of his play, aπd the logic of his attack was so coπviπciπg aπd his moves so aggressive, that iπ the eπd his oppoπeπt could ποt withstaπd the pressure. Carlseπ's play is all the more strikiπg for the fact that this is by πο meaπs his πatural game. Risk aπd, eveπ more so, bluff are far from his trademark. But he has aπ excelleπt feel for the playiπg coπteπt of the game aπd is ready to fight for victory οπ other players' terms, where that is the best choice.

Alexaπder Morozevich, οπ the other haπd, is a maπ who likes his games spicy. He is williπg to eπter uπpredictable complicatioπs agaiπst aπy oppoπeπt.

Game 52 Levon Aronian (2825) Alexander Morozevich (2769) Moscow 2012 (5)

1 .d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3.tlJc3 c6 4.e3 tιJd7 5.ttJf3 f5 6 . .i.d3 tbh6 7.b3 .i.d6

1 1 6

8 . .i.b2 0-0 9.0-0 1:.f6 1 Ο. 'iVc2 ttJf7 1 1 .tιJd2

Black's hopes involve αctivity on the kingside. How should he develop the initiαtive?

1 1 .. . e5!? Απ uπexpected aπd risky decisioπ. Temptiπg is 1 1 . .. l:ιh6 12 .f4 t2Jf6 with a complicated positioπ.

1 2 . .b:f5!? Ιπ playiπg his 1 1 th move, Black had to reckoπ with 12 .cxd5!? e4 13 .�c4 (13 .tt:Jcxe4 fxe4 14.tt:Jxe4 is iπterestiπg) 13 .. . tt:Jb6 (the temptiπg sacrifice οπ h2 is iπsufficieπt: 13 . . . �xh2+ 14.Φχh2 1:f.h6+ 1 5.Φg1 'ifh4 1 6.[3 ! t2Jf6 1 7.dxc6 f4 1 8.1:f.ae1 ! aπd White successfully beats offhis oppoπeπt's attack: 1 8 . . . tt:Jg4 19.fxg4 'iνh2+ 20.Φf2 'ii'g3+ 2l .Φe2 �xg4+ n.tt:Jf3 exf3+ Β.Φd2) 14.g3 aπd Black has some compeπsatioπ for the pawπ, but is it sufficieπt?

1 2 .. . e4 1 3 . .b:h7+!? Thi5 lead5 to a po5ition with an unu5ual material balance. The natural 13 .�xd7 allow5 the typical combination 13 . . . .i.xh2+ 14.�xh2 �h6+ 1S .�g1 'iVh4 1 6.f4 i.xd7 1 7.cxd5 cxdS with a guaranteed draw for Black: 1 8.tL1xdS 'iVhl+ 19.�f2 'ifh4+ 20.�gl.

13 ... �xh7 1 4.cxd5 .:tgβ 1 5.tbdxe4 The fir5t impre55ion i5 that Black ha5 great problem5. But thing5 are not 50 5imple.

1 5 ... tbf6 1 6.tbxf6+ 'iVxfβ 1 7.f4 tbhβ?!

Extremely complicated. Simpler aπd better i5 1 7 . . . .i.h3 18 .�f2 1:f.e8.

1 8. tί:le4 'iff5 1 9.dxc6 �e7 Coπtiπuiπg the liπe of maximum complicatioπ5.

20.c7 .:tcβ 21 . 11fb1 Aroπiaπ, by coπtra5t, trie5 to 5implify the po5itioπ. More daπgerou5 for Black wa5 2 l .'i!Vd3! 1:Ixc7 22.d5.

21 ... .:Xc7 22.tbc3 'ifxb1 23 . .:Sxb1 .1:td7 24 . .1:tbd1 bβ 25.e4

Vi5ually, it 5eem5 a5 though White ha5 everythiπg iπ order. The white pawπ5 look a5 though they will 5weep away everythiπg in their path.

Δ Δ Δ Δ CΔ

Δ il Δ Δ n w

However, the black piece5 are al5o very good, aπd both player5 had oπly five miπute5 (plu5 a 30 5ecoπd incremeπt) οπ the clock, to reach the time cοπ-

Chαpter 3 - The Maιlness of the Brave

trol. Ιπ 5uch circum5tance5, anything i5 po55ible.

25 .. . ..tb7 26.h3 tbgθ 27.e5 .:cs 28.d5 ..tb4 29.e6 .:tddθ

Ξ. Ξ. i . .t.

i Δ Δ

30.tί:le4? It turn5 out that the white pawn5 are ποt ju5t a strength, but al5o a weakπe55. Approximate equality could be maiπtaiπed by 30.l:!f3 tL1e7.

30 .. . .:Xd5 31 .tbQ5+ �gβ 32 . .:Xd5 .b:d5 33 . .1:td1 tί:le7 34.�d4?

Now the black piece5 develop fierce activity. More chaπce5 of holdiπg the game were offered by 34.l::!.c1 .

34 ... .1:tc2 35.g4 ..td2! 36 . .1:tf1 �c1 37.tbf3 .b:f4 38.tbh4+ �g5 39.tbf3+ �hβ 40.h4 .:Xa2

White re5igned.

Morozevich'5 play 5eem5 to be like doiπg a 5word-daπce οπ a tightrope above aπ aby55. Οπe mi55tep aπd it i5 iπ5tant death. Admittedly, hi5 oppoπent i5 al5o forced to take part in thi5 deadly daπce. 'Ri5k' 5eem5 aπ iπadequate and rather banal word to de5cribe 5uch aπ approach to che55. Rather, it i5 a duel to the death, with no retreat5 or compromi5e5 po5-sible. But 5uch play require5 eπormou5 work at the board, aπd 50 it i5 5imply impos5ible to play like thi5 without regular collap5es aπd defeat5.

1 1 7

Risk & B]uff in Chess

Situational risk is another thing. This is something one sees even from players who are predominantly known as positional players.

Game 53

lvan Cheparinov (2709) Pavel Elianov (2678) Reykjaνik 2013 (6)

1 .d4 dS 2.c4 c6 3.tt:J13 ttJ16 4.tt:Jc3 a6 5.a4 e6 6.g3 dxc4 7 . .tg2 cS 8.0-0 cxd4 9.tt:Jxd4 .te7 1 0.a5 0-0 1 1 .tt:Jc2 1fc7 1 2 . .te3 .td7 13 . .tb6 "ifcθ 1 4.tt:Je3 .tbS 1 5 . .:1.c1 tt:J1d7 1 6. tt:Ja4 .tgs 1 1.14

Where shou]d the bishop retreαt to?

1 7 ... tt:Jxb6?! This decision also turns out to be possible, but the attempt to change the position sharply involves some risk. The natural 1 7 . . . .ie7 leads after 1 8 .tt::Jxc4 tt::Jc6 19.b3 to a position where Black needs to show accuracy to equalise.

1 8.tt:Jxb6 'it'cS 19 . .:1.13?! As often happens, the sharp change in the position causes mistakes. Correct was 19.�f2! , although this also looks strange: 1 9 . . . .if6 20.tt::Jxa8 1:f.d8 2 l .b4! (less clear is 2 1 .'ifc2 .id4 22 .V!fd2 tt::Jc6 23.tt::Jb6 tt::Jxa5 24.b4! 'iff8) 2 1 . . . Vi'a7 (21 . .. 'ifxb4 22 .'ifc2 tt::Jc6 23 . .ixc6 .ixc6 24.tt::Jb6 c3 25 . .!:i.fdl) 22 .'ifc2

1 1 8

V!fxa8 23.tt::Jxc4 with a clear advantage to White. Also better than the text was 19.'ifd2 1ld8 20.b4 'ifxb6 2 1 .axb6 l:txd2 22.fxg5 .

1 9 .. . .t16 Black already has a choice. As well as the natural text, another interesting option was the paradoxical 19 . . . .id8!? 20.b4 (20.tt::Jxa8 .ixa5) 20 ... V!fxb4 2 1 .tt::Jxa8 .ixa5.

20.tt:Jxa8 20.b4!? 'ifxb4 2 1 .tt::Jxa8 tt::Jc6 leads to an unusual position, where Black has sufficient compensation for the rook: 22.tt::Jc7 .ia4 23.'ife1 'lixel+ 24.J;!xel tt::Jxa5.

20 .. . .:1.d8 21 . 'it'e1 tt:Jc6 22.tt:Jb6 Or 22.tt::Jc7!? .id4 23.tt::Jxb5 .ixe3+ 24.l:rxe3 'lixe3+ 25 .�fl axb5 26.1:ίdl with approximate equality.

22 ... .td4!

How does White best pαrry the bαηα] threαt of 23 . . . .ie3 ?

The unusual position on the board is very hard to judge, so White's next mistake is not at all surprising.

23.'ίW2? lt was essential to reduce the tension at once: 23 .tt::Jxc4! .ixc4 24.�fl ! .ixe3 25.l:rxc4 'ifxc4 26.l:ιxe3 and the most likely outcome is a draw.

23 ... e5! After this unexpected move, which Cheparinov clearly underestimated, Black finally seizes the initiative.

24.b4 lbxb4 25.fxe5 tbc6 26. "ifd2? The decisive mistake. However, not everyone can retain their self-control in such a rapidly-changing situation. Only 26/t:Jxc4! retained chances of resisting. Here is one sample variation, though it is by no means obligatory: 26 . . . .ixc4 27.�fl ! tt:Jxe5 28 .t2Jxc4 tt:Jxc4 29.'ifdl ! �f6 30.�c2 t2Jd2+ 31 .�xd2 !ιχd2 32 . .ί:!'.χc5 !ιdl+ 33 .�f2 .id4+ 34.e3 .ixc5 35.�e2.

26 ... c3 Now it all ends quickly.

27. "ifc2 tίJxe5 28. "iff5 g6 29. 'iff4 .J:r.eθ 30.tίJd5 'ifxd5 31 . 'iiί>f1 tίJxf3

White resigned.

The turn in the following game is even more unexpected.

Game 54

Evgeny Tomashevsky (2706) Levon Aronian (281 3) Tromse 2013 (3.2)

In order to appreciate the following battle fully, one needs to understand the sporting situation in which it was played. Tomashevsky had managed to defeat his powerful opponent with black in the first game of the minimatch, so a draw suited him in game two. The following scenario is natural - Aronian will try with all his might to confuse matters, whilst White will calmly attempt to damp down his opponent's actiνity. At first, that is exactly how matters unfold.

1 .d4 tίJf6 2.c4 e6 3.tίJf3 c5!? 4.d5 exd5 5.cxd5 ..td6!?

Chapter 3 - The Maιlness of the Brave

Using this opening variation can be called a bluff. In recent years, Levon has generally chosen more solid systems.

6.tbc3 0-0 In the only other Aronian game Ι found ση ChessBase, Levon played less accurately with 6 . . . .ic7. The further course of the game was highly interesting: 7.g4!? d6 8 .g5 tt:Jhs 9.e4 0-0 10 .t2Je5 g6 l l .t2Jc4 1:ίe8 12 . .ie3 b5 1 3 .t2Jxb5 .l::rxe4 with complicated play (PalliserAronian, Athens 2001).

7.g3 ..tc7 8.d6! ..tas 9 . ..tg2 tίJe4!? 1 0.0-0!?

1 0.�d3 .ixc3+ l l .bxc3 'iff6 12 .0-0 1::te8 13 . .if4 t2Jc6 14.1:tacl b6 1 5.t2Jh4 c4?! 16.'iVxc4 t2Jc5 was seen in the game Moiseenko-Gashimov, Gothenburg 2005.

1 0 ... lbxc3 Also possible is 10 . . . .ixc3 l l .bxc3 �f6 12 . .if4 .ί:ιe8 1 3 .�d3 t2Jc6 as in the game Aronian-Gashimov (World Blitz Championship 2009). It is not impossible that this particular game was what influenced Levon's opening choice.

1 1 .bxc3 bc3 1 2 . ..tg5 ..tf6 1 3. 'ifd5! tίJa6!

If you are going to suffer, then you may as well have a pawn to suffer for!

It is obvious that White has sufficient compensation for the pawn, but he needs to play energetically and bravely, which does not suit his match situation.

1 1 9


1 4 . .:Sc1 .:r.b8 1 5.'iff5! b5 16.e4!? The mσst eηergetic! White has a wide chσice: 16.1::tfdl !?, 16 .h4!?, but maybe the strσηgest is the sσlid 16 .�xf6 'ifxf6 1 7.'ifxf6 gxf6 1 8.t2Jh4 .ib7 19.t2Jfs .ixg2 20.'it>xg2 1::rfe8 2 I .lLJe7+ 'it>g7 22.1:f.fdl aηd it is hard to see hσw Black caη wiη this pσsitiση. But Tσmashevsky prepares to wiη the match frσm a pσsitiση σf streηgth.

1 6 ... .bg5! 1 7.lillcg5 g6 1 8.'ifg4 f6

How should White play? In taking your decision, do not forget to take account of the tournament situation.

1 9.lillch7!? Αη astoηishiηg decisiση! Has Evgeηy fσrgσtteη that he σηly ηeeds a draw? Prσbably, he made himself fσrget this, sσ as tσ cσηceηtrate better ση the garne! Meaηwhile, there was ησthiηg wrσηg with 19.t2Jh3 1:f.b6 20.1:f.fdl �b7 2 I .lLJf4 with cσrnpeηsatiση fσr the pawη.

1 9 ... �xh7 20.f4 ..tb7 21 .f5 Black has a clear extra piece, yet White, withσut aηy hurry at all, quietly iηcreases the pressure! This paradσx is explaiηed by the fact that the tba6 aηd �b7 are rnerely spectators σf the eveηts uηfσldiηg ση the kiηgside.

21 ... 'ifeβ

1 20

22.e5!? It is hard to refraiη frσrn such a rnσve, but eveη strσηger was the calrn 22.1:f.cel ! , briηgiηg the last piece iηto the attack. Black's task wσuld be very difficult iη this case, pσssibly iηsσluble. Α) Fσr exarnple, briηgiηg the kηight

iηto the garne dσes ησt help: 22 .. . t2Jb4 23.e5 t2Jd3 24.'ifh4+ 'it>g8 2S .'ifh6! 'iff7 26 . .ixb7 1:f.xb7 27.exf6 'ifxf6 28.1:f.e7 1::f.f7 29.1::f.e8+ .!:tf8 30.1:1xf8+! (30.1:f.e7=) 30 . . . 'ifxf8 3 I .'ifxg6+ 'ifg7 32.'ife8+ 'iff8 33 .'ife4, regaiηiηg the ·

sacrificed rnaterial with a veηgeaηce; Β) 22 . . . 'iff7 23.e5 �xg2 24.Φχg2

t2Jb4 (24 . . . .!::i.be8 25.e6) 25 .exf6! (Black survives after 25 .e6 dxe6 26.fxe6 'ifb7+ 27.'it>gl fS 28.e7 fxg4 29 . .!::i.xf8 'ifds 30.1:1xb8 'ifd4+) 25 . . . t2Jds 26.'ifgS! 'ifxf6 27.fxg6+ 'ifxg6 28 .'ifxd5 aηd White's attack cσηtiηues with equal rnaterial.

22 ... .bg2 23.�xg2 fxeS 24 . .:r.ce1 ?! After the exchaηge σf light-squared bishσps, this quiet rnσve is ησt sσ gσσd. He shσuld have played 24.'ifh4+! 'it>g8 2S.'ifgS! 'iff7 26.fxg6 f!YdS+ 27.'it>gl 'ifxd6 28.g7 1:f.xfl+ 29 . .!::!.xfl f!Yd4+ 30.'it>g2 'ifdS+ 3 I .'it>gl 'ifd4+ with a draw, siηce 3 I . .. l2Jc7? 32.'ifhs 'iνd4+ 33 .'it>g2 'ifdS+ 34.'it>h3 'ife6+ 3S.lιfs Φχg7 36.'ifg4+ is bad fσr Black.

How could Levon have exploited this error by White?

24 .. . gxf5?! lt was vital to wake up the slumberiπg kπight: 24 . . . lt:Jb4!. Ιπ this case, White's attack would probably fizzle out: 25.'iνg5 l:!xfS 26.1:Ixf5 gxfS 27.'iνxf5+ 'iνg6 28 .'iνxd7+ �g8 29.�xe5 lt:Jd3.

25.:Xf5 :Xf5 26.'ifxf5+ 'iνg6 27.'iνxd7+ �gθ

28 . .:[f1 ? After 28.1:lxe5 'iνc2+ 29.�f3 Tomashevsky was probably afraid of 29 ... 1:!f8+, but after the calm 30.�g4 'iνdl+ 3l .�g5 Black oπly has perpetual check.

28 ... c4? Here too, it was esseπtial to briπg the kπight iπ: 28 ... lt:Jb4! 29.'iic7 (29.'iνxa7 J:ld8) 29 .. .'it'e4+! 30.�gl 'it'b7!-+. Possibly it was exactly this elegaπt defeπce that Aroπiaπ missed some time back.


29.h4! c3 Or 29 .. . �e8 30.'ti'xb5 lt:Jb8 3 I .l:tf5! 'ti'e6 32.1:lf6! with a draw.

30.h5 'iνe4+ 31 .�h3 �hθ 32.'iνe6 ltJc5 33.'iνf6+ �h7 34.'iνf7+ �hθ 35.1i'f6+ �h7 36.1i'e7+ �hθ 37. 'iff6+ 112-112

From a player of the eveπ-tempered, eveπ phlegmatic type like Evgeπy Tomashevsky, οπe would rather have expected quiet play to maiπtaiπ equality. But agaiπst Aroπiaπ, such small coπcessioπs aπd compromises evideπtly seemed iπeffective to Evgeπy, aπd so he weπt for aπ opeπ battle. Eveπ wheπ the situatioπ οπ the board (aπd iπ the match!) did ποt by aπy meaπs require such risky actioπs, the fact that he was programmed for aπ uπcompromisiπg fight told. Evgeπy's pressure was so great that his oppoπeπt missed the fleetiπg chaπce that preseπted itself. Ιπ the eπd, both Evgeπy aπd chess were the wiππers.

The sportiπg situatioπ also had a sigπificaπt iπflueπce οπ the course of the followiπg game.

Game 55

Alexander Moiseenko (2673) Luke McShane (2683) Aix-les-Bains Ech 201 1 ( 1 1 )

•

1 2 1


This game was played in the last round of the European Individual Championship. Both players were arnong the leading group ση +5, and a draw would cornfortably have guaranteed both a place in the World Cup. Α win would have given chances of one of the very top places, but a loss could be costly. In this difficult psychological situation, the players preferred an uncornprornising struggle.

1 7 ... 'ife7 The critical rnornent. How should White continue?

18.e5! The pawn sacrifice is practically forced. After 1 8.�ael Black would take the pawn with 1 8 . . . tbxe4! whilst after 1 9.tbg3 he would sacrifice the queen: 19 ... tbxg3 20.1::f.xe7 1:txe7 with wonderful cornpensation.

1 8 ... dxe5 1 9.fxe5 'ifxes 20 . .i.f4 'ife7 21 .-i.gS

Is Blαck obliged to repeαt rnoves?

21 ... 'ifd6!? Declining the peaceful finish to the garne with 21 .. ."iVe5 22.�f4 'ii'e7.

22.b1'6!? 22.�f4 'ii'a6.

22 ... bf6 23.bg6 .:Xe2 24 . ..th7+! 24.�xf7+ �xf7 2S .'i!Vxe2 1:th8 favours Black.

1 22

24 .. . �g7 25. 'ifxe2 �xh7 26.1:a3! The point of White's cornbination, begun at rnove 18 . The queen's rook is included in the attack, and Black has to solve difficult problerns. It is clearly weaker to play 26.�xh5+? �g7 27.1:1a3 I:r.h8 28.'iff3 l:th6 and the white attack peters out.

26 .. . :e8?! Only SF could find the paradoxical 26 . . . �h6! 27.1::[af3 �gS 28.1::f.xf7 �e8, when the battle is only beginning. Also stronger than the text is 26 .. . �g7 27.1:taf3 d3 28.'ii'xd3 �d4+ 29.�hl fS .

27.'ifxh5+

27 ... �g7? But this natural rnove loses. After the only rnove 27 . . . �g8! 28.'fi'f3! (28 .1:taf3 is significantly weaker because of 28 . . . 'iνe5! 29.'ifxe5 ifιxeS with a serious advantage to Black, because 30.1::txf7 �xa4 3 l ..ί:!'.xb7 �c2 is irnpossible) 28 . . . �g7 ! 29.'ifxf7+ �h8 30.1:taf3 we have a situation of dynarnic equality.

28 . .:aι3 :h8 29 . .:Xf6 Possibly this sirnple rnove is what McShane rnissed in tirne-trouble. The rernaining rnoves were probably played just out of inertia.

29 .. . .:Xh5 30 . .:Xd6 ba4 31 . .1:[df6 .i.e8 32.d6 �8 33.:1fs :h4 34 . .:Xc5 ..tc6 3S.:cf5 .1:[h7 36 . .1:[f4 .1:[g7 37.g4 d3 38.:d4 1 -0


Conclusion What unites the games we lιave j ust examined ? The answer is the absence of a clearly defined motive for taking a risk. The game Carlsen-Topalov is perhaps a special case, where Wllite plunged into unpredictable complications because of an oversight. So what did make the other players decide on risks, contrary to the nature of the position? The main answer is obvious: the desire to win, either the particular game or the overall event. The player realised that with a normal , natural development of events lιis clιances would be significantly reduced. The game Tomashevsky-Aronian is especially notable in this respect. White was happy with a draw, and, moreover, solid play suits tlιe character and natural playing style ofTomashevsky. In such cases, experienced players usually try to make their opponents take the risk, to sharpen the game. But probably the psychological pressure was too great, to add to which was tlιe effect of the opponent's reputation. In such situations, it is extremely difficult to retain one's calm and, correctly assessing llis own mood, Tomashevsky decided to seek success through attack. After all, he knew he was keeping the advantage in this way too, and two results out of three suited him.

Of course, a lot depends on a player's manner of play and his temperament. For a sharp and aggressive player, who prefers attack to defence, going into an equal endgame can be j ust as much of a risk as the most adventurous combination. Thus, although this clιapter contains many striking examples, the autlιor is by no means telling everyone to sacrifice and take attack. It is very important to know yourself and your capabilities. You need to know what you can do, not only in general, but on that day and at that moment. If you manage to assess your mood accurately, then sometimes you can achieve things that you would not necessarily have expected. But if the right mood is lacking, you should avoid such escapades. After all, tllis is an attempt to settle matters, when normal methods are by no means exhausted. Ι would advise readers not to go to such extremes.

1 23


Chapter 4

The Logic of the Ι rrational

We have agreed to talk about risk aπd bluff iπ chess as some sort of coπscious decisioπ, takeπ with a clear head aπd iπ full kπowledge of what οπe is doiπg. Of course, duriπg a game it is impossible to thiπk absolutely ratioπally. The πeed to calculate complicated variatioπs, aπticipate the oppoπeπt's reactioπ aπd withstaπd the coπstaπt stress meaπs that aπy decisioπ οπ the chessboard will depeπd οπ maπy factors. Eveπ so, iπ this book the author, as far as possible, has tried to sort the wheat from the chaff, i.e., cases of deliberate risk-takiπg from the sort of risk that results from aπ oversight or a mistake iπ aπalysis.

However, there are situatioπs where a siπgle decisioπ, ποt takeπ with coπscious risk-takiπg iπ miπd, πevertheless leads to uπpredictable complicatioπs, where the player caπ oπly do his best to go with the flow aπd hope to fiπd his way through. Of course, calculatiπg variatioπs is esseπtial, but all the same, at the eπd of the day οπe caππot calculate the iπcalculable. Ιπ such situatioπs, it is much more importaπt to rely οπ oπe's iπtuitioπ (assumiπg it is somethiπg you caπ trust) .

Ι myself formed aπ additioπal rule, which Ι thiπk helps iπ playiπg such positioπs : 'Noπ-standard positioπs require πoπ-staπdard decisioπs' . Ιπ other words, πormal, typical methods teπd to work poorly iπ uπusual positioπs. By coπtrast, paradoxical moves quite ofteπ prove to be the salvatioπ. The more strict readers may retort that the exceptioπ proves the rule. This is true: educatioπ is πever a bad thiπg.

But that is eπough of philosophical discussioπs - let us turπ to aπ example.

1 24

Game 56

Mark Taimanov Bent Larsen Vinkovci 1970 (13)

1 .d4 tlJf6 2.c4 e6 3.tbc3 �b4 4. 'it'c2 c5 5.dxc5 0-0 6.�f4 bc5 7.tlJf3 tbc& 8.e3 d5 9.a3 1Wa5 1 O . .:Z.c1 �e7 1 1 .�e2 dxc4 12.bc4 tbd5 1 3.bd5 exd5 1 4.1i'b3

The pαwn ση d5 is hαnging. How cαn it be defended?

1 4 ... g5! This game is so famous and the diagram position so well-known that Black's move is now accepted as almost natural. And of course, SF chooses it as its first line. However, in those far-off days such courage was regarded as tantamount to a betrayal of the positional laws of chess. However, Larsen was a totally enemy of routine. Α 'normal' continuation, such as 14 . . . d4 1 5 .l2Jxd4 l2Jxd4 16.exd4, or 14 . . . 1:1d8 15 .0-0, leads to a position with a minimal advantage to White.

1 5.�g3 g4 1 6.tbd4?! Taimanov was no less an optimist than his opponent. He probably regarded Black's extravagant march of the g-pawn as an adventure, which ought to be punished. Quieter moves can in

Chαpter 4 - The Logic of the Irrαtionαl

no way serve as a possible refutation: 16 .l2Jd2 1:ίd8 (also possible is 1 6 . . . d4 I 7.l2Jd5 �e6 1 8.l2Jxe7+ l2Jxe7) 1 7.0-0 d4; 16 .l2Je5!? �f6 (16 .. . d4 1 7.exd4 l2Jxd4 18 .'iνd5 'i!Vd8!) 1 7.l2Jxc6 bxc6 with rough equality in all cases.

1 6 ... tbxd4 1 7.exd4 �g5 1 8.0-0?! Taimanov continues to follow the principle that Black's risky operation can (and should!) be punished only by equally energetic play. However, with normal continuations, Black is, at the very least, free of problems: 18 .1:lc2 l::te8+ 19.1:le2 1:t.xe2+ 20.�xe2 �d7; 1 8.1:t.d1 'i!Va6 19."iνbs 'i!Vxb5 20.l2Jxb5 �d7.

1 8 ... bc1 1 9 . .:Xc1 �e6 20.h3?! Taimanov has dreamed up an interesting plan of counterplay, but unfortunately, it turns out to have a hole. He should have swallowed his pride and settled for a probable draw after 20."iνxb7 'iνb6 2 I ."iνxb6 axb6 22.�c7.

20 ... gxh3 21 .�e5?! f6! After long thought, Larsen goes down the most principled route. 2 I . .. "iνb6 22.lLJb5 (weaker is 22 .l2Jxd5 �xd5 23.'iixd5 1::tfc8) 22 . . . �[5 was also fully possible.

22.tbe4 fxe5 23. 'ifg3+

How should Blαck plαy?

22 ... �g4!

1 25


This effective iηtermediate mσve had beeη missed by Taimaησv iη his calculatiσηs. 23 . . . Wh8? 24.'iνxe5+ aηd 23 . . . Wf7? 24.tbg5+ We7 2S.'iνxe5 bσth wiη fσr White.

24.1Wxg4+ �hθ Νσw it is Black whσ has a wiηηiηg attack.

25.tbg5 'ifd2 26 . .1:.c7 26.l::tfl hxg2 is tσtally bad.

26 ... 1Wxf2+ 27.�h2 1Wxg2+ 28.1Wxg2 hxg2 29.dxe5 .1:.ac8 30 . .:Xb7

Nσthiηg chaηges after 30 . .1:f.xh7+ Wg8 3 I .l::txb7 l::tf2.

30 ... .1:.c2 31 .ttJf7+ �g7 32.e6 �6 33.e7 g1 1W+ 34.�xg1 .1:.g8+ 0-1

Οηe mσdest pawη mσve by Black decisively chaηged the character σf the pσsitiση. Α quiet aηd rather baηal pσsitiση was traηsfσrmed iηstaηtly iηtσ a cσmpletely σrigiηal σηe, where σrdiηary rules aηd apprσaches wσrked badly. Taimaησv, to give him his due, played extremely iηveηtively aηd iηterestiηgly. But iη this battle σf twσ coηfirmed σptimists, it was the Daηe whσ came σut ση tσp. Perhaps because iη his dariηg raid with the g-pawη, he was ahead σf his time, whilst his σppσηeηt remaiηed iη his?

The fσllσwiηg games shσw eveη mσre clearly the streηgths aηd weakηesses σf Beηt Larseη. Οη the σηe haηd, there is the absσlute flexibility aηd lack if dσgma iη his thiηkiηg, aηd the ease with which he toσk decisiσηs, plus his bσuηdless σptimism, which helped him iη difficult situatiσηs. Οη the σther, a teηdeηcy tσ get wrapped up iη his σwη ideas aηd, as a cσηsequeηce, tσ igησre his σppσηeηt's ideas, plus σf course . . .

1 26

that bσuηdless σptlmism, which preveηted him assessiηg pσsitiσηs σbjectively.

Game 57

Sνetozar Gligoric Bent Larsen Lugano ol 1970 (4)

1 .d4 tiJf6 2.c4 e6 3.ttJc3 j,b4 4.e3 b6 S.j,d3 j,b7 6.ltJf3 ltJe4 7.0-0

In this position, which is quite populor in our day, Block hos α choice between three moves: 7 ... tbxc3, 7 .. . �xc3 ond 7 .. . f5. Which continuotion do you think Lorsen chose?

7 ... ttJxc3 Fσr thσse familiar with the Daηe's apprσach, the questiση aηswers itself - σf cσurse, he chσσses the mσst risky aηd prσvσcative liηe!

8.bxc3 bc3 9 . .1:.b1 ltJc6 1 0 . .1:.b3 h5 1 1 .e4

Ιη thσse far-σff days, wheη this game was played, His Highηess Theσry did ησt have aη uηambiguσus σpiηiση ση the pawη sacrifice made by White here. Hσwever, eveη a superficial glaηce at the pσsitiση is eησugh to reveal that the black kiηg faces difficult times ahead. Practically all σf White's pieces are pσised fσr the attack, aηd his pσwerful pawη ceηtre is ready fσr a decisive storm, whilst at the same time, the

black pieces are stranded on the queenside.

1 1 ... lίJe7 1 2.d5 lίJgβ 13.tbd4 'ife7 1 4 . .tc2 .tb4 1 5.�b5 0-0 1 6.'ifh5

White's pressure is growing. Does Black have any way to defend?

1 6 ... :tc8? Α decision characteristic of Larsen! Α super-optimist, he decides to let the black king take care of itself, and feels that his extra material is the most important factor. But the truth is that pawns are already irrelevant in this position. It was absolutely essential to play 16 . . . eS! , at least closing the diagonal of one of the powerful enemy bishops. After the possible continuation 1 7.1::rh3 h6 18 .4Jxc7 (1 8 .�xh6 gxh6 19.�xh6 l::rfc8 is far from deadly) 1 8 . . . 1::tac8 19.�xh6 gxh6 20.�xh6 1::tfd8 White has only perpetual check.

Chapter 4 - The Logic of the Irrαtional

1 7.e5! The most energetic continuation of the attack, although the direct 1 7 . .1::f.h3 4Jf8 was also not bad, and now White has a pleasant choice between 1 8 . .i.gS!? 'iνe8 (1 8 . . . f6 19.e5) 1 9.e5 fS 20.'iνxe8 .l::txe8 2l .tΔxc7 with material gains, or 1 8.e5 g6 19.�h6 exdS 20.f4! with a strong attack.

1 7 ... exd5

Is the position ready for the final attack?

1 8 . .tg5? Strictly speaking, this move does not actually spoil anything, but the position is already ripe for a forced (and none too difficult) win: 1 8 . .!::f.h3 h6 19.�xh6 gxh6 20.�xh6 �xeS 2 l .�xg6 �g7 22.�xf7+! (of course, this move has to be seen from afar, but it is far from the most complicated of ideas) 22 . . . \t>f8 23 .'iνf4!. But it seems that Larsen's boundless faith in the unbreachability of his own position communicated itself to his opponent. Ι can think of no other explanation for such strange play from Gligoric, who was one of the strongest players in the world.

1 8 ... 'it'f8 1 8 . . . 1/VxeS 19.�e3 'iνb2 20 . .I::th3 h6 2 l .�xh6 gxh6 22.�xg6 fxg6 23 . .!::f.g3 ! is too terrible even for Larsen.

1 9.tbd4

1 2 7


White continues to play by general considerations, in a position which requires decisive action. Again he could have won by 19.l::th3 h6 20 . .ixh6, although this time it is more complicated: 20 . . . gxh6 2 l .e6! (here the direct 2 1 ..ixg6 fxg6 22 .'iνxg6+ was not so strong: 22 . . . 'iνg7 23.'iνbl ! �h8 ! 24.'ifxb4 dxc4 and Black somehow holds) 2 1 . . . dxe6 22.�xg6 fxg6 23 .'iνxg6+ 'iVg7 24.'iVxe6+ �h7 25.l:rg3 'iVf8 26.'iVg6+ �h8 27.l:Ih3 .id2 28.f4.

1 9 ... :ee

Δ Δ Δ � �


20.a3? Amazing! Not only does White waste a tempo senselessly, but he also forces the enemy bishop to retreat to a better square. The logical consequence of the previous play was 20.�h3 h6 2l .tbf5! (2 1 .�xh6 gxh6 22.�xg6 now leads only to a draw: 22 . . . fxg6 23 . .1:1g3 ! �h7 24.'ifxg6+ �h8 25.1:rh3 'ifg7 26.�xh6+ �g8 27.'iνxg7+ �xg7 28.t2Jf5+ �f7 29.1:1f6+) 2 1 . .. 1:1xe5 22.�xh6 gxh6 23.tbxh6+ �g7 24.tbf5+ �f6 (also bad is 24 . . . .1:1xf5 25.�xf5) 25.f4 �xfS 26.'ifxf5+ �g7 27.'ifg5 and Black is in a bad way.

20 ... �c5 21 . .:r.h3 h6 22.tlJf5 :Xe5 23 . .bh6 gxh6 24. tlJxh6+ <i;g7 25.'iff3?

1 28

After 2S .t2Jf5+ �f6 White does not have the move 26.f4, but 26.'iVf3 still retains the tension. Now Black's task is significantly eased.

25 ... 'ife7 White's attack has fizzled out.

26.tlJxf7 dxc4 27 . .:r.h7+ <i;xh7 28 . .bg6+ <l;xg6 29.tlJxe5+ 'ifxe5 30.'ifxb7 .:r.te Ο-1

Throughout the entire game, right from the very risky opening, the Dane played as ifhe never for a single second doubted the outcome of the game. Of course, he was taking into account the character of his opponent, who preferred general considerations to concrete calculation. One should also not forget that 1970 was the absolute peak ofLarsen's career, Unfortunately, Fischer stood in his way, and in his match against the American, the great optimist suffered a bitter disappointment.

Game 58

Bent Larsen Lubomir Kavalek Lugano οΙ 1970 (10)

ο

The price of α move in this position with White to move is extremely high. Whαt would be your suggestion?

1 9.<i;b1 ?

Α pointless move, which could have led to serious problems for White. He should have carried out the intended breakthrough immediately: 1 9.g4! tt:Jxg4 20.f3 with a strong attack. And if he was determined to play a prophylactic move, then 19.'ife2! was a significantly better one.

1 9 .. . .tf7?

Α mistake in reply. After this, White's attack develops almost of its own accord. Larsen's comment is characteristic: Άfter a 1 6-minute think, Kavalek plays a move which helps the white attack. He was considering the move 19 . . . �xc4, but after 20.bxc4 tt:Jxc4 2I .'ife2 Black has nothing.' Α strange comment indeed, which only adds more confusion to the situation, rather than clarifying it. It is surprising that Kavalek, a player of energetic attacking style, should pass by a chance to change the course of the game, and no less surprising that Larsen's commentary should ignore his opponent's threats. Let us look more closely at the suggested possibility: 19 .. . �xc4! 20.bxc4 tt:Jxc4 2 I .'ife2 t2Jxb2 22.�xb2 and now 22 .. . 'it'a4! (with all due respect, one can hardly say this move is the most difficult to find) 23 .�d2 (what else?) 23 . . . d5 and White is completely defenceless against the many threats.

Chapter 4 - The Logic of the Irrational

20.g4! Better late than never! Indeed, the inclusion of the moves 19.�bl �f7 also favours White.

20 ... tlJxg4 21 .f3 exf3 22.bf3 tbe5 Suddenly it turns out that the white attack is decisive.

23.'it'h2 bc4 Alas, now this sacrifice is too late.

24.bxc4 tlJxf3 25.'it'h7+ �7 26. tίJcdS J:tgθ

Nor is he saved by 26 . . . t2Je5 27.�xe5 dxe5 28 .t2Jxe7.

27.tlJxe7 .:b828.�1 'it'xe729. 'it'xg6+ '1tf8 30.� 'it'xe6 31 .bg7+! Φe7 32 . .tfB+! J:[bxfθ 33.J:th7+ 1 -0

In this game, we again see the march of the g-pawn and, in the same breath almost, a kingside attack. But at the same time, one cannot help admiring the ease with which Larsen dismisses his opponent's attempts to counterattack, even in analysis. Of course, such an approach involves a great deal of risk. It was precisely this strategically risky play which enabled the Dane to win a mass of tournaments. But it also stopped him reaching the very, very top. Boris Gelfand, ση the other hand, can be considered the very antithesis of the Danish star. Certainly, one cannot say that risk-taking is the dominant feature of his play. But the remarkable idea conceived and realised in the following game is one that Larsen himself would have been proud of.

Game 59

Sergey Karjakin (2723) Boris Gelfand (2758) Khanty-Mansiysk 2009 (6)

1 .e4 e5 2 . .tc4 lbt6 3.d3 tbc6 4.lbf3 .te7 5.0-0 0-0 6 . .tb3 d5 7.exd5

129


lίJxd5 8.h3 a5 9.a4 tα:l4 1 0.lίJxd4 exd4 1 1 . .:.&1

It is clear to the naked eye that Black has solved all his opening problems. Can he pretend to more and, if so, how?

1 1 .. . .:a6!? Uηexpected aηd very beautiful! Black has several σther sσlid cσηtiηuatiσηs: 1 l . .. �e6; 1 1 . . . �b4; 1 l . .. c6. All σf these result iη a quiet, rσughly equal pσsitiση.

Hσwever, haviηg spσtted this very ηice aηd highly uηusual idea, Bσris cσuld ησt resist it. The game coηtiηuatiση is uηdσubtedly the mσst aggressive aηd alsσ riskiest liηe. After all, it iηvσlves the sacrifice σf a whσle piece.

12.1i'h5 After at first beiηg surprised, SF sσση coηfirms the cσrrectηess σf Black's idea. Ενeη sσ, the correct aηd mσst priηcipled liηe fσr White was tσ accept the

1 30

sacrifice: 12 .�xd5! 'i:Vxd5 13 .l::txe7 1::tg6 aηd ησw 14.f3 ! (he lσses quickly after 14.g4 'i:VhS! 15 .1::te4 (σr 1 5 .'i:Vf3 �xg4 16.hxg4 l:Ixg4+ 1 7.�fl l:i.gl+ 1 8 .�e2 '5'c5) 1 5 . . . 'i:Vxh3 (15 . . . f5 16 . .1::re5 'ifxh3 1 7.g5 traηspσses) 16 .g5 f5 1 7.1:ιe5 f4 1 8.'\i'fl �h4 19.'5'g2 1:lf5!) 14 .. . �xh3 15 .1::te2 'i:Vxf3 16 .'5'f1 , fσrciηg perpetual check: 16 . . . .Άχg2 1 7.l:ιxg2 1::txg2+ 1 8.'ifxg2 'Vifdl+ 19.'iffl 'i:Vg4+.

1 2 .. . tt:\b4!? The rσσk ση a6 has a great future ahead σf it. After the 'cσrrect' 1 2 . . . 1:le6!? its career sσση eηds.

13.tt:\a3 .J:I.g6 1 4 . .tf4 b6

How can White neutralise the growing activity of the black pieces?

1 5.1i'f3?! Preveηtiηg the �c8 cσmiηg to the lσηg diagσηal, but it iηstead fiηds σther effective wσrk. White did have available a maησeuvre, which coηfirms the thσught that ηση-staηdard measures require ηση-staηdard decisiσηs: 15 .ti:Jb5! c6 16 .tba3 c5 1 7.tbc4 �b7 1 8.�g3. The white pieces are alsσ wellplaced. The pσsitiση is rσughly equal.

1 5 .. . .te6! 16.be6 fxe6 But ησw White has prσblems. The pressure ση the f- aηd g-files is uηpleasaηt.

1 7.1i'e4 .td6! 1 8 . .txd6 cxd6!

1 9.'ifxd4? After 1 9.�fl tbd5! the black attack develops of its οwπ accord. The relatively best defeπce was 19.g3 e5 20.1:1e2, although here too, Black's chaπces are uπdoubtedly superior. The text proves the decisive mistake.

1 9 ... 'ifg5 20.g3 'iff5! 21 .g4 Of course, ποt a very πice move to have to play. 2 1 .\t>h2 was somewhat better, but theπ Black has a pleasaπt choice betweeπ a good eπdgame after 2 I . .. tbxc2 22.tbxc2 'iνxf2+ 23 .'iνxf2 �xf2+ 2H�igl �xc2 aπd aπ attack with 2 l .. . tbc6! 22.'5'xb6 tbes.

21 ... h5 Good eπough to wiπ, but eveπ stroπger was 2 l .. . tbd5! .

22 . .J:I.e4 d5 23. <li'h2 'iff3 24 . .J:I.ee1 hxg4 25. 'ife3 gxh3 26. 'it'xf3 .l:l.xf3 27 . .J:I.g1 .l:l.xf2+ 28 . ..txh3 .J:I.xg1 29 . .J:I.xg1 ltJxc2 30.llJb5 .l:l.f3+ 31 .<li'g4 .J:I.xd3 32.llJd6 llJe3+ 33.�4 liJc4 0-1

Black's play iπ this game was irreproachable. Karjakiπ, by coπtrast, failed to show his usual cold-bloodedπess, teπacity aπd accurate calculatioπ of variatioπs. Evideπtly, he was affected by the extreme paradox aπd courage of his oppoπeπt's idea. For Boris, such play is ποt typical, aπd so the psycho-


logical effect οπ his oppoπeπt was all the greater.

The πext two games, played by the author maπy years ago, accord absolutely with the title of this chapter. The logic of the positioπ impelled me iπ the first case to sacrifice a piece, aπd iπ the secoπd to decide οπ aπ extravagaπt kiπg move.

Game 60

Vladimir Tukmakov Vladimir Bagirov Moscow 1983 (3)

1 .d4 d5 2.c4 c6 3.llJf3 llJf6 4.liJc3 a6 5 . .ig5 liJe4 6 . .if4 ttJxc3 7.bxc3 dxc4 8.g3!? b5 9 . .ig2 .ib7 1 0.liJe5?! f6

We will pass over the opeπiπg phase, although it seems to me that this has ποt lost its theoretical iπterest eveπ after 30 years. Oπly White's last move I O.tbe5 was probably too optimistic.

Black's reply gave me α dif/icult choice. How should White continue?

1 1 .ltJxc4! Risky? Of course! But the logic of the positioπ requires precisely this decisioπ. I I .tbf3 c5 or I I .tbg4 e5! 1 2 .dxe5 'iνxdl+ 13 .�xdl h5 H.tbe3 g5 would be iπcoπsisteπt aπd therefore, iπcorrect.

1 3 1


1 1 ... bxc4 Bagirov thought for 50 minutes over this natural move, which gave me additional compensation for the sacrificed piece. Later Black tried 1 l . .. g5!? 12 .�e3 bxc4 1 3 .I:f.b1 �c7 14.h4 (SF's recommendation 14.d5 !? e6 1 5 .�d4! is also interesting) 14 . . . gxh4 1 5 . .ί:ίχh4 lt:Jd7 with double-edged play.

1 2 . .J:r.b1 e5! The most active and the strongest. After 1 2 . . . �c8 1 3 .�a4 White would have wonderful compensation for the piece.

13 . .J:r.xb7 exf4 1 4.'it'a4?! Prematurely committing the queen helps Black's defence. Better was 14.�b1 !? �d6 (14 . . . �e7 1 5 .�[5! <;!;>[7 16.'iνc5 Φf8 I 7."iνxc4 "iνc8 18 .�b3 also gives White many possibilities) 1 5 .�e4+ �e7 16.gxf4 with good compensation for the piece. But the most correct decision was 14.0-0 ! , completing his development and letting Black have the next word. Now after 14 .. .'iVc8 (after 14 . . . fxg3 1 5 .hxg3 �d6 the white queen goes on the same route as in the game: 16.�a4!) there is the very strong 1 5 .�b1 ! �e7 (15 . . . fxg3 16.fxg3 !) 16 .gxf4 f5 17.d5! and Black faces a difficult defence.

1 4 ... 'it'c8 1 5 . .J:r.b6 .tdβ 1 6.'it'xc4 �e7 1 7.0-0 .J:r.a7 1 8 . .J:r.fb1 .J:r.dβ!

18 . . . fxg3 gives White additional possibilities: 19.hxg3 .ί:ίd8 20.e4!.

1 9.gxf4 'it'eβ On 19 . . . �xf4 Black did not like 20.d5 �c7 2 1 ..1::f.6b2, but then he has a farfrom-obvious, but strong resource: 2 I . . .'iVd7 22.dxc6 "iνd6. The pawn on c6 is practically worth a piece, but in return, Black has real counterplay.

20.'it'd3 gβ Bagirov has repulsed the first attack, and it seemed to me that the game

1 32

had passed into a new, positional stage. The two pawns and active pieces compensate for White's small material deficit.

Δ Δ Δ VJ/i

Δ Δ Δ � Δ � φ

Even so, the vαlue of α move remαins high. Whαt would you suggest for White?

21 .c4 Played in the spirit of White's new conception. However, the tactical resources of the position are far from exhausted. 2 l .d5! cxd5 22 . .ί:ίχd6! <;!;>xd6 23 . .ί:ίb6+ lt:Jc6 24.c4 was significantly more unpleasant for Black, especially in conditions of time deficit.

21 ... �8 Bagirov, in time-trouble, tries to play as solidly as possible. Stronger was 2 l . .. �xf4!, not fearing 22.d5 �f5! and White has nothing better than the exchange of queens: 23 .�xf5 gxf5 24.dxc6 §J.c7. In this

case, the likely outcome of the battle is a draw.

22.d5 'fle7? And this is a serious mistake. He had to play 22 .. . 'ife8 ! 23 .dxc6 .txf4, although here too, White has excellent compensation for the piece after 24 . .tds.

23.c5! .bf4 24.e3 More energetic is 24.d6! 'iνe8 2S . .ί:t6b4! .ies (2S . . . .th6 26 .'iνb3 ! t2Jd7 27 . .1::f.e4 tbes 28 .f4) 26.f4, but in the 5th hour of play, one tends to want greater clarity.

24 .. . ttJd7 25.exf4 cxdS 26 . .J:I.c6

26 ... lbbθ? Α decisive time-trouble oversight. He should have preferred 26 ... t2Jxc5! 27.'iνd4 t2Je4, retaining good chances of a draw in the variation 28 . .txe4 dxe4 29.l:Ixf6+ �g8 30.'ifc4+ �g7 3 1 ..!:1e6 'ifh4 32.'iνc3+ �g8 33.1:lxe4. Black would have greater problems (especially in view of his time-trouble) after 28.�h3! .

27 . .J:I.d6! .J:I.xd6 28.cxd6 'fixd6 29. 'ifxdS 'ifc7 30. 'fle6 'fidθ

Allowing a nice finish. But Black is also helpless after 30 . . . �g7 3 l .'iνe8! t2Jd7 32.'ii'e7+ �h8 33 .l:Idl .

31 . .J:I.xb8 'ifxbθ 32. 'fixf6+ 1 -0

White's play cannot be considered as perfect, but he tried to follow the logic


of the irrational. In any event, as the author himself saw it. Ι will not hide the fact that this win brought me a great deal of pleasure, partly because such a style of play had enabled me to defeat such a high-class defender as Vladimir Bagirov.

Game 61

Gennady Kuzmin Vladimir Tukmakov Odessa 1968

1 .d4 tbf6 2.c4 g6 3.tbc3 i.g7 4.e4 d6 5.f3 c6 6.i.e3 lbbd7 7. 'fid2 a6 θ.tbge2 bS 9.tbg3 'flas 1 0.a3 hS 1 1 .cxb5 axbS 1 2.b4 'fidθ 1 3 . ..td3 lbb6 1 4.0-0 i.e6 15.d5 cxdS 1 6 . ..txb5+ i.d7 1 7 .es dxeS 1 8 . .bd7+

It rαrely hαppens thαt Blαck hαs still not mαnαged to cαstle αfter 18 moves of α King's Indiαn. This gαme is αη exception. It αlso rαrely hαppens thαt α cαpture with check leαves Blαck four different recαptures. Ι fαced exαctly this problem. How should Ι resolve it?

18 ... 'iii'xd7?! Possibly the most paradoxical move of my chess career! Ι understood only too well (or perhaps Ι did not, given that Ι still chose such a risky operation . . . ) that this was not the safest of moves.

1 3 3


However, the desire to justify all my previous play was just too tempting. The black king fearlessly marches in front of his army, demonstrating at the same time, as typically happens, both courage and stupidity. Taking with the queen, losing a piece, would have been even more stupid. The desire to keep the central pawns intact is understandable, but the price is too great. The position does not in general justify such a degree of risk. 1 8 . . . tt:Jfxd7! 1 9.lLJxd5 lLJc4 20.'iνc3 lLJxe3 2 I .lLJxe3 0-0 leads to a doubleedged position, where the activity of the black pieces compensates for the pair of passed pawns on the queenside. Weaker is 1 8 .. . tt:Jbxd7 19.lLJxd5 0-0 20.lLJe4.

1 9.1We2! d4 There is no way back! 19 ... We8 20.'iνb5+ lLJbd7 2 I .lLJxd5 leads to much the same position, as does 1 8 ... tt:Jbxd7, but with the significant difference that Black has managed to lose the right to castle!

20.1Wb5+ �cθ 20 .. . We6 2 I .f4! was immediate suicide.

21 .:Sc1 ! �b7 22.tlJge4! It is clear that White is not intimidated. Kuzmin plays in the most energetic way and now it is very hard to know what to advise Black.

22 .. . 1We8

1 34

23.tbc5+? After 23 .'ifxe5! the black position collapses quickly. For example, 23 . . . dxc3 (it is also completely hopeless after 23 . . . dxe3 24.lLJcS+ Wc8 2S .lLJ3a4) 24.lLJc5+ Wc8 2S . .!d.xc3 lLJfdS 26.lLJe6+ Wb7 27.I:lc7+.

23 .. . �c7

Black 's position sti11 Jooks extremely dαngerous. But now it is already rαther more difficult for White to mαke the correct choice.

24.tlJd7? The head spins at the extent of the choice, but strangely, there is no direct win. 24.lLJe6+!? Wb7 2S.'ifxe5! fxe6 26.�xd4 is not deadly, in view of the calm 26 . . . 'ifd8!. SF gives 24.'iνd3! Wb8 (neither 24 . . . dxe3 2S.lLJb5+ Wb8 26.lLJc7! Φχc7 27.lLJa6+ nor 24 ... dxc3 25.�xc3 lLJfdS 26.1:ίfcl are possible) 2S.lLJa6+ Wb7

26.tt:Je4! but it is extremely hard for the human player to find such quiet moves. The move chosen by Kuzmin looks very striking from aπ aesthetic point of view, but in practical terms it is a mistake.

24 ... "ifxd7 25.lbe4+ 'ifiιd8 26. 'ifxb6+ 'ifiιe8 27.tlJc5 'ifd6 28. 'ifb5+ 'ifiιf8

Five moves ago, Black could hardly have dreamed of such happiness: his king returns home favourably, whilst retaining his entire army.

29.-tgs 'ifiιg8 Psychologically, Black's desire to protect his king more securely is understandable after what he has gone through, but objectively, 29 .. . ii.h6 was stronger.

30.a4 'ifiιh7 31 .bf6 exf6 32. 'ifc4 "ife7

When all his troubles are behind him, Black, quite typically, loses concentration. Better was 32 . . . I;la7! and Black's pawn armada in the centre is significantly stronger than White's passed pawns.

33.a5 .:hc8 34 . .:ce1 f5? Α serious mistake in time-trouble. 34 .. .'ifc7 retains all the advantages of Black's position.

35. 'ifxd4 exd4? Panic! After the correct 3S . . . e4! 36.�c4 e3 , Black still stands better.

36 . .:Xe7 ..tf8 37 . .:Xf7+ 'ifiιg8 38 . .:16 'ifiιg7?

The final time-trouble blunder. The simple 38 .. . ii.xc5 guarantees a draw.

39 . .:xf8! 'ifiιxf8 40.llJd7+ 'ifiιe7 41 .lίJb6 .:ab8 42.lίJxc8+ .:Xc8 43 . .:d1 1 -0

Defeat in this game cannot be considered a chance thing. Of course, Black steadily followed the conception which forms the title of this chapter. But in this case, the logic was just too risky, and the deserved


punishment could have come rather earlier. However, the decisive reason was a loss of concentration.

Having decided on such a risky exception, one absolutely must be 100% mobilised, to the very last move. It is this kind of total commitment to the game that Viktor Kortchnoi always brings. He frequently creates enormous tension on the board, and the ability to combine a high level of risk with maximum concentration made him one of the strongest players in the world.

Game 62

Grigory Serper (2575) Viktor Kortchnoi (2625) Groningen 1 993 (9)

1 .c4 lίJf6 2.tlJc3 e5 3.lίJf3 tlJc6 4.g3 d5 5.cxd5 lίJxdS 6 . ..tg2 lίJb6 7.0-0 ..te7 8 . .:b1

With his last move, White quite clearly showed his intention of playing b2-b4, which would follow after 8 . . . 0-0, for example. How can this positional threat be prevented?

8 ... g5!? Bravo to those readers who were not afraid to suggest this extravagant solution to the problem! Α similar idea is known for White in the Dragon, although its reputation is not spotless.

1 3 5


Here, the opponent has an extra tempo, but the position admittedly assumes an unusual character, which helped persuade Kortchnoi to take such a risky step.

9.d3 h5 1 O.a3 h4 1 1 .b4 hxg3 12.hxg3 White plays in a classical fashion, although in such an unusual position, it was also perfectly possible to adopt less trivial plans. For example, 1 2 .fxg3 !? was interesting here, because Black does not have 1 2 . . . g4 1 3 .t2Jd2 'β'd4+ 14.�f2 'ifxc3 15 .�b2.

1 2 .. . a6 Kortchnoi also refrains from radical measures. 1 2 . . . '1Wd6!? 13 .lLJb5 'lih6 14.lLJxc7+ <;t>fg 1 5 .lLJxa8 l2Jxa8 was interesting, but too risky.

13.b5

13 ... αxbS is not only nαturαl, but αlso forced. Isn't it?

1 3 ... l2Jd4!? Νο! Unusual positions require unusual measures! Although, it has to be admitted that in this concrete position, there was nothing wrong with 13 . . . axb5 14.lLJxb5 g4.

1 4.tbxd4? The confidence and speed with which Black played his previous move disoriented Serper. He took his opponent at his word, not even looking deeply

1 3 6

into lines such as 14.lLJxe5 'ifd6 15 .e3!? 'lih6 16.f3, which leads to unpredictable consequences. 1 5 .f4!? is stronger: I S . . . 'ifh6! (IS .. . gxf4?! 16.t2Jxf7! 'ifcS! (weaker is 16 . . . <;t>xf7? 1 7 . .ixf4 'lics 18 .e3! and Black stands badly) 1 7.e3 with an attack) and in the resulting crazy position anything could happen.

1 4 ... exd4 15.bxa6?! Better is 15 .lLJe4 fS 16 .lLJd2, although after 1 6 . . . '1Wd6 Black has the initiative.

1 5 ... .:.Xa6 16. l2Jb5 l2Ja4 The position has finally assumed more or less normal characteristics, but Black already has a serious advantage.

1 7.e3 c6 1 8.tbxd4 l2Jc3 1 9. •c2 tbxb1 20. •xb1 •d6

It was also fully possible to go into positional channels with 20 . . . 0-0 2 I .'iν'b3 'iVb6 but Kortchnoi finishes the game in the same aggressive style in which he started it.

21 .• b3? Relatively more tenacious is 2 I ..I::!.el 'ifh6 22.e4 'ifh2+ 23 .<;t>fl .ih3.

21 ... •h6 22.:e1 cS! Now the queen's rook joins the attack!

23.l2Jf3 .th3 24. 1!fxb7? Losing by force. Admittedly, 24.lLJeS .ixg2 25 .Φχg2 (2S .'ifxf7+ Φd8 26.Φχg2 'ifh3+ 27.Φf3 .l::!.f6+) 25 . . . 'iνh3+ 26.Φf3 .l::!.e6 only prolongs the resistance.

24 ... .bg2 25. 'it'cβ+ Απ essential intermediate move. The immediate 25 .'it>xg2 leads to catastrophe: 25 . . . 1i'h3+ 26.'it>gl 1i'hl#.

25 ... �d8 26.'ίftxg2 .J:r.e6 27.l2Jg1 27.'it>fl loses the queen after 27 ... 1i'h3+ 28 .'it>e2 lixe3+.

27 .. . 'it'h1 + 28.Φ1'1 .J:r.f6 29.e4 On 29 . .ϊ::i.e2, Black settles things with 29 . . . .!::!.h2 .

29 ... .J:r.h2 30. 'ίfte2 Nor is he saved by 30.�e3 1:1fxf2+ (30 . . . .!:lg2) 3 1 .�xf2 iνg2+ 32 .'it>e2 1i'xf2+ 33 .'it>dl 1i'd2#.

30 .. . .J:r.hxf2+ 31 .Φd1 .J:r.d6 32.�e3 .J:r.xd3+ 33. Φc1 .J:r.c3+ 34. Φd1 'it'h6

0-1

Α most unusual game! But even that one pales before the next.

Game 63

Alexander Morozevich (2734) Viktor Laznicka (2666) Rhodes tt 201 3 (4)

1 .g3 eS 2.c4 tt:'Jf6 3.�g2 tt:'Jc6 4.tt:'Jc3 �cs 5.e3 dS 6.cxd5 tt:'Jb4

The gαme has tαken απ unusuαl turn from the very stαrt. How should White continue?

7.tt:'Jf3!? Α typical Morozevich decision! 7.d4 exd4 8 .exd4 �e7 9.tbf3 or 7.d3 lead


to quite interesting positions, but they would be the sort that follow standard principles and have many typical analogous positions. After the text, however, the position assumes a completely unpredictable and irrational character.

7 ... tt:'Jd3+ 8.Φe2 tt:'JxdS 9. 'it'a4+ �d7 1 0.'it'e4 tLJSb4 1 1 .a3!?

The situation is no clearer after l l .lLJxeS [5 1 2 .iνc4 tbxe5 13 .1i'xc5 lLJbd3 14.1i'd4 1i'e7! .

analysis diagram

This position is extremely difficult to assess.

1 1 ... �c6 1 2.'it'c4 b5 1 3.'it'g4 The variation 13 .tbxb5 e4! 14.lLJfd4 �xd4! 15 .axb4 lLJeS 16.1i'xd4 �xbS+ 1 7.'it>dl 1i'xd4 18 .exd4 tbd3 19.'it>c2 is far from forced. Once again, assessing the final position is very difficult.

13 . . . tt:'Jc2 1 4. 'it'xg7 .J:r.fβ 15 . .J:r.a2?! The game has already long since taken a completely unpredictable course (and how many more exceptions lie ahead!) , where decisions have to be taken almost exclusively on the basis of intuition. Thus, here it is hard to choose the correct square for the rook. lS .I:f.bl was somewhat more accurate.

1 5 ... b4! 1 6.axb4 tt:'Jcxb4 1 7 . .J:r.a5 'it'd6 1 8.'it'g4 �b6 1 9 . .J:r.a3 .J:r.dβ 20.tt:'Je4 'it'e7

Laznicka, unlike his opponent, plays solidly and predictably. But do you

1 3 7


recall the main rule about such positions? Here, too, a non-standard decision was strongest: 20oo o'ifg6! 2I .Vixg6 fxg6! 22oti:Jfg5 h6 23 oti:Jh3 gS and White has serious problems, despite his extra pawno Another idea worth considering was the tempo-gain 20oo o..ixe4!? 2I .ii'xe4 fS 220Vic4 e4, although after 23oti:Jel ! things are not so simpleo

21 .'iff5?! The threat was 2 l o o of5 ο Although Alexander understood very well that a queen is usually a bad blockader, he also understood even better than usual rules do not always apply in unusual positionso However, in this concrete example, the correct move was the 'normal ' 2 I .ti:Jh4! o

21 . . . f6! 22.tίJh4 �bS

Α mere glance suggests that White has serious problemso But are things so bad for him? He does have απ extra pawn, after all.

23.�3 Α surprising move! Although objectively it should lose, Ι still cannot help admiring it. After the natural (and best) 23 o�dl Black's task is not so simpleo The strongest reply is 23o o o'iff7! 24o..if3 �e7! with advantageo

23 ... tίJc2 Α good move, because not only is the rook on a3 hanging, but there is also a

1 38

deadly check threatened on e Ι . This is why 23 o�dl was stronger, not allowing the knight jumpo But even stronger is SF's 23o o o'iff7! (with the threat of 24oo o.id7) 24og4 .id7 250Vihs 'iνxhS 26ogxh5 fs 27oti:Jg5 e4+, winning immediatelyo

24.:Xd3 :Xd3 25.'ifh5+ 'itdθ 26.tίJf5 'ifb4 27.'itg4!

Where the king is heading, and why, is a secret. The hidden logic of the irrational!

27 ... :d7?! This solid move does not accord with this logic, howevero Instead, the seemingly illogical transfer of the bishop from its good position was stronger: 27ooo.ic6 28of3 ..ie8 29o'ifh4 .ig6 or, even better, 27ooo..ie8! 28o'ii'xh7 �d7 29o'iνh6 �g8+ 300�[3 .ig6o

28.'ith3! �d3 29.'iff3 c6 30.g4 hS! ο

31 .gxh5 :h7 32.tlJeg3 :thθ 33.e4 'ifc4 34.'ith4

It would be quite immodest of me to try to explain to the reader what Ι do not understand myself Of course, with the help of the indefatigable SF one can try to add rationale to this crazy game, but is it worth it?

.I .I

Δ

Both players remain true to their chess philosophies: Laznicka plays sensibly, Morozevichoo o incomprehensiblyo Even so, we should add that the best defence for White in this difficult position was 34ob3! Vixb3 3S o.ib2! o

34 ... �c7 Not spoiling anything, but 34 . . . 1:ίxhS+! 35 .t2Jxh5 �e2 ends the game at once.

35.b3! 'ifxb3 36.�b2 1Wxb2 37.1Wxd3 J:[d7

In time-trouble, this is a perfectly natural reaction to the threatened check, but it was even stronger to play 37 . . . �xf2! .

38.'iff3 llJb4 Why not 38 .. . 1:txd2! ?

39.llJe3 be3 40.dxe3 lίJd3 41 .:d1 4l .'iνxf6! .

41 ... a5 4l. .. �f8! .

42.�h3 42.'iYxf6! .

42 .. . :d6 43. 1Wg4 In the time-scramble, the position has been completely transformed, but it has not become any more clear. Who is playing for a win is also a big question. Probably both players, now!

43 ... :hd8 44. 'ifg7+ �b6 45.h6 'ifxf2 46.:b1 + llJb4 47.h7 'ifxe3

48.�f5 Not 48.h8'iV?? because of 48 .. . 1:!.xh8+ 49.'iνxh8 'iνg5#.

48 .. . :d2 49.:h1 49.<;th3!?.

49 ... 'ifg5+ 50. 'ifxg5 fxg5+ 51 . �xg5 a4 52.�6 a3 53.�e6 :2d6! 54.llJf5 :Xe6+ 55. �xe6 J:[hθ 56. �xe5 a2 57.J:a1 :Xh7 58.h4 J:a7


Black clearly stands better, but is this suf/icient for α win?

59.llJe3? The final mistake in the game. Passive defence loses, alas! Α worthy finish to this grandiose battle would have been 59.h5! t2Jc2 60.�xa2 .ί:Ιχa2 61 .h6 c5 62.h7 .U.a8 63 .<;tf6 c4 64.t2Je7 �h8 65 .t2JdS+ <;tcs 66.Φg7 .U.d8 67.h8'iY .ί::!.χh8 68 .<;txh8 t2Ja3 69.<;tg7 <;td4 70.<;tf6 Φχe4 7 l .t2Jc3+ <;td3 72 .t2Ja4 with a draw.

59 ... �5 60.:C1+ �b5 61 .J:a1 :a3 62.llJf5 �c4 63.h5 llJc2 64.:Xa2 :Xa2 65.h6 J:a7 66.� lίJd4 67.llJe7 J:a1 68.h7 :h1 69.�g7 llJe6+ 70. �θ J:[g1 + 71 . � llJg5+ 72. �g6 llJxh7+ 73.�xh7 c5 74.llJf5 :e1 0-1

am speechless! This game did not fail to impress any of the players at the European Club Championship, and they included many top stars. Of course, it is impossible to play like that all the time. That is precisely why Alexander Morozevich's career contains a mixture of massive successes with sharp failures. But one cannot but be amazed by such play!

The following game is different in a major way from the one just exam-

1 3 9


ined, although it contains paradoxical manoeuvres, unexpected sacrifices and an improbable number of complicated variations. But whereas the irrationality of the previous game had a purely improvisational character, the deep complications in this game were the result of solid home preparation.

Game 64

Veselin Topalov (2778) Viswanathan Anand (2785) Sofia 2005 (6)

1 .d4 tt:Jfβ 2.c4 e6 3.tt:Jf3 b6 4.g3 .bβ 5.b3 .tb4+ 6 . .td2 .te7 7.tt:Jc3 cβ 8.e4 d5 9.'ifc2 dxe4 1 0.tt:Jxe4 .tb7 1 1 .tt:Jeg5!?

In a game played not long before this, against Leko, Topalov played differently: 1 l .�g2 cS 12 .tt:Jeg5 tt:Jc6 13 .dxc5 bxcS 14.�c3, and even won. But given that it was a blindfold game at Monaco, one should not even estimate its significance. The move in the game is significantly more ambitious.

1 1 ... c5! It is very dangerous to play 1 1 . . . h6?! 12 .tt:Jxf7! �xf7 13 .tt:Je5+ �g8 14.�h3 �c8 1 5 .0-0 with wonderful compensation for the piece, but the quiet 1 1 . .. 0-0 was perfectly possible.

1 2.d5! exd5 1 3.cxd5 h6

140

Agαin the most principled continuαtion. Whαt should White plαy now?

1 4.tt:Jxf7!? Of course, the knight did not come to gS, merely in order to retreat with its tail between its legs, even more so in view of the fact that White had another alternative here: 14 . .tbS+. However, after 14 . . . tt:Jbd7! (after 14 .. . �f8 the piece sacrifice is even more effective: 1 S .tt:Jxf7 �xf7 16 .tt:Je5+) 15 .tt:Je6 fxe6 16 .'iνg6+ �f8 1 7.dxe6 'iνe8 ! 1 8 .'ii'xe8+ �xe8 19.exd7+ �d8! Black would have the initiative.

1 4 ... Φχf7 1 5.0-0-0 .td6! Defending against 16 .tt:Je5+. Taking the pawn with 1 5 .. . �xd5? was too dangerous in view of 16 . .tc3 tt:Jbd7 (16 . . . tt:Jc6 1 7.�xf6 �xf6 18 .l:txd5) 1 7.�xd5! tt:JxdS 1 8 .'iνf5+ ttJ7f6 19.tt:Je5+ �f8 20.tt:Jg6+ �g8 2 l .�xf6.

1 6.tt:Jh4

So far, everything had developed according to Topalov's tearn's analysis. Their verdict was that White's attack was worth α piece. But is this so obvious?

1 6 ... -tcθ! They had rnissed this superb defensive resource! They had only analysed 16 .. . �xd5?, after which 1 7.�c3 ! �xhl 18 .'iνg6+ Φf8 19.1:f.xd6 'iνxd6 20.l2Jfs leads to a win for White. In addition, 16 .. . 1:f.e8?! 1 7.'ifg6+ Φg8 1 8.l2Jfs 1:f.e7! 19.�c4 gives White a very strong attack. Less clear is 16 . . . l2Jbd7, but here too, 1 7 . .ic3! Φg8 18 .�h3 l2Jf8 19.�hel looks quite prornising. But now Topalov found hirnself in a very unpleasant position, a piece down, his opponent defending very confidently, and with it far frorn clear how he should develop his initiative. What would you suggest for White?

1 7 . .J:r.e1 !? After the direct 1 7.'iig6+ Φg8 18 .�c3 Black sirnplifies the position favourably: 1 8 . . . 'ife8 19.1:f.el 'ifxg6 20.l2Jxg6 �fS 2I .l2Jxh8 l2Jbd7.

1 7 ... lίJa6! Black dernonstrates his arnbitions unarnbiguously. He is not satisfied with 1 7 . . . 1:f.e8 18 .'iνg6+ Φg8 (18 .. . Φf8 19 . .ibS!) 19 . .ibS!

Δ Δ

analysis diagram


with an unclear position. He is after rnore.

1 8 . .J:r.e6!

This was the rnain idea of 1 7.1:f.e Ι .

1 8 ... tίJb4! Again the rnost energetic. After the passive 1 8 . . . l2Jc7 19.'iig6+ (it was worth considering 19.�c4!? bS 20.�c3 ! l2Jfe8 2 l .�xb5) 19 . . . Φg8 20.l2Jfs �f8 2l .�c4 bS 22.lbe7+ .ixe7 23.1:f.xe7 'iνf8 24.1:f.xc7 bxc4 2S .bxc4 White has full cornpensation for the piece.

1 9 . ..bb4! Weaker is 1 9.'i!Vg6+ Φg8 20.l2Jfs �f8.

1 9 ... cxb4 20 . .tc4! Beautiful variations arise after 20.'ii'c6!?.

analysis diagram

For exarnple, 20 .. . 1:f.e8! (things are dangerous for Black after 20 . . . �xe6 2 l .dxe6+ Φg8 22.e7 'ii'c7 23.�c4+ Φh7 24.'tif3) 2 1 .1:f.xd6 �d7 22.�c4! 1:f.c8 23.1:f.xf6+ gxf6 24.d6+ Φf8

14 1


2S.'i:Vds .ie6 26.'i:Vhs .ixc4 27.'ifxh6+ �g8 28 .'i:Vg6+.

20 ... b5! 21 . .h:b5

tb Δ

Δ Δ ::;r

How should we assess the resulting position? How should Black continue?

21 ... �e7? Having been faced with a dangerous prepared πovelty, Anand has had to solve extremely clifficult problerns, over the course of many moves. Up to ποw he has coped splendidly with this task, but ποw, faced with a clifficult choice again, he errs.

There was a mass of candidate moves: 2l. .. �g8!?; 2l . .. .!:Th8!?; 2l. .. a6!?. Calculating all the possible variations is beyoπd human capabilities, and in such cases, οπe must rely οπ intuitioπ. This time, Vishy was deceived. The logic of Black's strange-looking move was that the immediate 21 . .. he6 22.dxe6+ �g8 is bad because of 23.e7 he7 24 . .ic4+. Now Black is already threatening to take the rook.

22.�6! Probably Απaπd overlooked this stroπg move!

22 ... ltJxd5 Alas, he caππot play 22 .. . .itxe6 23.dxe6+ �g8 because of 24 . .ί::!.d l .

23.:Xe7+ Topalov, haviπg also used a lot of eπergy. forces the game. He had at least two stroπger possibilities: B . .ί::!.eS! .ib7

142

(23 ... .ie6 24.tίJxh8+ 'ifxh8 2S . .ί::!.xe6 �xe6 26.'i:Vc6+) 24.'tifS+ �g8 2S . .itc4 or 23.'tifS+! .if6 24.�el! . Ιπ both cases, White's pieces domiπate the board.

23 ... tlJxe7 24.�c4+

Now Black has several possibilities. Which one to choose?

24 ... <itf6 After 24 . . . .ie6 2S . .ixe6+ �xe6 26 . .ί::!.el+ �[6 27.t:Δxe7 l::!:c8! 28.t:Δxc8 'tixc8 29 . .ί:le4 'tixc2+ 30.�xc2 we reach aπ uπpleasaπt rook eπdgame for Black. He iπstead prefers to seek chaπces iπ the middlegame.

25.ltJxh8 'ifd4! 2S . . . iνxh8 26.Ii.dl !+-.

26.:td1 ! 'ifa1 + 27.�d2 1Wd4+ 28.�e1 'ife5+ 29.1We2 'ifxe2+

So, Black has ποt maπaged to avoid aπ exchaπge of queeπs after all. Somewhat more chaπces were offered by 29 . . . t:Δc6! 30.t:Δf7 'iνxe2+ 3 l .�xe2 t:Δas.

30. �xe2 tt:\f5 30 .. . .ig4+ 3 1 .[3 �xh8 32.fxg4 is πο better.

31 .tt:\f7 a5 3 I . .. .ie6 32 . .ixe6 �xe6 33 .t:Δd8+.

32.g4! The game goes iπto a techπical stage, which Topalov plays very precisely.

32 ... tt:\h4 33.h3 :&7 34.:td6+ �e7 35.:tb6 :tc7 36.tt:\e5 �2 37.�6+

'ίtd8 38.'ίtf1 .tb7 39.:Xb7 :Xb7 40.'ίtxg2 .l:.d7 41 .lίJf8 .l:.d2 42.lίJe6+ 'ίte7 43.lbxg7 :Xa2 44.lίJf5+ 'ίtf6 45.lbxh6 .l:.c2 46 . .tf7 .l:.c3 47.f4 a4 48.bxa4 b3 49.g5+ 'ίtg7 50.f5 b2 51 .f6+ 'ίth7 52.lίJf5 1 -0

White intends the following simple finish: 52 . . . bl� 53 .g6+ �h8 54.g7+ �h7 55 .g8�#.

Both Morozevich and Topalov strive from the first move to create non-standard positions and force their opponent to solve non-trivial problems. When


they are operating at full energy and capacity, it is a rare opponent who can withstand the pressure. But whereas with Alexander, this effort tends to be of an improvisational character, Veselin usually prepares his surprises in the quiet of his home. And this gives his opponents extra problems. Even Anand, without doubt one of the best defenders in the history of chess, and having solved the opening problems extremely well, could not in the end withstand the pressure maintained by Topalov so artfully.

Conclusion There are only a few players in the world, who are able to head voluntarily into positions where the battle goes on effectively without any rules of thumb and where normal chess laws do not apply. After all, all the best players are pragmatists. Refusing to enter openings they have worked out, avoiding their favourite positions , where they can score points almost without effort and without great tension, is at best irrational. It is another matter when chess is just one's hobby. Then every game can seem like a trip into the unknown, and the more exceptions, the better. Therefore, every player chooses his own path.

But there are some situations when one does not have to choose. As a result of extremely creative play by the opponent, or because of one's own mistakes, the position on the board suddenly loses all its customary points of orientation and slips completely out of control. What can one do when the pieces just seem to scatter in all directions and it is not clear who is attacking and who defending? The main thing is not to panic. This is an unbreakable rule of chess. One must never in any circumstances forget that this is just a game and all that is at stake is a mere point in the score table. You don't understand what is going on? ΟΚ, don't get desperate! Your opponent is probably in the same boat. Don't forget about your own colossal natural talent, which you have only been prevented from realising by an insufficiently strong computer or an imperfect memory. None of these trivialities play any role now, and all that will decide things is your imagination, your ability to find unexpected resources and, most of all, your never-ending belief in yourself. Assuming you do not forget the golden rule, enunciated above, that non-standard positions require non-standard decisions, success will not elude you.

And if not in tl1is game, then probably in the next !

143


Chapter 5

By Right of the Strong

In deciding to embark on a risky course, the player must take into account many factors, and purely chess ones by no means play the decisive role. The sporting situation, the previous score between the players, the personal relations between them, the ability to play decisive games - these are just some of those factors.

One should also not forget something as important as the degree of authority one's opponent carries. It is no secret that many players are overawed when facing great champions. In recent years, too, ratings have become almost a fetish - High Highness the Rating. Quite often one hears players elevate these rather insignificant numbers to almost mythical status. In this way, sometimes both players come under extra psychological pressure. The rating favourite, trying to uphold his rating, goes in for serious risk, whilst the underdog, in addition to his purely chess problems, has to cope with the tendency to automatically overestimate the strength of his opponent. Strong players quite often use their reputation (and rating !) as an additional weapon with which to pressurise their opponents.

144

Game 65

Bent Larsen Oscar Panno Palma de Mallorca 1969 (9)

ο

How should we assess this position? Is 29.α3 necessary?

29 . .:1.g3 Α typical Larsen decision. In a position where many GMs would think about drawing negotiations, he simply sacrifices a pawn. The move 29.a3 is tempting, but for the Dane it has the drawback that it is very natural and the opponent would therefore expect it. And, as he pointed out with pleasure in his annotations, Panno spent 5 of his 1 5 remaining minutes on his reply.

29 ... 'Wf6 Larsen's note to this move is also interesting: Ί could not see a direct refutation of 29 . . . �xb4' - perhaps because there simply isn't one!? After all, 30.�b2 is met by 30 .. . �a5 ! (but definitely not 30 . . . �el?? suggested by Larsen, because of 3 l .�xf5+! �xf5 32.�xb7+ <it>h8 33.�d4+). Admittedly, two bishops in an open position, plus the boundless optimism of the player of the white pieces, more than compensate for the small investment.

30.a3

Chapter 5 - By Right of the Strong

Even so! But time has been gained on the clock, and the opponent thrown somewhat off balance.

30 . . . .:1.e7 31 . .:1.g1 t:Δg7 In accordance with his quiet positional style, as well as his time shortage, Panno avoids active operations and simply maintains the status quo. 3 l . .. �d4! led to a forced draw: 32.�xf5+ �xf5 33.�xd4 tbxd4 34.�xd4 �h3 35 .�f2 �xd3 36.�g2 �e4.

32 . ..ib6 'ikeβ Better is 32 ... tbe6.

33. 'Wc2 ..ifβ 34. 'Wg2 'Wf7 35.a4! Starting activity on the queenside as well.

35 .. . .:1.e8?! Probably, neither player even looked at 35 .. . �c3 ! although this was Black's best chance. After 36.�g3 (36.b5 c5) 36 ... �xb4 37.�d4 �c5! 38 .�xg7+ �xg7 39.�xf5+ <it>g8 40.I;lxg7+ l:rxg7 4l .�xg7 <it>xg7 the game would end peacefully. Panno was probably thinking only about surviving to the time control, whilst Larsen simply did not bother his head with such trifles.

36. 'Wf3 �dθ 37 . ..if2 lί:ΊhS The knight is clearly heading the wrong way. Significantly stronger is 37 .. . �f6 but after 38.b5 it is not easy to defend as Black.

38 . ..id4 .:l.gθ 39 . .:1.b1 ! ..ih4 40.b5 axb5 41 .axb5 c5 42 . ..ic3 .:l.eθ?

The final mistake! It was essential to play 42 . . . b6.

43 . .:1.g1 ! .:l.gθ Defending against the threat of 44.�xh5!

44 . ..ixf5+! Black resigned.

Α classic example of such an encounter. It is interesting to see how differently

1 45


the two players played, in an objectively equal position. Black's main aim was to hold the balance and swim calmly into a peaceful harbour, whilst White strove with all his might to unbalance the position and create problems for his opponent, even at risk to himself. For Panno, only one possible result existed - a draw. Larsen, however, fought for a win, considering that he already had a draw in hand anyway and completely without thinking about possible defeat.

Game 66

τibor Karolyi (2535) Lev Psakhis (2535) Graz tt 1 981 (7)

•

Since 1 7 . .. t2Jxe4 allows 18.tbd5 followed by 19.tbb6, White has absolutely nothing to fear. So what should Black play?

1 7 ... tlJxe4!? Even so! At some risk to himself, Black tries to change the course of the game. Normal continuations, such as 1 7 .. .'iVb7 18 .�c2 �e6 19.ti:Jds, promise only an unpleasant battle for equality.

1 8.tαl5 tαl6 1 9.llJb6 'ifc6 20.tlJxa8 'ifxaθ 21 . ..tc2

The disease of seeking activity infects White as well. There was no need at all for the pawn sacrifice. The simple 2 1 .�e3 Vic6 (on 2 1 . .. bxc4 there is the

1 46

strong 22.�xc5) 22.I:f.acl guaranteed White a small advantage.

21 ... bxc4 22 . ..te3 'ifc6 23.b3 ..te6 24.bxc4 tlJxc4

Although it is still too early to speak of a real advantage to Black, it is clear that the risky exchange sacrifice has justified itself.

25 . ..tb3 tlJxe3 26. 'ifxe3 c4 27 . ..tc2 'ifc5

Having seized the initiative, Psakhis already has no doubts about ultimate victory and settles for purely technical means. However, a more energetic approach was 27 . . . �c5! since 28.Yixe5 then fails to 28 . . . �g4 29.Vids I:f.el+!.

28. 'ifc3 'ifc7 29.%Σe1 g6 30.%Σad1 ..tg7 31 . ..te4 'ifc5 32. 'ife3 'ifa5

33.'ifa7?! After 33.Vif3! , followed by 34-.�dS, the advantage of the black bishops is reduced to a minimum.

33 ... c3 34.%Σe2 ..tfθ 35. 'ifb7 %Σc8 36.%Σc2 %Σc4 37 . ..td3?

37.�d5 loses to 37 . . . 1::f.c7 38.'β'a8 �d7, but more tenacious was 37.�e1 .

37 .. . %Σd4 Now the outcome of the game is decided.

38. 'ifc6 'ifdθ 39 . .:Xc3 ..tb4 40. 'ifc7 ..bc3 41 . 'ffxc3 e4 0-1

The battle in this game followed much the same pattern as the previous one.

Psakhis played for a wiπ, ποt eveπ thiπkiπg about the possible πegative coπsequeπces of the risk he was takiπg. For him, there were oπly two results possible - οπe desired, the other guaraπteed. Karolyi was dreamiπg oπly of a draw aπd did ποt eveπ coπsider aπythiπg more thaπ that. Such aπ attitude frequeπtly leads to a result iπ favour of the stroπger player.

For a loπg time, wheπ faciπg oppoπeπts who were of a lower class thaπ himself, Vladimir Kramπik preferred to rely οπ purely techπical methods. However, iπ receπt years, he has beguπ to eπtertaiπ risk more ofteπ, which previously would have beeπ foreigπ to him.

Game 67

Vladimir Kramnik (2784) Daniel Fridman (2629) Dortmund 201 3 (6)

ο

How would you assess this position and how would you continue as White?

It is obvious that White has the iπitiative. He caπ quietly aπd without risk develop his activity οπ the kiπgside. Kramπik 's decisioπ to provoke aπ immediate crisis looks risky aπd ποt eπtirely logical.

20.f6!?

Chαpter 5 - By Right of the Strong

20.fxe6 fxe6 2I .tt:Jf4 is temptiπg, or, eveπ more iπterestiπg, just buildiπg up the pressure with 20.tt:Jf4, siπce theπ 20 .. . exf5? 2I .tt:Jcd5 l:rab8 22.tt:Jh5 is bad for Black.

20 ... .bf6 21 .:χ1'6! gxf6 22.tίJf4 lίJeS 23.tίJh5 'ii'e7 24.J:tf1 tbd7

Is White's compensαtion for the exchαnge sufficient? How should he develop his initiative?

Fraπkly speakiπg, it is ποt eπtirely obvious what the material was sacrificed for. SF feels this way at first, but gradually it comes to the coπclusioπ that White's activity should suffice for a draw.

25.'it'g2! For example, thus: 25 .'iff3 b5 26.'iff4 'iff8 27.tt:Jd5! (worse is 27.tt:Jxf6+ tt:Jxf6 28.'ifxf6 'ifg7 29.'ifxg7+ 'itJxg7 30.cxb5 axb5 3 I .tiJe4+ 'itJf8 32.tt:Jxc5 'itJe8) 27 ... exd5 28.i.xf6 (28 .tt:Jxf6+ tt:Jxf6 29.'ifxf6 d4) 28 .. . tt:Jxf6 29.'ifg5+ 'itJh8 30.'ifxf6+ =. But White did ποt sacrifice the exchaπge just to maiπtaiπ equality, especially as he had the latter iπ his pocket aπyway.

25 ... h6! It turπs out that the quiet queeπ move coπcealed a serious threat, which shows up iπ a liπe such as 25 .. . b5 26.g5 ! fxg5 27 . .!:!'.f6!? (White has at least οπe other temptiπg way to coπtiπue the attack: 27.tt:Jd5!? exd5 28 .tt:Jf6+ 'itJf8 29.Vi'xg5 tt:Jxf6 30.i.xf6 'ifc7 3 l .cxd5 'itJe8

1 47


32.e4! - not settling for perpetual check by 32.'it'g8+ �d7 33 .'iνg4+. ln this surprising position, White is a whole rook down, but the threats against the black king are very dangerous) 27 . . . �f8 28.'iνxg5 ltJfS 29.1:f.xf5 'ifxgS+ 30.I:!xg5 �e7 3 I .ltJg3 with a complicated and double-edged endgame.

26.h4!? Once again, Kramnik chooses to increase the pressure. The more direct 26.ltJe4 tt:Jxe4 27.'iνxe4 'δ'd6 (after 27 . . . e5 28 .ltJg3 'iνe6 29.tt:Jfs hS 30.1:ίf3 White has lasting positional compensation) 28 . .!::f.xf6 ltJxf6 29.tt:Jxf6+ �f8 30.ltJh7+ �g8 (30 . . . �e8? 3 l .�e5 !) 3 I .ltJf6+ led only to a draw.

26 ... �8 White's threats are well illustrated by the following sample variation: 26 .. . bS 27.1:ίf4! (27.g5 fxgS is premature) 27 . . . bxc4 28.g5 ! fxgS 29.hxg5 hxgS 30.1:ίf6! 1:ίdb8 (30 . . . tt:Jxf6 3 I .'iexg5+ �f8 32.�g7+ (32.tt:Jxf6 'ifb7 33.ltJh7+ �e8 34.ltJf6+ �f8) 32 ... �e8 33 .ltJxf6+ 'ifxf6 34.'iνxf6 cxd3 3S.�cl !±) 3 I .ltJdS exdS 32.'ifxg5+ �f8 33 .'it'h6+ �e8 34.1:ίχd6 1:ίχb2 3S.'δ'h8+ 'iνf8 36.ltJg7+ �e7 37.ltJfS+ �e8 38.ltJg7+. Admittedly, in this line things end peacefully, because 38.'ifxb2 'δ'g8+ is bad.

But how should White develop his initiative after the text move?

1 48

27.1i'g3! Citeβ 28.1i'f4 'iffβ? Fridman defends the threat to the pawn h6, missing the more dangerous threat. Admittedly, even after the more careful 28 ... 1:f.db8 White retains the better chances: 29.ltJe4 tt:Jxe4 30.dxe4 �d8 3 l .�xf6 ltJxf6 32.ltJxf6 ςt>cs 33 .'iνxh6 �b7 34.'δ'f4.

29.llJd5! With the black rook on d8, this decides!

29 .. . exd5 30 . ..bf6 There is no defence against the numerous threats.

30 .. . tt:Je5 31 . 'ifxe5+ q;,d7 32 . .tg7 .:es 33.li:Jf6+ �c7 34. 'ifa1 1 -Ο

There is no doubt that Daniel Fridman, a solid GM and a good defender, was fighting with psychological issues in this game, as well as purely chess ones; he overestimated the strength of his opponent's threats and was suffering from a sense of the opponent's authority. Ι am sure that, against a less exalted opponent, he would have coped with the problems significantly better. Likewise, a player less sure of himself than Kramnik would not have decided on so risky an operation.

The ex-World Champion's reputation played an even greater role in the result of the following game.

Game 68

Vladimir Kramnik (2796) Anton Shomoev (2579) Nizhny Novgorod 2013 (1)

1 .tί::Jf3 tί::Jf6 2.g3 b6 3.�g2 �b7 4.0-0 e6 5.d3 d5 6.tί::Jbd2 g6 7.c4 �g7 8.b4!? tbe4!

With his previous provocotive rnove, White is cleαrly drαwing the fire ση hirnself. Blαck tαkes up the gαuntlet! How should White continue?

9.cxd5!? It was not too late to avoid great risk by means of9.d4 tbxd2 IO.hd2, but Κramnik was aggressively inclined this day.

9 ... exd5 1 0.tί::Jb3 There were various ways to sacrifice the exchange. As well as the text move, it was worth considering lO.dxe4!? �xal l l .exdS .ixdS l2.e4 �b7 l3 .e5 or lO .�a3!? tbc3 l l .'ifc2 tbxe2+ l2 .'�>hl .ixal 13 .l:txal 0-0 l4.�el .C.e8 l5 .tbb3, with compensation for the sacrificed material, in both cases.

1 0 ... ba1 1 1 .tbxa1 tbd6 What has White got for the exchange? His dark-squared bishop has no opponent and is very strong, but even so, this hardly constitutes sufficient compensation.

1 2 . .tg5?! l2 .i.b2 is tempting, whilst SF suggests the leisurely l2 .'ifb3 0-0 l3 .t:Δc2 and


assesses White's chances rather optimistically, in my view.

1 2 ... f6 1 3 . .tf4?! Better was l3 .�d2, preventing l3 . . . a5 .

13 ... a5! 1 4.bxa5 :Xa5 1 5.'it'c2 c5 1 6.tί::Jb3 .1:a7

The situαtion looks criticαl for White. He is αη exchαnge down αnd Blαck only needs to cornplete his developrnent, whilst it is hαrd to see how White cαn prevent the Jαtter.

1 7.tbxc5?! Kramnik takes a big decision! If you are going to bluff, then you might as well do the job properly!

1 7 ... bxc5 1 8. 'it'xc5 .1:a6 1 9.1:[b1

� Δ CΔ Δ

Δ Δ � Δ φ

The threαts αgαinst d6 αnd b7 seern to force the only move. How should Blαck hαve defended?

1 9 ... tbd7? After the natural l9 . . . i.a8 ! 20.t:Δd4 tbd7! the activity of the white pieces offers only very partial compensation

1 49


for the rook. Admittedly, Kramnik still has optimism on his side, without which such play is doomed to failure, but even so, objectively Black's chances would be superior in this case.

20. 'ire3+ ι:Μl? Mistakes rarely come alone. It was essential to play 20 . . . 'ife7 2l .�xd6 V!fxe3 22.fxe3 1d.b6! with equality.

21 . .bd6 ..bθ 22.'irf4 .:r.es 23.ttJd4 :Xa2?

Black has already managed to spoil his position, but after the strongest move 23 .. .'iitig8! with the threat of 24 .. . g5 (the immediate 23 . . . g5? is bad because of 24.Vlffs l:txd6 2S .V!fxh7+ �f8 26.t2:Jfs) he would still retain chances of saving the game.

24 . .th3 .:r.axe2? Of course, the only defence 24 .. . f5 looks terrible. One can only conclude that Black lost the game earlier.

25.tlJxe2 :Xe2 26. 'irh6 Black resigned.

White played this game as if he never for one second doubted in his ultimate success. Black coped for a long time with the problems he faced, but Ι think he was hampered by excessive respect for his opponent. Over-rating his opponent's threats and a failure to

1 50

relax led to mistakes. The latter did not arise from purely chess factors, but are fully explained by the logic of psychology.

Alexey Shirov has never throughout his long career changed his aggressive and risky style. So it is quite possible that he would have decided on the sacrifice seen in the following game, even against a more eminent opponent. However, Ι have no doubt at all that his reputation helped him to achieve the victory.

Game 69

Alexey Shirov (2723) Jan Smeets (2657) Wijk aan Zee 201 Ο (4)

ο

We hαve α quiet, roughly equαl position. After the predictαble exchαnge of rooks on the e-file, neither side would hαve reαlistic chαnces of α win. Does White hαve αny wαy to shαrpen the gαme?

26 . .bh6?! Yes, he found a way! Admittedly, though, it involves some risk.

26 ... gxh6 27.'irxh6 .th7 Of course, not 27 ... �f7? 28.1::txe7+! followed by the knight coming into d6 .

28.1:r.e3 .tfβ 29.1:r.g3+! After the immediate 29.'ifxf6 Black manages to exchange a pair of rooks:

29 .. . 1:f.xe3 30.fxe3 lte8 3 l .l:f.fl �g7, and no trace of White's initiative remains.

29 .. . �h8 30.'ifxf6+ ..tg7 31 .'it'g5

In whose favour is the resulting non-standard position and how should Black play?

31 ... bd4?! The prime cause of Black's defeat. In itself, the move is not so bad, but the position becomes much sharper and the value of each move increases greatly. White would face a battle for equality after either 3 1 . .. 1:f.e6, covering d6 and creating the threat of �h6, or 3 I . .. 'ife7, with the possible variation 32.tbd6 �xgS 33 .:Xgs 1::tf8 34.tbxc8 �h6.

32.11d1 llfθ?! And here, he should have preferred the more active 32 . . . .ί:ιe2 ! . Chances would probably be equal, as shown by the following nice variation: 33 .<it>hl ! .ί:ιf8 (33 . . . 1:ιce8? 34.tbe5!) 34.1:lg4 �xf2! 3S . .i:ιxd7 l:ιel+ 36.<it>h2 �gl+ 37.<it>g3 �f2+.

33.�h2 33 .<it>hl is much the same, but stronger was 33.1:ig4! J:lfs 34.�cl �xf2+ 3S .<it>hl 'iVe6 36.tbd6 with the better chances for White.

33 ... 11cd8? Natural, but the losing move! He should have played 33 .. . 1:ιce8 ! 34.ifh6 'ifd8! .


analysis diagram

Α very difficult move! 3S .tbd6 'iff6 36.�xf6+ �xf6 37.tbxe8 1:txe8. The resulting, highly unusual position is very hard to assess. Most probably, it is about equal.

34.tbe5 Fully sufficient for the win, but a more effective way to end the game more quickly was 34 . .ί:ιχd4! �xd4 3S.tbes .ί:ιd7 36.ifh6! .

34 ... 'it'c7 35 . .:Xd4 .:Xd4 36.lίJQ6+ �g7

Black only prolongs his resistance by 36 . . . �xg6 37.'ifh6+ 'ifh7 38.'ifxf8+ �g8 39.ifh6+ �h7 40.1::rxg6.

37.lbxf8+ And Black resigned.

Previously, we pointed out that a knowledge of the opponent and his strong and weak points can help in the taking of a risky decision. The players in the following game have not only played each other many times, but also played together in numerous national team events. Α close acquaintance with not only the opponent's chess, but also his general character, helped Topalov to turn round a game which was not going particularly well for him.

1 5 1


Game70

Veselin Topalov (2771) Kiril Georgiev (2664) Rhodes tt 2013 (3)

1 .d4 tl:\f6 2.c4 e6 3.tl:\c3 .tb4 4.tl:\f3 b6 5 ... b3 c5 6 . .tg5 h6 7 . .th4 g5 8 . .tg3 tl:\e4 9.e3 .tb7 10.d5! d6 1 1 .0-0-0?!

Α serious opening inaccuracy. Significantly stronger is l l .�d3! �xc3+ 12 .bxc3 t2Jxg3 1 3 .hxg3 .

1 1 ... .txc3 1 2.bxc3 At first, Topalov had intended to play 12 .�d3 in this position, and only then noticed the variation 12 . . . t2Jxg3 ! 13 .'ifxc3 tι:Jxhl ! 14.'ifxh8+ �e7 1 5 .�xd8+ �xd8 16.l::rxhl exdS and White has no compensation for the pawn.

1 2 ... tl:\d7 1 3 ... c2 tl:\xg3 14.hxg3 'iff6 1 5 . .td3

Of course, after 1 5 .dxe6 fxe6 16 .1::f.xd6 0-0-0 Black has no problems at all, but that is still what White should have played.

1 5 ... 0-0-0 1 6 . .te4 �c7

It is obvious thαt Blαck hαs successfully solved his opening problems. More thαn thαt, White needs to show αccurαcy to mαintαin the bαlαnce. Or does he hαve α wαy to shαrpen the gαme?

1 7.tl:\d2?!

1 52

Α typical piece of chess bluff, based on a good knowledge of his opponent. Normal continuations, such as 1 7.g4 'tWe7 or 1 7.�b2 'tWe7 18 .t2Jd2 t2Je5, leaves Black with the initiative.

1 7 ... exd5? Black plays according to the motto 'safety first'. However, it was stronger and more principled to take the pawn at once: 1 7 .. . �xf2! , e.g. 1 8 .dxe6 fxe6 19.�xb7 �xb7 20.�e4+ �c7 2 1 ..!::i.hfl �e2! (less clear is 21 . . . �xg3 22.I:f.f7 l:thf8 23 .l:ιe7 1:1fe8 24.t2Jfl �f2 25.�xe6) 22.1d.f7 .ί:ίhf8 with advantage.

analysis diagram

i i

Δ Δ

However, Topalov, knowing his compatriot very well, was convinced the latter would take him at his word.

1 8. i.xdS tl:\e5 Here, taking the pawn is already less convincing: 18 . . . .ixd5 19.cxd5 �xf2 20.�hfl 'ifxe3 2 1 ..ί:ίdel 'ffxg3 22 .t2Je4

iνg4 23.1:f.xf7 and the most logical outcome to the game is a draw: 23 . . . !Ihe8 24.iνa4 ι;!;>b8 2S .iνc6 1:f.xe4 26 .iνxd6+ ι;!;>b7 27.�xe4 iYxe4 28.1:f.xd7+.

1 9.f3 White has successfully negotiated the most dangerous moment, and although Black still has nothing to complain about, the position has sharpened noticeably.

1 9 .. . W'g6 20.e4 h5 21 .llJf1 g4?! He should have played 2 1 . .. �xd5 22.cxd5 h4 and if 23 .g4 h3 ! .

22.f4 .bd5 23.cxd5 llJc4 24.W'a4 llJaS 25.l2Je3 h4?!

The situation has changed fundamentally: now it is Georgiev who tries to seize the initiative with a pawn sacrifice. After the natural 25 . . . 1:f.he8 26.tt:Jfs the advantage is on White's side, but it was worth considering 25 . . . f6, with the idea of 26 . . . iνe8.

26 . .:Xh4 .:Xh4 27.gxh4 'iff6 28.e5! Topalov reacts in the most aggressive manner.

28 ... dxe5 29.d6+

Δ Δ

29 ... 'ifi>c8? Of course, not 29 .. . 1:ίχd6 30.tt:Jd5+. However, 29 . . . ι;!;>b8 30.tt:Jxg4 iνxh4 31 .tt:Jxe5 iνg3 was significantly more stubborn.

30.d7+


Not spoiling anything, but even stronger was 30.�e4! 1:lxd6 (30 .. . ι;!;>b8 3 1 .fxe5) 31 .�a8+ ι;!;>c7 32 .'iνxa7+ ι;!;>c6 33.'iVa8+ ι;!;>d? 34.tt:Jds with a decisive advantage.

30 ... 'ifi>b8 31 .llJxg4 W'e6 3 1 . . . 'iVxh4 32.tt:Jxe5±.

32.fxe5 llJc4 33.llJf6 llJxeS? The decisive mistake in a difficult position.

34.W'f4! Now the outcome is decided by the dominant white pieces and the passed h-pawn.

34 ... 'ifi>b7 35.h5 c4 36.'ifi>c2 ttJxd7 Also bad is 36 . . . tt:Jd3 37.iνe4+ �xe4 38.tt:Jxe4 l:f.xd7 39.h6.

37.:Σ.d6 W'e7 38. W'd4 llJxf6 39 . .:Xd8 W'e2+ 40.'ifi>b1 W'f1 + 41 .'ifd1 W'xg2 42.:Σ.d6 W'f2 43.h6 'ifi>c7 44. W'd4 'iff5+ 45.'ifi>b2 W'b5+ 46.'ifi>a1 W'g5 47. W'd2 W'f5 48.:Σ.d4 'ifi>b7 49. 'ifg2+ 'ifi>a6 50. 1!fe2 b5 51 .:Σ.d6+ �as 52.W'e3 W'f1 + 53.'ifi>b2 W'g2+ 54.'ifi>a3

Black resigned.

Garry Kasparov and Nigel Short played their first game against each other as far back as 1980, when both were youngsters competing in the World Junior Championship. And whilst their rivalry was fairly even at the start, somewhere in the 1980s, Garry moved sharply ahead. Their World Championship match in 1993 did not change this. The long-time World Champion generally feels pretty comfortable against his English friend. This has been helped not only by chess factors, but also by his great knowledge of his opponent. One hardly needs to say that Nigel has enjoyed this relationship much less. This is all visible in the following game.

1 5 3

Risk & B!uff in Chess

Game71

Garry Kasparov (281 2) Nigel Short (2697) Sarajevo 1999 {3)

1 .d4 ttJf6 2.c4 e6 3.ttJc3 i.b4 4.ttJf3 c5 5.g3 0-0 6.i.g2 cxd4 7.ttJxd4 d5 8.cxd5 ttJxd5 9.i.d2 i.xc3 10.bxc3 ltJb6!? 1 1 .i.e3!? ttJdSN 12.'iVd2 ttJd7 1 3.i.g5! 'iVc7 1 4.ttJb5 'iVc5 1 5.c4! 'Wxc4 1 6 . .:1.b1 ttJ7b6 1 7.0-0 h6

How shou!d we assess this provocative move? Does the piece sacrifice win, or shou!d White in fact refrain frorn it?

18.i.xh6!? Kasparov does not need asking twice! Of course, this is the most decisive move, and there is no special risk in it, because in all variations, White always has a draw by perpetual check. Nothing comes from 1 8.�fcl because of 1 8 . . . 'ifg4! and then the piece sacrifice involves greater risk. However, 1 8 .e4!? hxg5 19.1:1fcl 'ifa4 20.exd5 deserved serious attention.

18 ... gxh6 1 9.e4! An essential intermediate move. As we have already pointed out, 19.'ifxh6? 'ifg4! is less good.

1 9 ... t2Je7 20 . .:1.fc1 1fa4 21 .'iVxh6 i.d7!

The strongest defence.

1 54

He cannot organise a defence after 2 l . . . tt:Jg6 22.h4!

analysis diagram

22 . . . jιd7 (White also has a dangerous attack after 22 . . . tt:Jc4 23.h5 tt:Jge5 24.f4 lLJd3 25.e5!) 23.h5 lLJh8 24.'iff6; 2l ... .!::f.d8 also loses: 22 .'iff6! lLJc6 23.e5.

White's attacking resources αre far frorn exhausted, however. How shou!d he develop his initiative?

22 . .:1.c5! The first impression is that Black is in a bad way, but things are not so simple.

22 .. . ttJg6 23 . .:1.g5 The most natural, but far from the only continuation of the attack. However, Black also holds after 23.i::th5 1::f.fd8! 24.'ifh7+ �f8 25 .lLJd6 jιes 26.e5 1ιχd6! (not 26 .. . tt:Jxe5? 27.'ifh8+ �e7 28.tt:Jf5+! exf5 29.'ifxe5+ �d7 30.1:lcl) 27.exd6 'ifd4 and after 23 .h4 'ifxa2!

24/bc3 'iVa3, when White must force a draw with 25.h5! (not 25 .1:ίg5 l::i.fc8 ! 26.h5 iVf8!) 25 . . .'ifxc5 26.hxg6.

23 ... 1Wc2!? Α good defence, but not the only one. It was also perfectly possible to play 23 . . . �xb5!? 24.1:f.bxb5 'iνd4 25.e5! (25 .1:f.xg6+ fxg6 26.'iνxg6+ 'iVg7 27.'tixe6+ 1:f.f7 is risky, and nothing is promised by 25 .h4 'iνg7 26.'iVxg7+ Φχg7 27.h5 �ac8 28.hxg6 J::f.cl+ 29.�fl fxg6) 25 .. . J::ίac8! and White must settle for a draw by perpetual again. Black also has ways to lose: 23 .. . 'ifxa2? 24.lLJc3 'iVc2 25.e5! iYxc3 (25 .. . �c6 26.�xc6 bxc6 27.1:f.b4+-) 26.�e4 .Άe8 27.1:f.h5! with inevitable mate.

24.tba3 "Wd3 Here too, he loses after 24 . . . 'ifxa2? 25.e5! iVe2 26.h4.

25.h4!? "ifxa3

How should White continue: force α draw or carry on the attack?

26.h5!? The moment of truth has arrived! Up to now, the World Champion has not been risking anything very much, as he always had the draw in hand. But now we reach a moment of serious choice. Both players were in great time-trouble, and Kasparov's flag was already hanging dangerously (at this time, there was no


time increment, Ι would remind you, and there are still fully 1 5 moves to be made to reach the time control). As Ivan Sokolov, who was watching the game, tells us, the World Champion was glancing from the board to the clock and back again, with his customary grimace .. . and still decided to continue the battle! Ι am convinced that almost any other player would have settled for perpetual check with 26.1:f.xg6+ in such a situation.

26 ... "ife7! The only reply! He loses after, for example, 26 . . . Άe8? 27.hxg6 fxg6 28.1:f.xg6+ Άχg6 29.'iixg6+ Φhs 30.J::f.b5 ! .

27.e5! Not 27.hxg6 f6 28.g7 (28.l:ιh5 'iVg7) 28 .. . fxg5 and White simply has nothing with which to continue the attack.

27 ... -teθ!? 28 . ..te4 f5 29.exf6 29.hxg6? 'iνg7 is bad.

29 ... :Xf6

30.hxg6?! Continuing to play va-banque! Objectively stronger is 30.�xg6 Άχg6 3 I ..!::!'.xg6+ 1:f.xg6 32.'ifxg6+ and the exposed position of the black king gives White sufficient counterplay for equality.

30 .. . "ifg7 In time-trouble, such moves are made automatically, but a stronger move was the much less obvious 30 .. . �c6! .

1 5 5


How does White retαin the tension in the position?

31 .'ifh7+! �8 32."ii'h4!? :cs? This natural move proves to be the decisive mistake! Short, on perfectly correct general principles, occupies the open file with his rook, but with his fl.ag hanging, he had no time to delve into the details. It was essential to move the rook one square further: 32 . . . !:Id8! 33 . .i.xb7! (the best chance! After 33.1:1h5 .i.xg6 34.�h8+ rJ;e7 the rook is defended, and Black's extra piece becomes the decisive factor) 33 . . . .i.xg6 34 . .i.e4 1:ίd4 35.f3 .

Black i s better, but in mutual time-trouble, anything could happen.

33.:hs! Now the situation on the board changes radically.

33 ... ..bg6 There is nothing better.

34.:h8+ �7 35.:Xc8 ttJxcθ 36.:Xb7+ �7 37 . ..bg6+ 1i'xg6

Νο better is 37 . . . rJ;xg6 38 .'iνg4+ rJ;h7 39.'iνxg7+ Φχg7 40.1:lxe7++-.

38.1i'b4! White regains the piece and retains all the advantages of his position.

38 .. . "ii'f5 39. "ii'xe7+ 40.1i'h7+

�g6 1 -0

The thirteenth World Champion was also characterised by a tremendous will to win, which made him particularly great. But the degree of risk which he allowed himself against opponents with whom he felt comfortable, his so-called 'clients', was sometimes extreme. And very few managed to withstand this pressure.

Conclusion What can we add to what has been said above! ? Naturally, we all prefer to be the favourite, rather than the underdog. But if we have any such favourites amongst the readers of my book, let me congratulate them and offer one piece of advice. If you are objective about your weaknesses, then you can even reap some dividends from them. The main thing is to have the right attitude. Α meeting with a top-class opponent must be viewed not as a foregone conclusion, but as a great journey, on which you have nothing to lose. You can react to any sacrifice from the opponent as a signal for immediate capitulation, or you can quietly set to calculating simple variations. After all , it is always too early to resign, and the sacrifice may possibly turn out to be incorrect. You can choose which of the variations is the most favourable. So, relax and have fun!

1 56

Chapter 6

Masculine Desperation

Undoubtedly, everyone faces such a situation from time to time. The opponent conducts the game superbly, our position deteriorates move by move and things become progressively more dangerous. What can one do? Should you grit your teeth and defend to the last second, or should you launch some desperate counterattack, ignoring the risk and your own fear?

In this chapter, we will examine some examples which may look like sheer courage, but which are really necessary attempts to change the course of an unfavourable game. As the great war theorist Claus von Clausewitz wrote, Όften a step looks completely reckless, but turns out to be the only way to save the situation, and so, in reality, it is the most cautious step.'

It is no coincidence that we open this chapter with an examination of the game by Petrosian. The ninth World Champion was not noted for his courage and he greatly disliked risk and adventure. But he hated losing even more, and when his back was against the wall, he turned into a tiger.

1 5 7


Game72

Mikhaii Tal τigran Petrosian Riga ch-URS 1 958 (7)

•

In the diagram position, White has απ

undoubted advantage. However, Petrosian was no stranger to difficult defensive tasks. What would you play in his place?

31 .. . .:Σf4!? Courage and willingness to risk were not the things most characteristic of Petrosian. On the other hand, the positional exchange sacrifice was his visiting card.

32 . ..bf4 Another possibility is 32.1::ίχf4 exf4 33.�xf4 tι:Jes 34.'iig3 'iνe7 3S.t2Jd2 with the better chances for White, but Tal plays for the maximum.

32 .. . exf4 33.tαi2 ttJe5!? 34. 'ifxf4? The young Tal always strove for concrete solutions, something which doubtlessly influenced Petrosian, when he decided on the sacrifice. The calm 34.'iνh3! would have placed Black's daring conception in some doubt. For example, 34 . . . f3 !? (34 . . . 'ii'g5 3S.I:f.ael) 3S .t2Jxf3 tι:Jxc4 36.1::ίf2 and the compensation for the sacrificed exchange is not sufficient.

34 ... tlJxc4 35.e5 tlJxe5

1 5 8

3 S .. . t2Jxd2!? was also worth considering 36.ttJe4 h6!

Now the worst is behind Black. Out of inertia, Tal plays several more careless moves and suddenly finds himself in the role of defender .

37 . .:Σae1 ?! Stronger is 37.b3 ! , fixing the cS-pawn.

37 ... ..tb8! 38 . .:Σd1 38 .. . t2Jd3 was a threat.

38 ... c4 39.d6 tαi3 40. 'ifg4? An outwardly active move, but Black has a tactical refutation. he should have played 40.'iνe3, retaining an inferior, but defensible position.

40 ... ..ta7+ 41 .�h1 f5! 42.lί::Jf6+ It is just as well he has this trick. He would lose at once after 42.1:1xf5 l:lxfS 43 .'ii'xf5 'ii'h4+ 44.'ii'h3 'ifxe4.

42 ... �h8! 42 .. .'tWxf6? 43 .'ifxc4+.

43. 'ifxc4 tlJxb2 44. 'ifxa6 tlJxd1 45. 'ifxa7 'ifxd6

The further course of the game is not without interest, but belongs to the theme of 'defending lost positions'. Tal successfully copes with a very difficult task.

46. 'ifd7 'ifxf6 47. 'ifxd1 .:Σbθ 48 . .:Σf3 .:ae 49. 'ife1 .:Xa5 50. 'ifxb4 .:es 51 .'iff4 �h7 52.�h2 .:Σds 53 . .:Σf1 'ifg5 54.'iff3 .:es 55.�g1 .:cs 56.'iff2 .:es 57.'iff3 .:as 58.�h2 �hθ 59.�g1 .:Σa2 60.'Wd5 :c2 61 . 'Waθ+ �h7 62. 'iff3 .:Σc1 63 . .:Xc1 'ifxc1 + 64.�h2 'ifc7+ 65.�h3 'ife5 66.g4 fxg4+ 67.�xg4 'ifg5+ 68.�h3 'iff6 69.'ife4+ �gθ 70.'ife8+ 'iffθ 71 .'ifxf8+ �χfθ 72.�g4 � 73.�5 %-%

It is interesting to see how the two players swapped their customary roles in this example. Petrosian sacrificed material Tal-style, whilst Tal defended a very

difficult position, showing tenacity and patience worthy of Iron Tigran himself!

Whereas Ίigran Petrosian only went in for such adventures rarely and unwillingly, for his contemporary Boris Spassky, the sharp and sudden change in the nature of the position was a favourite weapon and one which he used with great success throughout his career. Cold-bloodedness and enterprise allowed him to escape in one piece from the most difficult and complicated situations.

Game 73

Yury Averbakh Boris Spassky Leningrad ch-URS pff 1 956 (3)

1 .c4 tt:\f6 2.tt:\c3 g6 3.e4 d6 4.d4 �g7 s.�e2 ο-ο 6.-tgs cs 7.d5 'ifas 8 . ..td2 a6 9.a4 e5 1 O.g4 tt:\e8 1 1 .h4 f5 1 2.h5 f4 1 3.g5 'it'd8 1 4.�g4 tt:\c7 15 . .bc8 'ifxc8 1 6.tt:\f3

How should we assess this position? Try to guess Spassky's move.

1 6 .. . tt:\c6!! Answering the first question above is significantly easier: Black's position is extremely difficult. One can even go further and say that it is strategically hopeless. The KID bishop is totally blocked

Chapter 6 - Masculine Desperation

in and has no prospects, and this makes the chance of counterplay very small indeed. Black could play 16 . . . a5 and completely block the position, hoping to build a fortress, but at the age of 19 (as Spassky was at the time of this game), such a decision is simply impossible, especially for a player of active style! However, even in these exceptional circumstances, Spassky's decision is astounding., He gives up a whole piece, for just one pawn, and no other dividends are even visible.

1 7.dxc6 Averbakh's shock was so great that he used 50 minutes over this practically only move! Of course, the time control was the more generous 2.5 hours for 40 moves, which allowed players certain latitude, but one should not assume that an experienced GM spent all that time, just admiring his position. He was probably trying desperately to understand what he had done to deserve such disrespect!

1 7 ... bxc6 1 8.tt:\h4 The simplest path to victory was 1 8.a5! t2Je6 19.l2Ja4 followed by t2Jb6 and b2-b4.

1 8 ... 'ife8 1 9.hxg6 hxg6 20. 'ifg4 .J:Σb8 21 .tt:\d1 tt:\e6

The piece has not been given away entirely for nothing - the rook has occupied the open b-file and the knight is heading for d4. In addition, there is the potential advance . . . d6-d5 at the right moment, although right now, it is hard to see when this will become possible.

22 . .J:Σa3 tt:\d4 23 . .J:Σah3 'iff7 24. �c3 .J:Σfe8 25 . .J:Σ3h2 "ifxc4

The move in the game was not played very happily, of course, but 'in for a penny, in for a pound' !

1 59


26.tbx:g6 .J:r.e6

As well as his material advantage, White has απ attack. Find the strongest continuation.

27 . ..bd4?! The continuation 27.�h8+ �xh8 28 . .ί:ί.χh8+ <;t>g7 29.�xb8 is tempting, but after 29 . . . f3 it is not so easy to find the strongest continuation 30.tbf4! exf4 3 1 .1!fxf3. Admittedly, there is another path to victory: 29 . .ί:ί.h7+ Φχh7 30.1!fh5+ <;t>g7 3 1 .1!fh6+ Φg8 32.1!fh8+ Φf7 33 .1!fh7+ 'it>e8 34.1!fg8+ Φd7 35 .1!ff7+ <;t>c8 36.tbe7+ and Black has to give up his queen. Ι am sure that the impression of having missed a win somewhere had its effect on White's subsequent play, and one must also not forget the clock factor.

27 .. . :Xg6 He would lose at once after 27 . . . cxd4 28 .1!ffs.

28. 'iff5 'ife6 29. 'ifxe6+ :Xe6 30 . ..tc3 d5

The black central pawn mass suddenly goes in motion, although there are still no direct threats yet, and the extra piece is very strong in the endgame.

31 .f3 .J:r.b3 32 . .J:r.h3 c4 33.�d2 .J:r.g6 34 . .J:r.g1 d4 35 . ..ia5 ..tfθ 36 . .J:r.g4 .J:r.d6

1 60

Averbakh has seriously complicated his task. How should White play now?

37.�c2 37.1ιc7 1:1e6 38 .g6 .1ιg7 39.a5 would deprive Black of any counterplay.

37 ... .J:r.d7 38.g6 .J:r.db7 39 . ..te1 c5 40 . .J:r.gh4 ..tg7

The last few rushed moves in time-trouble have greatly complicated the position.

41 . ..ia5? And this move is a serious mistake.

41 ... c3! 42.bxc3 .J:r.a3 43.cxd4 exd4 44.:Xf4 .J:r.a2+ 45.�d3 .J:r.b1 !?

The forcing line 4S . . . c4+ 46 .Φχc4 1::f.xa4+ 47.Φd3 .i:IxaS was perfectly good, with roughly equal chances, but Spassky is already playing for more.

46 . .J:r.h1 :Xa4 47.�c2 .J:r.b5

It is clear that the worst is already behind Black, but even so, the resulting unusual position is hard to assess. What is White's best continuation?

48.e5? After the enormous metamorphosis in the position, Averbakh's head was clearly spinning, and what is almost the only way to save the game is far from obvious: 48.1::f.f7! c4 (after 48 .. . r:f.axa5 49.1::rh7 ..tf8 50.1:lc7 l;la2+ s u t>d3 1::rg2 52.e5 White has sufficient counterplay) 49 . .Άc3! 1::!.a2+ 50 . .Άb2 d3+ 5 Ui;>d2 i,xb2 52/Δχb2 �bxb2+ 53 .We3 with roughly equal chances. By contrast, attempting to hang on to the extra piece leads to great unpleasantness: 48 . .Άc7 c4! 49.1::f.f5 �a2+ SO.Wcl 1::!.al+ 5 l .Wc2 d3+ 52 .Wd2 .id4! 53 .1::f.xb5 axb5. Α surprising position! White has a clear extra piece in the endgame, but his position is absolutely hopeless. It is understandable that to realise this, and take the only correct decision, in such a situation is practically impossible.

48 .. . d3+?! Yet another paradox in this incredible game: the minor pieces prove stronger than the major ones! Significantly stronger was 48 . . . �bxa5! , retaining the powerful pawn centre.

49 . ..ti>xd3 :Xf4 50.�c3 Why not 50.We3! �a4 5 l ..ic3 ?

50 ... :Xf3+ 51 . ..ti>e4 :g3 52 . ..ti>f4 :Xg6 53.tbe3

Now it Black who has a large material advantage, but in an incredible way, this does him no good!

53 ... :bs 54.ttJf5 :ιs 55.:h5 :es 56 . ..ti>e4 :g1 57.:h3 �fβ 58 . ..ti>d5 :d1 +?

The wrong rook. Correct was 58 .. . 1::!.d8+! 59.lbd6 .ixd6 60.exd6 1::f.d1+ 6l .Wxc5 l::ί8xd6.

59 . ..ti>e4 :c1 60 . ..ti>d5 :d1 + 61 . ..ti>e4 :d7 62.ltJh6+! bh6 63.:Xh6

Chapter 6 - Masculiηe Desperatiση

Now the activity of the white pieces becomes the key factor in the position.

63 .. . :h7 64.:g6+ ..ti>f7 65.:f6+ ..ti>e7 66.:c6 Φd7 67.:Xc5 :h6 68 . ..ti>d5 :b6 69.�a5! :b5 70.:Xb5 axb5 71 .e6+ :Xe6 72 . ..ti>c5 :e5+ 73 . ..ti>b6 112-112

Boris' desperate courage in this game is amazing, but in this case his bravery can be explained by his youth. However, he continued to show such qualities as he got older, especially in cases where a lot was at stake.

Extremely characteristic is his Candidates' quarterfinal match in 1968. The final score of SVz-2112 in his favour would seem to suggest a thoroughly convincing superiority for the future World Champion, but if one limits oneself to assessing the positions reached after the opening during the match, then Geller's superiority is no less convincing.

Game74

Boris Spassky Efim Geller Sukhumi m 1 968 (2)

ο

It appears that the σpeniηg has gσηe ίη Black's favσur. He has made prσgress ση the queeηside, whilst White's prσspects ση the σther flaηk αre quite uηclear. What shσuld Spassky dσ?

1 6 1


20.:be1 ! After any other rook retreat Black carries out the simple, but also very convincing plan of . . . tί:JbS , . . . l::ta8, winning the a2-pawn and at the same time activating all his other pieces. With his unexpected exchange sacrifice, Spassky sharply changes the position. In doing so, he probably also took into account that his opponent very much disliked such sudden transformations of the position.

20 .. . .tc3 He has to accept the challenge, as after 20 . . . tί:Jb5 there would follow 2l .e5.

21 . 'iff2 .txe1 22 . .:Xe1 f6 23 . .th6 .1:.17 24.g4 e6

Black plays consistently and logically, but each move was taking him too much time. Very soon, time-trouble starts to affect things. After 24 . . . tί:Jbs 25 .g5 eS 26.'iνh4 .Άd7 27 . .ί:!'.gl the white initiative assumes a threatening character.

25.tlJh4 gS 26.tlJf3! Enviable sang-froid! Few players would have been able to refrain from 26.fxe6 .Άχe6 27.tί:JfS but, strangely, this eases Black's task: 27 . . . Φh8 28.h4 gxh4 29.i.f4 .ί:!'.b6.

26 ... exf5 27.gxf5 �hθ 28.h4 g4 29.tlJh2 g3

Black already had just a few minutes to reach the time control. In such situations, it is particularly difficult to make the correct choice . . 29 . . . tί:Jbs 30.tί:Jxg4 i.b7 retains the better chances.

30. 'ifxg3 tlJxc2 31 . .1:.g1 .tb7? Surprisingly, this natural move turns out to be almost the decisive mistake. The light-squared bishop occupies its usual position, but in this position, it would be better to reserve this square for the rook.

1 62

3I . . . tί:Jd4! 32.i.fl l::f.bb7 33 .tί:Jg4 l::f.g7! with a completely unclear position.

32 . .tf3 'ifd7 33 . .th5 .1:.e7 34.tlJg4 The white pieces arrive on the most active positions.

34 .. . .1:.g8 35. 'iff2! tlJd4? The last chance to prolong resistance was 3S . . . .ί:!'.xe4! 36.dxe4 i.xe4+ 37.Φh2 'ife7! - worse is 37 . . . 1txf5 38 .!tfl ! .

36.tlJxf6 .:Xg1 + 37. 'ifxg1 Black resigned. On 37 ... 'i:Vd8 or 37 . . . 'i:Vc8 the move 38 .i.e8! decides.

Geller's next black game in this match was even worse for him. Up to a certain moment, events developed according to much the same scenario. Having again played the Closed Sicilian without any great pretensions, Spassky at a certain moment faced a dilemma: whether to go over to passive defence or try to muddy the waters with a direct attack. As in the game above, he preferred risk.

Game75

Boris Spassky Efim Geller Sukhumi m 1968 (4)

ο

Black's rnain threat is 26 . . . tiJxb3. Can you suggest α good reply?

26.tlJd5

Alas, normal moves do not work: after 26.'iνh4 1::f.xc2 27.1::f.xc2 tbxc2 28 . .ic1 �c6! (defending against the threat of e4-e5) 29.�b2 eS White is left with nothing. After the intermediate 26.�xd4 there is the counter-zwischenzug 26 . . . tbxg4! 27.'iVh4 .ixd4+ 28.�h1 tbf6. Finally, 26.e5 �xg2 27.exf6 exf6 28.tbxf7 �a8! 29.tbxd6 'i:Vc6 30.tbe4 fS also fails.

26 ... ltJxb3 Black's last move is not at all bad, but the preliminary 26 . . . .ixd5! 27.exd5 was even more solid, and only now 27 . . . tbxb3, after which it is hard to find good advice for White.

27.e5! Playing va-banque! One recalls the words of Marshall Foch: 'My left flank is destroyed and the centre is collapsing. Ι attack! '. It would be shamefully cowardly to play 27.1::f.cd1 �xdS 28.exd5 tbd4 29.1::f.d2 in the hope of holding a strategically lost position.

27 ... ltJxc1 ! Played calmly and strongly. Less clear is 27 . . . dxe5 28 .tbxf6+ exf6 29 . .ixb7 tbxc1 30.�d5! tbxd3 3 I .'iVd2 1::f.a7 32.'iνxd3 fxgS 33 .'iνxg6.

28 . ..bc1 Kasparov gives as strongest 28.exf6 exf6 29.tbxf6+ �xf6 30.�xb7 but this has a computer refutation: 30 .. . tbe2+! 3 1 .�hl l:ιc7! 32.�d5 l:ιxc2 33.tbxf7 1:lxf7 34 . .igs 'iνes 35.�xf7+ �xf7 36.'iνxf6+ 'iνxf6 37.1::f.xf6+ �e8-+.

28 ... ..bd5 29 . ..bd5 ltJxdS 30. 'ifh4 tl:\f6 31 .exf6 exf6 32.'ifh7+ <Μθ 33.tbe4 'ife5

Ήere Ι considered resigning' (Spassky). Never believe a word of such admissions! They are just the result of the tension after a key victory. Α little coquetry in such circumstances is forgiveable.

Chαpter 6 - Mαsculine Desperαtion

34 . ..tf4 'ifd4+ 35.<ith1

White's only threαt is 36.�xd6+. Which move is stronger: 35 .. . .!:lc6 or 35 ... 1::f.d8 ?

35 .. . Ac6?? Just one step from victory and still having 40 minutes on the clock (a rare case) , Geller commits a serious oversight. After 35 . . . .!:Id8! the combination in the game would not work and it is all up for White. Now, however, the situation switches through 180 degrees in the most surprising fashion.

36 . ..th6! Amazingly, Black does not even have a draw now!

36 .. . ..txh6 37. 'ifhθ+ <ite7 38.ltJxf6 Had Black played 35 .. . 1::f.d8 ! , White would not have had this possibility, of course.

38 .. . ..tf4 Or 38 .. . �f8 39.1::f.el+ 'ifes 40.tbd5+! �e8 41 .1:1xe5+ dxeS 42.'ifxe5+ �d7 43 .tbxb4! �d6 44.�f6 with a winning position for White.

39.g5! There is no adequate defence to the mating attack.

39 . . . <ite6 40.'ifeθ+ <MS 41 .1i'xf7 :tc7 42. 'ifxc7 <itxg5 43. 'ife7 'ife3 44.tbe4+ <ithS 45. 'ifh7+ ..th6 46. 'ifd7 ..tf4 47.tl:\f6+ <itgS 48.tbd5 1 -0

1 63


It is noticeable that Geller, a deep strategist who also had a splendid feel for dynamics, nonetheless reacted so badly to a sharp change in the nature of the position. Spassky exploited this weakness extremely well in the 1968 match, and Kortchnoi did the same when he played Geller in the 197 1 CandidatesΌ Being weaker than his opponent when it came to solidity, Spassky subtly exploited the psychological factor by changing the course of games. In order to adjust, Geller needed time and strength, which he lacked at the decisive moments, whereas Spassky was able to make this adjustment quickly and easily. He retained this great quality right to the end of his active career.

Game 76

Garry Kasparov (2690) Boris Spassky (2605) Niksic 1983 (θ)

1 .d4 tίJfβ 2.c4 gβ 3.tίJc3 ..t..g7 4.e4 dβ 5.f3 tίJcβ 6.i..e3 aβ 7.tίJge2 :bs 8. 'ifd2 0-0 9.h4 b5 1 O.h5 bxc4 1 1 .g4

The position hαs not yet left the reαlrn of the opening, but Blαck hαd αlreαdy used α lot of tirne. White is cleαrly prepαring α direct αttαck on the king, αnd it is not quite cleαr how to oppose this. Whαt would you suggest?

1 64

1 1 ... ..t..xg4?! Spassky' s decision is astonishing in its courage, but is very characteristic of his approach. Understanding that with a normal development of events, he will come under a very strong attack, the ex-champion radically changes the position. It is interesting that the fearless SF does not share the human's concerns, calmly suggesting 1 1 . . . 1:r.e8 1 2.0-0-0 t2Jd7, but its optimism soon runs out. The other possibility is significantly more interesting: 1 I . .. t2Jb4!? 12.tbg3 t2Jd3+ 13 . .ixd3 cxd3 14.0-0-0 (14 . .ih6 cS 1S . .ixg7 <;t>xg7 16.hxg6 fxg6 1 7.'tih6+ <;t>[? is also completely unclear) 14 . . . c5! 1 S .dxc5 dxcS with mutual chances.

12.fxg4 tίJxg4 1 3.0-0-0! tίJxe3 1 4.'ifxe3 e6 1 5.hxg6 hxgβ 1 6.:d2

Preparing to transfer the rook to the h-file. However, 16.t2Jg1 ! dS 1 7.tbf3 was somewhat more accurate.

1 6 .. . :es Black could try to complicate the implementation ofWhite's plan, but the extra piece is a great strength in the attack: 16 . . . 'iff6 1 7.t2Jf4! tbxd4 18 .'ifh3 .ί:ί.fe8 19.l:t.f2 <;t>f8 20 . .ixc4 and Black cannot hold.

1 7.tίJg1 ! d5 1 8.tίJf3 a5 1 9.e5 Α solid positional treatment of the position. This would all be fine, were it not

for the fact that a more radical decision is available: 1 9.1:ιdh2! e5 (otherwise it is all easy) 20.klh7! exd4 2 I .I;lxg7+ Φχg7 n.'ifh6+ Φf6 23 .t2Jxd5+ Φe6 24.t2Jg5+. The loss of concentration in winning positions was a weakness of the young Garry that cost him many points. As World Champion, he very rarely repeated such aπ error.

1 9 .. . llJe7 20.�h3 20.t2Ja4, not allowing 20 ... c5, is more in accordance with his strategy of restraint.

20 .. . c5! 21 .dxc5 "f/c7 22. 'iff4 llJc6!

The poslt!on has become extremely sharp. White must take α responsible decision. What should it be?

23 . .1:.e1 ?! White goes over wholly to defence. The tactical blow 23.�xe6! is not so obvious.

analysis diagram


Admittedly, with accurate defence, Black does not lose at once: 23 .. . t2Jxe5! (all other moves are significantly weaker: 23 . . . .t:i.xe6 24.t2Jxd5 'i!Vb7 25.t2Jf6+ or 23 . . . fxe6 24.'ifh4 t2Jxe5 25.'ifh7+ Φf8 26.Itfl 'iff7 27.'i!Vh3+-) 24.t2Jxd5 t2Jd3+ 25.1:lxd3 'ifxf4+ 26.t2Jxf4 cxd3 27.�d5 and White retains the initiative, whereas in the game, it is Black who is dictating.

23 ... d4! 24.:Xd4 24.t2Jxd4 t2Jxe5 looks dangerous for White, but a very interesting line is 24.t2Je4!? t2Jb4! (weaker is 24 . . . t2Jxe5 25 .t2Jf6+ �xf6 26.t2Jxe5 c3 27.�xd4) 25 .t2Jfg5 f5 ! with fantastic complications.

24 ... tίJxd4 25.tίJxd4 "f/xcS 26.ttJf3 :tedθ 27.llJg5 'ife7 28. "f/h4 :td3 29."flh7+

Contrary to what Kasparov says, 29.t2Jce4 does not win because of 29 .. . �xe5! 30.'i!Vh7+ Φf8 3 1 .1:lfl

analysis diagram

3 1 .. . 1::[c3+! ! . Α truly improbable resource for a human to see! The machine finds such blows in seconds, of course. 32.bxc3 'i!Va3+ 33 .Φdl �d8+ 34.t2Jd2 1::f.xd2+ 35 .Φχd2 'ifxc3+ with perpetual check.

29 ... 'ίf.?f8 30.tίJxe6+ 30.t2Jce4 �xe5 leads to the finish in the previous note.

1 65


30 ... fxe6 31 . .J:[f1 + �eθ 32.11t'g8+ .tfθ 33. 11t'xg6+?

The final note in the orgy of time-trouble. In such circumstances it is simply not possible to find a line such as 33.tl:Jd5! �d7 (33 ... exd5 34 . .ί:ιχf8+ 'ifxf8 35 .'li'e6+ 'li'e7 36.'iνg8+; 33 . . . .i:lxd5 34.�f8+ �xf8 35.'ifxe6+ �d8 36.'i!Vxd5+ �c7 37.�g2=) 34.tl:Jxe7 �h6+ 35 .�c2 1::txg8 36.tbxg8 .l::r.xh3 37 . .!:ldl+ �c7 38.tbxh6 lhh6 39.�d4=.

33 ... 'Wtdθ 0-1 White lost on time in this now lost position.

The ex-World Champion's old recipe worked again, this time even against the most talented representative of the new generation. Although the young Garry outdid every player in the world in the mobility of his thinking, the problems posed before him in this game proved too much. This shows that the method itself is great, and one just needs to find the right time and place for its implementation.

The King's Indian belongs to that group of openings which is not fully correct; after all, Black concedes his opponent the centre in the hope of later exploiting the hidden dynamics of the position. The player of the black pieces must be ready at all times to go in for decisive and risky operations. The 13th World Champion never needed to study decisiveness nor dynamics.

Game77

Alexander Beliavsky (2620) Garry Kasparov (2625) Moscow 1981 (1)

1 .d4 llJf6 2.c4 g6 3.llJc3 .tg7 4.e4 d6 5.f3 0-0 6 . .te3 llJc6 7.11t'd2 a6

1 66

8.llJge2 :es 9.llJc1 es 1 0.d5 llJd4 1 1 .llJ1 e2 cS 1 2.dxc6 llJxc6 1 3.llJd5

White's position looks better. How can Black solve his problems?

Simple defensive moves such as 1 3 . . . .!:lb8 or 13 ... tl:Jd7 are not very promising, Kasparov thought for a long time and the result was an interesting, though risky exchange sacrifice.

1 3 ... b5!? Other active possibilities include 1 3 .. . tl:Jxd5 14.cxd5 tl:Jd4!? 1 5.tl:Jxd4 exd4 16.�xd4 f5 or 1 3 . . . �e6!? 14 . .ib6 'ifd7 15 .tl:Jc7 �xc4. White's chances are superior in all cases.

14 . .tb6 11t'd7 1 5.llJc7 .J:[bθ 1 6.llJxe8 11t'xe8 1 7 . .te3

The most natural, but not the most precise reaction. There would be fewer chances for Black to sharpen the game after 1 7.cxb5!? .!:lxb6 (1 7 . . . axb5 1 8 . .ie3) 1 8.bxc6 .!:lxc6 (the rather artful 1 8 . . . d5?! 19.exd5 e4 is met by the cold-blooded 20 . .!:lcl) 19.tbc3.

1 7 ... bxc4 18.llJc3 .te6 19 . .te2 19.tl:Jd5 looks more ambitious, but in this case, Black gets sufficient counterplay: 1 9 .. . tl:Jxd5! (19 . . . �xd5 20.exd5 tbe7 2 l .�xc4 e4 22.0-0 exf3 23 .I:rxf3 favours White) 20.exd5 e4! 2 l .dxe6 'ifxe6 22.�xc4! (the strongest! Otherwise the activity of the black pieces

mσre thaη compeηsates fσr his material deficit) 22 .. . 'iνxc4 23 .1:ίcl 'ifbs 24.'iνe2! with rσughly equal chaηces.

1 9 ... tlJd4 20.0-0 d5 Νσw Black has everythiηg iη σrder.

21 .exd5 liJxd5 22.liJxd5 ..bd5 23.1:.f2 h5 24 . .Z:Z.c1 1!Ve6 25 . ..tf1 h4 26.:e1 ..-c6 27 . ..th6

If Beliavsky was plaηηiηg to push his f-pawη, theη he shσuld have dσηe it immediately: 27.f4!? t2Jf5 28.fxe5 t2Jxe3 (28 . . . �xe5 29 . .!::i.xf5 ! gxfS 30.�d4=) 29.�xe3 (29.�xe3 �f8) 29 . . . �h6 30.Vi'd4 �xe3 3 I .'iνxe3 with equality.

27 ... -thθ 28.f4? But ησw this advaηce is σut σf place. He shσuld have settled fσr the mσdest 28.h3.

28 ... e4 Νσw the bishσp ση h6 is σut σf play aηd White's game quickly gσes dσwηhill.

29 . .Z:Z.d1 ? The least σf the evils was 29.f5 tΔxfS 30.1:ίχf5 gxfS 3l .�dl but iη this case, Black's large material advaηtage will have its say.

29 .. . ..te6?! He wiηs immediately after 29 .. . e3 ! 30.'iνxe3 t2Jfs .

30.f5 This attempt to create cσuηterplay σηly accelerates the defeat. Admittedly, thσugh, 30.�g5 tΔfs was σηly a little better.

30 ... liJxιs 31 . 1!Vf4 :es Black has a material advaηtage, aηd all his pieces participate iη the attack. The σutcσme σf the game is decided.

32 . .Z:Z.fd2 ..-c5+ 33.<iti>h1 ..te5 34.'it'g5 <ifi>h7 35 . .Z:Z.d8 :Χdθ 36.:Xd8 'it'f2 37.J:r.d1 liJxh6 38. 1!Vxe5 e3 39.1!Vc3 h3 40. 1!Ve1 tbg4 0-1


Kasparσv decided ση a risky exchaηge sacrifice, wheη trσuble was lσσmiηg just ahead. But iη the Kiηg's Iηdiaη, σηe frequeηtly gets situatiσηs wheη delay caη be effectively fatal. The fσllσwiηg game is a gσσd example, where the black player is σηe σf the mσst taleηted represeηtatives σf mσderη-day Chiηese chess.

Game78

Zhou Jianchao (2565) Ding Liren (271 7) Xinghua ch·CHN 2014 (7)

•

1 3 ... f4?! Α typical Kiηg's Iηdiaη 'all iη' apprσach! After this cσmmittal mσve, there is ησ rσσm fσr cσmprσmise. Aησther, mσre subtle decisiση was 1 3 .. . fxe4 14.l2Jxe4 �g4.

1 4.c5 g5 1 5.b5 tbg6 1 6.b6 cxb6!? After the ηatural 16 .. . axb6 1 7.cxd6 cxd6 18 .t2Jd2 Black's activity ση the kiηgside is alsσ tσσ late.

1 7.cxd6 a6 1 8 . .Z:Z.b1 The immediate 18 .t2Jd2 was eveη strσηger.

1 8 ... g4 1 9.tlJd2 ..td7?! Black 's desire tσ briηg his sleepiηg rσσk ση a8 iηto the game is uηderstaηdable, but this is a luxury that requires mσre time thaη is available. It was wσrth cσηsideriηg 19 . . . g3 ! ? fσllσwed by 20 . . . t2Jg4.

1 67


20.tlJc4 J:Σcθ 21 .Wfd2 b5 Now the counterplay associated with 2 1 . . . g3 is quite insufficient: 22.fxg3 fxg3 23 .hxg3 ti:JhS 24.ti:Jxb6 ti:Jxg3 2S .ti:Je2! .

22.axb5 lί:\h5 Black's ingenuity cannot be faulted. Almost every one of his moves is a surprise.

23.bxa6 b5!? 24.ltJxb5 Wfh4 25.f3 gxf3 26.gxf3

White hαs αchieved α greαt deαl on the queenside, αnd it seems thαt Blαck is in α very bαd wαy. Does he hαve αny wαy to muddy the wαters?

26 ... lί:\g3! Α nice move, but luckily for White, he does not have to accept the sacrifice. Admittedly, it transpires that Black's last move contains another, more prosaic idea: to put his queen on gS ψ hS and bring the other knight to h4. How can White fight against this plan?

27.lί:\b6?! Strangely, this tempo-gaining move proves inadequate.

Α) The advantage could only be retained with strictly only moves: 27.1::tfl ! ti:Jxfl 28.�xfl 'ifhs 29.'iff2! ti:Jh4 30.ti:Jd2 1::tc2 3 1 .�b4 I:i.xd2 32.�xd2 ti:Jxf3+ 33.�hl ti:Jxd2 34.'ifxd2. White has managed, with

1 68

difficulty, to repulse the pressure of the black pieces and now the pawn on a7 decides the game. After other continuations, Black holds, for example: Β) 27.'iνg2 �h3 28.'iff2 'iYgS! 29.hxg3

fxg3 30.'iνd2 ti:Jf4 3 1 .d7 �xd7 32.�xf8 �xf8 33.ti:Je3 ti:Jh3+ 34.�fl ti:Jf4; C) 27.1::te2 'ifhS! 28 .'ifdl ti:Jh4

29.ti:Jd2 ti:Jxe2+ 30.'iνxe2 1::tf6. 27 ... Wfg5! 28.hxg3 lί:\h4!

The remaining black pieces develop fearsome activity!

29.J:Σf1 Wfxg3+ 30.Φh1 lίJxf3 31 .J:Σxf3 Wfxf3+ 32. Wfg2 'ifh5+ 33.Wfh2 Wff3+ 34.Wfg2 'ifxd3!?

Black is already playing for the win. 34 ... 'iνh5+ forces a draw, because 35.�gl? �h3 is bad for Black.

35.J:Σg1 J:Σf7 36.lίJxcθ ..ih3! The most precise. The variation 36 . . . �xc8 37.a7 �b7 38.d7 1::txd7 39.ti:Jd6 Yi'xa3 40.ti:Jf5 still gives White some hope.

37.tΔe7+ J:Σxe7 38.dxe7 38.'iνf2 �g4!.

38 ... ..ixg2+ 39.J:Σxg2 'ifd1 + with inevitable perpetual check - draw.

And now we move from contemporary China to the 1980s Soviet Union. Ι would remind you that they played chess there too, and pretty well!

Game 79

Rafael Vaganian (2550) Lev Psakhis (2580) Moscow ch-URS 1983 (3)

1 .d4 ttJf6 2.ttJf3 e6 3 . .tgs h6 4.bf6 'iνxf6 5.e4 lbc6 6.c3 dS 7.ttJbd2 J.d7 8 . .td3 0-0-0 9.e5 'iνe7 1 O.b4 g5 1 1 .ttJb3 g4 1 2.ttJfd2 'iνg5 1 3.0-0 f6 1 4.b5

Δ Δ Δ J::t �

Plαy is tαking plαce on opposite flαnks, but White is ahead. Which knight retreat is preferable?

Not wishing to go over to passive defence, Psakhis decides on a piece sacrifice.

1 4 .. . ttJxe5! The natural retreat 14 .. .'��e7 does not bring anything good: lS .tbcS lt:Jg6 (also unsatisfactory is l S .. _fxeS 16.'i!Ya4! Φb8 1 7.lt:Jxd7+ 1:1xd7 1 8.b6 axb6 19.'f!Vxd7 'iνxd2 20.�d8+ lt:Jc8 2 l .'f!Vf6 1:rg8 22.'iνxe6) 16.lt:Jxd7 �xd7 (weaker is the natural 16 . . . 1:ixd7 17.�xg6 'ifxg6 18 .'iVa4 and 18 . . . �b8 is bad because of 19.b6) 17 . .ixg6 'iixg6 18.'fWa4 with a clear advantage to White.

1 5.dxe5 fxe5 1 6.c4 h5 1 7.'We2 e4 At the cost of a piece, Black has greatly activated his position and is ready to seize the initiative.

1 8.ttJxe4! The most principled decision.

Chapter 6 - Mαsculine Desperation

After 18 .i.c2 h4 Black would have full compensation.

1 8 .. . dxe4 1 9. be4 �bθ? White would also retain the initiative after 19 . . . i.g7 20 . .1:r.acl (premature is 20.i.xb7+ �xb7 2l .'iVe4+ c6 because the rook ση al is hanging) and also after 1 9 ... i.d6 20.lt:Ja5 b6 2 l .lt:Jb7.

Δ J::t

Δ Δ

tLJ

Having regαined his piece, Black hαs not completely solved αll of his problems. For complete happiness, he needs only to play 20 ... i.c8. However, what is wrong with the text move?

The sacrifices follow in turn. Now it is White's turn!

20.bb7! �xb7 The sacrifice must be accepted, because otherwise White will be attacking, whilst retaining material equality.

21 . We4+ ..tb6! Necessary daring! After 21 ... c6 the quickest win is by 22.1:.adl ! .ie8 23.lt:Ja5+ �c7 24.1:rxd8 �xd8 (24 . . . 'ii'xd8 2S .'iVe5+) 25 .fW'd4+.

22.:tθd1 ? Vaganian misses his way just one step from the target. The resolute 22.c5+! ends the game: 22 . . . �xc5 23 .l:Iacl ! 'iVds 24.'iνa4! �xf2+ 25 .1:rxf2 Φb7 (25 .. . 'ii'xb5 26.'f!Ve4! �c6 27.!hc6+ 'iνxc6 28.'iνe3+ Φa6 29.lt:Jc5+) 26 . .ι::ι.χc7+! �xc7 27.fW'xa7+ Φd6 28.l:Id2!.

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22 .. . 'it'f5! The σηly defeηce!

23.11Ve1 ? Here tοσ, it was esseηtial tσ play 23.c5+!, althσugh iη this case, it leads σηly to perpetual check: 23 .. . �xc5 24.tbxc5 'iνxe4 (mσre reliable thaη 24 .. . 'iνxc5 2S . .!:tcl althσugh here tσσ, the accurate 2S . . . 'iνf5! wσuld fσrce White to limit himself tσ perpetual check: 26.'iνd4+ <it>b7 27.Ii.xc7+ <it>xc7 28.�xa7+ <it>d6 29.'iνa3+) 2S .l2Jxe4 �xbS aηd iη the eηdgame, the chaηces σf the sides are rσughly equal.

23 .. . �c5 24.1Σd2 It was still pσssible to make thiηgs difficult with the strikiηg 24.1::f.d5! exdS 2S .'iνa5+ Φb7 26 .tbxc5+ <it>a8 27.'iνxc7, but this is ησt eησugh to save the game: 27 . . . l:tb8 28 .'i!Yxd7 'i:Vxd7 29.tbxd7 l::tb7.

24 ... h4 25.1Σe2?! g3 Νσw Black has aη attack to bσσt. The σutcome σf the game is clear.

26. ιli>h1 gxf2 27 . .:fxf2 .hf2 28 . .:Xf2 'it'g5 29.C5+ ιli>b7 30.C6+ bc6 31 .bxc6+ Φaθ 32.h3 1Σhf8 33.ttJd4 .:Xf2 34.'ifxf2 'ifc1 + 35.Φh2 'it'c5 36.'ifb2 'ife5+

White resigηed.

Αη exceptiσηally iηterestiηg game! The players prσved wσrthy σf each σther. First, Black sacrificed a piece fσr the iηitiative, aηd theη White did the same. Ιη the coηtext σf what we are discussiηg, bσth graηdmasters played absσlutely cσrrectly. Hσwever, theσry is theσry, aηd the σutcσme σf such games depeηds ησt ση geηeral cσηsideratiσηs, but ση cσηcrete mσves. Αηd sσ it prσved - σηe false mσve frσm Vagaηiaη decided the game.

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The fσllσwiηg game started mσre quietly, aηd Black prσved the strσηger iη this phase.

Game 80

Vladimir Kramnik (2784) Peter Leko (2737) Dortmund 2013 (5)

ο

Black stands excellently. It is hard even to suggest any sort of sensible plan for White. One has the impression that he faces α long and difficult defence. Is that so?

22.ttJde4!? Α cσmplete surprise! White σffers a whσle piece. Ιη dσiηg sσ, Kramηik prσbably toσk iηtσ accσuηt his σppσηeηt's character aηd style: Lekσ dσes ησt like suddeη chaηges iη the character σf the pσsitiση, preferriηg a slσw aηd safe build-up.

22 ... 'ifa7?! Αηd Kramηik turηs σut to be right! Black strives to maiηtaiη the status quσ at all cσsts. Uηdσubtedly, the priηcipled (aηd correct) decisiση was 22 ... fxe4 23 .tbxe4 �xb2 24.tbxc5 'iνd6 2S .'ifxb2. Of cσurse, the white pieces cσme to life quite ησticeably, but this is still ησt sufficieηt compeηsatiση fσr a piece. Fσr example, 2S . . . b4! 26.a4 tbaS with advaηtage to Black.

23.tlJxc5!

Continuing in the same active vein, although this time the sacrifice is only temporary.

23 ... 'it'xcs 24.d4 tlJxd4 Otherwise 2S.dS.

25.exd4!? 2S.lt::Jds �d6 26.lt::Jxe7+ �xe7 27 . .Άχd4 .Άχd4 28.1:i.xd4 .Άχb3 !? (28 . . . !1bc8 29 . .!:i.xc8 I:rxc8 30.�b2 leads to simple equality) 29 . .a'.c6 �f6 30 . .a'.xf6 �xf6 31 .�d2, with sufficient compensation for the pawn, was objectively the correct decision, but Kramnik keeps the tension, playing for the maximum.

25 ... 'ii'd6 26.d5 Jif7 27.l002 ..bb2 28. 'it'xb2 1:.fd8 29. 'it'd4 1:.bc8 30 . .:.Xc8 .:.Xc8 31 .tlJb4 1:.d8 32. 'it'a7 1:.d7 33. 'it'xa6

33 ... 'it'xa6? In this case, striving for safety proves excessive. Leko probably did not like the variation 33 . . . �xf4 34.�xbS �e3+ 3S .�hl �xb3 36.�fl .a'.d8 37.�aS and the passed pawn on dS is extremely unpleasant, but the active 33 . . . �c5+! 34.�hl �g7! ensures Black more than sufficient compensation.

34.tlJxa6 tlJxdS 35.tlJc5 1:.d8 36.1:.d4!

And suddenly the endgame becomes unpleasant for Black.

36 ... 'it>f8?! Α better chance was 36 .. . �c8! 37 . .a'.xdS .ΆxdS 38 . .Άχd5+ �g7 39.b4 �f6, but


even in a difficult situation, the Hungarian GM prefers not to change the character of the position.

37.tlJd3! 'iti>e8 38.tlJe5 1Le6 39.tlJxg6 1:.d7 40. 'it>f2 1:.g7 41 .1Lxd5 .:.Xg6 42.1Lxe6 .:.Xe6 43.1:.d5 .:.S6 44 . .:.Xf5 .:.Xa3 45 . .:.Xb5

The final transformation proves fatal -the rook ending is completely hopeless for Black.

45 ... 'iti>d7 46.'it>f3 'iti>c6 47.1:.b8 Black resigned.

One should not be surprised at Kramnik's brave decision. Dortmund has undoubtedly been his most successful tournament in a sporting sense - he has won this traditional event innumerable times. And when you have the wind in your sails, you can experiment a little. Α great expert and a deep explorer of the openings, here he turned away from the main lines, shifting the weight of the struggle to the middlegame. If you do not manage to outplay the opponent in a manoeuvring struggle, then take a risk. Do you remember Game 67 with Fridman? In addition, he knows Leko almost as well as he knows himself. And he knows very well the limits of risk against Peter. From this strange combination of circumstances, the bluff was born.

The opening of the next game started differently. Right in the opening, a very sharp theoretical struggle started. In such a sharp Meran, the value of every move is very great, and White, if he wants to get an advantage, risks no less than his opponent. This time, Black won the opening duel. As in the previous game, with the aid of a piece sacrifice White tried to change the course of

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a game that was developiπg uπfavourably for him.

Game 81

Valery Salov (2595) Jesus Nogueiras Santiago (2560) Bruxelles 1 988 (4)

• .I .t

21 ... :Xb2! Ιπ the Meraπ Variatioπ, which was very topical at that time, White had employed a dubious πovelty aπd had falleπ iπto difficulties. With his last move, Nogueiras weπt over to decisive actioπ.

What would you suggest for White, apart from immediate resignation?

22.hxg6! 22.�xb2 1:1a2 23 . .tc4! 1:rxb2 24 . .txd5 ..ixdS 25 .�h2! was objectively the best decisioπ, but iπ this case, Salov would have faced a highly uπpleasaπt defeπce iπ aπ iπferior positioπ.

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analysis diagram

Iπstead, he chooses more radical measures!

22 .. . hxg6 Of course, ποt 22 . . . 1::txe2?? 23 .gxh7+ with mate iπ a few moves. It looks as though White has just delayed the iπevitable eπd by οπe move, but Salov is ποt prepared to lie dowπ aπd die.

23 . ..bg6! Here too, objectively it was stroπger to play 23 .�xb2 �a2 24 . ..ic4! (24.�xa2 'iVxa2 does ποt leave White aπy hope at all) 24 . . . 1:ίχb2 25.�xd5 .txdS, but with such a course of eveπts, White would oπly proloπg the game. Iπstead, Salov starts a desperate attack. lt is of πο sigπificaπce that Black caπ refute it with accurate defeπce. lt is ποt so easy for the oppoπeπt to deal with the problems at the board, aπd so this is the best practical chaπce.

23 ... fxg6? Nogueiras goes wroπg at the first hurdle. He should have played 23 ... 1::txe2!, although this is aπ extremely hard move to decide upoπ. After 24.hf7+ the oπly move to wiπ is the fearless 24 .. . �g7! (after 24 ... �h8 25.1::txe2 White's threats look very uπpleasaπt, aπd oπly the computer move 25 .. /bg4! retaiπs some advaπtage for Black iπ the forced variatioπ 26.1::txg4 .txgS 27.1hg5 d3 28.tbg6+ �g7

29.lhds dxe2 30.1::!es Φχf7 3 1 .Ilxe2 Φχg6 32.1:1xe6+ Φf7 33.1:f.b6 �al+ 34.Φf2 �a6 35.g4 and even here, White will probably save hirnself) 25.�xf6+ (2S.ltxe2 1:t.a3!) 25 ... Φχf6 26.lιg6+ Φfs 27.�e2 .l::!.a3 ! . White does not have a rnate and regaining the material with 28.�xe6+ 'iνxe6 29.1:ίχe6 Φχe6 30.t2Jc6+ Φd7 3l .tΔxe7 d3 leads to aπ endgarne which is lost for him.

How cαn Black's mistake be exploited?

24.'Wxb2 .1:82 25.'ifb1 !? Strangely, White has another route to salvation: 2S .t2Jxg6! �cS 26.�xf6 l:t.xb2 27.tΔe7+ Φf7 28.t2Jxd5 �xdS 29.�e5.

25 ... :Xg2+ Greater problerns are posed by 25 . . . d3 26.�xd3 �cS+ 27.Φhl �xg2+. But here too, White probably holds: 28.1:f.xg2 �xg2+ 29.Φh2 jιfl+ 30.Φhl �xd3 3 l .t2Jxd3 t2Jd7 32.1:f.xe6.

26.'iW1 d3 27.'ifxd3 'Wxd3+ 28.:Xd3 .:r.c2!

Aggressive play for the win involves real risk: 28 .. . �c5? 29.1:ίd8+ Φh7 30 . .!:i.e3 ! ! and suddenly it i s the black king which is in a mating net.

29 . .:r.ed1 ..tds Nor is anything offered by the ternpting 29 . . . �g2+ 30.Φgl �cS+. After 3 1 .Φh2 jιds+ 32 .Φh3 t2Je4 33.1:f.xd5 exdS 34.1:f.xd5 the garne also ends in a draw.


30 . ..txf6 ..txt6 31 .:Xd5 After all he has been through, White prefers to force a draw with a further accurately-calculated sacrifice.

31 ... exd5 32.:Xd5 b4 33 . .:r.bs ..txes 34.fxe5 .:r.b2 35.�e1 'iW7 36.�d1 b3 37 . .:r.b7+ �e6 38 . .:r.b6+ 'iWS 39.e6 .:r.h2 40.e7 .:r.hs 41 .:Xb3 .:r.es 42.:e3

Draw agreed.

Even so, if one cornpares these last two exarnples, then, strangely enough, Salov's task was rather easier. Of course, he still needed to show courage and preparedness for decisive play, but here it arose naturally frorn a sharp opening and the character of the position. Α great rnaster like Valery sirnply had no right to take any other decision in the position that arose. Thus, White's bluff was effectively forced. Krarnnik, on the other hand, could very well have refrained frorn sacrifices. In this case, he would alrnost certainly not have won the garne, but the risk of losing would also have been less. In tennis terrns, it is useful to distinguish between forced and unforced errors. The first refers to rnistakes in difficult positions, when there is already little choice. The second can perfectly well be avoided, by playing accurately and cautiously. The sarne analogy can be applied to chess, in terms of forced and unforced risk. And whereas Salov had practically no choice, Krarnnik decided on a quite unforced bluff.

Vishy Anand is undoubtedly one of the great players in the history of chess. Enorrnous natural talent, and the ability to work colossally hard, have brought him to the World Charnpionship title.

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His only real weakness is his dislike of passive defence. Vishy sometimes prefers active counterplay, at the expense of his position. Thus, in the following game, without great thought, he goes in for a very risky undertaking.

Game 82

Anatoly Karpoν (2760) Viswanathan Anand (2765) Dos Hermanas 1 997 (6)

1 .d4 d5 2.c4 dxc4 3.e4 e5 4.lbf3 exd4 5 . ..bc4 tlJc6 6.0-0 ..te6 7 . ..be6 fxe6 8.1i'b3 1i'd7 9.1i'xb7 J:bβ 1 0.1i' a6 lbf6 1 1 .lbbd2 ..tb4 1 2.tlJc4 ο-ο 1 3.a3 ..tcs 14.b4 ..tb6 1 5.b5 t:Δe7 16.lbfe5 1i'e8 11 . .:e1 lbg6 1 8.lbd3! lbh4? 1 9 . ..if4! lbxe4 20 . ..tg3! lbxg3 21 .hxg3 ttJfS 22.a4

How should we αssess this position? Try to guess Anand's reαction.

22 ... t:Δe3!? The Indian GM's comment on this desperate move is remarkably laconic: 'Νο exclams or question marks for this move. It's simply necessary. Best practical chance.' Even so, there was an alternative to this bluff: 22 . . . lt:Jd6!? 23 .tbce5 cS! 24.bxc6 'iνc8 2S .'iνxc8 l:tbxc8 26.a5± �d8 27 . .ί:la4 lt:JbS and White still has a long way to go to win the game.

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23.tlJce5? Karpov is afraid of losing his large positional advantage, but even so, he should have accepted the piece sacrifice: 23.fxe3! after which Anand's intention 23 ... 'iνg6, 24.tbceS! 'iνxg3 25.a5 dxe3 fails to the calm 26.1:le2! (but not 26.axb6? l::tf2 27.lt:Jxf2 'ifxf2+ 28.Φhl 'iνh4+ with perpetual check) when 26 .. . I:f.xf2 doesn't help in view of 27.l:ιxf2! (27.lt:Jxf2?? exf2+ 28.Φfl 'iνh2) 27 ... exf2+ 28.Φfl 'ifh2 29.axb6 'iνgl+ 30.Φe2 and it is time for Black to resign. Νο better is 23 ... dxe3 24.lbxb6! (24.l:re2? 'iVhS) 24 . . . axb6 2S.1::rxe3. Black simply has no way to exploit the temporary retreat of the white queen, and the extra piece will become the decisive factor.

23 ... tlJc2 Has the advantage been lost? What should White do now?

24.tlJc6? Another mistake, which finally kills off his hopes of winning. Better was 24.a5! tbxel (an analogous position results from 24 . . . lbxal 2S.:!:f.xal �xaS 26.x:lxa5 l::rb6 27.'iνxa7 l:rxbS 28.1::f.a l !) 2S . .!::!'.xel �xaS 26.'iVxaS 'ifxbS 27.'ifxa7!±.

24 ... lbxa1 25 . .:Xa1 2S .lbxb8? tbc2 26.1:lcl eS !+.

2s ... .:as Also good is 2S . . . e5!? 26.aS �a8! .

26.:e1 !? Another typical Karpov move. The threat is stronger than its execution! But the advantage has already gone, and nothing comes either from the more direct 26.a5 e5! 27.axb6 axb6 28 .'iνxa8 "f!fxa8 29.l:txa8 1:1xa8 30.4Jdxe5 �al+ 3l .�h2 l:ldl .

26 ... e5!? 27.:Xe5 'iff7 28.a5!? But now this move could have brought White serious problems. Stronger was 28."f!fb7! .

28 . . . 'ifb3! 29.tίJcb4

29 ... Aaeθ?!

Δ Δ Δ

\t>

Having endured some difficult moments in this game, Vishy prefers to settle for the bird in hand. Equality also results from 29 . . . 1:lfb8 30.4Jc6. However, after the stronger 29 . . . c5! 30.bxc6 (30.axb6? axb6 3 I ."iνxb6 cxb4-+) 30 . . . .tc7 White would have faced a difficult defence.

30.:Χeθ :Χeθ 31 .�h2 3l .axb6 'δ'dl+ 32 .�h2 'i:Vh5+ leads to perpetual check.

31 ... 'iff7 32.axb6 'ifhS+ 33. �g1 'ifd1 + 34.�h2 'ifhS+ %-%

The confidence and ease with which the Indian GM decided on a bluff disoriented even Anatoly Karpov. By itself, this shows the effectiveness of such a device.


Judit Polgar is the only woman player over many years who has been able to compete on equal terms with the strongest male players in the world. The initiative was always an important thing for her and she was always prepared to give up material for it.

Game 83

Vadim Zviagintsev (2652) Judit Polgar (2671 ) Las Vegas 1 999 (4.2)

1 .d4 ltJf6 2.c4 e6 3.tίJc3 .tb4 4.ttJf3 cS S.g3 cxd4 6.ltJxd4 0-0 7 . .tg2 dS θ.cxdS ltJxdS 9. 'ifb3 'it'b6 1 Ο. bdS exdS 1 1 . .te3 bc3+ 12. 'ft'xc3 'ifg6 13.h4!

ΤΝ. 1 3 ... h5 1 4.g4! bg4 1 5.f3 ΙΣcθ 1 6.'ifd2

After αη interesting novelty from White, Judit Polgαr finds herself in α complicαted position. Should she go down the mαin line, which hαs probαbly been αnαlysed in detαil by her opponent, or should she try to find some unexpected, if risky pαth? Which would you choose?

1 6 ... tίJc6?! True to her aggressive style, Judit takes the second decision. White has the material advantage, but in return, she has the initiative. The natural 16 . . . �d7 leads, after a line such as 17.�f2 'δ'd6 18 .1:1agl

1 7 5


g6 19.1:ίg5 tbc6 20.tbxc6! bxc6 21 .1:lhgl 1:ίe8 22.1:ίχh5, to a position where White is attacking, with material equality. The ingenious SF suggests the unexpected 16 .. . jιh3! , preventing 1 7.�f2 . The variation 1 7.1:ίχh3 'iνg2 1 8 .tbf5 'iVxh3 19.tbe7+ �f8 20.tbxc8 'iνhl+ 2l .�f2 'ifh2+ 22.�fl 'iνh3+ leads to a draw, whilst after other continuations, Black has no problems.

1 7.fxg4 lίJeS Another possibility is 1 7 . . . 'iVe4, but here too, White retains the advantage: 1 8.1:ίgl tbe5 19.tbf5 ! tbxg4 20.'ifxd5! 'ifb4+ 2l .'ifd2.

1 8.gxh5? Now Black's risk proves fully justified. He should have played 1 8 .tbf5 ! .f:f.e8 19.'iνxd5 tbxg4 20.�d4 and the material advantage outweighs the activity of the black pieces.

1 8 ... 'it'e4 1 9.1:r.g1 Black is also fine after 1 9.1:ίh3 �g4 20 . .!::!.f3 Jd.e8! .

1 9 ... llJc4 Now the piece is regained, and the game goes into an equal endgame.

20. 'it'd3 tbxe3 21 . 'it'xe4 dxe4 22.�2 llJc2 23.1:r.ad1 l:r.c5 24.tbxc2 l:r.xc2 25.1:r.d7 l:r.xb2 26.h6 e3+ 27. �xe3 l:r.eθ+ 112-Υ2

Of course, this game was not as dramatic as the previous ones, but here, once again, courage and the willingness to take decisive action to change the course of the game brought success.

In chess, just as in life, it can be very difficult to decide on a radical step to change the whole course of events. Somewhere deep down, one understands the need for such a change, but to effect this, one needs to sacrifice

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something, which is also very difficult. But when you have nothing to lose, you can risk everything. 'Necessity is the mother of invention', as the saying goes. In the next game, White managed to overcome his inhibitions.

Game 84

Mark Dvoretsky Orest Averkin Odessa 1974

D

White to move. What should he play?

White has lost the strategical battle and with a natural course of events, he faces a long and passive defence. Instead of this, Dvoretsky decides on a bluff, with the aim of sharply changing the character of the position.

31 .llJf4!? After 3 l .tbxh8 Itxh8 32 . .!::!.c2 tbd6 White can only wait to see when and where the opponent will land the decisive blow.

31 ... exf4 32.gxf4 32.�xf4 was possible, but after the coldblooded 32 . . . �g5 33.e5 .Άχf5! Black's material advantage should decide the outcome of the game.

32 .. . j.h4! Meeting the threat of e4-e5 and at the same time taking control of the crucial square g3 .

33.f6! Brave and consistent. Bluff must be carried through to the end! 33.e5 .ixfS 34 . .ie4 :lf7 allows Black to defend without any special problems.

33 ... .bf6? It is not easy to choose the correct capture of the two, especially in time-trouble. Averkin makes a sub-optimal choice, and the battle sharpens markedly. Black probably rejected 33 . . . 'iνxf6! because of 34.e5 'iνg6 35.�b7, but after 35 .. . 1:t.a7 36 . .ixc8 �xc8 37.l:txb6 'iffs White's activity fizzles out.

34.e5 .i.h4?! Undoubtedly 34 ... 1::le7! was better, although here too, after 3S . .ib7 :la7 36 . .idS things are not so clear.

35.e6 SF shows that it was stronger to include 3S . .ib7! :la7 and only now play 36.e6 l:ιxb7 (36 .. . .ia4 37 . ..txc8 'iνxc8 38 . .ί:ιχb6) 37.exd7+ \t>xd7 38 .'iνe4, after which Black has to force a draw: 38 .. . \t>d6 39.'iνe5+ Φd7 40.'iνe4.

35 ... .i.a4 36.f5 Now 36 . .ib7 is already impossible.

36 ... 'it'f6 37.'it'e4 .i.gS? The sharp change in the position clearly robbed Black of his self-control, and he was also very short of time. He should have played 37 .. . \t>f8, although after 38 . .if4 the whole battle would lie ahead.


38 . .bg5 'ifxg5 39. Wfe5 Even stronger is 39.f6! .

39 . . . %Σh6?? Α terrible time-trouble blunder, although it was hard to find the correct line 39 .. . \t>d8! in such a situation. In this case, White would have to force a draw: 40.'ifd5+ \t>e8 4l .'iνes.

40 . .i.b7 :&7 41 . .bc8 1 -0 Time-trouble is finally over, but the black position is now in ruins.

As well as courage and a willingness to play such sacrifices, one also has to have very good timing. Here, Dvoretsky subtly chose exactly the right moment for his bluf( His tired opponent, who was also in time-trouble, was simply not prepared for such a sudden fundamental change in the position.

It is hard to resist the temptation to present an example from my own practice. Ι hope it sits quite appropriately in the context of our theme.

Game 85

Alexander Beliavsky (2650) Vladimir Tukmakov (2568) Bled 2002 (5)

•

Black had committed several inaccuracies in the opening and fallen into α difficult position. What can he do?

1 7 7


Not wishing to settle for passive defence, Ι decided to change the picture radically, albeit at the cost of a piece.

1 8 .. . .bf2+!? Objectively 18 .. . l:t.xdl 19.1:lxdl �f8 was better, but this position seemed too dull to me.

1 9.:Xf2?! Α natural reaction, but stronger was 19.ιit>xf2! t2Jg4+ 20.tit>gl ! (but not 20.tit>el? t2Jxh2 with splendid counterplay for Black) 20 .. .'ti'b6+ 2l .e3 t2Jxe3 (2I .. . fxe3 22.a5!) 22.t2Jxe3 'ifxe3+ 23 .'tif2 l:t.xdl 24.1:Ixdl �b3 25.1:1el and the compensation for the piece is clearly insufficient.

1 9 ... :Xd1 + 20 .... xd1 J:tdθ

As a result of his inaccuracy at move 19, White now faces a new, but significantly more difficult choice. His queen has many possible squares, but choosing the best one is not so easy.

21 .... c1 ?! It is pretty hard to work out that 2 1 . 'ifb Ι ! is the best. However, this is the move that underlines White's advantage: 2 I . .. t2Jg4 22.1:lfl "iVb6+ 23.e3 1:Id2 24.a5 �b5 25 .t2Jc3 'ifxf5 26.'ifxf5 .r:i.xg2+ 27.!it>xg2 t2Jxe3+ 28 .ιit>f3 t2Jxf5 29.gxf4±. The move 2 I .'�'c2 is also not bad, although in the variation 2 I . .. t2Jg4 22.1::f.fl �b6+ 23.e3 t2Jxe3 24.a5 'ifxa5

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25 .bxa5 t2Jxc2 Black retains chances of saving himself. After the text move, the game becomes double-edged.

21 ... lίJg4 22.J:tf1 Black has achieved his aim: the sharp change in the nature of the position has clearly unsettled my opponent. Here too, preferable was 22.l:rf3 "iib6+ (in this situation, it is not so good to play 22 .. . �e5 23.h3! 'iνxf5 24.hxg4 'ifxg4 25 .t2Jc3±) 23 .e3 fxe3 24.a5 'iVb5! (24 ... 1:Idl+ 25 . .1d.fl l:t.xcl 26.axb6 l:t.c2 27.t2Jcl axb6 28.h3 t2Je5 29.t2Jxe3±) 25 .t2Jc3 'ifxb4 26 .t2Jxe3 �c5 although here too, things are not so clear.

Δ Δ

Even so, White still has αη extra piece for the moment. Find Black's strongest move.

22 ... 'ife5! Significantly stronger than 22 . . . �b6+ 23.e3 fxe3 24.a5 "iib5 25 .t2Jxe3.

23.e4 The situation has sharpened to the maximum. Although Black has only one pawn for the sacrificed piece, White's position is far from easy to play. His knights are scattered around the board and the small, but extremely active black army can create various threats. In this situation, Beliavsky tries to seize the initiative. The other attempt at counterattack promises nothing: 23 .t2Je7+ ιit>d7

24.tt:Jxc6 bxc6 2S .�xc6+ We7 26.'iνe4 'ifd6! and White should think about equalising. Stronger was the coldblooded 23.h3! ttJd4 (23 .. . 'δ'χf5 24.hxg4 ·

'ifxg4 2S .gxf4 Yi'xe2 26.ttJc3 "iνc4;!;;) 24.ttJc3 ttJxfS 2S .hxg4 tt:Jxg3 26.�f3 although in this case, after 26 . . . t1d4! the position is completely unclear.

23 ... fxe3

How should White plαy?

24.tίJe7+? The point of his idea! The rook is included in the attack, yet in a surprising way, its activity only worsens White's position. He should have played 24.h3! with the possible variation 24 . . . ttJd4 2S .ttJxd4 "iνxd4 26.hxg4 e2+ 27.Wh2 exflttJ+ 28.'δ'xfl , and White retains chances of equalising.

24 ... Φd7 25. tbxcβ White starts to attack and loses! Other continuations were no better: 25.1::1xf7 We8 or 2S .ttJfs e2.

25 ... bxc6 26.'ii'd1+ 'ifd4?! Black's desire to simplify is understandable, but he could end the game more quickly by 26 . . . We7! 27."iνxg4 e2.

27.lίJc:3? Missing the chance to prolong resistance by 27.'ife2! We7 28 .ttJcl .

27 ... e2+! 28.'iνxd4+ tbxd4 29 . .:te1 tίJeS 0-1


The piece sacrifice in this game was a total bluff- Ι arn not at all asharned to adrnit it. But to a large extent this bluff was forced, because with normal play, the position just seerned to rne to be too lacking in prospects. Another factor which played a role in rny decision was rny good knowledge of rny opponent. Ι had known Beliavsky for rnany years and we had played nurnerous garnes. The Lvov grandrnaster is extrernely dangerous in positions where his opponent has no counterplay. In such cases, Beliavsky is superb at gradually strengthening his pressure, without having to worry about tactics. But he feels rather less cornfortable in double-edged positions. So, effectively, Ι had little choice. And in the end, with the aid of a good deal of luck, things turned out well.

In the following garne, a typical Sicilian duel in the opening does not presage anything particularly special. Indeed, it soon appears that White is going to achieve a fairly standard victory, but then events take aπ unpredictable turn.

Game 86

Adrian Mikhalchishin Boris Taborov Daugaνpils 1978

ο

On the boαrd, we hαve α stαndαrd Scheveningen Siciliαn. How should White develop his αttαck?

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1 6.lL\d5! Of course. If such a blow does not involve a piece sacrifice, it usually guarantees an advantage for White.

1 6 ... 'ifd8! This rnodest rnove is good. Not 1 6 . . . exdS 1 7.exd5 and White wins. Sornewhat stronger would have been 16 ... Jtxd5 1 7.exd5 eS, but even in this case, White retains pressure after 18 .JtfS! g6 19.Jtg4!.

1 7.'ifh5! Strangely, the knight jurnp to dS has not brought irnrnediate dividends. The text rnove is the rnost energetic continuation of the attack. Α) 1 7.tbe3?! allows Black to obtain

excellent counterplay by rneans of 1 7 ... f5! ; Β) After 1 7.'iνh3!? a strong reply is

1 7 ... e5, but not 1 7 . . . exd5? 18.e5! g6 19.exd6+-; C) Finally, White is prornised nothing

by 1 7.tbxe7+ 'iVxe7. 1 7 ... exd5 1 8 . .:r.t3!?

1 8.exd5? �xdS+ 19.Φgl g6 20.'iνh6 is significantly weaker in view of20 .. . tbe5 ! 2 1 .1:f.e3 �e6!. The rnove 18 .1:ίe3? dxe4 also fails, but one possibility was 18 .e5! g6 19.'i!Vh6 dxeS 20.1:f.xe5! tbxeS 2 l .�xe5 d4+ 22 .Φgl f6 23.�xg6 hxg6 24.'ifxg6+ with perpetual check. Strangely, there is no way to break through Black's defences.

1 8 ... l2Je5! 1 8 . . . dxe4! looks ternpting, but here too, White's attacking potential is sufficient for a draw: 1 9.1:1h3! ! exd3+ 20.Φgl h6 2 1 .gxh6 d2 22.h7+! (22.1:ίdl? �f3! 23 .Vi'xf3 �f6-+) 22 .. . Φh8 23 . .Άχg7+ Φχg7 24.h8'if+ l:txh8 25.1:ίg3+ �gs 26.�xg5+ 'ifxgS+ 27.Vi'xg5+ Φf8 28.Vi'e7+ =.

1 9.fxe5?

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Irnperceptibly, White crosses the red line. He had to play 19.1:lh3 ! h6 20.gxh6 g6 2I .Vi'f3 ! with approxirnate equality (weaker is 2 I .'i:Ve2 �f6 22.fxe5 dxeS 23.�c5 �e7): 2 1 . . . �f6 22.fxe5 dxeS 23.�c5 1:ίe8 (now we see the point of White's 2 1st rnove: Black cannot play 23 . . . �e7 24.�xe7 Vi'xe7 25 .exd5) 24.exd5 �xdS 25 . .Άe4 .Άχe4 26 .'i:Vxe4.

1 9 ... g6!

19 .. . .Άχg5? loses to 20.e6! fxe6 2 I .exd5, but whαt should White do now? It looks αs though his αttαck hαs stαlled.

20.'ifxh7+!! Α fantastic resource! Suddenly it turns out that norrnal rneans do not work. After 20.'ifg4 there follows 20 . . . dxe5! 2 1 ..Άe3 (2Ι . .Άχe5 .ΆxgS) 2 1 . . . Vi'c8! 22.'ifh4 dxe4 23.�xe4 fS ! with a decisive attack for Black! White's attack also peters out after 20.'ifh3 dxeS 2 1 ..Άχe5 �xgS. In the situation that exists, the queen sacrifice is the best practical chance, especially considering the rnutual tirne-trouble.

20 ... ς,txh7 21 . .:r.h3+ ς,tgs 22.exd6 f6 23.e5!!

Α unique position. White is a whole queen down, and it is Black's rnove, yet the outcorne of the garne is still unclear.

23 ... ..bd6! Black is also at his best. Weaker is 23 . . . fxe5 24.dxe7! (24 . .Άχe5? d4+! 25 .'ί!.ιgl .Άχg5-+) 24 . . . 'ifxe7 25.1:1xe5 'ifd7! (the πatural 25 .. . 'ifg7 suddeπly puts Black οπ the verge of defeat: 26.l:ιh4!! �xe5 27.�xe5 d4+ 28 .'ί!.ιgl l:ιae8 29.�f6) 26 . .!::f.ee3 aπd Black has oπly a draw: 26 .. . .!:tf4 27.l:ιh8+ 'ί!.ιf7 28.l:ιh7+ 'ί!.ιg8.

24.exf6?! Οπe caπ oπly marvel at Mikhalchishiπ's courage. He completely disregards material iπ this game! However, iπ this situatioπ, he should have preferred the piece: 24.exd6! 'ifxd6 25.1:lh6! wheπ Black 's task would be extremely difficult, especially iπ time-trouble. The correct decisioπ is to give up the rook 25 . . . l:ιa7! ! , but oπly the machiπe could do this: 26.�xa7 d4+ 27.'ί!.ιgl fS ! . Oπly ποw caπ Black breathe easily. The temptiπg 25 . . . 1:lf7?! leads after 26 . .Άχg6 .I:f.g7 27.gxf6 l:ιxg6 28.l:ιxg6+ 'ί!.ιf8 29.l:ιg7 to a positioπ where the chaπces favour White, despite his lack of a queeπ. Thiπgs are also ποt so simple after the other πatural defeπce 25 . . . .ie8. After the further sacrifice 26.l:ιxe8! l:ιaxe8 27.I:txg6+ 'ί!.ιf7 28.1:1xf6+ �xf6 29 . .ixf6 it is ποt so easy for Black to realise his material advaπtage.


24 .. . :t7! 25.:h6! Black's defeπsive task was simpler after 25.�xg6!? �e8 (stroπgest, though 25 .. .'�c7 aπd 25 .. .'�d7 are also possible) 26.�f5! �d7 27.�h7+ l:ιxh7 28 .f7+ 'ί!.ιf8 29.l:ιxh7 �xg5 30.l:ιh8+ 'ί!.ιχf7 3 I .l:ιh7+ 'ί!.ιf8 32.l:ιh8+ 'i:Vg8-+. The material eveπtually triumphs!

25 ... -teβ? Ιπ extreme time-trouble, Black forces a draw - safety first! There is a route to aπ advaπtage, but it is practically impossible to fiπd iπ time-trouble: 25 . . . �f8! 26.l:ιxg6+ 'ί!.ιh8 27.l:ιe7! .Άe8! (27 .. .'�'d7!?) 28 . .Άf5! 'ifc8!!+ (28 . . . iνxe7 29.fxe7+ .ig? is iπsufficieπt because of 30 . .I:f.h6+ 'ί!.ιg8 3 Ι ..Άh7+ with perpetual check) 29 . .Άχc8 .!::!'.xc8 30.l:ιe6 �h7 aπd suddeπly the white rook turπs out to be trapped! 3 I .l:ιg7+ �xg7 32.fxg7 .1:f.xg7 33.�xg7 �xg7. Less clear are the coπsequeπces of 25 ... 'iff8 26.l:ιxg6+ �h8 27.nh6+ 'ifxh6 28.gxh6. Although Black has aπ extra rook iπ the eπdiπg, realisiπg the material advaπtage is practically impossible.

26.:Xg6+ �hβ The same fiπish arises after 26 .. . �f8 27.I:I.h6.

27.:h6+ �gβ 28.:g6+ �hβ 29.:h6+ �gθ 30.:g6+ Υ2-Υ2

There is aπ Eπglish sayiπg, 'Doπ't throw out the baby with the bath-water'. The seπse of this is that sometimes iπ life, a persoπ reacts to a relatively small setback with a totally disproportioπate reactioπ, which simply briπgs much worse coπsequeπces οπ himself. This sayiπg seems particularly apt for this game. Το returπ from philosophy to chess, eveπts iπ the above game at first developed quite πormally for this variatioπ: White attacked aπd Black took defeπ-

1 8 1


sive measures. Both sides played very sensibly and intelligently. But at some moment, events simply slipped out of White's control. It was not too late to step back from the attack. But it is extremely difficult to admit one's own mistakes, especially in the middle of a game. Therefore, Mikhalchishin continued to come forward, not worrying about sacrifices and blindly following the logic of the attack. As the saying goes, the tail was wagging the dog. As a result of these unpredictable actions, a masterpiece was born.

Something similar happened in the next game between two of the greatest players, although this was 20 years ago, when they were both quite young.

Game 87

Vladimir Kramnik (271 Ο) Alexey Shirov (2705) Linares 1994 (12)

•

With his last move 23.'i:Yb3-c2 White created the positional threat of 24.g3. How should Black prepare for this threat?

23 .. . 1i'd7? What is this? Hastiness or reckless courage? Perfectly solid was 23 . . . hS 24.g3 �h6.

24.g3!

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Giving Black a very difficult choice. 24 .. . 1i'xh3!?

It would be strange to expect Shirov to adopt the passive 24 . . . �b8. After 2S.h4! the black rook would be inactive on a8, probably for the rest of the game. Admittedly the piece sacrifice was possible in another version: 24 . . . �gS 2S .h4 �xh4 26 .gxh4 'iVh3 27.�g2 'i:fxh4, although in this case, the calm 28 .'iVd2! gives White an advantage.

25 . .tg2 Wfh5 26.gxf4 tljg4 27.%Σfd1 .:Seθ!?

The direct 27 . . . 'ifh2+ 28 .�fl 'ifxf4 was also insufficient because of 29.1:f.d3 ! .

28 . .:ld3 'ifh2+ 29.c;tf1 f5!? Intending to include the second rook in the attack via f6. 29 .. .'ifxf4 is insufficient because of 30.'iYd2.

30.1i'd2! Of course, 30.1:f.g3? is premature because of the deadly 30 . . . 'iVxg3 .

30 ... .:lf6 The threat was 3 1 .1::th3. Of course, it was possible to play simply 30 . . . 'iνh4 but after the straightforward reply 3 1 .1:f.el White's victory is only a matter of time. Shirov tries to complicate his opponent's task as much as possible.

31 .f3 After 3 1 . .l:r.h3 Black had prepared 3 1 . .. 1:f.g6! , after which White must play 32.1:f.g3! (32.1:f.xh2 t2Jxh2+ 33 .�gl t2Jf3+-+ is just bad; whilst after 32.1:lel l:f.xel+ 33 .'iVxel 'iVxf4 Black has a real attack). Therefore the immediate 3 1 .1:f.g3 was significantly stronger, as then 3 1 . .. 1:f.fe6 loses to 32.t2JxdS! . But the text move looks very good also. The black knight has no retreat squares and White's material advantage looks like becoming overwhelming.

Try to guess Shirov's reaction.

31 .. . .1:.e4! ! Α surprisingly beautiful move and at the same time, the best practical chance!

32.tbxd5! Kramnik also rises to the occasion. It was also perfectly possible to play the direct 32.fxe4 fxe4 after which he would have had to find 33.tbe2! (weaker is 33 . .txe4 !1xf4+ 34.'iVxf4 1i'xf4+ 3S . .tf3 tbh2+ 36.\t>g2 tbxf3 37 . .!::i.xf3 �xd4; or 33 . .tf3 �g3! 34 . .txe4 1:f.xf4+ 35 .1i'xf4 'ii'xf4+ 36 . .tf3 tbh2+) 33 . . . exd3 34.'iVxd3 'ii'h4 35 .1i'g3 'ii'xg3 36.tbxg3 1:t.xf4+ 37.\t>gl with the better chances in the ending.

analysis diagram

However, the line chosen by Vladimir is more principled and stronger.

32 ... cxd5 33.c6! :Xf4 33 .. . 1:t.xc6? 34.fxe4 fxe4 35.l:th3+-.


34.cxb7! Weaker is 34.c7 lιf8 35 .1:f.cl 1:f.c8 with an unclear position.

34 .. . .1:.e4! Amazing! The black rook heads to the same attacked square!

35 . .1:.c1 ! Φh7! 36.bθ'W! Defl.ection at the cost of a whole queen. The attempt to advance the pawn in safety fails to Black's counterplay, which is fully adequate for a draw: 36.�c7 'iνg3 ! 37.b8'iV tbh2+ 38 .'it>gl l:tel+ 39.'iVxel 'iVxel+ 40.Φχh2 'ifh4+ = or 36.1:ίc8 'iVg3! 37.b81i' tbh2+ 38.Φgl �el+ 39.'iVxel 'ii'xel+ 40.\t>xh2 'ifh4+ 4I ..th3 �f2+ 42.Whl 'ifel+ 4Η!ϊ>g2 'iVe2+ =.

36 ... 'Wxb8 37.fxg4! The other capture unexpectedly loses after 37.fxe4? fxe4+ 38.\t>el 1:t.f2-+.

37 .. . 1!t'h2! 37 .. . fxg4+? 38 .\t>gl .

Now how do we defend against the threat of 38 ... fxg4 ?

38 . .1:.13?! Up to this moment, both players have played outstandingly, but now the tension and time-trouble starts to have its say. White should have settled for simplification: 38 . .tf3 ! 'ifxd2 39.1:f.xd2 fxg4 40.1:t.f2! (40.1:f.d3 1:f.e8!) 40 .. . gxf3 4l .b7, the consequences of which

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would have been rnuch easier to delve into after tirne-trouble has finished. The rook ending turns out to be winning for White: 41. .. l:th4 42.Iιfc2! l:tf8 (42 . . . f2 43.b8'iY .ί::!.hl+ 44.�g2 fl'ili+ 45 . .ί::!.xfl lιhxfl 46.�h2) 43 . .ί:lc8 .ί::!.hl+ 44.�f2.

38 ... :Xg4 38 . . . fxg4?? 39 . .!:r.xf6 gxf6 40.�xe4+.

39.b7? The decisive rnistake! This typical tirnetrouble rnove finally tips the scales of this epic battle in Black's favour. He should have played 39 . .ί::!.f2! �fg6! 40.�xd5 (40.�f3 'iνh3+ 41 .�e2 .ί:le6+ 42.�d3 .ί::!.ee4!) 40 ... 'iνh3+ 41 .�e2 I:i'.d6 42.'ife3! "iνxe3+ 43 .�xe3 l:txd5 44.1:f.bl .ί::!.e4+ 45 .�f3 1::f.e8 46.1::f.c2! l:rb8 47 . .!:Ic7, retaining the advantage.

analysis diagram

However, such subtle prophylactic play usually fares badly with one's flag hanging.

39 .. . .:r.fg6 40 . .:r.c2 There was also no salvation after 40.b8'i!V 'ifxb8 41 .1::f.f2 f4! 42.'iνc2 (42 .'iνd3 .ί::!.g3 43.'ifbl 'ifxbl 44.l:txbl f3) 42 .. .'iYb5+, nor after 40.1:tf2 .ί:lxg2 41 ..ί::!.χg2 'ifhl+.

40 ... :Xg2! 41 .'it'xg2 :Xg2 42.:Xg2 'it'h1 + 43.�2 'it'b1 0-1

It is hard to say if the piece sacrifice was planned, or whether Shirov played it

1 84

out of desperation. But having decided to bluff, he played with the rnaxirnurn of inventiveness and aggression. Look at his fantastic 3 1 st rnove! It would have been a travesty of justice if such energy and incredible irnagination had not brought hirn success. However, Krarnnik's play in this garne also did not deserve to lose.

This next exarnple is the direct opposite. There is no desperate attack, and no virtuoso defence. It is all rnundane and prosaic.

Game 88

Gennady Kuzmin (2550) Lev Psakhis (2535) Frunze ch-URS 1981 (14)

• i. • .t i i i i

i ·� � Δ • i. � i

ttJ tt:J II Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ

1'1 w

How should we assess this position? What move would you suggest for Black?

The black pieces are poorly coordinated, and the pawn on b4 is hanging. Defending such a position is not sornething one would wish on one's worst enerny. However, with his next rnove Psakhis produces a huge shock, even allowing for his sad predicarnent.

24 .. . c6! ! Το all his other problerns, Black adds a terrible bishop on b7. How could such a rnove enter a grandrnaster's head?

Firstly, there was already no good defence. If, for example, 24 .. . tbe7, then 25.f4 �h5 26.g4! 1::rh4 27.h3 and Black is not to be envied.

analysis diagram

The obviously unaesthetic text does have its positive sides, however. One of these is closing the a4-e8 diagonal and freeing the knight at e6, which might later jump to d4. It also turns out that the threat to take on b4 is not deadly.

25.�2! The strongest! Worse is 25 .t2Jxb4?! c5 26.t2Jd3 c4 27.t2Jbc5 i.c8 28.f4 l::rh5 29.tbxe6+ �xe6 with real chances of a draw for Black.

2s ... hs 26.t4 .:r.ts 27.ttJes?

Chαpter 6 - MascuJine Desperαtion

Careless! White probably thought that the win was only a matter of time. He should have played 27.�e4! c5 28.�xe6! fxe6 29.t2Jdxc5 and Black is in a bad way.

27 .. . lL\xe5 28 . .:Xe5 .:l.d5! Now it transpires that the worst is behind him.

29 . .:Xf5 .:XfS 30.h4 .:l.dS The position has finally equalised. The remaining moves only confirm the inevitable.

31 .c3 bxc3 32.bxc3 g6 33 . .:1.e5 .:Xes 34.fxe5 riJe7 35.riJe3 cs 36.lL!c1 c4 37 . ..tc2 ttJdβ 38. riJd4 llJc6+ 39. ri;xc4 lL\xa5+ 40. riJcS .tf3 Yz-Yz

Would Psakhis have managed to defend the position by normal means? Ι very much doubt it. But Black's suicidal-looking 24th move made such an impression on his opponent that the game ended very quickly and with quite a different result from what one would have expected. Evidently, Kuzmin thought Black's move was just capitulation and he found it impossible to maintain the necessary concentration. An incredible effect for such a modest move!

Conclusion Effectively, we l1aνe said everything that needs saying, in the games and the commentary thereto. Α sharp change in the position, when things are going badly, is always a good idea, both in chess and in life. The worse your position is, the greater the justifiable risk. Just as in life generally, chess players never like change, when things are going well. So do not be ashamed to complicate your opponent's life, with a paradoxical manoeuvre or unexpected sacrifice. He will probably not like it. If the best players in the world can lose in such situations, then your opponent today is probably going to make mistakes as well. Be an optimist. As the great writer Mikhail Zhvanetsky said: Ίf you inflate your joys to the level of your troubles, you will enjoy them' . So do not fear unpleasantness in life - it can be the source of great joy! Go in for dramatic changes, without fear or worry.

But if you really don't like doing that, Ι can only advise you never to get into a bad position. Do you think that is easier?

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Chapter 7

Ιη the Grip of Passion

Do you regard yourself as a calrn and rational person? If you have answered in the affirrnative, with no doubt at all, then sorne of the decisions you will see in this chapter are likely to astonish you.

Why should a player, without any necessity at all, take a decision which results in the position spinning cornpletely out of control and becorning totally unpredictable? Have you ever done this? Do you always analyse the situation frorn all angles and only then take your carefully-considered decision? Ι don't believe you!

After all, if you are reading this, you are a chess player, that is, a garnes player. And every player, no rnatter how experienced and calrn he is, knows what it is like to find hirnself in the grip of alrnost drunken passion. That is, when your actions are not guided by cold calculation and cornrnon sense, but by a desperate and irresistible urge to do a certain thing, regardless. Usually, this passion only lasts a few rninutes, and then you look with horror on the inevitable costs of your rnornent of rnadness.

But sornetirnes such decisions bring success in the rnost surprising and unlikely ways.

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Game 89

Alexander Beliavsky (2668) Carsten Ηοί (2385) Copenhagen 2003 (6)

•

The previous section of the gαme wαs α mαnoeuvring bαttle. In the seαrch of απ αdvαntαge, Beliαvsky hαd spent α greαt deα] of time αnd wαs in serious time-troubJe. Now Blαck fαces α difficu]t choice. Whαt would you plαy in his pJαce?

36 ... tlJQ3+!? Pure bluff! Hoi saw that his combination was not quite sound, but hoped that his opponent would not be able to make the time-control intact. But there was no reason to stake everything on one card. Black had the strong positional continuation 36 . . . lΔg7! followed by transferring the knight to fS . In the variation 37.'iνxb6 h3 38 .'ir'f2 hxg2+ 39.'ir'xg2 'iνe3 he has superb play for a pawn. Another line which was fully in keeping with the spirit of the position is 36 . . . h3 ! ? 37.g3 'iνfs. Black retains good chances and all the battle lies ahead: 38 .f4 �bl 39.l:tal 'f!!fxb4 40 . ..txh3 bS .

37.hxg3 hxg3 38.'itg1 'ifh6 39.:Z.h8+??

It is hard to refrain from such a move, when one's flag is hanging! This is indeed what Black was counting on. After the cold-blooded 39 . ..te2! 'iνh2+

Chαpter 7 - In the Grip of Pαssion

40.'it>fl 'ifhl+ 4l .'iVgl White keeps an extra piece. Admittedly, it surprisingly turns out that realising this advantage is extremely difficult: 4l . .. 'iVh6! 42.1:ίal 1::re6 43.l:!.dl 1:ίe3 and it is not clear how White can strengthen his position . However, Ι do not think Hoi penetrated so deeply into the secrets of the position. Be that as it may, his decision may objectively have been rather crazy, but from a practical point of view it was brilliant.

39 ... 'itxhθ 40. 'ifxf6+ 'ίfί>gθ 0-1 White's checks run out and he has no defence against mate.

This game is quite typical from the psychological point of view, so it makes sense to delve into the mechanism of such emotional bluff. It is obvious that by all logic, Hoi was the underdog in this game. Having weakened towards the first time control, he probably considered that he was not going to hold the position in the normal course of events. Consequently, a nice trap was always going to attract his interest. After all, this would provoke an immediate crisis and the game would be decided within a few moves. He would in any event avoid long and probably fruitless suffering. And the fact that the bluff turned out to be an entirely correct combination was just pure chance. And how will Hoi play the next time such a situation arises? Ι have no doubts about that!

In the following example, the logic outlined above fails completely. The double Soviet Champion Lev Psakhis, at the peak of his career, faced a strong and experienced player, who had by then, however, lost all his sporting ambitions.

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Game90

Orest Averkin (2450) Lev Psakhis (261 5) Sochi 1982 (7)

•

This non-stαndαrd position is not eαsy to αssess. White has α materiαl αdvantage, but Black's piece activity compensates. It is Black to move. What continuation should he choose?

27 ... ltJa3?! An extremely risky decision, especially considering that Psakhis had seen White's best defence. However, in the opponent's time-trouble it is hard to refrain from landing such a lovely blow, especially as such moves often bring success. The natural move 27 . . . �bl ! had only one drawback - it was too predictable.

Δ • Δ Δ Δ .Ι tLJ Φ

analysis diagram

However, from a purely chess point of view this move was definitely strongest,

1 88

and it poses more serious problems. For example, now 28 . .tcl ? is bad because of 28 . . . 1:le7. Black is also better after 28.�e6 tl:Jd4!. Even after the strongest move 28 .g3 Black has everything in order: 28 . . . 1ixb2 29.�xc5! J::i.xf4 30.�xb5 �fxf2! (but not 30 . . . �xg4? 3 1 .f4! and the rook is suddenly trapped) 3 l ..::lb7+ �f6. Furthermore, it is very difficult to play such a position as White, when in timetrouble.

28.bxa3? The reflex answer on which Black had been counting. After the strongest line 28.l::rc l ! I:r.xcl 29.�xcl tl:Jbs 30.tl:Jd2! , followed by transferring the knight to c4, Black would probably have regretted his artful decision at move 27.

28 ... :Xf4! 29.Jbf4 b3 30 . .te6? The decisive mistake. He should have played 30.�f3 ! b2 3 l .�e4 .i:ixe4 32 . .!:ιχe4 bl'f!V 33.�e7+ Φf6 34.�xa7. The passed c-pawn is not promoting and White manages to hold the position, e.g. 34 . . . c4 35 .a6 �b6 36.�xh7 'ifxa6 37.l:lc7 Vi'bS 38 .g3 .

30 ... b2 31 . .J:r.f7+ Φh6 32 . .J:r.b7 bHi' 33.:Xb1 :Xb1

After the exchange of a pair of rooks, White's position seriously deteriorates. The c-pawn will cost him a piece.

34.f4 c4 35.�2 c3 36.lbe3 c2 37.ttJxc2 .J:r.b2 38.�3 :Xc2 39.h4 .J:r.c3+ 40.ι�e4 :Xa3 41 . .td7 :XaS 42.f5 gxf5+ 43.Φχf5 Jbd5+ 44.r.te6 .J:r.d4 45.g3 'ifr>g7 46.-tcβ a5 0-1

How can we explain Black's bluff in this game? From a common sense viewpoint, it makes little sense. But during a game, it is impossible to evaluate risk in mathematical fractions and always

make aπ irreproachable decisioπ. Ιπ the takiπg of decisioπs, a huge role is played by character, emotioπ, aπd mood at a giveπ momeπt. Ιπ those days, Lev was youπg, aπd was wiππiπg tourπameπt after tourπameπt, aπd his self-coπfideπce sometimes weπt over the top. It was as if Lady Luck herself was guidiπg his actioπs aπd decisioπs, aπd at that time, she πever let him dowπ.

The decisioπ takeπ by our πext hero has πο logic at all. Ενeπ this author, who is usually ready to explaiπ aπythiπg, simply admits defeat.

Game91

Baadur Jobava (271 Ο) Benjamin Bok (2560) Wijk aan Zee Β 2014 (10)

1 .e4 e5 2.t2Jf3 t2Jc6 3.�e2 t2Jf6 4.d3 d5 5.ll:bd2 �c5 6.c3 a5 7.a4 ο-ο 8.0-ο :es 9.h3 h6 1 0.'iνc2 b6 1 1 .Ae1 .ib7 1 2.t2Jf1 �d6 1 3.t2Jg3 &i::B7 14.t2Jh4 c5 15.�g4 c4 16.dxc4 t2Jxe4

:ι .t i

i Δ

As usual, }obava has played the opening very modestly, banking on the middlegame. The position is sharp. Can you think of anything other than the natural 1 7. t2Jxe4 ?

1 7.:Xe4!? Jobava speπt oπly 3 miπutes οπ this fraπkly uπusual move!

Chapter 7 - In the Grip of Passion

If aπy readers failed to fiπd aπythiπg other thaπ the solid 1 7.t2Jxe4, theπ do ποt beat yourselves up over it. Admittedly, after 1 7. .. dxe4 1 8 .t2Jf5 'iνc7 19.�e3 White has πothiπg special, but with such aπ approach to the opeπiπg, he caππot expect aπythiπg more.

1 7 ... dxe4 But what ποw? 18 .t2Jxe4 .ixe4 (the immediate 1 8 . . . .ic5 is also good) 19.'i:Vxe4 .icS oπly gives miπimal compeπsatioπ for the exchaπge. Jobava πeeded oπly a few secoπds to fiπd his reply.

1 8.bh6!! Ιπ this case, the exclamatioπ marks do ποt bear aπy relatioπ to the purely chess streπgth of the move.

This latest sacrifice is just bluff! But the level is beyoπd praise.

1 8 ... �c5? Bok believes him! Απd what else could a 1 9-year old player do, who has just made his GM title, aπd is faced with a member of the 2700 club, the brilliaπt Baadur Jobava? But iπ fact, the piece could aπd should have beeπ takeπ: 1 8 .. . gxh6! 19.l:td1 t2Jc8! (the more πatural 19 .. .'�Wc7?! is sigπificaπtly weaker, due to 20.'iνd2 e3 2I .'iνxe3 �c5 22.'iνxh6 'iνc6 23 .'i:Vg5+ t2Jg6 24.t2Jh5 aπd to avoid worse, Black must force a draw: 24 . . . .ie7 25.'i:Vh6 .if8 26.'i:Vg5 .ie7. However,

1 89


serious attention should be given to the intermediate 1 9 .. . e3 !? 20.fxe3 and only now 20 . . . 'ifc7) 20.lt:Jhf5 (nor does anything result from 20.�xc8 l:f.xc8 2 I .lt:Jhf5 l:te6 n.lt:Jxe4 �xe4 23 .'iVxe4 'it>f8-+) 20 .. . 'iff6 2I .lt:Jxe4 (2I .lt:Jhs 'iνg6) 2 l . .. �xe4 22.'ifxe4 l::tb8 and White's attack fizzles out.

1 9 . .J:I.d1 'Wc7 20. 1Wc1 ! e3 Here too, taking the piece with 20 . . . gxh6 2 I .'i!Yxh6 'iVc6! was perfectly possible, although it suffices only for a draw, which was already shown above: n.'i!YgS+ lt:Jg6 (22 . . . 'it>h8? 23 .lt:Jhs+-) B.lt:JhS �e7 24.'i!Yh6 �f8 2S .'ifgs �e7.

21 . ..be3 ..be3 22. 'it'xe3

We have approximate material equality ση the board. Is that also the assessment of the position?

22 ... 'Wxc4? Black prematurely decides to take the game into positional channels. This would have been justified only after the correct 22 .. . 1::tad8! 23.1:ίχd8 'ifxd8 24.lt:Jhs �c8! with approximate equality. After the careless capture on c4, it turns out that White's succeeding attacking gestures cannot be defended against.

23.llJh5! 'it'e4 He also loses after 23 . . . lt:Jg6 24.lt:Jxg7! lt:Jxh4 2S.lt:Jh5 l::te6 26.'iVgS+ l::tg6

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27.�d8+ l::txd8 28.'iVxd8+ 'it>h7 29.'ifxh4.

24.'Wg5 llJg6 25.<ifiιh2?! White had a chance to end the game effectively with 2S .lt:Jxg7! 'it>xg7 26.lΔfS+ 'it>g8 27.f3! 'iVc6 28.l::td6 'iVcS+ 29.'it>h2 with a decisive attack.

25 ... -tcθ? Black's last chance to prolong his resistance was 2S . . . f6! . Even so, after 26.'ifxg6 (also good is 26.�d7 fxgS 27.l::txg7+ 'it>f8 28 .lt:Jxg6+ 'ifxg6 29.�xg6) 26 ... 'ifxg6 27.lt:Jxg6 White's material advantage should decide the outcome.

26.f3 'Wc2 27 . .J:I.d6! bg4 28.hxg4 c;fί>h7 29.llJxg6 fxgβ

30.llJf6+ Equally good is 30.1:ld7.

30 ... gxf6 31 . .J:I.d7 + c;fί>gθ 32. 'Wxfβ 1-0

Once again, Ι underline my complete capitulation in the attempt to explain the Georgian's decision. Nothing can explain it except absolute confidence, not just in himself, but in the gods to deliver him the desired result. It is probably similar to the sort of belief that a roulette player has, when he stakes everything on the zero. Το the outside observer, the decision simply looks mad, but the result justifies everything. If the outcome is a huge jackpot, one can only throw up one's hands in amaze-

ment. If not, you shake your head sadly. Of course, chess is not roulette. Such complete bluff in chess requires not simply luck, but huge talent and imagination, which is not necessary at all in the casino. But even so, one cannot help feeling that these great chess qualities could be used more rationally.

After such a genius example of using bluff, the following one may seem like little more than a street magician's trick, by comparison with the David Copperfield show. Admittedly, in our case, the same player takes both roles.

Game 92

Baadur Jobaνa (2706) Daniil Duboν (2614) Minsk 2014 (7)

1 .b3 e5 2 . ..tb2 tlJc6 3.e3 g6 4.h4 hS s.tt:\f3 ..tg7 6.c4 d6 7.d3 tt:\ge7 8.tt:\bd2 as 9.a3 ο-ο 1 0. 'ifc2 Ι:ιbθ 1 1 . ..te2 ..tg4 1 2.tt:\e4 'iVd7 1 3.0-0-0 b5 1 4.cxb5 :Xb5 1 5.d4 l:ιb6 1 6.tlJc5 'δ'fS 1 7 . ..td3 'iVcθ 1 8.tt:\a4 l:ιbθ 1 9.d5 tt:\a7 20 . ..tc4 c6 21 .dxc6 'ifxc6 22.e4 tt:\bS 23. cli>b1 l:ιfcθ 24.cli>a2 ..te6 25.Ι:ιc1 ..th6 26.tt:\g5 ..txc4 27.'ii'xc4 'iVeθ 28.'iVd3 f6

Α rαre σpening αnd α nσn-stαndαrd bαttle in the middlegαme hαs led tσ απ interesting pσsitiσn with σppσsite cαstling. The chαnces αre rσughly

Chαpter 7 - In the Grip σf Pαssiσn

equαl. It is wσrth remembering αlsσ thαt this gαme wαs plαyed ση the tσp bσαrd σf the tσurnαment, αnd the σutcome wαs extremely impσrtαnt in the σverαll context σf the tσurnαment leαdership. Ησw wσuld yσu plαy?

29.f4?! Undoubtedly, Jobava's move deserves a pure question mark, but his insane courage should also be marked! The natural continuation 29.1::f.xc8 'ii'xc8 30.'ifc4+ (30.1::!:cl ! ?) 30 ... 'iνxc4 3 1 .bxc4 fxgS 32.cxb5 1::f.xb5 33.�cl leads to an equal endgame, but such decisions are not for real fighters!

29 ... fxg5 30.hxg5 ..tfθ?! After 30 .. . �g7 Black probably feared 31 .[5 gxfS 32.exf5 , but 32 . . . e4! 33.'iixe4 �xb2 3Hti'xb2 I:i'.xcl 35.1:1xcl 'iνf7! 36.[6 t:Δd4! tips the scales in his favour.

31 .fxe5 dxes 32 . ..txes :Xc1 33.:Xc1 Ι:ιcθ?

This is a serious inaccuracy, after which the battle becomes sharper. He should have played 33 . . . 1:ιd8! and the extra piece should decide the outcome of the game. For example, 34.'iνc4+ <;t>h7 3S .'i!Ve6 (or 3S . .Ufl .f:rd2+ 36.<;t>al tbdS! 37.�b2 t:Δxa3) 3S ... t:Δg8! .

34.tlJc5! tlJc6 35.tt:\d7!

Δ Δ φ Δ

Jσbαvα hαs gσt whαt he wαnts - nσw α greαt deαl depends ση every mσve. Whαt shσuld Blαck plαy?

1 9 1


35 ... ttJxe5? The young Dubov clearly cannot withstand the tension. He has already lost his advantage, but here after 3S . . . �g7! 36.�xg7 Wxg7 37.tbf6 'ifeS 38.�xc6 tbc3+! 39 . .!:r.xc3 'iνxc3 40.'ifd7+ the game would have ended in perpetual check.

36.1i'd5+ 1i'f7? The final mistake in time trouble. However, even after the only move 36 .. . Wg7! 37.tbf6! iνf7 38 . .ί:ιχc8 'ifxdS 39.exd5 Black faces a difficult defence in the endgame. But it was essential to play this way.

37.'ifxf7+ Black resigned.

Continuing the analogy, Copperfield's viewers can only admire the fact that the street magician's illusions are usually based solely on their outward simplicity. Admittedly, those people who are paying to see them could not repeat these illusions themselves, but they have plenty to say about the tricks. In my capacity of a simple observer, Ι can say this about Jobava's decision to risk everything to win the tournament. For maximalists like him, first place is the only place that exists in the tournament table and for this, they will make any effort. But you and Ι know that first place is not the only place that matters - especially in Swiss events, there are many high places and prizes. Anyway, Ι am only trying to explain the trick employed by Jobava, not to repeat it.

The same is true of the following example, which Ι will undertake to explain fully, but would myself never try to copy.

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Game 93

Borki Predojevic (2643) Shakhriyar Mamedyarov (27 46) Rogaska Slatina tt 2011 (3)

1 .e4 e5 2.tlJf3 ttJc6 3 . ..ic4 ..tcs 4.c3 tlJf6 5.b4 ..ib6 6.d3 d6 7.a4 a5 8.b5 ta!7 9.0-0 0-0 1 0.tlJbd2 tbg6 1 1 . b2 ..tg4 1 2.h3 ..th5

Already the opening has developed unusually. In this position, we have motifs which are not very characteristic of the Italian Game. In particular, why shouldn't White win α piece with 13.g4 ?

1 3.g3

Limiting the knight on g6. The immediate 13 .g4? tbxg4 14.hxg4 �xg4 is premature, and leaves Black a very strong attack.

13 ... <ith8 1 4.tlJc4 1i'd7 15.<itg2 d5!? Initiating vast complications. The quiet I S .. . �a7 was also possible.

1 6.exd5 Best. 16.tL1cxeS tΔxeS 1 7.tΔxeS �e6 suits Black very well.

1 6 ... .1:r.fe8!? 16 . . . e4!?.

1 7.d6!? White accepts the challenge. The more cautious 1 7.tΔxb6 cxb6 1 8 .c4 leads after 1 8 . . . e4 19.dxe4 1:ίχe4 to a position where Black has definite compensation for the pawn.

1 7 ... .tc5 1 B.dxc7 'ifxc7 1 9.g4

The piece cJearJy cannot be saved, but there are various ways to sacrifice it. Which would you prefer?

1 9 ... e4!? Α surprising decision. Tempting is the thematic 1 9 . . . tΔxg4!? 20.hxg4 �xg4 with a dangerous initiative for the pawn. Here is one possible, but by no means obligatory variation: 21 .�g5!? e4 (21 . . . f6? 22.Iih1) 22.dxe4 tL1f4+ (22 . . . l:ιxe4) 23.�xf4 �xf4 24.�d3 (24/bceS �xeS 2S .t2Jxe5 �xd1 26.t2Jxf7+ 'it>g8 27.t2JgS+ leads to a draw) 24 ... �ad8 2S .t2Jd4 �xd4 26.cxd4 .ί:ie6 and White faces a difficult defence.

20.tbh2!? As well as this, White has half a dozen other perfectly acceptable continuations. But exhaustive analysis of every line is not part of our task.

Chapter 7 - In the Grip of Passion

20 ... exd3 21 .gxh5 tbh4+ 22. '""h1 'ifd7 23 . .te3

23 ... .1:r.ac8 Black continues to increase the pressure. The following forcing line also looks good: 23 ... �xh3 ! 24.tlg1 I:!.xe3! (the natural 24 . . . �xe3 2S .t2Jd6! .!::!.e7 26.fxe3 is significantly weaker) 2S .fxe3 �fS! (2S ... tL1e4? 26.�fl !) 26.tL1d2! tΔe4 27.tlg2! tΔxg2 28 .�f3! �xf3 29.t2Jhxf3 t2Jxd2 30.'it>xg2. With a series of only moves, White has managed to avoid any great unpleasantness and retain good drawing chances.

24.h6! Now it transpires that Black is not the only one attacking!

24 ... gxh6 25 . .1:r.g1 be3 26.tbxe3 b6 27.tbeg4 tbe4 28.f3! tbxc3 29. 'ifd2 .l:r.e2 30. 'iff4 'iffS

31 .'ifxf5?

19 3


In serious time trouble, White misses the strongest continuation. Admittedly, only SF is capable of calculating all of its consequences, and then only when it is on very good form! 3 I .'ifd4+! f6 3 2. jιc4! (a problem move, which is extremely hard to see in time-trouble) 32 .. .<�:Jxf3 33 .'ifxc3 'iff4 34 . .t:f.g3 ! ! (an unexpected and at the same time highly effective defence against mate) 34 . . . 1:ιχc4 3S.'ifa3! (again combining defence and attack) 35 . . . 1:ιχh2+ 36.lLJxh2 'ifxg3 37.'iff8+ 'ifg8 38.'ifxf6+ 'ifg7 39.'ti'd8+ 'iνg8 40.'ifxg8+ ι;txg8 4I .lLJxf3 and White should win. These inhumanly complicated variations show the amount of work that faced the players over the board. One can only imagine the feverish state they must have been in.

31 ... tbxf5 32 . ..bΠ d2 33 . .tb3

Here Predojevic suddenly offered a draw and a third party became involved in this dramatic encounter - the author of this book. As captain of the SOCAR team, Ι was following the game with enormous interest, since it was likely to decide the result of the match. Shakhriyar turned to me to ask what he should do (the rules allow players to consult their captains after 30 moves). What would you have done in my position? My player had a couple of minutes on his clock and Ι began frantically

1 94

studying the posltlon. We needed to win this game to win the match, but at first, the Bosnian's offer seemed to me to be a present, since Black is after all a piece down in the endgame! But then Ι saw a move which not only saves the game, but changes the assessment of the position at the very roots. In addition, Ι quickly convinced myself that this move was absolutely the only move and that Mamedyarov would probably see it. So, when Shakhriyar again turned to me for an answer, Ι indicated that he should play on. And immediately Ι regretted it!

33 ... l2Je4?? Shak, influenced by the course of the game, assessed his position as bad and would have accepted the draw, had it been his decision. But as a disciplined team player, he left the decision to his captain, and suffered as a result! 33 ... hS! 34.lLJf6 lLJd4! gives Black a clear advantage - a variation which seemed totally natural to me, but which escaped Shakhriyar's notice entirely.

34.fxe4 tίJQ3+ 35.:Xg3 J:e1 + 36.�g2 :Xa1 37.tbxh6

White's huge material advantage leaves no doubt as to the outcome of the game. The result of my decision, which seemed to me an entirely reasonable risk, was a serious mistake and cost us a defeat in the game and the match.

37 ... .J:[f8 38.lLJf7+ :Xf7 39 . .hf7 .J:[g1 + 40.�xg1 dHi'+ 41 .lLJf1 'Wd4+ 42.lLJe3 h5 43 . .td5 'ifxa4 44.lLJf5 1Wa1+ 45.Φf2 'ifb2+ 46.�

And Black resigned.

Α wonderful battle, although slightly spoiled by the outside factors which entered near the end.

Chαpter 7 - In the Grip of Pαssion

Of course, to agree a draw in the most critical position would not have been the most logical outcome, and indeed, had the draw been agreed, then the game would probably not have made it into this book. But even with these potential drawbacks, Ι wish Ι could turn the clock back and leave the decision to Shakhriyar.

Conclusion It is my deeply-held belief that extreme gambling is not a recipe for success, either in life or in chess. This is because such gamblers are driven by the process itself, whereas for a true professional, the result is the key thing. However, this does not mean that the ideal player is a completely cold killer, lacking all emotion and feeling. This is especially not the case in chess, where preparation and home analysis plays such a large role. In the absence of real interest and emotion, sucl1 work turns into a routine slog, which becomes ineffective. But it is certainly desirable during a game to retain a clear and calm head.

The attentive reader may argue that the autl1or is contradicting himself - after all, the majority of examples presented in this chapter demonstrate the opposite, and in the only example where the gambling ended badly, it was partly due to the author's own interference!

However, firstly, even the finest rule has its beautiful exceptions, which remain in the mind more readily than tl1e rule itself. In addition, the rules and principles of chess have been covered in thousands of books , whereas the exceptions only occupy one chapter of this book. And secondly, healthy sporting gambles sometimes (but far from always) lead one to the only correct decision in aπ otherwise hopeless situation. So, follow the rules, but do not ignore the exceptions. In any event, this should be your personal decision, and not a recommendation from outside.

195


Chapter 8

When a Win is the Only Acceptable Result

The ability to play decisive games is an essential quality for a chess master. Games on whose result hangs the match, tournament or even the whole of one's life, are quintessentially what chess is about, as a sporting event. In my books Ι always devote serious space to this topic.

But the ability to play key games is by no means the same as loving exceptions. Anatoly Karpov has won many decisive games in the course of his brilliant career, but in doing so, his best friend was not a love of risk and gambling, but cold-bloodedness and patience.

In general, the biggest factor in being successful in such situations is the ability to remain true to yourself, especially when a great deal is at stake. In the games given below, the dominating factors are decisiveness , nerve and risk. It is not coincidence that we start with two games by Mikhail Tal. As we know, a striving to attack was the keynote ofhis career, but in situations where he needed to win, he became even more fearless and irresistible.

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Chapter 8 - When α Win is the Only Acceptable Result

Game94


It seems entirely appropriate to give the word about this game to Tal himself: 'Before the 1Oth and final game, Ι had the advantage of the white pieces and was in a good mood. Ι also believed in my ability to play decisive games.'

1 .e4 c5 2.tl:J13 tl:Jc6 3.d4 cxd4 4.tl:Jxd4 e6 5.tl:Jc3 d6 6 . ..te3 ttJ16 7.14 ..te7 θ. 'if13 0-0 9.0-0-0 'ifc7 10.tl:Jdb5 'ifbθ 1 1 .g4 a6 1 2.tl:Jd4 tl:Jxd4 13 . ..bd4 b5 1 4.g5 tl:Jd7 1 5 . ..td3 b4

Ι hate to ask the discerning reader this question, but here goes: where is the knight going to move to?

1 6.tl:Jd5! Only those with no acquaintance with Tal could have any doubts. Besides, the variation 16.tbe2 eS 1 7.�e3 exf4 1 8.tbxf4 tbes promises White little. But risk and danger were the ex-World Champion's calling card, and this was the ideal atmosphere for a decisive game.

1 6 ... exd5 1 7.exd5 This game attracted enormous interest from chess lovers the world over and it has been the subject of detailed analy-

sis from generations of explorers. But even with the help of SF, the answers to many of the questions remain completely unclear.

One can only sympathise with Larsen, who had to resolve such questions and take crucial decisions at the board. White threatens to win immediately with the standard two bishops sacrifice. So Black must decide between two continuations ( 17 . . . f5 and 1 7 . . . g6), but even the machine, let alone a human, can calculate all the consequences of the two moves. One must rely ση intuition, which in this case let down the Dane. But what does your intuition tell you?

1 1 ... 15 The final conclusions of numerous analysts, including Kasparov and SF, is that 1 7. .. g6! is stronger, and places White's brave idea in doubt. The main variation looks like this: 1 8 . .!::r.de1 ! (the most threatening) 1 8 . . . �d8 1 9.'iVh3 tbes 20.'iVh6 �b6! 2 l .fe5! �d4 22.�e4! �f2! 23.e6 fe6 24.de6, and here both 24 . . . �b7 and 24 ... d5 lead to a large advantage to Black. However, after 1 7 .. . g6 the move 18 .�he1 also deserves serious attention. The drawback of this move is obvious: the rook leaves the h-file. In the game, it was the march of the h-pawn, supported by the rook, which decided the

1 97


issue. Οη the σther haηd, the bishσp d3 remaiηs defeηded, which is alsσ sigηificaηt iη several variatiσηs. Here is σηe: 1 8 .. . �d8 19.'t!Hh3 lLJeS 20.'t!Hh6 �b6 2 1 .fS ! . Νσw Black faces a ηew chσice: what to take with ση fS. Takiηg with the piece is perfectly pσssible: 2 1 . .. �xfS !? 22.�xfS (weaker is 22.�xe5 dxeS 23.�xfS gxfS 24 . .!::!.d3 .l::!.a7! 2S . .l::th3 f6 26.gxf6 f4 27 . .!::!.hS Φh8! 28 . .!::!.hxeS .!::!.af7 aηd Black wiηs) 22 .. . gxfS 23.Ι:ιχe5! dxeS (wσrse is 23 .. . �xd4? 24 . .!::!.xd4 �a7 2S . .!::!.h4 f6 26 . .!::!.el .!::!.ae8 27 . .!::!.dl !±) 24.�xb6.

analysis diagram

The resultiηg cσmplicated pσsitiση is hard tσ assess defiηitively, but it is σbviσus that White has gσσd cσmpeηsatiση fσr the exchaηge.

Νσ less iηterestiηg is 2 1 . .. gxfS 22.�xb6 l2Jg4 23 . .!::!.gl ! (23.�d4! t2Jxh6 24.gxh6 leads tσ the same pσsitiση) 23 ... t2Jxh6 24.gxh6+ Φh8 2S.�d4+ f6 26.1::f.del ! . We have reached a cσmpletely uηique pσsitiση, iη which White has σηly a piece fσr the queeη, but it is Black whσ has to seek a way tσ save the game. Eveη sσ, he is able tσ dσ sσ: 26 . . . �b7! (the σηly mσve!) 27 . .!::!.g7 �xdS 28 . .!::!.ee7 �g8 29.�xfS (the same result cσmes frσm 29 . .!::!.xg8+ Φχg8 30 . .I:!.g7+ Φh8 3 1 .�xfS) 29 .. . ds

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analysis diagram

aηd White has to fσrce perpetual check. Οηe caη σηly sum up by sayiηg that after the strσηgest reply (1 7 .. . g6) the game is σηly begiηηiηg.

18.1:.de1 !? Equally gσσd i s 1 8 . .!::!.hel !? �d8 (with this arraηgemeηt σf white rσσks, 1 8 .. . .!::!.f7! ? makes mσre seηse thaη iη the game, e.g. 1 9.�xfS (after 1 9.h4 lΔf8 20.h5 the rσσk ση dl wσuld lσσk better ση hl) 1 9 .. . t2Jf8 20.�e6! lΔxe6 2 1 .dxe6 J::tfs 22.�f6! ! �xf6 23 .'ife4 g6 24.gxf6 l:f.xf6 2S .'ifd4 .!::!.f8 (2S ... .!::!.xe6? 26.�d5; 2S ... Φg7? 26.fS) 26.e7 .!::!.e8 27.'i:VdS+ Φg7 28 .'i!Vd4+ Φh6 29.fS �xfS 30.�h4+ Φg7 3 1 .'i!Vd4+; SF's irση haηd briηgs everythiηg to a draw) 19.'i!Vh3 'fkc7 20.�xfS J::f.xfS 2 l .'iνxfS lΔf8 22.'ffe4 't!Hf7 23.h4 with mutual chaηces. Ιη geηeral, it is hard to assess the rσσk ηuaηces eveη after patieηt

Chapter 8 -When α Win is the Only Acceptab1e Result

analysis with the computer, so what can one say about the chances of the players, over the board?

1 8 ... :tf7? Larsen makes the wrong choice. In this situation, he had to play 18 ... i.d8! after which White has many possibilities. The best, probably, is Tal's suggestion 19.'iνh5! (not 19.hg7 Φχg7 20.'ifh5 1:1g8! 2I .hf5 W8 and Black defends) 19 ... tbc5 20.hg7! tι:Jxd3+ 2l .Φbl ! 'iνc7! (2I . .. tι:Jxel? 22.g6 loses at once) 22 . .txf8 tι:Jxel 23 . .!hel 'iνf7 24.'ifxf7+ Φχf7 25.hd6 with a roughly equal ending.

1 9.h4! Exactly! Now it turns out that the white pieces are ideally placed. Significantly weaker was 19.i.xf5? tbf8! and the black pieces come to life miraculously.

1 9 ... .tb7

Black's task has become much more complicated. For example, activating the knight Joses: I9 .. . tbc5? 20.h5 tbxd3+ 2 I .'ifxd3 �f8 22.g6 lιc7 23 .gxh7+ Φχh7 24.'ifg3!. But now how shou]d White develop his attack?

20 . .bf5!? Tal's comment here is interesting: Ά result of the sporting situation. if this had not been the final game, Ι would have played the sharper 20.g6 hxg6 21 .h5 g5 22.i.xf5 ! with extremely dangerous threats.

analysis diagram

However, Ι could not find a forced win at the board after 22 ... i.f6 23.i.e6 'iff8 (not 23 . .. �xd4 24.fxg5 'iff8 25.g6) and therefore decided not to get into time-trouble by calculating a lot oflengthy and complicated variations'. As it turns out, this was a wise decision. Certainly, it would be impossible to calculate precisely all of the variations in such a complicated position, although the line given by Tal turns out to be clearly better for White: 24.i.xf6 g4 25.'iνxg4 tι:Jxf6 26.'iνg5 Φh8 27.i.xf7 'iνxf7 28.h6 g6 29.f5 .

analysis diagram

On the other hand, in the line 23 .. . �xd4 24.fxg5 Black has the strong reply 24 .. . 'iνe8! and after the forced 25 .'iνg4 Φcs 26.i.f7 'iff7 27.'i!Vd4 'ifds we reach a completely unclear position. It only remains to mention SF's recommendation: 20.h5! 'iff8 2 l .g6

1 99


1:1f6 22 .gxh7+ �xh7 (22 . . . �h8 23 .h6) 23.�xf6 'ifxf6 24.'ifh3 1::f.f8 25.1::i.e6±.

20 ... :Xf5 After 20 .. .ι�:Jf8 !? White decides with 2 l .�xh7+! �xh7 22.h5! �xgS 23 .'ife4+ �g8 24.fxg5 with a winning attack.

21 .:Xe7 tbe5! 22.1We4 1Wf8 The only move. 22 . . . 1::f.f7? 23.J::{xf7 tt:Jxf7 24.g6 is bad.

23.fxe5 .J:.f4 There were more chances of a successful defence after 23 .. . 'ifxe7 24.'ifxf5 .ixdS 2s .. !:rfl dxeS 26.�xe5 1::te8.

24.1We3 .J:.f3 Black could have won a piece by 24 .. . �xd5 25.exd6 1::f.xd4 26.'fWxd4 �xhl 27.'ifxb4 �d8 28.b3 but this position would be extremely hard to save.

25.1We2 1Wxe7 26.1Wxf3 dxe5 27 . .J:.e1 .J:.dθ

27 . . . 1:tf8 28 .'irb3 'iff7 29.�xe5 'tWxdS 30.�d6 'ifxb3 3 l .axb3 is absolutely hopeless for Black.

28.:Xe5 1Wd6? After this move, it is impossible to save the black position. More tenacious is 28 . . . 'iff7! 29.'ifxf7+ �xf7 30.�c5 1::f.e8 3 1 .1::f.xe8 �xe8 32.�xb4 �xdS although the resulting opposite-coloured bishop endgame offers only certain practical chances of making a draw.

29.1Wf4 .J:.fθ 30.1We4 b3 31 .axb3 .J:.f1 + 32. �d2 1Wb4+ 33.c3 1Wd6 34.�c5!

The most elegant and the quickest way to win.

34 ... 1Wxc5 35 . .J:.e8+ .J:.fθ 36.1We6+ Φhθ 37.1i'f7! 1 -0

One of Tal 's most famous games. Of course, half a century later, we look at this game through different eyes. Nowadays, every club player knows about

200

the knight sacrifice on dS, and plays it without any fear or doubt. But in those days, only a few conquistadors like Velimirovic used such aπ idea. Solid players, especially in a decisive game, would not usually permit themselves to stop to such cheap tricks. It was the eighth World Champion who expanded the horizons of chess and made such sacrifices into a standard device.

The following game between the same two players had a quite different character. Both players had already lost their Candidates' semifinal matches. The battle for third place, which gave the right of entry to the next Interzonal tournament, only had significance for Tal, since the qualification stages had much less significance for a Western player than a Soviet one. Unlike his opponent, Larsen could play in a completely relaxed manner. Possibly for this reason, or maybe some other, the situation before the fifth game was very bad for Tal - he was trailing 1 -3 . Consequently, one can understand his fears and worries at the critical stage.

Game95

Bent Larsen Mikhaii Tal Eersel m 1969 (5)

ο

Chαpter 8 - When α Win is the Only Acceptαble Result

20.tlJxa8 After 20.tbe6!? 'i!Vb6+ 2 I .Ilf2 we reach a complicated position and, of course, the Dane would have played this way had the match situation been different. But when every half-point brings one closer to overall victory, it makes sense to avoid any risk.

20 ... tlJxe4! This tempting blow is only sufficient for a draw.

21 .fxe4 11Vg5+ 22.'itf2

Is Blαck obliged to force the drαw?

22 .. . 11Vg2+??! From a purely chess viewpoint, a terrible mistake. Of course, he should have played 22 .. . 'iνh4+ 23.Φgl 'iVgS+.

analysis diagram

.t Δ

Tal undoubtedly understood this, and it was also obvious to Larsen. At this point, Tal thought for a long time.

What could he have been thinking about in this position? About the fact that the match situation was critical and a win essential? Yes, it probably was. But defeat in this game would practically deprive him of any remaining chance. So, it seems the only thing to do was to end the game with perpetual check and prepare for the next. However, Tal would not have been Tal if he had missed a chance to stake everything ση one card. But so as to give his bluff more chance of working, he thought himself into hopeless time-trouble. Larsen, convinced that such a double risk was impossible, suddenly had to mobilise all his reserves for the fight. This is extremely difficult, and in the latter lay the one miserly chance of success for Tal's bluff.

23.�e1 li::Jh4 24.�e3? The bluff works! Larsen panics, although there was no need at all. After all, if one looks calmly at the position, it is clear that Black has no real threats. The simplest win was 24.lbf2! but in fact almost any sensible move wins, because for all the threatening appearance of the black forces, he simply lacks the reserves to develop his initiative. It is even possible to play the ineffective 24.a3 f3 25.�e3.

24 ... 11Vxe4! Probably Larsen had missed this move. Black increases the pressure, ignoring his huge material deficit. However, if you think about it, Black had no alternative here: 24 . . . fxe3 25.l::txf7 Φχf7 26.�h5+ is completely bad.

25 . ..tf2 f3 26.bh4 'ifxh4+ 27.li::Jf2 fxe2 28. 'ifxe2 e4!

Playing for the maximum!

20 1


It was also possible to minιm1se his material deficit: 28 ... .ixfl

Δ Δ :S:

analysis diagram

29.ι.t>xfl (29.'ifxfl 'iVb4+ is dangerous) 29 . . . 'ifxh2. Since the knight on a7 is not taking part in the fight, Black's chances are not worse.

29 . .:[g1 e3 30.'Wxe3 .:[e7 31 . .:Xg7+ Necessary.

31 ... <ifi>xg7 32 . .:c7 ..td7 33 . .:Xd7 .:Xd7

After the latest miraculous transformation, the forces are practically balanced. True, the knight on a8 is currently out of play, and so White's desire to bring it back into the game is fully understandable.

Whαt do you think of the move 34.'ti'xa7 ?

34 .... xa7? However, this decision proves to be a mistake.

202

Α) 34.'ti'g3+ 'fi'xg3 35.hxg3 .!:ί.e7+ 36.ι.t>d2 ι.t>f6 looks dangerous for White, because the fate of the knight on a8 is now subject to serious question; Β) Stronger is 34.'iνc3+ ι.t>g8

(if 34 ... 'iνf6 then 35 .ti:Je4 'i:Vxc3+ 36 .ti:Jxc3 ι.t>f6 37.ti:Jb5 a6 38 .ti:Jc3 and the white knights are starting to cooperate, which promises equal chances) 35 .'ti'g3+ 'ifxg3 36.hxg3 ne7+ 37.ι.t>d2 wins a tempo compared with the previous variation. White should probably save the game, although it is not easy to decide on such a line in a practical game;

C) But if we retain the queens, then we have to play more carefully: 34.ι.t>d2 1::re7 35.'iνc3+ ι.t>f7 36.'iif3+ ι.t>e8 37.ti:Jd3 'fi'xh2+ 38.ι.t>c3.

34 ... .:e7+ 35.<ifi>d1 ? Larsen slips. Significantly more stubborn was 35.ι.t>fl , although even in this case, White is in a bad way: 35 . . . 'ti'c4+ 36.ι.t>g2 (36.ι.t>gl l:tel+) 36 .. . 'ti'xd5+ 37.ι.t>fl 'ifeS! .

35 ...... c4! Now it all ends quickly.

36. 'Wb6 'Wf1 + 37. <ifi>d2 38.<ifi>c3 'Wc1 + 39.<ifi>d4 40. <ifi>c4 .:c2+

.:[e2+ 'We3+

0-1

Alas, even such a successfully-employed bluff could not change the overall course of events. The optimistic Dane did not bat an eyelid and won the match with games to spare, by a score of Slf2-21f2.

In the following game Teimour Radjabov had to win, because he had lost the first game of this mini-match. However, unlike Tal, he did not take risks from the very first moves, but preferred aπ outwardly harmless development. The appearance proved deceptive.

Chαpter 8 - When α Win is the On!y Acceptαble Result

Game96

Teimour Radjaboν (2744) Vasily lνanchuk (2768) Khanty-Mansiysk 201 1 (5.2)

1 .tt:Jf3 c5 2.g3 g6 3.c4 Ji..g7 4 . ..ig2 tt:Jc6 5.tt:Jc3 e6 6.d3 tt:Jge7 7.h4 h6 8 . ..id2 b6

9.h5!? The usual continuations here are such things as 9.0-0 or 9.a3. Another possibility is 9.ii'cl , preventing castling. In the resulting unhurried positional battle, the chances are roughly equal. Radjabov gives the game a completely unexpected twist.

9 ... g5

Whαt do you think is the point of White's Jαst move?

1 0.tt:Jxg5! Crossing the Rubicon! Any other decision would be totally inconsistent.

1 o . . . hxg5 1 1 . Jixg5 Let us try to see why White sacrificed the piece. It is understood that he needed to win the game, and so any risk is justified. But there are also purely chess arguments: the powerful passed h-pawn, Black's slight lack of development and the discoordination between the black pieces. The question is whether these are sufficient.

1 1 ... Jixc3+ ?! The sharp change in the position has clearly unsettled lvanchuk. The bishop on g7 plays an important role and its immediate exchange for the white knight enhances White's attacking potential. The natural l l . .. �b7 1 2.h6 �e5 1 3 .f4 (13.�d2 f6) 13 ... �xc3+ (now this exchange is justified) 14.bxc3 1::ίh7 was stronger, since in this case, it is much harder for White to include his queen in the attack.

1 2.bxc3 Ji..b7 13.'ii'd2 1Wc7 The threat was 14.�f4, and in the event of 1 3 . . . f5 14.�f6 1:f.h7 with the idea of 1 5 . . . 'ίt>f7, White has the excellent riposte 1 5 .g4! �c7 16 .g5 and the white g- and h-pawns are highly unpleasant.

1 4 . ..if6 0-0-0 Completely unexpectedly, the situation has become quite threatening. Black cannot play 14 . . . 1::th7 1 5 .�e4 lί:Jg8 16 .'iνg5! .

1 5.0-0-0!? White quietly continues his development, as it is hard for Black to organise his defences. However, it was perfectly possible also to play the more resolute 15 .h6 1:f.h7 16.�e4 tί:Jg6 1 7.�xd8 tί:Jxd8 18 .�xb7+ �xb7 1 9.f3 with the better chances.

1 5 ... J:ιhg8 1 5 .. . 1:f.he8 (defending the knight on e7) 16.h6 lί:Je5 1 7.�xb7+ 'ίt>xb7 18 .h7

203


tb5g6 19.'iνg5! also fails to relieve Black of all his problems.

White also needs to show definite accuracy. Try to guess Radjαbov's far from trivial decision.

1 6 . ..bc6! Unlike the similar operation by Black at move 1 1 , here this is a timely and very strong decision. The natural 16.h6 was weaker: 16 . . . I:f.g6! 1 7.h7 .i:ixf6 1 8.h8'iν 1::!.xh8 19.1::i.xh8+ tbd8 20 . .Άχb7+ �xb7 2 I .'iνg5 �xf2 22 .'iνxe7 tbc6. Although White now has a material advantage, after the inevitable loss of the pawn on e2 , his advantage is gone.

1 6 ... dxc6? Now the game cannot be saved. It was absolutely necessary to play 1 6 . . . .Άχc6! 1 7 . .Άχe7 !Ide8 1 8 . .Άg5! (stronger than 18 . .Άf6 .Άxhl 19.l:rxhl eS) 18 . . . .Άxhl 1 9.1:1xhl 'iνc6, when White's chances are superior, but the battle is not over yet.

1 7.h6 .J:.g6 1 8.h7 .J:.xf6 19.hθ'it' .J:.xhθ 20 . .J:.xhθ+ �d7 21 .d4!

Possibly lvanchuk had missed this resource when playing his 1 6th move. The d-file is opened and Black cannot avoid great material losses.

21 ... 'ifd6 22. 'ifgS! .J:.f5 23. 'ifh4 cxd4 24 . .J:.xd4 .J:.d5 25.cxd5 'ifa3+ 26.�b1 cxd5 27 . .J:.h7 'it'xc3 28 . .J:.xf7 1 -0

204

The seemingly quiet and unpretentious opening made the piece sacrifice even more effective psychologically. In addition, Vasily Ivanchuk often experiences problems playing decisive games. However, in this case, he survived the shock and won the tie-break. The following game was one of the most dramatic of the 2013 Candidates' tournament. But its sporting significance was an important part of the sub-text.

Game 97

Levon Aronian (2809) Vladimir Kramnik (281 0) London ct 2013 (12)

This game from the Candidates' tournament was played two rounds before the end, so its sporting significance cannot be overestimated. Both grandmasters were battling for the lead, with the Russian half a point ahead of his opponent. Thus, Aronian absolutely had to win. This circumstance had a serious effect on the white player's decisions in the course of the game.

1 .d4 tiJf6 2.c4 e6 3.tiJf3 d5 4.tbc3 c5 5.cxd5 tiJxdS 6.e3 tbc6 7 . .i.d3 Ji.e7 8.a3 0-0 9. 'it'c2 cxd4 1 O.exd4 f5 1 1 .0-0 Ji.f6 1 2. tbxd5 'ifxd5 1 3. Ji.e3 b5 1 4. 'it'e2 Ji.b7

Black's next move will be 15 . . . f4. How would you meet this unpleasant threat?

Chapter 8 - When α Win is the Only Acceptable Result

1 5.:ac1 Objectively stronger was 15 .�xb5 f4 16.�c4 "iνe4 1 7.�d3 "iνd5 18 .�c4, forcing a draw, but as we have already said, Aronian needs to win this game at all costs.

1 5 ... a6 1 6 . .1:.fd1 f4 1 7 . .1:.c5 1i'd6

The time has come for αη important decision. What would you do?

1 8.1i'c2! White goes in for a risky piece sacrifice. But in the sporting circumstances that he faced, he had no other option. After other continuations, such as 1 8.�d2 tt:Jxd4 19.tbxd4 "ifxc5 20."iνxe6+ Ι:ιf7 (20 . . . �h8? 2I .'ifh3) 2l .�xh7+ �xh7 22 .'ifxf7 "ifxd4 23 .'ifxb7 .tld8 24."iνf3 'iVdS! or 18 .�xf4 'ifxf4 19.'ifxe6+ �h8 20.Ii.xc6 �xc6 2 I .'iνxc6 �xd4, he would have faced a difficult battle for a draw.

1 8 ... fxe3 1 9.bh7+ �hθ 20.fxe3 lbe7?!

The enormous importance of the result has its effect ση Kramnik's play too. Safety first! Significantly stronger was the zwischenzug 20 . . . 1:i.ac8! after which the balance tips in favour of Black: 2 I .'iνd3 (also insufficient is 2 I .ifbl tbe7 22 . .!::Ih5 �xf3 23 .gxf3 t2Jg8! whilst 2I .l:Ih5 fails to 2 I . .. tbxd4!) 2 I . .. tbe7 (it is worth considering 2 1 . . .

g6!? or 2I. .. tbxd4!?) 22.I:i.h5 �xf3 23 .gxf3 t2Jg8.

Can White exploit his opponent's error?

21 .e4? This looks quite attractive, but is actually a mistake. He should have played 2 I .l:Ih5! after which the advantage unexpectedly switches to White: 2 I . .. l:Iac8 (2I . .. .ixf3 22 .gxf3 g6 (also inadequate is 22 .. . .!::r.ac8 23 .'ifg2 g5 24.h4) 23.�xg6+ �g8 24.�hl! with a strong attack and material equality) 22.'ife2 �xf3 23 .'ifxf3 �g5. In this case too, White has the initiative: 24.�bl+ �g8 25 .'iVh3 �f6 (25 . . . .ih6 26.g4!) 26.l:Ih8+ �f7 27.'ifh5+ g6 28 .'ifh7+ �e8 29.1:!.xf8+ �xf8 30.1:lfl tbfs 3 I ."iνxg6.

21 . . . :ace? 2 I . .. 'iνf4! 22.l:Ih5 lbg8! refutes White's 2 1 st move.

22.e5! Fortunately, he has a move which saves him from serious unpleasantness.

22 ... be5 23.llJxe5 .l:.xc5 24.llJQ6+! llJxgβ 25.dxc5 �e4! 26 . .l:.xdβ bc2 27.bg6 bgβ 28 . .1:.xe6

As a result of a forcing operation, we have reached aπ interesting endgame. Of course, White must forget about winning, but he retains chances of a draw. The further course of the game is

205

Risk & B]uff in Chess

very dramatic, but is no longer relevant to our theme.

28 .. . �d3 29.h4 a5 30.c6?! .J:[f1 + 30 . . . l;lc8 ! .

31 .ιJi>h2 .:tc1 32 . .:.e3 �b1 33 . .J:[c3 .:Xc3 34.bxc3 ιJi>g8 35.c7 ..tf5 36. ιJi>g3 ιJi>f7 37. ιJi>f4 ..tc8 38. 'it>g5 ..td7 39.h5 �e6 40.g3 a4 41 .g4 ιJi>f8 42.ιJi>f4 ιJi>e7 43.g5 'it>d7 44.ιJi>e5 �g8 45.c8'if+

4Ht>d4 Φχc7 46.Φcs .tc4 47.h6 gxh6 48.gxh6 .id3=.

45 ... ιJi>xc8 46.ιJi>d6 ιJi>d8 47.'it>c6 ιJi>e7 48.ιJi>xb5 ιJi>e6 49.ιJi>xa4 ιJi>f5 50.g6??

SO.h6 g6 S l .Φbs ΦxgS 52 .c4 Φχh6 53 .a4 gS 54.a5 g4 SS .a6=.

50 ... ιJi>g5 51 . ..t.ιb5 ιJi>xh5 52.a4 ιJi>xg6 53.a5 ιJi>f6 54.a6 ..td5 55.c4 b8 56.'it>b6 ιJi>e5 57.Φc7 g5 58.Φbθ �e4 59.ιJi>c7 g4 60.a7 g3 61 .c5 b8 62.ιJi>b8 ..tc6 0-1

Α real thriller, in which the tension is maintained until the very last moment. Aronian's piece sacrifice was essential, given the tournament situation. But the enormous stress created over the board had its effect on the course of the game. What did Aronian lack for success here? Desperate decisiveness? Calmness? Or maybe a combination of the two? The real great fighters seem to know the secret of some magical elixir, which allows them to triumph in the most important encounters. Levon probably needs only to master this art.

In the following game, White also had to win. Only the level of the event and the 'price' of the game was lower. Possibly that made it easier to take the necessary decisions and the desired result was achieved.

206

Game 98

Etienne Bacrot (271 0) Romain Edouard (2587) Caen ch-FRA 2011 (9)

1 .d4 d5 2.ttJf3 ttJf6 3.c4 dxc4 4.e3 e6 5.bc4 a6 6.0-0 c5 7 . ..tb3!? tlJc6 8.tlJc3 cxd4 9.exd4 ..te7 1 0 . ..tg5 0-0 1 1 . 1i'd2 �d7!? 1 2 . .J:[ad1 tlJa5 1 3 . ..tc2 tlJc4 1 4. 'ti'e2!? .:tc8 15.�b3!? b5 1 6.tbe5 ttJb6 1 7 . .J:[fe1 h6!?

17 . . . b4 would have left White with a pleasant choice: 1 8 .d5!? (1 8 . .ixf6!? .ixf6 19.tί:Je4 .ibS 20.'i!Vg4 is also good) 1 8 . . . exd5 (the only move. If 18 . . . bxc3? 19.dxe6+-) 19.ti.Jxd7 'ifxd7 20.'i!Vxe7 'ifxe7 2 l ..ί::l'.xe7 bxc3 22 . .ixf6 gxf6 23 .bxc3 l;lxc3 24.1:f.a7 and White is playing for a win without any risk at all.

Α provocative move! A1though Edouard feared the sacrifice ση h6, he hoped that his opponent wou]d at Jeast hesitate over the decision to Jaunch α direct attack. White had JittJe time Jeft α]ready and every minute spent here wou]d enhance BJack's chances. Shou]d White risk the piece sacrifice?

1 8.bh6!? Το Black's surprise and disappointment, this resolute move came almost at once. Maybe the speed with which Bacrot took such a committal decision was influenced by the tournament situation.

Chαpter 8 -When α Win is the Only Acceptable Result

The game was played in the final round and Bacrot had to win at all costs. From a purely chess viewpoint, 1 8 . .th4 was perfectly good, and 1 8 . .txf6!? .txf6 19."iVe4 was also worth considering.

1 8 .. . gxh6 19. 1:1.d3! Brave and consistent. The outwardly aggressive 19.d5! ? only leads to unwelcome simplifications: 1 9 . . . exd5 20.t2Jxd7 "iVxd7 2 I ."iVxe7 "iVxe7 22.�xe7 1::f.fd8 and Black retains excellent drawing chances.

1 9 ... �h8 Black replied very quickly, which was the right practical decision. He also had little time left, and it was an unaffordable luxury to waste it ση variations like 19 .. . b4? 20.'iνd2 <;ith7 2l .�h3 t2Jg8 22 .t2Je4! or 19 . . . t2Jc4 20.�xc4 bxc4 2I .l:th3.

Now how should White continue?

20.'ifd2!? Avoiding the objectively stronger 20.d5 exdS 2 I .t2Jxd7 "iVxd7 (or 2 I . . . t2Jbxd7!? 22."iVxe7 tt:JcS) 22 ."iVxe7 'ifxe7 23.l:txe7 1::!:fe8 24.1::rxe8+ 1::f.xe8 2S.<;itfl with only a symbolic advantage in the ending. White is thinking only of attack!

20 ... ltJg8 21 .d5! Black has defended against the immediate threats to his king, but this central breakthrough creates new problems.

21 .. . liJc4!? The other possible defence is 2l . .. exd5!? 22 .t2Jxd5 t2Jc4 although in time-trouble, it is not humanly possible to calculate variations such as 23.'i:Vc3 ! (weaker is 23 .t2Jxc4 bxc4 24 . .txc4 .tgS! !) 23 .. . t2Jxe5 24.'iνxe5+ �f6D 25.t2Jxf6 t2Jxf6 26.�edl �e8 27.�xd7 'ifxd7 28.'iνxf6+ <;ith7.

22 . .ixc4 bxc4 23. 1:1.d4!

-

Δ Δ Δ

23 .. . �c5?? The first mistake, and immediately decisive! Absolutely the only defence was 23 .. . 'ife8 ! although even in this case, things are not easy for Black. For example, 24.t2Je4 (24.t2Jxc4 �bS!? suits Black, but 24.t2Jxd7 'iνxd7 25.dxe6 was very interesting) 24 .. . exd5 25.1::rxd5 .te6 26.t2Jd6 .txd6 27.1::f.xd6 with full compensation for the piece.

24.dxe6! .ixd4 25. 'ifxd4 'iff6 In playing his 23rd move, Black had forgotten about the double check in the variation 2S . . . .txe6 26.t2Jxf7++-.

26.exd7 1:1.cd8 27.1:1.e3 t:Δe7 28.1:1.13 liJc6 29.tlJxf7+ 1 -0

The logic of the sporting situation sometimes conflicts with the logic of the position. In the following game, the game developed very clearly against Black, but then his opponent presented him with a golden opportunity.

207


Game99

Rustem Dautov (2600) Lev Psakhis (2565) Dresden zt 1998 (9)

•

Black could have repeated the position for α

third time with 33 .. . 1:ld4. What would you do in his place?

White's position looks very threatening. He has two bishops, with the darksquared one monopolising the long diagonal, his king is well defended and finally, his passed pawn on dS confirms his advantage. It seems as though Black should be grateful for this fleeting chance to repeat moves and make a draw. Psakhis undoubtedly understood all of this very well, but unfortunately, his tournament situation was such that he needed to win. Thus, he had no choice.

33 ... 1:1.416?! 34.f3

Α strange move, since Black did not have any real threats. After 34.l:ta3 ! .i.xh3 ! (if 34 . . . a5 3S.l::tb3 Black has a weak pawn on b6 to add to his woes) 35.1:txa7! (3S .'ifxh3? l::txf2) 3S . . . 'iVf4 36.[3 Black faces a difficult defence

34 ... �xh3 35.'it'e3? Time-trouble panic! Even now, it is strong to play 3S.l::ta3! l::t8f7 36.'iVeS ! 'iVxeS 37 . .i.xe5 l::tfS 38.�b2 and the .i.h3 is offside. After 38 .. . l::tf4 39.gxh3 l::txf3 40.1::txf3 l::txf3 4I .<it>g2 White's chances are clearly better. Another superior move to the text was 3S.'iVeS .

35 .. . :Xf3! After this simple tactical blow, the outcome of the game is decided.

36.'ifxg5 :Xf1 + 37.�h2 hxg5 38.:Xh3 1Σθf2 39.1Σhθ+ �7 40.�e5 1Σe2 41 .1Σh7+ �eθ 0-1

Lev Psakhis played in accordance with the joking Russian proverb: Ίf something is impossible, but you want it badly enough, then it's possible! '. Lev once again proved the truth of this saying, which may sound strange to foreigners, but has a clear resonance with Russian life. What is most surprising is the ease with which he achieved his aim. Evidently, he wanted it very much indeed!

Conclusion Effectively, everything which needs to be said in this Conclusion was already said in the opening lines of the chapter. Ι would only emphasise that attacking and risk-taking are not an essential part of playing for a win, even in those cases where victory is the only acceptable result. In all situations, especially in extreme situations, one should choose the methods which best suit your temperament, character and playing style. The more important the result of the game, the more comfortable you need to feel.

But if you do choose the risk-taking path, then do so without concern or fear. Do not look back and do not worry about having chosen the wrong tactics. Fortune favours the brave !

208

Chapter 9

The Last Chance!

We have looked in detail at the use of risk in all sorts of chess situations. But there are some sad instances, when the bluff fails (or things do not even get that far) , the attack does not get anywhere or, ση the contrary, the opponent's pieces get within serious striking distance of one's king. In short, the position is bad and only a miracle can save you. But everybody knows that miracles never happen to you. In your heart, you just want to forget about this dreadful game as soon as possible, or indeed the entire tournament, which has gone wrong from the very start. Or the match, which should have been the moment of your great triumph, but now looks like ending with defeat. The desire to resign at once becomes stronger and stronger, and the thought that you sometime analysed the wrong line obsesses you.

Immediately take your self in hand! Never resign prematurely! There is always a last chance !

On the following pages you can see, for example, what happened in one of the first World Championship matches.

209


Game 1 00

Mikhail Chigorin William Steinitz Haνana Wch m 1 892 (23)

•

23 ... tαl4? At this moment, the match score was 9-8 in favour of Steinitz and under the rules, he only needed to win one more game to keep his title. However, it is not hard to see that in this position, he needs to think about drawing. This could be achieved most simply by means of 23 . . . 1::tcd8 24.1:tfdl (24.::radl tbcl !) 24 . . . ::rd7 2S .ltd2 1:ted8 26.1::f.adl tbcl !

analysis diagram

although there are also other ways. But in the 23rd game of a desperately hard match, and in the heat of Cuba to boot, things are never easy! Clearly, the World Champion assessed his position very pessimistically. The

2 1 0

last move can be regarded either as the last chance, or a mark of desperation, whichever you prefer.

24.cxd4 1Σc2+ 25. �g1 :ee2 26.:ae1 :Xg2+ 27.�h1

Bearing in mind the circumstances outlined above, one cannot rule out the possibility that Steinitz simply forgot that the bishop on d6 defends the h2-pawn. Even World Champions sometimes hallucinate!

27 ... �g7 28 . .C.e8 f5 29.tίJe6+ 29.1:ιe7+ �h6 30.tbe6 was a simpler win.

29 ... �6 30.1Σe7 .C.ge2! If you are going to bluff, then carry it through to the end! The machine's recommendation 30 . . . �xh2+ 3 I .i.xh2 �xe7 32.dS is unpromising even from the perspective of a draw.

31 .d5? The question mark is not for the move itself, which is forced, but for the fact that, under the rules, Chigorin could have sealed it and adjourned! This would effectively have guaranteed victory in the game, and thus prolonged the match. But in those days, chess was not played with attention to such subtleties. In addition, White's position is completely winning, so why not settle it at once!?

31 ... 1Σcd2

Δ Δ

How did the gαme finish, αnd with it, the mαtch?

32 . .tb4??

Δ Δ

One of the most dramatic oversights in the history of the World Championship. Ι even suspect that with this dreadful move, Chigorin intended to check on c3, forgetting about the rook on e7, but in the process, he forgot something even more important! 32.1:f.xb7 �hS (32 . . . .i:Ixd5 33 .t:bf4) 33.1:f.b3 wins easily.

32 ... :Xh2+ 0-1 And mate next move.

Since this game, a lot of water has fiowed under the bridge and many World Championship matches have been played. The others have also provided their share of drama. One only has to recall Game 23 (that unlucky number again!) of the

Chαpter 9 - The lαst Chαnce!

Botvinnik-Bronstein match, where the latter missed a fairly simple draw after the resumption and with it, the chance to become World Champion. Or Game 32 (does this combination of digits look familiar?) of the Baguio City match, where Kortchnoi, having by superhuman efforts pulled back from S-2 down to level the score at 5-S, for some reason decided to play for a win as Black and lost. Maybe he was affected by the scandal surrounding the Soviet delegation and Dr Zukhar, the agreement on which was suddenly broken on the eve of the game? In the immortal words of the leader of the Soviet delegation, Viktor Baturinsky: ΌΚ, so we are not gentlemen! '. This perhaps has nothing to do with chess, and Dr Zukhar himself was demonised, but the aim was achieved - the emotional Viktor Kortchnoi was thrown off balance. Ι would not like to describe this as a case of the Last Chance, but Karpov made the most of a favourable psychological situation. The famous 'Toiletgate' scandal in the match between Kramnik and Topalov also had its effect on the match. Topalov lost the first two games of the match very feebly, and then there followed two draws, at which point the match situation was very threatening for the Bulgarian. In the remaining eight games, he needed to win a minimum of two, without losing any. Ι will not venture to speculate whether the members of Topalov's team really believed Kramnik was cheating, but as a 'last chance saloon' effect, the accusation worked brilliantly. The Russian player was completely thrown offbalance and even lost the fifth game by default. Soon, Topalov not only levelled the match score, but even went ahead.

2 1 1


As we see, even in battles at the very highest level, it is not just a question of chess means that are used. And what about blitz? Real blitz 'professionals' have a whole range of tricks which one can scarcely call 'last chance' tricks, because they are used at all stages of the game and are part of the player's permanent armoury. After castling, their rooks frequently appear directly on el , they frequently win absolutely dead-drawn opposite-coloured bishop endings, thanks to the fact that in the manoeuvring phase, their bishop slips unnoticed onto the adjacent diagonal and the position becomes a same-coloured bishop ending! The king is moved midway between two squares and then chooses which one it was standing on, according to which is the more beneficial. Of course, all these tricks only work when the game is not being broadcast live or monitored closely by an arbiter, and such methods are just plain cheating. But even when both players observe the laws of chess, miracles still happen sometimes.

Game 1 0 1

Alexander Grischuk (2764) Sergey Karjakin (2775) Moscow blitz playoff 201 2 (1)

•

What is Black's last chance in this position?

2 1 2

77 .. . 'ίtd5 78.rl.a5+ 'ίtd4 79 . .1:[g4+ 'itd3 80.:b4 :c8 81 . .1:[h5 'ίtc3 82.:h3+ �c2 83.a4 J:[d8 84.a5 rl.a8 85.rl.a4 rl.aβ 86.rl.a2+ 'itb1 87.:ha3 h5 88. 'ίtg3 h4+ 89. 'ίtxh4 J:[hβ+ 90 . ..tgs :a& 91 .rl.a4 :a8 92.t4 :g8+ 93.'itf6 :t8+ 94.Φe7 rl.a8 95.:f2 rl.a7+ 96.'ίtd6 rl.aβ+ 97.'1tc5 rl.a8 98.:e4 :c8+ 99.'ίtb6 :c1 1 00. aβ 'ίta1 1 01 .rl.a4+ 'ίtb1 1 02 . .1:[b4+ 'ita1 1 03.a7 :cβ+

Here is the answer to the question posed above. The rook is a desperado!

104.'ίtxc6 112-112

Of course, in playing on, Sergey was not so much hoping for such a miraculous turnaround as relying on the clock, especially as in Armageddon games, there is no increment added. And what was at stake here was considerable - the prize was a plot of land in the Moscow suburbs! Nor were the rules broken in the following story, told to me by Semen Palatnik. It happened in a rapid game. Sam had a completely hopeless position, and even though he could queen a pawn with check, his opponent only had to move his king away and there would be option but to stop the clocks. Even the opponent's desperate time-trouble did not promise any hope, as things were just too simple. The solution was to under-promote to a knight. Even though not in check, the opponent instantly moved his king as a reflex action, whereupon the newly-promoted knight took the enemy queen. Instead of a zero in the score table, Sam obtained the full point. Even though Ι only have a verbal confirmation of this story, Ι have no reason to doubt the word of the esteemed grandmaster.

The fσllσwiηg aηecdσte is legeηdary. It σccurred at the eηd σf the 1940s, iη Leηiηgrad. Οη the etage σf the Chigσriη Chess Club, the semi-fiηal σf the USSR Champiσηship was takiηg place, aηd iη σηe rσuηd, the theη yσuηg master Efim Geller was playiηg the experieηced Caucasiaη master Leσηid Shamaev, whσ was a well-kησwη figure befσre the war. The seηiσr player (bσth iη terms σf title aηd age) fell iηto a very difficult pσsitiση, aηd ση top σf that, his fl.ag was haηgiηg. His σppσηeηt was alsσ iη time-trσuble. The situatiση was further cσmplicated by the fact that Shamaev was iη desperate ηeed σf a visit tσ the toilet, but did ησt dare dσ sσ, as he wσuld be bσuηd to lσse ση time. Hσwever, his pσsitiση was sσ bad aηd his physical ηeed sσ great that Shamaev σpted fσr the lesser evil aηd raη σff to the toilet. Geller, withσut bσtheriηg to thiηk at all, played the first mσve that came iηto his head, as it was clear his σppσηeηt wσuld lσse ση time. Hσwever, the latter theη suddeηly reappeared σut σf ησwhere, aηd with a triumphaηt cry σf 'Gσt yσu, fσσl!', played a simple wiηηiηg cσmbiηatiση. It traηspired that Shamaev, wheη thiηkiηg up his last chessbσard trap, had ησt beeη cσηviηced Geller wσuld fall fσr it, sσ decided to 'streηgtheη' it a bit. Haviηg ruη a few steps away frσm the bσard, Shamaev hid behiηd a curtaiη aηd awaited the reactiση frσm his uηsuspectiηg σppσηeηt. The trick wσrked brilliaηtly.

Ιη geηeral, the clσck plays a huge rσle iη chess. Οηe hardly ηeed meηtiση the cσlσssal ηumber σf wiηηiηg pσsitiσηs which are thrσwη away iη time-trσuble. But σccasiσηally, extreme time-trσuble turηs frσm beiηg aη eηemy to a frieηd,

Chapter 9 - The Lαst Chance!

as iη the story abσve. Ofteη, a player iη a bad pσsitiση will deliberately get himself iηto seriσus time-trσuble. There is ησthiηg illegal σr immσral abσut this, aηd it may well cause the σppσηeηt, whσ up tσ ησw has beeη playiηg very well aηd very calmly, to lσse his head. Of cσurse, this device was mσre effective iη the σld days, befσre the time iηcremeηt became staηdard. But iη σur day, thiηgs are less severe. Οηe σf my pupils, a very well-kησwη graηdmaster, almσst gave me a heart attack, wheη he played his mσve at the very last secσηd σf the time iηcremeηt. Ι cσuld σηly appreciate his artistry later, wheη it turηed σut that he had everythiηg uηder cσηtrσl. But duriηg the game, Ι did ησt kησw this, aηy mσre thaη his σppσηeηt did!

Οηe player whσ had a great arseηal σf, fraηkly, very dubiσus tricks was graηdmaster Eduard Gufeld. Οηe σf his favσurite devices was to σffer a draw iη a better pσsitiση. His σppσηeηt wσuld usually get a bitter disappσiηtmeηt if he accepted, because Gufeld wσuld theη categσrically deηy ever haviηg made aηy such σffer, aηd there wσuld be ησ witηesses tσ cσηtradict him. Naturally, ησt all σf his cheated σppσηeηts regarded such behaviσur as sσmethiηg to be prσud σf. Ιη σηe well-kησwη case, σur herσ, haviηg made a lσsiηg bluηder agaiηst the Dutch master Lex Jσηgsma, simply tσσk the mσve back aηd played sσmethiηg strσηger. Κησwiηg the Ukraiηiaη GM as Ι dσ, Ι dσubt very much that this was the σηly such case iη his career. Edik later lived fσr maηy years iη Geσrgia aηd dσubtless had aη iηflueηce ση the yσuηger players there. Years later, Zurab Azmaiparashvili

2 1 3


emplσyed the same trick agaiηst Malakhσv, althσugh admittedly with his σppσηeηt's agreemeηt. His behaviσur prσved highly successful, as the Geσrgiaη weηt ση tσ wiη aη impσrtaηt game aηd becσme Eurσpeaη champiση. But returηiηg to the uηfσrgettable Gufeld, σηe caη ησte with pleasure that 'age did ησt wither him'. Ιη aη Opeη iη the USA, he σηce fσuηd himself iη a very difficult pσsitiση, but shσwed all his σld iηgeηuity. Ιη this case, what saved him was ησt a brilliaηt cσmbiηatiση, but the fact that there was a fire alarm buttση ση the wall behiηd his σppσηeηt's back, which Gufeld pressed. The resultiηg sireη shσcked his σppσηeηt sσ much that the whσle cσurse σf the game was chaηged cσmpletely. It is hard eveη to imagiηe the thiηgs σur eηergetic aηd taleηted frieηd Eddie wσuld have gσt up to iη the preseηt-day cσmputer era. Ιη aηy eveηt, he wσuld made the wσrk σfFIDE's aηti-cheatiηg committee sigηificaηtly mσre challeηgiηg. But eησugh abσut Gufeld. Let's returη to sσme chess.

Game 1 02

τigran Petrosian Daνid Bronstein Amsterdam ct 1956 (2)

D

35.'ifd6

2 1 4

It is σbviσus that Black's pσsitiση is very bad. Lackiηg aηythiηg better, Brσηsteiη had fσr the last few mσves beeη aimlessly mσviηg his kηight tσ aηd frσ betweeη fS , c6 aηd d4. But dσes Black ησt have a slight chaηce?

35 ... tlJf5 The threat to take the queeη is σbviσus eveη to a complete begiηηer, but aηy threat is better thaη ησthiηg.

36.tlJg5?? Cσmpletely uηexpectedly, the threat prσves much better thaη aηyσηe could have thσught! Lulled iηtσ a false seηse σf security by the kηight's repeated jumps to aηd frσ, Petrσsiaη fails to spσt the sigηificaηce σf the last mσve. The ηatural 36 .'ifc7 wσuld have uηderliηed Black's cσmplete helplessηess.

36 ... tbxd6 Αηd White resigηed.

Of cσurse, σηe caη just explaiη Petrσsiaη' s shσckiηg bluηder as σηe σf thσse iηcredible σversights which happeηs frσm time tσ time, eveη iη elite chess. It is alsσ rather hard to regard his σppσηeηt' s attack ση the queeη as really beiηg a 'last trick '. But σηe caη draw sσme kiηd σf lessση eveη frσm this tragi-cσmedy: ηever lσse coηceηtratiση, eveη wheη it appears that yσu caηησt pσssibly face aηy daηger. Αηd, ση the σther haηd, eveη iη the mσst hσpeless pσsitiσηs, try to create sσme sσrt σf threat.

Bσth σf these maxims are illustrated iη the fσllσwiηg example.

Smyslσv plays the first part σf the game superbly, tσtally σutplayiηg his σppσηeηt.

Game 1 03

Vasily Smyslov Mikhaii Tal Bled-Zagreb-Belgrade ct 1959 (15)

•

Black's position is completely hopeless. Whαt is his lαst chαnce?

27 ... tlJf3+! Exactly. Otherwise, he would have to resign at once.

28.gxf3 After all, there was also the possibility of White falling for 28 .Φfl?? 'ifhl#. This alone is enough to justify the knight jump.

28 ... 'ifg5+ 29.'ίtf1 29.�g4 J::taxc8.

29 ... 'ifxf5 30.:Xf8+ :Χfθ 31 .fxe4 dxe4 32. 'ife3 J:tdθ 33. 'ifg3

But now it is all over, surely. As well as a material advantage, White is also attacking.

33 ... g5 34.J:tc5 J:td1 + 35.<ϊti>g2 'ife6 36.b5?!

Black has no threats at all, so why not push the passed pawn? But in a surprising way, this gives Black some sort of hope. Of the numerous ways to win, the simplest is 36 .'ii'b8+ Φh7 37.'iνh8+ Φg6 38 .'ii'g8+ Φhs 39.'il'c8 �d7 40.l:tc3.

36 .. . <iti>h7!

Chαpter 9 - The Lαst Chance!

Incredible calmness! Now the threat is 37 . . . Ild3.

37.J:tc6? Α natural move, especially in time-trouble, but this misses the win. But things are no longer so simple, anyway. The strongest was the rather unnatural move 37.l:tc3! , defending the third rank.

37 ... 'ifd5?! The correct idea, but executed in the wrong form. It was essential to play 37 .. .'iνfS! and now after the automatic 38 . .t:i.f6? (better is 38.J::tc3 but after 38 .. .'iνxb5 (this is where we see the drawback of White's 36th move!) Black is no longer in any danger of losing) 38 .. . 'iνxb5 39.J::txf7+ Φg8 40.J::tg7+ Φf8 it is already White who has problems.

38.'ife5? The problem-like 38 .'iνh2! e3+ 39.Φg3 is unrealistic with one's flag hanging, whilst after 38.1:f.cl 1:txcl 39.�xcl 'iVxbS he loses the highly important bS-pawn.

38 ... J:tg1 +! And now it all ends at once!

39.<iti>h2 J:th1 + 40.<iti>g2 J:tg1 + 112-112

Amazing! White's position looked absolutely winning, as indeed it was. Smyslov did not commit any huge mistakes, but the position just became

2 1 5


complicated at some point, and then quite unclear. Again and again Ι come back to the riddle of Mikhail Tal. It is possibly his examples which are best of all for explaining the phenomenon of bluff in chess. In poker, things are clear enough: the opponent cannot see your cards, and must judge things on the basis of your behaviour, sometimes correctly, sometimes not. But in chess, where everything is visible, the only factor that can change things is the potential of the pieces. This is both objectively, depending on the character of the position, and subjectively, what the player himself puts into them. With Tal, the potential energy of his pieces was significantly greater than with those of any other player of his day. And this often created phantoms for his opponents. For example, especially once his genius became so well known, opponents would often overestimate his attacking possibilities in a position, whilst at other times they would underestimate his chances, especially after having seen that his sacrifices were often just bluff. In the 1959 Candidates' tournament, Smyslov was a victim of the phantoms from the young Tal. The calm and solid ex-World Champion simply could not take seriously the escapades of the young player. Respect and understanding only came later.

In some senses, Garry Kasparov went down a similar path many years later. His pieces also seemed to possess a special energy and, like Tal, he himself created a special aura, not just on the board but around it. How else can one explain the dramatic conclusion to the following game?

2 1 6

Game 1 04

Boris Gelfand (2700) Garry Kasparov (2775) Dos Hermanas 1996 (9)

•

Δ � Δ Δ

.tr

White has two extra pawns and threatens 28.f5. Are things really that bad? What should Black do?

27 ... ..te4? The desire to keep the bishop on the diagonal is perfectly understandable. It is clear that White is better after 27 . . . f6 28.f5 �f7 29.1:thd1 ; but much stronger is 27 . . . ti:Je4! 28.ti:Jxe4 1:txe4! 29.�d3 1::1e3 30.1:thd1 1:tae8 with compensation for the sacrificed material.

2B . ..td1 ?! 28.1:te1 ! places Black's idea in doubt, e.g. 28 . . .'iνa7 29.�g4 (also possible is 29.b4 ti:Ja4 (29 ... ti:Jd7 30 .�d1) 30.�d4 'iVxd4 3 1 .1:txd4 �xg2 32 .1:1g1 �h3 33 .ti:Je4) 29 .. . g6 30.ti:Jxe4! ti:Jxe4 3 1 .�d4 with an obvious advantage to White.

28 .. . tlJd3+! An unexpected blow! Gelfand had evidently counted only on 28 ... 1:ta3? 29.1:te1 .

29.:X:d3 ..txd3 30.'ifxd3 :X:a2 The battle flares up with renewed strength.

31 . ..tc2 gβ? In time-trouble, the wish to defend the king is almost a reflex action.

However, this gives White an essential breathing-space. The game could be saved with the tempo-gaining 3 1 . .. !1e3! 32 .'iνxh7+ �f8 33.'iνh8+ �e7 34.tbf5+ �d7 3S .tbxe3 'iνxe3+ 36.'it>bl .ί:ιχc2 37.�xc2 (37."iνh3+ 'iνxh3 38 .gxh3 l:t.f2 39.1:lgl g6 is also safe for Black) 37 . . . 'iνe2+ with perpetual check.

32.lίJe4 :a1 + 33 . .tb1 33 .�b2? 1:f.xhl 34.tbf6+ <it>g7 3S .tbxe8+ <it>f8 36.ti:Jf6 'iνgl ! can only lead to problems.

33 ... .:Xe4! The only way to continue the fight.

34.'ii'xe4 'ifxb3 35.'ifc2 'ife3+ 36.�d1 'ifxf4 37 . .Ω.e1 'ifd4+ 38.�e2 'ii'fβ 39.'ii'd2

Black's position is bad. The time-control is approaching, απ excellent moment to try the last chance!

39 ... 'ii'e5+! Α typical 'spite' check! Kasparov's characteristic reactions also left little doubt that the end of the game was near. Objectively, 39 .. . 1ιa4 or 39 . . . 'iνh4 were stronger, although these moves would only delay the inevitable demise. Now, however, it seems White can win how he likes.

40.�1 ?? Alas not! Correct was 40.'it>f2! or even 40.'it>f3.

Chapter 9 - The Last Chance!

40 .. . .:Xb1 ! Suddenly Black regains the piece, retaining an extra pawn in the endgame.

41 . .:Xb1 'ii'f5+ 42.�e2 'ii'xb1 Of course, after what had gone before, Gelfand was in no state to play this endgame. Possibly he could have put up more resistance, but the analysis of the endgame lies outside the scope of this book.

43.'ii'f4 'ifc2+ 44.�1 'ilb1 + 45.�e2 'iνb4 46.�3 'ifc3+ 47.�e2 'ife5+ 48. 'ifxe5 dxe5 49.c5 �8 50.�d3 f5 51 .�c4 e4 52.�b5 e3 53.c6 bxcβ+ 54.dxc6 �e7 55.�b6 e2 56.c7 e1 'if 57.c8'if 'ifeβ+ 0-1

Boris coped confidently with some highly complicated problems, but then tripped up, when just a step from victory. But with aπ opponent like Kasparov, one can never permit oneself to relax for a second.

Vasily Ivanchuk, as a rule, does not relax his concentration in winning positions and continues to play accurately. But even he suffers unexpected lapses sometimes.

Game 1 05

Vasily lvanchuk (2739) Alexander Moiseenko (2665) Sochi 2005 (9)

•

� Δ t2J

Δ Δ Δ 'ςt)

2 1 7


Outwardly, the position Jooks completely hopeJess for Black. What is his Jast chance?

23 ... llJxg3 24.hxg3 .:.Xg3! Moiseenko finds a way to muddy the waters! The computer's first line 24 . . . 1:1g6 can only prolong the resistance.

25 . .:.Xd6! Naturally, Black was not seriously counting on 25.fxg3 �xe3+ 26.\t>h2 'ifh6+ with perpetual.

25 ... .:.aa 26.1:.e6! 'ifgθ 27. 'ifb7 .:.gs 28 . .:.Xc7 1:.b8 29. 'ife4

Is it all over? The white pieces dominate the board, quite apart from his material advantage. But even in absolutely hopeless positions, one must continue

3 I .l:ίxb8 'iidl+ 32 .\t>h2 �hS+; 3 l .�xg7+ \t>g8! (3 I . . . l:i.xg7 32.:Ixg7 'i!Ydl+ 33 .\t>h2 �hS+ 34.\t>g3 \t>xg7 3S . .!:!:d6) .

31 ... .:.Xb7 32.'ifxb7 'ifd1 + 33.ςph2 1:.h5+ 34 . .:.Xh5 'ifxh5+ 35. ςpg3 'ifg5+ 36.'ifo>f3 'iff5+ lh-Yz

to seek chances - hope springs eternal! White has to acquiesce in perpetual 29 ... 'ifdθ! 30.1:.b7?? check.

.i 1V Μ � i Μ

Δ 'iV Δ Δ

.i Δ Δ \t

Mirac]es do sometimes happen, but only to those who believe. PracticaHy any move wins -except the one played in the game . . . But what is wrong with it?

30 ... tίJf8! Amazing! This modest knight retreat to a more passive square saves the game. Suddenly, the weakness of the back rank becomes the decisive factor, which nobody (including even Ivanchuk) would have suspected.

31 .1:.h6

2 1 8

The final example could appear in any other chapter, as well as this one. But the situation which we will discuss is so typical that it would be wrong to omit it from the book.

The phenomenon of the 'difficult opponent', even between players of roughly equal strength, is well known. It is especially interesting to follow the fortunes between the elite players, who meet each other at the board so often. When players of similar strength meet very often, the score can just be balanced, as their ratings would suggest. However, exceptions occur. If, for example, you take the statistics between Karpov or Kasparov, and their close rivals, the score is often surprisingly poor from the latter's point of view. The same is true in the case of the reigning World Champion Magnus Carlsen, who has an especially onesided record against Hikaru Nakamura.

The talented and ambitious American is only a pale shadow of himself, in games against the World Champion, showing none of his customary inventiveness, solidity in defence, or accuracy in converting advantages. Even in absolutely winning positions, inexplicable things seem to happen.

Game 1 06

Hikaru Nakamura (2789) Magnus Carlsen (2872) Zurich 2014 {3)

• .� . · � i � Ά� i

i

i Δ i Δ Δ i Δ ll:. Δ 'ii Δ .i t2J

Δ iϊi. ;:: � iϊi. ;::

At first sight, the position looks double-edged. White is attacking on the kingside, whilst Black has counterplay against the enemy king, on the opposite flank. What should Black play?

26 .. . .b:b2 Alas, it turns out it is all an illusion. The attack down the h-file is much more dangerous than the black counterplay. The text move is the best chance. Black loses after 26 . . . 'tWd7 27.'iνh4 tlxg3 28.hxg6 fxg6 29.'tWxg3 tbxe4 30.'iνg2 tbf2 3 1 .tlxh7, whilst the line 26 . . . tbbxc4 27...txc4 tbxc4 28.hxg6 �xb2 29.�xb2 tbxb2 30.gxh7+ Φh8 3 1 .tlxb2 'ifb6 32.1:h2 is not much better.

27 . .b:b2 ttJbxc4 28 . .b:c4 tbxc4 29.hxg6 'ifb6 30.g7 J:[dθ 31 . 1Wh4 :Xb2+ 32.'ίfi>a1 :Xh2 33.:Xh2 Wg6 34.lL!f5 :es 35.'ifg4 'ifb6


The threat was 36.l:ίh6. 36.'ifh3 'ifg6

White's position is very good, but does he have α direct win?

37.d6? Unfortunately, the only move that does not win! Nakamura decided it was time to go over to decisive action. In reality, the victory only required patience, because after the waiting move 37.Φa2 bS (what else?) 38 .d6 now wins, since in the variation 38 . . . tbxd6 39.tbxd6 .ίd.d8 40.tbfs I:.dl 4l .Φb2 Black does not have a deadly check on b6. Another good line is 37.tlhl bS 38 .d6! tbxd6 39.tbxd6 1:d8 40.tbf5, and there was even a third option: 37.'ir'fl ! bS 38 .J::lxh7! 'tWxh7 39.tbh6+ and Black must give up the queen with 39 .. .'�xh6 40.gxh6, which is tantamount to resignation.

37 .. . tbxd6 38.tbxd6 J:[dθ! Suddenly it transpires that White has only won a piece, not the game. For Nakamura, this realisation was too great a shock and he completely lost control of the position.

39.tbc4?! The unusual move 39.tbc8! allows him to retain winning chances in the line 39 . . . Φχg7 40.tbe7 l:tdl+ 4l .Φa2 �e6+ 42.'tWxe6 fxe6. But how realistic are

2 1 9


they? By contrast, the natural 39.ι�:Jf5 leads to immediate defeat: 39 .. . !ιdl+ 40.�a2 Vie6+.

39 ... 'ifxe4

i Δ

• i Δ i

Δ

The position hαs become much shαrper. But White still hαs α chance to sαve the game. Whαt is it?

40.'iVh5? Now the game is quickly lost. It was still possible to hold the position with the cold-blooded 40.tbe3! 'ifd3 4l .tbfs and Black has only perpetual check: 4l . .. 'ifdl+ 42.�a2 1::td2+ 43.I:f.xd2 �xd2+.

40 ... .1:1.d3! Having been given the slightest chance, Carlsen is as ruthless as ever.

41 . .1:1.h4 'iff5

White's attack is just a distant memory, whilst Black has a material advantage and the attack.

220

42.'iVe2 After 42.g6 Vixg6 43 .Vixg6 fxg6 44.tbxe5 �xa3+ 4S .�b2 �b3+ 46.�c2 bS the armada of black pawns decides.

42 ... b5 43.tίXJ2 'iVxg5 Quite enough to win, but also good was 43 . . . 1::txa3+ 44.�b2 �g3.

44.'iVxd3 'iVxh4 45.l2Je4 �xg7 Now Black only needs to show accuracy, which Carlsen manages to do.

46.'iVf3 'iVf4 47.'iVg2+ �θ 48.�b2 h5 49.tίXJ2 h4 50.�c2 b4 51 .axb4 cxb4 52.'iVa8+ <;tg7 53.'iVxa4 h3 54. 'ifb3 h2 55. 'iVd5 e4 56. 'ifh5 e3 57.tlJf3 e2 58.<;tb3 f6 59.l2Je1 'ft'g3+ 60.�a4 'iVg1 61 .'ifxe2 'ifa7+ 0-1

It is hard to understand, and even harder to explain, what happened here. In a position where he only had to show minimal care, Hikaru's nerves failed him. He gave his opponent the only chance he could have, when it appeared that there was not even such a chance in existence. Ι cannot shake off the impression that, deep down, both players were convinced that something of the sort would happen.

We have already discussed the fact that, during a game, the players are competing amidst a field of energy, where their ideas, wills and desires are competing against one another. With some World Champions, this chess-willpower potential was especially powerful and a greater degree of tension was created over the board. The opponents of players like Tal or Kasparov had to battle not just the purely chessboard problems, but also with a kind of chess fever, which seized them. The geniuses were aided by this escalating tension, whilst their opponents found it something to

which they were unaccustomed and which was fatal to them. Many experience this discomfort, but it is hard to fight against it.

We have already told the story of Benko and his dark glasses, with which he hoped to resist the Tal influence, after losing several games in succession. It is interesting to note that Hikaru also tried this device against Carlsen, wearing dark glasses to the board in the tournament at St Louis. And he made a draw, but for some reason, he then dropped this practice. However, this catastrophic score against his rival gives rise to other thoughts. Maybe Magnus also creates some special tension during the game. Maybe he is not as powerful as Tal and Kasparov, and maybe the tension is of a different sort. Whereas the latter pair created what may be seen as a tidal wave of combinative threats, which swept their opponents away, Magnus is more like a whirlpool, which


quietly sucks his opponents in and drowns them slowly. Emanuel Lasker was similar, but there are more recent parallels: Anatoly Karpov and the young Gata Kamsky.

In his time, Tony Miles, an elite GM in the 1970s and 80s, but having a terrible score against Karpov, even resorted to the desperate step of answering the champion's l .e4 with the unexpected 1 . . . a6?!. The Englishman even managed to win the game! So, for Nakamura, everything is not lost, although admittedly, Miles' legendary victory with 1 . . . a6 was his only win against Karpov. [Editor's Note: This is not entirely true. Miles also beat Karpov, again with black (using the 4 . . . tbf6 s .tbxf6+ gxf6 line of the Caro-Kann) , at the 1983 BBC TV tournament in Bath. Unfortunately, due to a strike action by the BBC staff at the time, the game was never broadcast] Nonetheless, the subject of the 'diffi.cult opponent' is still relevant today.

Conclusion The sort of tricks discussed at the start of this chapter cannot be recommended in any way. They are mentioned solely to enliven the discussion. But it is always useful to know of their existence, as you never know who fate will pair you against.

On the other hand, the sort of devices which do not contradict the laws of chess can sometimes be employed successfully. If we are speaking of concrete recommendations, then the last chance always involves a threat or a sacrifice. Nothing ventured, nothing gained, and you will not change your fate without actively trying. It is always too early to resign, and nobody ever won a game by resigning. And it is absolutely essential to believe in your lucky star - without such belief, it is impossible to be successful in chess!

So, give it a try, and you are bound to be lucky - if not in this game, then in the next!

2 2 1


lndex of Games

From the Author Game 1

Game 2

Anatoly Karpov

Fabiano Caruana

lntroduction Gαme 3 Emanuel Lasker

Game 4 Alexander Alekhine

Gαme 5 Alexander Alekhine

Gαme 6 Alexander Alekhine

Gαme 7 Mikhail Botvinnik

Chapter 1.

Gαme 8 Mikhail Tal

Game 9 Boris Spassky

Gαme 1 0 Boris Spassky

Gαme 1 1 Bukhuti Gurgenidze

Gαme 1 2 Mikhai!Tal

Gαme 1 3 Mikhai!Tal

Game 1 4 Mikhai! Tal

Gαme 1 5 Mikhai! Tal


Gαme 1 7 Mikhail Botvinnik


Gαme 1 9 Lajos Portisch

Game 20 Mikhai! Tal

Chapter 2 Game 2 1 Paul Keres

Game 22 Genna Sosonko

Gαme 23 Mikhail Tal

Gαme 24 Robert Fischer

Game 25 Smbat Lputian

Gαme 26 Veselin Topalov

Game 2 7 Wang Hao

Game 28 Veselin Topalov

Gαme 29 Veselin Topalov

Gαme 30 Ivan Cheparinov

Gαme 3 1 Vladimir Κrarnnik

Game 32 David Bronstein

Gαme 33 Curt Hansen

222

Garry Kasparov

Magnus Carlsen

Frank Marshall

Aaron Nimzowitsch

Max Euwe

Max Euwe

Samuel Reshevsky

Efim Geller

Isaak Boleslavsky

Alexey Suetin

David Bronstein

Miroslav Filip

Oscar Panno

Vasily Smyslov

Vasily Smyslov

Mikhail Botvinnik

Mikhail Tal

La j os Portisch

Mikhai! Tal

Bent Larsen

Miguel Najdorf

Eugenio Torre

Bent Larsen

Viktor Kortchnoi

Vladimir Tukmakov

Vladimir Tukmakov

Anish Giri

Vladimir Κramnik

Vladimir Κrarnnik

Emil Sutovsky

Peter Leko

Ljubomir Ljubojevic

Viktor Kortchnoi

Moscow Wch m 1 9 85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Sao Paulo/Bilbao 2 0 1 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

United States Wch m 1 90 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

Bled 1 9 3 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3

The Netherlands Wch m 1 9 3 5 . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5

The Netherlands Wch m 1 93 7 . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8

The Hague/Moscow Wch 1 948 . . . . . . . . . 2 1

Riga ch-URS 1 95 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Riga ch-URS 1 95 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Riga ch-URS 1 95 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Riga ch-URS 1 95 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Portoroz izt 19 5 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8

Portoroz izt 1 95 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Bled-Zagreb-Belgrade ct 1 959 . . . . . . . . . . 32

Bled-Zagreb-Belgrade ct 1 9 59 . . . . . . . . . 34

Moscow Wch m 1 960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6

Moscow Wch m 1 960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8

Bled m 1 9 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Amsterdam izt 1 964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Bled m 1 96 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Gothenburg izt I 9 5 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Ο

Tilburg 1 98 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Bled m 1 96 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Curacao ct 1 9 62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Tilburg 1 994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8

Palma d e Mallorca 1 9 92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1

Beijing 2 0 1 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Linares 1 999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Wijk aan Zee 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Poikovsky 2 0 1 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Brissago Wch m 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1

Petropolis izt I 9 7 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4

Malmδ 1 996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6

Gome 34 Veselin Topalov

Gome 3 5 Levon Aronian

Chapter 3 Gome 36 Robert Fischer

Gome 3 7 Leonid Shamkovich

Gome 38 Leonid Stein

Gome 39 Nikolay Κrogius

Gome 40 Leonid Stein

Gome 4 1 Bent Larsen

Gome 42 David Bronstein

Gome 43 Mikhail Tal

Gome 44 Viktor Kortchnoi

Gome 45 Valery Salov

Gome 46 Garry Kasparov

Gome 47 Viswanathan Anand

Gome 48 Andrey Volokitin

Gome 49 Shakhriyar Mamedyarov

Gαme 50 Hikaru Nakamura

Gome 5 1 Magnus Carlsen

Gome 52 Levon Aronian

Gome 53 Ivan Cheparinov

Gome 54 Evgeny Tomashevsky

Gome 55 Alexander Moiseenko

Chapter 4 Game 56 Mark Taimanov

Game 5 7 Svetozar Gligoric

Gome 58 Bent Larsen

Game 59 Sergey Karjakin

Gome 60 Vladimir Tukmakov

Gome 6 1 Gennady Kuzmin

Gome 62 Grigory Serper

Gome 63 Alexander Morozevich

Gome 64 Veselin Topalov

Chapter 5 Game 65 Bent Larsen

Game 66 Tibor Karolyi

Game 67 Vladimir Κramnik

Gome 68 Vladimir Κramnik

Gome 69 Alexey Shirov

Game 70 Veselin Topalov

Gome 7 1 Garry Kasparov

Vladimir Κramnik

Viswanathan Anand

Mikhail Tal

Vladimir Simagin

Salo Flohr

Leonid Stein

Vlastimil Hort

Theo van Scheltinga

Bent Larsen

Bent Larsen

Jozsef Pinter

Alexander Beliavsky

Teimour Radjabov

Teimour Radjabov

Igor Κhenkin

Alexander Κhuzman

Vladimir Κramnik

Veselin Topalov

Alexander Morozevich

Pavel Elianov

Levon Aronian

Luke McShane

Bent Larsen

Bent Larsen

Lubomir Kavalek

Boris Gelfand

Vladimir Bagirov

Vladimir Tukmakov

Viktor Kortchnoi

Viktor Laznicka

Viswanathan Anand

Oscar Panno

Lev Psakhis

Daniel Fridman

Anton Shomoev

Jan Smeets

Kiril Georgiev

Nigel Short

Index of Games

Κhanty-Mansiysk ct 2 0 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8

Κhanty-Mansiysk cι 2 0 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 0

Bled-Zagreb-Belgrade c t 1 95 9 . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Leningrad 19 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Κiev ch-UΚR I 9 5 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7

Κiev RSFSR-UΚR 1 960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Los Angeles pff 1 96 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2

Beverwijk Ι 964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4

Amsterdam izt 1 9 64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Eersel m I 969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Beer-Sheva Ι 988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 00

Linares 1 99 Ι . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 0 2

Linares 2 0 0 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 03

Dortmund 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 6

Germany Bundesliga 2003 /04 . . . . . . . . Ι 0 8

Warsaw 2 0 0 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι Ι Ο

lstanbul ο! 20 1 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I Ι Ι

Wijk aan Zee 2 0 1 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 1 3

Moscow 2 0 1 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I 8

Reykjavik 20 I 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 0

Troms0 2 0 1 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 1

Aix -les-Bains Ech 2 0 1 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 24

Vinkovci Ι 970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 27

Lugano ol 1 9 7 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 28

Lugano ol 1 9 7 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 1

Κhanty-Mansiysk 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 2

Moscow 1 983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 3

Odessa Ι 968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 3 5

Groningen Ι 993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 3 8

Rhodes ιι 20 1 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 39

Sofia 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 42

Palma de Mallorca Ι 969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 48

Graz ιι 1 9 8 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 49

Dorιmund 2 0 1 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 0

Nizhny Novgorod 20 1 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 2

Wijk aan Zee 2 0 1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 3

Rhodes ιι 2 0 Ι 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 5 5

Sarajevo I 999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 5 7

223


Chapter 6 Garne 72 Mikhail Tal

Game 73 Yury Averbakh



Game 76 Garry Kasparov

Game 77 Alexander Beliavsky

Game 78 Zhou Jianchao

Game 79 Rafael Vaganian


Game 8 1 Valery Salov

Game 82 Anatoly Karpov

Game 83 Vadim Zviagintsev

Garne 84 Mark Dvoretsky

Game 85 Alexander Beliavsky

Game 86 Adrian Mikhalchishin


Game 88 Gennady Kuzmin

Chapter 7 Game 89 Alexander Beliavsky

Game 90 Orest Averkin

Game 9 1 Baadur Jobava

Garne 92 Baadur Jobava

Game 93 Borki Predojevic

Chapter 8 Game 94 Mikhail Tal

Game 95 Bent Larsen

Game 96 Teimour Radjabov

Game 97 Levon Aronian

Game 98 Etienne Bacrot

Game 99 Rustem Dautoν

Chapter 9 Game 100 Mikhail Chigorin

Game 101 Alexander Grischuk

Game 1 02 Tigran Petrosian

Game 1 03 Vasily Smyslov

Game 1 04 Boris Gelfand

Game 1 05 Vasily Ivanchuk

Game 1 06 Hikaru Nakamura

224

Tigran Petrosian Riga ch-URS 1 9 5 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 1

Boris Spassky Leningrad ch-URS pff 1 95 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 62

Efim Geller Sukhumi m 1 96 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 65

Efim Geller Sukhumi m 1 968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 66

Boris Spassky Niksic 1 98 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 7

Garry Kasparov Moscow Ι 9 8 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 69

Ding Liren Xinghua ch-CHN 2 0 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 1

Lev Psakhis Moscow ch-URS 1 9 8 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 7 2

Peter Leko Dorιmund 2 0 1 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 74

Jesus Nogueiras Santiago Bruxelles 1 98 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 5

Viswanathan Anand Dos Hermanas 1 997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 7

Judit Polgar Las Vegas 1 999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 9

Orest Averkin Odessa 1 9 74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 80

VladimirTukmakov Bled οΙ 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 1

Boris Taborov Daugavpils 1 9 78 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 84

Alexey Shirov Linares 1 994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 7

Lev Psakhis Frunze ch-URS Ι 98 Ι . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 9

Carsten Hoi Copenhagen 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 2

Lev Psakhis Sochi Ι 9 8 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ι 9 3

Benjamin Bok Wijk aan Zee Β 2 0 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 94

Daniil Dubov Minsk 2 0 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 96

Shakhriyar Mamedyarov Rogaska Slatina tt 20 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 7

Bent Larsen

Mikhail Tal

Vasily Ivanchuk

Vladimir Κramnik

Romain Edouard

Lev Psakhis

William Steinitz

Sergey Karjakin

David Bronstein

Mikhai! Tal

Garry Kasparov

Alexander Moiseenko

Magnus Carlsen

Bled m I 965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

Eersel m I 969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Κhanty-Mansiysk 20 I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

London ct 20 1 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Caen ch-FRA 20 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 1

Dresden zt 1 998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 3

Havana Wch m 1 892 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 6

Moscow blitz playoff 2 Ο I 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 8

Amsterdam ct 1 956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

Bled-Zagreb-Belgrade ct 1 95 9 . . . . . . . . . 2 2 1

Dos Hermanas 1 996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2

Sochi 2 0 0 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

Zurich 2 0 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Risk and Bluff in chess - Vladimir TukMakov

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