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European Forum CyprusΕΥΡΩΠΑΕΥΡΩΠΑIIΚΟΚΟ ΦΟΡΟΥΜΦΟΡΟΥΜ ΚΥΠΡΟΥΚΥΠΡΟΥ AVRUPA KIBRIS FORUMU AVRUPA KIBRIS FORUMU

Peace and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean

organisedin co-operation with the Goethe-Zentrum Nicosia

Co-funded by the European Commission

Nicosia, 24-25 September 2010

Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean

Prof. Iván MARTIN Associate Researcher at the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales, (Madrid)

Outline

1. Prospects and challenges in the Mediterranean 2. The European Union and the (Eastern) Mediterranean: objectives, actions, instruments, resources3. Conflict resolution as a prerequisite for cooperation and development or as a consequence thereof?4. Prospects for cooperation and questions for partner countries in an interdependent Mediterranean

region

The Mediterranean in 2020: Main Trends

Of course, there are many ways to look into the future, many strategic vectors to look at, many context and dynamic factors to take into consideration, different perimeters or “areas” to focus on.1 From an economic and social point of view, however, there is hard evidence that the Mediterranean constitutes a forward-looking unit, i.e., that, in many respects, it has a common future to share. Among the many issues that could be picked to prove the case (environment in general, energy, urbanization….), four main trends in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries that will determine the future of the Mediterranean, and hence of its regions, highlight the high level of interdependence across the Mediterranean, common challenges and potential synergies:

1 For a recent , normative forward-looking analysis of the Mediterranean, see IPEMED (2010): "The Mediterranean Region in 2030: The Ways for a Better Future", 8 pages, as well as CIHEAM (2008): Mediterra. The Future of Agriculture and Food in Mediterranean Countries. Sciences Po. Les Presses and CIHEAM, Paris, 356 pages.

Demographic Dynamics and Employment

Figure 1. Total Population in the Mediterranean. 1990-2020The Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs, i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Syria) are, taken together, the world region with arguably the most daunting employment challenge, at least in relative terms. Official labour participation rates there are the lowest in the world (below 46% of the working age population, compared to the world average of 61.2%), reflecting the lowest female participation rate in the world (below 25% as compared to a world average of 42%). Despite this, average unemployment rates (almost 15% of the labour force) are higher than in any other region with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Demographic projections for the coming ten to fifteen years, with an expected increase of 2.5 million a year in the working-age population (see Figure 1), make all foreseeable scenarios even bleaker. Adding together the projected needs for new jobs calculated under conservative assumptions on the basis of national statistical sources, the AMCs will need more than 1,500,000 additional jobs a year over the next 10 years (see Table 1) in order to provide employment opportunities for new labour market entrants and to keep the number of unemployed unchanged (already 7 million before the crisis). And these figures may be significantly underestimated, since they are based on the (hardly realistic) assumption that there will be constant labour participation rates. The 15 million new jobs which are needed up to 2020 would therefore mean an increase of 30% in relation to the current level of total employment in these countries, and would amount to between 1/3 and 2/3 more jobs per year than those created over the last five years in the region, a period of marked economic prosperity with average yearly growth rates of 5% for the region.

Table 1. Estimation of Yearly Job Creation Needs up to 2020*Morocco Algeria Tunisia Egypt Palestine Jordan Lebanon Syria TOTAL

2009-2020 180,000 225,100 84,600 715,526 45,977 53,501 15,000 221,000 1,540,704+5% labour

participation of women

228,000 317,600 107,077 742,286 70,294 54,845 16,700 247,000 1,783,802

*Assuming unchanged labour participation rates and number of unemployed.Source: “Labour Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Arab Mediterranean Countries: Determinants and Effects,” see footnote 2.

A study commissioned by the European Commission in 20092 concludes that immediate action is needed, because the status quo in terms of employment risks causing not only serious social and even political instability, but also permanent damage to the development prospects of these countries. 2 “Labour Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Arab Mediterranean Countries: Determinants and Effects,” European Economy, Occasional Papers Num. 60, May 2010. Brussels. 3 Volumes, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/op60_en.htm. Executive Summary:www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/RobertSchumanCentre/Research/Migration/LabourMarketsMigration/LMM.aspx.

Water Access and Availability Figure 2. Water availability (2007)

Always considered in relation to people’s living conditions, a glance at Figure 2, a map of the world’s fresh-water availabilities, clearly shows a common characteristic of the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean: all of them, from Morocco to Palestine, have less than 1,000 m3 per year of available water per inhabitant, the lowest levels in the world and well below the threshold of 1,700 m3 of renewable water laid down by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as the minimum necessary to cover the basic needs of the population. Half the world’s population suffering this type of “water poverty” lives in the Mediterranean. In this situation of “water stress,” access to drinking water has already become one of the main factors of social instability and a recurrent source of conflicts in the region.3

The figures are eloquent: 30 million inhabitants of the Mediterranean Partner Countries have no access to drinking water, and 35 million have no access to sanitation, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is already forecasting that the Arab countries will not reach the Millennium Development Goal of “reducing to half by 2015 the percentage of persons without sustainable access to drinking water and to basic sanitation.” Besides this, the distribution of water resources between the north and the south of the Mediterranean is as unequal as the distribution of income (and inverse to the distribution of energy resources): the north has 75% of the total renewable water resources in the Mediterranean Basin, the east has 13% and the south of the Mediterranean only 10%, whereas more than 80% of the land in North Africa is desert. The demand for water in the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean, which has grown by 60% in the past 25 years, is set to continue growing, and the scarcity of water in the south can only get worse in the coming decades, especially as a result of demographic growth (an increase is expected from the present 270 million inhabitants to 370 million by 2030) and growing urbanisation, but also as a result of the increase in agricultural production (FAO calculates that irrigated lands will grow by 38% in the south and 56% in the east of the Mediterranean by 2030), together with climate change and the desertification of part of their lands: according to estimates by Population Action International, the per capita water availabilities will remain at stable levels between 1995 and 2005 to the north of the Mediterranean, and will be reduced by 40% to the south and east.

Thus, the issue of water needs to stop being treated, as hitherto, merely as an environmental problem (which it is, of course): it is an essential factor in economic development (especially in relation to agriculture, which consumes between 70 and 85% of available fresh water, but also in relation to tourism and industry), and it is also a social issue of major importance (it should not be forgotten that access to drinking water is, above all, a human right), central to poverty-fighting strategies in the region, besides being an ever more pressing geopolitical problem. But all this should not make us forget that the issue of water is, above all, an issue of efficiency in the management of available resources: between 40 and 50% of available water is lost in

3 Agua y conflicto en el mundo árabe. Notas del Foro Socioeconómico de Casa Árabe Num. 04/2008, January 2008. http://publicaciones.casaarabe-ieam.es/foro/notas/notas_4_agua.pdf.

leakage from the distribution systems. Here the city governments, but also local and regional authorities more generally, have an important role to play, and decentralized cooperation could take the lead.

These major challenges of employment and water availability, with a direct effect on people’s living conditions, are compounded by the challenges of food security (the AMCs have a structural deficit in basic food production) and environment deterioration.4

Development finance

With the exception of oil- and gas-producing countries (in the region, mainly Algeria and Syria), Arab Mediterranean Countries still have a major shortage of resources for development. The inflow of migrant remittances was 26 billion US$ in 2007, amounting to 9.5% of the GDP in Morocco and more than 20% in Jordan or Lebanon. Foreign direct investments were 24.2 billion US$ in 2008 according to the IMF for all the Arab Mediterranean Countries, hence excluding Turkey, but much too volatile, descending to 16.2 billion US$ in 2009, and too concentrated in Egypt, which absorbs around half of the total. Aid was around 6 billion US$ a year for the AMCs. These resources do not make up for their structural trade deficits (according to IMF figures, the AMC current account deficit amounted in 2009 to 16.5 billion US$, and this despite the surplus registered by Algeria as the only country in the region) and the external debt service (exceeding 20 billion US$ a year).5 In economic terms, this means that they are indeed financing the development of the rest of the world, instead of benefitting from development finance for their own development needs.

The recent “Report on Co-Development Financing in the Mediterranean,” drafted by the “Milhaud Commission” under the mandate of President Sarkozy6 confirms this lack of financial resources and the need for public investment as a leverage for development in the Mediterranean. This makes the contribution of EU funds to development in the Mediterranean Partner Countries critical, and focuses attention on the coming EU Financial Perspectives 2014-2020 as a possible turning point in this regard.

Convergence Figure 3. The income divide

As a result of the former issues (low employment rates and a deficit of development finance resources), the Mediterranean has emerged as one of the most acute economic dividing lines in the world (Figure 3), with an income gap of close to 10 which has hardly been reduced over the last fifteen years (if one excludes the statistical effect of EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007). In Purchasing Power Terms, the income gap has hardly been narrowed between the euro zone and the MPCs since 1995 (see Table 2): at this pace of convergence, Morocco would need 241 years to reach 50% of the Euro area PPP GDP per capita, and Tunisia more than 62 years, for instance.

The convergence situation is still more dramatic if we look into development gaps within the AMCs, given the important income

4 See CIHEAM (2008), quoted in footnote 1, as well as CIHEAM (2010), Atlas Mediterra. Mediterranean Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and the Rural World, Sciences Po. Les Presses and CIHEAM, Paris, 132 pages.5 For an exhaustive analysis of finance for development in Africa, and case studies for Morocco and Algeria, see AECID, CeSPI, FIIAPP and SID (2009): International Finance for Development in Africa. Trade, Investment, Debt, Aid and Remittances. 2009 Edition. 2 Vol. 83 and 116 pages.6 Milhaud, Charles (2010) : Rapport de la Commission sur le Financement du Co-développement en Méditerranée.

disparities between AMC regions. A real convergence policy is arguably the most pressing rationale for enhanced co-operation across the Mediterranean, and regions have an important role to play in it.

Table 2. GDP per capita 1995-2007 (PPP constant 2005 international US$)1995 2000 2005 2007

Morocco 2661(10.69%)

2980(10.57%)

3589(12.13%)

3880(12.55%)

Algeria 5631(22.63%)

6087(21.59%)

7176(24.25%)

7310(23.64%)

Tunisia 4422(17.77%)

5444(19.31%)

6445(21.78%)

7102(22.97%)

Egypt 3586(14.41%)

4211(14.94%)

4574(15.46%)

4628(14.97%)

Jordan 3547(14.25%)

3632(12.88%)

4342(14.67%)

4628(14.97%)

Syria 3759(15.11%)

3725(13.21%)

4002(13.52%)

4260(13.78%)

Lebanon 7979(32.06%)

8328(29.54%)

9561(32.31%)

9546(30.87%)

AMC (a) 4294(17.26%)

4743(16.82%)

5417(18.31%)

5537(17.91%)

Euro Area 24884 28194 29590 30921

a) Weighted average. In parenthesis, the ratio to GDP per capita of the Euro Area.Source: World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation:Taking Stock of the Situation

The wide range of cooperation programs between the European Union (EU) and Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) is the result of multiple initiatives and strategies pursued by EU institutions toward the region since 1995. The “layers” of cooperation that have been superimposed over the years include: 1) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (since 1995), also known as the Barcelona Process;2) The European Neighbourdhood Policy since 2005;3) The Union for the Mediterranean (since July 2008);4) The Advanced Status, granted to Morocco in October 2008.

This note aims at giving an overview of the current situation including a review of the status of each of these cooperation initiatives. A comparative table presents in pages 4-5 the respective priorities of the different cooperation schemes and their main fields of action, largely superimposed. They concern the cooperation between the EU on the one hand, and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, on the other. Libya, for the moment, has (auto) excluded itself from Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Turkey benefits from a pre-accession strategy since 1999.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

In November 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Barcelona gathered the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 15 Member States of the EU at that time and of 12 MPCs (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, which became candidate for accession in 2004, and Cyprus and Malta, new member States in 2004). They adopted the Barcelona Declaration7 (a political document, not a legal instrument), which founded the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Its overall objective is to turn the Mediterranean into “an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity” that “requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership”

The EMP is a global process that includes: - establishing a common area of peace and stability through strengthened political dialogue (Political Chapter);- implementation of an economic and financial partnership and progressive establishment of a free trade area for 2010 (Economy Chapter); - bringing peoples closer and developing exchanges between civil societies (Social, Cultural and Human Chapter). In 2005, a new chapter on justice and home affairs was added.

The multilateral follow-up of the EMP is performed through periodic meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (approx. every 18 months) and by the “Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process” of senior officials who meet, in principle, on a monthly basis. There are also sectoral ministerial meetings, in which the ministers agree on joint conclusions, with a summary of discussions, a number of general political declarations and the objectives of actions to be engaged in the respective field. These conclusions are essentially a tool for political and policy dialogue8.

The legal instruments implementing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are bilateral Association Agreements (AA) between the European Union and each of the Mediterranean Partner Countries that have come into effect between 1998 (for Tunisia) and 2005 (for Algeria). Syria has not signed its AA yet. Association Agreements9 provide for bilateral Association Councils that meet annually at ministerial level to evaluate the progress accomplished and to determine political priorities for cooperation.

The core of the EMP is the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area scheduled for 2010. To this effect, AAs provide for the creation of bilateral free trade areas (FTA) for industrial products (with negotiations for the progressive liberalization of trade in agricultural products) between the EU and each MPC, with a transition period of 12 years for total customs tariffs dismantling on these products on a basis of reciprocity.

MEDA programs have provided financial support for the modernization process in MPCs and to mitigate short-term adverse effects of the FTA (€4.6 billion for the period 2000-2006 or an approximate average of €3.50 inh./year10). A small share of MEDA funds also finances regional programs (see EUROMED Background Note n°2).11 In addition, the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP)12 created in 2002 within the European Investment Bank grants loans to MPCs for direct support to private sector development and for infrastructure projects. Since 2004, the FEMIP has provided credit for an amount of €6.7 billion to MPCs and it has a lending envelope of €7.6 billion for 2009-2013.

Since 2004, a series of new Euro-Mediterranean institutions have been created: the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (2004), the Anna Lindh Foundation for the dialogue between cultures (2005) and the Euro-Mediterranean University (2008). These will soon be followed by the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly

7 http://www.medea.be/index.html?doc=261. 8 A list of ministerial conferences is available at http:/ /ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/conf/index_en.htm. 9 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/docs/index_en.htm . 10 Figures in http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf. 11 For a description of all regional projects, see EuropeAid (2008), see bibliography. 12 http://www.eib.org/projects/regions/med/index.htm .

(EMRLA). (See EUROMED Background Note n° 3.)

The Five Year Work Program13 adopted during the Euro-Mediterranean summit of Heads of State and Government held in Barcelona in November 2005 established a series of general objectives and specific goals for each of the four chapters of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The absence of local and regional authorities in this Program was manifest.

Work Program for 2009During the Marseilles Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,14 the ministers agreed on the principle of adopting a bi-annual Work Program during each bi-annual Summit and established the Program for 2009, with an indicative list of ministerial meetings15. Due to the political stalemate of the Partnership since 2008, only four ministerial meetings have been held in 2009 (water, employment, sustainable development, and economy and finances).

A new trend has emerged recently from ministerial meetings, that is, using work

programs, action plans or even full-fledged Euro-Mediterranean strategies to coordinate actions designed to achieve sectoral objectives: - In the transport sector, the Regional Transport Action Plan (RTAP) for the Mediterranean;- In the field of energy, the Priority Action Plan for 2008-2013 (approved at Cyprus, December 2007); - A work program on tourism to be elaborated and submitted during the next ministerial conference in 2010 (decided in Fez, 2-3 April 2008); - A process that should lead within a two-year period to a new Euro-Mediterranean Culture Strategy (Athens, 29-30 May 2008);- A Mediterranean Maritime Strategy to be developed according to the Marseilles Declaration;- A Framework of Actions to develop a genuine social dimension of the EMP approved by Employment Ministers (Marrakech, 8-9 November 2008);- A long-term water strategy for the Mediterranean currently being defined (Jordan, December 2008).

The Marseilles Declaration also provides for a new field of cooperation in Urban Development, with the involvement of regional authorities to define appropriate planning.

13 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/summit1105/five_years_ en.pdf.14 Final Declaration, Marseilles 3-4 November 2008, http://ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1103_ministerielle_Euromed/Final_Statement_Mediterranean_ Union_EN.pdf . 15 3rd Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Water; 1st Euro- Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on sustainable development projects; 6th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Transport and Urban Development; 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Higher Education & Scientific Research; 6th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Energy; 4th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on the Environment; 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society; 9th FEMIP Ministerial Meeting; 5th Euro-Mediterranean ECOFIN Ministerial Meeting; 8th Euro-Mediterranean Trade Ministerial Conference; 1st Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Food Security, Agriculture and Rural Development; 1st Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Justice, Liberty and Security; 11th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Foreign Affairs; 1st Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Human Development.

The Union for the Mediterranean

Following a personal initiative of the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, and after more than nine months of intense internal debate within the EU, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched in July 2008 during the Paris Summit with the accession of new Mediterranean partners, the gradual establishment of a new institutional structure (Co-presidency, Joint Permanent Committee, Secretariat) and the identification of six concrete regional projects. The founding documents of the UfM are the Declaration of the Summit of Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government held on 13 July 2008 in Paris, the “Paris Declaration”,16 and the Final Statement of the Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Marseilles17.

The UfM groups 43 European and Mediterranean States, EU institutions and a number of regional organizations. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro that accepted the acquis of the Barcelona Process were welcomed during the Paris Summit as new members18. The Union for the Mediterranean will “build on the acquis and reinforce the achievements and successful elements of the Barcelona Process”. Institutionalization

During the ministerial Conference in Marseilles, a new institutional structure was adopted by all the partners. It is composed of:- A system of bi-annual Summits of Heads of State and Government. The next summit will be held under the Spanish Presidency of the European Union in 2010.- A system of Co-presidency for all summits and all ministerial meetings, as well as meetings of senior officials. For the period 2008-2010, Egypt has been designated for the presidency of 16 www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/07/0713_declaration_ de_paris/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf. 17 www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1103_ministerielle_ Euromed/Final_Statement_Mediterranean_Union_EN.pdf 18 In addition to the 27 member States of the EU, the 9 partners mentioned in the introduction and Turkey, Mauritania and Albania were accepted as new members of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in November 2007.

MPCs. France assumed the presidency of EU members from July to December 2008, then jointly during the Czech-French presidency (January-July 2009) followed by the Swedish-French presidency (July-December 2009).- A reinforced Senior Officials Committee. Its mission is to deal with all aspects of the initiative, prepare the ministerial meetings and submit to them project proposals and the annual work program. - A Joint Permanent

Committee based in Brussels that will assist and prepare the meetings of Senior Officials. It will also provide appropriate follow-up and may also act as a rapid reaction mechanism if the need arises. - A Secretariat whose functions will be limited in principle to the identification and follow-up of UfM projects, the promotion of new projects and the search of funds and partners for their implementation. This newly created institution is the only one whose role does not concern the EMP as a whole, but appears to be limited to UfM projects only. The European Commission will continue to manage regional programs of the EMP as it has done so far. The Secretariat will have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status. It shall have a technical mandate and will follow the recommendations of senior officials, but will be composed of officials appointed by the States participating in the process. As provided by the Marseilles Declaration, the Secretariat will have a Secretary General and six deputy secretary-generals. It will be based in Barcelona and was supposed to start functioning in May 2009 according to statues to be adopted by senior officials before the end of February 2009. However, the political stalemate faced by the EMP has delayed its creation, and the details concerning its composition, functioning and mandate have still to be definitely endorsed by partner countries.

EMP PrioritiesFive-year work program

Barcelona Conference 2005*

ENP PrioritiesEC Communication of 2006

on “strengthening the ENP”**

UfM PrioritiesMarseilles Declaration

November 2008***Political and Security Partnership Strengthening Political Cooperation Political and Security Dialogue

Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens

The EU needs to play a more active role in multilateral conflict-resolution including, if necessary, participating in civil and military peace missions.

Middle East Peace Process (regular review of the political situation in the Middle East)

Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at local level

Possibility of alignment with CFSP Declarations (Common European Security and Defence Policy) offered to all EMP partners

Terrorism (implementing a Code of Conduct to counter terrorism)

Increase the participation of women in decision-making Intensified parliamentary cooperation

Deepening of the dialogue on the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) and crisis management

Ensure freedom of expression and association Strengthening of EU diplomatic presence in all EMP partners

Strengthen democracy and political pluralism through expansion of participation in political life and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms

Foster the role of civil society Enhancing Regional CooperationDeepening of regional dialogue on joint cooperation, best practices and exchange of experience in the area of elections

Enable the development and implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions

Strengthened cooperation with “the neighbours of our neighbours” For example, on energy, transport, fight against illegal migration

Lay the foundations for a long-term Program, the Euro-Med Program for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters – PPRD (2008-2011)

Sustainable Economic Development and Reform

Enhancing the Economic and Trade Component Economic and Financial Partnership

Create more job opportunities for more young people in the region

Envisage the FTA (Free Trade Area) within a deep and comprehensive approach Energy

Improve the business climate, in particular for SMEs

Reinforced support for reforms and efforts aimed at improving the economic and trade regulatory environment and the investment climate

Transport

Reducing regional poverty rates Strengthened economic integration and cooperation in key sectors Agriculture

Closing the prosperity gap and raising the GNP growth rates Urban Development Increasing North-South and South-South regional cooperation Strengthening Financial Cooperation WaterIncreasing the rate of employment of women in partner countries

Maximizing the impact and leverage of scarce resources EnvironmentGovernance Facility Information SocietyNeighbourhood Investment Fund TourismImproved coordination between Member States and EC assistance Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area

Economic dialogueBuilding a Thematic Dimension to the ENP Industrial Cooperation

Considering additional multilateral agreements in energy and transport Ongoing work on statistics cooperation Work for the extension of the EU transport and energy networks to neighbouring countries, as well as interoperability

Maritime Safety

EMP PrioritiesFive-year work program

Barcelona Conference 2005*

ENP PrioritiesEC Communication of 2006

on “strengthening the ENP”**

UfM PrioritiesMarseilles Declaration

November 2008***Participation of neighbours in relevant Community agencies and programmes

Educational and Socio-cultural Exchanges Promoting People-to-People Exchanges Social, Human, and Cultural CooperationHalve the number of illiterate female and male adults and children

Educational, cultural, youth and research exchanges Developing a genuine social dimension

Promote equality of access to quality education Enhanced civil society participation in ENP HealthReduce disparities in educational achievement between Mediterranean states Exchanges between regional and local authorities Human DevelopmentEnhance graduate employment through high quality higher education Training the regulators of tomorrow Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education

and Research AreaIncrease awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilizations Business-to-business contacts Promoting dialogue between cultures, cultural

diversityVisibility and information activities Strengthening the role of women in society

EuroMed Youth

Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security

Facilitating Mobility and Managing Migration Cooperation with civil society and local actors

Promote legal migration opportunities Visa facilitation, removing obstacles to legitimate travel Enhancing the visibility of the Partnership

Facilitate the flow of remittance transfers Addressing readmission and effective and efficient border management Justice and Law

Address “brain drain” MigrationReduce significantly the level of illegal migration and trafficking of human beingsPromote modernization and efficiency of the administration of justiceReinforce judicial cooperation Promote the ratification/implementation of UN Conventions on organised crime

EMP Priorities ENP Priorities UfM Priorities* Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Barcelona, November 2005. Five-year work programme, http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st00/st00002.en05.pdf ** COM (2006) 726 final, Communication from the Commission on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 4 December 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf*** Final Declaration, Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Marseilles, 3-4 November 2008 http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1103_ministerielle_Euromed/Final_Statement_Mediterranean_Union_EN.pdf

The Union for the Mediterranean

Projects

The Heads of State and Government considered that it was crucial to translate the objectives established by the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and by the Work Program of 2005 into concrete regional projects. The first six projects that will be completed in subsequent Summits are: - De-pollution of the Mediterranean (including coastal and protected maritime areas, focusing on the “water and waste sector”).- Maritime and Land Highways (including connection of ports, creation of coastal motorways and the modernization of the ‘trans-Maghreb” train). - Civil Protection (a joint Program on prevention, preparation, and response to disasters).- Alternative Energies: Feasibility, development, and creation of a Mediterranean Solar Plan.- Higher Education and Research: A Euro-Mediterranean University, based in Slovenia, with the mission to develop post-graduate and research programs. - Mediterranean Business Development Initiative (aimed at assisting entities in MPCs that already support small and medium-sized enterprises).

The Union for the Mediterranean projects have not been implemented yet due to the political

stalemate and the lack of concrete financial commitments in the Paris summit and the Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles, even if preparatory meetings have already been held for each project. All the projects are currently in a pre-feasibility study stage (analysis of barriers to their implementation and the necessary regulations) that will be followed by the identification of pilot projects.

Political StalemateThe Arab-Israeli conflict has blocked the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for most of the last year. After the Paris summit on the Union for the Mediterranean in which the League of Arab States participated as an observer, the demand of Arab Mediterranean Partner Countries to grant the Arab League the status of permanent observer in all Euro-Mediterranean meetings (not only for bi-annual summits) and Israel’s opposition to their demand paralysed the EMP during several months. Euro-Med Committee meetings, the meetings of senior officials and ministerial meetings were either cancelled or postponed. An agreement was reached during the Marseilles Euro-Med Ministerial Meeting of November 2008 granting the Arab League the status of permanent observer in all Euro-Mediterranean meetings, but the reaction of Arab MPCs to Israel’s attacks in the Gaza Strip once again blocked the functioning of the EMP and the implementation of decisions on the Union for the Mediterranean until July 2009.

The European Neighbourhood Policy

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed by the European Commission since 2003 within the context of the enlargement of the EU seeking not only to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours but also to strengthen prosperity, stability and security along the borders of the EU19. Through the ENP, the EU proposes to its neighbours a privileged relationship based on mutual commitments in favour of common values (democracy, human rights, the rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP’s philosophy consists in ensuring neighbouring countries—in exchange of concrete progress in the internalization of these common values through legal, political, economic, and institutional reforms, and particularly by adopting the “aquis communautaire”, i.e. the EU’s body of law—the perspective of deeper economic integration with the EU and their participation in the European single market (in terms of free movement of goods, capital, and services, but not people), as well as the possibility of participating in EU programs and agencies.

The ENP is therefore based on the model for the EU enlargement (although it explicitly excludes the perspective of eventual EU membership); in other words, it is focused on the achievement of predetermined results: for the candidate countries the achievement of Copenhagen criteria and the full adoption of the EU’s “acquis”; for the ENP countries the completion of reforms established within the framework of relevant bilateral Action Plans. The ENP provides for a gradual approach (for the adoption of reforms) focused on concrete and differentiated objectives for each country, based on periodical and objective assessments by the European Commission of the progress made. The ENP has produced significant changes in terms of financial management by introducing three new planning instruments based on the methodology of the pre-accession strategy: Country Reports, Action Plans, and Progress Reports20.

The main instruments for the implementation of the ENP are four-year Action Plans that receive financial support for their implementation under

19 The countries benefiting from the ENP are Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Lebanon in the Mediterranean, and Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to the east of Europe. Algeria, Syria and Libya are not part of this policy, but they benefit from the ENPI like Russia. Belarus does not have an Action Plan. 20 They are all available on line at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument – ENPI. They establish a number of priorities, objectives, and actions to be accomplished (for Morocco, for instance, there are 9 priorities, 85 objectives and 395 actions programmed)21. Elaborated according to the standard negotiation program for accession to EU membership by candidate States which consists of 35 chapters, Action Plans incorporate into the cooperation between the EU and neighbouring Mediterranean countries new issues such as human and social rights, technical standards and many others, offering new possibilities and perspectives for this cooperation.

Since 2007, the ENP finances regional and bilateral cooperation programs between the EU and neighbouring countries, replacing previous geographic and thematic assistance programs of the European Union.22 The total allocation for the period 2007-2013 for the 16 neighbourhood countries plus Russia amounts to €11,810 million.

The main focus of the ENPI is on Country Programs, transposed in operational terms through Action Plans. During recent years, the European Commission has increasingly granted direct budget support (transfer of funds to specific sectors) instead of funding for individual projects. The total annual budget support to ENP/ENPI countries increased from €397 million to €635 million in 2007, accounting in 2007 for 100% of overall financial cooperation in the case of Morocco and 88% in Egypt during the same year23.

The ENP has therefore become a new frame of reference for bilateral relations between the EU and neighbour countries along its borders. This does not mean Mediterranean countries have abandoned the more general framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the ENP falls within the EMP), but it redefines its priorities and operating methods. The EMP becomes the framework for multilateral cooperation at regional level while the ENP complements the EMP and appears as the main instrument for bilateral cooperation. With the exception of Syria, Euro-Mediterranean Association

21 Action Plans may be consulted at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm 22http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/how- does-enpi-work_en.htm. 23 See the brochure “Budget Support: The effective way to finance development?”, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/budgetsupport08_en.pdf.

Agreements remain the contractual framework for relations with MPCs, but new neighbourhood agreements are being envisaged with the most advanced MMPCs (namely Morocco, after being granted the “advanced status”, and Israel).

Reference Documents The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, official

website of the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/ external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm

European Neighbourhood Policy, official website of the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

Euromed Info Centre, official information portal on the cooperation between the EU and neighbour countries of the South http://www.euromedinfo.eu/.

Erwan Lannon and Iván Martín (2009), Report on the Status and Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (IEMed), Barcelona http://www.mcrit.com/iemed/EMP2009/Status%20en%20PDf_doc%2008juliol.pdf

EuropeAid (2008), “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - Regional Co-operation: An Overview of Programs and Projects”, http://ec.europa.eu/ europeaid/where/ neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/documents /infonotes_enpisouth_regional_cooperation_en.pdf

Med.2003-2009 The Mediterranean Yearbook. IEMed and Fundación CIDOB, Barcelona, http://www.medyearbook.com/

Iván Martín (2005): “La politique européenne de voisinage et la coopération transfrontalière et interrégionale en Méditerranée occidentale” Discussion Document, Three Cultures Foundation, Seville, www.eco.uc3m.es/ immartin/DOCUMENTDEDISCUSIONFRrevise.doc.

Iván Martín (2009): “EU-Morocco Relations: How Advanced is the 'Advanced Status'?”, in Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 14.2, pp. 239-245, Routledge. 14.2, pp. 239-245, Routledge.

Mediterranean Sea Basin Programme, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-border/documents/ mediterranean_sea_adopted_programme_en.pdf

Bilateral Indicative Multi-Annual Allocations for 2011-2013 (million €)

Country

Financial Envelope 2011-2013(Million €)

Increase in relation to 2007-2010

Population(Millions)

Assistance per capita per year

(€)Morocco 580.5 18.2% 31 6.2Algeria 172 4.2% 34 1.6Tunisia 240 6.7% 10 8Egypt 449.3 7.2% 82 1.8Palestinian Authority*

504 6.3% 4,5 37.3

Jordan 223 12.2% 6 12.4Lebanon 150 7% 4 12.5Syria 129 32.3% 21 2Libya 60 1000% 6 3.3Arab Mediterranean Countries**

2 507.8 12.8% 198,5 4.2

Ukraine 470.1 26.8% 46 3.4Moldavia 273 73.5% 4 22.7Georgia 180 99.3% 4 15Azerbaijan 122 76.8% 9 4.5Armenia 157 213% 3 17.4Eastern Partnership***

1 202.1 57.9% 66 6.0

*Excluding extraordinary humanitarian aid. ** The NIP for Israel, as a Mediterranean Partner Country, was also approved by the European Commission, but as a developed country, it has not been considered for these calculations. Israel will benefit from 6 million euros for 2011-2013.*** Excluding Belarus (an allocation of 80 million euros is planned, an increase of 533.3%, equivalent to 2.6 euros per inhabitant and per year). For Russia, 45 million euros have been reserved for 2011-2013 under the ENPI.

Source: Prepared by author based on European Commission documents. See Press Release: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/221&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

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Euromed Survey of Experts and Actors 2009: What Does It Tell Us About the Present and Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? 24

The IEMed’s Survey of Experts and Actors on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), commissioned by the European Commission, was carried out between June and September 2009. The Survey offers unique insight into the various perceptions of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and policies – including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – among the micro-cosmos of practitioners and experts involved in these increasingly complex processes. Precisely because of this increasing complexity, a Report on the Status and Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was prepared to provide the respondents with an overview and detailed information about the developments in the field since 2005.25 Out of the around 2,800 detailed questionnaires sent out, 371 were returned by respondents from the 43 member countries of the Union for the Mediterranean. This can be considered a representative sample of the universe of experts and actors involved with the EMP.

The EMP As a Whole Is More Than the Sum of Its Parts

First of all, it is interesting to note that the overall assessment of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is, generally speaking, quite positive. When respondents were asked to assess the progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a whole 14 years after its inception, their responses were heavily concentrated (close to 50%) around the median values (4 to 6 on a scale of 0 to 10, which is neither very disappointing nor very positive), with the remaining answers relatively equally distributed on either end of the spectrum (22% of respondents see the EMP as positive or very positive – 7 to 10 on the scale – and 26% as disappointing or very disappointing). This balanced yet somewhat polarised view of the EMP re-emerges in the assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean and does not show major variations across respondent categories (i.e., response patterns are very similar across policy-makers, experts from think tanks, universities and the media, and representatives of civil society).

This overall quite positive assessment can be attributed to the high expectations of experts in the field of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, who seem to welcome any new initiative. It also illustrates the demand for new cooperation actions. New projects and initiatives are welcomed by experts and actors with a vote of confidence and high expectations for their future performance, revealing a widespread engagement with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a project and a process, regardless of the difficulties and shortcomings of its actual implementation. A clear example of this is the highly positive perception of the UfM’s potential contribution to achieving the objectives of the EMP or of the new UfM projects well before they have become operational (more than 60% of respondents consider the Mediterranean Solar Plan and De-pollution of the Mediterranean projects to be positive or very positive contributions, and between 50% and 60% hold this view of the other four projects). This is despite respondents’ clear reservations

24 Euromed Survey of Experts and Actors. Assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Perceptions and Realities. See the analysis of the Survey’s results at www.iemed.org/activitats/2010/euromedsurvey/ceuromedsurvey.php. 25 LANNON, Erwan and MARTÍN, Iván. Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status and Progress 2009, Documents IEMed No. 3, 2010. Available at: www.iemed.org/publicacions/10_02_25_Report_BCN_Progress_Lannon_Martin.pdf.

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regarding the articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the UfM and the EU enlargement process: 48% of respondents detect a certain or total lack of coherence among them.

In any case, the assessment is much more qualified when it comes to detailed, disaggregated questions about the EMP and the Survey results are analysed by major priority area. Indeed, as shown by the results of Question 1.4, when the answers regarding the objectives set for all four priority areas in the 2005 Five-Year Work Programme are viewed together, the majority of respondents consider that there has been no progress or even a regression in all fields of cooperation (see charts below), and only around a third of respondents see progress in all four priority areas.

CHART 1 Assessment of Progress in the Four Priority Areas of the EMP

Successes and Failures of the EMP

The Survey also offers a clear picture of the main concrete successes and failures of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in these 14 years. Overall, respondents consider that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is mainly benefiting the business climate and economic interests, without this translating into job creation, the integration of women into economic life, a reduction of poverty and disparities in education or a convergence towards EU income levels. This means that improving people’s living conditions is still the major untackled challenge of the

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1. Political and Security Partnership

Progress35%

No progress47%

Regression8%

Don't know10%

2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform

Progress32%

No progress

48%

Regression10%

Don't know10%

3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges

Progress36%

No progress

45%

Regression7%

Don't know12%

4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security

Progress31%

No progress41%

Regression11%

Don't know17%

Question Q.1.4. Among the priorities defined in 2005, for which do you consider progress was achieved and for which do you think that there was no progress or even regression?

EMP. Another line of interpretation, based on the positive assessment of most EMP regional programmes, is that respondents appreciate all concrete undertakings, i.e. what is actually done.

Among the EMP’s successes one should highlight:i) Regional programmes in the economic field: Some 71% of respondents stated that there has been progress on technical assistance and risk capital support from the FEMIP, 70% on transport and energy cooperation, 69% in relation to the development of the information society (Medibtikar, the EuroMed Innovation and Technology Programme), and 65% on investment promotion (ANIMA and Invest in Med). ii) Business climate: Some 60% of respondents consider that there has been progress on improving the business climate for SMEs in the MPCs. The same applies to business-to-business contacts, enhanced support for reforms, and efforts to improve trade and the economic regulatory environment or multilateral programmes in the economic field.iii) Exchanges, be they educational, cultural, youth or research exchanges, are also very positively assessed (72% of respondents see progress). All multilateral programmes in the field of education and social exchanges are considered to have experienced progress by between half and two thirds of the respondents. This was particularly true of those on dialogue between cultures and cultural heritage. iv) Perhaps as a consequence, 59% of respondents consider that there has been progress on “Increasing awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations.”

But the Partnership has also clearly failed, in the view of respondents, in some key areas of cooperation:

i) Promotion of democratisation and human rights: Some 73% of respondents consider that there has been no progress or even regression in enabling citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level, 71% in the extension of political pluralism and participation by citizens, and 69% in the promotion of freedom of expression and association.ii) In the area of sustainable development, 80% see no progress or even regression in reducing the poverty rate, 80% in reducing the prosperity gap and 76% in the creation of job opportunities for young people.iii) Strengthening of financial cooperation, in particular, maximising the impact and leverage of scarce resources (i.e., the issue of efficiency), where 71% see no progress or even regression.iv) South-South regional economic integration, where 76% see no progress and 7% a regression.v) In the area of social and cultural cooperation, respondents consider that there has been no progress or even regression in reducing disparities in education achievement between European and Mediterranean States (73%), enhancing graduate employment through efficient, high-quality higher education (70%) and promoting equitable access to quality education (61%).vi) With regard to cooperation in the area of migration and justice and security (introduced as a fourth pillar for cooperation in 2005), 50% of respondents consider it disappointing or very disappointing (0 to 3 on a scale of 0 to 10), as opposed to only 6% who consider it positive or very positive (7 to 10).vii) As for facilitating mobility and managing migration, 83% see no progress or even regression for visa facilitation, and slightly less for readmission and border management. Along the same lines, 83% see no progress or even regression in addressing the “brain drain”

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caused by migration, 71% in significantly reducing the level of illegal migration and trafficking of human beings, and 69% in promoting legal migration opportunities.

Mid- to Long-Term Scenario in the Mediterranean

Given this overview, and turning our attention towards the future of the region and the Partnership, based on the probability assigned by the respondents to different hypotheses that assume that the current level and framework of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation will be maintained (see Chart 2 below, which summarises the answers to question Q.4.2 of the Survey), a baseline scenario for the mid- to long-term prospects of the Mediterranean can be constructed. This scenario would feature:

- Continued paralysis of Euromed cooperation as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli conflict;

- Intensified demographic dynamics and employment pressures in MPCs leading to dramatic social tensions;

- Water scarcity as an additional source of conflict and social tension in the region;- Environmental deterioration in the Mediterranean that will threaten the living conditions

of riparian States;- A lack of convergence to EU levels of income;- An uncontrolled rise in illegal migration, leading to an increase in social tensions and

xenophobia in Europe;- Entrenched political regimes in MPCs showing a high degree of continuity

The only positive dynamic to emerge from the Survey is the probability of increased participation by women in economic, social and political life.

It is interesting to note the high degree of consensus regarding the assessment of the probability of different hypotheses over the mid to long term across respondents from different countries and groups of countries. The probability of the Arab-Israeli conflict paralysing the EMP is the only hypothesis where divergences were somewhat marked: the farther away from the conflict respondents are, the higher the probability assigned. Thus, Maghreb respondents consider it significantly higher (7.5 on average) than Mashreq respondents (6.92), and respondents from the “Rest of the EU” (7.17) consider it higher than Mediterranean EU respondents (6.48). Israeli respondents either are clearly optimistic or do not attach much importance to such paralysis (average of 3.75), and Turkish respondents consider the current global economic crisis particularly dangerous for their development prospects.

Priorities for the development of the EMP/UfM

In line with this analysis of current trends in the Mediterranean, with regard to the question concerning the top five priorities for the Union for the Mediterranean and the upcoming UfM Summit (Question 5.2 of the Survey), the most frequently mentioned are:

Conflict resolution in the region (62% of respondents), Promotion of democracy and political pluralism (49%), Water access and sustainability (41.5%), and Education (41%).

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The least cited priorities, in contrast, include civil protection (only 18% of respondents include it in their top five priorities), a wider free trade area, liberalisation of EU agricultural markets, food security, the fight against international terrorism, the creation of an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean, and the establishment of free movement of persons in the Mediterranean (21% each), the management of migration flows (22%), and the promotion of equality between men and women (23%). This casts a certain shadow on the current choice of priorities in the framework of the UfM, as some of the issues that are high on the agenda for the upcoming UfM Summit (such as the deepening of the free trade area or food security) do not seem to be considered priorities by the experts and actors.

However, in some cases priorities vary very significantly across countries and groups of countries. Thus, as seen in Table 1, conflict resolution is considered a top priority by 62% of respondents as a whole, but by 73% of those from the Maghreb, 77% of those from the Mashreq and only 55% of those from the EU-27 (and, within the EU, by 81% of French respondents but only 43% of Spanish ones). Promoting democracy and political pluralism is considered a top priority by 49% of respondents, but again with marked variations: 62% of those from the Mashreq, 52% of those from the Maghreb and 48% of those from the EU-27. The increase in the funds allocated to the EMP is considered a priority by only 29% of the total sample, but 44% of Maghreb respondents and only 20% of those from the EU. Employment promotion is considered a top priority by 41% of the Maghreb respondents, but only 30% of the overall sample (and 28% of respondents from the EU-27).

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