Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf ·...

10
ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris 24-25/9/2018

Transcript of Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf ·...

Page 1: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣCENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES

Georgios EftychidisCenter for Security Studies - KEMEA

Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris 24-25/9/2018

Page 2: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

24-25/9/2018 2Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris - France

According to the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) “an insider is any

person with authorized access to an organization’s resources to include personnel,

facilities, information, equipment, networks, or systems”.

The NITTF defines the insider threat as “the risk an insider will use their

authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to their organization. This

can include theft of proprietary information and technology; damage to company

facilities, systems or equipment; actual or threatened harm to employees; or

other actions that would prevent the company from carrying out its normal

business practice”.

Page 3: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

24-25/9/2018 3Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris - France

• To understand the role of human factor in the organisations’ infrastructure

requires a study of complex behavioural, technical, and organisational issues

• A thorough insight on why employees might be tempted to commit a crime

against their employers and under which conditions, may help organisations

to put in place better systems to reduce the risk from insider threats

• Insider attacks are under-reported due to an insufficient level of damage to

warrant prosecution, a lack of evidence or insufficient information to

prosecute, and concerns about negative publicity

Page 4: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

24-25/9/2018 4Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris - France

Page 5: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

24-25/9/2018 5Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris - France

Who ?

• Deliberately seeks employment with an organization with intent to

cause harm

• Causes harm once employed but who had no intention of

doing so when first employed

• Is exploited by others to do harm once employed, and may be either

a passive, unwitting – negligent or unwilling insider

Page 6: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

24-25/9/2018 6Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris - France

What ?

• Unauthorized disclosure of information

• Physical or electronic sabotage

• Facilitating third party access

• Financial or process corruption

• Theft

Page 7: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

24-25/9/2018 7Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris - France

Why ?

• Coercion – being forced or intimated

• Revenge – for a real or perceived wrong

• Ideology/radicalization or advancement of an ideological or religious objective

• Money – for illicit financial gain

• Exhilaration – for the thrill of doing something wrong

Page 8: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

24-25/9/2018 8Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris - France

How and When ?

• Insiders will identify and understand the business’vulnerabilities and know how and when they can be exploited

• They will use their legitimate access to resources andfacilities, or take advantage of poor access controls to gainunauthorized access

• These activities may take place after considerable planning or on thespur of the moment when an opportunity arises

Page 9: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

24-25/9/2018 9Joint OECD – EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris - France

Establishment of a Holistic Security Approach

• Discovering your business – understanding the human

factor

• A personnel security risk assessment / Background checks

• Ongoing security procedures – creating a security culture

• Information and communications technologies

• Train personnel for capacity building

Page 10: Georgios Eftychidis Center for Security Studies - KEMEA Eftychidis - WG Insider Threats.pdf · Joint OECD –EU JRC Workshop: System thinking for CI resilience and security, Paris

ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣCENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES

Thank you for your attention!

Research AssociateTel.: +30 210 7710805mobile: e-mail:

www.kemea.gr

Georgios Eftychidis

+30 [email protected]