Suspending Judgment to Create Value: Suspicion and Trust in

Negotiations

Marwan Sinaceur

Skepticism, a long-standing idea

In ancient Greece the Skeptics philosophers recommended epochê (ἐποχή), or the suspension of judgment

Epochê stems from recognizing how ambiguous (i.e., subject to opposite interpretations) the world can be

Recognizing ambiguity –considering that both something and its opposite may be true– is an important facet of an inquiring mind

Different cognitive activity Greater information search

The current research

I set out to explore these ideas in the context of negotiations

Will suspicion, defined as the state in which perceivers experience ambiguity about a target person’s motives, be more efficient than trust in generating information search in negotiations?

In turn, could suspicion lead to more mutually beneficial agreements?

Ambiguity vs. uncertainty

Oxford English Dictionary Ambiguity = thinking that a single stimulus can have two

meanings and be interpreted in opposite ways; considering that both something and its opposite may be true

Uncertainty = not knowing for sure or with confidence Example: a sign such as “±” (Leibniz, 1684)

Ambiguity in psychology The same stimulus can be interpreted in different, non-

compatible ways (Ittelson & Kilpatrick, 1951) A figure can be seen either as the letter B or the number

13 (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006) A face can be interpreted in opposite ways (Huart et al.,

2005) A target’s behavior can be interpreted in opposite ways

(Fein, 1996)

Suspicion: Ambiguity about motives

Ambiguity about motives Suspicion = the state in which perceivers entertain

different, plausibly rival, hypotheses about a target’s motives (Fein, 1996; Hilton, Fein, & Miller, 1993)

Suspicion = the state in which perceivers experience ambiguity about a target’s motives

Consequences for attributions Belief that another might have hidden motives (Fein,

1996; Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990) Less prone to making the fundamental attribution

error (Hilton et al., 1993) Conscious deliberation about plausible causes and

categorizations (Hilton et al., 1993) More likely to give consideration to motives (Fein,

1996)

Suspicion: Ambiguity about motives

Suspicion and information search

Should increase speculative information search(arguments by Kramer, 1998, 1999a; Schul et al., 1996)

Less susceptibility to biases in seeking information (e.g., Fein et al., 1997; Millar & Millar, 1998; Schul et al., 1996)

These effects should generalize to negotiation

Prediction: Suspicion will lead to greater propensity for information search

Lack of trust Suspicion: experiencing ambiguity about a

target’s motives, i.e. suspending judgment Distrust: definitely not trusting, i.e. making a

definitive judgment, albeit negative

Distinction consistent with definition of trust (distrust) Trust (distrust): positive (negative)

expectations or beliefs about a target’s motives (Kramer, 1999b; Lewicki et al., 1998; McAllister, 1995)

Suspicion vs. distrust/trust

No distinction between suspicion and distrust made before Suspicion not empirically disentangled from

distrust (e.g., Fein, 1996; Schul et al., 1996)

Terms “suspicion” and “distrust” used interchangeably

Suspicion vs. distrust/trust

Suspicion and information providing

However, suspicion (and distrust) likely to decrease information providing to others(cf. argument by Kramer, 1998)

Indeed, trust is beneficial because it increases information providing in negotiation

Higher joint outcomes (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2006; De Dreu et al., 1998; Rubin & Brown, 1975)

Greater information exchange (Butler, 1995), which facilitates trading off issues (Bazerman & Neale, 1983)

Specifically, greater information providing about preferences (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Rubin & Brown, 1975)

Summary of arguments

Suspicion compared to trust…

… will have a positive effect on information search

… but has a negative effect on information providing

  

Suspicion and joint outcomes

Information search increases information exchange and joint outcomes, independently of information providing (Thompson, 1991)

In fo rm a tio n se a rc h In fo rm a tio n p ro v id in g

In fo rm a tio n e x c h a n g e

Suspicion and joint outcomes

Prediction: Dyads in which one party is suspicious and the other trusting (Suspicious-Trusting) will attain higher joint outcomes than will either dyads in which both parties are trusting (Trusting-Trusting) or dyads in which both parties are suspicious (Suspicious-Suspicious)

Overview of experiments

Expt 1a Vignette Do suspicious individuals explain a target’s behavior

differently? Expt 1b

Method identical to Expt 1a Are suspicious individuals more willing to seek information?

Expt 2 Pilot Study: Pre-tested a different operationalization of

suspicion Face-to-face, role-played negotiation Can suspicion lead to higher joint outcomes in negotiations?

Expt 3 Method identical to Expt 2 Do information search behaviors mediate the positive effect

of suspicion over trust?

Overview of experiments: Uncertainty

Ambiguity is likely to involve some general uncertainty

Uncertainty has effects on

Attributions (Weary et al., 2006; Weiner, 1985)

Information processing and search (Tiedens & Linton, 2001) Especially in negotiation (Anderson & Neale, 2005; Neale &

Fragale, 2006)

Thus, I controlled for uncertainty in all experiments

Through the design: the trust and distrust conditions were associated with uncertainty

Through measuring uncertainty: items were adapted from Tiedens & Linton (2001)

Experiment 1a

Do suspicious individuals explain a target’s behavior differently?

Between-subject design 2 (Trust vs. Distrust) x 2 (Uncertainty associated with trust/distrust vs. Certainty associated with trust/distrust) factorial design with an extra condition (Suspicion)

Negotiation vignette (N = 105)

Experiment 1a: Manipulation

Suspicion The counterpart’s motives in making the offer could both be benevolent and malevolent

Trust [Distrust] associated with Uncertainty The counterpart is likely to have benevolent [malevolent] motives in making the offer

Trust [Distrust] associated with Certainty The counterpart undeniably has benevolent [malevolent] motives in making the offer

Experiment 1a: Main Measure

Participants’ spontaneous attributions about a target’s offer were coded

Used Malle’s coding scheme (e.g., Malle, 1999, 2003; Malle et al., 2000; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002)

“Conscious attributions of motives” are explanations…

(a) … That describe the target’s motives and purposes What the target tries to fulfill through performing his/her actions

(b) … In which the motives and purposes are explicitly marked as mental states with a mental state verb

The perceiver consciously attributes motives to the target through using such verbs as “she wants to achieve”, “he wishes”, “she needs”, “she intends to”

Experiment 1a: Results

Checks – Uncertainty (6-item scale, α = .65)

Participants’uncertainty

-2.5

-1.5

-0.5

0.5

1.5

2.5

Distrustwith

Certainty

Distrustwith

Uncertainty

Suspicion Trust withUncertainty

Trust withCertainty

Experiment 1a: Results

Checks – Trust (3-item scale, α = .66)

Participants’ trust

1

2

3

4

5

6

Distrust withCertainty

Distrust withUncertainty

Suspicion Trust withUncertainty

Trust withCertainty

Experiment 1a: Results

Suspicion vs. Distrust/Trust – Conscious attributions of motives

Consciousattributionsof motives

0

1

2

Distrust withCertainty

Distrust withUncertainty

Suspicion Trust withUncertainty

Trust withCertainty

Coding scheme from Malle (2003)Suspicion against every other

condition

Experiment 1a: Summary

Some evidence that suspicion is a distinct state from distrust/trust

It entailed thinking more about conscious attributions of motives

This difference was not due to uncertainty

Experiment 1b

Are suspicious individuals more willing to seek information?

Procedure and Manipulation identical to Experiment 1a

Between-subject design 1 x 3 (Suspicion vs. Trust associated with uncertainty vs. Distrust associated with uncertainty) N = 99

Experiment 1b: Main Measure

Strategy statements

Participants were asked to mention the strategies they would intend using in the negotiation

Participants’ statements were coded for the number of strategies focusing on information search to create value

(2 coders, α = .85)

Examples: Listening; asking open-ended questions; uncovering interests; understanding why the target wanted the patent

Experiment 1b: Results

Suspicion vs. Distrust/Trust – Information search strategies to create value

Informationsearchstrategies

0

1

2

Distrust withuncertainty

Suspicion Trust withuncertainty

Suspicion against every other condition

Experiment 1b: Summary

Suspicion elicited greater propensity for information search to create value

Experiments 2-3

Do suspicious negotiators create more value (i.e., higher joint outcomes) than do trusting negotiators?

Experiment 2: Pilot

Pilot Study: Pre-tested a different operationalization of suspicion in the context of face-to-face negotiations

Experiment 1a-1b: Thinking that another’s motives could be both benevolent and malevolent

Experiments 2-3: Thinking that a counterpart may fall in two categories (s/he could be trustworthy or untrustworthy) but that the judgment about this needs to be fully suspended

In both cases, ambiguity stems from inclining in no particular direction and considering that both something and its opposite may be true

Experiment 2: Pilot

Manipulation

Suspicion

About half of the classmates assigned to the other party’s role had been instructed to provide inaccurate information about their true interests, while the other half of the classmates assigned to the other party’s role had been instructed to provide accurate information

Trust (with Uncertainty)

Their counterpart would probably have benevolent motives. Their counterpart was likely to provide accurate information about her/his true interests. Indeed, s/he was likely to think that […] ongoing cooperation was important in this negotiation between classmates

Experiment 2: Pilot

Information search behaviors

Participants were asked to describe the strategies + the behaviors they would intend using in the negotiation (2 open-ended items for strategies + behaviors)

Coded for the number of information search behaviors that they mentioned

Examples from the suspicion condition: “Ask specific questions; listen carefully; drop

notes” “I will not say much”

Experiment 2: Pilot

Close-ended Measures

Trust check (1 item)

Uncertainty check (2 items; α = .61)

Willingness to make motive attributions (1 item)

Experiment 2: Pilot

Total of Information search behaviors (Sum of the values obtained from coding strategies + behaviors)

0

1

2

Suspicion Trust with Uncertainty

Informationsearchbehaviors

Experiment 2: Pilot

Summary

This second operationalization of suspicion was successful

Results consistent with Expts 1a-1b Suspicion elicited a greater willingness to make motive

attributions and mention information search behaviors than did trust

Experiment 2

Can suspicion lead to higher joint outcomes in negotiations?

Negotiating dyads randomly assigned to one of three conditions

Suspicious-Trusting (or Trusting-Suspicious) Suspicious-Suspicious Trusting-Trusting

N = 96

Experiment 2: Procedure

Face-to-face negotiation

Role information: 15 minutes

Suspicion vs. Trust manipulation: 5 minutes

Role-play negotiation: 35 minutes

Experiment 2: Results

Manipulation check 97% of Participants correctly recalled the

information about the other’s motives given in their instructions

Trust check (1 item)

Uncertainty check (3 items; α = .73)

Speculation about motives (1 item)

Experiment 2: Results

Value creation by dyads – Joint outcomes(Suspicion against every other condition)

18,000

19,000

20,000

21,000

22,000

Suspicious-Trustingdyads

Suspicious-Suspiciousdyads

Trusting-Trustingdyads

Total points earned by the dyad

Experiment 2: Results

No difference between suspicion and trust in the distributive issue (and no effect for role)

AlphaPharmaBioPharma

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

Suspicious negotiators Trusting negotiators

Pointson thedistributiveissue

Experiment 2: Summary

Suspicious-Trusting dyads attained higher joint outcomes (i.e., created more value) than did either Suspicious-Suspicious or Trusting-Trusting dyads

However, needs more direct evidence that information search explains the positive effect of suspicion over trust

Experiment 3

Do information search behaviors mediate the positive effect of suspicion over trust?

Negotiating dyads randomly assigned to one of two conditions

Suspicious-Trusting (Parties always in same role since no effect for role) Trusting-Trusting

Procedure and Manipulation identical N = 64

Experiment 3: Measures

Information search behaviors Based on the coding performed in the Pilot Study Total of four different information search behaviors measured through participants’ ratings

Asking questions Taking notes when the other speaks Not interrupting [other-reported; reverse scored] Remaining silent to gather information

Experiment 3: Results

Total of information search behaviors

12345678910

Suspicion Trust with Uncertainty

Total of fourdifferentbehaviors(ratings)

Experiment 3: Results

Value creation by dyads – Joint outcomes

18,000

19,000

20,000

Suspicious-Trusting dyads Trusting-Trusting dyads

Total points earned by the dyad

Experiment 3: Results

Information search behaviors by the suspicious party mediate the effect of suspicion on value creation in the negotiation

Information search behaviors by the suspicious party

β = .41 * β = .66 *** / β = .58 **

Suspicious-Trusting dyads Jointvs. Trusting-Trusting dyads outcomes

β = .40 * / β = .17 ns

Limitations

Suspicion was manipulated as an initial state (intrapersonal)

But initially suspicious perceivers may not remain in this state

Suspicion is likely to be eventually replaced by distrust or trust

Suspicious individuals are likely to be uncomfortable with ambiguity and be motivated to resolve it

Suspicion may induce negative impressions or distrust in the target of the suspicious perceiver over time (interpersonal)

Implications

Motive attributions (e.g., Ames, 2005; Malle et al., 2002; Reeder et al., 2004) can shape actual behavior in interpersonal interactions

Motivated information processing helps to create value in negotiation (De Dreu et al., 2000, 2006)

Ambiguity about another’s motives – suspicion – provides a motivation for wanting to be more accurate about those

Suspicion is more attuned to effortful information search than is trust

Trust may reflect “the sign of a person who falls asleep” (Alain, 1924)

A trust paradox in negotiation Rubin and Brown (1975) speculated that trusting negotiators

may develop incorrect expectations about each other’s preferences

Through greater information search suspicious negotiators can attain more integrative agreements in negotiations than trusting ones

Future directions

Suspicion vs. distrust in negotiation Suspicious-Distrusting vs. Distrusting-Distrusting vs.

Suspicious-Suspicious dyads Data were collected

Being suspicious and expressing trust Suspicious negotiator vs. Suspicious negotiator who

expresses trust

The positive effect of suspicion (i.e., ambiguity about another’s motives) might be enhanced by greater tolerance to ambiguity

Suspicion vs. trust in group decision-making Information search vs. Information providing