Journal ofthe British Societyfor Phenomenology ΥοΙ 35 Νο 3 October 2004

JACQUES DERRIDAS DOUBLE DECONSTRUCTIVE READING Α CONTRADICTION ΙΝ tERMS GERASΠMOSΚAKOLΠUS

The present essay constitutes a critical appraisal of Derrida s deconstructive double reading This appraisal highlights a certain tension between the two different gestures that cοmΡήse deconstructive reading namely between the first reading (a reading that reproduces or doubles authorial or textual intention) and the second reading (a reading that deconstructs the meanings that have been detennined and identified dUΉng the first reading) Derήdas general position is that ίn the absence όf an extra-linguistic foundation for meaning all textual meaning js exceeded or split by the intervention of wήting that is by a dissemination irreducible to polysemy Υet while such a position renders possible the deconstruction of semantically determinate and identifiable claims (dUΉng the second reading) ίι renders impossible the attainment of such claims (dUΉηg the first reading)

Ι

Deconstructive Reαding as α Double Reading Ιn Ο Grαmmαtology ίn the chapter entitled The Exorbitant Question of Method Derrida notes that deconstructive reading situates itself ίη the gap between what the author commands within her text (her vouloir-dire) and what she does not command that is what takes place ίη her text without her will This distance fissure or opening is something that deconstructive reading must produce (OG 158DLG 227)1 Υet ίn order Ιο produce this fissure or opening deconstructi ve reading

must first reproduce what the author wants-to-say something that requires the submission to classical reproductive reading practices The traditionαl reading (namely the reproduction οί the authorial or textual intention) is then destabilised through th6 utilisation ltf all those elements that have refused Ιο be incorporated within ίι Hence the meanings produced during this first reading become disseminated duήng the second reading Ιn other words during this second reading the text loses its iηitial apparent semantic detenninacy organized around the axis οί its authorial intention and is eventua1ly pushed into producing a number of incompatible meanings which are undecidable ίη the sense that the reader lacks any secure ground for choosiηg between them For example ίη Plato s Pharmacy2 Derrida exhibits the way ίn which the text of Phaedrus despite Plato s inteηtion Ιο keep the two opposite meanings of pharmαkon - namely the meanings of remedy and poison - separate ends ηρ affinning α lα fois both

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Α deconstructive reading therefore contains both a dominant 3

reproductive middotading and a cήtίcaΙ productiνe reading The first reading which Deπida ca11s a doubling corηmentary [commentαire redoublantJ (OG 158DLG 227) finds a passage lisible and understandable and reconstructs the determinate meaning of the passage read according to a procedure that the deconstructive reader shares with comrnon readers The second reading which he calls a critical reading or an active interpretation goes οη Ιο disseminαte the meanings that the first reading has already construed Ιn this double reading or double gesture [double geste]4 Deπida is obliged to use classica1 interpretatiνe noπns and practices aήd at the same time to negate their power to control a text to construe thorougWy a text as something detenninate and Ιο disserninate the text into a series of undecidable meanings

The tension ίn Derrida s double interpretiνe procedure is rather apparent Deconstruction can only subvert the meaning of a text that has already been construed Ιn order for a text s intentional meaning to become destabilised the text needs to possess a certain stability so that it can be rendered deteπninate In ΟGrαmmαtology Derrida describes this doubling commentary - the initial detennination or reading that the deconstructive operation focuses οη - as

the Ίninima deciphering of the fm( pertinen( or competent access to structures that are relatively stable (αnd hence destabilizable1) and from which the most venturesome questions and interpretations have to stυt [italics added] (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 268)

The expression relatively stable (and hence destabilizable) πήποrs the paradoxica1 presuppositions of deconstructiνe cήtίcίsm the determination of the metaphysical text has to be stαble since the destabilising force of deconstruction can take place only οη something that possesses a certain stability whilst simultaneously being unstαble ίη order for deconstruction to be possible

Initia11y Deπida seems to be justified ίη arguing that a certain structure though stable t is potentially destabilisable Ά stability is not an irnmutability (Άfterwοrdt 151Postface 279) Change is aπ ineliminable neνer-ending possibility Yet Derrida inνokes those reasons for the destabilization of a certain textua1 structure which would preclude aπy (even relative) stability to ίι Therefore the question that aήses is whether it is possible to think together the possibility οί stable determinations and meaning as dissemination ίη a non-contradictory manner

But how does Derrida justify the possibility of the relatiνe stable structure of the doubling commentary For him the analysis of the constitution of meaning undertaken ίn the fυst part of ΟGrαmmαtology and condensed ίn the statement that [ t ]he absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely 5 does not

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constitute an obstacle to the existence of relatiνe stable or determinate meanings Οη the contrary differance - a neologism which Deπida coins ίη order to under1ine the fact that meaning is the product of the endless differential play of language - is not presented as a constitutive indeteπmnacy but rather as render[ing] deteπmnation both possible and necessary (Άfterwοrd 149Postface 275) Differance is the playful moνement which produces the differences that are constitutiνe for words and conceptualisation ίη general Differance is the systematic play of differences of the traces of differences of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other (Ρ 27IPOS 38)6

Derrida s differance constitutes the radicalization of Ferdinard de Saussures structurallinguistics and ίη particular of the determination of the sign as arbitrary and differential Ροτ Saussure a linguistic sign connects not a thiηg with a name but an idea with an acoustic image7 or respectively a signified (signίjie) with a signifier (signίjiant) Ιη this sense the constitutiνe elements οί the linguistic sign are not physical but mental The bond between the signifίer and the signίfied Saussure tells US is not natural but instituted or conνentional So signs are arbitrary within the giνen system of language and haνe meanίng only within this system The signs of language are not autonomous ideas and sounds which exist independently of the linguistic system These ideas and sounds are simply elements of a linguistic system and have the status οί conceptual and phonic differences produced from withiη this system itself Α sign has meaning through the position which ίι occupies within a chain of conceptual and phonetic differences As Saussure declares η a language there are on1y differences (CLG 166) These differences are not differences betweeη positiνe teπns ηamely betweeη already formed acoustic images οτ ideas ίη language there are only differences without positiνe terms (CGL 166) Ιn that respect language is not a system of identities but a systematic structure οί differences

Derrida infers from Saussure s position οη the arbitrary and differential character of the sign that it is impossible that a simple element be present ίn and of itself refeπing οη1Υ to itself (Ρ 26IPOS 37) Signs do not reflect preshyexisting objectiνities οτ meanings The possibility of any signification is dependent οη a silent system of differential references Ιη this sense ίη order for any present element to signify it must refer to another element different from itself that is not present Denida νiews meaning as a process of signification which functions according to this pattem and thus that the idea of the capacity to grasp the essence or the meaning of a sign - a true presence - is an illusion

Since the signified is neνer preseηt ίn its full plenitude the structure of the sign is always already simultaneously marked by difference and ηοη-

285

presence Derrida coins the neologism differαnce ιο describe the difference or the being-different of these differences the production as well as the contamination of each present element by something which is not present The substitution of the e of difference by the a of differaηce from the present participle differaηte reca11s the French verb differer The verb differer has two seemingly quite distinct meanings which are drawn from the Latin verb differere The double meaning of the French differer is rendered ίn English by the different verbs to differ and to defer Hence differer ίn the sense of the verb to differ signifies difference as lack of resemblance between two things distinction lack of identity dissimilaήty or discemibility while differer ίn the sense of the verb to defer sigηifies the interposition of delay the interva1 of a spacing and temΡοήlίΖίηg that puts off until later what is presently denied the possible that is presently impossible8

Hence differαnce for Derrida does not constίtute aη obstacle that would prevent someone from making relαtively stαble determinations regarding a text s meaniηg In fact differαnce we are told is the condition of possibility and impossibility of meaning while it makes meaning present it excludes it from beiηg αbsolutely present Henc~ the non-identity of meaniηg with itself this differαnce has not the slightest effect οη the establishment of a text s intentional meaning as Derήda often argues ellphatically in opposition to all those who he thiηks are misinterpreting him when characterising deconstruction as henneneutic teποήsm (eg John Ellis )9 this process of intentioηs and meaning differing from themsel νes does not negate the possibility of doublίng commentary (AfteIWord 147Postface)

Ιη this sense deconstructioηs doubling commentary does not differ radically from other tradition~l reconstructions of a text s authorial intentions As Deπida himself confesses And you are ήght ίn saying that these practical implicatioηs for interpretation are not so threatening to conventional modes of reading (Άfterwοrd 147Postface 271) All those readers who would hastily conclude that the radical view of language and meaning put forward ίη the first part of Ο GrαmmatologylO fundamentally overtums all our traditional ηotions of iηterpretation and reading would find themselves filled with surpήse when in the second part ίn the section entitled The Exorbitant Question of Method they are suddenly prompted to respect all the classical exigencies and all the instruments of traditional cήtίcίsm (OG 158IDLG 227)

Ιη the same spirit ίn Afterword Towards an Ethics of Discussion Derrida cautions against reading uηdecidability as equivalent to indeterminacy

Ι do not believe Ι have ever spoken of indeteπninacy whether in regard to meaning or anything else Undecidability is somethiηg else again undecidabi1ity is always a

286

determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example of meaning but also of acts) These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for exshyample discursive - syntactical ΟΤ rhetοήcal - but also political ethical etc) They are pragmatically determined The analyses that Ι have devoted Ιο undecidability concern just these deteπninations and these defmitions not at all some vague iηdeterminacy Which is to say that from the point of view of semantics but also of ethics and ροlί tics deconstruction should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism

Το be sure in order for structures of undecidability to be possible (and hence structures of decisions and of responsibilities as well) there must be a certain play differance nonίdentity Νοι of iηdetermination but of differance or of nonidentity with oneseIf ίη the very process of deteπnination Differance is not indeterminacy It renders determinacy both possible and necessary (Afterword 148-9Postface 273-4)

Hence Deπida does not seem ΙΟ question the attribution οί relatively stable meanings to words and by extension to texts themselves This is what allows Deπida to be able to decide for example whenever Plato uses the equivocal word pharmakon whether he means either remedy or poison The essential or undecidable equivocity of the word pharmakon is οί another nature It lies ίη the text s refusa1 to decide against its author s intentions ίη favour οί the identification οί the word with one οί its two opposite meanings (thus the pharmakon is described as undecidable) The text does not refuse Ιο determine different meanings for the word pharmakon it refuses to decide ίη favour οί the one or the other Υet ίί differance is not indetenninacy ίί it renders deteπninacy both

possible and necessary thereby allowing a text to possess a relative stability then what is it that renders the deconstruction οί these relatively stable determinations possible The answer is again Differance ΑΙΙ those elements previously descήbed as interνening ίn the production of meaning shyplay difference differance - are a1so invoked to justify the deconstruction of that effect οί meaning wmch the differentia1 play itself has produced Ιn order Ιο justify the possibility οί a texts deconstruction Deπida turns Ιο the turbulent effects of differance which however were previously declared as ηοΙ constituting an όbstacΙe Ιο the attainment οί those stable textual determinations which are now subject Ιο deconstruction The differential play by preventing a concept s meaning to be fully present (present Ιο itself Ιο its signified to th~ other) (OG 8IDLG 17) is now posed as that wmch pushes the concepts (see for example the concept pharmakon) - and by extension the text ίη its entirety - into undecidability The same play which did not previously prevent concepts from possessing a relatively stable meaning If as Simon Glendinning writes the necessity οί play ensures that any putative unity οί meaning is α priori dispersed ίn advancell then which stability of meaning even relative is ίι possible Ιο begin from If the term dissemination12 is another name for the play which for Deπida characteήses aΙΙ conceptual identities then the stability

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of meaning that the doubling commentary requires seems ιο haνe its possibility undermined

Derήda fal1s ίηΙο a paradox when he presents this play or differαnce shythe constant slipping of entities aηd their passage into their opposites as a perpetual reνersal of properties - as limited οηlΥ Ιο a determinαte oscillation between highly determined possibilities without haνing any ρήοr effect οη the process of the detenninαtion of these possibilities If there is a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indeterminαtion (Άftervιοrd 144Postface 266) ίn the process of deteπnination as h~ himself declares how then is determination possible ίη the fonn required by the doubling commentary

Deπida mterprets the effects of the differentia1 constitution of concepts αt will Το the extent that deconstruction needs the doubling commentary the constitution of a sign s meaning or identity through its differences from other sigηs does ηοΙ preνent signs or concepts from carrying with them at the leνel of their use a certain relatiνely stable load of meaning (something that according Ιο Derrida allows the existence of stable determinations of a texts νouloir-dire as that of his doubling commentary) Οη the other haηd when Deπida needs to explain and justify how the deconstruction of this doubling commentary is made possible he inνokes a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indetermination that was able to open the space of my iηterpretation for example that of the word supplement [italics added] (Άfterwοrd 144Postface 266)13 Thus Derrida seems to remain blind to the consequences of the existence of this play or relatiνe indeteπnination ίη relation to the possibility of doubling commentary itself The hesitation that Derήda exhibits ίη regard to the exact role middotthat indeteπninacy plays within middotdeconstructiνe reading - a hesitation imposed by the νery prerequisites of deconstructiνe dbuble reading - forces him into contradictory statements such as when οη the one hand he explicit1y refers to a certain play άr indetemήnation in order to justify the possibility of deconstruction while οη the other hand he claims that 1 do not belieνe 1 haνe eνer spoken of indetenninacy whether in regard to meaning or anythίng else Differαnce is not indeterminacy (Afterword 148Postface 273) Yet ίη a third passage Deπida declares again that [ο]nce again that was possible only if a non-self-identity a differαnce aηd a relαtive indeterminαcy opened the space of this νiolent history (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 267) Thus due to the paradoxical presuppositions of deconstructiνe reading a11 Deπidas descriptions will haνe to oscillate uncertainly between the need for the attaiηment of stable determinatioηs and the possibility of their dissemiηation

11 Interpreting Authorial 1ntention Ιn contradiction with what he says about

the endless play between concepts the fissure that differαnce effects οη the

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core of presence the sign which is just a trace the residue of meaning which is just meaning falling short of itself or the dispersαl of meaning in general Deπida treats authοήal or textua1 intention (a texts vouloir-dire) as something which can be determined univocally And this seems to flow from the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself Deconstruction is installed between a texts intended meaning (its declαrαtiνe layer) and the text itself (its descriptive layer) If a text s authorial intention was not fixed and uniνoca1 then it would be difficult for deconstruction ιο juxtapose against it contradictory elements found ίn the same text 14 Thus contrary to the text as a whole which Deπida treats as heterogeneous and equiνocal authοήal or textual intention is presented as a1ways possessίng coherence15 homogeneity and as being characteήsed by lack of ambiguity Moreoνer Derrida treats the text during its first reading as if only one inteφretatiοn of authοήa1 intention were possible He neνer examines the possibility (without being theoretically able to preclude such a possibility) that other interpretations of authοήal intention are also possible The aim of this is Ιο protect the effectiveness of the strategy of deconstruction If Derrίda accepted even potentially that other interpretations of a text s νouloir-dire were possible then he could ποΙ preclude the possibi1ity that other non-metaphysica1 determinations of a text s intentional meaning could be feasible deteπninations that would not thus be ίη dire need of deconstruction This in tum would affect his whole narrative about Westem metaphysics which is aηimated by the spffit of an unequiνocαl interpretation of the texts of the philosophical tradition thereby deΡήνίng it of much of its credibility Moreoνer if he conceded the possibility of the existence of other plausible interpretations either metaphysical or ηοΙ (although this is something that he could ηοΙ know ίη adνance) then the deconstruction of merely one interρretation out of this potential plethora of plausible interpretations would have only a limited significance and effectiveness

The kind of certainty about a text s νouloir-dire that deconstruction requires is possible only if authorial meanings are pure solid selfshyidentical facts which can be used to anchor the work However this way of conceiving meaning is ίη direct opposition to deconstruction for which meaning is impossible to detemύne ίη teπns of a fixed entity or substance Αη author s intention is itself a complex text which can be debated translated and νariously interpreted just like any other text (Άfterwοrd 143Postface 265)

Derrida for all his harsh criticism of organicist concepts seems paradoxica1ly to share the prejudgement that philosophica1 texts at least if only at an initial leνel are integrated wholes as if the υnίΙΥ of the work resides ίη the author s all-perνasive intentίon However there is ίn fact ηο reason why the author should not have had severa1 mutua11y contradictory

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iηtentions or why her intention may not have been somehow selfshycontradictory This is actua11y a possibility that Denida does not consider at all The way ίη which authοήal intentioηs appear ίη texts does not necessarily foπn a consistent whole and it may be unwise to rest υροη this assumption too heavily particularly if one speaks as Deπida does about intention as ΌηΙΥ an effect There is absolutely ηο need to suppose that authοήal or textua1 intention either do or should constitute hannonious wholes

Ιη this sense Derήda s stance towards a text s authοήal intentioη (ie its νouloir-dire) could be described as juridical anything which cannot be herded inside the enclosure of probable authοήal meaning is brusquely expelled and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single goveming intention Under such an approach authorial indetermiηacies are abolίshed ίn order to be replaced with a stable meaning They must be normalised Such a doubling commentary of authοήal or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the greatest number of a work s elements Heηce it would not be exorbitant to attribute to Deπida ίn his treatment of authοήal or textual intention the same accusations he attήbutes to the metaphysical tradition conceming the way ίn which it treats texts as unified wholes

111 Conclusion Derήda could have limited himself Ιο the less ambitious (and

also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles or containers of αbsolutely present meanings Of course he would not be the first philosopher to make such a claim Moreover such a claim would not necessarily exclude the possibίlity of the existence of re1atively stable meaniηgs it would exclude only the existeηce of perfectly univocαl meanings 16 Υet Derήda is not coηtent with merely doubting univocity He wants to do something bigger to decoηstruct He thus takes the fιυther step of arguing that ίn the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our linguistic practices the dissemination of construed meanings into undecidability is endless Now the possibility of deconstruction arises but a certain anomaly ίn its double interpretive procedure seems Ιο arise too α text must be read determinαtely ίη order to be disseminated into an undecidability that never breaks completely free of its initial detennination Deconstruction can only subvert the meaηings of a text that has already been construed determinαtely So what does deconstruction ultimately favour detenninαtion or disseminαtion Deπida needs to decide17

whether differαnce promotes stability ίη meaning (even a relative one) or dissemination He cannot utilise both possibilities simply because deconstruction needs them both 18

University of Crete Greece

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Α deconstructive reading therefore contains both a dominant 3

reproductive middotading and a cήtίcaΙ productiνe reading The first reading which Deπida ca11s a doubling corηmentary [commentαire redoublantJ (OG 158DLG 227) finds a passage lisible and understandable and reconstructs the determinate meaning of the passage read according to a procedure that the deconstructive reader shares with comrnon readers The second reading which he calls a critical reading or an active interpretation goes οη Ιο disseminαte the meanings that the first reading has already construed Ιn this double reading or double gesture [double geste]4 Deπida is obliged to use classica1 interpretatiνe noπns and practices aήd at the same time to negate their power to control a text to construe thorougWy a text as something detenninate and Ιο disserninate the text into a series of undecidable meanings

The tension ίn Derrida s double interpretiνe procedure is rather apparent Deconstruction can only subvert the meaning of a text that has already been construed Ιn order for a text s intentional meaning to become destabilised the text needs to possess a certain stability so that it can be rendered deteπninate In ΟGrαmmαtology Derrida describes this doubling commentary - the initial detennination or reading that the deconstructive operation focuses οη - as

the Ίninima deciphering of the fm( pertinen( or competent access to structures that are relatively stable (αnd hence destabilizable1) and from which the most venturesome questions and interpretations have to stυt [italics added] (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 268)

The expression relatively stable (and hence destabilizable) πήποrs the paradoxica1 presuppositions of deconstructiνe cήtίcίsm the determination of the metaphysical text has to be stαble since the destabilising force of deconstruction can take place only οη something that possesses a certain stability whilst simultaneously being unstαble ίη order for deconstruction to be possible

Initia11y Deπida seems to be justified ίη arguing that a certain structure though stable t is potentially destabilisable Ά stability is not an irnmutability (Άfterwοrdt 151Postface 279) Change is aπ ineliminable neνer-ending possibility Yet Derrida inνokes those reasons for the destabilization of a certain textua1 structure which would preclude aπy (even relative) stability to ίι Therefore the question that aήses is whether it is possible to think together the possibility οί stable determinations and meaning as dissemination ίη a non-contradictory manner

But how does Derrida justify the possibility of the relatiνe stable structure of the doubling commentary For him the analysis of the constitution of meaning undertaken ίn the fυst part of ΟGrαmmαtology and condensed ίn the statement that [ t ]he absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely 5 does not

284

constitute an obstacle to the existence of relatiνe stable or determinate meanings Οη the contrary differance - a neologism which Deπida coins ίη order to under1ine the fact that meaning is the product of the endless differential play of language - is not presented as a constitutive indeteπmnacy but rather as render[ing] deteπmnation both possible and necessary (Άfterwοrd 149Postface 275) Differance is the playful moνement which produces the differences that are constitutiνe for words and conceptualisation ίη general Differance is the systematic play of differences of the traces of differences of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other (Ρ 27IPOS 38)6

Derrida s differance constitutes the radicalization of Ferdinard de Saussures structurallinguistics and ίη particular of the determination of the sign as arbitrary and differential Ροτ Saussure a linguistic sign connects not a thiηg with a name but an idea with an acoustic image7 or respectively a signified (signίjie) with a signifier (signίjiant) Ιη this sense the constitutiνe elements οί the linguistic sign are not physical but mental The bond between the signifίer and the signίfied Saussure tells US is not natural but instituted or conνentional So signs are arbitrary within the giνen system of language and haνe meanίng only within this system The signs of language are not autonomous ideas and sounds which exist independently of the linguistic system These ideas and sounds are simply elements of a linguistic system and have the status οί conceptual and phonic differences produced from withiη this system itself Α sign has meaning through the position which ίι occupies within a chain of conceptual and phonetic differences As Saussure declares η a language there are on1y differences (CLG 166) These differences are not differences betweeη positiνe teπns ηamely betweeη already formed acoustic images οτ ideas ίη language there are only differences without positiνe terms (CGL 166) Ιn that respect language is not a system of identities but a systematic structure οί differences

Derrida infers from Saussure s position οη the arbitrary and differential character of the sign that it is impossible that a simple element be present ίn and of itself refeπing οη1Υ to itself (Ρ 26IPOS 37) Signs do not reflect preshyexisting objectiνities οτ meanings The possibility of any signification is dependent οη a silent system of differential references Ιη this sense ίη order for any present element to signify it must refer to another element different from itself that is not present Denida νiews meaning as a process of signification which functions according to this pattem and thus that the idea of the capacity to grasp the essence or the meaning of a sign - a true presence - is an illusion

Since the signified is neνer preseηt ίn its full plenitude the structure of the sign is always already simultaneously marked by difference and ηοη-

285

presence Derrida coins the neologism differαnce ιο describe the difference or the being-different of these differences the production as well as the contamination of each present element by something which is not present The substitution of the e of difference by the a of differaηce from the present participle differaηte reca11s the French verb differer The verb differer has two seemingly quite distinct meanings which are drawn from the Latin verb differere The double meaning of the French differer is rendered ίn English by the different verbs to differ and to defer Hence differer ίn the sense of the verb to differ signifies difference as lack of resemblance between two things distinction lack of identity dissimilaήty or discemibility while differer ίn the sense of the verb to defer sigηifies the interposition of delay the interva1 of a spacing and temΡοήlίΖίηg that puts off until later what is presently denied the possible that is presently impossible8

Hence differαnce for Derrida does not constίtute aη obstacle that would prevent someone from making relαtively stαble determinations regarding a text s meaniηg In fact differαnce we are told is the condition of possibility and impossibility of meaning while it makes meaning present it excludes it from beiηg αbsolutely present Henc~ the non-identity of meaniηg with itself this differαnce has not the slightest effect οη the establishment of a text s intentional meaning as Derήda often argues ellphatically in opposition to all those who he thiηks are misinterpreting him when characterising deconstruction as henneneutic teποήsm (eg John Ellis )9 this process of intentioηs and meaning differing from themsel νes does not negate the possibility of doublίng commentary (AfteIWord 147Postface)

Ιη this sense deconstructioηs doubling commentary does not differ radically from other tradition~l reconstructions of a text s authorial intentions As Deπida himself confesses And you are ήght ίn saying that these practical implicatioηs for interpretation are not so threatening to conventional modes of reading (Άfterwοrd 147Postface 271) All those readers who would hastily conclude that the radical view of language and meaning put forward ίη the first part of Ο GrαmmatologylO fundamentally overtums all our traditional ηotions of iηterpretation and reading would find themselves filled with surpήse when in the second part ίn the section entitled The Exorbitant Question of Method they are suddenly prompted to respect all the classical exigencies and all the instruments of traditional cήtίcίsm (OG 158IDLG 227)

Ιη the same spirit ίn Afterword Towards an Ethics of Discussion Derrida cautions against reading uηdecidability as equivalent to indeterminacy

Ι do not believe Ι have ever spoken of indeteπninacy whether in regard to meaning or anything else Undecidability is somethiηg else again undecidabi1ity is always a

286

determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example of meaning but also of acts) These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for exshyample discursive - syntactical ΟΤ rhetοήcal - but also political ethical etc) They are pragmatically determined The analyses that Ι have devoted Ιο undecidability concern just these deteπninations and these defmitions not at all some vague iηdeterminacy Which is to say that from the point of view of semantics but also of ethics and ροlί tics deconstruction should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism

Το be sure in order for structures of undecidability to be possible (and hence structures of decisions and of responsibilities as well) there must be a certain play differance nonίdentity Νοι of iηdetermination but of differance or of nonidentity with oneseIf ίη the very process of deteπnination Differance is not indeterminacy It renders determinacy both possible and necessary (Afterword 148-9Postface 273-4)

Hence Deπida does not seem ΙΟ question the attribution οί relatively stable meanings to words and by extension to texts themselves This is what allows Deπida to be able to decide for example whenever Plato uses the equivocal word pharmakon whether he means either remedy or poison The essential or undecidable equivocity of the word pharmakon is οί another nature It lies ίη the text s refusa1 to decide against its author s intentions ίη favour οί the identification οί the word with one οί its two opposite meanings (thus the pharmakon is described as undecidable) The text does not refuse Ιο determine different meanings for the word pharmakon it refuses to decide ίη favour οί the one or the other Υet ίί differance is not indetenninacy ίί it renders deteπninacy both

possible and necessary thereby allowing a text to possess a relative stability then what is it that renders the deconstruction οί these relatively stable determinations possible The answer is again Differance ΑΙΙ those elements previously descήbed as interνening ίn the production of meaning shyplay difference differance - are a1so invoked to justify the deconstruction of that effect οί meaning wmch the differentia1 play itself has produced Ιn order Ιο justify the possibility οί a texts deconstruction Deπida turns Ιο the turbulent effects of differance which however were previously declared as ηοΙ constituting an όbstacΙe Ιο the attainment οί those stable textual determinations which are now subject Ιο deconstruction The differential play by preventing a concept s meaning to be fully present (present Ιο itself Ιο its signified to th~ other) (OG 8IDLG 17) is now posed as that wmch pushes the concepts (see for example the concept pharmakon) - and by extension the text ίη its entirety - into undecidability The same play which did not previously prevent concepts from possessing a relatively stable meaning If as Simon Glendinning writes the necessity οί play ensures that any putative unity οί meaning is α priori dispersed ίn advancell then which stability of meaning even relative is ίι possible Ιο begin from If the term dissemination12 is another name for the play which for Deπida characteήses aΙΙ conceptual identities then the stability

287

of meaning that the doubling commentary requires seems ιο haνe its possibility undermined

Derήda fal1s ίηΙο a paradox when he presents this play or differαnce shythe constant slipping of entities aηd their passage into their opposites as a perpetual reνersal of properties - as limited οηlΥ Ιο a determinαte oscillation between highly determined possibilities without haνing any ρήοr effect οη the process of the detenninαtion of these possibilities If there is a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indeterminαtion (Άftervιοrd 144Postface 266) ίn the process of deteπnination as h~ himself declares how then is determination possible ίη the fonn required by the doubling commentary

Deπida mterprets the effects of the differentia1 constitution of concepts αt will Το the extent that deconstruction needs the doubling commentary the constitution of a sign s meaning or identity through its differences from other sigηs does ηοΙ preνent signs or concepts from carrying with them at the leνel of their use a certain relatiνely stable load of meaning (something that according Ιο Derrida allows the existence of stable determinations of a texts νouloir-dire as that of his doubling commentary) Οη the other haηd when Deπida needs to explain and justify how the deconstruction of this doubling commentary is made possible he inνokes a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indetermination that was able to open the space of my iηterpretation for example that of the word supplement [italics added] (Άfterwοrd 144Postface 266)13 Thus Derrida seems to remain blind to the consequences of the existence of this play or relatiνe indeteπnination ίη relation to the possibility of doubling commentary itself The hesitation that Derήda exhibits ίη regard to the exact role middotthat indeteπninacy plays within middotdeconstructiνe reading - a hesitation imposed by the νery prerequisites of deconstructiνe dbuble reading - forces him into contradictory statements such as when οη the one hand he explicit1y refers to a certain play άr indetemήnation in order to justify the possibility of deconstruction while οη the other hand he claims that 1 do not belieνe 1 haνe eνer spoken of indetenninacy whether in regard to meaning or anythίng else Differαnce is not indeterminacy (Afterword 148Postface 273) Yet ίη a third passage Deπida declares again that [ο]nce again that was possible only if a non-self-identity a differαnce aηd a relαtive indeterminαcy opened the space of this νiolent history (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 267) Thus due to the paradoxical presuppositions of deconstructiνe reading a11 Deπidas descriptions will haνe to oscillate uncertainly between the need for the attaiηment of stable determinatioηs and the possibility of their dissemiηation

11 Interpreting Authorial 1ntention Ιn contradiction with what he says about

the endless play between concepts the fissure that differαnce effects οη the

288

core of presence the sign which is just a trace the residue of meaning which is just meaning falling short of itself or the dispersαl of meaning in general Deπida treats authοήal or textua1 intention (a texts vouloir-dire) as something which can be determined univocally And this seems to flow from the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself Deconstruction is installed between a texts intended meaning (its declαrαtiνe layer) and the text itself (its descriptive layer) If a text s authorial intention was not fixed and uniνoca1 then it would be difficult for deconstruction ιο juxtapose against it contradictory elements found ίn the same text 14 Thus contrary to the text as a whole which Deπida treats as heterogeneous and equiνocal authοήal or textual intention is presented as a1ways possessίng coherence15 homogeneity and as being characteήsed by lack of ambiguity Moreoνer Derrida treats the text during its first reading as if only one inteφretatiοn of authοήa1 intention were possible He neνer examines the possibility (without being theoretically able to preclude such a possibility) that other interpretations of authοήal intention are also possible The aim of this is Ιο protect the effectiveness of the strategy of deconstruction If Derrίda accepted even potentially that other interpretations of a text s νouloir-dire were possible then he could ποΙ preclude the possibi1ity that other non-metaphysica1 determinations of a text s intentional meaning could be feasible deteπninations that would not thus be ίη dire need of deconstruction This in tum would affect his whole narrative about Westem metaphysics which is aηimated by the spffit of an unequiνocαl interpretation of the texts of the philosophical tradition thereby deΡήνίng it of much of its credibility Moreoνer if he conceded the possibility of the existence of other plausible interpretations either metaphysical or ηοΙ (although this is something that he could ηοΙ know ίη adνance) then the deconstruction of merely one interρretation out of this potential plethora of plausible interpretations would have only a limited significance and effectiveness

The kind of certainty about a text s νouloir-dire that deconstruction requires is possible only if authorial meanings are pure solid selfshyidentical facts which can be used to anchor the work However this way of conceiving meaning is ίη direct opposition to deconstruction for which meaning is impossible to detemύne ίη teπns of a fixed entity or substance Αη author s intention is itself a complex text which can be debated translated and νariously interpreted just like any other text (Άfterwοrd 143Postface 265)

Derrida for all his harsh criticism of organicist concepts seems paradoxica1ly to share the prejudgement that philosophica1 texts at least if only at an initial leνel are integrated wholes as if the υnίΙΥ of the work resides ίη the author s all-perνasive intentίon However there is ίn fact ηο reason why the author should not have had severa1 mutua11y contradictory

289

iηtentions or why her intention may not have been somehow selfshycontradictory This is actua11y a possibility that Denida does not consider at all The way ίη which authοήal intentioηs appear ίη texts does not necessarily foπn a consistent whole and it may be unwise to rest υροη this assumption too heavily particularly if one speaks as Deπida does about intention as ΌηΙΥ an effect There is absolutely ηο need to suppose that authοήal or textua1 intention either do or should constitute hannonious wholes

Ιη this sense Derήda s stance towards a text s authοήal intentioη (ie its νouloir-dire) could be described as juridical anything which cannot be herded inside the enclosure of probable authοήal meaning is brusquely expelled and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single goveming intention Under such an approach authorial indetermiηacies are abolίshed ίn order to be replaced with a stable meaning They must be normalised Such a doubling commentary of authοήal or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the greatest number of a work s elements Heηce it would not be exorbitant to attribute to Deπida ίn his treatment of authοήal or textual intention the same accusations he attήbutes to the metaphysical tradition conceming the way ίn which it treats texts as unified wholes

111 Conclusion Derήda could have limited himself Ιο the less ambitious (and

also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles or containers of αbsolutely present meanings Of course he would not be the first philosopher to make such a claim Moreover such a claim would not necessarily exclude the possibίlity of the existence of re1atively stable meaniηgs it would exclude only the existeηce of perfectly univocαl meanings 16 Υet Derήda is not coηtent with merely doubting univocity He wants to do something bigger to decoηstruct He thus takes the fιυther step of arguing that ίn the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our linguistic practices the dissemination of construed meanings into undecidability is endless Now the possibility of deconstruction arises but a certain anomaly ίn its double interpretive procedure seems Ιο arise too α text must be read determinαtely ίη order to be disseminated into an undecidability that never breaks completely free of its initial detennination Deconstruction can only subvert the meaηings of a text that has already been construed determinαtely So what does deconstruction ultimately favour detenninαtion or disseminαtion Deπida needs to decide17

whether differαnce promotes stability ίη meaning (even a relative one) or dissemination He cannot utilise both possibilities simply because deconstruction needs them both 18

University of Crete Greece

290

constitute an obstacle to the existence of relatiνe stable or determinate meanings Οη the contrary differance - a neologism which Deπida coins ίη order to under1ine the fact that meaning is the product of the endless differential play of language - is not presented as a constitutive indeteπmnacy but rather as render[ing] deteπmnation both possible and necessary (Άfterwοrd 149Postface 275) Differance is the playful moνement which produces the differences that are constitutiνe for words and conceptualisation ίη general Differance is the systematic play of differences of the traces of differences of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other (Ρ 27IPOS 38)6

Derrida s differance constitutes the radicalization of Ferdinard de Saussures structurallinguistics and ίη particular of the determination of the sign as arbitrary and differential Ροτ Saussure a linguistic sign connects not a thiηg with a name but an idea with an acoustic image7 or respectively a signified (signίjie) with a signifier (signίjiant) Ιη this sense the constitutiνe elements οί the linguistic sign are not physical but mental The bond between the signifίer and the signίfied Saussure tells US is not natural but instituted or conνentional So signs are arbitrary within the giνen system of language and haνe meanίng only within this system The signs of language are not autonomous ideas and sounds which exist independently of the linguistic system These ideas and sounds are simply elements of a linguistic system and have the status οί conceptual and phonic differences produced from withiη this system itself Α sign has meaning through the position which ίι occupies within a chain of conceptual and phonetic differences As Saussure declares η a language there are on1y differences (CLG 166) These differences are not differences betweeη positiνe teπns ηamely betweeη already formed acoustic images οτ ideas ίη language there are only differences without positiνe terms (CGL 166) Ιn that respect language is not a system of identities but a systematic structure οί differences

Derrida infers from Saussure s position οη the arbitrary and differential character of the sign that it is impossible that a simple element be present ίn and of itself refeπing οη1Υ to itself (Ρ 26IPOS 37) Signs do not reflect preshyexisting objectiνities οτ meanings The possibility of any signification is dependent οη a silent system of differential references Ιη this sense ίη order for any present element to signify it must refer to another element different from itself that is not present Denida νiews meaning as a process of signification which functions according to this pattem and thus that the idea of the capacity to grasp the essence or the meaning of a sign - a true presence - is an illusion

Since the signified is neνer preseηt ίn its full plenitude the structure of the sign is always already simultaneously marked by difference and ηοη-

285

presence Derrida coins the neologism differαnce ιο describe the difference or the being-different of these differences the production as well as the contamination of each present element by something which is not present The substitution of the e of difference by the a of differaηce from the present participle differaηte reca11s the French verb differer The verb differer has two seemingly quite distinct meanings which are drawn from the Latin verb differere The double meaning of the French differer is rendered ίn English by the different verbs to differ and to defer Hence differer ίn the sense of the verb to differ signifies difference as lack of resemblance between two things distinction lack of identity dissimilaήty or discemibility while differer ίn the sense of the verb to defer sigηifies the interposition of delay the interva1 of a spacing and temΡοήlίΖίηg that puts off until later what is presently denied the possible that is presently impossible8

Hence differαnce for Derrida does not constίtute aη obstacle that would prevent someone from making relαtively stαble determinations regarding a text s meaniηg In fact differαnce we are told is the condition of possibility and impossibility of meaning while it makes meaning present it excludes it from beiηg αbsolutely present Henc~ the non-identity of meaniηg with itself this differαnce has not the slightest effect οη the establishment of a text s intentional meaning as Derήda often argues ellphatically in opposition to all those who he thiηks are misinterpreting him when characterising deconstruction as henneneutic teποήsm (eg John Ellis )9 this process of intentioηs and meaning differing from themsel νes does not negate the possibility of doublίng commentary (AfteIWord 147Postface)

Ιη this sense deconstructioηs doubling commentary does not differ radically from other tradition~l reconstructions of a text s authorial intentions As Deπida himself confesses And you are ήght ίn saying that these practical implicatioηs for interpretation are not so threatening to conventional modes of reading (Άfterwοrd 147Postface 271) All those readers who would hastily conclude that the radical view of language and meaning put forward ίη the first part of Ο GrαmmatologylO fundamentally overtums all our traditional ηotions of iηterpretation and reading would find themselves filled with surpήse when in the second part ίn the section entitled The Exorbitant Question of Method they are suddenly prompted to respect all the classical exigencies and all the instruments of traditional cήtίcίsm (OG 158IDLG 227)

Ιη the same spirit ίn Afterword Towards an Ethics of Discussion Derrida cautions against reading uηdecidability as equivalent to indeterminacy

Ι do not believe Ι have ever spoken of indeteπninacy whether in regard to meaning or anything else Undecidability is somethiηg else again undecidabi1ity is always a

286

determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example of meaning but also of acts) These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for exshyample discursive - syntactical ΟΤ rhetοήcal - but also political ethical etc) They are pragmatically determined The analyses that Ι have devoted Ιο undecidability concern just these deteπninations and these defmitions not at all some vague iηdeterminacy Which is to say that from the point of view of semantics but also of ethics and ροlί tics deconstruction should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism

Το be sure in order for structures of undecidability to be possible (and hence structures of decisions and of responsibilities as well) there must be a certain play differance nonίdentity Νοι of iηdetermination but of differance or of nonidentity with oneseIf ίη the very process of deteπnination Differance is not indeterminacy It renders determinacy both possible and necessary (Afterword 148-9Postface 273-4)

Hence Deπida does not seem ΙΟ question the attribution οί relatively stable meanings to words and by extension to texts themselves This is what allows Deπida to be able to decide for example whenever Plato uses the equivocal word pharmakon whether he means either remedy or poison The essential or undecidable equivocity of the word pharmakon is οί another nature It lies ίη the text s refusa1 to decide against its author s intentions ίη favour οί the identification οί the word with one οί its two opposite meanings (thus the pharmakon is described as undecidable) The text does not refuse Ιο determine different meanings for the word pharmakon it refuses to decide ίη favour οί the one or the other Υet ίί differance is not indetenninacy ίί it renders deteπninacy both

possible and necessary thereby allowing a text to possess a relative stability then what is it that renders the deconstruction οί these relatively stable determinations possible The answer is again Differance ΑΙΙ those elements previously descήbed as interνening ίn the production of meaning shyplay difference differance - are a1so invoked to justify the deconstruction of that effect οί meaning wmch the differentia1 play itself has produced Ιn order Ιο justify the possibility οί a texts deconstruction Deπida turns Ιο the turbulent effects of differance which however were previously declared as ηοΙ constituting an όbstacΙe Ιο the attainment οί those stable textual determinations which are now subject Ιο deconstruction The differential play by preventing a concept s meaning to be fully present (present Ιο itself Ιο its signified to th~ other) (OG 8IDLG 17) is now posed as that wmch pushes the concepts (see for example the concept pharmakon) - and by extension the text ίη its entirety - into undecidability The same play which did not previously prevent concepts from possessing a relatively stable meaning If as Simon Glendinning writes the necessity οί play ensures that any putative unity οί meaning is α priori dispersed ίn advancell then which stability of meaning even relative is ίι possible Ιο begin from If the term dissemination12 is another name for the play which for Deπida characteήses aΙΙ conceptual identities then the stability

287

of meaning that the doubling commentary requires seems ιο haνe its possibility undermined

Derήda fal1s ίηΙο a paradox when he presents this play or differαnce shythe constant slipping of entities aηd their passage into their opposites as a perpetual reνersal of properties - as limited οηlΥ Ιο a determinαte oscillation between highly determined possibilities without haνing any ρήοr effect οη the process of the detenninαtion of these possibilities If there is a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indeterminαtion (Άftervιοrd 144Postface 266) ίn the process of deteπnination as h~ himself declares how then is determination possible ίη the fonn required by the doubling commentary

Deπida mterprets the effects of the differentia1 constitution of concepts αt will Το the extent that deconstruction needs the doubling commentary the constitution of a sign s meaning or identity through its differences from other sigηs does ηοΙ preνent signs or concepts from carrying with them at the leνel of their use a certain relatiνely stable load of meaning (something that according Ιο Derrida allows the existence of stable determinations of a texts νouloir-dire as that of his doubling commentary) Οη the other haηd when Deπida needs to explain and justify how the deconstruction of this doubling commentary is made possible he inνokes a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indetermination that was able to open the space of my iηterpretation for example that of the word supplement [italics added] (Άfterwοrd 144Postface 266)13 Thus Derrida seems to remain blind to the consequences of the existence of this play or relatiνe indeteπnination ίη relation to the possibility of doubling commentary itself The hesitation that Derήda exhibits ίη regard to the exact role middotthat indeteπninacy plays within middotdeconstructiνe reading - a hesitation imposed by the νery prerequisites of deconstructiνe dbuble reading - forces him into contradictory statements such as when οη the one hand he explicit1y refers to a certain play άr indetemήnation in order to justify the possibility of deconstruction while οη the other hand he claims that 1 do not belieνe 1 haνe eνer spoken of indetenninacy whether in regard to meaning or anythίng else Differαnce is not indeterminacy (Afterword 148Postface 273) Yet ίη a third passage Deπida declares again that [ο]nce again that was possible only if a non-self-identity a differαnce aηd a relαtive indeterminαcy opened the space of this νiolent history (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 267) Thus due to the paradoxical presuppositions of deconstructiνe reading a11 Deπidas descriptions will haνe to oscillate uncertainly between the need for the attaiηment of stable determinatioηs and the possibility of their dissemiηation

11 Interpreting Authorial 1ntention Ιn contradiction with what he says about

the endless play between concepts the fissure that differαnce effects οη the

288

core of presence the sign which is just a trace the residue of meaning which is just meaning falling short of itself or the dispersαl of meaning in general Deπida treats authοήal or textua1 intention (a texts vouloir-dire) as something which can be determined univocally And this seems to flow from the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself Deconstruction is installed between a texts intended meaning (its declαrαtiνe layer) and the text itself (its descriptive layer) If a text s authorial intention was not fixed and uniνoca1 then it would be difficult for deconstruction ιο juxtapose against it contradictory elements found ίn the same text 14 Thus contrary to the text as a whole which Deπida treats as heterogeneous and equiνocal authοήal or textual intention is presented as a1ways possessίng coherence15 homogeneity and as being characteήsed by lack of ambiguity Moreoνer Derrida treats the text during its first reading as if only one inteφretatiοn of authοήa1 intention were possible He neνer examines the possibility (without being theoretically able to preclude such a possibility) that other interpretations of authοήal intention are also possible The aim of this is Ιο protect the effectiveness of the strategy of deconstruction If Derrίda accepted even potentially that other interpretations of a text s νouloir-dire were possible then he could ποΙ preclude the possibi1ity that other non-metaphysica1 determinations of a text s intentional meaning could be feasible deteπninations that would not thus be ίη dire need of deconstruction This in tum would affect his whole narrative about Westem metaphysics which is aηimated by the spffit of an unequiνocαl interpretation of the texts of the philosophical tradition thereby deΡήνίng it of much of its credibility Moreoνer if he conceded the possibility of the existence of other plausible interpretations either metaphysical or ηοΙ (although this is something that he could ηοΙ know ίη adνance) then the deconstruction of merely one interρretation out of this potential plethora of plausible interpretations would have only a limited significance and effectiveness

The kind of certainty about a text s νouloir-dire that deconstruction requires is possible only if authorial meanings are pure solid selfshyidentical facts which can be used to anchor the work However this way of conceiving meaning is ίη direct opposition to deconstruction for which meaning is impossible to detemύne ίη teπns of a fixed entity or substance Αη author s intention is itself a complex text which can be debated translated and νariously interpreted just like any other text (Άfterwοrd 143Postface 265)

Derrida for all his harsh criticism of organicist concepts seems paradoxica1ly to share the prejudgement that philosophica1 texts at least if only at an initial leνel are integrated wholes as if the υnίΙΥ of the work resides ίη the author s all-perνasive intentίon However there is ίn fact ηο reason why the author should not have had severa1 mutua11y contradictory

289

iηtentions or why her intention may not have been somehow selfshycontradictory This is actua11y a possibility that Denida does not consider at all The way ίη which authοήal intentioηs appear ίη texts does not necessarily foπn a consistent whole and it may be unwise to rest υροη this assumption too heavily particularly if one speaks as Deπida does about intention as ΌηΙΥ an effect There is absolutely ηο need to suppose that authοήal or textua1 intention either do or should constitute hannonious wholes

Ιη this sense Derήda s stance towards a text s authοήal intentioη (ie its νouloir-dire) could be described as juridical anything which cannot be herded inside the enclosure of probable authοήal meaning is brusquely expelled and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single goveming intention Under such an approach authorial indetermiηacies are abolίshed ίn order to be replaced with a stable meaning They must be normalised Such a doubling commentary of authοήal or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the greatest number of a work s elements Heηce it would not be exorbitant to attribute to Deπida ίn his treatment of authοήal or textual intention the same accusations he attήbutes to the metaphysical tradition conceming the way ίn which it treats texts as unified wholes

111 Conclusion Derήda could have limited himself Ιο the less ambitious (and

also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles or containers of αbsolutely present meanings Of course he would not be the first philosopher to make such a claim Moreover such a claim would not necessarily exclude the possibίlity of the existence of re1atively stable meaniηgs it would exclude only the existeηce of perfectly univocαl meanings 16 Υet Derήda is not coηtent with merely doubting univocity He wants to do something bigger to decoηstruct He thus takes the fιυther step of arguing that ίn the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our linguistic practices the dissemination of construed meanings into undecidability is endless Now the possibility of deconstruction arises but a certain anomaly ίn its double interpretive procedure seems Ιο arise too α text must be read determinαtely ίη order to be disseminated into an undecidability that never breaks completely free of its initial detennination Deconstruction can only subvert the meaηings of a text that has already been construed determinαtely So what does deconstruction ultimately favour detenninαtion or disseminαtion Deπida needs to decide17

whether differαnce promotes stability ίη meaning (even a relative one) or dissemination He cannot utilise both possibilities simply because deconstruction needs them both 18

University of Crete Greece

290

presence Derrida coins the neologism differαnce ιο describe the difference or the being-different of these differences the production as well as the contamination of each present element by something which is not present The substitution of the e of difference by the a of differaηce from the present participle differaηte reca11s the French verb differer The verb differer has two seemingly quite distinct meanings which are drawn from the Latin verb differere The double meaning of the French differer is rendered ίn English by the different verbs to differ and to defer Hence differer ίn the sense of the verb to differ signifies difference as lack of resemblance between two things distinction lack of identity dissimilaήty or discemibility while differer ίn the sense of the verb to defer sigηifies the interposition of delay the interva1 of a spacing and temΡοήlίΖίηg that puts off until later what is presently denied the possible that is presently impossible8

Hence differαnce for Derrida does not constίtute aη obstacle that would prevent someone from making relαtively stαble determinations regarding a text s meaniηg In fact differαnce we are told is the condition of possibility and impossibility of meaning while it makes meaning present it excludes it from beiηg αbsolutely present Henc~ the non-identity of meaniηg with itself this differαnce has not the slightest effect οη the establishment of a text s intentional meaning as Derήda often argues ellphatically in opposition to all those who he thiηks are misinterpreting him when characterising deconstruction as henneneutic teποήsm (eg John Ellis )9 this process of intentioηs and meaning differing from themsel νes does not negate the possibility of doublίng commentary (AfteIWord 147Postface)

Ιη this sense deconstructioηs doubling commentary does not differ radically from other tradition~l reconstructions of a text s authorial intentions As Deπida himself confesses And you are ήght ίn saying that these practical implicatioηs for interpretation are not so threatening to conventional modes of reading (Άfterwοrd 147Postface 271) All those readers who would hastily conclude that the radical view of language and meaning put forward ίη the first part of Ο GrαmmatologylO fundamentally overtums all our traditional ηotions of iηterpretation and reading would find themselves filled with surpήse when in the second part ίn the section entitled The Exorbitant Question of Method they are suddenly prompted to respect all the classical exigencies and all the instruments of traditional cήtίcίsm (OG 158IDLG 227)

Ιη the same spirit ίn Afterword Towards an Ethics of Discussion Derrida cautions against reading uηdecidability as equivalent to indeterminacy

Ι do not believe Ι have ever spoken of indeteπninacy whether in regard to meaning or anything else Undecidability is somethiηg else again undecidabi1ity is always a

286

determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example of meaning but also of acts) These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for exshyample discursive - syntactical ΟΤ rhetοήcal - but also political ethical etc) They are pragmatically determined The analyses that Ι have devoted Ιο undecidability concern just these deteπninations and these defmitions not at all some vague iηdeterminacy Which is to say that from the point of view of semantics but also of ethics and ροlί tics deconstruction should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism

Το be sure in order for structures of undecidability to be possible (and hence structures of decisions and of responsibilities as well) there must be a certain play differance nonίdentity Νοι of iηdetermination but of differance or of nonidentity with oneseIf ίη the very process of deteπnination Differance is not indeterminacy It renders determinacy both possible and necessary (Afterword 148-9Postface 273-4)

Hence Deπida does not seem ΙΟ question the attribution οί relatively stable meanings to words and by extension to texts themselves This is what allows Deπida to be able to decide for example whenever Plato uses the equivocal word pharmakon whether he means either remedy or poison The essential or undecidable equivocity of the word pharmakon is οί another nature It lies ίη the text s refusa1 to decide against its author s intentions ίη favour οί the identification οί the word with one οί its two opposite meanings (thus the pharmakon is described as undecidable) The text does not refuse Ιο determine different meanings for the word pharmakon it refuses to decide ίη favour οί the one or the other Υet ίί differance is not indetenninacy ίί it renders deteπninacy both

possible and necessary thereby allowing a text to possess a relative stability then what is it that renders the deconstruction οί these relatively stable determinations possible The answer is again Differance ΑΙΙ those elements previously descήbed as interνening ίn the production of meaning shyplay difference differance - are a1so invoked to justify the deconstruction of that effect οί meaning wmch the differentia1 play itself has produced Ιn order Ιο justify the possibility οί a texts deconstruction Deπida turns Ιο the turbulent effects of differance which however were previously declared as ηοΙ constituting an όbstacΙe Ιο the attainment οί those stable textual determinations which are now subject Ιο deconstruction The differential play by preventing a concept s meaning to be fully present (present Ιο itself Ιο its signified to th~ other) (OG 8IDLG 17) is now posed as that wmch pushes the concepts (see for example the concept pharmakon) - and by extension the text ίη its entirety - into undecidability The same play which did not previously prevent concepts from possessing a relatively stable meaning If as Simon Glendinning writes the necessity οί play ensures that any putative unity οί meaning is α priori dispersed ίn advancell then which stability of meaning even relative is ίι possible Ιο begin from If the term dissemination12 is another name for the play which for Deπida characteήses aΙΙ conceptual identities then the stability

287

of meaning that the doubling commentary requires seems ιο haνe its possibility undermined

Derήda fal1s ίηΙο a paradox when he presents this play or differαnce shythe constant slipping of entities aηd their passage into their opposites as a perpetual reνersal of properties - as limited οηlΥ Ιο a determinαte oscillation between highly determined possibilities without haνing any ρήοr effect οη the process of the detenninαtion of these possibilities If there is a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indeterminαtion (Άftervιοrd 144Postface 266) ίn the process of deteπnination as h~ himself declares how then is determination possible ίη the fonn required by the doubling commentary

Deπida mterprets the effects of the differentia1 constitution of concepts αt will Το the extent that deconstruction needs the doubling commentary the constitution of a sign s meaning or identity through its differences from other sigηs does ηοΙ preνent signs or concepts from carrying with them at the leνel of their use a certain relatiνely stable load of meaning (something that according Ιο Derrida allows the existence of stable determinations of a texts νouloir-dire as that of his doubling commentary) Οη the other haηd when Deπida needs to explain and justify how the deconstruction of this doubling commentary is made possible he inνokes a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indetermination that was able to open the space of my iηterpretation for example that of the word supplement [italics added] (Άfterwοrd 144Postface 266)13 Thus Derrida seems to remain blind to the consequences of the existence of this play or relatiνe indeteπnination ίη relation to the possibility of doubling commentary itself The hesitation that Derήda exhibits ίη regard to the exact role middotthat indeteπninacy plays within middotdeconstructiνe reading - a hesitation imposed by the νery prerequisites of deconstructiνe dbuble reading - forces him into contradictory statements such as when οη the one hand he explicit1y refers to a certain play άr indetemήnation in order to justify the possibility of deconstruction while οη the other hand he claims that 1 do not belieνe 1 haνe eνer spoken of indetenninacy whether in regard to meaning or anythίng else Differαnce is not indeterminacy (Afterword 148Postface 273) Yet ίη a third passage Deπida declares again that [ο]nce again that was possible only if a non-self-identity a differαnce aηd a relαtive indeterminαcy opened the space of this νiolent history (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 267) Thus due to the paradoxical presuppositions of deconstructiνe reading a11 Deπidas descriptions will haνe to oscillate uncertainly between the need for the attaiηment of stable determinatioηs and the possibility of their dissemiηation

11 Interpreting Authorial 1ntention Ιn contradiction with what he says about

the endless play between concepts the fissure that differαnce effects οη the

288

core of presence the sign which is just a trace the residue of meaning which is just meaning falling short of itself or the dispersαl of meaning in general Deπida treats authοήal or textua1 intention (a texts vouloir-dire) as something which can be determined univocally And this seems to flow from the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself Deconstruction is installed between a texts intended meaning (its declαrαtiνe layer) and the text itself (its descriptive layer) If a text s authorial intention was not fixed and uniνoca1 then it would be difficult for deconstruction ιο juxtapose against it contradictory elements found ίn the same text 14 Thus contrary to the text as a whole which Deπida treats as heterogeneous and equiνocal authοήal or textual intention is presented as a1ways possessίng coherence15 homogeneity and as being characteήsed by lack of ambiguity Moreoνer Derrida treats the text during its first reading as if only one inteφretatiοn of authοήa1 intention were possible He neνer examines the possibility (without being theoretically able to preclude such a possibility) that other interpretations of authοήal intention are also possible The aim of this is Ιο protect the effectiveness of the strategy of deconstruction If Derrίda accepted even potentially that other interpretations of a text s νouloir-dire were possible then he could ποΙ preclude the possibi1ity that other non-metaphysica1 determinations of a text s intentional meaning could be feasible deteπninations that would not thus be ίη dire need of deconstruction This in tum would affect his whole narrative about Westem metaphysics which is aηimated by the spffit of an unequiνocαl interpretation of the texts of the philosophical tradition thereby deΡήνίng it of much of its credibility Moreoνer if he conceded the possibility of the existence of other plausible interpretations either metaphysical or ηοΙ (although this is something that he could ηοΙ know ίη adνance) then the deconstruction of merely one interρretation out of this potential plethora of plausible interpretations would have only a limited significance and effectiveness

The kind of certainty about a text s νouloir-dire that deconstruction requires is possible only if authorial meanings are pure solid selfshyidentical facts which can be used to anchor the work However this way of conceiving meaning is ίη direct opposition to deconstruction for which meaning is impossible to detemύne ίη teπns of a fixed entity or substance Αη author s intention is itself a complex text which can be debated translated and νariously interpreted just like any other text (Άfterwοrd 143Postface 265)

Derrida for all his harsh criticism of organicist concepts seems paradoxica1ly to share the prejudgement that philosophica1 texts at least if only at an initial leνel are integrated wholes as if the υnίΙΥ of the work resides ίη the author s all-perνasive intentίon However there is ίn fact ηο reason why the author should not have had severa1 mutua11y contradictory

289

iηtentions or why her intention may not have been somehow selfshycontradictory This is actua11y a possibility that Denida does not consider at all The way ίη which authοήal intentioηs appear ίη texts does not necessarily foπn a consistent whole and it may be unwise to rest υροη this assumption too heavily particularly if one speaks as Deπida does about intention as ΌηΙΥ an effect There is absolutely ηο need to suppose that authοήal or textua1 intention either do or should constitute hannonious wholes

Ιη this sense Derήda s stance towards a text s authοήal intentioη (ie its νouloir-dire) could be described as juridical anything which cannot be herded inside the enclosure of probable authοήal meaning is brusquely expelled and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single goveming intention Under such an approach authorial indetermiηacies are abolίshed ίn order to be replaced with a stable meaning They must be normalised Such a doubling commentary of authοήal or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the greatest number of a work s elements Heηce it would not be exorbitant to attribute to Deπida ίn his treatment of authοήal or textual intention the same accusations he attήbutes to the metaphysical tradition conceming the way ίn which it treats texts as unified wholes

111 Conclusion Derήda could have limited himself Ιο the less ambitious (and

also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles or containers of αbsolutely present meanings Of course he would not be the first philosopher to make such a claim Moreover such a claim would not necessarily exclude the possibίlity of the existence of re1atively stable meaniηgs it would exclude only the existeηce of perfectly univocαl meanings 16 Υet Derήda is not coηtent with merely doubting univocity He wants to do something bigger to decoηstruct He thus takes the fιυther step of arguing that ίn the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our linguistic practices the dissemination of construed meanings into undecidability is endless Now the possibility of deconstruction arises but a certain anomaly ίn its double interpretive procedure seems Ιο arise too α text must be read determinαtely ίη order to be disseminated into an undecidability that never breaks completely free of its initial detennination Deconstruction can only subvert the meaηings of a text that has already been construed determinαtely So what does deconstruction ultimately favour detenninαtion or disseminαtion Deπida needs to decide17

whether differαnce promotes stability ίη meaning (even a relative one) or dissemination He cannot utilise both possibilities simply because deconstruction needs them both 18

University of Crete Greece

290

determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example of meaning but also of acts) These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for exshyample discursive - syntactical ΟΤ rhetοήcal - but also political ethical etc) They are pragmatically determined The analyses that Ι have devoted Ιο undecidability concern just these deteπninations and these defmitions not at all some vague iηdeterminacy Which is to say that from the point of view of semantics but also of ethics and ροlί tics deconstruction should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism

Το be sure in order for structures of undecidability to be possible (and hence structures of decisions and of responsibilities as well) there must be a certain play differance nonίdentity Νοι of iηdetermination but of differance or of nonidentity with oneseIf ίη the very process of deteπnination Differance is not indeterminacy It renders determinacy both possible and necessary (Afterword 148-9Postface 273-4)

Hence Deπida does not seem ΙΟ question the attribution οί relatively stable meanings to words and by extension to texts themselves This is what allows Deπida to be able to decide for example whenever Plato uses the equivocal word pharmakon whether he means either remedy or poison The essential or undecidable equivocity of the word pharmakon is οί another nature It lies ίη the text s refusa1 to decide against its author s intentions ίη favour οί the identification οί the word with one οί its two opposite meanings (thus the pharmakon is described as undecidable) The text does not refuse Ιο determine different meanings for the word pharmakon it refuses to decide ίη favour οί the one or the other Υet ίί differance is not indetenninacy ίί it renders deteπninacy both

possible and necessary thereby allowing a text to possess a relative stability then what is it that renders the deconstruction οί these relatively stable determinations possible The answer is again Differance ΑΙΙ those elements previously descήbed as interνening ίn the production of meaning shyplay difference differance - are a1so invoked to justify the deconstruction of that effect οί meaning wmch the differentia1 play itself has produced Ιn order Ιο justify the possibility οί a texts deconstruction Deπida turns Ιο the turbulent effects of differance which however were previously declared as ηοΙ constituting an όbstacΙe Ιο the attainment οί those stable textual determinations which are now subject Ιο deconstruction The differential play by preventing a concept s meaning to be fully present (present Ιο itself Ιο its signified to th~ other) (OG 8IDLG 17) is now posed as that wmch pushes the concepts (see for example the concept pharmakon) - and by extension the text ίη its entirety - into undecidability The same play which did not previously prevent concepts from possessing a relatively stable meaning If as Simon Glendinning writes the necessity οί play ensures that any putative unity οί meaning is α priori dispersed ίn advancell then which stability of meaning even relative is ίι possible Ιο begin from If the term dissemination12 is another name for the play which for Deπida characteήses aΙΙ conceptual identities then the stability

287

of meaning that the doubling commentary requires seems ιο haνe its possibility undermined

Derήda fal1s ίηΙο a paradox when he presents this play or differαnce shythe constant slipping of entities aηd their passage into their opposites as a perpetual reνersal of properties - as limited οηlΥ Ιο a determinαte oscillation between highly determined possibilities without haνing any ρήοr effect οη the process of the detenninαtion of these possibilities If there is a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indeterminαtion (Άftervιοrd 144Postface 266) ίn the process of deteπnination as h~ himself declares how then is determination possible ίη the fonn required by the doubling commentary

Deπida mterprets the effects of the differentia1 constitution of concepts αt will Το the extent that deconstruction needs the doubling commentary the constitution of a sign s meaning or identity through its differences from other sigηs does ηοΙ preνent signs or concepts from carrying with them at the leνel of their use a certain relatiνely stable load of meaning (something that according Ιο Derrida allows the existence of stable determinations of a texts νouloir-dire as that of his doubling commentary) Οη the other haηd when Deπida needs to explain and justify how the deconstruction of this doubling commentary is made possible he inνokes a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indetermination that was able to open the space of my iηterpretation for example that of the word supplement [italics added] (Άfterwοrd 144Postface 266)13 Thus Derrida seems to remain blind to the consequences of the existence of this play or relatiνe indeteπnination ίη relation to the possibility of doubling commentary itself The hesitation that Derήda exhibits ίη regard to the exact role middotthat indeteπninacy plays within middotdeconstructiνe reading - a hesitation imposed by the νery prerequisites of deconstructiνe dbuble reading - forces him into contradictory statements such as when οη the one hand he explicit1y refers to a certain play άr indetemήnation in order to justify the possibility of deconstruction while οη the other hand he claims that 1 do not belieνe 1 haνe eνer spoken of indetenninacy whether in regard to meaning or anythίng else Differαnce is not indeterminacy (Afterword 148Postface 273) Yet ίη a third passage Deπida declares again that [ο]nce again that was possible only if a non-self-identity a differαnce aηd a relαtive indeterminαcy opened the space of this νiolent history (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 267) Thus due to the paradoxical presuppositions of deconstructiνe reading a11 Deπidas descriptions will haνe to oscillate uncertainly between the need for the attaiηment of stable determinatioηs and the possibility of their dissemiηation

11 Interpreting Authorial 1ntention Ιn contradiction with what he says about

the endless play between concepts the fissure that differαnce effects οη the

288

core of presence the sign which is just a trace the residue of meaning which is just meaning falling short of itself or the dispersαl of meaning in general Deπida treats authοήal or textua1 intention (a texts vouloir-dire) as something which can be determined univocally And this seems to flow from the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself Deconstruction is installed between a texts intended meaning (its declαrαtiνe layer) and the text itself (its descriptive layer) If a text s authorial intention was not fixed and uniνoca1 then it would be difficult for deconstruction ιο juxtapose against it contradictory elements found ίn the same text 14 Thus contrary to the text as a whole which Deπida treats as heterogeneous and equiνocal authοήal or textual intention is presented as a1ways possessίng coherence15 homogeneity and as being characteήsed by lack of ambiguity Moreoνer Derrida treats the text during its first reading as if only one inteφretatiοn of authοήa1 intention were possible He neνer examines the possibility (without being theoretically able to preclude such a possibility) that other interpretations of authοήal intention are also possible The aim of this is Ιο protect the effectiveness of the strategy of deconstruction If Derrίda accepted even potentially that other interpretations of a text s νouloir-dire were possible then he could ποΙ preclude the possibi1ity that other non-metaphysica1 determinations of a text s intentional meaning could be feasible deteπninations that would not thus be ίη dire need of deconstruction This in tum would affect his whole narrative about Westem metaphysics which is aηimated by the spffit of an unequiνocαl interpretation of the texts of the philosophical tradition thereby deΡήνίng it of much of its credibility Moreoνer if he conceded the possibility of the existence of other plausible interpretations either metaphysical or ηοΙ (although this is something that he could ηοΙ know ίη adνance) then the deconstruction of merely one interρretation out of this potential plethora of plausible interpretations would have only a limited significance and effectiveness

The kind of certainty about a text s νouloir-dire that deconstruction requires is possible only if authorial meanings are pure solid selfshyidentical facts which can be used to anchor the work However this way of conceiving meaning is ίη direct opposition to deconstruction for which meaning is impossible to detemύne ίη teπns of a fixed entity or substance Αη author s intention is itself a complex text which can be debated translated and νariously interpreted just like any other text (Άfterwοrd 143Postface 265)

Derrida for all his harsh criticism of organicist concepts seems paradoxica1ly to share the prejudgement that philosophica1 texts at least if only at an initial leνel are integrated wholes as if the υnίΙΥ of the work resides ίη the author s all-perνasive intentίon However there is ίn fact ηο reason why the author should not have had severa1 mutua11y contradictory

289

iηtentions or why her intention may not have been somehow selfshycontradictory This is actua11y a possibility that Denida does not consider at all The way ίη which authοήal intentioηs appear ίη texts does not necessarily foπn a consistent whole and it may be unwise to rest υροη this assumption too heavily particularly if one speaks as Deπida does about intention as ΌηΙΥ an effect There is absolutely ηο need to suppose that authοήal or textua1 intention either do or should constitute hannonious wholes

Ιη this sense Derήda s stance towards a text s authοήal intentioη (ie its νouloir-dire) could be described as juridical anything which cannot be herded inside the enclosure of probable authοήal meaning is brusquely expelled and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single goveming intention Under such an approach authorial indetermiηacies are abolίshed ίn order to be replaced with a stable meaning They must be normalised Such a doubling commentary of authοήal or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the greatest number of a work s elements Heηce it would not be exorbitant to attribute to Deπida ίn his treatment of authοήal or textual intention the same accusations he attήbutes to the metaphysical tradition conceming the way ίn which it treats texts as unified wholes

111 Conclusion Derήda could have limited himself Ιο the less ambitious (and

also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles or containers of αbsolutely present meanings Of course he would not be the first philosopher to make such a claim Moreover such a claim would not necessarily exclude the possibίlity of the existence of re1atively stable meaniηgs it would exclude only the existeηce of perfectly univocαl meanings 16 Υet Derήda is not coηtent with merely doubting univocity He wants to do something bigger to decoηstruct He thus takes the fιυther step of arguing that ίn the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our linguistic practices the dissemination of construed meanings into undecidability is endless Now the possibility of deconstruction arises but a certain anomaly ίn its double interpretive procedure seems Ιο arise too α text must be read determinαtely ίη order to be disseminated into an undecidability that never breaks completely free of its initial detennination Deconstruction can only subvert the meaηings of a text that has already been construed determinαtely So what does deconstruction ultimately favour detenninαtion or disseminαtion Deπida needs to decide17

whether differαnce promotes stability ίη meaning (even a relative one) or dissemination He cannot utilise both possibilities simply because deconstruction needs them both 18

University of Crete Greece

290

of meaning that the doubling commentary requires seems ιο haνe its possibility undermined

Derήda fal1s ίηΙο a paradox when he presents this play or differαnce shythe constant slipping of entities aηd their passage into their opposites as a perpetual reνersal of properties - as limited οηlΥ Ιο a determinαte oscillation between highly determined possibilities without haνing any ρήοr effect οη the process of the detenninαtion of these possibilities If there is a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indeterminαtion (Άftervιοrd 144Postface 266) ίn the process of deteπnination as h~ himself declares how then is determination possible ίη the fonn required by the doubling commentary

Deπida mterprets the effects of the differentia1 constitution of concepts αt will Το the extent that deconstruction needs the doubling commentary the constitution of a sign s meaning or identity through its differences from other sigηs does ηοΙ preνent signs or concepts from carrying with them at the leνel of their use a certain relatiνely stable load of meaning (something that according Ιο Derrida allows the existence of stable determinations of a texts νouloir-dire as that of his doubling commentary) Οη the other haηd when Deπida needs to explain and justify how the deconstruction of this doubling commentary is made possible he inνokes a certain ρΙαΥ or relαtiνe indetermination that was able to open the space of my iηterpretation for example that of the word supplement [italics added] (Άfterwοrd 144Postface 266)13 Thus Derrida seems to remain blind to the consequences of the existence of this play or relatiνe indeteπnination ίη relation to the possibility of doubling commentary itself The hesitation that Derήda exhibits ίη regard to the exact role middotthat indeteπninacy plays within middotdeconstructiνe reading - a hesitation imposed by the νery prerequisites of deconstructiνe dbuble reading - forces him into contradictory statements such as when οη the one hand he explicit1y refers to a certain play άr indetemήnation in order to justify the possibility of deconstruction while οη the other hand he claims that 1 do not belieνe 1 haνe eνer spoken of indetenninacy whether in regard to meaning or anythίng else Differαnce is not indeterminacy (Afterword 148Postface 273) Yet ίη a third passage Deπida declares again that [ο]nce again that was possible only if a non-self-identity a differαnce aηd a relαtive indeterminαcy opened the space of this νiolent history (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 267) Thus due to the paradoxical presuppositions of deconstructiνe reading a11 Deπidas descriptions will haνe to oscillate uncertainly between the need for the attaiηment of stable determinatioηs and the possibility of their dissemiηation

11 Interpreting Authorial 1ntention Ιn contradiction with what he says about

the endless play between concepts the fissure that differαnce effects οη the

288

core of presence the sign which is just a trace the residue of meaning which is just meaning falling short of itself or the dispersαl of meaning in general Deπida treats authοήal or textua1 intention (a texts vouloir-dire) as something which can be determined univocally And this seems to flow from the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself Deconstruction is installed between a texts intended meaning (its declαrαtiνe layer) and the text itself (its descriptive layer) If a text s authorial intention was not fixed and uniνoca1 then it would be difficult for deconstruction ιο juxtapose against it contradictory elements found ίn the same text 14 Thus contrary to the text as a whole which Deπida treats as heterogeneous and equiνocal authοήal or textual intention is presented as a1ways possessίng coherence15 homogeneity and as being characteήsed by lack of ambiguity Moreoνer Derrida treats the text during its first reading as if only one inteφretatiοn of authοήa1 intention were possible He neνer examines the possibility (without being theoretically able to preclude such a possibility) that other interpretations of authοήal intention are also possible The aim of this is Ιο protect the effectiveness of the strategy of deconstruction If Derrίda accepted even potentially that other interpretations of a text s νouloir-dire were possible then he could ποΙ preclude the possibi1ity that other non-metaphysica1 determinations of a text s intentional meaning could be feasible deteπninations that would not thus be ίη dire need of deconstruction This in tum would affect his whole narrative about Westem metaphysics which is aηimated by the spffit of an unequiνocαl interpretation of the texts of the philosophical tradition thereby deΡήνίng it of much of its credibility Moreoνer if he conceded the possibility of the existence of other plausible interpretations either metaphysical or ηοΙ (although this is something that he could ηοΙ know ίη adνance) then the deconstruction of merely one interρretation out of this potential plethora of plausible interpretations would have only a limited significance and effectiveness

The kind of certainty about a text s νouloir-dire that deconstruction requires is possible only if authorial meanings are pure solid selfshyidentical facts which can be used to anchor the work However this way of conceiving meaning is ίη direct opposition to deconstruction for which meaning is impossible to detemύne ίη teπns of a fixed entity or substance Αη author s intention is itself a complex text which can be debated translated and νariously interpreted just like any other text (Άfterwοrd 143Postface 265)

Derrida for all his harsh criticism of organicist concepts seems paradoxica1ly to share the prejudgement that philosophica1 texts at least if only at an initial leνel are integrated wholes as if the υnίΙΥ of the work resides ίη the author s all-perνasive intentίon However there is ίn fact ηο reason why the author should not have had severa1 mutua11y contradictory

289

iηtentions or why her intention may not have been somehow selfshycontradictory This is actua11y a possibility that Denida does not consider at all The way ίη which authοήal intentioηs appear ίη texts does not necessarily foπn a consistent whole and it may be unwise to rest υροη this assumption too heavily particularly if one speaks as Deπida does about intention as ΌηΙΥ an effect There is absolutely ηο need to suppose that authοήal or textua1 intention either do or should constitute hannonious wholes

Ιη this sense Derήda s stance towards a text s authοήal intentioη (ie its νouloir-dire) could be described as juridical anything which cannot be herded inside the enclosure of probable authοήal meaning is brusquely expelled and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single goveming intention Under such an approach authorial indetermiηacies are abolίshed ίn order to be replaced with a stable meaning They must be normalised Such a doubling commentary of authοήal or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the greatest number of a work s elements Heηce it would not be exorbitant to attribute to Deπida ίn his treatment of authοήal or textual intention the same accusations he attήbutes to the metaphysical tradition conceming the way ίn which it treats texts as unified wholes

111 Conclusion Derήda could have limited himself Ιο the less ambitious (and

also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles or containers of αbsolutely present meanings Of course he would not be the first philosopher to make such a claim Moreover such a claim would not necessarily exclude the possibίlity of the existence of re1atively stable meaniηgs it would exclude only the existeηce of perfectly univocαl meanings 16 Υet Derήda is not coηtent with merely doubting univocity He wants to do something bigger to decoηstruct He thus takes the fιυther step of arguing that ίn the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our linguistic practices the dissemination of construed meanings into undecidability is endless Now the possibility of deconstruction arises but a certain anomaly ίn its double interpretive procedure seems Ιο arise too α text must be read determinαtely ίη order to be disseminated into an undecidability that never breaks completely free of its initial detennination Deconstruction can only subvert the meaηings of a text that has already been construed determinαtely So what does deconstruction ultimately favour detenninαtion or disseminαtion Deπida needs to decide17

whether differαnce promotes stability ίη meaning (even a relative one) or dissemination He cannot utilise both possibilities simply because deconstruction needs them both 18

University of Crete Greece

290

core of presence the sign which is just a trace the residue of meaning which is just meaning falling short of itself or the dispersαl of meaning in general Deπida treats authοήal or textua1 intention (a texts vouloir-dire) as something which can be determined univocally And this seems to flow from the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself Deconstruction is installed between a texts intended meaning (its declαrαtiνe layer) and the text itself (its descriptive layer) If a text s authorial intention was not fixed and uniνoca1 then it would be difficult for deconstruction ιο juxtapose against it contradictory elements found ίn the same text 14 Thus contrary to the text as a whole which Deπida treats as heterogeneous and equiνocal authοήal or textual intention is presented as a1ways possessίng coherence15 homogeneity and as being characteήsed by lack of ambiguity Moreoνer Derrida treats the text during its first reading as if only one inteφretatiοn of authοήa1 intention were possible He neνer examines the possibility (without being theoretically able to preclude such a possibility) that other interpretations of authοήal intention are also possible The aim of this is Ιο protect the effectiveness of the strategy of deconstruction If Derrίda accepted even potentially that other interpretations of a text s νouloir-dire were possible then he could ποΙ preclude the possibi1ity that other non-metaphysica1 determinations of a text s intentional meaning could be feasible deteπninations that would not thus be ίη dire need of deconstruction This in tum would affect his whole narrative about Westem metaphysics which is aηimated by the spffit of an unequiνocαl interpretation of the texts of the philosophical tradition thereby deΡήνίng it of much of its credibility Moreoνer if he conceded the possibility of the existence of other plausible interpretations either metaphysical or ηοΙ (although this is something that he could ηοΙ know ίη adνance) then the deconstruction of merely one interρretation out of this potential plethora of plausible interpretations would have only a limited significance and effectiveness

The kind of certainty about a text s νouloir-dire that deconstruction requires is possible only if authorial meanings are pure solid selfshyidentical facts which can be used to anchor the work However this way of conceiving meaning is ίη direct opposition to deconstruction for which meaning is impossible to detemύne ίη teπns of a fixed entity or substance Αη author s intention is itself a complex text which can be debated translated and νariously interpreted just like any other text (Άfterwοrd 143Postface 265)

Derrida for all his harsh criticism of organicist concepts seems paradoxica1ly to share the prejudgement that philosophica1 texts at least if only at an initial leνel are integrated wholes as if the υnίΙΥ of the work resides ίη the author s all-perνasive intentίon However there is ίn fact ηο reason why the author should not have had severa1 mutua11y contradictory

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iηtentions or why her intention may not have been somehow selfshycontradictory This is actua11y a possibility that Denida does not consider at all The way ίη which authοήal intentioηs appear ίη texts does not necessarily foπn a consistent whole and it may be unwise to rest υροη this assumption too heavily particularly if one speaks as Deπida does about intention as ΌηΙΥ an effect There is absolutely ηο need to suppose that authοήal or textua1 intention either do or should constitute hannonious wholes

Ιη this sense Derήda s stance towards a text s authοήal intentioη (ie its νouloir-dire) could be described as juridical anything which cannot be herded inside the enclosure of probable authοήal meaning is brusquely expelled and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single goveming intention Under such an approach authorial indetermiηacies are abolίshed ίn order to be replaced with a stable meaning They must be normalised Such a doubling commentary of authοήal or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the greatest number of a work s elements Heηce it would not be exorbitant to attribute to Deπida ίn his treatment of authοήal or textual intention the same accusations he attήbutes to the metaphysical tradition conceming the way ίn which it treats texts as unified wholes

111 Conclusion Derήda could have limited himself Ιο the less ambitious (and

also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles or containers of αbsolutely present meanings Of course he would not be the first philosopher to make such a claim Moreover such a claim would not necessarily exclude the possibίlity of the existence of re1atively stable meaniηgs it would exclude only the existeηce of perfectly univocαl meanings 16 Υet Derήda is not coηtent with merely doubting univocity He wants to do something bigger to decoηstruct He thus takes the fιυther step of arguing that ίn the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our linguistic practices the dissemination of construed meanings into undecidability is endless Now the possibility of deconstruction arises but a certain anomaly ίn its double interpretive procedure seems Ιο arise too α text must be read determinαtely ίη order to be disseminated into an undecidability that never breaks completely free of its initial detennination Deconstruction can only subvert the meaηings of a text that has already been construed determinαtely So what does deconstruction ultimately favour detenninαtion or disseminαtion Deπida needs to decide17

whether differαnce promotes stability ίη meaning (even a relative one) or dissemination He cannot utilise both possibilities simply because deconstruction needs them both 18

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iηtentions or why her intention may not have been somehow selfshycontradictory This is actua11y a possibility that Denida does not consider at all The way ίη which authοήal intentioηs appear ίη texts does not necessarily foπn a consistent whole and it may be unwise to rest υροη this assumption too heavily particularly if one speaks as Deπida does about intention as ΌηΙΥ an effect There is absolutely ηο need to suppose that authοήal or textua1 intention either do or should constitute hannonious wholes

Ιη this sense Derήda s stance towards a text s authοήal intentioη (ie its νouloir-dire) could be described as juridical anything which cannot be herded inside the enclosure of probable authοήal meaning is brusquely expelled and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single goveming intention Under such an approach authorial indetermiηacies are abolίshed ίn order to be replaced with a stable meaning They must be normalised Such a doubling commentary of authοήal or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the greatest number of a work s elements Heηce it would not be exorbitant to attribute to Deπida ίn his treatment of authοήal or textual intention the same accusations he attήbutes to the metaphysical tradition conceming the way ίn which it treats texts as unified wholes

111 Conclusion Derήda could have limited himself Ιο the less ambitious (and

also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles or containers of αbsolutely present meanings Of course he would not be the first philosopher to make such a claim Moreover such a claim would not necessarily exclude the possibίlity of the existence of re1atively stable meaniηgs it would exclude only the existeηce of perfectly univocαl meanings 16 Υet Derήda is not coηtent with merely doubting univocity He wants to do something bigger to decoηstruct He thus takes the fιυther step of arguing that ίn the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our linguistic practices the dissemination of construed meanings into undecidability is endless Now the possibility of deconstruction arises but a certain anomaly ίn its double interpretive procedure seems Ιο arise too α text must be read determinαtely ίη order to be disseminated into an undecidability that never breaks completely free of its initial detennination Deconstruction can only subvert the meaηings of a text that has already been construed determinαtely So what does deconstruction ultimately favour detenninαtion or disseminαtion Deπida needs to decide17

whether differαnce promotes stability ίη meaning (even a relative one) or dissemination He cannot utilise both possibilities simply because deconstruction needs them both 18

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References 1 JacquesDerήda Ο Grammatology trans Gayatri C Spiνak (Baltimore John Hopkins

UώνersίtΥ Press 1976 (OG) De lα Grαmmαtologie (Paris Les Editions de Μίηυίι 1967) (DLG)

2 Jacques Deπida Platos Phaπnacy ίη Disseminαtion trans Barbara Johnson (Chicago Cbicago University Press 1981) (D) Le Pharrnacie de Platon ίη Lα Disseminαtion Collection Έssais (paris Editions de Seuil 1972) (DIS)

3 Deaida cal1s this initial reading that deconstruction enacts οη the text dominant interpretation (interpr6tation dominant) [J Deπida Άfterwοrd Toward an Ethic of Discussion in Limited Inc trans S Weber (Evaston ll Northwestem Uniνersity Press 1988) ρ 143 (Άfterwοrd) Postface Vers une ethique de discussion in Limited Znc (Paήs Les Editions de Minuit 1972) ρ 265 (Postface)]

4 Jacques Deπida Signature Event Context ίη Limited Znc opcit ρ21 Signature Evenement Contexte ίη Mαrges de Ια philosophie (parίs Les Editions de Minuit 1972) ρ392

5 Jacques Derήda Structure Sign and Play ίη the Discourse of Human Sciences ία Writing αrιd Difference trans Alan Bass (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1978) ρ 280 La structure le signe et 1e jeu dans le discours de sciences humains ίη Ecriture et Difference (Paήs Editίons de Seuil 1967) ρ 411

6 Jacques Derήda Positions trans Alan Bass (London The Athlone Press 1987) (Ρ) Positions (paris Les Editions de Minuit 1972) (POS)

7 Ferdinard de Saussure Cours de linguistique generαle (Paris Payot 1973) ρ 98 (CLG) 8 Jacques Derήda Differance ίη Mαrgins ο Philosophy trans Alan Bass (London

Harvester Wbeatsheaf 1982) ρ 3 La differance in Mαrges de lα philosophie Paήs Les ~tions de Minuit 1972 ρ 3

9 JoOO Μ Ellis Agαinst Deconstuction (Princeton NJ Pήnceton University Press 1989) ρ134

10 The fπst part of Ο GrαmmatoZogy is presented by Deπida as a theoretίcal matrix while the second part (ίe Derrida s deconstructive reading of Rousseau s Essay and the Conesswns) is presented as an example of the fust part The firsr part of this book Writing before the Letter sketches ίη broad outlines a theoretical matrix It indicates certain signίficant histοήcal moments and proposes certain cήticaΙ concepts These critical concepts are put Ιο the test ίn the second part Nature Culture Wήtίng This is the moment as it were of the example although strictly speaking that ηοιίοη is not acceptable within my argurnent (OG lxxxixIDLG 7)

11 Simon Glendincing Οπ Being with Others Heidegger-Qerridα-Wittgenstein (London Routledge 1999) ρ 81

12 Explaining the term dissemination Gayatri Chacravorty Spivak mentions the following ΈΧΡΙοίtίng a false etymological kinship between semantίcs and semen Derήda offers this version of textuality Α sowing that does not produce plants but is simply inficitely repeated Α semination that is not insemination but disseminaton seed spilled in vain Not an exact and controlled polysemy but a proliferation of always different always postponed meanings (G S Spivak Translators Preface ίη Jacques Deπίda Ο Grαmmαtology Ορ Ιχν) While Ricbard Harland adds Disseminαcion must be distίnguished from univocity or the state of single meanings maintaίned by the signίfied ίη the writer s mind but it must also be distinguished from polysemy or the state of multiple meaώngs maintained by the signifιed in the readers mind Disseminαtion is the state of perpetually unfulfilled meaning that exists ίη the absence of all signifieds (Richard Harland Superstructuralism The Philosophy ΟΙ Structuralism amp Post-Structurαlism New York Methuen 1987 ρ 135)

13 In the next page of the Άfterwοrd Towards an Ethics of Discussion explicatίng the possibility of the deconstruction of doubling commentary Derrίda refers once more Ιο a trelatiνe indeteoninacy within deteπnination as a prerequisite for the possibility of any

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deconstruction [o]nce again that was possible only if a non-self-identity a differance and a relαtive indeterminαcy opened the space of this violent history (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 267)

14 In the Άfterwοrd Derήda declares ίη consistency with what he thinks about language and meaning that doubling coπunentary is not a moment of simple reflexive recording that would transcήbe the originary and true layer of a texts intentionαl meαning a rneaning that is univocαl and self-identical (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 143Postface 265) However in practice Derήda treats the doubling of a texts authοήal intention according Ιο those teπns that he denounces above Indicative of this attίtude is the fact that from his multiple readings hesitation is cornpletely absent

15 Por example in Violence and Metaphysics Derήda declares that [w]e will refuse to sacήfice the self-coherent unity of intention [lunite fidele α soi de lintention] to the becorniηg which then would be ηο more than pure disorder (1 Derήda Violence and Metaphysics ίη Writing αΜDifference Ορ ρ 84)

16 This position would be also content with a certain conception of differance while differance makes meaning present ίι excludes ίι from being αbsolutely present

17 In Structure Sign and Play ίn the Discourse of the Human Sciences when he refers to two different Interpretations of interpretation the structuralist decίΡheήng of a meaning and the Nietzschean affmnation of play which can be compared respectively with the two different kinds of interpretation that cοmΡήse deconstructive double reading itself Derrida declares that Ί do not belίeve that today there is any question of choosing - ίη the first place because here we are ίη a region (let us say provisionally a region of histοήcίty) where the category of choice seems particularly tήνίaΙ (1 Derήda Structure Sign and Wrίtίng αΜ Difference οΡcίΙ ρ 293) Even if ίι is accepted that this declaration does not constitute aπ attempt to escape from aπ adequate justification of the paradoxical demands of deconstructi ve reading what are the interpretive resources that Derrida has utilised ίn order to reach such an assertion about the kinds of interpretation prevailing today as well as todays situatίon regarding choice 1s such an assertion made from either the side of decipheήng or playful interpretatίon Does not such an assertion violate what Demda say~ about choice

18 Ι would like to thank Dr Peter Langford for his invaluable help

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deconstruction [o]nce again that was possible only if a non-self-identity a differance and a relαtive indeterminαcy opened the space of this violent history (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 145Postface 267)

14 In the Άfterwοrd Derήda declares ίη consistency with what he thinks about language and meaning that doubling coπunentary is not a moment of simple reflexive recording that would transcήbe the originary and true layer of a texts intentionαl meαning a rneaning that is univocαl and self-identical (italics added) (Άfterwοrd 143Postface 265) However in practice Derήda treats the doubling of a texts authοήal intention according Ιο those teπns that he denounces above Indicative of this attίtude is the fact that from his multiple readings hesitation is cornpletely absent

15 Por example in Violence and Metaphysics Derήda declares that [w]e will refuse to sacήfice the self-coherent unity of intention [lunite fidele α soi de lintention] to the becorniηg which then would be ηο more than pure disorder (1 Derήda Violence and Metaphysics ίη Writing αΜDifference Ορ ρ 84)

16 This position would be also content with a certain conception of differance while differance makes meaning present ίι excludes ίι from being αbsolutely present

17 In Structure Sign and Play ίn the Discourse of the Human Sciences when he refers to two different Interpretations of interpretation the structuralist decίΡheήng of a meaning and the Nietzschean affmnation of play which can be compared respectively with the two different kinds of interpretation that cοmΡήse deconstructive double reading itself Derrida declares that Ί do not belίeve that today there is any question of choosing - ίη the first place because here we are ίη a region (let us say provisionally a region of histοήcίty) where the category of choice seems particularly tήνίaΙ (1 Derήda Structure Sign and Wrίtίng αΜ Difference οΡcίΙ ρ 293) Even if ίι is accepted that this declaration does not constitute aπ attempt to escape from aπ adequate justification of the paradoxical demands of deconstructi ve reading what are the interpretive resources that Derrida has utilised ίn order to reach such an assertion about the kinds of interpretation prevailing today as well as todays situatίon regarding choice 1s such an assertion made from either the side of decipheήng or playful interpretatίon Does not such an assertion violate what Demda say~ about choice

18 Ι would like to thank Dr Peter Langford for his invaluable help

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