Today Chapter 4 extensions 4.6 - 4.8 Chapter 5. Krugman & Venables (1995-1996) intermediate inputs...
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Transcript of Today Chapter 4 extensions 4.6 - 4.8 Chapter 5. Krugman & Venables (1995-1996) intermediate inputs...
Today
• Chapter 4 extensions 4.6 - 4.8
• Chapter 5
Krugman & Venables (1995-1996)
• intermediate inputs• labor mobile between sectors but not between
regions• firms use M-products (µ) and M-labor (1-µ)• also known as the Vertical Linkages (VL) model• base model of Chapter 3 is usually named the
CP model (Core-Periphery)
The VL model in writing• U = F1-δ Mδ
• cj = pj -ε Iε-1 E
• total spending on M-products in stead of δY is now
E = δY + μ npx
1
1
N
iicM
11
1
1N
iipI
value of allvarieties produced
Supply side
• mark-up pricing in core model was p = βW/ρ with normalization β = ρ -> p = W
• now becomes p = Iµ W(1-µ) • zero profit condition px = Iµ W(1-µ) ( α + βx)• x = α(ε-1)/β = αε
• Food sector:– CRS: F(1-λ) = 1-λ – DRS: F'(1-λ) >0 ; F''(1-λ) < 0
• Consumer income = (M) wage income + output food sector: Y = Wλ + F(1-λ)
Intersector mobility
• price index is the same for F workers and M-workers
• for mobility between sectors only the nominal wage matters
• dλ/λ = η [W - F'(1-λ) ] (4.14)• same as in core model: equal demand and
supply leads to
Regional wages in VL modelSupply x1 = demand in region 1 + demand in region 2
+ extra production melted away
• α (ε -1)/β = (E1 p1 -ε
I1ε-1
+ E2 p1 -ε
T 1-ε I1
ε-1 )
leads to
• W1 = (1- β)/α)1/ε(1-µ) I1-µ/1-µ (E1I1
ε-1 + E2 T1-ε I2
ε-1)1/ε (1-µ)
• W2 = (1- β)/α)1/ε(1-µ) I2-µ/1-µ (E2I2
ε-1 + E1 T1-ε I1
ε-1)1/ε (1-µ)
• simplifies to core model when µ = 0
• main differences: – E in stead of Y
– Extra term I-µ/1-µ : supplier access effect : closer to suppliers lowers price index and can give higher nominal wages.
The four forces in the LV model
• extent of competition effect: a higher λ lowers the price index of all other products (-)
• market size or home market effect: a higher λ increases the market (+)
• (new) access supplier effect: a higher λ increases nominal wages (+)
• (new) marginal productivity effect in food sector (-)– only with DRS: a higher λ increases food wages
region 2
region 1
share of M-workers in region 1
W1/W2
T=1.5
B stable equilibrium
B
The VL model with DRS in the food sector
region 1
region 2
share of M-workers in region 1
W1/W2
T=1.3
B unstable equilibrium
B
The VL model with DRS in the food sector
region 2
region 1
share of M-workers in region 1
W1/W2
T=1.1
B stable equilibrium
B
The VL model with DRS in the food sector
T0
1
0,5
λ1
Fig 4.10 The bell-shaped cirve
Unstable equilibria
Stable equilibria
The VL model with DRS in the food sector
VL model: with lowering T from dispersion to agglomeration to dispersion
T0
1
0,5
λ1
Fig 4.3 The Tomahawk diagram
Unstable equilibria
Stable equilibria
CP model: no (increasing) spreading force when T becomes lowNext chapter: Helpman(1998) also gets a bell-shaped curve by introducingthe housing market as a spreading force
The generalized model
• Puga (1999) not discussed here in detail
• CP model plus µ (intermediate production) ηs (intersector migration) and ηr (interregional migration)
• Only the model with ηr =0 (no interregional migration) gives the bell-shape curve
The Footloose Entrepreneur (FE) model
• two labor production factors in stead of one:• skilled/unskilled ; human capital/labour ; R&D/production;
headquarters/plants• Skilled labor is mobile, unskilled labor immobile• In production function:
– α: skilled labor as fixed costs– β: unskilled labor as variable costs
• makes the model solvable because the mobile skilled labor demand is not a function of x
• equation (4.25) for skilled labor wage rate r1/r2
• discussion on the FE model will come back later
Chapter 5
Agglomeration, the home market effect
and spatial wages
Terminology (confusing!)• Concentration:
– industry is concentrated in some regions (xri /xni ) / ( xr /xn ) >1
• Specialization:– region is specialized in some industries (xri /xr ) / ( xin /xn ) > 1
– (xri /xr ) / ( xin /xn ) also know as the location coeffcient
• is the same : (xri /xni ) / ( xr /xn ) = (xri /xr ) / ( xni /xn )
Concentration=Specialization
• The distinction between concentration and specialization is not relevant for one spatial level. It is only done to be consistent with trade theory terminology:– specialization=concentration at the country level
• Agglomeration:– concentration of more than one industry
Wrong terminology:
• There is more car production in Germany than in The Netherlands or:
concentration -> Eir / Ein ≠ Eis / Ein
• concentration is relative not absolute
No concentration, no agglomeration
Concentration, no agglomeration
No concentration, agglomeration
concentration, agglomeration
Country A Country B
a. Neither specialization, concentration nor agglomeration
Industry 1 Industry 2
b. Specialization (=country concentration), no agglomeration
c. regional concentration, specialization, no agglomeration (??)
d. Concentration and agglomeration, no specialization
Country A Country B
Industry 1 Industry 2
in terms ofch 3-4 thiswas called agglomeration
hereagglomerationis about more industries
e. Concentration, agglomeration and specialization
Country A Country B
Industry 1 Industry 2
d. Concentration and agglomeration, no specialization
Concentration manufacturing
<1 Below national average
> 1 Above national average
(Eir / Er)/( Ein / En )
Absolute size manufacturing
Eir
Concentration bussiness services
< 1 Below national average
> 1Above national average
(Eir / Er)/( Ein / En )
Absolute size bussiness services
Eir
Convergence
• Increase/decline of gdp/cap differences
• Barro & Sala-i-Martin and others:
• Global no;within EU yes,but
• Results for EU:– 1980-1990 convergence– Later: divergence– Depends on level of region disaggregation
Nuts2 1995
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Gini coefficient: 0.1561
EU 1995-2001
Nuts2 2001
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Gini coefficient: 0.1539
EU 1995-2001
Nuts3 1995
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Gini coefficient: 0.2109
EU 1995-2001
Nuts 3 2001
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Gini coefficient: 0.2118
EU 1995-2001
Figure 5.2 Krugman specialization index
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8
France
UK
Spain
Austria
Germany
Italy
Belgium
Average
Sweden
Netherlands
Portugal
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Ireland
1994-1997
1980-1983
1970-1973
1980-2000:Increasingspecialization
Figure 5.3 Agglomeration of manufacturing in the EU*
0 10 20 30
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
Denmark
Finland
Austria
Sweden
Belgium
Netherlands
Spain
UK
Italy
France
Germany
1994-1997
1970-1973
Moderate changes
G. Ellison & E. L. Gleaser (1997)/(1999)
• Concentration is the rule, not the exception• Geography accounts for 20% of economic concentration• Concentration itself does not imply the existence of spill-overs• Natural advantages (first nature) may have similar effects
• -> no real support for GE
D. Black & J. Vernon Henderson (1999) ‘Spatial Evolution of Population and Industry in the United States’, American Economic Review Vol. 89, No. 2, May 1999, pp321-327
• evolution US urban growth 1900-1990
• Scale economies and agglomeration
• distribution remains remarkably stable• big cities stay big• little downward mobility• more upward mobility
“Geography matters?”
• Market potential
• mpj = ∑ i ≠ j ( Ni /dij)
Five hypotheses to be tested
1. The home market effect: large home market leads to net exporters
2. Large market potential raises local factor prices
3. Large market potential induces factor inflows (Chapter 9)
4. Shock sensitivity
5. Reductions in trade costs induce agglomeration
1. Home market effect
• an increase in a country's demand for cars will lead to a more than proportional increase of the production of cars
• if yes: support for new trade theory with transport costs and geographical economics
• if no: support for new trade theory without transport costs or neoclassical theory
Davis & Weinstein (1996-2003)
• Distinguish between trade theory and geographical economics• Measuring the home-market effect
• Xgnr = κgnr + κ1SHAREgnr + κ2IDIODEMgnr + END + errgnr
• SHARE = share of output good g in industy n for country r
• IDIODEM = difference between demand gn in r and demand gn in other countries
• END = endowments for gn + (neo-classical theory)
• if κ2 >1 home market effect (geographical economics)
• IDIODEM no geographical content (no distance)• Test on Japanese regions
Table 5.1 Home market effect for Japanese regions
IDIODEM 1.416 (0.025)
0.888 (0.070)
SHARE 1.033 (0.007)
-1.7441 (0.211)
END included? No Yes
# Observations 760 760
Source: Davis and Weinstein (1999); Standard errors between brackets, estimation method: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
ProblemsEND is in fact endogenous according to GE theoryHome market effect <-> lack of labor supply elasticity -> higher wages in agglomerations
yes no
• Neoclassical trade theory: factor price equalization
-> no spatial wage structure• New trade theory: some varieties produced in country A
and others in country B, no endogeous agglomeration towards A or B
-> no spatial wage structure
(unless A and B are different in size from the start)
2) Spatial wage structure
2) Spatial wage structure:distance to centres
• Hanson (1998) study on Mexico• Hypothesis 1: regional wages lower at higher
distances from Mexico City and USA• Hypothesis 2: trade liberalization has lead to a decline
of regional wage differences• finds strong support for H1 and weak support for H2• H1: (H2 with time dummy)
ln (Wit /Wct ) = k0 + k1 ln(tit ) + k2 ln(tfit ) + errit (5.2)
(k1 and k2 negative)
remember Wr = ( Σs Ys Trs1-ε
Isε-1 )1/ε
2) Spatial wage structure:market potential
• Log (Wj) = κ0 + κ1 log(Σk Yk e-κ2 Dij) + erri (5.4)
Table 5.3 EU regions 1992-2000
remember Wr = ( Σs Ys Trs1-ε
Isε-1 )1/ε
Coefficient Standard error
k1 0.898 0.020
k2 0.013 0.001
R2 0.61
2) Spatial wage structure:real market potential
• Hanson (1996)
• Log (Wj) = κ0 + ε-1log(Σk Yk ε+(1- ε)/δ Hk
(1-δ)(ε-1)/δ
Wk(ε-1)/δ T(1-ε)Djk) + errj (5.5)
• assumption: agriculture replaced by the housing market as a spreading force of non-tradables. If local demand increases due to agglomeration prices will go up -> additional spreading force
Structural wage
equation: (5.5) 1970-80 1980-90
δ 0.962 (0.015) 0.956 (0.013)
ε 7.597 (1.250) 6.562 (0.838)
Log(T) 1.970 (0.328) 3.219 (0.416)
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.347
Observations 3075 3075
ε/(ε-1) 1.152 1.180
ρ 0.868 0.847
Significant, but δ very high