Running head: Aesthetic Experience - student.cc.uoc.gršΨΓ350... · 2 Summary This study assessed...

Running head: Aesthetic Experience

“Intergrating the philosophy and psychology of aesthetic experience:

development of the Aesthetic Experience Scale “

Despina Stamatopoulou

University of Crete

Address for correspondence:

Despina Stamatopoulou,

University of Crete, School of Philosophy,

Department of Philosophy and Social Studies,

Panepistimioupolis, Gallos, Rethymno, 74100,

Crete, Greece.

Email address: Stamatop@ phl.uoc.gr

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Summary

This study assessed the dynamic relationship between person and object in aesthetic experience. Patterns of the structure of aesthetic experience were derived from a conceptual model based on philosophical and psychological ideas. These patterns were further informed by interviewing individuals with extensive involvement in aesthetic activities and twentyfive secondary students. Accordingly, they were tested by developing a large pool of items attempting to identify measurable structural components of aesthetic experience. Refined first in a pilot study, the 36 items questionnaire was administered to 652 Greek students, aged from 13 to 15 years. Correlation matrices and exploratory factor analyses on principal components were used to examine internal structural relationships. The obliquely rotated five-factor solution of the refined instrument, accounted for the 44.1% of the total variance, was combatible with the conceptual model of aesthetic experience, indicating the plausibility of both. The internal consistency of the items was adequate and external correllational analysis offered preliminary support for subsequent development of a self-report measure that serves to operationalize the major constructs of aesthetic experience in the general adolescent population. The results could also raise a bunch of theoretical issues for those interested in empirical aesthetics, suggesting that in experiential functioning, expressive perception and affect may play a more constructive role in cognitive processes than is generally acknowledged.

Psychological research on aesthetic issues has taken three distinct paths. One path is that of experimental aesthetics which either focuses on the gestalt properties of the material object (e.g., a painting) and defines the aesthetic effect directly in its perception (Arnheim, 1966, 1974) or on the arousal properties of the stimulus and the pleasures afforded by a work of art (Berlyne 1971, 1974) and links aesthetic behavior to exploration and the psycho-physiological concept of arousal. The other path is the philosophical psychology of art and aesthetic experience which primarily considers the work of art to be the experience that results from the transaction of the perceiving person’s aesthetic experience with the material object, through which the object is created and recreated (Dewey, 1934). A third path, recently emerged, is the psychology of emotions which primarily points out that for emotions to be aroused, people must be actively engaged in sensing the meaning of what is presented to them (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994; Mandler, 1982; for a critical review, see Ellsworth, 1994; Tan, 2000).

The perceiving person’s aesthetic relationship with the material object is an old problem in aesthetics. In addition, the concept of experience has been resistant to scientific psychological investigation (Crozier & Chapman, 1984). On the other hand,

3 the analytic empiricist’s stand, mostly adopted by psychologists focused on isolated aspects of the structural and content aspects of the aesthetic activity and produced fragmented pieces of knowledge. However, there is no real experience that treats them in isolation (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990).

In order to understand the very complex process of aesthetic experience, we moved beyond the acknowledgement of aesthetic in formal works of art. We rather focused on aesthetic experience which is present in the everyday for ordinary people, aiming to investigate the essential meaning-structure of those modes of existence that are embodied, and in the praxis of the life-world situations are indicated by the name aesthetic experience. This attempt was consistent with the phenomenological approach that any psychological research must take account of the “intentional attribution of meaning” and the unity of man and world, rejecting deeply rooted dichotomies like mind/body (e.g., Varela et al., 1991) or emotion/cognition (Damassio, 1994).

The focus was on the experiential realm of the experience characterized by intensity of perception, depth of feeling and a sense of profound significance (Benson, 1993; Ginsberg, 1986; Dewey, 1934; Reid, 1969). Investigations within developmental ecological psychology have shown that whether the perceived rhythms and textures are created by repetitive spatiotemporal or kinaesthetic movements, the result is a harmony between the perception and the activity (Gibson, 1969; Steri, 1993). In this sense, no distinction was made between any visual or auditory experience. However, approaches emphasising the modularity of mind argue that people being highly sensitive to visual stimuli often have a low sensitivity for music or dance or poetry (Gardner, 1993).

Thus, the main purpose of the present study is to access the dynamic relationship between the person and the aesthetic object and to describe what the aesthetic experience is like on the basis of empirical data. A primary interest of this paper is to stimulate and provoke psychological experimentation in an important area of human behaviour—aesthetic experience which has been investigated extensively in a philosophical manner. So, one goal of the paper is to help inform existing psychological ideas about aesthetic experience with ideas from philosophy, in order to intergrate both into a theoretical model that allows the search for measurable components of aesthetic experience. In the second section of the paper, the primary goal is to identify some salient features of aesthetic experience on the basis of empirical data, by developing appropriate items and factor analysing them to structure its dimensions. This target is further objectified throughout the refinement of a questionnaire capturing the general disposistion to the process in Greek adolescents. The last section attempts to integrate the findings with related theoretical questions.

As a preliminary to this approach, we need to consider the complexity of the word “aesthetic” and the concepts of beauty and art. Realising that aesthetic experience need not be confined to works of art dispels one kind of confusion. Further understanding is achieved by realising that aesthetic experience, although traditionally linked with beauty, need not be confined to the perception of what is beautiful, for we can say that things which are ugly, dull or repulsive are also candidates for aesthetic perception. Towards a “working definition” of Aesthetic Experience I._From expressive perception to sympathetic identification

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Although we could probably agree that aesthetic experience is grounded in sense experience and physiological mechanisms, we come up also agreeing of perceiving colours, rhythm, texture, space, movement, scenes, events, figures and also moods, emotions and meanings, moving from the sensuous to the mental (Collinson, 1992). Furthermore, we are apparently ready to ascribe qualities that normally are characteristics of persons, other living organisms, or even inanimate objects to aesthetic objects. Closely related to this is an equal readiness to regard them as essentially expressive of or embodying or communicating emotions (Collinson, 1992). Dewey (1934) argued that aesthetic perception involves activities comparable with those of the creative artist, contrasting perception with recognition. Bare recognition of something or someone merely attaches a tag or a label, imposes a role name. But when we perceive something aesthetically we do not see it, as a pointer to something else, for the perception itself is the experience — a searching absorption that may be charged with suspense and emotions of all kinds, an extension of understanding and enrichment of meanings.

From a psychological view point, Arnheim (1966) holds a primarily perceptual perspective specifically adopting a Gestalt approach with a cognitive orientation. For Arnheim, emotion in aesthetic experience is the tension produced by the interaction of mental forces without forming a differentiated structural dimension. He linked perceptual expression (outer dynamics of the visual stimuli) to motivation (inner dynamics) via the concept of isomorphism and rejected the concept of empathy. Instead, the dynamic properties of the perceived object were considered responsible for most aesthetic expression. As a consequence, he does not seem to differentiate perceptual and conceptual structures in aesthetic experience. However, he claimed that art goes beyond direct perception; it requires judgements based on the observers’ entire life experiences and presupposes translations of intellectual conclusions into perceptual images and vice versa in a lightning-fast comparison (Arnheim, 1966, pp. 312-318).

Empirically oriented investigations of aesthetic experience were carried out by Werner (1954), who empasized the subject-object relations in perceptual experience. He argued for two different modes of perception, the physiognomic and the geometric which is objective and technical in nature. The characteristics of physiognomic perception are its pervasive dynamics, relative fusion or lack of differentiation of self and world, total organismic involvement, and embeddedness of the perceived object in an atmosphere of feeling and action. He claimed that the physiognomic mode of perception becomes explicit in the phenomena of empathic responses and synesthesia and that it comes particularly to the forefront in the realm of myth, art, and religion (Werner, 1954). II. Affective (empathic) responses experienced contemplatively: the paradox of tragedy

According to theories of empathy, however, instead of the notion of expressive

or physiognomic perception, it is the complex activity of empathy and identification, which, although not typical to aesthetic experience, explains the attribution of expressive qualities to aesthetic stimuli (Lind, 1988). Vernon Lee (1913) introduced

5 the notion of aesthetic empathy as an instance of a tendency, deeply embedded in human thought processes, for the mind to merge its activities as a perceiving subject with those of the perceived object (see also Lipps, 1965).

Kreitler and Kreitler (1972) argued that in art the emotional involvement is generated through empathy, which they characterized as a “feeling into”. These authors assume there are two types concerned with how empathic responses occur in art. The first involves representation when a spectator might dredge up memories of previous emotional experiences. The other is best understood as a tendency to imitate kinaesthetically the movements of others, which in turn leads to the imitator enjoying a similar emotional experience to that of the person who is being, imitated (pp. 270-271).

Lazarus (1991) pointed out that emotions aroused by aesthetic experiences, as well as gratitude and compassion are closely related to our capacity to empathise with others. He claimed that as with empathy there is no single or unique aesthetic emotion. Aesthetic experiences can arouse any of the emotions. He emphasized the notion of personal meaning as the underlying dimension of any aroused emotion, so when a movie touches us, we “put ourselves in the shoes of the hero and feel what he is feeling”, depending, however, on how well what is portrayed fits our circumstances. Lazarus and Lazarus (1994) suggested that being in the safety of a theatre rather than actually living the events being depicted is an important reason why our emotional reaction does not get out of hand. Such an argument, however, adopting a rather instrumental mode of human functioning, might not be sufficient to solve the paradox of emotions in art (see Ellsworth, 1994).

In fact, the major question underlying discussions on aesthetic emotions is whether or not art experiences elicit genuine emotions, which at the same time can be characterised as aesthetic emotions. When ascribing “empathic emotions” to aesthetic experience, it might be problematic to accept that the intentional object of the aesthetic emotion is a representation of something that relies besides the aesthetic object itself (Tan, 2000). This raises questions of what is special in emotions provoked by art. Although the congruence of feeling (positive or negative) may play a key role in aesthetic experience, the relation of empathic emotions to what philosophers called the emotional state of “aesthetic delight” is still an open question.

Questions like this have been addressed by aestheticians, like Beardsley (1982) and Osborne (1970, 1986) who maintained that “empathic emotions” and pleasures afforded are not a necessary condition of an aesthetic experience, since they distract the perceiver into making more new interpretations of the aesthetic qualities of an object. In the same vein of thought, Kreitler and Kreitler (1972) regarded a type of inhibition called “disinterestedness” as crucial to the experience of arts. According to them, there are two main aspects to this. An object and its appeal may be separated from one’s self, by putting out of gear with practical needs and ends. A second possibility is that detachment is due to the richness and complexity which characterize the experience evoked when a person concentrates so fully on an aesthetic object. The difference between these two possibilities is that the distance involved in the first is a factor external to experiencing and limits its boundaries without reducing intensive personal involvement; while according to the second, distance is a factor inherent in aesthetic experience (p. 282). This enables a pronounced quality of engangement that is characterised by marked recentering of the self and word (Benson, 1993).

6 Bullough (1912) introduced the concept of “psychic distance” which provides a

criterion of what makes aesthetic contemplation possible. It is the psychological mechanism of distancing that changes our relation to the characters and renders them seemingly fictitious while at the same time we sympathise (“concordance” in his writings) with the characters. Bullough calls this phenomenon the Antinomy of Distance (see also Beardsley’s conceptualisation of “the detached effect”; Beardsley, 1982).

A rather differentiated position was held by Aristotle (Aristotle; cf. Butcher, 1895; Collinson, 1992; Halliwell, 1987), who introduced the concept of stasis-contemplation and classified pleasures of aesthetic experience into three categories: “immediate pleasure”— expressive perception when just colours in a painting may produce pleasure, “intellectual pleasure” and the “proper tragic pleasure”— which requires unity in diversity in a well woven plot, all of which are essential to the function of arts upon the audience to experience catharsis.

In the Poetics Aristotle maintains that the spectator should experience pleasure in witnessing tragic drama, and that there is a pleasure that is “proper to it”; proper in that the well-made tragedy engenders in the spectator both the experience and the resolution of the emotion of pity and fear. The proper pleasure for Aristotle is connected with knowledge (Hursthouse, 1992). Pity and fear, when contained by the structure of the well-wrought tragedy, instead of provoking us to movement and action as they do in daily life, are experienced contemplatively; for the sake of knowing what they are like rather than as spurs to action. We are purged (katharsis) by them in being able to experience and know them fully. So that, they yield their pleasure (“the paradox of tragedy”): the pleasure, according to Aristotle, of an untrammelled knowledge of their natures (Collinson, 1992).

However, where empathic identification “stops” and becomes transformed to aesthetic distance is clearly not easy to identify and may be a non- easily measurable distinction. Nonetheless, both emotional closeness and emotional distancing appear to be important, the exact nature of which is perhaps dependent on the motivational frame of the experience as well as on complex interactions between observer, object and situation.

III. The concept of arousal: an organic link between emotional and cognitive processes

For the empiricists the notion of arousal plays an important role when linked to the notion of hedonic value (Berlyne, 1971, 1974) or to interpretation-cognitive orientation (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972; Mandler, 1982; Ortony, 1991), as well as to physiological aspects of perception (Berlyne, 1971; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972). The Gestalt approach assumes that words, shapes, colours and feelings may all share a single isomorphic internal response, when individuals seek out order (Arnheim, 1966; Smets & Knops, 1976). The concept of arousal can also be linked with approaches stressing the concept of interest, understood rather as an emotional tendency to action than as a cognitive state, in the sense that the beholder cannot resist exploring the artwork in a search for further understanding and enjoyment (Tan, 2000). A related psyschological construct is Csikszentmihalyi’s account of “flow” which refers to an experience of dynamic and wholistic involvement that occurs when an activity is optimally challenging (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990).

7 At the heart of Berlyne’s theory is the claim that art elicits pleasure by acting

on arousal, that is, on the person’s level of attention, alertness or excitement which is affected by the psychophysical, ecological and collative properties (such as complexity, incongruity and novelty) of the material object (Berlyne, 1971, 1974). The perceiver is motivated to explore the aesthetic pattern until it is understood. This assimilation and consequent resolution of uncertainty is accompanied by a reduction in arousal, to the optimal level, which is experienced as pleasure (tension-relief process).

Mandler (1982), from his arousal-cognitive orientation placed emphasis on “set”, which he referred to as anticipation. The work of art may or may not be in accord with the anticipation (set), thus leading to some degree of interruption, which is a necessary condition for the occurrence of any emotional experience. Emotional tension, then, depends on competition between incompatible tendencies, as well as on discrepancies between stimulation and set. Thus, we would expect that the aesthetically meaningful experience (in the emotional sense) would depend to an extent on making more new interpretations and differentiations. Cognitive approaches like the above emphasize the conscious experience of emotions and thus, the semantics and the syntax of propositional structures (e.i., belief system) (for the dichotomy between depictive and propositional representations: see Langer, 1953; Reid, 1969; Kirby & Kosslyn, 1992) in artworks. However, they tend to disregard issues concerned with the emergence of novelty, the blending of empathic emotions with the formal and structural elements of arts (e.i., rhythm and texture), as well as the dynamic plasticity of these dimensions within the aesthetic experience (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990; Takahashi, 1995). And it is indeed, this dynamic merging, not confined to semantic structures that gives the multilayered nature of meaning in an aesthetic experience (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972, Braun & Cupchic, 2001).

Kreitler and Kreitler (1972) argued that in aesthetic experience, stimuli to do with emotion evoke kinaesthetic imitation, which leads to physiological arousal. Emotional experience might follow when such physiological changes are linked with cognitive orientation and further elaboration, where a stimulus turns into a cue only after it is subjected to a series of processes designed to determine its actual meaning and the relation of this meaning to other external and internal stimuli. They claimed that the concept of arousal could be applied not only to “collative” variables of form, but also to the meaningful content of art. Pleasure is interpreted within the homeostatic model of motivation. However, the adoption of this view, according to Crozier and Chapman (1984), does not resolve the apparent contradictions of deriving pleasures from an arousal-increasing mechanism.

Apter (1984, 1999), applying his reversal theory of motivation to the arts, substituted the notion of a single dimension of arousal with that of pairs of metamotivational modes (“proto-functions”; see also Apter, 1999), by distinguishing the telic and the paratelic mode. In the telic mode the goal of behaviour is primary, so that high arousal tends to lead to anxiety, and arousal reduction gives pleasure or relaxation. In the paratelic mode the focus is upon the activity itself rather than upon the goal, so that high arousal is actively sought by the individual, and low arousal leads to boredom. With this distinction, Apter (1984) offered an explanation to the “paradox of tragedy” by introducing the notion of parapathic emotions in the paratelic mode. Within this mode, “cognitive synergies” (the experience of mutually-exclusive properties in relation to the same identity) are especially welcome and enjoyable, so

8 that, even negative emotions can take on a special quality, which allows them to be experienced as pleasant (e.i., “empathy-alienation synergy”). Synergies, then, allow suspension and tolerance to ambiguities and provide a special phenomenological quality over and above this, which is described as “fascinating”, “delightful” or “intriguing” experience in arts.

IV. Absorption, a related concept In Winner’s accounts the notion of “absorption” might function as an organic

link (Winner, 1982) among tension-relief processes (arousal), catharsis (cf. Aristotle; Butcher 1895), and aesthetic pleasure derived from the process of appreciation (Berlyne, 1971). Tellegen and Atkinson (1974) spoke of absorption as a readiness for experiencing deep involvement, a heightened sense of the reality of the attentional object, an impereviousness to normally distracting events, and an appraisal of information in unconventional and idiosyncratic ways. Wild et al. (1995) proposed that absorption is an organismic disposition that, when activated by the absence of instrumental striving and goals, and by the perceived absence of coercion, enables experiential involvement with attentional objects.

McCrae (1987) indicated that openness to experience, a directly relevant construct, is the common core of events such as imaginative daydreaming, aesthetic sensitivity, awareness and appreciation of emotional responses. Tellegen [personal communication to Roche and McConkey presented in their article “Absorption” (1990)] defined absorption as “a general disposition to enter, or a capacity for entering, experiential states characterised by marked cognitive restructuring, which undoubtedly takes place on a very high level in the cognitive structural hierarchy, [and] can have a dissociative (disaggregative) or holistic (reaggregative) character depending on circumstances, as well as on the individual’s personal characteristics” (see also Rader & Tellegen, 1987). In this sense, absorption can be probably seen as an aspect overriding aesthetic experience, providing a wider framework for structuring the interplay among emotion, perception and cognition within aesthetic experience process.

In moving towards a synthesis of an operational psychological model of aesthetic experience based on the previous conceptualizations, we propose a process model that begins with a functional decomposition of aesthetic experience into five interrelated components: first, expressive perception provides a wider framework for structuring the experience. Expressive perception is closely related to the process of sympathetic identification, where in positive or negative forms of sympathy, the requirement is for congruence of feeling patterns rather than for an identity feeling (Takahashi, 1995). Second, primary cognitive processes (appraisals) of anticipation of the form (as novel stimulus), in which sensory-perceptual cues and cognitive elements enter a dialogue as to constitute a synthesised dynamic complex whole, are important. Meaning throughout primary processes is often generated and communicated but not easily verbalised. Third, it seems that although overlapping, the perceptual and conceptual structures are not identical. Conceptual structures could be best understood as secondary processes of cognitive restructuring and elaboration where explicit meaning is captured through a series of evaluative processes designed to determine

9 actual meaning and the relations of this meaning to the meanings of other concominant external and internal stimuli (e.i., evaluation of the content-form relationships). Fourth, emotional closesness, which is generated through empathy, and emotional distance, and emotions describing the final emotional state of relief (catharsis) which is characterised by a sense of regaining the self, are also important. Nonetheless, emotions can result from any perceptual and cognitive processes within aesthetic experience. In this sense, the fourth component, although contributing impulse of its own by stressing the empathy-alienation process, it seems to be dependant on motivational framing. Thus, the fifth component pertains to the function of the paratelic metamotivational mode — a particular state of mind—, whose primary characteristic is activity orientation, prolonged suspension and high arousal; and is a prerequisite for the activation of the process of aesthetic experience.

It is also assumed, that regardless of the cognitive and emotional content of an aesthetic experience, its structure, its quality, the way it feels while it lasts, seems to be the same (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990; Reid, 1970; Stephan, 1990).

Pilot Study - Scale Development The initial phase of the empirical study involved the preliminary development of appropriate items and their factor analysis in order to structure the dimensions of the Aesthetic Experience Scale. This was started by interviewing twenty individuals whose extensive involvement in aesthetic activities served as a basis of identifying salient features of the experience. Twentyfive secondary students were also interviewed and their answers formed the basis of the developmental profile of the items. 300 items were collected, describing instances of having an aesthetic experience, in terms of feelings, thoughts and behaviors, regardless of the art form as well as whether the aesthetic object waas a work of art or an ordinary object. A close interpretative analysis of these accounts informed by our theoretical themes, as well as by the developmental guidelines of aesthetic development (see Gardner, 1981; Hargreaves, 1989; Hemming, 1982; Winner, 1982) identified four main categories of responses: perceptual responses, concentrating on formal elements and their expressive qualities; emotional responses, emphasising reactions to emotional content of the aesthetic objects and personal associations; a cognitive type of response where a search of relational meanings between formal and semantic structures was formed; a variety of responses describing the autotelic nature of the activity as intrinsically satisfying and also, although characterised by a loss of ego, giving a sense of personal integration and a sense of self expansion.

A sample of content-specific quotations given by adolescents quite representative of the categories mentioned above was selected in order to form two equivalent sets of 72 questions (in Greek) covering a wide range of forms and associations. Both sets contained items which hypothetically focused on the same structural dimensions of aesthetic experience, but they were otherwise deliberately varied with respect to experiential content. These items were arranged on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (never happens to me) to 5 (it happens very often).

Both questionnaires were administered to 480 (238 + 242) Greek secondary students aged from 13 to 15 years. Data were subjected to a series of correlational and

10 factor analyses. Analysis on each set of items suggested a quite similar varimax rotated five-factor pattern, on principal components, as being the most appropriate for simplisity, interpretability, and consistency with the theoretical assumptions1. For each of these factors, a set of unique salient items (items for which loadings were distinctively high for only one target factor but also their correlations were greater than .20 with other items on the intended factor ) were retained for further analysis. The selected 36 items in each set were then subjected to the same factor analysis procedure in order to refine further the structural dimensions of the Aesthetic Experience Scale. Inspection on each set’s inter-item correlations revealed that an oblique rotation could furnish an accessible more realistic solution.

Generally, the first set of items seemed to form a clearer factor pattern with distinctively higher factor loadings on each of the obliquely rotated factors. Since the intra-factor correlations were also higher, items from the first set were used to make up the basis of the Aesthetic Experience Scale. Factor analysis on this set of items, based on the scree test for eigenvalues, yielded a five-factor oblique rotated solution, which explained 33.9% of the variance. Factor 1 (Expressive Perception: assimilating the dynamic properties of the perceived objects) explained 15.8% of the variance; Factor 2 (Intrinsically Satisfying Activity Orientation) explained 5.2% of the variance; Factor 3 (Emotional Closeness: synesthetic responses and sympathetic identification) explained 4.5% of the variance; Factor 4 (Cognitive Elaboration: resonating similarities between formal and semantic structures) explained 4.4% of the variance. Finally, Factor 5 (Merging of Action and Detached Awareness: cognitive synergies and catharsis) explained 4.0% of the variance.

To improve the conceptual precision of the factors, four items from the selected version that loaded on more than one factor or that had a loading lower than .37 on the target factor were also deleted. The five-factor solution for the factor analysis of the remaining 32 items resulted in the same factorial structure, and accounted for 35.7% of the common variance. The resultant obliquely rotated factors were used to identify the subscales of the Aesthetic Experience Scale2.

Method Sample The validation sample consisted of 330 male and 322 female (652 total) secondary school students, aged from 13 to 15 years, from 14 schools. Within schools the selection of the classes was random, but the selection of the schools was designed to be representative of the population of Greece in terms of the socioeconomic status of the catchments (5 categories), and geographical areas (urban, suburban, rural). Materials

1 An extended report of these successive factor analyses for the two preliminary sets of items is available on request to interested researchers. 2 The detailed descriptions of the two successive factor analyses on the selected version are available on request to those who are concerned or interested in the specifics of the scale’s development.

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The final version of the Aesthetic Experience Scale (AES) consisted of five subgroups of items: (1) Expressive Perception—assimilating the dynamic properties of the perceived objects, with nine items; (2) Activity Orientation Intrinsically Satisfying, with five items; (3) Emotional Closeness—synesthetic responses and sympathetic identification, with four items; (4) Cognitive Elaboration—resonating similarities between formal and semantic structures, with six items; (5) Merging of Action and Detached Awareness—cognitive synergies and catharsis, with eight items. Format and Scoring of Items

The final version employed the same 5-point format for the responses, which was used in the pilot study. The form of each question asked for a rating of each item on a scale of 1 to 5: (1) never, (2) rarely, (3) sometimes, (4) often, and (5) very often. Procedure The investigator administered the questionnaire and was also present in the classroom at the completion. The teacher, if present, took no part. Students were told that there were no right or wrong answers and that their truthful answers about aesthetic matters were wanted.

Results Refinement of the Aesthetic Experience Scale (AES)

The scale was subjected to an initial exploratory analysis to determine the pattern of inter-item correlation, and the factor pattern. Exploratory factor analysis was used considering that the underlying dimensions of the Aesthetic Experience Scale had not been previously specified on past research (Ford et al., 1986), and yet, the findings of the pilot study indicated that the complexity of the construct possibly needs further exploration (Gorsuch, 1983).

Using the total sample (652 Ss), an item correlation matrix was calculated followed by a factor analysis on principal components. Based on Kaiser’s rule and the results of the scree test (Cattell, 1966), a five-factor solution was chosen to fit the data best accounted for the 42.2% of the total variance. An oblique rotation was considered more realistic for the case of this study as the theoretically important underlying dimensions of aesthetic experience seemed related enough to furnish an accessible oblique rotation solution.

The results showed that the matrix of the factor loadings was almost entirely positive and most of the correlations were significant3.

At this stage, four items were deleted; one item (#46) had a low item factor correlations (less than .40) on the target factor and three items (#34, #42, #53) had a high inter-factor correlation on more than one factor. 3 Further inspection of the relevant material reporting the specific loadings for this analysis is available to those interested on request.

12 Factor Analysis

The five-factor solution for the factor analysis of the 28 items accounted for the 44.1% of the total variance. Table 1 presents the assigned factor names and the rotated structure matrix for the five-factor solution.

Insert Table 1 about here Factor 1 explained 24.6% of the total variance, Factor 2 explained 5.8%, Factor

3 explained 5.4%, Factor 4 explained 4.5%, and Factor 5 explained 3.9%. The most salient items of Factor 1 were drawn from the Cognitive Elaboration

subscale of the pilot study. In addition, two items of the subscale—Merging of Action and Detached Awareness intended to measure cognitive synergies loaded on this factor. Another item from the Expressive Perception subscale, that was meant to measure the explorative studying of human figures also crossloaded on Factor 1. These items reflected cognitive exploration of formal and semantic structures, restructuring and further cognitive elaboration. Hence, Factor 1 was labeled the Cognitive Synergies and Elaboration: resonating similarities between formal and semantic structures (6 items).

Suggestively, Factor 2 included all the items of the Emotional Closeness subscale and two more items that were meant to access people’s personal pleasure and fulfilment when they take part in aesthetic activities and identify with their creations. Factor 2 was labeled Emotional Closeness: synesthetic responses, sympathetic identification and personal associations (6 items).

Two items from the Activity Orientation subscale intended to measure absorption while making or apprehending something and three items from the Merging of Action subscale meant to measure emotional distancing, evaluative cognitions and a sense of purifying relief (catharsis), loaded on Factor 3. Thus, items loading heavily on Factor 3 reflected emotional distancing that allows beholders to make evaluations about the whole artwork as well as to experience catharsis. Factor 3 was labeled Experiential Emotional Distancing: merging of action and detached awareness allowing final evaluative cognitions and catharsis (5 items).

Two items from the Merging of Action and Detached Awareness subscale, one item from the Cognitive Elaboration subscale and one item from the Activity Orientation subscale made up a new factor, which pertains to the self-rewarding, pleasurable intensity of the aesthetic experience. Factor 4 was labeled Paratelic Mode: the qualitative dimension of the aesthetic experience as a metamotivational mode (4 items).

Finally, Factor 5 contained five items from the Expressive Perception subscale, one item from the Cognitive Elaboration subscale meant to access evaluative cognitions on formal structures, and one item from the Activity Orientation subscale intended to measure emerging relational meanings between formal and semantic structures. This factor was labeled Expressive Perception: assimilating the dynamic properties of the perceived objects (7 items). Insert Table 2 about here

Intercorrelations among factors were generally moderate, ranging from r= .18 to r= -.32. Cognitive Synergies and Elaboration (Factor 1) and Expressive Perception were positively correlated (.29). Emotional Distancing (Factor 3) and Paratelic Mode

13 (Factor 4) were negatively correlated with all other factors, and the strongest association was between Expressive Perception and Experiential Emotional Distancing (-.32) (see Table 2). Internal Consistency

Internal consistency of the AES was measured by Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. The alphas for the whole scale and the five subscales were .88, .64, .63, .74, .63, and .75, respectively. Although effort is needed to enhance the reliabilities in composites of items associated with the three subscales (primarily as a consequence of additional refinements in wording), it appeared that a factor analysis would still be appropriate. External-Correlational analyses

The 652 students comprising the sample were also asked to fill out four items intended to measure familiarity with aesthetic experiences of various forms. These items were as follows: “Please define yourself: Do you go to art museums?” The students were asked to rate their responses to the items from 1 (does not characterise me at all) to 4 (characterises me perfectly). In addition, students were asked to fill out a six-item self-report to measure their self-perceptions of aesthetic competence. Each item consisted of two contrasting descriptions. For each description, there were two alternative choices (sort of true for me/ & /really true for me) from which the respondent chooses one. For example, one item on the instrument contrasts children who think they are good at expressing themselves through art with children who do not think they are good. They have to decide which describes them better and indicate their choice (sort of true for me or really true for me) depending on how closely the description fits them. Positively and negatively worded descriptions were randomly distributed, and scoring was on a 4-point scale. For scoring, items were recoded so that higher numbers represent positive opinions. The purpose of this procedure, in absence of any relevant measure of aesthetic experience, was to compare students’ self-reports on art familiarity and perceived competence with AES. The person correlations between Perceived Art Familiarity score and AES were: r=.38 with total score; r=.30 with Cognitive Elaboration; r=.30 with Emotional Closeness; r=.24 with Experiential Emotional Distancing; r=.28 with Paratelic Mode; and r=.33 with Expressive Perception. In addition, the correlations between Perceived Competence score and AES were: r=.50 with total score; r=.27 with Cognitive Elaboration; r=.35 with Emotional Closeness; r=.49 with Experiential Emotional Distancing; r=.36 with Paratelic Mode; and r=.43 with Expressive Perception. All correlations were statistically significant at level less than .001 (see Table 3).

Insert Table 3 about here

Discussion

The purpose of this study was based on both philosophical and psychological work in order to explore on the basis of empirical data what constitutes the aesthetic

14 experience, focusing on dynamic structural elements rather than on content. Although difficult to separate content from structure, the results offer a more detailed understanding of what the structure of the experience may be like. Besides that, the results could possibly raise a bunch of theoretical, philosophical, and psychological issues for those interested in research on aesthetics.

The undertaken analyses offer preliminary support for the validity and reliability of the Aesthetic Experience Scale (AES) as a measure of aesthetic experience. The proposed model of aesthetic experience was substantially supported by the results, identifying some distinct factors as components of the aesthetic experience process. The findings suggest that three of the aesthetic experience dimensions (Expressive Perception, Cognitive Elaboration and Emotional closeness) are relatively robust. However, the items representing Experiential Emotional Distancing (Factor 3) and the Paratelic Mode (Factor 4) are in need of further refinement. In relation to the replication of the factor pattern of the pilot study, the findings on these factors (Factor 3 and Factor 4) suggest a rather unstable factor solution. Especially, one item related to “catharsis” fluctuated being associated with sympathetic identification and experiential emotional distancing, indicating some possible underlying attributes of “catharsis”, when related to aesthetic experience, that are also in need of further refinement and additional research. One possibility is that achieving catharsis may require the interplay of both dimensions, depending on how the respondent succeeds in distancing oneself from the negative affect through identifying with the aesthetic object sympathetically. This interplay may have a broad array of affective dimensions (i.e., interest and tension) and thereby enchances exploratory, non-istrumental functioning as well as cognitive elaboration. However, it could also be suggested that the combination of complex items within highly correlated dimensions also needs further refinement and simplification.

The internal consistency coefficients of the items were also moderate, indicating that the degree of homogeneity among items (total or within each subscale) reflects to some degree the theoretical complexity of the construct. Furthermore, the significant correlations between the AES and students’self-reports of familiarity with arts and on perceived competence in the aesthetic domain offer moderate evidence for construct validity. However, the validation process is a long one, almost never conclusive. Additionally, the AES focused more heavily on visual aesthetic stimuli. There were common items as well as items related to music, poetry and dance, and there was no differentiation of factors depending on the art form. However, it seems more reasonable for further development of the AES to concentrate more on one art form. Finally, the AES was administered to "ordinary” students. It might be of interest to explore the aesthetic experience of artists and nonartist, as far as these categories might be found among adolescents. It is also important to explore the relations of the AES to other conceptually similar and dissimilar measures (such as Tellegen’s Absorption Scale; see Waller & Reisse, 1989).

Apart from its possible practical contributions of a measuring instrument, the findings suggest theoretical contributions, specifically in exploring and elaborating structural dimensions of aesthetic experience. Although the results refer directly to adolescents, they may pertain to adults as well. Firstly, Factor 1 (cognitive synergies and elaboration) suggests a cognitive elaboration that implies an appreciation of a richy interplay among the formal (structural) and semantic structures of the attentional

15 object. This interplay activates a multiplicity of potential particular meanings that function complementary (in synergetic manner) to one-another, and thus, induce higher complexity and affectivity (Avital & Cupchik, 1998). This process may trigger a shift from the particular back to the whole, fostering a cognitive restructuring where abstractions are made. On the other hand, Factor 5 (expressive perception) indicates an integration of direct sensory awareness with any relevant motivations/emotions and memory that leads to an experiential search for structures that can assimilate the dynamic-expressive structural properties of the perceived object. It also seems that the perception of expressive form results in an absorbing harmony between perception and activity, and thus, becomes a source of affective reactions. These affective reactions function anticipatorally through action, offering a structuring of the meaning of the aesthetic object and enabling both a constructive response to be made to forthcoming information and a defamiliarizing (distancing) mechanism to be activated. This defamiliarizing process restructures the viewer’s anticipation and feeds back corrective information to the ongoing activity (Braun & Cupchik, 2001). This suggestive model, however, remains to be worked out in detail, especially with studies focusing on the role of expressive perception and emotion during the complex process of experiential involvement that seems to be sensitive to sensory qualities in the world and in the artwork.

This factorial pattern brings back the argument about perceptual and conceptual structures within the process of aesthetic experience (Takahashi, 1995). Although showing a close relation between perceptual and conceptual structures, these findings suggest that there is a distinction between schematic/perceptual (primary processes) and conceptual (secondary processes) in non-instrumental functioning. Aesthetic experience could be seen as an activity that maximazes experiential functioning, wherein “expressive” perception functions as the underlying force for the unfolding (emotional and conceptual) of the aesthetic experience, allowing figure-ground differentiation (where sights, rhythm, imagery, feelings are brought into focal attention and are actively ascribed with meaning) and cross-modal elaboration (see also, Rader & Telligen 1987; Wild et al., 1995). In this sense, the findings may introduce some evidence to justify Goodman’s suggestions (Goodman, 1976; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994; and Mandler, 1982) that feeling functions cognitively. However, the findings may fit better with Leventhal’s functional approach to emotion, suggesting that the expressive/schematic and conceptual levels of cognitive-emotional patterns are distinctive, whereas schematic/expressive reactions are constructive and generate “emotional” meaning (Leventhal, 1984; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). Furthermore, it may be true that emotion functions as an appraisal mechanism (Ellswoth, 1994), however, this seems a rather impoverished way of conceptualizing the viewer’s encounter with an aesthetic object, occuring only through preexisting schemata, concerns, and anticipations (Miall, 1989; Takahashi, 1995) and thus, limiting the aesthetic encounter to an individual’s reaction to object recognition. These findings also highlight the need for further investigation of the perceptual experience of formal dynamic structures (beyond semantic structures) that may trigger emotional experiences and furthermore how affective information provided by the perception and action can be represented cognitively as affective knowledge of the experience of a situation.

16 Factor 2, resonating well with Kreitler and Kreitler (1972) indicates a close

emotional orientation (a “feeling into”) that encompasses both: a situation where spectators dredge up memories to previous emotional experiences with the relevant aesthetic experience being attenuated, and a tendency to imitate kinethetically perceived motor/affective patterns (e.g., rhythm; see Tan, 2000). According to this study’s findings, this process might be better characterised as sympathetic identification since “empathy”, within the frame of aesthetic experience, may be more detached than the experience of the basic emotion itself (Hoffman, 1990). According to Takahashi (1995), in sympathetic identification, feeling may be congruently positive (sympathetic enjoyment) or congruently negative (sympathy or compassion). The findings of this study on Factor 2 suggest that the congruence of feelings is a bridge between emotional and personal components and the experienced worlds of the aesthetic object (Braun & Cupchik, 2001). Furthermore, emotion, apart from being self-referential, may also be better seen as a productive mechanism that allows cross-modal elaboration of the attentional object, which in turn, intiates varied meanings to the perceptual field. In this sense, we may oversimplify the role of inter-sensory perception, if we limit ourselves to an individual’s reaction of object recognition within aesthetic experience (Takahashi, 1995). However, the ability of emotion to cross domains and its constructive role in cognitive functioning and restructuring of existing schemata appears generally to have been overlooked by psychologists dealing with art.

Factor 3, on the other hand, describes a detached orientation, combining detached awareness and anticipation of the unfolding of the aesthetic experience, followed by evaluative cognitions and a feeling of catharsis. Factor 3 reflects experiential emotional distance, which, in accordance with Kreitler and Kreitler’s accounts, can also characterize the type of inhibition called “disinterestedness” (distance) which intensifies the subjective experience of the aesthetic object and fosters the richness and complexity of the experience. This experience, according to Mandler (1982), is dependent on the process of arousal and evaluative cognitions. However, the present study suggests that the structure of the aesthetic activity shapes the structure of the experience by activating experiential evaluation in a detached mode. This congruence possibly increases the aesthetic distance as well as the emotional differentiation of the perceiver and the subject-matter, while offering an intensified, coherent constructive action (rather than a coherent simulation) which is absorbing and serves as the ground for evaluative cognitions, as well as the foundation of catharsis as a genuine aesthetic “metaemotion”. In this sense, catharsis seems to be tied to the constructive process of meaning rather than to the purging of negative feelings related to personal concerns with respect to semantic references. This experiential, relational process may frame negative emotions in a wider perspective challenging a clearer apprehension of the symbolic forms implicit in ordinary emotional experience.

Another part of the above consideration may also be interpreted in the light of Tellegen’s and Atkinson’s (1974) accounts about the “dissociative” (disaggregative) or “holistic” (reaggregative) character of absorption, as well as about the cognitive and emotional aspects of absorption. Whilst such claims need to be assessed a coherent pattern can be discerned regarding the role of absorption, arousal and emotion, offering links to perceptual novelty as well as to cognitive elaboration. The “absorption” component of aesthetic experience can be argued to be central to understanding the

17 nature of aesthetic experience. Our results suggest that absorption, constituting a multidimensional construct implies a distinctive way of conceiving attentional possible aesthetic objects: the efficient identification of ambiguous perceptual, imaginal or felt objects or scenes, and rich with-in and cross-modal elaboration of those objecs (see also Wild et al., 1995). Thus, absorption functions in a twofold manner: enhancing experiential involvement and challenging already formed knowledge, forming a meaning-enchancing process. These aspects of aesthetic contemplation are easily overlooked in studies whose primary interest is on how cognition and emotion serve instrumental functioning such as planning, decision making, and goal setting.

The suggestions of this study related to the cathartic model proposed above may be interpreted more clearly with respect to Factor 5. This factor pertains to the qualitative aspect of the aesthetic experience, where the quality of the experience seems to depend on a heightened state of consciousness (possibly related to flow experience; see Csiskzentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990). The quality of the emotion comes from the experiential realm which allows feelings to constitute attentional objects in their multimodal complexity (Wild at al., 1995). Meaning analysis may begin when activated “paratelic” arousal and emotional responses are coupled triggering further cognitive elaboration and prolonged complex emotional responses (see Apter, 1984). The main function of this meta-motivational mode is to encapsulate the situation (“framing”), removing it from the immediate self-concerns and allowing high arousal and tolerance to ambiguity by inducing aesthetic cognitive synergies (see also Apter, 1999), where contradictory perceived characteristics enhance each other phenomenologically in a complementary manner that maximizes experiential involvement and meaning-enhancing process by means of aesthetic contemplation. By allowing the amplification of the emotional experience beyond self-concerns and “likeness”, experiential involvement functions “paradoxically” as a self-modifing mechanism (restructuring relational emotional meanings beyond identity) so that experience becames deeper and enriched (e.g., catharsis).

These ideas suggest that when the viewer begins an aesthetic activity, his intentional state (not necessarily explicitly conscious) is formed through experiential action; where the intentional object of any emotions aroused during the aesthetic experience, is the richness of the experience itself rather than any instrumental feelings of “likeness” or “pleasance” that provoke us to action in everyday life. This heightened state of consciousness may explain why negative emotions and high arousal can be “pleasurably” afforded in arts, however, possibly restructuring the self. In this sense, aesthetic experience may offer a model for the highest forms of organization in matter and consciousness that facilitates cultural innovation in general and restructures society to crusial matters in life.

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Table 1

Oblique Rotation Factor Solution on P.C.a for the Revised Aesthetic Experience Scale for Adolescents (n=652)

Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

Cognitive Synergies and Elaboration c

54 to appreciate a poem more when the form enhances its meaning .60

44 to realize that the knowledge of weaving increases your enjoyment of

tapestry

.57

58 to make evaluations of a movie regardless of whether you like it or not .56

17 to appreciate a painting if you realize how its structure is balanced .52

43 to enjoy studying people’s faces .50 .42

55 to realize that the costumes match the meaning of a play, while watching it .44 .40

Emotional Closeness c

21 to feel fulfilled when surrounded by beautiful things made by you .72

32 to like a picture because of your color preferences .64

34 to feel distressed by the sight of garages on the outskirts of towns .52

18 to cry while watching a film .50

31 to do a painting for your own pleasure .49 .41

42 to find your feet moving in tune with the rhythm of some music .48

Experiential Emotional Distancing c

continued

2

Table 1


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

57 to go away with a smile of pleasure when looking at an everyday life-scene -.73

22 to forget time when participating in aesthetic activities -.72

25 to be tense with expectancy about the final result in aesthetic activities -.72

56 to have strong feelings after evaluating your creation -.65

51 to feel purified and released after listening to a musical composition -.52

Paratelic Mode c

52 to feel excited when trying to compose music or paint something -.77

45 to enjoy sitting in your room contemplating things made by you -.68

53 to feel emotionally enhenced and fulfilled after appreciating an artwork -.52 .43

24 to realize that your attempt to apprehend a painting gives you pleasure .47 -.51 .45

Expressive Perception c

16 to enjoy improvising accompaniments to the songs .42 .70

11 to realize that the expression in the eyes evokes feelings in you .64

13 to enjoy trying to identify feelings on faces in portraits -.45 .60

12 to feel completely absorbed in a work of art or music .59

15 to have an idea for a painting when seeing a misty light .46 .54

Continued

3

Table 1


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

14 to think that a photo is spoilt because the background is too complex .53

23 to think about some old myths, when looking at the sea .48

Msd 2.6 3.54 3.5 2.85 2.78

SDse .77 .80 .86 .92 .79

Percentage variance explained 24.6% 5.8% 5.4% 4.5% 3.9%

Reliability f .64 .63 .74 .63 .75

Note. a. P.C.= Principal Components. b. Factor Loadings less than |.40| are not shown. c. Factor 1 — Cognitive Synergies

and Elaboration; Factor 2 — Emotional Closeness; Factor 3 — Experiential Emotional Distancing; Factor 4 — Paratelic

Mode; Factor 5 — Expressive Perception. d. Ms=Means. e. SDs= Standard Deviations. f. Reliabilities are based on items

in each target factor. M (Total)= 3; SD (Total)= .63. The sample is 652 students; 330 boys and 322 girls, aged 13-15.

4

Table 2

Factor Correlation Matrix in the Exploratory Principal Components Oblique Factor Solution (n=652)

Factor 1

Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5

1 Factor 1— Cognitive Synergies and Elaboration --

2 Factor 2— Emotional Closeness 24*** --

3 Factor 3— Experiential Emotional Distancing -19*** -23*** --

4 Factor 4— Paratelic Mode -21*** -20*** 24*** --

5 Factor 4— Expressive Perception 29*** 18*** -32*** -26*** --

Note. N=652. Decimal points are omitted from the correlation coefficients. *** . Correlation is significant at the

0.001 level (2-tailed).

5

Table 3

Person Correlations for AES subscales and AES total score, Art Familiarity Score, and Perceived Art

Competence Score (n=652)

Total Score of AES Total score of Art

Familiarity a

Total score of Perceived

Art Competence b

Cognitive Synergies and Elaboration .79*** .30*** .27***

Emotional Closeness .73*** .30*** .35***

Experiential Emotional Distancing .76*** .24*** .49***

Paratelic Mode .73*** .28*** .36***

Expressive Perception .82*** .33*** .43***

AES Total Score 1.00 .38*** .50***

Note. N=652; ***p< .001. a. Art Familiarity comprised of Scores on Four Items: Qaf1 “How often do you go to

theater or cinema?”; Qaf2 “How often do you go to art galleries or museums?”; Qaf3 “How often do you go to

concerts or music halls?”; Qaf4 “How often do you go to see dance performances or ballets?”. b. Perceived Art

Competence comprised of Scores on Six Items: Qpac1 “Do you think yourself as good at expressing yourself

through arts?”; Qpac2 “Do you consider yourself competent in aesthetic activit nes?”; Qpac3 “Do you like

appreciating beautiful things and sights?”; Qpac4 “Do you feel completely absorbed when participating in aesthetic

activities?”; Qpac5 “Do you consider yourself sensitive to a variety of aesthetic stimulus?”; Qpac6 “Do you feel

proud of your creation?”

6

Table 2

Factor Pattern (Oblique Rotation on Principal Components) for the 32 Items Comprising the Aesthetic Experience Scale

Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

Factor 1

54 to appreciate a poem more when the form enhances its meaning .63


tapestry

.58 -.36

58 to think that a photo is spoilt because the background is too complex .55 .46

17 to enjoy studying people’s faces .54 .37

43 to make evaluations of a movie either you like it or not .53

55 to realize that your attempt to apprehend a painting gives you pleasure .53 -.48 .39


41 to realize that the costumes match the meaning of a play, while watching it .49

33 to find your feet moving in tune with the rhythm of some music .46 .46

46 to realize that the writing is crisp and lively, while reading a novel b .38

Factor 2


32 to like a picture because of your color preferences .64 -.36

34 to experience strong pleasure at the end of listening a song you like b .57 -.49

7

18 to feel distressed by the sight of garages on the outskirts of towns .49 -.40

continued

Table 2


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5


42 to wonder how you might capture emotions in a song you are composing b .41 -41

Factor 3


22 to be tense with expectancy about the final result in aesthetic activities -.71

25 to forget time when participating in aesthetic activities -.71 .35


51 to feel purified and released after listening to a musical composition -.50 -.38 .36

Factor 4


45 to enjoy sitting in your room contemplating things made by you -.66

53 to leave away everyday problems when enjoying music b .51 -.56

24 to feel emotionally embellished and fulfilled after appreciating an artwork .39 -.50 .40

Factor 5


11 to enjoy improvising accompaniments to the songs .55 .63

8

continued

Table 2


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

13 to enjoy trying to identify feelings on faces in portraits -.43 .57

12 to feel completely absorbed in a work of art or music .46 .53

15 to have an idea for a painting when seeing a misty light .45 .50

14 to do a painting for your own pleasure .41 .47

23 to think about some old myths, when looking at the sea .41 .46


Note. a. Factor Loadings less than |.35| are not shown. b. These items were deleted. The sample is 652 students; 330 boys

and 322 girls.

9

Table 1

Oblique Rotation Factor Solution for the 32 Items from the Pilot Study that Retained for Use in the Main Study

Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

Expressive Perception b

11 to enjoy improvising accompaniments to the songs .71


13 to enjoy trying to identify feelings on faces in portraits .67

14 to do a painting for your own pleasure .64 -.43

15 to have an idea for a painting when seeing a misty light .57


17 to enjoy studying people’s faces .40



Activity Orientation Intrinsically Satisfying b


22 to be tense with expectancy about the final result in aesthetic activities .62


24 to feel emotionally embellished and fulfilled after appreciating an artwork .51 -.35

25 to forget the time when participating in aesthetic activities .50 -.35

continued

10

Table 1


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

Emotional Closeness b




34 to experience strong pleasure at the end of listening a song you like .43 -.36

Cognitive Elaboration b

41 to realize that the costumes match the meaning of a play, while watching it .50

42 to wonder how you might capture emotions in a song you are composing .48

43 to make evaluations of a movie either you like it or not .48


tapestry

.45

45 to enjoy sitting in your room contemplating things made by you .42

46 to realize that the writing is crisp and lively, while reading a novel .36

Merging of Action & Detached Awareness b



53 to leave away everyday problems when enjoying music -.52

11

continued

Table 1


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

54 to appreciate a poem when the form enhances its meaning -.43

55 to realize that your attempt to apprehend a painting gives you pleasure -.40



58 to think that a photo is spoilt because the background is too complex -.35


Note. a. Factor Loadings less than |.35| are not shown. b. Factor 1 — Expressive Perception; Factor 2 — Activity

Orientation Intrinsically Satisfying; Factor 3 — Emotional Closeness; Factor 4 — Cognitive Elaboration; Factor 5 —

Merging of Action & Detached Awareness. The sample is 238 students; 111 boys and 127 girls.

12

Appendix A

Oblique Rotation Factor Solution for the 36 Items from the Pilot Study that Comprised the First Set of Items

Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5


11 to enjoy improvising accompaniments to the songs .69


13 to enjoy trying to identify feelings on faces in portraits .66

14 to do a painting for your own pleasure .63

15 to have an idea for a painting when seeing a misty light .56 -.43



17 to enjoy studying people’s faces .39


20 to enjoy noticing the lights at night reflected at windows c

Activity Orientation Intrinsically Satisfying b

22 to be tense with expectancy about the final result in aesthetic activities .64

21 to fell fulfilled when surrounded by beautiful things made by you .62


24 to feel emotionally embellished and fulfilled after appreciating an artwork .54

13

continued

Appendix A


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

25 to forget the time when participating in aesthetic activities .50

26 to feel you couldn’t put a book down because it is exciting c .46 .48 .37

Emotional Closeness b




34 to experience strong pleasure at the end of listening a song you like .45

55 to realize that your attempt to apprehend a painting gives you pleasure -.40


41 to realize that the costumes mach the style of a play, while watching it .51


tapestry

.48

42 to wonder how you might capture emotions in a song you are composing .45

45 to enjoy sitting in your room contemplating things made by you .44

46 to realize that the writing is crisp and lively, while reading a novel .40

43 to make evaluations of a movie regardless you like or not .38

continued

14

Appendix A


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

47 to realize, when looking at El Greco paintings, that the shape of the figures

and the color variation enhance their symbolic meaning c

Merging of Action & Detached Awareness b



53 to leave away everyday problems when enjoying music -.47


54 to appreciate more a poem when the form enhances its meaning -.40

57 to think that a photo is spoilt because the background is too complex -.38


59 to feel proud when looking at your finished creation c


Note. a. Factor Loadings less than |.35| are not shown. b. Factor 1 — Expressive Perception; Factor 2 — Activity

Orientation Intrinsically Satisfying; Factor 3 — Emotional Closeness; Factor 4 — Cognitive Elaboration; Factor 5 —

Merging of Action & Detached Awareness. c. These items were dropped from further consideration. The sample is 238

students; 111 boys and 127 girls.

15

Appendix B

Oblique Rotation Factor Solution for the 36 Items from the Pilot Study that Comprised the Second Set of Items

Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5


11 to imagine what poets feel when writing their poems .62

12 to enjoy predicting what will be the future shape of clouds .57

13 to think of old photos when seeing old people at a village cafι .56

14 to feel sorry when you see nice old buildings pulled down .55

15 to feel excited when wondering what to paint .51

16 to think that the function and the form of a piece of handicraft fit together .46

17 to realize when looking at Parthenon that you get a feeling of balance/harmony .46

18 to sit at the seaside just listening and watching the waves moving .45

19 to realize, when enjoying a karagiozis play, that his figure anticipates the best

configuration of characteristics that pertain to Greeks

.37

Sympathetic Identification in Empathetic Context and Emotional Catharsis b

21 to feel sympathy with the sufferings of the hero, when watching a film -.59 .40

22 to enjoy making faces in front of the mirror -.59

23 to practice playing a character you have just seen in a painting or read in a

novel

-.55

24 to wonder how you might capture emotion in a painting you are doing -.47

continued

16

Appendix B


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

25 to feel purified after enjoying the appreciation of a painting -.46

26 to shout with happiness because you have really enjoyed a sight -.39


31 to think about the ideas rising out of a novel while absorbed in its reading .59

32 to feel a sense of freedom when finishing an aesthetic activity .46

33 to wonder about the style of the painter while enjoying a painting .46

34 to believe that is helpful for your appreciation to be aware of some “tragic”

conventions

.45 .36

35 to evaluate the competence of the maker, while admiring a piece of

handicraft

.44

36 to take into consideration the character’s role, when choosing his/her

costume

.41 .-39

37 to enjoy trying to understand a poem or a painting you do not like

Search for Personal Meanings, Intrinsically Satisfying b

41 to choose those posters/pictures for your room at home that have a special

meaning for you

-.56

44 to feel less nervous after listening to some music -.50

42 to feel pleasurably satisfied when finding your ideas expressed in an artwork -.48

17

continued

Appendix B


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

45 to enjoy improvising when acting or playing puppets .42 -.46

46 to think that even you don’t like an artwork at the end, your endeavor to

interpret it might enhance you

-.37

47 to spend a lot of time to gaze at the sea, feeling a sense of peacefulness to

your way home

-.35

Synesthetic responses and inability to verbalize meaningsb

51 to have difficulties expressing in words your feelings for an artwork .56

52 to experience pure ecstasy listening to music .55

53 to have visual images when listening to music .50

54 to believe that the variation of colors in a photo could be a good stimulus for

any feelings

-.35 .47

55 to say why you like some works of art .46

56 to forget time when absorbed by an artwork .43

57 to believe that walls’ advertisements can be works of art .39 .42

continued

18

Appendix B


Factor Loadingsa

Items 1 2 3 4 5

58

to think that when listening to or looking at beautiful and harmonious things

might give you a sense of well being

.36 .38


Note. a. Factor Loadings less than |.35| are not shown. b. Factor 1 — Expressive Perception; Factor 2 — Sympathetic

Identification and Emotional Catharsis; Factor 3 — Cognitive Elaboration; Factor 4 — A Search for Personal Meanings

Intrinsically Satisfying; Factor 5 — Synesthetic Responses and Inability to Verbalize Meanings. The sample is 242

students; 125 boys and 117 girls.

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