On the History of the Greek Kósmos

Department of the Classics, Harvard University

On the History of the Greek κοσμοσAuthor(s): Aryeh FinkelbergSource: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 98 (1998), pp. 103-136Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311339 .

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ON THE HISTORY OF THE GREEK KOXMOX1

ARYEH FINKELBERG

"... Anaximander's idea of the eternal power of Dike ruling natural phenomena implies the idea of a cosmos ... Therefore we are justified in describing his conception of the universe as the spiritual discovery of the cosmos ... The idea of a cosmos ... conveniently symbolizes the whole influence of early natural philosophy upon the culture of the Greeks." These much cited words are from Werner Jaeger's essay "The discovery of the world-order," published in 1933 as a part of his monu- mental Paideia,2 which played a significant role in stimulating the scholarly discussion of the history and meaning of the Greek x6<oto;, but seems to be responsible also for some of its essential shortcomings. Jaeger sought to account for the emergence of a new vision of the world which was brought about by the Presocratic thinkers. His approach was conceptual: in discussing the Presocratics' theories he did not argue from their use of xKo~to;, and therefore his conclusions are formally independent of terminological considerations. Yet in calling the emergence of the new vision of the universe "the discovery of the world- order," as well as in having defined it and systematically referred to it as "cosmos," he intimately linked the Presocratics' "spiritual discovery" with the term x6'aoto;, which was thus supposed to convey the very essence of this vision; the "idea of a cosmos" turned out to be the terminological concept of

xKr•to;. In the subsequent discussion the

word has come to be treated as the acknowledged Presocratic term for the new and distinctive vision of the world, so that the ultimate objec- tive of the study has been, not to determine the precise scope of the

1 An earlier draft of the first part of this paper was read at the annual meeting of the Israel Society for the Promotion of Classical Studies held at the Haifa University on 31 May-1 June 1995.

2 Quoted after the English translation: W. Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideas of Greek Culture, trans. G. Highet (Oxford 1947) 1.160-161.



104 Aryeh Finkelberg

application of the word, but rather-partly tacitly, but mainly explicitly-to explain how the word came to convey the conception of the "cosmos."3 Of course, such an approach has not favored a critical analysis of the evidence.

The current notion of IxCdoog as "the combination of order, fitness and beauty"4 is the inexhaustible source of the scholarly talk of the Pre- socratic vision of the universe as a structured system exhibiting the beauty of a perfect arrangement. Unfortunately, the notion is speculative: the association of the derivative sense-"world"-of ic6ago with its other derivative sense "adornment," and with its primary meaning, "order," has never been empirically proved, but is in fact an artificial semantic configuration. According to this logic the use of ix6ito; in the derivative sense of, say, "adornment" must also have preserved its link with the primary sense "order"5 and have been closely associated with the word's other secondary senses, e.g., "government." x6"too;

in the sense of "order," K6xoio; in the sense of "adornment," and X6aoto; in the sense of "world" are homonymic uses, and the divergent senses of a word do not produce a cumulative meaning. The vitality of this

speculative notion may be traced to the manner of implementation: the lack of evidence is compensated by question-begging speculative

3 The meaning of K?aoiog in the Presocratics was briefly discussed by K. Reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn 1916) 174-175; his conclusions were critically assessed by O. Gigon, Untersuchungen zu Heraklit (Leipzig 1935) 52-55. Subsequent to the publication of Jaeger's Paideia there came the full-scale

investigations of K6•Ci•o

as a terminological concept by W. Kranz: "Kosmos als

philosophischer Begriff friihgriechischer Zeit," Philologus 93 (1938/39) 430-448, and "Kosmos und Mensch in der Vorstellung frihen Griechentums," Nachrichten d. Gdtt.

Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Ph.-hist. KI., 2.7 (1938) 121-161. The Presocratic uses were examined briefly by G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments2 (Cambridge 1962; first edition: Cambridge 1954) 311-315 (on which see G. Vlastos's critical comments, "On Heraclitus," AJP 76 [1955] 344-347) and at length by C. H. Kahn, Anaxi- mander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York 1960) 219-230. The discussion culminated in J. Kerschensteiner's comprehensive study Kosmos. Quellenkritische Unter-

suchungen zu den Vorsokratikern (Munich 1962). The general uses of K6oatog have been

surveyed by H. Diller, "Der vorphilosophische Gebrauch von K6otog; und KOagE~v," in

Festschrift Bruno Snell (Munich 1956) 47-60, and in the first chapter of Kerschen- steiner's Kosmos 4-25. Relevant comments on the uses of Ka~tog; as well as concise summaries of the semantic development of the word are found in some other authors.

4 W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge 1962-1981) 1.208 n. 1.

5 Which obviously is not the case, see, e.g., 11. 4.145, or Hdt. 7.31.



On the History of the Greek KOXMOX 105

assumptions,6 and a circular way of reasoning runs from the supposed meaning of x6o(togo to an interpretation of the general purport of Pre- socratic theories, and from these theories to the meaning of xoGtog.

While it is clear that we try not to read the later senses of x~oogto into the earlier uses, scholars often take the cosmological application for granted; the typical approach is to take the word at the outset as referring to the world and to construe the text in the light of this assumed meaning. A more critical attitude, adopted by Kirk, led to conclusions greatly differing from the current views; Kirk was attacked from the speculative positions7 and his approach condemned as "too strict and narrow."8 It does not, however, seem too strict to demand from those who claim certain texts to be the first instances of a new linguistic usage to take on themselves the onus probandi. It seems to me somewhat too liberal to grant conveniently the cosmological application of x6'rto; in a given Presocratic text without seriously checking the possibility of other meanings. The danger of the anachronistic rendering can be avoided only if the exclusive appropriateness of the cosmological sense or, alternatively, the definite inappropriateness of all the other senses of the word may be shown.

But when the cosmological application of the word in a given text is proved beyond reasonable doubt, it still remains to decide whether it

6 One of the most instructive examples is perhaps the following, Jaeger (above, n. 2) 160: "We do not know whether Anaximander himself used the word cosmos in this connection: it is used by his successor Anaximenes, if the fragment in which it occurs is correctly attributed to him." This is a cautious and philologically conscious statement. Kahn (above, n. 3) 219: "As Jaeger has put it, the philosophy of Anaximander represents 'the discovery of the cosmos,' and there is no good reason to suppose that this discovery was ever called by any other name." (Note that Kahn does not believe that in Anaximenes B 2 the Koa6to; is genuine.) For another, no less conspicuous, example, see the following note.

7 By Vlastos (above, n. 3) 344, 345 n. 19: "[Kirk concludes that] the word Kratog; could only mean 'order,' not 'world,' at this [sc. Heraclitus'] time.... I am not ... confi- dent ... that

Ko•tog; was not used even in sixth century speculation for 'world' ... the

Milesians would certainly need a substantive by which to refer ... to the world(s) which issue from the arche ... such a need is bound to be met sooner or later, and ... it could be met very early by the use of i6Cogo; since the notion of the world as an orderly arrangement was, of course, present from the beginning." (Vlastos's more specific argument, ibid. 345-346, against Kirk, namely that Heraclitus B 30 "is evidence that KoG?.og, though it implies, does not just mean, 'order,' for what is in question here is not merely that nobody made the order of the world, but that nobody made this orderly world [Vlas- tos's italics]," regrettably begs the question.)

8 M. Marcovich, Heraclitus. Editio Maior (Merida 1967) 99.




exhibits the usual or contextual meaning of the word. The failure to draw this fundamental linguistic distinction has ensued in the artificial rendering of xo6a`ao; as "world-order," assumed by scholars to be the transitional meaning between the primary sense "order" and the derivative "world." Yet just as x6pagLo; used, for example, by Herodotus with reference to Polycrates' furniture (3.123.1), does not mean "furniture-adornment," so being used with reference to the world, the word does not acquire the hybrid sense "world-order." The conventional rendering of

x6a•Lo; as "world-order" is to be discarded, and the word

is to be rendered as either "order" or "world" depending on whether the use is occasional, and therefore the sense "world" is only contextual, or regular, and hence the meaning is usual.9 It goes without saying that the usual meaning "world" of

x6a•Lo; should not be admitted unless the

systematic character of the use can be argued. This would seem to call into question the current scholarly consen-

sus. In what follows I propose a reexamination of evidence on more critical grounds. I hope to show that a strict and open-minded scrutiny of evidence, free of speculative presuppositions, leads to conclusions considerably different from the familiar picture.

I

In describing Socrates' philosophical interests at Memorabilia 1.1.11, Xenophon says: "he did not even discuss, as most others, the nature of all things, inquiring into how what the men of wisdom call the

xoa6oo runs and by what necessities each of the heavenly phenomena

takes place." These words indicate that by the time they were written

•6•Loo was already put to terminological use, but for Xenophon the

term was still a peculiar technical idiom of a definite provenance, and the commentators generally agree that the usage must have been rela-

tively new.10 If, for the purpose of the argument, we assume the earliest date of Memorabilia 1.1-2, viz. soon after the attack against Socrates

published by Polycrates in 393/2 B.C., still the testimony remains

incompatible with the current view of the fifth- and even sixth-century 9 Thus, for example, Aristotle's oipav6;, when used with reference to the world, is

rendered neither as "heaven" nor as "world-heaven," but "world." 10 See, among others, Gigon (above, n. 3) 54; Kirk (above, n. 3) 314; Plato Gorgias,

ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1959) 308; Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 226 n. 5.




terminological use of xdogog. It has been contended that Xenophon's phrase only means "that it is the philosophers who call the world

,doagog, not that they have started doing this fairly recently."" Yet Aristophanes' philosophical parodies demonstrate that until at least the twenties of the fifth century B.C. the Athenian public was well acquainted with contemporary philosophical writings, and Socrates' mentioning, in Plato's Apology 26D-E, a drachma as the price of Anaxagoras' book in the Athenian market place, even if ironically exaggerated, shows that the situation was not much different some twenty-five years later.12 The fifth-century philosophers addressed their books to the general reader and their phraseology could hardly strike this reader as peculiar.13 It has also been suggested that Xenophon's remark may have reflected the Athenian usage while elsewhere, notably in Ionia, the sense "world" was established much earlier. Yet except Archelaus, all the philosophers active in fifth-century Athens were visi- tors from abroad, including Ionia. Easy explanations do not work; there must be something wrong with either Xenophon's testimony or, more probably, the current account of the Presocratic usage.

The beginning of the terminological career of xKogo; is traditionally associated with Pythagoras whom, it is generally maintained, Greek doxography credited with using the word as "world." Yet the examina- tion of the testimony hardly warrants this view. We have two principal reports. AMtius 2.1.1 (= DK 14, 21): Iua)0odpaxppro; pt•obvjc y6axE xTil r&)v

0,oov reptoX~lv 6Kaiov Ei Xrig Z;v ao)fo "x6EO.14

The ordinary

11 Vlastos (above, n. 3) 345; cf. Kahn (above, n. 3) 220; D. Lanza, Anassagora: testi- monianze eframmenti (Florence 1966) 217, ad B 8.

12 The Athenian reader must, then, have been well acquainted with Anaxagoras' usage, and therefore O. Gigon's suggestion, Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memo- rabilien (Basel 1953) 17, ad loc., that Xenophon's "wise men" may refer to Anaxagoras, is hardly plausible.

13 Therefore Kranz's explanation (above, n. 3) 446-447, that "dem attischen Durch- schnittsbuirger war noch un 400 Kosmos fiir Weltall ein Ausdruck der Gelehrten," is unconvincing. Besides, Xenophon definitely was not a "Durchschnittsbtirger"; rather he was a literate person with a wide range of interests, including the philosophical. Kranz's strong contrast between "learned people" and "average citizens" seems to be somewhat anachronistic, but at any rate Xenophon did not address his writings to citizens who did not read books.

14 Photius, Bibl. 440a27, who draws on Stobaeus (see H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci4 [Berlin 1879] 44), glosses i1 z'v 6owv e Eptox7 as 6 o'pctvy; and specifies AMtius' rdtit; as the perfection and beauty of the heaven. In Achilles Isag. 129d rz xx&v is a gloss on Stobaeus' 1i rOv ~"ov • Eptoxr.

For Achilles' dependence on Stobaeus see Diels, ibid. 327a; for his inaccuracy in transcribing his sources see ibid., 21-26.




sense of nrEptox i is "an enclosing, compass," and in its two other occurrences in AMtius the word means "circumference, envelopment."15 This being so, the phrase l r'Ov Xiov rEptoxi most naturally refers to the (outer) heaven.16 The other report is D.L. 8.48 (= Dox. 492; cf. DK 28 A 44): ro'rov [sc. Pythagoras] 6 'axIopi'v6g ;rlotv ... Kai Xtv o1pav(xv Rpfxrov 6volitixoat KIdcov K a xTIv yfiv oxpoyyAyXrjV- b 8& OE)opao(To; HIapxpEvi8rl [sc. called the earth spherical],

0;q 8E Z•v(ov 'Haiobov xrX. The opposition rbv o5pav6v - -,rv yfiv suggests that the sense of the ouipav6; is "heaven" rather than "world.""17 The agreement between AMtius' and Diogenes' testimonies makes it likely that they come from a common source, and we have no special reason to question the Theophrastean provenance of the information.18 It should however be realized that the report cannot be taken at face value. What is reported is a Pythagorean tradition which, we can infer, authorized the use of ic"aogo; in the sense of "heaven." Since the attribution of this terminological invention to Pythagoras conforms to the Pythagoreans' routine practice, it is impossible to know how old this use really was. The only historical evidence the report furnishes is the use of

K61oto; for "heaven" by the Pythagoreans of the last generations. We shall return to this meaning of the word later.

Another report that has been adduced to prove the Milesian use of

K6coo; in the sense of "world" is a phrase from the Theophrastean

15 [Plut.] Plac. 3.892E (=Diels [above, n. 14] 364a16), cf. LSJ, s.v. nrEptoxii, 2; Stob. Ecl. 1.29.1 (= Diels [above, n. 14] 369b26 = DK 68 A 93).

16 Cf. Kranz (above, n. 3) 432 (who however is prepared to go beyond the report, 436-437); U. Hilscher, "Anaximander and the Beginnings of Greek Philosophy" in D. J.

Furley and R. E. Allen eds., Studies in Presocratic Philosophy (London 1970) 1.297 n. 41 (first published in Hermes 81 [1953] 255-277, 385-417); J. Mansfeld, The Pseudo-

Hippocratic Tract F•ept

6Pio6g&6ov ch. I-II and Greek Philosophy (Assen 1971) 42 n. 26.

17 Cf. Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 42 n. 26. 18 As Gigon (above, n. 3) 54, points out, the report would fit with Theophrastus' char-

acteristic interest in the history of philosophical terminology. The attribution to Pythago- ras of the use of KoLo;og for "world" in Achilles' report (see above, n. 14) and in Schol. Hom. ad II. 3.1 (... i7 1ov at ov t6;

Kx••Lov rtn luv0ay6po Ei'prlyrat) is a result of the deterioration of the tradition. The Theophrastean origins of AMtius' information have been disputed because the alleged attribution to Pythagoras of the use of

xoaCtog for

"world" does not conform to certain scholars' idea of the terminological use of the word. Thus, for example, Vlastos (above, n. 3) 345 n. 19, questions the attribution because this would be too late a date, while Kirk (above, n. 3) 313 and n. 1, 314, because the date would be too early.




account of Anaximander's Apeiron preserved in Hippolytus (Ref 1.6.1 = DK 12 A 11: tot; oiupavot? icac tv v a toi;

K•ioov) and Simpli-

cius (Phys. 24.13 = DK 12 A 9: tot; oiupavo; icc 'tot; Ev avdrot;

Ko~6icoL)g). It has been supposed that the locution reflects Anaximan- der's own words,19 but the supposition is speculative.20 Besides, in the account the plural oi.pavo" refers to Anaximander's plural worlds: Hip- pol. ibid., tpbS k 8E toitco ivty

dcV&Stov e vat, v ( auPpaivet yiv(o-

Oat ro1; oiUpavoi`;; Simpl. Phys. 41.17 (absent from DK): ?; [sc. t~i1 a1~Epol) e(P o] t(TV X&i6toV K IdvrItV ittrav EFva t Ti ?tv o~paov(v yEV eo;

e0,yev; cf. Ps.-Plut. Strom. 2 (DK 12 A 10): tob TCetpov

(pavat 'rTv Uoyav aitrav ~XV tvExLV Tj Ol Rtav)1bC ; yeV&e(•o tE K ao (p0op~x.21 Consequently the phrase

' ij; [sc. ti6;

•paE(o•; tIvo; toi

&ienipov] y~veioat rol; oiupavol5; (Hippol. ibid.) / ( A n &iravTo; yveoOat rol; oiupavo6d; (Simpl. Phys. 24.13) speaks of the generation of worlds from the Apeiron, and hence icai tbv v a(rot; K ctiov / tot; Ev aXrot; 6outou; can scarcely mean other than "and the arrangements in them." Incidentally, the translation of the ou.pavot as "heavens" would also result in rendering the

•icogo; /

K•cogot as

"arrangement(s)": "the heavens and the arrangement(s) [enclosed] in them."

The earliest philosophical text in which cK6ogo; occurs is Anaximenes B 2. Yet the fragment shows unmistakable signs of a late rewording and the genuineness of o~iogo; has, with good reason, come under suspicion.22 But even if the word is assumed to be genuine, the

19 Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 175, followed, among others, by Gigon (above, n. 3) 53-54, Kranz (above, n. 3) 433, and Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 29-38.

20 As Kirk (above, n. 3) 312, rightly comments, "there is no suggestion that Theophras- tus is quoting Anaximander." Cf. Vlastos (above, n. 3) 345 n. 19; Guthrie (above, n. 4) 1.111, and others.

21 Zeller's suggestion, followed by F. M. Cornford, "Innumerable Worlds in Presocratic Philosophy," CQ 27 (1934) 10-11, Kranz (above, n. 3) 433, and Kahn (above, n. 3) 46-53 (who abrogated this interpretation in the Preface to the 1985 reprint), that oljpavot refer to Anaximander's celestial rings, is untenable; cf. Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 45 n. 40; A. Finkelberg, "Plural Worlds in Anaximander," AJP 115 (1994) 502-504. Kirk (above, n. 3) 312, is correct in pointing out that o-pavc6o is used in the regular Peripatetic sense of "world."

22 See K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie (Munich 1926) 209-211; cf. Gigon (above, n. 3) 54; and for a more balanced view: Vlastos (above, n. 3) 363 n. 55; G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge 1983) 159; Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 77-83; Guthrie (above, n. 4) 1.131-132; G. Wihrle, Anaximenes aus Milet (Stuttgart 1993) 63-66.




fact that its immediate context suffered a rewording makes the fragment worthless as evidence of Anaximenes' linguistic usage. Another text which for a long time has been referred to as an authentic witness of a very early cosmological use of cK6aojo; is the first two chapters of the pseudo-Hippocratic tract De hebdomadibus.23 However, as Mansfeld has demonstrated, the entire tract, including the first two chapters, is of a much later date, most probably first century B.C.24 The earliest indu- bitably authentic occurrence of cK6aojo; in the philosophical context is, then, in Heraclitus. However for the purposes of the argument I post- pone the discussion of Heraclitus' fragments until we reach conclusions regarding the use of the word in the first half of the fifth century.

In the extant lines of Parmenides' poem i6oto;S appears twice, but both instances are irrelevant: K6aojov nkiov in B 8.52 exemplifies the traditional use with reference to the order of a narrative,25 and icara'

io6otov in B 4.3 is the epic formula for "in order, orderly."26 Neverthe-

less some critics wish to understand Parmenides' icara 6icotaov as "throughout the world,"27 but whatever sense modem commentators may suggest, the Greek audience must have taken the expression to mean "orderly," and Parmenides could not have been unaware of this.28

Of the two extant occurrences of the word in Empedocles the first is in B 26:

23 See Kranz (above, n. 3) 433, Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 54-55, and others. 24 For the history of the discussion of the date of the tract see the first chapter of Mans-

feld (above, n. 16), esp. 16-30. 25 See Diller (above, n. 3) 57; Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 9-10; see also A. H.

Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides (Assen 1986) 218. 26 Cf. DK 1.232, ad loc.; Kirk (above, n. 3) 313; Diller (above, n. 3) 55; Kerschen-

steiner (above, n. 3) 119-122; M. Finkelberg, "Homer's View of the Epic Narrative: Some Formulaic Evidence," CP 82 (1987) 135-138; see also L. Tarain, Parmenides (Princeton 1965) 47-48; E. Heitsch, Parmenides (Munich 1974) 147; Coxon (above, n. 25) 189, and others.

27 As, for example, G. Calogero, Studi sull' eleatismo (Rome 1932) 22 n. 1; U. H61lscher, Parmenides (Frankfurt am Main 1969) 47; or D. O'Brien in P. Aubenque ed., Etudes sur Parmdnide (Paris 1987) 1.21-22.

28 On Parmenides' dependence on the traditional epics see W. Jaeger, The Theology of Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford 1947) 35-36, 92-96, 104; H. Schwabl, "Zur 'Theogo- nie' bei Parmenides und Empedokles," WS 70 (1957) 278-289; id., "Hesiod und Par- menides. Zur Formung des parmenidischen Prooimions," RhM 106 (1963) 134-142; A. P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (New Haven 1970) 6-37; Coxon (above, n. 25) 7-17.



On the History of the Greek KOYMOY 111

(1) ev & • Lpt KpwatrOt E•t RptcLnogivoto K-1CX0oto, (2) ic•d (pO•wt

ei; 0,CX C ccd ciS~ueoat ev gept ai'•f;. (3) acura yp 3tL tv a'ria, &t' &8

,a,•,(v 8e Oeovta

(4) yivovtat 6vOpornot Ire ai "t

&ov EOvea •O•Prlpv

(5) icore gtvv tDtXotrlit aUVEPX6•,ev' ei; ieva cK6aoov,

(6) •6•ore 69' aow •x' i icaora (popoujeoVa N••i•eo; ,,x0t, (7) eia6icev ev

gPivto0v'ta r Inv 1neeVEpOE yeVrlltat.

Assuming that lines 4-6 are of cosmological rather than biological purport and therefore

K•otaog; in line 5 does not designate the frame of

animal bodies, the rendering of the word depends on whether the phrase "now coming together by Love into one

K6acto;" refers to the

intermediary period of the gradual unification of the elements, viz. the manifold world, or to the ultimate condition of the perfect unity, viz. the Sphere. Now it is evident that line 7-"until, growing together into one, they [sc. the elements] are subdued and become the whole"29--describes the ultimate condition of the perfect mixture, and this meaning is further supported by the contrast with the first line of the fragment (Kpaerouaot-1nt vep0e y

,vrlrat) where the reference is to

the ultimate condition of Strife.30 But if line 7 depicts the ultimate condition rather than the intermediary period, lines 5 and 6-"now coming together by Love into one K6ago;, // now again being borne apart from each other by the hatred of Strife"-must also describe the ultimate conditions, the reigns of Love and of Strife respectively. Consequently the "one icoaCo;o" in line 5 must refer to the perfect mixture of the four elements, i.e., the Sphere.31 The other Empedoclean fragment in which

Kct6og; is found is B 134: 29 Or, alternatively, "become totally subdued," although J. Bollack, Empidocle 3: Les

Origines: commentaire 1 (Paris 1969) 131, seems correct in that the translation of to' rn&v as an adverb is contrary to Empedocles' usage, cf. M. R. Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments (New Haven 1981) 183.

30 The contrast is emphasized and correctly explained by Wright (above, n. 29) 183: ... the roots are 'underneath' in the opposite sense to their prevailing (cf. line 1),

because they are not separate and dominant masses but are in such a mixing ... that none of their characteristics is visibly distinct."

31 Cf. E. Bignone, Empedocle (Turin 1916) 420. Kirk (above, n. 3) 313, if I correctly understand him, reaches a similar conclusion: "K6atov here means 'group,' or 'arrangement, organism'." J. Bollack, "Sur deux fragments de Parmenide," REG 70 (1957) 61, argues that the x6Tog; in B 26.5 is not an equivalent of opitpo; og cKXorepig: he adduces as a parallel B 17.7 which, he infers, must indicate the general direction of the




01)~c y x0 XVAPOgie

KE(pxX11 1CItc C yuiCOCOicxat, o0 C eV

XC&Rti v(Oxoto 6Uo KXc•6Ot &ctovtot,

oiu n6o& 0, oi3 0o, yoiva, oC9 itr-i6a •xaviiev9a,

&XX, (pp v iepi~J ic

O•ml apwro; •ETC Xo Uioivov, sppovriot Kilov OavrIa x aCrati ovxouaa 0 oftv.

This description of the spp~iv icpij should be compared with Empe- docles' portrayal of the Sphere in B 29: oi y7p &cr vxtkoto 6•o

hXlgiot &~ioovrato, // oi~ i6Egn , oi~ o y• oiva( , o ( U EToCLa yTvvrievt~ , &•XXX& o ipaqpo;g rl xxi K oo;g E•rtv acix~. The fact that the two descriptions are practically identical suggests the identity of their respective subjects-the (ppi"v iepi and the Sphere.32 Nevertheless Empedoclean scholars refrain from the identification: taking for granted that

•c6o•og must mean "world," they conclude that the (ppi~v iepij must

be a god contemporaneous with the manifold world. Yet Empedocles' belief in a cosmic god contemporaneous with the world is otherwise unattested, either in the extant fragments or in the doxographical reports,33 and the whole idea rests on the rendering of K?ioo;S as "world." However this sense is unnecessary, for, as we have seen, in B 26.5 Empedocles uses the word to designate the Sphere. This being so, it is obviously preferable not to render the iK6ctog; as "world" and thus to avoid the unnecessary multiplication of entities assuming an addi-

cosmic development rather than its final stage. Unfortunately, Bollack fails to quote the identical line B 20.2, which would hinder his argument. Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 128, says that since the Sphere is not an ordered structure, Empedocles could not have designated it as K6YoLo;, but this is to beg the question. Besides, the general presumption that K6oYLo; necessarily suggests the idea of an inner structure is wrong:

K•YJog 8&' OvZ~E

ai z div •6riv (Hdt. 7.36.5). 32 The more so as both fragments belong to one poem, viz. On Nature. Diels' removal

of B 134 to the Katharmoi was, not without reason, called by G. Zuntz, Persephone (Oxford 1971) 218, the abuse of evidence; see Bignone (above, n. 31) 631-649; C. Horna, "Empedocleum," WS 48 (1930) 3-7; Zuntz, ibid., 214-218; N. van der Ben, The Proem of Empedocles' Peri Physios (Amsterdam 1975) 11-15,

33 Kranz (above, n. 3) 443, refers to Sext. 9.127 (= DK 31 B 136), but if Sextus' words have a textual basis in Empedocles, it need not be other than B 134. K. v. Fritz, "NOYX, NOEIN and Their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras). Part I" in A. P. D. Mourelatos ed., The Pre-Socratics. A Collection of Critical Essays 2 (Princeton 1993) 62 n. 125, compares the idea of the divine <ppilv supposedly pervading the world with B 110.10, but there is a great distance between the unified divine mind and the statement that all things severally have intelligence and share in thinking, a view which is related to the perceptive ability of the "roots."



On the History of the Greek KOWMOI 113

tional, and otherwise unattested, cosmic deity alongside the Sphere, similar to, and yet separate from it. Moreover it may be argued that if the four "roots" mixed in equal proportion make blood which is the thought organ in men (B 98; B 105; Theophr. De sensu 10 = DK 31 A 86), the Sphere, which is the perfect mixture of the four elements in equal proportion (B 17.27 seems to state that the elements are of equal bulk), must in its entirety be a thought organ34 which is, of course, the .pp'v iep" of B 134; this must be the ultimate explanation why Empe- docles "hymns" the Sphere "as god."35 The ioagog, through which the

qpp1lv "darts with swift thoughts," must, then, be the Sphere rather than the articulated world.36 But if the K6dogo; is nevertheless admitted to refer to the developed world, the fact that Empedocles uses the word indifferently to denote the Sphere of Love and the world would entail the contextual character of the meaning "world" in B 134.5.

Anaxagoras B 8: o6 EX(pptorat XXhXhov 'rch Ev t6 1vi KdoygJ

o06u: noVcIon7at cna i 'o•iC o0h p -6 Ogp~tv & iC to x•uxpou oiit) t6

•u•Xpbv &an6 "toi Oepgo^. Simplicius quotes the fragment as illustrat- ing Anaxagoras' doctrine "in everything a portion of everything." If he is right, the specification "in the one world" becomes irrelevant37 and even misleading, for it suggests that the "inseparability" of things is due, not to their intrinsic nature, but to their belonging to "the one world."38 Now the phrase "the things ... are not separated from one another ... neither the hot from the cold nor the cold from the hot" implies that "things" are opposites like the hot and the cold, and therefore these are opposites that cannot be separated from each other.39 The phrase 9v -o ovi K6ogip, which qualifies t(A, viz. the opposite things, specifies what precisely opposites are meant to be inseparable, and Anaxagoras' illustration-the hot and the cold-suggests that "the one

xo•tjog" is "the one, the same order" to which complementary oppo-

34 Cf. Wright (above, n. 29) 238. 35 Simpl. De anima 70.17; cf. 68.2 and Phys. 1124.1. 36 This would dispense with the anachronistic immateriality of the <ppriv, which, on the

rendering ic6~ago as "world," scholars are compelled to allow; see, e.g., Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 143; Guthrie (above, n. 4) 2.260, and others.

37 Not mere "beinahe pleonastisch" (Gigon [above, n. 3] 53). 38 Lanza (above, n. 11) 217, ad B 8, believes that the phrase confirms the Anaxagorean

doctrine of the uniqueness of the world, but does not explain how the supposed reference to this doctrine here may be pertinent to Anaxagoras' meaning.

39 Schofield (above, n. 22) 371, aptly recalls Heraclitus' doctrine of the unity of opposites.




sites belong: the things that, like the hot and the cold, in the one array are not separated from one another nor cut off with an axe.40 If so, the sense of the phrase "one K6ctoog" here is precisely the same as in Empedocles 26.5-"one arrangement."41

Melissus B 7: (2) ... Ei ytxp E&rpototvrat, a&vaycrjl "t ov yi1l 6ioilov

•fvat, &XX &nt6XXaUOat t6 lrp6aeOv 6v, t &q o E c 6v yivs 0at ... (3) &XX' o-08& tEacoo'trljfjvat Gvixgo6v-6

yp K6aLo; 6 lrp6aoiv ov ob~iC &n6 t6Xrat oiutre 6 "il Eov yivertat. Since Melissus' argument

is directed against the changeability of 9b ~6v and has nothing to do with cosmology, the sense "order, arrangement" of the K6a0io` is obvious: "nor is it possible for it [sc. 'b i6v] to be rearranged, for the previously existing order does not perish, nor a nonexisting one come into being."42 It seems evident that, if by the time of the composition of this text K6aogo; was already a current term for "world," its use in the argument could mislead the reader into thinking that Melissus argues the unchangeability of the world.43 Yet he does not seem to have consid-

40 Vlastos (above, n. 3) 345, objects to Kirk's construal (above, n. 3) 313, of Anaxago- ras' "one

io6atog" as "the one group or category ... probably, the continuum formed by

each pair of opposites": ". .. his [Anaxagoras'] K6~oCtog is indeed a continuum, but a sin-

gle one wherein 'everything has a portion of everything,' not the many continua of his

multiple pairs of opposites, which would not be 'one world"' [Vlastos's italics]. Unfortu-

nately, the argument is a petitio principii, but apart from this Schofield (above, n. 22) 371, must be right in that the continua of opposites were regarded by Anaxagoras "as provid- ing the best illustration of his general theory that 'in everything there is a portion of

everything'." 41 Euripides fr. 910 (= DK 59 A 30: dav~r&oot i0cxOopav (<pi6aJE•g cotov &ayrjp•v)

is

thought to be an echo of Anaxagoras' teaching. Kahn (above, n. 3) 220, says that Ic60otog here is an instance of the "philosophical" use of the word in the fifth century. Yet the

phrase not only allows the rendering "order," it even suggests it: "perceiving the unaging world of deathless nature" does not make good sense.

42 Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 174, contended that ico6atoo means here "einen bestimmten Zustand, eine Phase dieser Welt ..." The construal disregards the purport of Melissus'

argument and was rightly dismissed by Gigon (above, n. 3) 52; cf. Kirk (above, n. 3) 313; Vlastos (above, n. 3) 345; Guthrie (above, n. 4) 2.115; Schofield (above, n. 22) 396, and others.

43 As it has misled some critics (notably H. Diller, "Die philosophiegeschichtliche Stel-

lung des Diogenes von Apollonia," Hermes 76 [1941] 365-366; cf. Kahn [above, n. 3] 229) into thinking that Melissus may have attacked the idea of the changeability of the world maintained by contemporaneous philosophers. Now, regardless of whether these

philosophers called the world ico6atog, it seems clear enough that whatever Melissus may intend to show to be unchangeable, he argues the impossibility of its alteration qua rt d6v, and it is the

•c6aJto (= arrangement) of rb 6v that he demonstrates to be unalter-

able.




ered the possibility that his audience could hesitate to refer 6 K66ogo; 6

pp6e0ev ~vhv to rb nup6~0( v 6v, for otherwise he most probably would

have avoided the use of the word or would have specified it as 6 cp6oaOev 6oago; i6vrowv or d6vro;---cf. ••ralooGkr OVMv Ed6vzov r t

in the next sentence.44 In all the instances examined thus far Kc60to; seems to be invariably

used in the traditional sense "order," "arrangement." Only in one occurrence, at Empedocles B 134.5, the word may be, though not too likely, taken as applying to the world. If this is indeed Empedocles' reference here, juxtaposed to the application of ICoGxo; to the Sphere at B 26.5, it attests to the occasional character of the use and the ensuing contextual character of the sense "world." Considering also that the established sense "world" most probably would preclude Melissus' use of the word in his argument, we may infer that by the middle of the fifth century the word still did not acquire the cosmological sense. With this conclusion in mind we may turn now to Heraclitus. In his fragments K6GJaoo

occurs in B 30, 89, and 124, though only in B 30 its authenticity is unquestionable.45

B 30: K•x6oov

(r6voe), t6v a-rbyv tadv a rv, o0re t?

Oet• v o0ME

MvOpnov inoiiEsv, axx' jv deli cai oativ ai fo at i *inp ai&,oov,

d&iro6gevov gtpa icta &tnooe~vv-iegvov grpa. The fragment is generally held to be the first instance of the use of

i6cotoa with reference

to the world, but this is not at all certain, for the reference to the ordered alterations of fire is equally possible: "This order[ed sequence],46 the same of all [things], did none of gods or men make, but it ever was and is and shall be: everliving fire, kindling in measures and extinguishing in measures." Theoretically speaking, B 30 may be an instance of (a) the usual meaning "world," (b) the contextual mean-

44 MS; e?w aooCrLov

xv 6vrov Ei•l, Mullach;

CE•aiKOG•tjrEi* Et ioWV

6vrowV, Heidel.

45 The word is found also in B 75, but Diels's assessment of it as a fragment, disputed by Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 194 n. 2, has been generally abandoned, see Gigon (above, n. 3) 52; Kirk (above, n. 3) 312-313; Marcovich (above, n. 8) 10; J. Bollack and H. Wis- mann, Hiraclite ou la Separation (Paris 1972) 234, C. H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge 1979) 216, and others.

46 "Ordered sequence, series" is one of the most fundamental and well-established meanings of ic6'tog in Homer and afterwards, as for instance, in II. 24.622, Od. 13.76-77, or Hdt. 8.67; the same sense the word has in the epic formula

iact•r K6tov in application to song. For further examples see Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 5-24; cf. Kranz (above, n. 3) 430-431.




ing "world," or (c) the usual meaning "order." Option (a) is hardly com- patible with our conclusion that even some fifty years later "world" was not the usual meaning of Kop`og either in the Greek West (Empedo- cles) or, what is especially significant, in Ionia (Anaxagoras, Melissus). The decision is, then, between (b) and (c), and reasons in favor of the latter option seem to be more cogent.

If by K•6itog

Heraclitus wished to refer to the order of the world, he would have had to clarify this because, as we have seen, this was not a customary application of the word. It has been repeatedly argued that

•SE specifies the K6oatog as that very order which we see around us, i.e., the order of the world.47 However since beside its deictic sense "8E has another principal meaning, that of referring forward, Heraclitus' supposed specification must have been misleading. Habitually taking

K6ctgog in the general sense of "order," and naturally looking for its

specification first of all in the text itself, Heraclitus' reader would readily find in &wr6A'gevov ptgtpa Iai &roope3vvCTP vov pov pa the suitable point of reference of the word and consequently would understand the 66E as proleptic, viz. relating the

x•6oog to the ordered alterations of

fire. In other words, Heraclitus' contemporaries could hardly understand 6og`og; as "the order of the world"; rather they would have understood it as "the order of the fire's kindling and extinguishing." Further, Heraclitean scholars regularly mistranslate -rv antbyv &RntVtOWV as "the same for all,"48 because "this world [or as the word is artificially rendered, "world-order"], the same of all [things]" does not make sense.49 But the phrase "this order, the same of all [things]" does, portraying as it does fire's regular alterations as changes of the global scale. Finally, the reference to the world would turn the phrase "none of gods or men made" into the denial of the view that the world was

47 Kirk (above, n. 3) 314; cf. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy4 (London 1930) 162; Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 175-176; Kranz (above, n. 3) 441, and others.

48 Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 170 n. 1, followed by Kirk (above, n. 3) 308-309, and others, excises rov aurbyv •nicvryov

as a gloss. 49 One may however wonder whether "this world-order, the same for all" is better.

Vlastos (above, n. 3) 346-347, takes the nctivryov

as the masculine and understands "one and common

oca•gog" of the waking as distinct from "private x6atCot" of those asleep (B

89). Apart from the questionable authenticity of Kicago; in B 89, its grammar differs from that of B 30. When the "common" is related to men, as in B 89 and also in B 113, the idea is conveyed by the dative ("the common [binding] for everybody"), but when it is related to things, as in B 114, by the genitive ("the common [principle] of everything"), and it is the latter construction which is found in B 30.



On the History of the Greek KOXMO1 117

brought into existence by a creator, an idea which no Greek (at least until Plato's Timaeus) held, and the solemn rejection of which would have sounded to Heraclitus' audience pointless and grotesque.50 But the assertion that the order of fire's alterations was not brought about by an extraneous agent is an informative statement of the self-sufficiency of cosmic fire.51 Considering all this, the fragment seems to be properly understood as speaking of the ordered eternal sequence of the fire's measured alterations, which is also the sequence of all things; the idea thus conveyed is comparable with Anaximander's i toi Xpbpvou tr;tq (B 1).52

B 89: 6 'Hpdlhxt T6 (Plat rtot;~ i yprlYop6atv 'vo wia ti Kotvbv

c(ojlov dEvat, t(v 8F Kol VotltvoV IOTOV Ev o

i'tov onooUpE(PEGOtt. Diels accepted the first clause and the word i'tov in the second one, but, as Gigon pointed out, icotvov instead of 4,v6v in the first clause indicates that it also underwent a rewording.53 This casts doubt on the genuineness of co'ato;, which may well be a gloss. And there can be little doubt that it is indeed a gloss: the word means "one's world,"54 but such a metaphorical use presupposes the usual meaning "world," which was not the case even half a century later.

B 124: &ronep odapla EiKfi KEXU?xWvoV 6 K0h1ZGto;, q(PTGV 'HpdlKhtTo, [6] IX6opto;. If K6~6to; is assumed to be a part of the quotation, and if Diels's emendation adppta for adp4 of the MS is accepted, then Heraclitus' contrast would be between a random heap of sweepings and the most beautiful co6ijto;. Both the Theophrastean context and the intrinsic meaning of the opposition suggest that the

50 The difficulty is concisely stated by G. E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy (Cam- bridge 1971) 273 n. 3: "It is striking that in Fr. 30 Heraclitus denies that the world-order is the product of 'any god or mortal' ... This is such an explicit denial that it looks as if it is directed against some specific myth or theory. Yet we have considerable difficulty in identifying this with any certainty from our available evidence."

51 This notion was reported by Theophrastus, as reflected in a number of dependent accounts in which the fire's kindling and extinguishing are said to be KxtrXd tvx Ei••ap- ?tavrlv &vdyXrv (Simpl. Phys. 22.33 = DK 22 A 5) or simply

K•a' Eitapkvxprlv (D.L. 9.8; Aet. 1.7.22; 1.27.1; 1.28.1 = DK 22 A 1, 8), cf. Heraclitus B 137.

52 On the synonymy of ro'atog; and rd(t; see Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 11 and n. 5, 12 and n. 1, 17 n. 1.

53 Gigon (above, n. 3) 10; cf. Kirk (above, n. 3) 63-64; Marcovich (above, n. 8) 100; Kahn (above, n. 45) 104, T. M. Robinson, Heraclitus (Toronto 1987) 138.

54 Or, as Kirk (above, n. 3) 63, puts it, "the sum of one's experience"; cf. Kranz (above, n. 3) 441.




contrast turns on the idea of order;55 the meaning of ~c6opo; is, then, "order," but it remains unclear whether the word is used absolutely or with reference to the world, thus exhibiting the contextual sense of "world." If the cosmological context of Theophrastus' quotation is taken as indicative of the similar purport of Heraclitus' saying, the latter may have been (though not necessarily) the case, but Theophrastus cites the phrase for a rhetorical effect and therefore his context is indecisive.56 The only secure conclusion seems, then, to be that K16opo; is employed here in its usual sense of "order"; whether or not the word was used with reference to the world must remain undecided. Yet in speculating on the possibilities one should remember that it would not be particularly discriminating to postulate a contextual sense in igno- rance of the context. It may also be observed that while the idea of orderliness is pivotal in the supposedly Heraclitean use of K6copo; in B 124, in its cosmological application, as exemplified in Empedocles B 134.5 and B 29.5, the word does not distinctively suggest this idea.

We turn now to the philosophers of the second half of the fifth century. The relevant fragments are those of Diogenes of Apollonia and Democritus.57

Diogenes B 2:

heoei &p 6oKEt r t "iv th•sC Uav E•ToV mtdvayvra tx svuxa &7et aco

a•rjat w trepototh 0at i0x•oC ocnr6o* a ndv. icde "tohe'o doorXpO vi• y (p XtX E6v "tO

P )t KOCYJO) eo6vta v qv, rqic ca, 5•op icai &tIp Kca

'iYp a i V'r x 6)a oa pauveEat E v t0e t Ko• do •6vxa, Ei

toYPo•v tt -v 'Sepov toi &rtEpo , i'trpov 8v TTf i pqoat, iaci J1?) '6 a)Ct&6 6v e'r"tErMtE RoXaXc; ~xa &'trepotoi'ro, o68api4 o 9te t(doayeaOt a&XXfXot •186varo K•cX.

The emphatic repetition "in this I6o'Jo;9" may seem to suggest a contrast with some other ico1ao; or K6coraot, and indeed the doxographical

55 Cf. Gigon (above, n. 3) 52; Marcovich (above, n. 8) 550. 56 Cf Kranz (above, n. 3) 440-441; H. Frainkel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," AJP

59 (1938) 319; Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 97 and n. 2.

57 In the fragments which came to us under the name of Philolaus (whose floruit may be as late as c. 400 B.C., see C. A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton [Cambridge 1993] 1-6),

ic6oato in the sense "world" is quite frequent. Since, however, the authenticity of these

fragments is controversial, it would be more prudent to reach our conclusions indepen- dently of these texts and to check their use of the word as against the conclusions arrived at.




tradition ascribes to Diogenes the belief in a plurality of worlds.58 Now Diogenes Laertius adduces the first sentence of Diogenes' book (B 1): "I believe that at the beginning of any account the author ought to make his starting point indisputable .. ." The opening words of B 2 ("my opinion, in sum, is ...") and its general content suggest that the fragment is such an "indisputable starting point," and indeed Simplicius, who cites it, says that it directly followed the proem. Consequently even if a few sentences between B 1 and B 2 are missing, it seems obvious enough that they were not dedicated to the theory of plural worlds. From the philosophical point of view as well the contrast between our world and other worlds is scarcely possible here, for the principle Dio- genes is formulating is universal. It follows that on the assumption of the established sense "world" for -6Ko?to;, the emphatically repeated demonstrative must be pointless. Further, if ic60go; means "world," Diogenes' wording appears intolerably and surprisingly pleonastic, compared with his usually succinct style: ei y'&p 'r av [t•Fi6] T 0 KG[(1o E6v'tx [viv], yi w i iS' p wad i p wpi ii3

pp Kid Rp t6t 6,raxx [oa qxpaive- 'rat Ev

Y~o•e -dr KIo? I6vrxo], ei tou~rov rt ix•h. Finally, the phrase rx

tv '06e K0o•JL• 6avrao vuv suggests a contrast with rx& av 'r5Fe ( r

Kr6t~o) k6vtxa 7tp~oev,

which, if K•doog

is rendered as "world," yields the patently impertinent opposition between the present and previously existing components of the world.

Diogenes' opposition is between the apparently manifold and essen- tially unified nature of things,59 and the temporal specification of the manifold as "existing now" habitually puts this metaphysical contrast on the cosmogonical plane; therefore the implied ra or rather t6 bv (8oe )

ic6ct'o ~bv

tp6o0ev is unified nature itself, viz. the arche.60

roapog;, then, must refer to the general arrangement of things,61 irre- spective of whether this is the articulated world or the uniform arche. The latter application is exemplified by Empedocles' use of KcJopog; with reference to the uniform Sphere, and Melissus' use with reference to homogeneous being; if in Empedocles B 134.5 KoJCpog is assumed to refer to the world, Diogenes' usage would exactly parallel Empedocles' in that the word would apply to both the uniform arche (which is

58 D.L. 9.57; Ps.-Plut. Strom. 12 (= DK 64 A 1, 6), etc. 59 So correctly Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 178. 60 Cf. Reinhardt (above, n. 3) 174. 61 Cf. Kirk (above, n. 3) 313.




comparable with the homogeneous Sphere) and the differentiated world. The emphatically repeated demonstrative and the list, otherwise pleonastic, of the world components are thus intended to specify the sense "arrangement" of Ko6~jto; as "cosmological arrangement," and the fact that Diogenes was at pains to secure this sense shows that by his time the word was not habitually used in the cosmological context.

In Democritus' fragments co6aiog; in the sense "world" occurs twice, in B 274 and B 34,62 but both instances are unreliable. The authenticity of B 247 (&v6pi aotp noa yfi •atii.

I VUXfiG yap &ya0fiG Xatpi; 6

Jtntag ; Koa6Jog) has been rejected for the reason that the phrase con-

sists of two corrupted iambic trimeters,63 and this meter is hardly inci- dental, for the phrase is a banal variation on a sentiment popular in fifth-century Athenian drama.64 It is noteworthy that in the second line of the trimeter the meter is broken precisely by the unmetrical

KoCYIo;g.65 As to B 34, it comes from David the Armenian, a Christian Neoplatonist of the sixth century, Prolegomena 38.14 (Busse):

cati 6c(rEp v w )inavri 6p&04ev Xr p[~v ~t6vo(g 6povTa otov T&

6eta, t e 6& Kai 6pXovTa waxi ap6pvlxva otov T av6p6r(iEta ....

S 'z8&

%?t6vC0 &p 6;vx t va ep

px& 6o•oyxa 0a, (bXv acrbv tp6') ov ictai v r(J &v0pdrOt iicP,

K6p 1 CrLP b•t

t v ic•ax v Awtl6'Kptrov

cal'rca 0opoFvat, •wa -tx gev piovov; oPXoUxtv WoRtep 6 Xoyo;, 'r &

ic•ai tpxovtat ica 6 pxolotv (; 6 60lt ... 'r & 8•a 6 vw;

a•pxov'tat W6o0tCFp fl En?tteoupa.

62 In B 180, B 195, and B 274 the meaning is "adornment"; in B 258 and B 259 the reference is to political order.

63 J. Freudenthal, Die Theologie des Xenophanes (Breslau 1886) 38 n. 3. 64 Both in tragedy (e.g., Eur. fr. 777, 1047 N) and in comedy (e.g., Aristoph. Plut.

1151); the maxim is cited also in prose writers (Thuc. 2.43; Lys. 31.6). See DK ad B 247; R. Philippson, "Demokrits Sittenspruche," Hermes 59 (1924) 369-371; S. Luria, "Zur Geschichte einer kosmopolitischen Sentenz," Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1925, 78-81; id., "Einstellungen des Klassikertextes bei Stobaios," RhM 78

(1929) 88-90; cf. Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 173 and n. 4, but the popularity of the sentiment already in the second half of the fifth century makes her suggestion of the Stoic

provenance of B 247 unnecessary. 65 Some scholars (notably S. Luria, Demokrit [Leningrad 1970] 602, who denied the

genuineness of B 247, see the previous note, but later changed his mind) are ready to admit that Democritus could cite the popular verse maxim; if this was the case (which does not seem particularly likely), the unmetrical K6otog; could not originally belong to Democritus' quotation.




David has no doxographical authority, and his attribution of the notion of ttxpb; Kx6`tLo to Democritus does not find support in other sources. The earliest instance of the term is in Aristotle who, without specifying its provenance, applies it to animals in general.66 The term, again in application to animals, is related by Galen to "men of antiquity expert in inquiry into the nature of things."67 Scholars are willing to see in Galen's reference to ancient philosophers of nature an assistance to David's attribution, but this seems to be a mistake: the parallel between the world and man suggests a world ruled by Reason, which the parallel between the world and animal does not; these are two conceptions of different philosophical provenance. In the Atomists' world there is nothing akin to the human intelligence, and therefore of all the Pre- socratics Democritus is the least likely choice for being credited with formulating the conception of man as microcosm.68 But not only is the philosophical plausibility of David's attribution scant, the comparison he draws between the world and man is patently Platonic, and his appeal to the authority of Democritus is surprising. Considering that the microcosmic theory was quite popular in later philosophy in general and in Neoplatonism in particular, and seeing that beside Democritus there is no other Presocratic philosopher addressed in either of David's extant works,69 the question arises whether the Democritus referred to is the Abderite, or rather the prominent third-century Neoplatonist of the same name, whose theory of soul (which is significant for our case) was influential enough to be included in a doxography eventually used

66 Phys. 252b26. The argument Aristotle considers in Phys. 8.2 is that if it is possible for an animal to rouse itself from rest to motion, it may be possible for the universe as a whole to be now at rest and now in motion. Luria (above, n. 65) 425, says that he is "deeply convinced" that not only the term, but the views considered by Aristotle, are Democritus', but Guthrie (above, n. 4) 2.471 n. 2, seems closer to the truth when he remarks that "this is certainly not an analogy of which Democritus would have approved."

67 De usu part. 3.10 (= DK 68 B 34). 68 The idea was implicit in Presocratic thought from its very beginning, but, as Guthrie

(above, n. 4) 2.472, comments, "the most striking thing about their [the Atomists'] achievement is the extent to which they freed themselves from the anthropomorphic conception of the universe with which the microcosmic theory is most naturally linked."

69 Save, of course, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. David's reference, In Porph. 105.11 (Busse), to Heraclitus' manner of writing as exemplifying &a`pema is irrelevant, for since Aristotle's Rhetoric Heraclitus' style was commonplace; note the popular dic- tum (cf. D.L. 2.22 = DK 22 A 4) concerning the deepness of Heraclitus' meaning which David adduces.




by Stobaeus.70 But even if we assume that Democritus meant here is the Abderite, David's appeal to his authority in connection with the Pla- tonic theory of the microcosm would allow two explanations: either the notion of jtipo K6icago; as such was intimately associated in the Greek tradition with Democritus' name, or David mistakenly credited him with the Platonic conception of the microcosm. The fact that in mentioning the microcosmic theory Aristotle and Galen fail to refer to Democritus, as well as the general silence of Greek doxography about the Democritean provenance of this popular notion, speak against the former possibility, and therefore the latter is more probable.71

It thus emerges that the fifth-century texts do not furnish any clear- cut evidence for Koago;o as "world." The word is consistently used in its primary sense of "order, arrangement," and even in this sense no systematic employment of it in cosmological speculations is traceable. On the contrary, certain instances of the Presocratic use (notably, Melissus' and Diogenes') suggest that the word had no distinctive cosmological connotations. Xenophon's testimony that "world" was not among the fifth-century senses of 6oCjgo; proves to be correct.

II

A philosopher who began to teach in Athens in the last years of the fourth century, Epicurus, defined Koago; as nTIptoijr ti oupavoi, ~oapa CE a ix yiyv ai itdrvTa t qpactv6~geva nept•Zoiaa.72

The definition need not much surprise us, for "heaven" is a well attested sense of the Greek Kiago;. This meaning is explicitly stated in the Epinomis,73

70 Ecl. 1.49 (1.370.1-2 Wachsmuth). 71 As H. Langerbeck, A6•i; intpoagii• (Berlin 1935) 77, saw. The title of Democritus'

book Mipb S; 6idiooto;S may have been an ultimate source of the confusion. 72 Pyth. 88; cf. 112: ritva& 'oapa oTpEpocatl axoT

roi Palvet oi CdRvov i,

Tb ~~Ipo; ro'ro roC K6 -to oE

' arvat, niEpi 0 r

'outnv o ppE•qEat ... &XX&cxKai

'C, &vrlv po;

yiF-IcwXov axi'y lrOEplEarivcxl id (0O;uruCii 'verxl roi irEPiirOXEiV, Ccx Kai r aXaca Krx. For further instances of this use in Epicurus see flepi pqaFo;o ta', col. IIIa-IVa in D. Sed-

ley, "Epicurus and the Mathematicians of Cyzicus," Cronache Ercolanesi 6 (1976) 37-38. 73 Epin. 987B7: the sphere of the fixed stars is said to be what "one would especially

call r?toago;."

Although in the Epinomis K6oagIo; seems to be used exclusively in the sense "heaven" (977B2; 986C4; 987A5, B7, D8), the only generally recognized instance of this meaning remains 987B7, though the synonymy of -co"ago;, "OXtIRno;, and

oibpavd; at 977B2 (for this use of"Ok•vXno; cf. Parm. B 11.2-3) is often noted, see, e.g., Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 50; Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 43; cf. W. Burkert's observa-



On the History of the Greek KOLMOY 123

is frequent in Aristotle,74 found in the third century in Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus75 and in the astronomical work of Euclid,76 is reported in the first century A.D. by Philo to be a regular use of the word,77 and is recorded by Greek lexicographers.78 The use is attested as early as Isocrates Panegyricus 179: cti yxNp yj;

&taindal; tri )Ib io t KOO Et-

Rtvrl; 8Xoa rt [[tijRCVr; ,

Koa, '11 Riv 'Aaiaoq 6; 8' E'pU'PTn%

laoov- jgvrle K Xi. The speech, which was finished c. 380, was not of course an esoteric philosophical piece; we may thus infer that by this time the use of

K6atgo; in the sense "heaven," viz. synonymously with o^Opav6q,

was fairly popular. This conclusion finds support in Isocrates Busiris 12, composed several years earlier: &dpa yocp tot; Rev olou) r6nouno

... to; REv nr' •Rpsov •Xzrauovoivo0u, tot; 8' u n; r alo )i rov

8taCpi0tpogRLvou;, Cai"rlv &F i7v o6pav [sc. Egypt] v

Xa,,iaroc Rv

tob K6aoto KEtiivylv Krk. The sense in which Isocrates uses xK6ajo;

here is best clarified by the comparison with Herodotus 1.142: oi &8 '"o0ve; o-rot ... o.• loRv o1Jpovo wK(Xt t ov O)po)ev Lv tO

K•) ioC tO) t'aTzoXavov i6SpaodU6 vot nt6ktax ... o.tes yxp t x ivo ati7' oT9pia

It tb inotist f9 'Ilovi X oite t x& .•tu ... tx& g•v inb roi 0IUXpo sTe Kai &ypoi itew6gtva, tix 6k 'nb ToG Ospgoi [s Kii al aO g 8Fo;g.79 It thus emerges that where Herodotus says 6v to4 Xoao iatc •toi oupavoi,

tion, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, trans. E. L. Minar Jr. (Cambridge, Mass. 1972) 245 n. 36, that "at 986C the word

o6atgo; [is] connected in an emphatic way

with paths of the stars." 74 E.g., Meteor. 340b10, 12; Met. 1063a15; EN. 1141bl. 75 Ap. Stob. Ecl. 1.1.12 = H. v. Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (Stuttgart 1905)

1.122.3-4: ao' 86i n&; 6E •c 6ato;, Xtaao6oFevo; nEpti yyatcv, //I iei•rat. Cf. Arius Did.

fr. 33 Diels (above, n. 14) 467.7 (= Arnim, 1.34.27): r*v 8' iXtIov IKai Tiv aGXk•vrlv 6io pop&q OapeaOl, riiv

pt'v in8 Oi K*6aooGRo &d'n' &vaToXfi; n' &'xvacxohiv, ri'v 8' wvav- rtav t6I 1Oo` CI (6t&ov iEK o(98ion Ii'rcapaivovra;.

76 Phaen. 6.15 (Menge): 69piroyv &8 YIaOor' 6 t& t Tfij; lVo I'Civ ininE6ov

FiCninTov E~i rbv o6agIov i ,r.

(cf. 12.14); 8.29: ic6ajgot neptarpoqi~; Xp6vo; aOriv, iV )

lccxaTov T&v x&haviv earipoy &ir 'an'Vt & o' jvaToki; ini iv

tVij; &ava'tOXijv napaylver•at i1

&q' o lnoToiv '6Trnouv ini rTv acxbyv v6nrov. 77 Philo De aet. mund. 6.73 (Cohn-Wendland): yFcxTat totvvy 6 6ato; ao;Ka' Ev

tiv [np&Tov] oao2x$aica Ag oipavo) Ica rIapoov KaTx& neptoXiv ((ai) yi; cKac •zv in' abxrfi ('ov iai c quTwv, KaO' eTpov i i'6vo; o;pav6;q nK. For the use of o6aIgo; for "heaven" in general literature see Diod. 1.169.17, 19; 173.8 (Milller).

78 Pollux 4.158 (247.24 Bethe): obpav6;q, c6a0TCo;, AiCiko;, Cvat, S3ca T& iv TO iicuxy, & oi inokoit

~,o(8ta xakooatv nKcr. Hsch. Lex. 2812 (3.354 Schmidt): n6xo;-

oupavo6, -o6ago;o kX. 79 For other instances of Herodotus' use of oupav6q in the sense of "climate" see J. E.

Powell, A Lexicon to Herodotus 2 (Cambridge 1938), s.v. iC6atao;.




Isocrates uses ev ahcaio' toU Kxo•Cgo)v.

Isocrates' use of 6oago; for "climate" testifies that as early as about 390 B.C. the synonymy between

olpav6o and K6ago; was so close and familiar as to make possible the occasional use of the latter in derivative senses of the former.

The use of K•coog;

in the sense of "heaven" is frequent in Plato, although it is often overlooked by translators and commentators.80

Leges 820E-821B:

AO. ao[pov 86i1 ,Rb e'tX& o•aa opa otr 7 OrlOtyV loitg v`otg, av

TiRt&O &poCnqcl ?X oioa oi 7a1i To9vavtiov ... .bv •t~y3toaov OeNv

Icai 5Xov [bv KIca0ov qpNThv oitCe ?rleltv 88&v o'me. stoXrunpaygo- veiv tI&g oairig AEpvvovzaog--oa

yp o38U' otov etvat--zo F_

'otcevov n

ov toitoi to vavtiov ytYv6pievov 6po; g &v yti~yveo~ t

... KA. eic6ra oiyetg" 6tXX' iarpov r?npt ~gdOrla xi otoorov

ave'upfioog•v;

The two references to the study of the stars and the subsequent discussion (821B-822D) of the tracks of the heavenly bodies indicate that the inquiry into tbv gyytorov O0bv cail iXov tbv 6i0agov is astronomy and therefore K6ogo; must mean "heaven" here rather than "world."8'

Philebus 28E: cb &' vo6v nidvra 6taovcooaEdt

a 'v

t o pydvaoit coal fig; ove(g oS CoXO6poou Kct ?l (iou ot oehal Vrl;g acot doalpyov ia oc ldolg ri1g neptupopa; &;tov Icxr. Plato's counting "the K6(coog" with the sun, moon, stars, and the heavenly revolution as visual manifestations of the Mind's ordering activity again favors the sense of "heaven." Similarly, in Criti. 121C3, where Plato says that Zeus called all the gods into "their most honorable residence" which icarx

' eoov nravro;g ro

KcT6xoot P3EP3cuia I aCi op& idtvraa ioc yeveaeog Er •E~,F•Ev,

the translation "in the middle of the whole heaven" not only avoids the oddness of the location of the god's residence "in the middle of the whole world" (in the midst of the spherical earth? in between the earth and the sky?) but is distinctly suggested by the icaOopQ, the basic sense of which is "to look down."

80 But see D. J. Furley's comment, Aristotle On the Cosmos (Cambridge, Mass. 1978) 349 note c.

81 Also in its two other occurrences in the cosmological context in the Laws (897C8 and 967C5) Kico"Tog means "heaven"; in 897C this sense is further warranted by the comparison with Plato's explanation of the benefits of sight in Tim. 46E-47C.



On the History of the Greek KOLMOI 125

Timaeus 27A: "8o4ev y xp iifRiv Tipgatov gLv, iCT OvTa cuTpovott-

Kcxtatov fLgov Kal 7Lcpi qcpeTCoog to. 7avLbrg Ei&vat l XlctoXa 'pyov InetnrOTgtjvov, nIpTov Xyetiv p06pOevov &rbt ig t o to K6ogo(TO) yev~(oeS, eevx&v &k Ei; 5vOp8nyov (pa3ntv Kxh. The phrase &p6dgpie- vov-FXUexe&v suggests a series of consecutive accounts, more than two-of the world and of man-as the traditional translation of the

Ko•R•og as "world" makes it mean. Again, on the current rendering,

Plato's emphasis on Timaeus' being an astronomer appears irrelevant: to account for the generation of the world and of man one might well (and would better) have been a philosopher. The meaning "heaven" suits the context better: "beginning from the generation of the heaven and going down to the creation of man" is indeed a series of accounts in which Timaeus' expertness in astronomy may find its proper application.

The fourth-century use of Ka6~1og for "heaven" brings us back to Aitius' report, according to which Pythagoras was the first who called

tilv yiv 8T(ov rneptoxlyv 6cogov. The phrase resembles Epicurus'

K•X6og •-rti neptoxTi tig oupavob, and, more remotely, Aristotle's 6

rteptxov K6•Rgog ri"v yiiv.82 As we concluded above, the report reflects

the use of •c6•gog by the Pythagoreans of the last generations, and we

can now see why it may have drawn Theophrastus' attention: it became current in Athens at the beginning of the fourth century B.C. and was taken up by philosophers.

Another semantic development which took place in this period was the extension of the meaning of oupav6g; which, in addition to its primary sense of "heaven," came to mean "world." The first instance of this use seems to be Rep. 509D: ... 68o

a?6t)o evat, al pacitexItv

tb TV vo-roi Y Vvoug ;e Iai 6tonlou, b 86' a~ 6patoi, i~va tIl ouipavou ei?inv 860 ( ot coipi a eooa t nrepi t6 voxa. The meaning is frequent in Plato83 and is well instanced in Aristotle.84 The use is attested in

82 Meteor 339b4. Cf. 6 epi qtiv yfiv 6KoCgo; which is composed of the four elements (Meteor 339a19, 340b8, etc.). This is 6 0'

xo. 6 o Iog; (Meteor. 340b12) located below 6

n7pi r,& avo cpopx; i•Tog ; ExivoU oi ~icaog; [sc. aether] i•rThprlS (Meteor 339b18;

cf. fr. 26 Ross). Cf. Theophrastus' similar subdivision of the heaven into the upper and lower regions, De igne 351.19-25 (Wimmer): il npcfirrl a(cpppa, which consists of the element whose nature is

ui•xro; and

cKacapa•, and i'l xepi r•v fig yi~; cpcaipav [sc.

oapcapa] which is egLytvtvrl cKaxi &d cx-arax yFveFatv (that Theophrastus conceived of the

former as filled with the Oepgo6v rather than aether is immaterial here). 83 E.g., Tim. 28B2; Pit. 273C1; Phlb. 30B5; Lg. 896E1, etc. 84 E.g., Phys. 212b17; De caelo 301a17; Met. 990a5, etc.; the third sense of ocpav;6

in Aristotle's definition at De caelo 278b10-21: "In yet another sense we call 'the




philosophers, but if it were not popular enough, Plato could not hope, as he most probably did, his wordplay in Republic 509D be understood by the general reader.

Plato's use of •o6•og;

for "world" is well exemplified, but it seems that not in all instances in which the word is traditionally translated as "world" does it have this meaning.

Gorgias 507E-508A: cpaq 86' oi aocpoi, Jo KaXhiKeXt;, Kai odpa-

vbv cai yfiv ;cai OECoCg iai &vOpthnou;g 'ilv (otvoviav ouv•xetv Kcai

pt•,~av Cai Kooglt6trl-a Kai aocppoo;vlv Kcai 8tccat6trlTa, Kcai Tb

"Xov [to1o 8t6, x taia K6Cdoaov Coaiocotv, 6 •raipe, oi~ drCoogitav o`Ni

d•oXao(iav. The current rendering of the ico(tog; as "world" or

"world-order" raises some problems. First, K6oaLog is contrasted with dwKoX(aoia, but "world" can hardly be the opposite of "intemperance."85 Secondly, -rb OXov can scarcely mean "the universe" here: the denial that the universe may be called "intemperance" is absurd, and moreover, in the sense "universe" to ~iXov need not be specified by the demonstrative to^ro. But if -r6 oXov does not refer to the universe, it cannot be called "a world-order." rbo iOXov to^ro is the fellowship of "the heaven and the earth, gods and men" ("the heaven and the earth" stand here for the respective abodes of gods and men, not for cosmological entities) which rests on "order and temperance and justice." For this reason the sages refer to this all-embracing community as a (moral) order, not disorderliness86 and intemperance, and that is why the intem-

perate, who "is incapable of fellowship" "would be dear neither to a fellow-man nor to a god."87

heaven' the body encircled by the extreme circumference: the whole or totality we are in habit to call 'the heaven'."

85 To avoid the difficulty translators resort to awkward verbal additions: "... they call this universe a world-order ... not a world-disorder" (Dodds [above, n. 10] 308, ad 508A3); ". .. they call the sum of things the 'ordered' universe ... not the world of disorder and riot" (W. D. Woodhead in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns eds., The Collected Dia-

logues of Plato 2 [Princeton 1963] 290). 86 For the moral sense of &riooa(ia in Plato cf. Symp. 188B. 87 Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 223-224, is correct in stressing the moral and political,

rather than cosmological, purport of the passage. The sages Plato refers to are commonly maintained to be the Pythagoreans (see Dodds [above, n. 10] 308, ad 508A3; cf. A. E.

Taylor, Plato. The Man and His Work [London 1926] 128-129; Guthrie [above, n. 4] 4.284, Kerschensteiner, ibid., and others) and the passage is often taken as witnessing the

Pythagorean use of Ki6otgo;.

Whether or not it is Pythagorean (for a balanced view see Burkert [above, n. 73] 77-79), the linguistic use is quite regular: the sense of the

K~6ojto;



On the History of the Greek KOLMOZ 127

Phaedrus 246B-C:

XVUX X1 a RCX av0XC cxv tt'o E1U1Xat Xoi v•xTo zoC ,

irtv-ra &m o8pavcv

7reptroXi, .XToT' -v Xo1)A ; d8 ' ytYvotFVrj. TOza Cgtiv o0v o~oa 1cuai in;Rtspo•tvrvl pte poiropsi

-rE ici dvmroa 'Tv K 6opov 8totKE1C, l & 8 tEpoppl )oaOa T <pUpEat o;g E v oGtpEEO) 'tvog0 &vt1iXPrlat, oT K•aotmoOl1 eoax, o

c&ta yri'vov Xa4Coixoa KcXk.

The verb 8totiko is usually taken here in the sense "to manage, to con- trol," the ensuing translation being: "when a soul is perfect and winged it travels in the heights and controls the whole world."88 Yet the parallel with Kacott o0dEac suggests the other sense of &8otl~, namely "to inhabit" (cf. Tim. 19E), while the contrast between r6v oK6aoov &totw•1 and o&toa yrji'vov ,a[poioax indicates that the reference is to the heaven. The soul journeys throughout the whole universe,

rndtva oupav6v, taking now one form, now another: when it is "perfect and winged" it travels in the heights ([tewexoporopd)

and inhabits rndvra r6v K6aoaov, "the whole heaven" (precisely as Plato portrays this in the following paragraphs where he depicts the procession of gods and souls throughout the heaven); but when, stripped of its wings, it falls from the heaven, it enters o0&toa yqi.vov, viz. inhabits the earth.89 The passage is of great interest: the fact that

K•6o•og which stands for "heaven" is con-

trasted with o0pav6g which stands for "world, universe" suggests that by that time (presumably the mid-sixties of the fourth century B.C.90) K6coog; had still not acquired the sense of "world."

If I am correct that the rendering of Kco•og;

as "world" in Grg. 508A3 and Phdr 246C2 is erroneous, it emerges that this meaning is found only in the late dialogues, notably, the Timaeus, Politicus, and Philebus (i.e., presumably from the fifties of the fourth century B.C. onwards). Since these dialogues seem to be the first Greek texts in which

Ko6oLo;S is used in the sense of "world" (we shall return to

is "social order" which Plato associates with the related moral notions, coojit6zr;q and

88 See, e.g., Platon. Oeuvres completes,5 ed. L. Robin 4 (Paris 1961) 3e partie. Phetdre 246C, translation; R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge 1952) 70.

89 Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 43 n. 31, 122 n. 288, is prepared to recognize K6otgo; in the

sense of "heaven" here. 90 For a concise critical survey of the studies concerning the chronology of Plato's dia-

logues, see L. Brandwood, "Stylometry and Chronology," in R. Kraut ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge 1992) 90-120.




Xenophon's Memorabilia in a moment), it seems reasonable to conclude that the usage was Plato's own terminological innovation. The way in which the term is treated in all three dialogues supports this conclusion. In Timaeus 28B3, before he starts to employ the word in the new sense (in 24C1

Ko6•1o; is used in the political context, and in

27A6, as we have seen, in its regular sense of "heaven") Plato defines

Kcoa~o; as a synonym of oi6pav6g (in the sense of "world"): 6 8 ir& n

oIapav•;--ii KOgOO; 11 xi a •XXo oTt lro'TE _ovowX ogi6vo; ' W ia'TXV

ixotto, tro~0' iyIV davotd0om'o K-tX. In the same manner, the first

time the term occurs in the Politicus (269D8) it is expressly introduced as a synonym of oUpaxv6g (=world): 8v &i8 oiUpavbv ici m c6xl ov

7rn(OvotdKxa1CEv, noXXav LEv •ai CX cap1ovplv nxapx xro yevvvioavxog

Etzei?rlXpEv KcTX.91 Finally, in the first of the two occurrences of the word in the terminological sense in the Philebus (29E1; 59A3; as in the Timaeus, here too the very first appearance of the word, in 28E4, is in the sense of "heaven") its conventional character is carefully pointed out: Ta-rxbv &8 Xca3g 8i XnRpi ro•8 ~ v

K6otLov XTyog•v. It thus

seems evident that Plato did not expect that his use of Koatgo;

for "world" would be readily understandable outside the Academy.92 There was however one writer who immediately noticed Plato's terminological innovation.

Above I allowed for the sake of the argument that Memorabilia 1.1-2 is of an early date, but now we may try to determine its chronology with a more precision. If these chapters are of an early date indeed, the peculiar sense in which, according to Memorabilia 1.1.11, "the men of wisdom" used Kacoog; can only be "heaven."93 Now the

91 In both dialogues all the occurrences of ic6ogio; subsequent to the definition are in the terminological sense. The only exception is Tim. 40A where the meaning is "adornment" (so correctly F. Astius, Lexicon Platonicum [Leipzig 1835] 207, s.v. cK6aoog;; Corn- ford's "world" is a mistranslation), though Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 43 and n. 31, seems correct in detecting the pun on "adornment" and "heaven."

92 W. Burkert, "Platon oder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprung des Wortes Philosophie," Her- mes 88 (1960) 159-177, suggested that the term (plXoYocpia was invented by Plato rather than by Pythagoras. If my conclusions are correct, xc6'ogo, currently considered a dis-

tinctively Pythagorean term, was also Plato's innovation. If so, Philolaus' fragments--at least those in which ic6aoog; occurs in the sense of "world" (B 1, B 2, B 6, B 17; all these are accepted by Burkert [above, n. 73] 218-277; and Huffman [above, n. 57] 15-37 and

passim)-must be a post-Platonic forgery. It is not for nothing that in accounting for the

Pythagorean doctrines Aristotle failed to mention Philolaus' book. 93 So in F W. Sturz, Lexicon Xenophonteum (Leipzig 1801) 1.776, s.v. Kc6o`o;.



On the History of the Greek KOWMOI 129

discussion of "the nature of all things" is specified by Xenophon as the inquiry into "how what the men of wisdom call the

Ko"tgoq runs" and

into "by what necessities each of the heavenly phenomena takes place." The latter inquiry is astronomical; if the

KoqoLto; means "heaven," the

former would be astronomical too, and the whole discussion of "the nature of all things" would turn out to be about astronomy alone. The sense of the K6co0o; must, then, be "world." This being so, Memora- bilia 1.1-2 cannot be earlier, or at least much earlier, than Plato's Timaeus.94 Xenophon's "the men of wisdom" are thus the Academy, and it is their peculiar use of Ko6Lgo; he records here and imitates elsewhere: 6 'rbv Xkov aoov oa'itt'tov

T K•i oalvVzoxv ... o'rto t&x

gt'ytorxo p v rpd&x'Trv 6p&'opat (Mem. 4.3.13).95

Plato seems to have not intended his new usage to replace the traditional ones: he used Ko~0ao; interchangeably with oppabv6;, and in the Laws he returned to the use of the word in its regular meaning, "heaven," a use which he never entirely abandoned;96 Aristotle contin- ues to use

K•6o•o; in the sense of "heaven," and in reference to the

world he uses 6o .ato; less frequently than ou'pav6;. At the same time Aristotle's use of the word in Plato's terminological sense suggests that the term was not eventually discarded in the Academy, and hence its absence from the Laws seems to have been due to Plato's ad hoc decision rather than to a principled renunciation of the usage. It seems that in working on the Timaeus Plato felt the need for an additional term for "world" which would convey semantic nuances absent in o)pav6;. What, then, could be Plato's reasons for introducing 6oag.o; as an additional term for "world"? The traditional scholarly association of

94 Perhaps the new usage was initiated earlier in the Academy, in oral discussions; Xenophon's reference may be to the oral use of the term rather than to specific dialogues. All this however must remain purely speculative. Our textual evidence is Phdr. 246C, which is the terminus post quem (presumably, the sixties of the fourth century), and the Timaeus, which is the terminus ante quem (presumably the fifties). The Memorabilia, which is now commonly considered a unified composition, must, then, be later than Phaedrus and probably even later than Timaeus. For a critical survey of the discussion of the date of the Memorabilia, see R. Nickel, Xenophon (Darmstadt 1979).

95 Cf. the way in which Xenophon conveys a similar idea in Cyr. 8.3.13: ... eeoFo yeE ... oi cai -rivE -riiv 6Wv

•Xh•v 6ttyv oiv(*Xoxotv Icr.

96 Lg. 821A2, 897C8; (at 967C5 ic•(6ogo;

must mean "order," a meaning which is suggested by vo; ... 6 8taicExcoogincgi) irtv0' )oa caZr' o-opavov in the previous sentence); we recall that Kc6oL'o; in the sense of "heaven" is found in Tim. 27A6 and Phlb. 28E4 (i.e., in both cases before the formal introduction of the new terminological sense) and in the Critias (121C3), which presumably follows the Timaeus immediately.




K6oJog; with beauty and orderliness seems to be irrelevant. Timaeus 29A: "If this K6o0og; is beautiful (KcX6;) and the creator good, it is obvious that he looked to the eternal [pattern], but if what is awful to say is right, then to the created one. It is clear to everyone that he looked to the eternal, for it [sc. this K60oYog] is the most beautiful

(iKktolrno;) of creations .. ." Clearly, the assumption that cK6o"o; strongly implies the idea of beauty would turn Plato's reasoning into a sophistry. As to the idea of "order," in Plt. 273B5 the Kcoaog; is said to be in a state of disorder before it comes to its present orderly condition.97 Plato's meaning can perhaps be better isolated if we consider the word from the linguistic point of view, namely, that of its morphology and the semantic field to which it was linked by Plato's innovative use.

Using K6~C1og; in the sense of "world" was the extension of its sense of "heaven" by analogy with the extended use of

oopa(v6g. This exten-

sion of meaning brought cK6?oo; into a semantic relation with 8to- KooaIo) and its derivative 8td&Kcooao; / a/ctaro t;6 which were used in the cosmological context already in the fifth century.98 There is however a principal morphological difference between

8td•Kootog; /

8StaK16(Xojt otg, on the one hand, and

K6ctJog, on the other: while the

former is the verbal noun related to Sta•xooF`o

as the designation of its action, viz. cosmogony, the latter, if related to the verb, comes to designate the result of its action, viz. the world as an outcome of cosmogony.99 I would therefore suggest that Plato sought for a term

97 Note that the logical subject of the phrase no,,fi;

'v ,riEZXov &tr(aiat lXpiv ei; zrv viyv K~6ojgov a0ptPto(uOt

is 6 0K60ojo; (272E5, 273A1). 98 For the first time in Parmenides B 8.60, which is the first known occurrence of the

word (zrv oot Ey 0 6c8tcoojpov otuc6rz andvroz or`pazro). The verb

8t•aoopj(io was used

by Anaxagoras (B 12) with reference to the cosmogonical activity of the Mind. 8toiCoo-

igo; is a verbal noun and as such designates action-"(distributive) marshalling, setting in order, regulating" (as was stressed by Reinhardt, [above, n. 3] 175, but ignored by Kranz

[above, n. 3] 434; see also Kerschensteiner [above, n. 3] 13). Its use in the resultative sense is derivative, and hence later. For this reason in Parmenides B 8.60 and in the Atomists' book titles--MEyaq o8tiKooajo; and Mtcpb &8tdrooKgo;-the proper rendering of the word must be "[world-] ordering" rather than "[world-] order" (in Parmenides this sense is authenticated by the fact that the 6t&acoolgo; which the goddess is promising to relate turns out to be a cosmogony; Kahn's interpretation [above, n. 3] 227, of the

8t~IKootgo; in B 8.60 as "the system of the natural world" neglects both the morphology

of the word and the content of the Doxa). 99 As Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 13, cf. 14, 16, observed.



On the History of the Greek KOLMOZ 131

which would be a resultative noun in respect to the action conveyed by 8taKooaglo, and icoogo was just the word. This suggestion seems to be corroborated by a semantic development which evidently took place outside the Academy but which seems to have been motivated by the same terminological need-I mean the extension of the use of

8t61ooago; / o86acoardlot;

to designate, not only cosmogony, but also the ensuing world. The first instance of this use is Aristotle Meta- physics 986a6, which is the only occurrence of the word in the cosmological context in Aristotle, but in later authors the use is abundant.100 This usage conforms to the general semantic development of the word which gradually came to be used also in the resultative sense.101 As a result,

taocdoagrlot; and K6Jogo; became synonyms, and in the course

of time these terms generally replaced the use of oupav6; in the sense of "world."

III

It remains to examine the semantic development as a result of which

Kcoaogo came to designate the world's several regions. Presumably drawing on current exegeses Plutarch construes the five aoCioot in Timaeus 55C-D as earth, water, air, fire, and heavens,102 and scholars are prepared to follow his interpretation, thus allowing "world's regions" as Plato's intended meaning of Koa6goti.103 The passage reads as follows:

100 Ps.-Arist. De mundo 391bl 1 (StoaKcolrolat), 400b32 (Sta6Kooago;);

in the Stoics: D.L. 7.137; Arius Dyd. ap. Eus. Prep. Evang. 15.15 (= Arnim [above, n. 75] 2.169.19), etc.

101 This use seems to be first attested in Thuc. 4.93, where the word is applied to battle order. In Plato Stoacirlo;t; occurs several times, but never in the cosmological context; it is however noteworthy that he uses the word predominantly in the deverbative sense. In Symp. 209A7 the meaning is "the ordering of society"; in Critias 118A1 "the organizing of the territory" by the works described in the next paragraphs; in Lg. 853A3 "the arrang- ing of the law"; in Tim. 23E2 the sense is ambiguous, but it seems that what is meant to have been recorded is the chronicle of founding the city rather than its constitution; the only clear instance of the resultative meaning is Tim. 24C4. It may, then, seem that Plato's feeling for the deverbative sense of

&taKcdoaglo; was too strong to put the word to the

terminological use in the resultative sense. 102 De E. 389F-390A; De def. or 421F-422A, 422F-423B, 430B-C. 103 R. D. Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of Plato (London 1888) 198-199, ad loc.; A. E.

Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford 1928) 378, ad loc.; F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London 1937) 221; Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 51-53; cf. Mans- feld (above, n. 16) 43.




& 81i it Ei vr6voXa Xoy~t6Igvo; •ttXgE &knopoi n~drepov

&Xnipou; Xpl Kcogou;o fvat Xiyetv i irCnpaXq ~xovrx;, 'r6 lgiv &nEipou; ijyiatxr' &v ?vor;q 7(xipov trvb; devat 66y(iya v

lunrtpov xpe~Ov evat, 7n6'rEpov &A Eva i i •xv axbro); Fxrl0ex ne_<(uxd;au o yetyv nori npoon•icnt, taXXov &v a(xiq o'Trg LiKCxOq 6taunopi7otj . 'r jgiv o3v 6i1 nap' 1[t(6v va acxbyv ixar&x 'rv eiK6Ca X6yov nTUcx6o vrtrljvut el 6v, EXXo;g & Ei; 6XX(a nirl phi•q; 'rtepa 860x 5dot.

Timaeus' unaccounted digression from the discussion of the primary bodies to the question of how many i6~o0aot should be assumed is puz- zling. However, what seems clear is that the question posited in the first clause refers to the number of worlds allowed to be in existence, which is confirmed by the comparison with Timaeus 31A-B.1'4 But if the io6agot in the first clause means "worlds," '"xva i~i' vre (x a'rooi in the next clause and 'vax atxr6v in the last one must also refer to worlds. Plutarch's exegesis is unwarranted: whatever the purport of the passage may be, the K6aoLot means "worlds," not "regions."105 Besides this Timaeus passage two other texts have been referred to as supposedly testifying the fourth-century origins of the notion of the universe as stratified into several oajogot.

Damascius De Principiis 321 (Ruelle) = Eudemus fr. 150 (Wehrli, 70.12-19):

EpEFicr j; ~ &S 6 E1pto; Z&vmro [.tv

evaoCt &d•i mic Xp6vov cxi X8oviav I'x; srpEi; npcjaX;q &pxd;, 'ilv ~aXv g(Pni np6 Tcv 8voiv, aXi xr&; 6 io poZ& XrlV x av, 'Xv &8 Xp6vov notiIoat -K Tou y6vov

Ualoto 7np ici irveiwcoa cai ci {6p, riv pnkuijv, oxtt, npitv roi

vorl ou, g C 1v v tCvTe LZFotg 8tplvtt• vo)v TnoxilV &rlv

yewvev uov oivat 8&0v, rlV vTC iv'Zxov KacXcL[tiVjv, 'aixTbv

( ibo) E•o inEv, nesvtEKoopgov. n7epi & tol)Tov (kxog i'a•g pcXv•xIt K(Xtpo;.

'04 nI6epov

o1v 6p0•e Eva oCpavbv nrpoostpjiKcaOEv,

ii InoXX •i Kai neirpou ; X•ytv

iv 6pe6terpov; va, Ei'nsp Ca-r "tb nap6d&itYga 86Erl1itoOpyrg1vo; otat ... 68t& taOra

oi•zre &0o oijZ' &nIEpo; e~nicO1eV 6 rnot~v KC6ogou;, 6XX' Ef 688 govoyevi~; o pav6;

105 Though conceding Plutarch's interpretation, Cornford (above, n. 103) 220-221, wonders: "It still remains a puzzle why Plato should speak of the notion that there are five cosmoi = regions in the one world as an alternative to a single cosmos = world or an indefinite number of worlds" [Cornford's italics].



On the History of the Greek KOEMOX 133

Damascius draws here on Eudemus, and Kerschensteiner106 suggested that the explanation of the Pherecydian tuXo'o

as coatoot

must be his, for, she argues, the surmise i'owg EittEnv bespeaks Eudemus' attempt to construe, in following Aristotle Metaphysics 1091b8, Pherecydes' approach as midway between theology and natural philosophy. The suggestion does not appear tenable when Damascius' whole passage is considered. The first two underlined phrases are clearly Damascius' own surmises, and the third is quite on a par with them. The explanation of

rtevr_4guXo; as nrev'r•co~o og must, then, be Damascius' (and it

may be added that this explanation need not be more relevant than his two previous conjectures). Further evidence of the early use of Kc6?aog for several cosmic regions has been found in the Theophrastean report on Anaximander discussed above (pages 108-109), the plural acoigot in which have been admitted to refer to the elemental spheres.107 Yet Simplicius' plural seems to be due to a corruption, the correct version being the singular Kacoiog in Hippolytus.108 But if nonetheless Simpli- cius' version is preferred, the grammatical parallel between rob; oipa- vou; and toi;

K6tomago seems to suggest the meaning "a single

coato;S (arrangement) in each single oiUpav6; (world)." At any rate, if

Theophrastus is supposed to have described the cosmic strata in others' doctrines by the term co6aogot, he may certainly be expected to have used the term in his own stratification of the universe (De igne 351.19-25), which is not the case.

Yet although the notion of the world's several a6oigot cannot be plausibly traced back to the fourth century B.C., its preconditions are already there. Mansfeld109 aptly compares the notion of regional

K6at1ot with the popular view of the universe as composed of concen-

tric elemental spheres,110 as well as with the subdivisions of the heavenly region in the early Academy"' and the Aristotelian distinction

106 Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 53-54 and n. 1. 107 Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 44-45; cf. Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 44. 108 See Finkelberg (above, n. 21) 486, 493-494. 109 Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 43-44. 110 See, for instance, Arist. De caelo 287a30-b14; and in the Stoics: D.L. 7. 137, 155;

for further references see Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 114 and notes 250, 251, 252; 115 and notes 253 and 256. Mansfeld traces this view back to Aristotle, but it was already prefig- ured in the Presocratic cosmologies.

Ill Xenocrates fr. 15, cf. fr. 5 and 18 (Heinze = fr. 213, 83, 215 Isnardi Parente); Hera- clides Ponticus fr. 96 (Wehrli). Cf. P. Boyanc6, "La religion astrale de Platon ' Cic6ron," REG 65 (1952) 331-335; Burkert (above, n. 73) 245 n. 36.




between the upper and lower heavens. As to the term 6co(toq,

Epinomis 987B advises to reserve the name for the sphere of the fixed stars alone, but in the second part of AMtius' report on Philolaus, which, as Burkert has shown, is a Platonic concoction,112 we find the typically Platonic threefold division of the heavens113 in which

ioa'to; is the

name of the sphere of the five planets, the sun and the moon, as distinct

from"Ok•hgnro;, which is the outer heaven, and from oUpav6;, which is ro l)1noo(krlvov Kai R-pPyetov jgipo;. Thus it seems that the name Kojogo; was applied to more than one, if eventually not to all, heavenly regions, and it was but a short step to make this cumulative use systematic. Again, Aristotle's two senses of Koa(log, the upper and lower heavens, readily suggest the terminological distinction between two heavenly KG6got.114 We may thus suppose that the "regional" meaning of K6opog; was a generalization of its use in the sense of "a (particular) heavenly region (sphere)" for all the world's spherical strata.115 The

pseudo-Hippocratic tract De hebdomadibus, which seems to be the first known instance of the use of 6o'Tgoq in the "regional" sense, confirms this conclusion.

In the first two chapters of the treatise the world is divided into seven ro4t; (1.41, 50, 63 Roscher), jgoipat (1.70), or g'pip (1.78) which severally (1.43, 70, 2.15, 42) and collectively (1.95) are referred to as K6oJgot. These are the outer heaven, the spheres of the stars, of the sun, of the moon, of air, of water, and the earth, beneath which there are other Ki6ogot oiot 8 -rv t0bv opttolyv jloto j ve tv •18v (2.1). The

peculiar feature of these K6opGot is that, except for the earth and the outermost heaven (2.15), all of them (including the spheres of air and

112 Aet. 2.7.7 = DK 44 A 16; Burkert (above, n. 73) 244-246. 113 Burkert's "of the cosmos" (above, n. 73) 245 and n. 36, repeated in Mansfeld's refer-

ence (above, n. 16) 43 n. 34, to Burkert, is mistaken.

114Epiphan. Adv. haer 3.31: E{vat 5& e' yet [sc. Aristotle] &51o Ko6o•go•T tbv &vw Kai

Tbv KXdOC CT X,. 115 It should be noted in this connection that the Stoics seem to have used the term

a(paipa for both the celestial spheres and the elemental spherical layers: Arius Did. fr. 31 Diels (above, n. 14) 466.9 (=Arnim [above, n. 75] 2.169.1) ... rnepteXeo0at &%

rtdoa T&; ( cov Irxavwgjvw0iv

nmXb Tfi T•&v &(hav&v ocpaipaq. t&v 5e nr(avwgevwv dyrlxo-

tdhrlv elvat TeX& tlV (xZCv) &~havwv Tilv Toi Kp6vou, tger& & Ta(xriv Tijv Tzo- At'd, etra ilv toi "Apeog, Pefij; &e% Tv to3

'Eptoi, icai jleC' azr(lV

ilV TfiT 'Ap(poSi'lT, eFxa •lv toi illioi, i i&o't & tSi jlV i TvfiG j iAvl i Rald(ovdo av tzco d~pt ... nDR &8 tail ae &lIv rlV TjilV To t

t' aR oP v p (PEP ov U pog, ETo3Xa TV (TO) i6azo, TEXEv-

Ta(av 5•% til% T- Yiq Rept Cb g•oov oralgeov ToD lrogot ceIteIVl

qK X.




water as well as the subterranean ones) move in circles (2.6, 47). This bizarre behaviour of the 6oaTjot suggests their origin in the astronomical theory of the homocentric rotating spheres. The Hebdomadic cosmology seems to be a generalization of the astronomical model for the world as a whole, and the use of K6o'tot for the designation of all the elemental spheres must be part of this generalization. If so, the tract evidences the derivation of the use of K60otot in the "regional" sense from the use of the word for heavenly spheres.l16

More specific conclusions must remain conjectural. The source on which the Hebdomadic author presumably drew could hardly be astronomical. First of all, Eudoxus' spheres were known as

uptipa1t,17 and

secondly, certain features of the Hebdomadic picture suggest its philosophical, rather than astronomical, provenance. Indeed, the name of the outermost sphere 6

06X•rtigto; Kcotio; (2.15, 42) evokes Epinomis 977B, where 6o(0og;, "Okugnrog;, and

oaUpav6g are used synonymously

of the outer heaven (cf. "Oh••rtog;

as the name of the outer heaven in the Platonic account of Philolaus); if Roscher's emendation lprilrou for Xcipitro (1.44) is accepted, this epithet of the outermost sphere would

parallel Theophrastus' description (De igne 351.24) of his rpdokrl apcixpa as Ktircxog; but above all, the immobility of the outermost K6cLog; is conspicuous: in so far as it is not the sphere of the fixed stars, it cannot come from an astronomical theory. To these it may be added that a person who, like the Hebdomadic author, does not hesitate to locate the fixed stars and the planets in the same sphere can hardly be a reader of astronomical treatises. The source of the De hebdomadibus must, then, have been a philosophical tract in which the theory of the homocentric rotating spheres was adapted to the Academic-Peripatetic stratifications of the heaven into several main regions, and these con- centric strata were termed K6O(0ot. The piece seems to have originated in Platonic-Peripatetic circles: Eudoxus' theory (as improved by Callip- pus) of the homocentric spheres was introduced into philosophy and adapted by Aristotle; the Hebdomadic terminology suggests Academic,

116 Cf. Corp. Herm. 1.1.7: Eirthx KoagIot = the seven planets. 117 Both in astronomical and general literature, see, e.g., Arist. Met. 1073b17; Eucl.

Phaen. 12.6 (Menge); Arch. Aren. 256.1 (Heiberg); Diod. 1.172.32, 34 (Miiller). It is however noteworthy that ic6agog was the established astronomical term for the sphere whose radius is the straight line between the centers of the earth and sun, see Arch. Aren. 218.2, cf. 218.24, 31 etc. This terminological use of

K6o•gog must be derivative of its

meaning "heavenly sphere."




and if Roscher's emendation is accepted, also Peripatetic, provenance, while the use of KoG'Tot for all the heavenly regions is a generalization of Platonic (but perhaps also the astronomical-K6oJlgo; as the term for the solar sphere) usage.

But whatever the detailed points of semantic development may be, it seems evident that the "regional" sense of 6oajgo;, besides the use in the sense of "world," is another extension of its meaning "heaven.""118 The word which meant "heaven" and then "a (particular) heavenly sphere," came to designate also all the other "spheres" of which the universe was commonly believed to consist.119 Assuming Mansfeld's date of the De hebdomadibus, this use must be late, around the first century B.C.

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY

118 Not the narrowing of the sense of "world" as is generally supposed; see, e.g., Kerschensteiner (above, n. 3) 58-59; Mansfeld (above, n. 16) 44 and n. 35.

119 This is the exact meaning of icoaJgog in its "regional" use. The meaning was never lost and the word seems to have been used only for the world's strata or strata-like

regions, as in Herm. ap. Stob. Ecl. 396.17; 405.1 (Wachsmuth), where 6 0'er6polo; K6oagog and 6 ~irntx6vioq K6Tagog are distinguished (LSJ, s.v. c6ajgog iv, "of any region of the universe" [LSJ's italics], with reference to 6 pverdpoato Kpog6to in Stobaeus is mis-

leading). The popular construal of the word as referring to "partial arrangements" of the world (as, for instance, in Cornford [above, n. 21] 9: "K6ajgot here [in Hippolytus' report on Xenophanes] might mean successive 'arrangements' in which dry land and sea are distinct ... Or the

Ka6•aot may be those other 'climes, sections or zones of the earth' which

have suns and moons of their own (Adt. 2.24.9)," or in Kirk [above, n. 22] 178 n. 1: "... the ambiguous use of Kdoagot [in the same report of Hippolytus] ... there properly 'world-arrangements,' i.e. of the earth's surface .. ."), is a linguistic fancy.



On the History of the Greek Kósmos

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