of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s...

63
A Formally Verified Abstract Account of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems Andrei Popescu Dmitriy Traytel λ = Isabelle β α HOL

Transcript of of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s...

Page 1: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

A Formally Verified Abstract Account of

Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems

Andrei Popescu Dmitriy Traytel

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL

Page 2: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931

Page 3: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 Fix a consistent logical theory that

- contains enough arithmetic,- can itself be arithmetized.

Page 4: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931

There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither prove nor disprove).

Fix a consistent logical theory that- contains enough arithmetic,- can itself be arithmetized.

Page 5: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931

There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither prove nor disprove).

Fix a consistent logical theory that- contains enough arithmetic,- can itself be arithmetized.

The theory cannot prove (an internal formulation of) its own consistency.

Page 6: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Pen and Paper Proofs of � and �

Page 7: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Pen and Paper Proofs of � and �

… … … …

Page 8: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Pen and Paper Proofs of � and �

The reader who does not like incomplete and (apparently) irremediably messy proofs of syntactic facts may wish to skim over the rest of this chapter and take it for granted that …

… … … …

Page 9: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Formal Verifications of � and �

Page 10: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Formal Verifications of � and �

Paulson

2015

Isabelle

O’Connor

2005

Coq

Harrison

2004

HOL Light

Shankar

1986

NQTHM

1978

TEM

Sieg

Page 11: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

End of story

Page 12: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

End of story?

Page 13: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

End of story?

Page 14: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Formal Verifications of � and �

Shared structure

Page 15: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

- Fix a particular logic: Classical FOL

Formal Verifications of � and �

Shared structure

Page 16: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

- Fix a particular logic: Classical FOL

- Fix a particular theory (+ finite extensions of it)

- Arithmetic (Harrison, O’Connor)

- Hereditarily finite set theory (Sieg, Shankar, Paulson)

Formal Verifications of � and �

Shared structure

Page 17: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

- Fix a particular logic: Classical FOL

- Fix a particular theory (+ finite extensions of it)

- Arithmetic (Harrison, O’Connor)

- Hereditarily finite set theory (Sieg, Shankar, Paulson)

Formal Verifications of � and �

Shared structure

Page 18: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

- Fix a particular logic: Classical FOL

- Fix a particular theory (+ finite extensions of it)

- Arithmetic (Harrison, O’Connor)

- Hereditarily finite set theory (Sieg, Shankar, Paulson)

- Tour de force for the particular combination

Formal Verifications of � and �

Shared structure

Page 19: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

- Fix a particular logic: Classical FOL

- Fix a particular theory (+ finite extensions of it)

- Arithmetic (Harrison, O’Connor)

- Hereditarily finite set theory (Sieg, Shankar, Paulson)

- Tour de force for the particular combination

Formal Verifications of � and �

Shared structure

Scope of and remains largely unexploded

Page 20: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

- Fix a particular logic: Classical FOL

- Fix a particular theory (+ finite extensions of it)

- Arithmetic (Harrison, O’Connor)

- Hereditarily finite set theory (Sieg, Shankar, Paulson)

- Tour de force for the particular combination

Formal Verifications of � and �

Shared structure

Scope of and remains largely unexploded

E.g. do they hold for Intuitionistic FOL, HOL, CIC?

Page 21: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Our Motto:

Page 22: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Our Motto:Don’t Fix, Gather!

Page 23: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Our Contributions

Page 24: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Our Contributions- Abstract formalization of and

- Answer “What must/may a logic/theory offer?”- Understand variants and distill trade-offs from the literature- Correct a mistake in a pen and paper proof

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL

Page 25: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Our Contributions- Abstract formalization of and

- Answer “What must/may a logic/theory offer?”- Understand variants and distill trade-offs from the literature- Correct a mistake in a pen and paper proof

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL

- Concrete instantiation to hereditarily finite set theory

- Reproduce (for ) and improve (for ) Paulson’s formalization

Page 26: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

What must a logic/theory offer?Generic Syntax Connectives Provability

Relation Numerals

Page 27: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

What must a logic/theory offer?Generic Syntax Connectives Provability

Relation Numerals

Classical Logic

What may a logic/theory offer?Order-like Relation Proofs Encodings

Represent-ability

Derivability Conditions

Standard Model Soundness

Consistency Omega-Consistency

Completeness of Provability

Proofs vs. Provability

Page 28: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Generic Syntax

Page 29: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• sets: Var, Term, Fmla with Var⊆Term Generic Syntax

Page 30: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• sets: Var, Term, Fmla with Var⊆Term

• operators: FV_Term : Term → 2Var

FV : Fmla → 2Var

subst_Term : Term → Var → Term → Termsubst : Fmla → Var → Term → Fmla

Generic Syntax

Page 31: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• sets: Var, Term, Fmla with Var⊆Term

• operators: FV_Term : Term → 2Var

FV : Fmla → 2Var

subst_Term : Term → Var → Term → Termsubst : Fmla → Var → Term → Fmla

• properties, e.g.:x∈FV(φ) implies FV(subst φ x s) = FV(φ) - {x} ∪ FV_Term(s)

Generic Syntax

Page 32: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• sets: Var, Term, Fmla with Var⊆Term

• operators: FV_Term : Term → 2Var

FV : Fmla → 2Var

subst_Term : Term → Var → Term → Termsubst : Fmla → Var → Term → Fmla

• properties, e.g.:x∈FV(φ) implies FV(subst φ x s) = FV(φ) - {x} ∪ FV_Term(s)

Generic Syntax

We require unary substitution only. We derive parallel substitution from it.

Page 33: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Connectives

Page 34: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• operators: ≡ : Term → Term → Fmla→, ∧, ∨ : Fmla → Fmla → Fmla¬ : Fmla → Fmla⊥, ⊤ : Fmla∃, ∀ : Var → Fmla → Fmla

Connectives

Page 35: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• operators: ≡ : Term → Term → Fmla→, ∧, ∨ : Fmla → Fmla → Fmla¬ : Fmla → Fmla⊥, ⊤ : Fmla∃, ∀ : Var → Fmla → Fmla

Connectives

We require a minimal list w.r.t. intuitionistic deduction and define the rest. Note: operators, not constructors

Page 36: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• unary relation: ⊢ ⊆ Fmlawe write ⊢φ if φ ∈ ⊢

• properties: ⊢ contains the standard (Hilbert-style) intuitionistic FOL axioms about the connectives

Provability Relation

Page 37: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• unary relation: ⊢ ⊆ Fmlawe write ⊢φ if φ ∈ ⊢

• properties: ⊢ contains the standard (Hilbert-style) intuitionistic FOL axioms about the connectives

Provability Relation

• nonempty set: Num ⊆ Fmla0

Numerals

Page 38: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• property: ⊢ ¬ ¬ φ → φ Classical Logic

Page 39: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• property: ⊢ ¬ ¬ φ → φ Classical Logic

Order-like Relation

• formula: ≺ ∈ Fmla2 • properties, e.g.:

for all φ∈Fmla1 and n∈Num,if ⊢φ(m) for all m∈Num, then ⊢∀x. x≺n → φ(x)

Page 40: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• property: ⊢ ¬ ¬ φ → φ Classical Logic

Order-like Relation

• formula: ≺ ∈ Fmla2 • properties, e.g.:

for all φ∈Fmla1 and n∈Num,if ⊢φ(m) for all m∈Num, then ⊢∀x. x≺n → φ(x)

• set: Proof • binary relation: ⊩ ∈ Proof×Fmla

we write p⊩φ if (p,φ)∈⊩

Proofs

Page 41: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• formulas subst, ⊩, ¬ • property:

behave like operators/relations (subst, ⊩, ¬) on encodings

• operators: ⟨_⟩ : Fmla → Num and ⟨_⟩ : Proof → Num

Encodings

Represent-ability

Page 42: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• formulas subst, ⊩, ¬ • property:

behave like operators/relations (subst, ⊩, ¬) on encodings

• operators: ⟨_⟩ : Fmla → Num and ⟨_⟩ : Proof → Num

Encodings

• property: ⊬⊥Consistency

Represent-ability

Page 43: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

• formulas subst, ⊩, ¬ • property:

behave like operators/relations (subst, ⊩, ¬) on encodings

• operators: ⟨_⟩ : Fmla → Num and ⟨_⟩ : Proof → Num

Encodings

• property: ⊬⊥Consistency

• property: For all φ∈Fmla1,

if ⊢¬φ(n) for all n∈Num then ⊬¬¬(∃x.φ(x))

Omega-Consistency

Represent-ability

Page 44: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

What must a logic/theory offer?Generic Syntax Connectives Provability

Relation Numerals

Classical Logic

What may a logic/theory offer?Order-like Relation Proofs Encodings

Represent-ability

Derivability Conditions

Standard Model Soundness

Consistency Omega-Consistency

Completeness of Provability

Proofs vs. Provability

Page 45: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Proofs

EncodingsRepresent-ability

Derivability Conditions

Omega-Consistency

subst, ⊩ ⊢φ implies ⊢⊢⟨φ⟩

There exists φ∈Fmla0 such that⊬φ and ⊬¬φ

Page 46: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Proofs

EncodingsRepresent-ability

Derivability Conditions

subst, ⊩ ⊢φ implies ⊢⊢⟨φ⟩

There exists φ∈Fmla0 such that⊬φ and ⊬¬φ

ConsistencyRosser’s Trick

a la Rosser

Page 47: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Proofs

EncodingsRepresent-ability

Derivability Conditions

subst, ⊩ ⊢φ implies ⊢⊢⟨φ⟩

There exists φ∈Fmla0 such that⊬φ and ⊬¬φ

ConsistencyRosser’s Trick

¬

a la Rosser

Page 48: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Proofs

EncodingsRepresent-ability

Derivability Conditions

subst, ⊩ ⊢φ implies ⊢⊢⟨φ⟩

There exists φ∈Fmla0 such that⊬φ and ⊬¬φ

ConsistencyRosser’s Trick

Order-like Relation

¬

a la Rosser

Page 49: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

EncodingsRepresent-ability

Derivability Conditions

subst ⊢φ implies ⊢⊢⟨φ⟩

There exists φ∈Fmla0 such that⊬φ and ⊬¬φ

and φ is true in the standard modelsemantic

⊢⊢⟨φ⟩ implies ⊢φ

Standard Model Soundness Completeness

of ProvabilityProofs vs. Provability

Page 50: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

EncodingsRepresent-ability

Derivability Conditions

subst ⊢φ implies ⊢⊢⟨φ⟩

There exists φ∈Fmla0 such that⊬φ and ⊬¬φclassical

⊢⊢⟨φ⟩ implies ⊢φ

Classical LogicConsistency

Page 51: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

EncodingsRepresent-ability

Derivability Conditions

subst ⊢φ implies ⊢⊢⟨φ⟩

⊬¬⊢⟨⊥⟩

Consistency

⊢⊢⟨φ⟩∧⊢⟨φ→ψ⟩→⊢⟨ψ⟩

⊢⊢⟨φ⟩→⊢⟨⊢⟨φ⟩⟩

Page 52: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

EncodingsRepresent-ability

Derivability Conditions

subst ⊢φ implies ⊢⊢⟨φ⟩

⊬¬⊢⟨⊥⟩

Consistency

⊢⊢⟨φ⟩∧⊢⟨φ→ψ⟩→⊢⟨ψ⟩

⊢⊢⟨φ⟩→⊢⟨⊢⟨φ⟩⟩

In the paper:Jeroslow’s

“improvement"to remove this

condition

results in weaker conclusion

+ mistake in proof

Page 53: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither
Page 54: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

12000 LOCλ

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL

Page 55: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

From Abstract to ConcreteGeneric Syntax Connectives Provability

Relation Numerals

Verified instances-Robinson’s Arithmetic (Q)-Hereditarily finite set theory

Page 56: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

From Abstract to Concrete

classical semantic

Instantiations of

with Paulson’s HF set theory.

Page 57: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

From Abstract to Concrete

classical semantic

Instantiations of

with Paulson’s HF set theory.

12000 LOC

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL12000 LOC

Page 58: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

From Abstract to Concrete

classical semantic

Instantiations of

with Paulson’s HF set theory.

Paulson assumes soundness (and redundantly consistency!)

We removed the soundness assumption from the instantiation of → strictly stronger result → required us to replace “easy” semantic proofs with tedious x → proofs in the HF calculus (no help from the abstract side here)

12000 LOC

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL12000 LOC

Page 59: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

From Abstract to Concrete

classical semantic

Instantiations of

with Paulson’s HF set theory.

Paulson assumes soundness (and redundantly consistency!)

We removed the soundness assumption from the instantiation of → strictly stronger result → required us to replace “easy” semantic proofs with tedious x → proofs in the HF calculus (no help from the abstract side here)

12000 LOC

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL12000 LOC

-5000 LOC

Page 60: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

From Abstract to Concrete

classical semantic

Instantiations of

with Paulson’s HF set theory.

Paulson assumes soundness (and redundantly consistency!)

We removed the soundness assumption from the instantiation of → strictly stronger result → required us to replace “easy” semantic proofs with tedious x → proofs in the HF calculus (no help from the abstract side here)

12000 LOC

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL12000 LOC

-5000 LOC +5000 LOC

Page 61: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Conclusion- Abstract formalization of and

- Answer “What must/may a logic/theory offer?”- Understand variants and distill trade-offs from the literature- Correct a mistake in a pen and paper proof

- Concrete instantiation to hereditarily finite set theory

- Reproduce (for ) and improve (for ) Paulson’s formalization

- Still unanswered/future work

- Do and hold for Intuitionistic FOL, HOL, CIC?- Can we do more on the abstract level? (e.g. derivability conditions)

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL

Page 62: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

Conclusion- Abstract formalization of and

- Answer “What must/may a logic/theory offer?”- Understand variants and distill trade-offs from the literature- Correct a mistake in a pen and paper proof

- Concrete instantiation to hereditarily finite set theory

- Reproduce (for ) and improve (for ) Paulson’s formalization

- Still unanswered/future work

- Do and hold for Intuitionistic FOL, HOL, CIC?- Can we do more on the abstract level? (e.g. derivability conditions)

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL

Thank you! Questions?

Page 63: of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theoremspeople.inf.ethz.ch/trayteld/slides/cade19.pdfGödel’s Incompleteness Theorems 1931 There are sentences that the theory cannot decide (i.e., neither

A Formally Verified Abstract Account of

Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems

Andrei Popescu Dmitriy Traytel

λ→

∀=Is

abelle

β

α

HOL