Macro financial modeling - Centre for Economic Policy … · In Reduced‐form [Diffusion terms...
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Transcript of Macro financial modeling - Centre for Economic Policy … · In Reduced‐form [Diffusion terms...
In Reduced‐form [Diffusion terms only]
Macro‐finance model:
TFP
• S is state of financial system.• Nonlinearity:
– σ(S) = 0 for S> – σ 0, S<
• Conditional volatility• Skewness, fat tails
Asset Market Feedback; Uncertainty Shocks
TFP
Asset price:
If S is bank capital
TFP
• Amplification• More conditional volatility
Crisis shock
TFP
If S is maximum capital that can be raised
“Informational/moral‐hazard” Poisson shock:
State evolution: TFP
Two shocks
TFP
TFP
• Shock to finance (S), with limited real impact (i.e.
– GM/Ford; Enron; Amaranth• Shock to macro (Y) with limited financial impact(i.e. is small)– Recession, no financial crisis
Theoretical Questions
• What is S? From “Risk Topography” (with Markus and Gary)1. Capitalization or capital capacity of financial sector2. Liquidity mismatch of financial sector
• Liquidity mismatch = liquidity of assets – liquidity promised through liabilities, other contracts
• Other candidates:– Interconnectedness, network fragility– Concentration– Government backstop
Shocks to S
• Need a deeper model
• If S is equity capacity– Increase in adverse selection increases costs of raising outside equity
– Increase in moral hazard (e.g., management needs to exert more effort in a crisis environment), also increase cost of raising outside equity
Shocks to S
• Suppose S is liquidity mismatch– Increase in “margins” (but why did margins increase to begin with?)
– Shortening of maturity structure (why did that happen to begin with…)
– Diamond‐Dybvig preference shocks; Bank‐run beliefs (sunspot?)
• I am unhappy with models of liquidity; – Liquidity has something to do with time – it will take a while to evaluate an investment
– Many papers use the word liquidity, but are really about “capital” and asset values
Is Incidence of Default Necessary?
• Clearly not at a high level • “Debt contract” is important
• Debt not default• Debt creates a non‐linearity, because of lack of contingency• Default may trigger distress costs
• One could tell a deeper story where incidence of default triggers rent‐seeking actions– Everyone tries to manipulate legal regime to maximize their interests
– Delay = endogenous financial distress costs
Measurement (“Systemic states”)
• How to measure ?– Capital: need to measure across entire intermediation sector
– Liquidity: Same problem + deeper issue of how to measure liquidity (BGK answer: LMI)
• Hidden state? – What is correlated with ?
– Credit spreads, for example
Metrics
• What makes a good measure of S?– Not “it forecasts downturns”
– Instead: it measures conditional volatility, skewness, etc.
• Suppose we estimate and
TFP
– Systemic risk at T = Probability (
Empirics from HK (2012)
‐1
‐0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
1973‐I
1974‐I
1975‐I
1976‐I
1977‐I
1978‐I
1979‐I
1980‐I
1981‐I
1982‐I
1983‐I
1984‐I
1985‐I
1986‐I
1987‐I
1988‐I
1989‐I
1990‐I
1991‐I
1992‐I
1993‐I
1994‐I
1995‐I
1996‐I
1997‐I
1998‐I
1999‐I
2000‐I
2001‐I
2002‐I
2003‐I
2004‐I
2005‐I
2006‐I
2007‐I
2008‐I
2009‐I
2010‐I
EBS‐Sharpe
Financial Equity (From Tyler)
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
200000
1973‐I
1974‐I
1975‐I
1976‐I
1977‐I
1978‐I
1979‐I
1980‐I
1981‐I
1982‐I
1983‐I
1984‐I
1985‐I
1986‐I
1987‐I
1988‐I
1989‐I
1990‐I
1991‐I
1992‐I
1993‐I
1994‐I
1995‐I
1996‐I
1997‐I
1998‐I
1999‐I
2000‐I
2001‐I
2002‐I
2003‐I
2004‐I
2005‐I
2006‐I
2007‐I
2008‐I
2009‐I
2010‐I
Total equity
Total equity
Equity to Equity
0 2 4 6 80
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2EBP (credit risk premium) to Equity
0 2 4 6 8−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0Investment to Equity
0 2 4 6 80
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Equity to Equity
0 2 4 6 80
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14EBP (credit risk premium) to Equity
0 2 4 6 8−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
Investment to Equity
0 2 4 6 8
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Panel B: Non Distress Periods
Panel A: Distress Periods