Fritz, Kurt von_Νόος and νοεῖν in the Homeric Poems_1943_CPh, 38, 2, pp. 79-93

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7/28/2019 Fritz, Kurt von_Νόος and νοεῖν in the Homeric Poems_1943_CPh, 38, 2, pp. 79-93 http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/fritz-kurt-von-and-in-the-homeric-poems1943cph-38 1/16 NOOΣ and Noein in the Homeric Poems Author(s): K. von Fritz Reviewed work(s): Source: Classical Philology, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 1943), pp. 79-93 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/264293 . Accessed: 28/06/2012 10:28 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Classical Philology. http://www.jstor.org

Transcript of Fritz, Kurt von_Νόος and νοεῖν in the Homeric Poems_1943_CPh, 38, 2, pp. 79-93

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    NOO and Noein in the Homeric PoemsAuthor(s): K. von FritzReviewed work(s):Source: Classical Philology, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 1943), pp. 79-93Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/264293 .

    Accessed: 28/06/2012 10:28

    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

    .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

    content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

    of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

    .

    The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

    Classical Philology.

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    CLASSICALPHILOLOGYVolume XXXVIII APRIL 1943 Number 2

    NOOMAND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMSK. VON FRITZ

    T HE history of the Greek terms desig-nating knowledge or the acquisitionof knowledge has a double interest.With the exception of the East Indiansthe Greeks are the only nation in the his-tory of the world which developed a com-plete scientific and philosophical termi-nology entirely in its own language andalmost free from any foreign influence.'Most of the terms used in Greek philoso-phy and science are, therefore, either di-rectly taken over from prephilosophicaland prescientific language or are deriva-tions from and adaptations of words be-longing to this prephilosophical language.These words could not have been put tosuch use if their meanings in prephilosoph-ical language had not had some affinityto the philosophical concepts which theywere later used to express. A study of thehistory of such terms offers, therefore, aunique opportunity for an inquiry into theconnections between philosophical andprephilosophical thought. This is especial-ly true of the words designating knowl-edge or the acquisition of knowledge, since,as B. Snell2has shown, many of them cor-

    1 This does not, of course, mean that Greek philos-ophy and science were not influenced by foreignthought. But the Greeks did not take over any for-eign words directly into their philosophical and sci-entiflc terminology, and there are only a very fewcases of little signiflcance in which a Greek term mayhave been adopted as a direct translation of a foreignterm.2 Bruno Snell, "Die Ausdrticke fiur den Begriff des

    Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie," Philo-logische Untersuchungen, XXIX (1924).

    respond to typical and rather primitiveexperiences, situations, and reactionswhich are often described in early Greekpoetry, especially in Homer, and sincetheir origin from these experiences hasgreatly influenced the early developmentof a theory of knowledge in Greek philos-ophy.The second reason why the history ofthe Greek terms for knowledge is of someinterest derives from the fact that this his-tory continues right down to the presenttime, since a great number of modern phil-osophical terms in this field are either di-rectly borrowed from the Greeks or trans-lated from their language. The changes ofmeaning which these have undergone inthe course of this long history were natu-rally not always deliberate but often in-advertent. Such inadvertent changesoften cause confusion. In order to distin-guish the real philosophical problems fromthe pseudo-problems arising from suchconfusion, it seems useful to follow thehistory of the terms so as to discover theexact point at which the confusion started.

    Most of the Greek words for knowledge-To4?'a, Yv"u-0, w7CLS, avieVcUL, arropLv,

    '&,G,ua, 'rta-Hgg-have been thoroughlyanalyzed in Snell's excellent book. But heomitted the words voi3s and vOcLv, per-haps because the word voUS, from whichVOELV,voqjua, voqcts,etc., are derived, doesnot mean "knowledge" or "acquisition ofknowledge" but rather "mind" or "intel-

    ICLASSICALHLOLOGY,XXXVIII, APRL,1943 3 79

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    80 K. VON FRITZlect." Yet there can be hardly any doubtthat the verb voeZvand its derivationsdesignate certain ways of acquiringknowl-edge and that in this respect, therefore,Snell's book has left a gap. An attemptto fill this gap in part was made byJ. Boehme.3 But his analysis, which, asits title indicates, starts from a more spe-cial problem, is, as we shall see, neithercomplete nor free from error. Some of hisomissions and errors were supplementedor corrected in a review of his book byB. Snell,4 who contributed some excellentobservations. But even Snell in this casedoes not ask what simple and everydayexperiences led to a distinction betweenI6ELP,' YL IKEY, and vOe?v in a languagewhich shows no signs of the influence ofabstract speculation, though he has usedthis approach with brilliant success in re-gard to other Greek words for knowledge.There is also an interesting article byJ. Stenzel.' He tried to determine themeaning of voiVSnd vOELvn early Greekphilosophy by means of a reconstructionof the archaic way of thinking (das ar-chaischeDenken). Unfortunately, he con-fines himself entirely to the philosophicaltexts; and even a man of his philosophicalacumen cannot, in an attempt like this,neglect with impunity the interconnectionbetween prephilosophical language andearly philosophical terminology. If he hadanalyzed the Homeric usage, he would, Ibelieve, have discovered that the archaicway of thinking, though in some respectslacking modern differentiations, is neitherso obscure nor so difficult to understandas he thinks it is. It may therefore beworth while to make an attempt to fill thegaps left by previous inquiries. Since the

    3 Joachim Boehme, Die Seele und das Ich im Ho-merischen Epos (Berlin: Teubner, 1929).4 Gnomon, VII (1931), 77 f.s Julius Stenzel, "Zur Entwicklung des Geistesbe-

    griffes in der griechischen Philosophie," Die Antike,I (1925), 244 ff.

    problems with which we are confronted inHomer are naturally somewhat differentfrom those with which we shall have todeal in an analysis of philosophical texts,and since later literature is not quite freefrom philosophical influence, it seems ad-visable to keep the two parts of our in-quiry separate. The present article, there-fore, will confine itself to Homer. A sec-ond article, which is to be published soon,will follow the history of the terms and oftheir derivations vo6u.ta,vo71qfs,bcavoEZtv,5aLavoLa,tc., from Hesiod to Plato.If there existed a universally acceptedetymology of the word voiVS,t would beadvisable to start with a discussion of thisetymology. Since this is not the case, itseems preferable to begin with an analysisof the texts and to come back to the ques-tion of possible etymologies later.6 But,though our approach will be somewhatdifferent, it seems appropriate to statebriefly the conclusions at which Boehmearrived in his book.7 He states that voivsin Homer always means something purely

    intellectual or rather purely mental (reinintellektuell) 8 he adds by way of explana-tion that vOeZvan in no case be identifiedwith any kind of sensual perception9 andthat the voVS s always put in contrastwith emotion.10 He does not say expresslythat the concept of voi3sand vOcLv everimplies an element of volition, though hisstatement that the voiVSs always "reinintellektuell"might be taken to imply sucha denial."Boehme further distinguishes threemain meanings of the word vovis: (1)"Seele als Trager seelischer Erlebnisse,"

    6 See below, pp. 91 f-7Op. cit.8 Ibid., p. 27 (rein qeistiqe Bedeutung) and p. 53

    (rein intellektuell).9 Ibid., pp. 24 fr.10 Ibid., pp. 52 ff.11Cf. also Boehme's distinction between v6osand

    qpeves (ibid., pp. 44 and 54).

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    NOO AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERICPOEMS 81which may perhaps be translated as "thesoul as an organ of experiences"; (2) "Ver-stand," which can be either "mind" or"intellect" or "intelligence" or "under-standing"; (3) "Plan," which is "plan" or"iplanning."'12n order to clarify these dis-tinctions, Snell"3pointed out that in thefirst case vo-vsmeans an organ, in the sec-ond and third case the function of thisorgan but with the further difference thatin the second case it means the functionas such while in the third case it means thefunction at a given moment. The secondmeaning, then, would correspond to thepresent tense of a verb, the third to anaorist. We shall see later that there ismuch truth in this latter distinction; butthe Homeric poems do not contain anysuch abstract notions as "organ" or "func-tion," and the difficulty encountered inthe attempt to translate Boehme's defini-tions into English shows that words likevois or Verstand have no exact equiva-lents in different languages. It seemstherefore preferable to follow a somewhatmore empirical method and to begin withan analysis of outstanding passages inwhich the words occur and with a tenta-tive description or outline of the meaningswhich we encounter rather than with adefinition or a direct translation.14

    12 Ibid., pp. 53 f. 13 Gnomon, p. 77.14 Recently there seems to have arisen a school ofthought which contends that the traditional method ofdetermining the meaning of a term-namely, by ananalysis of outstanding and signiflcant passages inwhich it occurs and by making use of the results ofthis analysis in the interpretation of other passages-is "subjective" or "arbitrary" and implies a viciouscircle. The suggestion is then made that it should bereplaced by the more objective method of statistics.It should, however, be obvious that no intelligent sta-tistics can be made unless one has flrst a principle ofdivision, and this principle cannot be found exceptby intelligent observation. It is, on the other hand,not true that the traditional method implies a viciouscircle. If a geometrical simile is to be used, it mayrather be likened to a spiral, since a more and morecomplete understanding is reached as the investiga-tion continually returns from the interpretation oflarger contexts in which the word occurs to the word

    itself, and from the word as such to the interpretationof larger contexts.

    There are a great many passages in theHomeric poems in which the opinion isexpressed or implied that different indi-viduals or nations have different voo. Thelocus classicus for this notion is the thirdline of the Odyssey: wroXXGva'vOpcwnrwv&cvaarcEa KaL vOoveyvw. The word voOSin thisline has been translated into English in agreat many different ways: "their mindand ways,"'15 their ways and purposes,"''6"their various temper,"'7 to take threewell-known translations at random. Allthe translators, however, seem to havefelt that the word implies both an intel-lectual element and an element of voli-tion. Indeed, it seems obvious that Odys-seus is said to have discovered not a dif-ferent grade of intelligence or a differenttype of intellect in different nations butrather a different outlook on and attitudetoward life which expresses itself in ac-tions.A slightly different but closely relatedmeaning of voOS an be found in the Iliadiv. 307. Nestor lines up the troops forbattle: the horsemen and chariots infront, the infantry in the rear, the KaKOLnthe middle so that the latter will be com-pelled to stay in line and fight even againsttheir will. Then he exhorts the horsemennot to leave the ranks, whether it be inorder to join battle with the enemy aheadof the others or by holding back, since bykeeping the ranks closed they will makethe impact of their attack much greater.Then he goes on to say: c16EKaLol lrporEpoL

    r6XEaS KaL TEUXE' hr'p,fov ToWE voov Ka'CAu/vEvL T,0,EOL ExovrTs. The fact thatvoos s here linked with Ou/o'smakes the in-terpretation more difficult, since it is notcertain from the outset to which aspect of

    15 Homer's Odyssey, trans. L. Bigge-Wither (Ox-ford, 1869).16 The Odyssey of Homer, trans. Earl of Carnarvon(London, 1886).17 The Odyssey of Homer, trans. J. G. Cordery (Lon-don, 1897).

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    82 K. VONFRITZthe desired attitude each one of the wordsrefers. But, since it is an attitude inbattle which Nestor asks for, since inconnection with the tactical arrangementsthis attitude requires a certain intellectualunderstanding, and since OvAo's lwaysdesignates a more passionate or emotionalpart or function of the soul, it is clear thatin this case also vo'os mplies both an in-tellectual element and an element of voli-tion. There is further, just as in the firstpassage quoted, an implication that dif-ferent individualsmay havedifferentVO'Ol.But, in addition, the passage implies thatthe same individual may have different6ootat different times.Both these peculiarities of the vo'oscanbe followed a little further. The differencein the vo'otof different individuals can beused to characterize these persons, as, forinstance, the Phaeacians by their voos

    Geova?s,18the Cyclopes by their lack of agod-fearing Po'os,19r Aias and Achilles bytheir voos a 77V-.20 But an individual canalso have a certain kind of vo'os pecificallyin relation to another individual, as, forinstance, Odysseus' servants in regard toOdysseus.2'The inextricable connection of an in-tellectual element with an element of vo-lition in the concept of vo'oss perhapsbest illustrated by the passage in Odysseyii. 121 ff.: -rUawv0vLs ouoa 'o',4ara lIl?7eXo-

    VrL p717 aap ,uv TfOVf y'va'a, UrEL f'Opa -yap .LE' 70)7' 'ElC Y/0' 0Vev_7o. - y&p ouv LOTO' TE TEO' KaLKT7?,Icr' `bo TatL,O/pa KE KELP?7 TOVfOV exPoop o'riva oL vvv 'v a6e71oEaL TLOELo OEoL,which one writer translates as follows:"Of these not one such notions as Penel-

    18 Odyssey vi. 121: in the passage quoted, Odysseusis wondering whether he will flnd the inhabitants ofthe island to have a v6oSOeovlis, but from what followsit is clear that the vMoSOeovOiss as characteristic of thePhaeacians as the V6OS 7n7vis of Achilles and Aias, etc.19 Od. ix. 176.20 Iliad xvi. 35; xxiii. 484; cf. also Od. xviii. 381.21 E.g., Od. xxi. 205.

    ope's conceived. This thought of hers isnowise seemly. Therefore so long thycheers and stores devour they as she thiswill retains."22 The same mixture of thesetwo elements is also found in all thosecases in which vo'oscan be translated by"attention,"23 "intention,"24or "plan."25But it is natural that there are passagesin which the intellectual element is em-phasized and others in which the elementof volition is more in the foreground.When Circe says: ooL66 nTs EV o-GeooLva'X47xros V'oS b,-r26 she means thatOdysseus' clearness of mind has not beenaffected by her magical art,27while in thesentence o-v 6 ot vo'ov OVK EfrEXeo-o-aS28ndsimilar passages29 vo'os seems to mean"will" or "wish." Yet the other elementis never completely missing, since in thefirst of the two passages quoted Odysseus'clearness of mind finds its expression inhis aims and actions, while in the secondone, as in all those similar to it, vo'osdoesnot mean a vague desire but a clearlyconceived aim and a vision of a way to itsattainment.That these two elements can be foundin the concept of vo'oswas not unknown.In fact, most dictionaries indicate asmuch. But, since some of Boehme's re-marks30tend to obscure the fact, it wasnecessary to restate it and to illustrate itby examples, especially since these sameexamples will prove useful in the furthercourse of our inquiry. To begin with,

    22 Bigge-Wither, op. cit. (Italics are mine.)23 I. vii. 447. This meaning is very rare in Homer;cf. also below, p. 91.24 E.g., Od. iv. 256 and 493.25 E.g., II. ix. 104-5: oi yap rts v6ov &XXov .j.eeiova TOUOf

    vo0uet olov &yi voiw si,d srAXatno' 9Lal KiP; cf. also II. xv509, and Od. v. 23; xxiv, 497.26 Od. x. 329.27 See also Boehme, op. cit., p. 53, n. 2, and below,p. 87.28 . xxiii. 149.29 Cf. It. viii. 143; xvi. 103; xx. 25; Od. xxii. 215;

    etc.30 See above, p. 80.

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    NOO: AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMS 83Boehme's distinction between voos as"soul" and voos as "mind" or as an organand its function seems not very ade-quate.31 There is no evidence anywherein the Homeric poems that the vo'oswasconceived of as a separate entity in anal-ogy to the 4lvX7', hich after the death ofa person goes to another place and livesthere by itself. Boehme himself quotes32as evidence for the meaning "soul,"among a great many similar examples, thepassages Odysseyi. 3 and x. 329, which wehave analyzed above.33 But it is difficultto believe that the omeric Odysseusshould have discovered different types ofsouls or different organs of knowledge indifferent nations. It is much more likelythat he found their minds to function dif-ferently. In the Circe passage, on theother hand, it is absolutely impossible todistinguish between organ and function;and the same is true of Boehme's otherexamples. All that we can say, therefore,is that the Homeric Greeks did not makethe rather abstract distinction between anintellectual organ and its function34 butthat if they had made the distinction theywould probably have considered the vo'osa function rather than an organ.Snell's distinction between the functionas such and the function at a given mo-ment is much more to the point. Onemight object that in those cases in whichvoos means "plan" it designates the re-sult of a function rather than the functionitself. Yet the passages in which theword vo'osoccurs in this sense35seem toindicate that even then it designates notso much a ready-made plan but a plan inthe process of being conceived or elabo-rated. Snell's distinction between the last-

    31 op. cit., p. 56.32 Ibid., p. 54. 33 See above, p. 81.34 One may perhaps add that a great many philos-ophers from Aristoxenos to the present time also have

    rejected this distinction on philosophical grounds.35See esp. II. ix. 104-5.

    ing function and the function at a givenmoment, therefore, seems most ade-quate,36 especially since this covers alsothe meanings "attention" and "inten-tion." It is, however, perhaps pertinentto add that even in this latter use, whichcorresponds to the aorist of the verb, theword vo'osnever means a purely momen-tary decision but always implies somekind of long-range vision.Since everywhere, then, the word voosseems to designate a function rather thananything else, it is perhaps permissible toturn to the verb vaeOvn the hope of find-ing in its analysis the key to our mainproblem, though from the linguistic pointof view the verb is clearly secondary.37Boehme, as we have seen,38 contendsthat there is no emotional element what-ever in the vo'osand that in fact it alwaysappears as the very opposite of emotion.He explains an expression like xaLpe 0 3as referring to "purely intellectual joy,"which, he declares, is not an emotion.40 Ido not know whether there is such a thingas purely intellectual joy-perhaps inanalogy to Spinoza's amor intellectualisDei-but I am quite sure that no such

    36 Gnomon, p. 77; cf. also above, p. 81.37 It is certainly a strange fact requiring some ex-planation that the verb voeiv is derived from thenoun v6os,though the latter, as we have seen, clearlydesignates a function, so that we should expect theopposite relation between noun and verb on analogyto the similar cases of PyvyP6cKeLV and yP61A7vor ricTra(rOaLand ZirLaTT5,I71.But this difflculty must not prevent usfrom beginning our analysis with the verb, since itis quite possible that the verb, though secondary, haspreserved an earlier stage of the development of themeaning of v6os, just as, for instance, CanadianFrench has preserved certain peculiarities of theFrench language of the seventeenth century whichhave disappeared in the language of the motherland.In the present case this is all the more likely, sincethe verb would naturally better preserve the func-tional character of the original meaning of the rootthan would the noun, and since actually the noun, aswe shall see, shows a much greater variety of meaningthan the verb. As to possible explanations of the de-rivative character of the verb see below, pp. 92and 93.

    38 See above, p. 80.39 Od. viii. 78. 40 Op. cit., p. 53.

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    84 K. VON FRITZmystic notions can be found in Homer.There may be a joy the cause of which ispurely intellectual, though even this is byno means the case in the passages whichBoehme quotes from Homer,41 but the joyitself would still remain an emotion. Inhis desire to stress the antagonism be-tween vo'osand emotion-perhaps underthe influence of Plato's distinction of vo'os,OvAIos, nd 17rLOvALat-Boehmeas over-looked and obscured a factor which is ab-solutely fundamental for an understand-ing of the essence and origin of the earlyconcept of v'os.If we take at random three passagesfrom the third book of the Iliad in whichthe verb voe-lvoccurs, we find the follow-ing evidence: (1) To'v 5's oiv 6vorE'ap74cAXos MEvfXaos cpXolue6ov lrpolrapoLoEv61iXov AIaKpLat3av'ra "s TE Xwiv e'Xa'p?7*42(2) Tov 5' s ou'v ivoraev 'AMXcavbpos0EOeLtb5sEv irpoIaXoLol4 q4avrEva, KaTE7rXacLyI kLXovirOp 43 (3) KacLp Ws o'v EvonoE OEas IrEpt-KaXXcfaELprIv afT7OEAa0' LIEpoevTa KaL ojtta-ra,iapMiaLpol'ra, 0a3r aE." In all three casesthe verb is followed by a verb express-ing violent emotion. In fact, this is thecase in about one-fourth of all the pas-sages in which the verb voE6v occurs inHomer. If one adds to these the casesin which the fact that voE6v auses a vio-lent emotion does not need to be expresslystated because it follows immediatelyfrom the situation,446 one finds that morethan half of all the passages with voPvimply violent emotion. The following ob-servations, however, may at first sight

    41 When Agamemnon (Od.viii.78) rejoices over theviolent quarrel between Odysseus and Achilles, onecan hardly say that the cause of his joy is "purelyintellectual."42 11. iii. 21 ff. 43Ibid. 30 ff. 44 Ibid. 396ff.45Ibid. v. 669, 711; vi. 470, 485; xi. 248; xii. 143,

    393; xv. 395; xx. 419; xxi. 49, 418, 527, 550; xxii. 136,463; xxiv. 700; Od. i. 322; iv. 148, 653; vi. 163; xii.248; xvii. 301, 576; xix. 233, 552; xx. 204; xxiv. 232.46Il. ii. 391; iv. 200; v. 95, 590; vii. 17; viii. 10; x224, 550; xi. 284, 521, 575, 581, 599; xii. 335; xv. 422;

    seem even more surprising: (1) Withoutexception, in all those cases in which theverb voe-lvhas a direct and concrete ob-ject47 violent emotion is caused by thevoeLv.(2) In all those cases in which theverb has a direct and concrete object theverb is used in the aorist. These interre-lations, however, are not reversible. Theverb is not infrequently used in the aoristwhere no emotion is involved. Likewise,violent emotion may follow where thereis no direct and concrete object.

    Since, considering the very great num-ber of passages involved, what we haveobserved can hardly be a mere coinci-dence, we must look for an explanation ofthese facts. Actually, what at first sightmay seem somewhat mysterious is notvery difficult to explain. All the cases inwhich the verb PoE6v ccurs and in whichit has no direct and concrete object canbe brought under one of two heads: theobject of the verb voELv,whether it be ex-pressly mentioned or merely to be under-stood, either is a situation rather than aconcrete thing48or else it is an intentionxvii. 116, 483, 486, 682; xxiv. 294, 312; Od. vii. 290;viii. 271, 533; x. 375; xi. 572, 601; xiii. 318; xv. 59;xvi. 5; xviii. 228, 309; xx. 367. It is clear that whenPriam on his way to Achilles sees a good omen (II.xxiv. 294), when Odysseus for the first time after along absence sees the smoke of his house (Od. i. 58),when Hector sees the chariot and horses of Achilles(II. xvii. 483), or when Helios discovers Ares andAphrodite in flagranti delicto, they feel strong emo-tions, whatever their character in a given case maybe, though the poet does not and need not expresslymention the fact. These cases, therefore, as well asall the others enumerated in this note, belong in thesame category as those mentioned in the precedingnote, though this cannot be proved by statistics con-cerning the occurrence of certain speciflc words.

    47 By "direct and concrete object" I mean, for in-stance, a human being, an animal, a house, a river,smoke, or the like, but not, for instance, &XXan thefrequent expression &XX' 6,ocr,E, here &XXa eans "an-other plan." I do not, of course, include the cases inwhich the verb is negatived, since emotion naturallywill be caused by VoeiV and not by oi VoeV.

    49 This is the case in the following instances: II.iii. 374; v. 312, 680; viii. 91, 132; ix. 223; xi. 343; xv.453, 649; xvii. 483; xx. 246, 291; xxiii. 305; Od. vi. 67;viii. 94; xvi. 136; xvii. 193, 281; xxi. 257.

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    NOO AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERICPOEMS 85or a plan.49 It is the first of these twogroups that gives the answer to our prob-lem. When Paris sees Menelaus,50 t is notthe sight of Menelaus as such that strikeshim but the realization that Menelaus hasno more ardent desire than to take re-venge by killing him on the battlefield.When Menelaus discovers Paris,5"he isstruck by the realization that now at lasthe may have an opportunity to avengehimself. When Helen is stunned at thesight of her visitor,52 it is because of hersudden realization that this is not an oldwoman but a goddess. In other words, ineach of these cases the concrete object isonly the incident through which a charac-ter suddenly realizes the full meaning of asituation. This situation is the real objectof the mental act designated by the verbvOEYv. It is nothing but an abbreviated andmore concentrated expression when thedescription of the situation is replaced bythe object in which the situation is fo-cused.53 This is also the very simple rea-

    49 See II. i. 343 ("to have foresight and hindsight,"but with stress on the ability to plan), 545, 577; vii.358; ix. 105; xii. 232; xv. 81; xx. 310; xxii. 235; xxiii.140, 193; xxiv. 560; Od. ii. 382, 393; iii. 27; iv. 795;v. 170, 188; vi. 112; vii. 299; xvi. 409; xviii. 184, 230,242, 344.

    50 Il. iii. 30 ff.; see above, p. 84.51 Ibid. iii. 21 ff. 52 Ibid. iii. 396 ff.53 In the passage II. iii. 21 ff., for instance, Paris'"sensual perception" of Menelaus and his realizationof the dangerous situation in which he flnds himselfhappen in his mind at the same instant and are psy-chologically hardly separable. This is the reason whywhat is actually the object of sensual perception or of

    recognition can grammatically become the object ofthe verb voeTv. Much more instructive, however, aresome other passages. In Od. iv. 78 ff. Menelaus tellsTelemachus of his own wanderings, then mentionsOdysseus, who has not yet come home after so manyyears. When Telemachus hears the name of his father,he begins to weep. Having told so much, the poetgoes on to say: v67o- be yv MevEXaos (iv. 116). Hereit is quite clear that the poet does not mean that nowfor the flrst time Menelaus notices Telemachus: hehas been talking to him all the time. N67oe Si lAuvmeansthat he saw him weeping, that is: he saw how he wasaffected: he realized the situation. Another very in-structive example is to be found in Od. xix. 552. Herethe object xjvas is connected with a participle so thatthe action of the geese which Penelope iv677er is di-rectly expressed. But the context shows that even

    son why the verb voe-tv,when it has a di-rect and concrete object, is always sur-rounded by expressions of emotion. For asingle and concrete object does not ordi-narily suggest a whole situation unless itssight strikes us suddenly with some im-pact. The suddenness then naturally callsfor the aorist, while the impact with whichit strikes naturally results in emotion.It is also quite clear why the interrela-tion is not reversible.54 Where the abbre-viated expression is not used, there needbe neither suddenness nor emotion, as, forinstance, in the many cases in which aperson describes and explains a situationand then adds: VOEElSU Kal ai-6's ("but youunderstand [or "you realize"] this [thesituation] yourself").55But nothing, on theother hand, compels the poet to use theabbreviated expression (in which refer-ence to the situation as such is replacedby mention of the object in which the situ-ation is focused) always when he makes asituation strike a person with a suddenimpact.56

    So far, then, our investigation showsthat there are two basic meanings of theword voEYv: to realize a situation and toplan or to have an intention. What is theinterconnection between these two mean-ings? Is one of them derived from theother? Or are both of them derived fromthe same root? Or are they derived fromdifferent roots which merely by the coin-cidence of phonetic developments pro-this action is not the real object of Penelope's vOELpbut rather the contrast of the behavior of the geesewith what she saw and heard in her dream.

    54 See above, p. 89.65 E.g., Od. xxi. 257; cf. also II. i. 577; xxiii. 305;Od. xvi. 136; xvii. 193, 281.56 The poet can, for instance, say: "when he no-ticed that Menelaus was going to attack he trembled"instead of saying "when he noticed M. he trembled";but he never says in quiet discussion and where thereis no emotion involved: "you notice M.," but al-ways: "you notice that. . ..,""you notice how.... or "you notice this" where "this" means asituation and not a concrete object.

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    86 K. VONFRITZduced words of different meaning butidentical appearance? The last of thesepossibilities can be eliminated from theoutset, since, as we have seen, an elementof volition and an intellectual element areso closely connected in the concept of voosthat the double aspect of the word canhardly be due to chance.57But all theother possibilities have to be seriouslyconsidered.The survey given in notes 45, 46, 48,and 49, covering all the cases in which theword occurs in Homer, shows that inabout four-fifths of all cases vocZJvmeansto realize a situation and only in aboutone-fifth to plan or to have an intention.The evidence concerning the noun voos ismuch less clear, since, as a comparison ofdifferent modern translations shows, inthe majority of the cases involved trans-lators disagree as to whether the intellec-tual element or the element of volition ispreponderant, so that there is no suchclear-cut distinction possible between twodifferent meanings as in the case of theverb. Yet, at closer scrutiny, the evidenceseems sufficient for the solution of ourproblem: (1) We have seen above58 thatone of the meanings of voos in which thevolitional element is strongest, namely,"wilful attention," is still very rare inHomer and becomes more frequent onlyin later writers.59 We shall see later thatin all the other cases also in which thevolitional element seems absolutely preva-lent the intellectual element is strongerthan most translations express.60 (2) It isimportant to restate the fact that voosnever means a momentary decision but,even when it can be translated by "wish"or "will," always implies some long-rangeplan or vision. (3) What is perhaps mostimportant, since this meaning is muchmore frequent in Homer, wherever voos

    57 See also below, p. 92.58 See above, p. 82. 59See n. 23 above.60 See below, p. 92.

    and POElV in Homerare used in the senseof plan or planning it is almost always inconsequence of the realization of a dan-gerous situation. This may be significant;for a situation of this kind naturally atonce suggests a plan to escape it, to over-come it, or to make use of it. This planthen appears in the form of a vision which,so to speak, extends the present situationinto the future. Since, furthermore, insituations of this kind the plan and the in-tention to carry it out are psychologicallyidentical, this would also explain vociv inthe sense of having an intention and sowould, at the same time, show how thevolitional element gradually creeps in.A similar, though not identical, transi-tion may also be observed in the use ofthe word voos. In the expression ai8pELpoLtvoowo6'he voos of Epicaste is blunted byignorance of a relevant fact so that shedoes not understand the situation, name-ly, that she is about to marry her ownson. When Agamemnon says that Mene-laus held back ovSr' KVq E'LKCK)OvTr a4pa68pc7LvoOLO,62e explains later that Menelausacted in this way because he did under-stand the situation, namely, that Aga-memnon and not he was the leader. But inconnection with OKVPCE'L CV the expressiona'pa8Lpc7t voowomeans also that Menelausdid not sufferfrom a lack of resolution. Inthis case the transition from "lack of un-derstanding" to "lack of resolution" is es-pecially clear. Finally, in the expression-TOXVKEP8EL1?7L vooLo63 the greed for gainhas blunted the voos, but because the voositself is concentrated on gain. Here, then,the volitional element has come to theforeground.No such easy transition, it seems, canbe found from the volitional to the intel-lectual element in the concept of voos.Theoretically one might think that the re-alization of a situation might be the result61Od. xi. 272. 62 II. X. 122. 63 Od. xxiii. 77.

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    NOO AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERICPOEMS 87of watchful attention and that this mightform the link of transition between the vo-litional and the intellectual element in theconcept. But voe-tvnever means "towatch," though Boehme, in strange con-trast to his assertion that the voos s al-ways "purely intellectual," says that itdoes.64 He argues on the basis of his in-terpretation of a scene in the Iliad,65where, at the critical moment of a duelbetween Paris and Menelaus, Aphroditesuddenly intervenes and snatches her fa-vorite from the hands of his enemy. Thepoet adds that Paris would have met withcertain death: EL u) ap' 4b P6?o1vE AloSOvuyaT7rrp 'AOpo6LrT7. According to Boehme,this means: "if she had not watched thewhole duel closely." But it would havebeen very ridiculous to make the goddess,who later takes great pains to restoreParis to his full beauty, watch the duelwith close attention but without interfer-ing until her favorite is in a most deplor-able state and his good looks greatly im-paired. It is therefore quite clear that thewords EL u? 'ap' 6ob P677Yedo not mean "ifshe had not watched" but "if she had notsuddenly clearly seen or realized the im-minent danger." A survey shows that thisis the meaning in all the passages in whichthe expression 4v6PO?77Eccurs.66But notonly does voELv itself never mean "towatch" but in the overwhelming majorityof the cases found in Homer the realiza-tion of a situation designated by VOElV iSnot even the result of watching or of wilfulattention but is either the result of a vividimpression that comes to the mind fromthe outside and with a sudden impact orof a slow process in which the differentelements which come to the knowledge ofthe subject gradually form a concrete pic-ture of the situation. Finally, in those fewcases in which VOEaVs preceded by watch-

    64 op. cit., p. 26. 65 E. 370 ff.66 V. 312, 680; viii. 91, 132; xi. 343; xv. 649; xx. 291.

    ful attention the two mental acts are al-ways carefully distinguished.67In conclusion, then, we may say that,as far as Homer is concerned, there is notrace whatever of a transition from themeaning of planning to that of realizationof a situation but that there is definiteevidence for the possibility of a transitionin the opposite direction. Since there is noearlier Greek literature than Homer, anyinvestigation into the earlierhistory of theterm leads into the field of linguistic specu-lation. It seems wise to remain for a whileon the more solid ground of the Homericusage.It is now possible to define more ac-curately the relation between the intellec-tual and the emotional element in theconcepts of voos and vocPv.We have seenthat vocLvn a majority of the passages inwhich it occurs, but by no means always,is followed by violent emotion. YetBoehme is not wrong when he contendsthat it is not only in Plato and in Stoicphilosophy that the voosis contrasted withemotion but that traces of this contrastcan also be found in Homer.68 There areundoubtedly passages in Homer in whichthe poet says or implies that the voos isdulled or blunted by emotion.69 But thisseeming contradiction is not difficult toexplain. The realization of a situation,even when it strikes us with a sudden im-pact which causes strong emotion, oftenraises us above our ordinary abilities,makes us see all the implications and con-sequences of the situation with unwonted

    67 A passage excellently suited to illustrate thispoint is II. xxii. 90 ff. Hector had watched Achilles ashe was drawing nearer and nearer and had taken thefirm resolution to fight him in single combat. Butwhen Achilles was right upon him, brandishing his ter-rible spear, fear seized Hector is iv6ae. In this pas-sage there can be no doubt whatever that Hector hadboth seen and closely watched Achilles long before;and yet only when Achilles was right before him b6qae,that is, only then he realized what it meant to flghtthis man.68 Op. cit., pp. 53 f.69 See the passages discussed ibid., esp. p. 53, n. 2.

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    88 K. VON FRITZclarity, and makes us act with unusual de-termination and foresight. But it is alsopossible that the emotional impact withwhich the realization of an imminent dan-ger, for instance, strikes us dulls and ob-scures our minds so that our actions seemto lack co-ordination. In the first case theemotion helps the transition from a visionof the present to a vision of the possibili-ties of the future-or, in other words, fromvoEIv in the sense of realization of a pres-ent situation to voe?v n the sense of plan-ning or vision of the future. In the secondcase the emotion proves inimical to thevoos or understanding by which it wascaused and stops it short in the first phaseof its functioning. This shows that onemust interpret these passages from thepsychological point of view and that it isfaulty logic to conclude that voe?vcannever occur alongside emotion, becauseemotion sometimes obscures the voos.

    Most interesting, however, is the rela-tion between the concept of voetvand theconcept of perception. Snell,70 Krause,7and many others have rightly stressed thefact that in the Greek language the notionof voe?v as an especially close relation tothe sense of vision. Boehme, on the otherhand, contends72 that from the very be-ginning voEcLvwas carefully distinguishedfrom any kind of sensual perception-inother words, that it always designates apurely mental act. He fails to explainhow in a period and in a literature whichotherwise show no sign of a high degree ofabstract thinking, so abstract a distinc-tion could not only be made but unfail-ingly applied in all cases by the Homericpoets. We are now able to give this ex-planation. Snell has given a brilliant anal-ysis of the difference between le'tv and

    70 Gnomon, p. 77.71 Deutsche Literaturzeitung, XLVIII (1) (1927),

    1049.72 Op. cit., pp. 24 ff.

    yL-yV'O-KELV.73 The term lbe-v covers all thecases in which something comes to ourknowledge by the sense of vision, includ-ing the case in which this object remainsindefinite: for instance, a green patch or abrown patch the shape of which we can-not quite distinguish.Theterm y7VC'TKELV,on the other hand, designates specificallythe recognition of this object as some-thing definite: for instance, a shrub, or amound, or a human being. 4 This recogni-tion implies, of course, the classificationof the object under a general concept.Snell has pointed out75 that if there is anetymological connection between 7t7vC'-O-KELVand yt-veo-Gatt may be explained bythe fact that only when the indefinite some-thing is classified does it come into being, soto speak, as a definite object.76 The termvoEcv, hen, signifies a further step in therecognition of the object: the realization,for instance, that this brown patch is notonly a human being but an enemy lyingin ambush. This latter realization, if weuse our modern terminology, is, of course,a purely mental act and does not belongto sensual perception proper. The Ho-meric Greeks did not think in such ab-stract terms. But we need no longer besurprised that they clearly distinguishedbetween the vision of a brown patch, itsrecognition as a human being, and the re-alization that this human being is an ene-my lying in ambush, since this distinction

    73 "Die Ausdrucke," pp. 24 ff.74 The Homeric language has, of course, no specialword which designates exclusively the perception ofindeflnite shapes or color patches which have not yetbeen identifled or classifled as deflnite objects. As inall languages, the word which designates "sensual vi-sion" is also used for the perception of a deflnite ob-ject. But whenever the act of recognition as a deflniteobject is distinguished from or added to the mere per-ception of a yet unidentified shape the word yvpCvatis used.75 "Die Ausdruicke," pp. 21 f.76 The attempt to connect the word yvGxva& ith

    6voja, nomen, "name," is now rejected by most schol-ars for linguistic reasons. Otherwise the assumptionthat there is some connection would be very tempting,since it is by being named that an object is classified.

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    NOO2 AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMS 89results directly from very simple everydayexperience. IIThere is, however, another case whichdeserves special attention, since it is ofvery great importance for the history ofthe terms vovsand vo&Evn Greek philos-ophy. In the case just now discussed,what was first recognized indifferently asa human being reveals itself on closer scru-tiny as an especially important categoryof human being, namely, an enemy withthe intention of doing harm to us; but itremains a human being nevertheless. Inthe case of Helen and Aphrodite, men-tioned above,78what appeared first as anold woman, that is, a human being, revealsitself as a goddess, that is, as somethingvery different from a human being.7Similar, though not identical, is the casein which someone considers a human be-ing as friendly because it approaches himwith friendly words and gestures, and re-alizes only later, and when it may be toolate, that evil intentions were hidden be-hind the friendly appearance.80 Bothcases have in common the fact that thefirst recognition or classification turns outto be deceptive and has to be replaced byanother and truer recognition which, soto speak, penetrates below the visible sur-face to the real essence of the contem-plated object and at the same time, bymeans of this new and corrected recogni-tion, reveals a situation of great emotion-al importance.81 These cases in which themental act designated by vOELCmplies acorrection or reversal of the first impres-sion are, of course, different and more

    77 As to a possible still more remote origin of theapplication of the term v6oSto this kind of experiencesee below, p. 93.78 See above, p. 87.79 For similar cases see, e.g., Od. i. 322; iv. 653; etc.80 E.g., II. xix. 112.81 Boehme (op. cit., p. 61), Snell (Gnomon, p. 77),and many others considered this the original andmost characteristic meaning of Ofeiv; but the evi-dence shows that it belongs to a later stage of the de-velopment and became prevalent only in certain sec-tions of pre-Socratic philosophy.

    complicated than the case discussedabove, in which this mental act addssimply a further element to the recogni-tion, for instance, of a brown patch as ahuman being. But all the cases discussedare psychologically sufficiently closely re-lated to make us understand without dif-ficulty how the meaning of the term voEtvcould be extended to cover all of them.The fact that the cases which involve acorrection of the first impression are muchless frequent in Homer than those of thesimpler type may perhaps be consideredsufficient evidence to indicate that themore complicated type marks a later stagein the history of the meaning of the term,especially since the extended meaning wasto become prevalent in early Greek philos-ophy, where it acquired great importancein the development of a theory of knowl-edge.Some further observations may beadded. When we realize that a humanbeing who at first seemed indifferent orfriendly has evil intentions, we arrive atthis discovery in the course of a mentalprocess which involves a certain amountof reasoning and, one may say, logical de-duction. There is something in the ges-tures and behavior of a man, some inflec-tion in his voice, some expression in hisface, etc., which first arouses our suspi-cion and finally, taken together with otherobservations, leads us to the conclusionthat behind his friendly appearance thereare evil intentions. The process throughwhich we arrive at this conclusion may re-quire considerable time, but the realiza-tion itself that this is an enemy usuallycomes like a flash. We suddenly "see" or"feel," or sometimes mistakenly believewe see, what he is aiming at. We are thenmuch more conscious of this sudden reali-zation, which has the appearance of a"perception," than of the mental processwhich has led to it. This may seem toapply especially to those cases in which

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    90 K. VON FRITZthe verb voEZvs used in the aorist. Buta similar observation can be made in allthose cases in which the verb is used inthe present tense. Stress is then alwayslaid on the visualization of the situationas a whole, not on the process of reasoningby which we may gradually arrive atthis visualization.82 Finally, where JoEvmeans planning, it is the visualization ofthe plan which we see unfold, not a proc-ess of reasoning by which its usefulness orthe necessary interdependence of its dif-ferent parts might be demonstrated.3While, therefore, as pointed out above,84vo,Ev is always distinguished from purelysensual perception, it is not conceived ofas the result of a process of reasoning,much less as this process itself, but ratheras a kind of mental perception, if this ex-pression is allowable. In other words, itmay, in some way, appear as a kind ofsixth sense which penetrates deeper intothe nature of the objects perceived thanthe other senses. This connotation of theterm was to become of great importancein early Greek philosophy. It is also veryimportant to be aware of the fact thatoriginally, and in Homer, voPs nevermeans "reason" and voELv never "to rea-son," whether deductively or inductively.Let us then turn back for a moment tothose passages in Homer in which differ-ent vo'o are attributed to different indi-viduals and nations or to the same indi-vidual at different times. Where voos and

    82 E.g., 11. . 577; xxiii. 305; Od. iv. 148; xvi. 136;xvii. 193, 281; xviii. 223; xx. 309, 367.83 So, e.g., very clearly II. ix. 105. The same is true

    of the passages (e.g., II. ix. 600; xx. 234; Od. v. 188)in which v'oetv means "to have an intention." Inthese cases also it is very easy to see that the visionof the intended action is stressed and not the processof reasoning by which a person may arrive at his reso-lution. Where, on the other hand, a person deliberatesconcerning his future course of action, this process ofdeliberation is never described by the word voetv butby a number of different words, most of them derivedfrom the root Opev (cf. also B. Snell, "Das Bewusstseinvon eigenen Entscheidungen im frtihen Griechentum,"Philologus, LXXXV [1930], 141 ff.).

    84 See above, p. 88.

    -OsEIvmean the recognition of the true na-ture or essence of a thing as against itssurface appearance, there is no room fora difference in the vo'o of different peo-ple, since the truth is but one. But whenand where voos and vo&Evmean the wayin which a situation is perceived or con-sidered (one may also say, "what a situa-tion means to a person") and the immedi-ate reaction to this situation,85it is quitenatural that we should find different vootin different individuals and nations. Forthe realization that those human beingsover there on the wrecked ship are stran-gers has an entirely different meaning tothe Laestrygonians and to the Phaeacians.Since in cases like this what a thing meansto a person, what the person "sees" in thething, and the person's reaction to it arepsychologically inextricably connected, itis easy to understand how this lattermeaning of "active reaction" sometimescomes in.86 When, for instance, the poetsays that a man has a voos0EoV6Is,87 hemeans primarily that this man reacts withat'c's to the presence or appearance of agod; but this implies also that a godmeans more to him and that he sees morein a god than a man who has not a voosGIEOVU7S.It is perhaps partly in connection withcases like this that still another extensionof the meaning of voos was gradually de-veloped. The difference in the voos of a0Eov6?7S a4vi7p and of a man who is not god-fearing is permanent in the sense thatthey will react differently whenever cer-tain objects come to their notice or cer-tain situations arise. But as the notiondevelops that the gods are ever presentor keep always a watchful eye on mortals

    85 This use of the word v6os,by the way, becomesvery rare in later authors (some instances of it canbe found in Theognis) and does not occur in philo-sophical texts, while it is rather frequent in Homer.This confirms the observation made in n. 81.86 See above, p. 81 f.87 Od. vi. 121; viii. 576; ix. 176; xiii. 202; etc.

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    NOO2 AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMS 91the voos OEovb'sof a man will express itselfnot only in the a&bas with which he reactswhenever he is in the presence of a godbut also and preponderantly in the factthat he is more often or always aware ofthe ever present watchfulness with whichthe gods follow his actions. It is thereforeperhaps not a mere coincidence that oneof the very rare cases88 in which voosseems to have the meaning of "wilful at-tention" is the passage in which Poseidoncomplains that the mortals no longer turntheir voos to the gods.89 It is characteris-tic of the outlook of a god-fearing manthat with him the gods are always "partof the picture," and this may also be ex-pressed by saying that his voos is alwaysturned to the .gods.There is still one further extension ofthe meaning of voos which has to be con-sidered. The gods may in some way beever present and ever watchful. Yet thisever-presence is different and, in someparadoxical way, more "far off" than theactual and personal bodily presence ofeither a human being or a god. Here,then, we have a voos which sees or isaware of things which are not present insuch a way that we can see them with ourbodily eyes.90 But this voosis not restrict-

    88 II. vii. 446 ff.; see also n. 23 above.89 We have here another instance in which it iseasy to follow the gradual development of the meaningof the word. In the sentence 6OTs7O TOav&Towtn v6ov

    KaL MLTLP EPLftEL the word EvbPEL'has obviously still theoriginal meaning of '-aircr-insequo, "I make follow,""I send after." If this is the correct translation of thepassage, we have here a v6os which is made to follow(or is intentionally turned toward) the gods. The pre-ceding stages would be: (a) a v6oSwhich is struckby the presence of a god and realizes its importance;(b) a v6os which is always in some way aware of thewatchfulness of the gods.

    90 In this connection one may perhaps point outthat in the Homeric poems there seems to be a dif-ference between Zeus (who is never personally presentin a battle and does not personally give advice to mor-tals except indirectly through messengers, dreams, oromens but who from his outlook on Mount Olympuskeeps watch over human affairs in general) andAthena, Hera, Ares, and other gods, who attend tohuman affairs in person. The ever-presence of a godwhich nevertheless is somewhat more far off seemsto have been developed flrst in Zeus and later extendedto other divinities.

    ed to the case just analyzed. Any full re-alization of a situation implies a mentalvision, which not only penetrates deeperbut also "sees farther" both in space andin time than our eyes.9' This voos which"makes far off things present"92was alsoto become of great importance in Greekphilosophy. In Homer it is perhaps mostbeautifully illustrated by the simile in theIliad93 where a traveler "who has trav-ersed many lands" envisages in his voosthe different countries which he has seenand which in the future course of his jour-ney he may traverse again.What we have discussed up to thispoint accounts, as far as I can see, for allthe different meanings which the wordsvoosand voELvave anywhere, in Homer.All of them, as we have seen, can be de-rived from one original and fundamentalconcept, which may be defined as the real-ization of a situation. But from this oneoriginal concept a great many other con-cepts have been developed, all of whichare described by the same word and someof which, nevertheless, are as differentfrom or even contradictory to one anotheras the concept of understanding from theconcept of will, wish, or plan or the con-cept of many different vooL in different in-dividuals and nations from the concept ofone indivisible voos, which is the same ineverybody, and which, whenever it looksat an object, must always come to thesame conclusion as to its essence and na-ture.So far, I have tried to keep our investi-gation free from all etymological and lin-guistic speculation. We have now reacheda point at which we may perhaps safelyask whether there is an etymology that

    91Starting from this observation, one might alsoexplain vociv in the sense of "planning" and v6os inthe sense of "plan" as nothing but a special case ofthe v6os which sees farther in space and time thanbodily vision.92 Cf. Parmenides, Frag. B2. 1 (Diels).93 xv. 80 ff.

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    92 K. VONFRITZagrees with our previous findings and car-ries us a step further into the preliteraryhistory of our term. I do not propose todiscuss all the etymologies of the wordvoos which have been proposed, sincemany of them are either based on ratherfantastic assumptions concerning the de-velopment of the meaning of the word94or are phonetically impossible.95 Thereare, as far as I can see, only two etymolo-gies of the word which deserve seriousconsideration-one from VEbEV, "to nod"(Lat. nuere;Ger. nicken) 96 the other froma root snu, "to sniff" (MHG snouwen;Ger. schnuppern, schniiffeln),97 which pre-supposes, of course, that the original formof voos was Vn'bfos.The first of these twoetymologies has the great advantage ofpresenting us with a Greek verb directlyderived from the same root as the noun.This would solve the riddle with whichwe were confronted at the beginning ofthis inquiry,98namely, that a noun whichclearly designates a function and not aquality or a concrete object seems to haveno equivalent in a verb belonging to thesame stage of the linguistic development.We might then assume that there is sucha verb, namely, veULJv,ut that the nounvOos developed new meanings in whichvEvetvhad no part and that this led tothe creation of a new verb voe-tv hich cor-responded to the new meanings of thenoun. The connection between the nounand the original verb, on the other hand,might be found in a comparison of thosemany passages in which Zeus expresses

    94 So Kieckers' derivation from P4etv, "to swim";the derivation from Sanskrit naya, "to lead," etc.See Boisacq, Dictionnaire tymeologique de la languegrecque, S.D.

    95 This is the case, e.g., with the attempt to derivev6os from the same root as 'yvCvat.

    96 See Prellwitz, Etymologisches Worterbuch dergriechischen Sprache (G6ttingen, 1905), pp. xii and 315.97 See E. Schwyzer in Festschrift fur Paul Kret-

    schmer (Leipzig and New York, 1926), pp. 247 ff.98 See above, p. 83.

    his will by a nod" with those passages inwhich vo'os designates the will of Zeuswhich cannot be resisted.'00But as soon as one tries to derive theother meanings of voos and vOELv fromthis assumed original meaning of the roothe encounters insurmountable difficulties.For not only is there no easy psychologi-cal transition from voos in the sense of"twill" o YOOSn the sense of "understand-ing" :101 much more decisive is the factthat neither voos nor JoetJ ever designatesa momentary decision of the kind whichmay be, and often is, expressed by a nod'02but that these terms always imply somelong-range plan or vision.'03 Yet if "tonod" in the sense of giving one's assent ormaking a decision was the origin of theword YOoswe should expect at least thisderivative meaning to have survived inthe usage of voos or voe-t somewhere inHomer.104That this is not the case seemsto exclude also the possibility that two

    99E.g., II i. 514, 527; viii. 175, 245. Cf. alsoAthena: II. vi. 311; Hector: IL. x. 393; Achilles: Od.iv. 6.100E.g., II. viii. 143; xvi. 103, 688; xvii. 176; Od.xxiv. 164.101 See above, p. 87.102 It is important to notice that in all those casesin which vebeLP, K,Tarapetv, EirLVebeL, etc., mean "to makea decision" the decision is always made in response tothe request of another person. In all other cases (e.g.,II. ix. 223, 620) in which a form of vebew is used witha personal subject, it means "to signal," "to give a signto someone," etc. In these latter cases there is, ofcourse, still less reason to believe in a connection of

    the word with P6os,103 See above, p. 83.104 There are three passages in the II. (xvi. 103,688; xvii. 176) in which vbosseems to approach themeaning which must be postulated if the word is tobe derived from Vf ftv. In all three cases heroesstruggle in vain against the v6osof Zeus. The reasonfor their lack of success is the fact that Zeus, by fa-voring the Trojans, wishes to give satisfaction toAchilles. For Zeus, on the demand of Thetis, hasagreed by a nod (iV'Efbe) to give her son this satis-faction. Yet the seeming connection is fallacious. For

    vebecv in i. 528 expresses the momentary decision togrant Thetis' wish, while Aias' defeat, for instance, ispart of the long-range plan by which this decision iscarried through in detail. It was not a part of thedecision itself to have Aias specifically defeated by theTrojans. His defeat is only incidental.

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    NOO AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMS 93roots of different form and meaning havebeen merged in the word voos by the merecoincidence of phonetic developments.105Let us then consider the derivationfrom a root meaning "to sniff ." E. Schwy-zer, who proposed this etymology,106 hastried to cope with the difficulty presentedby the absence of a verb of equal linguisticage by pointing out that the history of theformation and survival of words and wordforms shows many irregularities. Onemight perhaps add that an original verbcTveFEVrom the root snu must in Greekinevitably have become identical in ap-pearance with vEvELv,"to nod."1107 Thismay have been the reason for its replace-ment by a new derivative from voos,espe-cially after vooshad developed new mean-ings.A second objection which has beenraised against Schwyzer's etymology'08can now easily be refuted. It is quite truethat in Homer vOaevappears more oftenconnected with the sense of vision thanwith any other sense. But this need notalways have been the case. The most fun-damental and most original meaning ofvOaevn Homer seemed to have been "torealize or to understand a situation." Themost primitive case in which a situationbecomes important is that in which thereis danger or where there is an enemy nearby. The most primitive function of thevoos therefore would have been to sense

    106 For another possibility see n. 107 below.106 See n. 97 above.107 Many linguists are convinced that the originalform of PEIELP, "to nod," was also avOFrc. If this is cor-rect and if one takes into consideration that VEbELPis just as much &vavebetv as KaTPaveUeP and that ananimal raises its head with a jerk when it senses or"smells" danger, there is just a faint possibility thatthe roots of the words for "to nod" and for "to sniff"were originally identical. But this is too vague aspeculation to be acceptable, unless some conflrma-tive evidence from other Indo-Germanic languagesshould turn up. In any case it is certain that v6oswasnot derived from VEbELVn the sense of making a de-

    cision.108 Cf. Krause, loc cit.

    danger and to distinguish between friendand enemy. It is not unlikely that in avery early stage of human developmentthe sense of smell played a preponderantpart in this function. One has only topoint to the fact that even in our present-day language we still speak of "smellinga danger." With the development of ahigher civilization the sense of smell wouldnaturally have been more and more re-placed by the sense of vision. But the un-derstanding of a situation remained never-theless distinguished from the vision oreven recognition'09 of an indifferent ob-ject. It is not impossible that the emer-gence of this new concept of a purely men-tal function was greatly favored by thefact that the original connection of thisfunction with the sense of smell recededmore and more into the background, asthe sense of vision became more prepon-derant in importance, and finally wascompletely forgotten. This transition, inthe course of which the vooswas more andmore considered as a way of acquiringknowledge or as a "capacity," as the phi-losophers of the eighteenth century wouldhave said, different from but analogous tothe senses"0 may also help to explain whyit was the noun rather than the verbwhich survived so that a new verb had tobe derived from it.The results of our inquiry, then, seemto show that Schwyzer's etymology is verylikely to be correct. But our inquiry itselfwas completely independent from all ety-mological considerations. The usefulnessof its results for an analysis of the meaningand history of voos, voELv, and their deri-vations in early Greek philosophy will notbe influenced by the acceptance or rejec-tion of any etymological explanation ofthese terms.COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

    109 See above, p. 88.110 See above, p. 90.