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4Our ageing world; our world is ageing fast ............................................................................6 4 2012 ..........................................8 4 Providing data to support the relationship between care practice and quality .............9 of care in long term care facilities in Europe

4 Steve Jobs: Stanford Commencement 2005 ....................................................................... 10 4 2012 ... 13 . 4 ........................ 14 . . 4 . . .............................................................. 17

2011

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4 ; B. Barthalay, (: ) ........................ 24 4Greece and its Euro Nightmare: What are the lessons from Argentina? ..................... 28V. Sukup

4 European parties in the post Lisbon reality. . ..................................... 32 4 8 9 2011 ........... 38.

4 ........................................................................................................... 40 4 ............................................................................................................ 42 4 .......................................................................................................................................... 44 4 .............................................................................................................. 45

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C O N t E N t S

EvrOPAIkI EkFrASSIq u A r t E r L y E d I t I O N O N E u r O P E A N I S S u E SF I r S t P u b L I S h E d : 1 9 8 9 I S S N : 1 1 0 5 - 8 1 3 7 E u r O 5 y E A r 2 2 v O L . 8 3 O C t O b E r - N O v E M b E r - d E C E M b E r 2 0 1 1

PrOPrIEtOr - EdItION:

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pression, Institutions", non Profit

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tel.: +30 210 3643224

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EdItOr - PubLIShEr by LAW:

Nicos yannis

PubLIShING dIrECtOr:

Eleni katsampouka

Giorgos Pantelias

Maria Fanou

dIrECtION:

katerina Androna

CONtrIbutOrS:

G. Alexias

b. barthalay

P. Gkatzios

M. koppa

t. Papadopoulou

M. Peglis

M. Sarli

rena Simopoulou

v. Sukup

M. yannakou

k. volikas

tEChNICAL AdvISOr:

hliea

PubLIC rELAtIONS

iForce Communications SA

4 Editorial .....................................................................................................................................5

EuropEan YEar for activE agEing and SolidaritY bEtwEEn gEnErationS

4Our ageing world; our world is ageing fast ............................................................................6 4 European year 2012 European year for Active Ageing ....................................................8 4 Providing data to support the relationship between care practice and quality ..............9 of care in long term care facilities in Europe

4 Steve Jobs: Stanford Commencement Speech 2005 ......................................................... 10 4 2012: European year for Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations ............ 13 k. volikas

4quality in health and ageing as key factors for the modernization ............................. 14 of European health care systems. by G. Alexias

4Greek bank of Memories. by M. Sarli ................................................................................. 17

SaKHarov priZE 2011

4 Freedom of Thought and human rights. by M. yannakou ............................................ 18 4human rights in external relations of the European union: ......................................... 20 The role of the European Parliament. by M. koppa

4Aside from realpolitik there are human rights as well. by t. Papadopoulou ............. 22grEEcE-argEntina (part 1)

4Greeces fault? b. barthalay, translation from French into Greek: rena Simopoulou 24 4Greece and its Euro Nightmare: What are the lessons from Argentina? ..................... 28 V. Sukup

LAtESt NEWS

4 European parties in the post Lisbon reality. by M. Peglis .......................................... 32 4decisions of the European Council, 8-9th december 2011 ........................................... 38 P. Gkatzios

PErMANENt COLuMNS

4Whats going on in Europe .................................................................................................... 40 4 European Expression News .................................................................................................. 42 4NGO .......................................................................................................................................... 44 4 bOOk PrESENtAtION ...................................................................................................... 45

E d I t O r I A L 5

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Our ageing world Our world is ageing fast

: http://www.who.int/ageing/en/ world health organization

the world is rapidly ageing. While this is an important challenge for the developed world, 70% of all older people now live in low or middle-income countries. Population ageing is also occurring much faster in these countries. This means they will have a much briefer oppor-

tunity to build the infrastructure necessary to address this demographic trend.

Epidemiological consultancy

Call for an epidemiological con-sultancy to provide a compre-hensive review and a critical appraisal of the evidence on the infec-tious disease burden in the ageing pop-ulation of developing countries. dead-line: 15 October 2011.

Call details and proposal form

the challenges of population ageing worldwideThe fast ageing of popula-tions around the world is presenting

challenges for developed and develop-ing countries. These include:

strains on pension and social secu-rity systems;

increasing demand for health care; bigger need for trained-health work-force in gerontology;

increasing demand for long-term care, particularly in dealing with dementia; and

the raising of pervasive ageism that denies older people the rights and opportunities available for other adults.

These challenges can be counter-acted by implementing the following measures.

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Ensuring that older population have a basic level of financial security

tax-funded pensions that pro-vide basic support to vulner-able older people are an effec-tive way of helping them avoid poverty. These are not unaffordable. It has been estimated that abolishing extreme pov-erty in old age by providing a univer-sal, tax-funded, basic pension equiva-lent to$1 a day to all over age 60 would cost less than % of the gross domestic product of the majority of developing countries.

Developing age-friendly environments

For any given level of physical limitation, a key determinant of an older persons capacity to function is the environment in which they live. The World health Organi-zation recently commenced a pro-gramme designed to foster age-friend-ly environments that encourage ac-tive ageing by optimizing opportuni-ties for health, participation and se-curity in order to enhance quality of life as people age. The core of the pro-gramme is the WhO Global Network of Age-friendly Cities.

Availability and accessibility of effective health care

In less developed countries, access to basic primary care including the early detection and management of common conditions like hyperten-sion and diabetes can allow older peo-ple to maintain their health and capac-ity to live independently. In developed countries, the feared increase in de-mand for health care from population ageing is likely to be largely met by eco-nomic growth. An integrated continu-

um of long-term care can support old-er people to age in place and provide institutional care for those with severe limitation. Several developed countries have established such systems, but a major challenge will be developing in-tegrated long term care in less devel-oped countries.

Maintaining social patterns that influence the well-being of older adults

Many changing social pat-terns are likely to influence both the behaviours and well being of older people. One com-mon trend during economic develop-ment has been for a shift from extend-ed households to more nuclear house-holds comprising one or two genera-tions. For example, in Japan, the pro-portion of people living in 3-genera-tion households has fallen from 46% in 1985 to 20.5% in 2006. These pat-terns present some challenges for older people. Since older people living alone are less able to benefit from the shar-ing of goods that might be available in a larger household, the risk of falling into poverty in older age may increase with falling family size.

Another recent social change has occurred in countries with a high

prevalence of hIv/AIdS. here, high mortality among adults has seen in-creasing numbers of skipped gener-ation households. In these house-holds, surviving older adults have taken on responsi-bility for the chil-dren of younger generations who have died in the

AIdS epidemic. Across sub-Saharan Africa, families headed by older adults are often the poorest, not only placing these vulnerable older people at great-er risk, but also making it harder for the children in these households to es-cape poverty. Another impact of the hIv epidemic is the nearly 1,000,000 older people in sub-Saharan Africa who are estimated to have been or-phaned. In the past, they could have expected support from younger gen-erations if they become frail and lost their independence. Now, that support will not be available.

Older people a vital resource for societies

the ageing of population rep-resent as well an opportuni-ty for societies. If older peo-ple can retain their health, and if they live in an environment that promotes their active participation, their experi-ence, skills and wisdom will be with-out any doubts a resource for societ-ies. however, most people of very ad-vanced will be needing accessible and effective acute and long-term care. de-veloping integrated systems that pro-vide seamless access to the care they require is a priority for both developed and developing countries.

: 8

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FINAl CONFErENCE OF thE ShEltEr prOjECt

Providing data to support the relationship between care

practice and quality of care in long term care facilities

in Europe

Room Maelbeck, Residence Palace, International Press Centre, rue de la

Loi, 104 Brussels

With people aged 80 plus set to comprise 11.5% of the Eu population by 2050, the drive to deliver ef-fective and affordable long term care is an urgent challenge. A 2011 OECd report financed by the Eu-ropean Commission, predicts that the cost of care in OECd coun-tries could triple in 2050 from the current average of 1.5% of GdP to 4.5%. The demand for long term care is set to double. A compre-hensive vision that combines clin-ical efficacy with cost effectiveness will be vital if Europe is to achieve a sustainable society in 2050.

The ShELtEr final conference will showcase how person lev-el data can address cross-cultur-al differences in the quality of care and the organization of LtCF care practice. It will use data from an EU funded project on older peo-ple in nursing homes. The project was undertaken in eight countries: Czech republic, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Nether-lands and the uk.

Find more about the event here: http://www.kent.ac.uk/chss/shelter.htm

: 10

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, , Apple Pixar ( Disney, - ). .

, - Stanford ...

I am honored to be with you today at your commencement from one of the finest universities in the world. I never graduated from college. truth be told, this is the closest Ive ever gotten to a college graduation. today I want to tell you three stories from my life. Thats it. No big deal. Just three stories.

the first story is about connecting the dots

I dropped out of reed College after the first six months, but then stayed around as a drop-in for another 18 months or so before I really quit. So why did I drop out?

It started before I was born. My bi-

ological mother was a young, unwed college graduate student, and she de-cided to put me up for adoption. She felt very strongly that I should be ad-opted by college graduates, so every-thing was all set for me to be adopted at birth by a lawyer and his wife. Ex-cept that when I popped out they de-cided at the last minute that they re-ally wanted a girl. So my parents, who were on a waiting list, got a call in the middle of the night asking: We have an unexpected baby boy; do you want him? They said: Of course. My bio-logical mother later found out that my mother had never graduated from col-lege and that my father had never grad-uated from high school. She refused to

sign the final adoption papers. She on-ly relented a few months later when my parents promised that I would some-day go to college.

And 17 years later I did go to col-lege. but I naively chose a college that was almost as expensive as Stan-ford, and all of my working-class par-ents savings were being spent on my college tuition. After six months, I couldnt see the value in it. I had no idea what I wanted to do with my life and no idea how college was going to help me figure it out. And here I was spending all of the money my parents had saved their entire life. So I decid-ed to drop out and trust that it would all work out okay. It was pretty scary at the time, but looking back it was one of the best decisions I ever made. The minute I dropped out I could stop tak-ing the required classes that didnt in-terest me, and begin dropping in on the ones that looked interesting.

It wasnt all romantic. I didnt have a dorm room, so I slept on the floor in friends rooms, I returned Coke bot-tles for the 5-cent deposits to buy food

Steve JObS1 9 5 5 - 2 0 1 1

Stanford Commencement

Speech 2005

: 11

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with, and I would walk the seven miles across town every Sunday night to get one good meal a week at the hare krishna temple. I loved it. And much of what I stumbled into by following my curiosity and intuition turned out to be priceless later on. Let me give you one example:

reedCollegeat that time offered perhaps the best calligraphy instruc-tion in the country. Throughout the campus every poster, every label on every drawer, was beautifully hand calligraphed. because I had dropped out and didnt have to take the nor-mal classes, I decided to take a callig-raphy class to learn how to do this. I learned about serif and san serif type-faces, about varying the amount of space between different letter combi-nations, about what makes great ty-pography great. It was beautiful, his-torical, artistically subtle in a way that science cant capture, and I found it fascinating.

None of this had even a hope of any practical application in my life. but 10 years later, when we were de-signing the first Macintosh comput-er, it all came back to me. And we de-signed it all into the Mac. It was the first computer with beautiful typogra-phy. If I had never dropped in on that single course in college, the Mac would have never had multiple typefaces or proportionally spaced fonts. And since Windows just copied the Mac, its likely that no personal comput-er would have them. If I had never dropped out, I would have nev-er dropped in on this calligraphy class, and personal computers might not have the wonderful typogra-phy that they do. Of course it was impos-

sible to connect the dots looking for-ward when I was in college. but it was very, very clear looking backwards 10 years later.

Again, you cant connect the dots looking forward; you can only con-nect them looking backwards. So you have to trust that the dots will some-how connect in your future. you have to trust in somethingyour gut, des-tiny, life, karma, whatever. This ap-proach has never let me down, and it has made all the difference in my life.

My second story is about love and loss

I was luckyI found what I loved to do early in life. Woz and I started Apple in my parents garage when I was 20. We worked hard, and in 10 years Apple had grown from just the two of us in a garage into a $2 billion company with over 4000 employees. We had just released our finest creationthe Macintosha year earlier, and I had just turned 30. And then I got fired. how can you get fired from a company you started? Well, as Apple grew we hired someone who I thought was very talented to run the company with me, and for the first year or so things went well. but then our visions of the future began to diverge and eventually we had a falling out. When we did, our board of directors sided

with him. So at 30, I was out. And very publicly out. What had been the focus of my entire adult life was gone, and it was devastating.

I really didnt know what to do for a few months. I felt that I had let the previous generation of entrepreneurs downthat I had dropped the baton as it was being passed to me. I met with david Packard and bob Noyce and tried to apologize for screwing up so badly. I was a very public failure, and I even thought about running away from the valley. but something slow-ly began to dawn on meI still loved what I did. The turn of events at Ap-ple had not changed that one bit. I had been rejected, but I was still in love. And so I decided to start over.

I didnt see it then, but it turned out that getting fired from Apple was the best thing that could have ever hap-pened to me. The heaviness of being successful was replaced by the light-ness of being a beginner again, less sure about everything. It freed me to enter one of the most creative periods of my life.

during the next five years, I start-ed a company named NeXt, another company named Pixar, and fell in love with an amazing woman who would become my wife. Pixar went on to cre-ate the worlds first computer animat-ed feature film, toy Story, and is now the most successful animation studio

in the world. In a remark-able turn of events, Apple bought NeXt, I returned to Apple, and the technol-ogy we developed at NeXt is at the heart of Apples current renaissance. And Laurene and I have a won-derful family together.

Im pretty sure none of this would have happened if I hadnt been fired from Apple. It was awful tast-

StayHungry

Stay Foolish

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ing medicine, but I guess the patient needed it. Sometimes life hits you in the head with a brick. dont lose faith. Im convinced that the only thing that kept me going was that I loved what I did. youve got to find what you love. And that is as true for your work as it is for your lovers. your work is go-ing to fill a large part of your life, and the only way to be truly satisfied is to do what you believe is great work. And the only way to do great work is to love what you do. If you havent found it yet, keep looking. dont settle. As with all matters of the heart, youll know when you find it. And, like any great relation-ship, it just gets better and better as the years roll on. So keep looking until you find it. dont settle.

My third story is about death

When I was 17, I read a quote that went something like: If you live each day as if it was your last, someday youll most certainly be right. It made an impression on me, and since then, for the past 33 years, I have looked in the mirror every morning and asked myself: If today were the last day of my life, would I want to do what I am about to do today? And whenever the answer has been No for too many days in a row, I know I need to change something.

remembering that Ill be dead soon is the most important tool Ive ever encountered to help me make the big choices in life. because almost ev-erythingall external expectations, all pride, all fear of embarrassment or fail-urethese things just fall away in the face of death, leaving only what is tru-ly important. remembering that you are going to die is the best way I know to avoid the trap of thinking you have something to lose. you are already na-ked. There is no reason not to follow

your heart.About a year ago I was diagnosed

with cancer. I had a scan at 7:30 in the morning, and it clearly showed a tumor on my pancreas. I didnt even know what a pancreas was. The doc-tors told me this was almost certainly a type of cancer that is incurable, and that I should expect to live no longer than three to six months. My doctor advised me to go home and get my af-fairs in order, which is doctors code for prepare to die. It means to try to tell your kids everything you thought youd have the next 10 years to tell them in just a few months. It means to make sure everything is buttoned up, so that it will be as easy as possible for your family. It means to say your goodbyes.

I lived with that diagnosis all day. Later that evening I had a biopsy, where they stuck an endoscope down my throat, through my stomach and into my intestines, put a needle into my pancreas and got a few cells from the tumor. I was sedated, but my wife, who was there, told me that when they viewed the cells under a microscope the doctors started crying, because it turned out to be a very rare form of pancreatic cancer that is curable with surgery. I had the surgery and Im fine now.

This was the closest Ive been to facing death, and I hope its the clos-est I get for a few more decades. hav-ing lived through it, I can now say this to you with a bit more certainty than when death was a useful but purely in-tellectual concept:

No one wants to die. Even people who want to go to heaven dont want to die to get there. And yet death is the destination we all share. No one has ever escaped it. And that is as it should be, because death is very like-ly the single best invention of Life. It is lifes change agent. It clears out the old

to make way for the new. right now the new is you, but someday not too long from now, you will gradually become the old and be cleared away. Sorry to be so dramatic, but it is quite true.

your time is limited, so dont waste it living someone elses life. dont be trapped by dogmawhich is living with the results of other peoples thinking. dont let the noise of others opinions drown out your own inner voice. And most important, have the courage to follow your heart and intuition. They somehow already know what you tru-ly want to become.Everything else is secondary.

When I was young, there was an amazing publication called The Whole Earth Catalog, which was one of the bibles of my generation. It was created by a fellow named Stew-art brand not far from here in Men-lo Park, and he brought it to life with his poetic touch. This was in the late 1960's, before personal computers and desktop publishing, so it was all made with typewriters, scissors, and polaroid cameras. It was sort of like Google in paperback form, 35 years before Google came along: It was ide-alistic, and overflowing with neat tools and great notions.

Stewart and his team put out sever-al issues of The Whole Earth Catalog, and then when it had run its course, they put out a final issue. It was the mid-1970s, and I was your age. On the back cover of their final issue was a photograph of an early morning coun-try road, the kind you might find your-self hitchhiking on if you were so ad-venturous. beneath it were the words: Stay hungry. Stay Foolish. It was their farewell message as they signed off. Stay hungry. Stay Foolish. And I have always wished that for myself. And now, as you graduate to begin an-ew, I wish that for you.

Thank you all very much.

: 13

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GreeCe and itS eurO niGHtmare

What are the Lessons From argentina?By Viktor Sukup (*)

Exit from the euro-zone with a subsequent marginalisation in the EU or stay within what appears in-creasingly as a kind of straight-jacket condemning the country to a never-ending recession and a severe social regression? Greek citizens and their leaders are caught in an infernal trap which does not seem to have any promising solution soon, as neither of both ways appears to offer more than a frightening outlook for the next years. They will have to pay anyway for years the price of past faults and weaknesses, es-pecially the combination of heavy clientelism, ballooning state bureaucracy, corporatist rigidities, systematic tax evasion and widespread corruption, all of which are certainly no Greek monopolies but had reached here particularly high levels, compounding finally, together with higher inflation rates, the euro-systems intrinsic construction failures. There might be, nevertheless, quite different perspectives according to the way which will be chosen in the months and years ahead. A brief look at other countries experiences can be useful to try to make the best possible choice.

there are certainly important lessons from East and South East Asias policies to tackle suc-cessfully its severe debt and monetary crisis of 1997/8. they did so, essentially, by realizing serious home-made reforms, rejecting the recipes of the Inter-national Monetary Fund and re-establishing stronger national control on their economies which had been largely weakened by the worldwide deregulation of financial operations recommended, if not imposed, by the Bretton Woods institutions and the US pres-sure. Iceland has later shown that even a tiny popula-tion can renegotiate successfully, to some extent, the terms of reimbursement of a huge national debt accu-mulated by a handful of irresponsible bankers. the ex-perience of Argentina is one of the most interesting, as this country -whose birth as an independent state was contemporary of that of modern Greece1, with which

1 Georges prEVElAKIS - the history behind the collapse, repr. of an article published in Esprit (paris), 11/2011, describes a number of particular aspects of contemporary Greek society, some of which are certainly quite contrary to modern development, like the role of orthodox religion, a kind of anti-Western resentment and widespread parasitism related to local and corporatist power structures.

it shares also a long history of foreign debt problems and of chronic political instability, with several dicta-torships in the 20th century- has suffered a decade ago a particularly severe crisis with several similari-ties to todays Greek one but has come out of it with an astonishing economic dynamism and real social im-provements2. Obviously, there are big differences, but also clear similarities, and the comparison might any-way bring some illustrative views on Greek econom-ic policy options.

recent experiences from the ro de la plata

Argentina had embarked, after an acute hy-perinflation episode, on a currency board sys-tem by tying its peso to the US dollar in 1991. 2 It can be recalled here that president Cristina Fernndez has been re-elected in October 2011 by an unprecedented landslide victory. No doubt, traditional peronist clientelism contributed to this result, but anyway a similar result in any pIGS or other European country would be difficult to imagine these years

It reached by this measure a radical reduction of its chronic inflation and an important inflow of foreign capital. For several years, the country, which registered then relatively high growth and low inflation rates, was praised by the IMF and the international estab-lishment as an example to be followed by other coun-tries, even if the IMF, enthusiastic about the govern-ments ultraliberal privatization, liberalization and de-regulation policy, initially did not agree to the estab-lishment of the dollar-peso-parity3. A few years later, anyway, the artificially stimulated growth gave way to a serious recession leading to the outbreak of the worst crisis in Argentinas history in 2001. this was the direct consequence of the dollar-peg and the result-ing overvaluation of the peso -as the inflation, then very low by national standards, was still higher than in the OECD countries- and spiralling foreign debt, while large industrial sectors had gone bankrupt and health and education systems, as well as infrastructures and justice, had sharply deteriorated. Foreign capital had been essentially used to buy national and local assets like water, telephone and electricity companies as well as the national oil enterprise YpF and Aerolneas Ar-gentinas. It made huge profits which were entirely ex-ported and gave few other results than sensibly high-er tariffs for the now privatised public services. After the national breakdown unemployment and poverty rates in historically prosperous Argentina reached un-precedented levels and the traditional political system was in ruins. the peso was devalued by more than two

3 It was in fact introduced nearly two years after Carlos Menems presidential victory. his election was to a certain extent result of the hyper-inflation of 1989, which reached that year around 5.000%, and after a dozen of failed intents to get rid of it, under half a dozen of successive Ministers of Economy.

(*) Dr. Viktor Sukup, former professor of European and international economy at the University of Buenos Aires, author i.a. of Europa y la globalizacin. Tendencias, problemas, opiniones (Buenos Aires, 1998). Official of the European Commission in Brussels, expressing exclusively personal views.

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thirds and the accumulated astronomic foreign debt was defaulted.

But very soon the country entered a new dy-namic. Since 2002/3, Argentina has had one of the highest growth rates of the world, renegotiated and only very partially reimbursed its foreign debt, and its economy has enjoyed the strongest expansion in several generations. this is certainly due, in an im-portant measure, to the rapidly rising world mar-ket prices for Argentinas agricultural export prod-ucts, among which soybeans have become the most important one, while the Asian, especially Chinese demand was now the main external motor of Ar-gentinas economy. But there have been also inter-nal factors, without which these nearly Chinese growth rates of 8-9% could not have been reached. the policy of the 90s has been replaced by another one, where protectionist measures are not exclud-ed any more by ideology and where the state recov-ered its capacity of intervening in manifold ways in the economy, especially to reduce poverty while al-so promoting and protecting national industries. to sum up, following blindly, with heavy applause from the USA and Europe, the liberal Washington con-sensus had led the country to national bankruptcy, more social inequality, less development and scan-dalous corruption as well as widespread poverty; on the contrary, giving up that policy under the pres-sure of the resulting national disaster, together with the adoption of a realistic exchange rate, allowed Ar-gentina to go exactly the opposite way.

Some psycho-sociological, geographical and historical aspects

there are some important elements to under-stand the differences between both countries and try to anticipate their future evolution. While Greece remained one of Europes poorest coun-tries and had important emigration waves throughout its contemporary history, together with its dramat-ic population exchange with turkey around 1920, Ar-gentina became, after 1880, the second largest immi-gration destination during several decades for Europe-ans -and additionally Armenians, Syro-lebanese and some japanese- looking for a better future overseas. God is Argentine, people used to say. Its national psy-

chology was based on a traditional firm belief in up-ward social mobility in a country then with apparently unlimited possibilities, and in the usefulness of high-er education: My son, the doctor, who will be pros-perous and highly skilled, was the leitmotiv for mil-lions of poor, often more or less illiterate immigrants from Italy, Spain and Central and Eastern Europe. On the basis of its agricultural wealth and its exports of cereals and meat, among the most important of the world, in the first half of the 20th century, the la-pla-ta-country had become one of the ten richest world-wide. Catholics and other Christians lived peaceful-ly together with significant population segments of jewish and Muslim-Arab roots. Geographically, the eighth largest country, right after India on the world scale and 21 times the size of Greece -but even now only less then four times its population-, was one of the two giants of South America; until some decades ago it could, not without logical arguments, pretend to be the regional leader. their inhabitants felt more Eu-ropean than latin American, and among their fellow citizens were the only Nobel prize winners in sciences of the entire region, as well as writers like jorge luis Borges, quintuple Formula-1-champion juan Manuel Fangio, tango star Carlos Gardel and football legends like Maradona. Buenos Aires, some kind of a New York-like melting pot with Mediterranean flavor, used to be the cultural lighthouse of the Spanish speaking group of countries, one of the largest cities of the world and the paris of the South, with one of the most famous opera houses, while on the Cte dAzur there was a saying as rich as an Argentine. Buenos Aires was not only the birthplace of the soon internationally well-known tango, but also one of the capitals of art nou-veau architecture and especially of psychology, with far more psychoanalysts than New York. Woody Allens films are particularly popular here, and psychology is ever present in the countrys latin-America-wide pres-tigious literature and films, as it is in everydays local language and its outstanding graphic humor.

just before 1930, a British analyst wrote that a coup dtat on the river plate was as unthinkable as on the thames. But after the outbreak of the world crisis in 1929 and the rapidly following first of several military regimes, Argentina became also one of the politically and economically most unstable countries of latin America. Its industry, largely lead-ing on the regional level around 1950, was soon clear-

ly distanced by that of its Brazilian rival, and the poor countries where most of Argentines or their parents or grand parents had come from, such as Spain and Italy, turned much more prosperous than the former im-migrants paradise in the South. Argentina became a country of massive emigration for political and eco-nomic reasons in the 1970s, even if it continued to be an important immigration destination for the poorer neighboring countries.

One similarity with Greece is that both Buenos Aires and Athens concentrate around one third of the respective national population. Sociologists can cer-tainly identify some substantial differences in social structure, immigrants integration, urban patterns and other aspects. And of course, the historical rival-ry between Argentina and Brazil, with its origins in colonial times, has little resemblance with the com-plicated relationship between Greece and turkey, and there is no Cyprus-like problem between them. If there have been sometimes serious tensions and even an arms race, none of them has ever dominat-ed the other and no real war has opposed them, even if the comparatively tiny Uruguay was some kind of a buffer state born out of their historical rivalry and al-so some local armed conflicts long time ago. If Argen-tina maintains an old diplomatic conflict with Brit-ain about the Malvinas (Falklands) islands lost back in 1833, which became even the object of a short war in 1982 causing around one thousand victims, now-adays there is no major tension with any of its direct neighbors risking to trigger an armed conflict. It was not always like that: around 1978 there were seri-ous tensions and even a danger of war with Chile, a neighbor with which Argentina shares the third lon-gest border of the earth.

Altogether, even if we look with some concern at its yet not overcome intrinsic tendency to eco-nomic and also political instability and some-times violent internal socio-political conflicts, Argen-tinas prospects might appear relatively promising. It is certainly a conflict and crisis-prone country with an eternal tendency to generate inflation, capital flight and excessive indebtedness, while corruption and cor-poratist tendencies are two more of its endemic prob-lems. But it has also shown, after the outbreak of the world crisis in 1929 and after the collective disasters of the last dictatorship (1976-83) and of the national bankruptcy around 2001, a remarkable level of resil-

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ience which is certainly related not only to its poten-tial of natural resources but also to some qualities of its population. And when the world is going, undoubt-edly, towards increasing difficulties of producing food for its rising population, Argentina, while not immune to environmental problems -due to climate change and also, locally, to deforestation and soil deteriora-tion following excessive soybean cultivation-, is still sure to keep its place as one of the largest producers of agricultural products, whose economic value can only rise in the foreseeable future. International capi-tal owners dont ignore it and have begun to buy ag-ricultural land around Buenos Aires and in its fertile plains of the pampa.

Similarities and differences of both situations

rather than stimulating modernization, one analyst writes, Greeces participation in the EEC, the EU and the euro-zone acted as an anaesthetic4. Much the same can be said about Argentinas policy of tying its peso to the US dollar. In both cases, massive capital flows came in, stimulated very artificially the economy and then fled the coun-try, while far from improving its overall competitive-ness, it suffered in fact a notable decline.

there is no way, of course, for Greece to devalue its currency now but the forced or negotiated exit of the euro-zone -if it does not break up itself by some-thing like a possible Franco-German move towards a kind of Northern Euro- would mean ipso facto a very strong devaluation. therefore its competitive sit-uation would change completely, as was Argentinas case in 2002. Imports would be easily twice as ex-pensive while exports could rise strongly even if their often high import content might reduce significant-ly the real possibilities. In any case, important pro-portions of products hitherto imported would have to be either produced locally or their consumption -be it German cars, French cheese or Chinese textiles- ought to be sharply reduced, as Argentina was able to slash in 2002 its rather unnecessary imports like those of japanese beer and Italian wine and to rein-itiate the development of many of its then very de-pressed industrial sectors like textiles, metal-work-

4 G. prEVElAKIS Art. cit.

ing branches, automobile and agricultural machines industries and many others.

Greece has obviously neither the agricultural potential of Argentinas extraordinarily fertile pam-pa nor the South American countrys national autar-chy in energy supply. Where could it find the engine for its economic revival5 and how could it pay much higher prices for necessary import items like oil and cereals? there is a big competitiveness gap which is very difficult to bridge. the basic problem is, as a re-cent times editorial put it in a simplified formula, that Greeks want to spend much more buying BM-Ws than Germans want to spend on ouzo and Greek holidays6. And tourism, ouzo and olives alone will not make it. there might be other important factors reducing the trade deficit, but the essential change will be necessarily more on the side of imports and economic reforms. If the EU, Mrs Merkel and Mr. Sar-kozy really want to help Greece out of its nightmare, two basic points should certainly be fiscal pressure on the big fortunes and on the powerful Church rather than on the impoverished middle class and the poor, and reduction of the high military spending. For this the international community and the troika would also have to take serious measures in order to avoid or at least reduce the flight of millionaires to tax ha-vens and to curb the influence of arms exporters lob-bies. But in all those increasingly often repeated pa-thetic EU crisis summits, joint press conferences and telephone calls between Athens, Brussels, paris and Berlin these elements seem to have been largely or completely ignored. the policy recommendations are essentially to follow more of the same, i.e. auster-ity for everybody except those just mentioned, to-gether with massive privatisation and technocratic rather than democratic leadership: exactly the tra-ditional IMF medicine rightly rejected by success-

5 More and better distributed profits from its enormous shipping fleet, as well as from tourism, might be some of the main points, and Greeces potential role as an energy hub between russia, the Caspian Sea area and the West is said to be important. retirement and health tourism could be an interesting niche to be more exploited: after all, Greece enjoys one of Europes highest life expectancies, probably to a great extent due to the healthy Mediterranean diet, and maybe others could learn something from Zorba the Greek. there are certainly also important possibilities for boosting renewable energies and reducing energy consumption, one of the keys of Europes future and, and therefore also for reducing the traditional trade deficit of countries like Greece, and even of Spain and portugal, where renewable sources of energy have already been developed much more. 6 Euro Band-Aid, The Times, 24 Nov. 2011.

ful Asian countries like South Korea and Malaysia in 1997/8. As one of the most lucid observers stated, maybe with some exaggeration, the responsibles of the fire outbreak are made fire-fighters, as are nom-inated prime Ministers of Greece and Italy and pres-ident of the European Central Bank precisely three former Goldman Sachs economists. Nothing guar-antees, the comment concludes, that they are to-day a good investment rather than a toxic product7.

there are some other significant differences be-tween the situations of Greece in 2011 and of Argen-tina in 2001, among them the industrial countries decision, in 2001/2, to abandon completely the latter in its mess after having encouraged it to follow a di-sastrous policy in the 90s. Argentinas rejection, then, of the traditional recipes was followed in the short term by very big hardships, heavy losses for many8 and new emigration waves as well as a long period of being a pariah of international financial markets. But it led the country immediately to an explosion of artistic creativity and very soon to an impressive economic revival and a real social recovery, whatev-er weak points there might be in its recent policies. there are perhaps, as indicated, few ways for Greece of becoming really competitive even with a radically devaluated new drachma. Nevertheless, a similar re-sponse could be finally, maybe, even with a dramatic short-term impact, a better way to address the roots of the Greek disaster than to continue a rather autistic IMF, ECB and Commission-inspired austerity, deregu-lation and privatization policy9 which does not seem

7 le complot des Super Mario, Le Canard enchan, 23 novembre 2011.8 the pesificacin -the devaluation of over 70% of the hitherto supposedly dollar-equivalent peso and the subsequent conversion of credits in dollars to credits in those pesos- was of course a big loss for those who had believed in the perennial nature of the dollar-peso-parity and had not changed their pesos for dollars before it was too late, or for those who had to reimburse dollar credits. But it was inevitably imposed by the implosion of the system. Argentina had no choice, whatever the official propaganda had made believe the people during the 90s. Finally, the resulting inflation did not reach at all, as forecast by the Cassandras, hyper-inflation levels, real estate prices (indicated in dollars since long before) plunged but recovered rapidly with the economic upturn of the following years. Employment also plunged and then recovered, while poverty sky-rocketed and then fell. 9 Much of this has of course, in principle, macroeconomic rationality and can be helpful for a thorough reform. But austerity ought certainly to target in priority those who can and should really pay more taxes, which does not seem the case; privatisations risk to have in practice more negative than positive results, as shown by Argentina in the 90s with its lack of adequate regulation to avoid high-level corruption and mismanagement, which resulted so

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able to bring solutions even in the long term while aggravating month after month the already dramat-ic social and economic situation of the country

Some concluding remarks

Monetary questions, lying at the very heart of economic and social relations, have a struc-tural character and need definitely a thor-ough reorganization to overcome the systemic crisis, without dismantling the social safety nets and pro-ducing disastrous consequences. Such a reorganiza-tion would also have to cope with the big global chal-lenges such as ageing and climate change, underline Bernard lietaer and two other high-level special-ists10. It is also quite obvious that a radical change of the general antisocial direction of the industrial countries economies is recommendable if we want to stop what another analyst has called the great re-gression initiated with the reforms of the thatcher-reagan years11. A former French prime Minister, not very left-wing socialist Michel rocard, wonders why national states today have to pay much higher inter-est rates than private banks, and concludes by say-ing: there is an urgency to send a very clear signal to people: Europe is not in the hands of the financial lob-bies, but at the service of the citizens12. But isnt it, really? Incidentally, today even the very liberal World Economic Forum recognizes that increasing social in-equality constitutes a growing problem for national and international stability. Outstanding analysts such as paul Krugman, joseph Stiglitz, jeremy rifkin, Susan George and George Soros also warn about the dire con-sequences of unlimited speculation and pathological cupidity inextricably associated with the liberal anglo-saxon model13. Finally, a well-known journalist, who is also far away from any left-wing extremism, com-ments that the ideas of the far-right National Front of getting France out of the euro would be une idi-

finally to be a costly mistake from the viewpoint of the countrys and its populations interests. 10 In their forthcoming book on Money and Sustainability: the Missing Link.11 jacques GENErEUX La grande regression, Seuil, paris, 2010.12 Michel rocard and pierre larrouturou Faut-il que les Etats payent 600 fois plus que les banques?, Le Soir (Brussels), 9 jan. 2012.13 For instance, joseph StIGlItZ - Le triomphe de la cupidit, Babel, Arles (France), 2010; jeremy rIFKIN - Le rve europen ou comment lEurope se substitue peu peu lAmrique dans notre imaginaire, Fayard, paris, 2005; Susan GEOrGE - Leurs crises, nos solutions, Albin Michel, paris, 2010.

otie san nom. Mais imposer la Grce, puis au portu-gal, puis dautres, des mesures qui ont prcipit leur ruine et europis leur faillite, tait galement dune indicible stupidit.14 there might be other aspects to be taken into account and more diplomatic ways to express the complex aspects of the present reality, but there is little doubt that such comments reflect the basic components of the nightmare in which the Eu-ropean Union has put itself by deciding first a radical financial deregulation which generated a big world-wide casino of speculation, and then by creating an in-trinsicly fragile monetary union without real conver-gence of fiscal, budgetary and overall economic poli-cies. And as joseph Stiglitz recently summed up, pres-ent policy measures taken to resolve the resulting crisis recall in fact the medieval doctors who believed in bloodletting as the general remedy for illnesses

Annex: two comparative opinions of Argentine specialists

jorge remes lenicov, after a long career as profes-sor and researcher in economic sciences, had the special privilege of being nominated Minister of Economy just at the moment of the explosion of the dollar-peg convertibility system (and of a very chaot-ic political situation with the constitutional president having abandoned the power in the middle of mas-sive popular demonstrations which had led to about 30 victims), and of observing later during several years the European evolution as Ambassador of his coun-try to the EU from 2002 to 2010. So he had an excel-lent opportunity to look at the similarities and differ-ences between the Argentine and the Greek situation. Among the similarities, he underlines a) the fixed ex-change rate coupled with a productivity growth that was lower than in the USA and EU, respectively; b) re-lated to this, a growing deficit in the current account and the balance of payments; c) a high and growing -but underestimated in official figures- fiscal defi-cit; d) the lack of anticipation of the crisis, despite, in the Greek case, the obvious non-compliance with the Maastricht rules for fiscal deficit and public debt. re-

14 jean-Franois KAhN Quand lUMpS joue avec le feu, Le Soir (Brussels), 20 jan. 2012: would be a real idiocy. But imposing on Greece, then on portugal and others, measures which have precipitated their ruin and Europeanized their bankruptcy, was of an undescriptible stupidity.

garding the differences, there was a major recession in Argentina for several years before the default, with a GDp decline of over 15%, a much higher unemploy-ment reaching over 18%, but substantially higher def-icits in Greece; the international reserves had fallen by 63% in Argentina, he says, bringing a severe solvency crisis and eventually the blocking of bank accounts, but this did not happen in Greece before the outbreak of the crisis, as this country could of course count upon important structural funds and later emergency loans from the EU. But the measures taken since November 2009 in the Greek case are quite similar to those of Argentina in 2000-01 and dont really attack the un-derlying competitiveness problem; while Argentina finally could -and was obliged to- devaluate radical-ly its peso by abandoning the dollar peg, Greece has now the difficult choice of returning to a devaluat-ed drachma by a complicate renegotiation of its rela-tions with the EU and probably imposing some heavy restrictions, for a transition period, to the withdraw-al from bank accounts (as Argentina did in December 2001), or trying to recover competitiveness by letting fall employment and salaries in the context of very acute political and social tensions15.

Mario rapoport, director of the prestigious Institute for research in Economic and So-cial history of the University of Buenos Ai-res and author of a number of remarkable publications on regional integration, development policy and in-ternational economy, underlines also the similarities with respect to monetary overvaluation and growing loss of competitiveness, policies of liberalization and privatization and the opening of the national econo-my without any control, which triggered the affluence of speculative capital followed later by massive capital flight. But the public debt by inhabitant was nearly ten times bigger in Greece in 2010 than it was in Argen-tina in 2001, and much higher in relation to GNp. the adjustment, he concludes, will fail in Greece and in Spain like it failed, during the desperate attempts in 2000-01 of ever tougher austerity measures and new IMF financial help leading finally to the inevitable decision to block the bank accounts, in Argentina16.

15 jorge rEMES lENICOV Similitudes y diferencias entre la crisis argentina (2001) y la de Grecia (2010), part of an article to be published soon in the Argentine review Archivos del Presente, Buenos Aires.16 Mario rApOpOrt Grecia en el espejo argentino, Pgina/12, Buenos Aires, 30 May 2010.

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European partiesin the post-Lisbon reality

by Michalis Peglis /

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A long lasting truth

One of the longest standing truths about the Europe-an union is the titling of the European elections as a second order national election. Concluded by reif and Schmitt1 back in 1980 it titled the first elections to the European Parliament by universal suf-frage of 1979. Thirty years have passed since then, the number of countries doubled in Europe while the member-ship of the European union has tripled. The iron curtain collapsed and the un-ion has been transformed in both con-tent and context. Still, this well told truth holds strong. It succeeds to un-derstand and explain what is actually at stake at the European elections. When, every five years, people are called to the European ballot box, they exercise their right having the national polit-ical context in mind. It is indeed im-pressive that this contention has been reaffirmed even for the seventh elec-tions of 2009 and has proved correct all along2. Globalization and Europeani-

1 reif, k. and Schmitt, h. (1980) Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election results, in European Journal of Political Research, 8(1): 345.2 Eijk, C. van der, Franklin, M. and Oppenhuis, E. (1996) The Strategic Context: Party Choice, in C. van der Eijk and M. Franklin (eds), Choosing

sation in particular, shortening of dis-tances, technology revolution, on the one hand, while a common currency and real legislative powers for the Eu-ropean Parliament, on the other, have made no real difference to this attitude.

The main reason for this phenome-non can not be that people are wrong, that would be wrong to contemplate. Instead, contrary to the national ex-perience, the European elections do not produce any tangible political out-come. The day after, the political con-text under which citizens live remains the same and, although they under-stand that there will be new person-nel in the European parliament, they do not view this as important in pro-ducing change.

As of December 1, 2009

the ratification of the latest treaty of the European un-ion became a slow and stress-ful procedure that was further down-graded by the vortex of the global eco-nomic recession and the fear for dom-ino effects in the light of economic in-terdependence. however, the Lisbon

Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union (Ann Arbor, Mich.: university of Michigan Press). See also Marsh, M. (1998) testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections, British Journal of Political Science, 28(4): 591607.

* Michalis PEGLIS ( ) is a PhD candidate on European parties at the University of Macedonia where he brings in several years experience from the European parties cooperation. He has a Masters degree in Public Ad-ministration and Public Policy from the London School of Economics (mpeglis@gmail.gr).

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treaty3 introduced important chang-es that are expected to affect this sec-ond order attitude. According to par-agraph 7, article 17, the appointment of the president of the European Com-mission, the top job in brussels, shall take into account the European elec-tions. This clause means a lot when re-viewed in combination to what is un-der the authority of this president. The European Commission, the executive body of the European union, is exer-cising and monitoring the implemen-tation of the policies of the union. Ac-cording to article 17 paragraph 6 the president has key competences: con-sents on the Commission members, distributes portfolios, appoints vice-presidents and, last but not least, can have any member resign upon his re-quest.

The aim of the treaty is to in-crease the political stake of the Eu-ropean elections establishing, for the first time, a semi-direct link between the European Commission and the cit-izens, through the election of its pres-ident and, as a consequence, its politi-cal programme4.

Europarties and the 2009 European elections

the Lisbon treaty, signed in de-cember 2007, was not ratified by all member states before the European elections of 2009 and, there-

3 treaty of the European union http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm4 Further in the direction of consolidating the European party political system of the Eu is the Andrew duff report (2010) On a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976 Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament, as well as, the Marietta Giannakou report (2011) On the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding Committee on Constitutional Affairs

fore, it was technically not effective as yet. however, the clause regarding the appointment in public of a candidate for the presidency of the Commission could well be exercised by the Europe-an parties even with the pre-Lisbon, but towards-Lisbon, status quo. The European Council would not feel com-fortable not to take into account the elections to the European Parliament5.

European parties6 proved not ready, to put it softly, in 2009 to ex-ercise the new political role. This per-formance says more when combined with the well established record of, at least, all three major European parties as to their commitment to advancing European integration and evolving to real political parties. Most European parties have talked a lot about this, the issue has been debated in public dia-logue, as well as, academic discourse, but when the chance was there in 2009 they did not deliver. The actual clause to link the result of the European elec-tions with the appointment of the can-didate president was originally pro-posed by a Europarty7.

According to ricard-Nihoul: The idea is not new and has been gaining ground, but during the last elections

5 Other changes introduced by the latest treaty are the further increase of the powers of the European Parliament by extending the co-decision procedure, the further extension of the role of qualified majority voting (qMv) in the Council and the entry into the scene of national Parliaments as safeguards of the subsidiarity principle. For a better understanding of the Lisbon treaty see also bonvicini G. ed. (2009) democracy in the European union and the role of the European Parliament, quaderni IAI6 European parties or Europarties refer to the organisations of transnational political parties cooperation in the European level.7 EPP (2002) A Constitution for a strong Europe Estoril Congress document, English version, paragraph 47, source: www.epp.eu. The EPP played an important role in the maturing of this idea, as already in 2004 it made an explicit declaration that, as the winner party of the 2004 European elections, it would not support a candidate president for the Commission should (s)he be not from its ranks.

the European parties failed to act on it.8. Priestley contents that [t]he oc-casion to make the European elections a choice about the future President of the Commission was lost because some national parties refused to par-ticipate in the process, and thus in-directly underlined their own reluc-tance to commit to a politicisation of Europe9. As far as the European Peo-ples Party, there was luck of consensus at the level of the party leaders even as to whether there should be an EPP can-didate, while in the Party of European Socialists the agreement was not to put up a common candidate. behind this historical set-back lies the resilience of integovernmentalism and of the in-ter-prime-ministerial tradition of the EU that demonstrated its endurance.

Our contention is that this clause has a great potential to further con-solidate a European political system, a public sphere and increase the po-liticisation of the union. Appointing a candidate is at first but this involves the preparation and presentation of the political content of the candidate: the programme.

What the Europarties could have done

What they could and, for some, should, have done is exactly what they are expected to do after Lisbon in full and in depth: chose their candidate for the Presidency of the European Commis-sion, even behind closed doors, debate a political platform to come along and present this platform through the na-tional member parties to the national electorates. Not just a manifesto that

8 ricard-Nihoul G. - Sydow von G.(2010) From Institutional reform to Mass Politics or how to Engage Citizens in the union of Lisbon.9 Priestley J. (2010) European Political parties: the missing link, Notre Europe, policy paper 41.

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is a wish list for the future, but a polit-ical programme mutatis mutandis the ones their national components pre-sent for the national elections. When going towards the presidential elec-tions in France, or the elections for the bundestag in Germany, parties spend several months of preparation on their governmental programme that is ex-pected to be specific. It can not be too general, as the media and their oppo-nents will use the discrepancies and in-efficiencies to criticise. The electorate must know what it will get out of each political party should it be given the mandate to govern.

by debating the political pro-gramme for the European Commis-sion they would, at the same time, look for a candidate president that will im-plement this programme. Of course, as (s)he deserves to be integrated in its formation, her appointment should be made some several months ahead of the European elections in order to have adequate time to be engaged in the preparation of its content. It should be finalised during the last 1-2 months before the elections and communicat-ed to the electorate through the na-tional member parties jointly with the European parties. This is not sui gen-eris as it is exactly what happens at the national level in Europe or at the uS presidential elections. hence, the win-ner Europarty gets its candidate pro-posed by the European Council and elected by the European Parliament. Should the European Council, for what ever reasons, decide not to propose the candidate of the winner party, the Eu-ropean Parliament has the competence to reject the proposal and demand the respect of the treaty.

The 2009 elections to the Europe-an Parliament was a test not passed by Europarties. Not one of those tests put very often, as the next one will have to wait another five years. It remains

to be seen whether they will change mode towards the next elections for the European Parliament in 2014.

Appointment of the Members of the Commission

historically, although the pro-file of the European Commis-sion used to be more techno-cratic, party affiliation was the domi-nant paradigm for the appointment of its members. It is usually the case that the candidate is a personality from the political background of the national government or the result of consulta-tion among government coalition part-ners. At an interesting analysis of all Commissioners from 1958-2004 Arndt Wonka shows that [M]ore than half of the Commissioners in the sample (53.6 per cent) held a post as a government minister in their respective member state before they were nominated as Commissioner10.

Should, at the next occasion, the 2014 European elections, the system work fine and europarties put up can-didates for the presidency of the Com-mission and the European Council propose the winners candidate and (s)he be elected as Commission presi-dent, the day after, the member states will propose their Commissioners that will form the new College of the Com-mission.

The appointment of the members of the Commission is done accord-ing to paragraph 7, article 17, by the Council. This means that the Europe-an elections and the vote exercised by the electorate marks no effect on this appointment, as winner of the Euro-pean elections may be party A but

10 Wonka A. (2004) Delegation and Abdication? The appointment of the European Commissioners and its Policy Implications Working paper, Mannheim: MZES. (not available in book shops. More info: http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de)

because party b holds the national government it will have the right to propose the member of the Commis-sion. In hungary in 2009 under a so-cialist government the opposition cen-tre-right Fidesz got a sky-high result of 56% with the socialists receiving only 17% of the popular vote. Still, the so-cialist government exercised, shortly after, its right to appoint a candidate from its ranks for the Commission that was together with the other can-didates put up for election by the Eu-ropean parliament. This paradox is ex-plained by the fact that historically the European elections were not associat-ed with the appointment of the Eu-ropean Commission insofar this was considered as part of the intergovern-mental competences of the national governments.

In reality, it is actually quite com-mon that the European elections give opposition parties better results espe-cially when parties in government have been there quite a while. The elector-ate, in a looser expression of vote, strengthens opposition parties aiming to send a message to the incumbents of the national context. The character of the second order election is the ex-planation.

Associating the European Commission with the European elections

What we are proposing is that the competence to propose a member of the Commission be shifted from the gov-ernment-of-the-day to the European Party and its national member or co-alition that ranked first at the Europe-an elections. Our aim is to strengthen the association of the European elec-tions not just to the election of the members of the European Parliament, as was originally the concept, not just

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with the appointment of the President of the Commission, as the Lisbon trea-ty introduces, but with the new Com-mission in total.

It has been proposed that nation-al parties could nominate their candi-date member of the Commission that would head the list of the national par-ty at the Euroelections. The idea was not integrated in the new treaty of 2009 for two sound reasons: the size of the Commission will shrink in the fol-lowing years11 and, secondly, the pres-ident of the Commission is departing from the old concept of first amongst equals and is becoming more like a prime minister where the resignation of the ministers is a key discretion of her competences. having national par-ties linking the nomination of their candidate member of the Commission with the European elections and, thus, getting the legitimacy of the election ballot would not facilitate the presi-dent to exercise his discretional pow-ers in full. Giving to the appointment of the candidate commissioners sound public legitimacy in the member coun-try is in the direction of intergovern-mentalism, as it makes him more of a national representative. This is quite about the opposite to the further inte-gration and politicisation that the pub-lic nomination of the president of the Commission brings about.

Our proposal is to link the Euro-pean elections ballot box with the Eu-ropean Parliament and the European Commission and this in full compli-ance with the institutional and po-litical direction that the new treaty

11 According to article 17 paragraph 5 of the Lisbon treaty: As from 1 November 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of members, including its President and the high representative of the union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this number.

brings about. The party or coalition that wins the European elections shall have the right to appoint the candidate member of the Commission whenev-er this is needed during the five-year mandate. This can take place in the framework of the associated Europe-an Party that will consolidate the final list proposal for Commission members out of the results of its national mem-ber parties. This proposal shall:

- Further strengthen the European dimension of the European elections, as voters will know that the party that wins the election will have an addi-tional key competence.

- The legitimacy of the government of the day to appoint this European of-ficer is anyway disputable. The compe-tences of the national government are well reflected in the Council and the European Council. The Commission is the supranational institution and it makes sense that it be linked with the European elections.

- The proposed Commission is sub-ject to scrutiny and election by the Eu-ropean parliament where the winner party of each member state is repre-sented usually with more seats.

- Further, as the appointed Com-mission President has the portfolio delegation authority he should be sup-ported by a Commission synthesis that is a better reflection of the result of the European elections that gave him the

ticket to be elected in this position12.

- the proposal fur-ther strengthens the in-dependence of the Com-missioners from the national governments, as their appointment would be linked with the Euro-pean elections13 and their legitimacy be more Euro-pean than national.

A counter argument on this proposal would be the likely chance of having a high-populist or ex-tremist party ranking first due to the loose vote of the citizens. As a con-sequence it would appoint the mem-ber of the Commission who w