Going Global. The History of EC/EU External Relations. A Jean Monnet Module on the History of European Integration

(Professor Sara Lorenzini)

ERIKA MARZANO

THE EC AND THE METAPOLIEFSI.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ROLE IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION

OF GREECE

1

ERIKA MARZANO

The EC and the Metapolitefsi

The European Community Role in the

Democratization of Greece

2

OUTLINE

Introduction ……………..…………………………………………………………. 4

A Step Back: Karamanlis‟ and the Colonels‟

Relationship with Europe …………………………………………………………. 5

To Join or not to Join? This is the Question ……………………………………. 7

Friends and Foes …………………………………………………………………… 9

Fully Integrated …………………………………………………………………... 11

Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………….. 13

Bibliography & References ………………………………………………………. 15

3

A united Europe, as Ι have said, will have a genuine democratic character. With its democratic

structure and functions it will also consolidate the democratic regimes of each country. Because it

is obvious that democracy, which is going through a dangerous crisis at this time, is greatly in need

of adaptation to the conditions of our time. And it is characteristic of this crisis that, of the 150

countries in the world today, only 19 have true democratic regimes. But even in those, democratic

institutions are being sorely tried. 1

Constantinos Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece

1A Speech Delivered at the Town hall of Aachen, in 1978, on the occasion of his being honored with the Charlemagne

Prize (Federal German Republic) created in 1949 to be awarded annually by the West German city of Aachen, to

distinguished personalities for outstanding contributions to the ideal of the European Unity.

http://www.pro-europa.eu/index.php/en/library/the-struggle-for-the-union-of-europe/161-karamanlis,-konstantinos-the-

ideal-of-a-united-europe

4

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 1970s, the democratic European Community was surrounded by three

dictatorships. In Greece, the Colonels‟ Junta had been ruling since the 1967 coup; in Spain,

Francisco Franco had emerged victorious after the Spanish Civil War; in Portugal, the Estado Novo

totalitarian regime had put an end to Portuguese political instability.

It was during this decade that some countries faced “waves of democratization”, as the political

scientist Samuel Huntington defined them2, in other words, they transitioned from authoritarian

regimes to democratic regimes.

According to Huntington, Greece, Spain and Portugal followed similar historical paths with their

transition to democracy that led the so-called “third wave of democratization”, which later involved

some Latin American countries.

The European Community played a key role in the democratization of South-Western Europe,

especially regarding Greece; in fact, in order to ensure the economic stability of the Community, it

was necessary that its members had a democratic regime, that is why Greece, Spain and Portugal

had to make changes before becoming full members.

The acknowledgement of democracy as a prime objective to reach and protect had already come

into discussion before, even though the founding members – and those who had joined during the

first enlargement – were already democratic countries. During the early phases of the Community,

Brussels had explicitly defined the democratic precondition for EC entry in a Parliamentary

Resolution of January, 15 1962:

“A necessary condition for membership must be the existence of a democratic

state structure that guarantees free political order.

Those States whose governments have no democratic legitimacy and whose

citizens do not participate in the expression of political will, either directly or

through their freely elected representatives, cannot expect to be greeted in the

concert of nations gathered in the European Community.” 3

2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman OK, University of

Oklahoma Press, 1991. 3 “Condizione necessaria per l’adesione dev’essere l’esistenza di una struttura statuale democratica che garantisca

libero ordinamento politico.

Quegli Stati i cui governi non hanno alcuna legittimazione democratica e i cui cittadini non partecipano all’espressione

della volontà politica, né direttamente, né attraverso loro rappresentanti liberalmente scelti, non possono pretendere di

essere accolti nel consesso dei popoli riuniti nelle Comunità Europee.” (personal translation)

Assemblea Parlamentare Europea – Documenti di seduta – 15 gennaio 1962 – Documento 122

5

In Greece, the establishment of democracy was seen as a necessary step to secure the economic

benefits of European Community membership, while the Community was in turn seen as a

guarantor of democracy, protecting the country from external aggression or from the birth of new

authoritarian regimes.

The European Community was able to serve as a model for Greece, influencing it both in the

formation of its political parties‟ character and in the building of its institutional structures. The

identification of the European Community with democracy had a symbolic impact on Greece.

The aim of this paper is to describe to what extent and how the European Community helped

Greece in its transition to democracy. Community membership was considered an important factor

in stabilising and protecting democracy.

The European contribution to the strengthening of the reborn Greek democracy is also to be

connected to a phase of weakness of the United States‟ power, following the Watergate scandal.

The requirements necessary to apply for the accession to the Community were essentially two:

democratic stabilization and economic development. Although some might argue that Greece had

already become democratic at the time of its accession to the European Community, the role of the

Community itself in this transition is to be found even before the enlargement that involved Greece.

In Greece the two processes – European integration and democratisation – were strictly intertwined.

A STEP BACK: KARAMANLIS’ AND THE COLONELS’ RELATIONSHIP WITH

EUROPE

The rapprochement of Greece to the new-born European Economic Community had already begun

in the late 1950s thanks to a charismatic figure, Minister Constantinos Karamanlis. Karamanlis

wanted to seek a possible counterweight to the US interference in the country, in accordance with a

more independent national policy. Karamanlis‟ European dream aimed to put an end to the

“overprotective” relation United States had with Greece. The fragile post-war Greek state‟s

sovereignty had to suffer the American interference; the United States were an “international ally”

that did not guarantee stability. Inspired by the political culture of fully European traditions4,

Karamanlis‟ reference models were Konrad Adenauer in Germany and Charles De Gaulle in

France.

4 Antonio Varsori, L’Occidente e la Grecia: dal colpo di Stato militare alla transizione alla democrazia (1967-1976), in

Mario Del Pero, Victor Gavìn – Fernando Guirao, Antonio Varsori, Democrazie. L’Europa meridionale e la fine delle

dittature, Firenze, Le Monnier 2010, cit., p. 10.

6

Karamanlis‟ plan was abruptly interrupted by the rise to power of the Colonels, following the coup

d'état of April 21, 1967. Supported by the United States, the Colonels established a dictatorial

regime in the country and Karamanlis decided to retire into voluntary exile in Paris.

During the seven year long (1967 – 1974) military regime, the European Community had remained

ambiguous in its relationship with the Colonels‟ Junta.

The apparent total Western acceptance of the Colonels seemed to find partial justification in the

absence of internal opposition to the regime.

The mobilization and attention towards Greece was especially dynamic in the Northern and

Western European socialist circles, led by the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and

Belgium, historically conscious to the issue of democracy and respect for human rights, as well as

from NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International).

The attitude taken by the heads of the major Western powers, especially Germany, Great Britain

and France was much more cautious and unclear, having these nations various interests in the Greek

economy. In preparation for a visit to London, Altiero Spinelli, one of the founding fathers of the

European federalist movement, wrote to Pietro Nenni, the historic leader of the Italian Socialist

Party and at the time Minister for Foreign Affairs, “However, it would also be appropriate to

express our dissatisfaction with the weakness towards the regime of the colonels in Greece.”5

Nevertheless, Greece‟s position in the European Community mostly resented the problem of the

failure to respect human rights, raised since 1967 by Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the

Netherlands within the Council of Europe, which pushed for the creation of a commission of

investigation of the Council.

The Greek government procrastinated; it implemented modifications of little importance to its

Constitution, without showing particular democratization intentions or greater respect for human

rights. The Colonels relied on the support of the three major powers, hoping not to reach the

threshold of two third, in case of a vote in favour of the expulsion of Greece in the Council of

Europe.

The report of the commission of investigation on torture in Greece showed the true nature of the

regime, unleashing the outraged reaction not only of European governments, but also of the

European public opinion that prompted the governments of France, Britain and Germany to review

their positions on the expulsion of Greece. “Avanti!”, a newspaper of the Italian Socialist Party,

5 “Converrà tuttavia esprimere la nostra insoddisfazione per la mollezza verso il regime dei colonnelli in Grecia.”

(personal translation) 25 March 1969, IIa nota concernente la visita a Londra del 22 – 28 aprile, Collaboration d'Altiero

Spinelli avec Pietro Nenni, AS-44, n 000044, 17/03/1969 – 05/08/1969

7

dated May 7, 1969, headlined “With an implicit and strong condemnation of the dictatorship of the

Colonels, the Council of Europe called on Greece to restore the democratic regime”.6

The Junta opted for a unilateral withdrawal from the Council of Europe and the European

Community froze Greece‟s 1962 Association Agreement, namely the agreement to negotiate over

Greece‟s accession to the EC within a period of 22 years 7 that had made Greece enjoy the status of

Associate Member, until the democratic and parliamentary structures would be restored. In

addition, the Community suspended financial aid to the country. This was the first step the

community took in order to deny its consent to a non-democratic regime.

Following the 1974 humiliation of the Colonels, due to the Cyprus debacle, the Greek president,

General Phaedon Gizikis, recalled Karamanlis from his self-imposed exile, to form a civilian

government of national salvation to resolve the crisis. This event marked the start of the so called

Metapolitefsi (Greek: Μεταπολίτευση, translated as “polity / regime change”), a period that goes

from the fall of the military Junta to the 1974 legislative elections and the democratic period

immediately after these elections.

It was Karamanlis‟ guidance that led the country towards democracy. He built unilateral consensus

among the different political institutions of the country: the army, the monarchy and the state

bureaucracy; when necessary, he managed to face the threats to democracy through electoral and

constitutional means, paving the way for democracy consolidation.

TO JOIN OR NOT TO JOIN? THIS IS THE QUESTION

Karamanlis‟ first step towards European integration was to reactivate the Association Agreement in

July 1974: Athens‟ aim was to give its future relations with the Community a fundamental political

meaning, knowing that from the economic point of view – given the difficult economic situation of

6 “Con una implicita e ferma condanna della dittatura dei Colonnelli, il Consiglio d'Europa chiede alla Grecia il

ristabilimento del regime democratico” (personal translation)

AS – 0044 04, in Historical Archives of the European Union 7 “From the signing of the Athens Agreement on 9 July 1961, Greece had enjoyed the status of Associate Member of the

Community. Indeed, on 8 June 1959, Greece had become the first state to invoke Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome

which provided for individual states, a union of states or an international organization to become associated with the

Community. The Association Agreement that came into force in November 1962 provided in particular for a customs

union between Greece and the Community at the end of a 22-year transitional period as well as for the conclusion of a

financial protocol and the harmonisation of certain policies, with particular regard to agriculture and taxation. The

free movement of persons, services and capital was to take effect at the end of a 12-year period. Article 72 of the

Association Agreement also acknowledged that Greece would eventually accede to the European Community. An

Association Council and a Joint Parliamentary Committee were also established.”

Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe

http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/61a2a7a5-39a9-4b06-91f8-69ae77b41515/publishable_en.pdf

8

the country – it would not have been easy to reach a full and rapid implementation of the

agreement. The new Greek Government, with Constantinos Karamanlis at its head, wanted to

integrate the country into the European Community as soon as possible, indeed, the application for

full accession was submitted on July 12, 1975, few days after the ratification of the new Greek

constitution, by means of a letter addressed to the at that time President of the Ministerial Council,

Garret FitzGerald. The Greek people had a right to membership of the community based on the

commitments already entered into under the Association Agreement8.

The reasons behind Karamanlis‟ choice for full accession to the European Community were both

political and economic.

The Prime Minister considered the Community to be the ideal institutional framework within which

stability could be achieved and national confidence restored. The role of the Community institutions

in the eyes of a State in search of legitimacy and international support, was a guarantee.

Constantinos Mistotakis, Greek Foreign Minister, in an interview with The Times, reiterated the

idea of the European Community as guarantor of democracy:

Naturally, we do not expect our nine partners in the Community to become the

guardians of Greek democracy. By joining a broader group of like-minded

Western Democracies, however, our own democratic institutions will be

reinforced. […] They [potential dictators] are bound to know that the abolition

of democracy entails immediate ostracism from the Community. This could

have grave internal and external consequences. So, in this respect, the EEC is

a safe haven. 9

Karamanlis also sought to reinforce Greece‟s independence and position within the international

system in order to be able to negotiate. Greece wanted, as a European country, to be present in, and

have a voice in European matters. “Europe has taken the road towards integration. Athens wishes

to be there to make its contribution to what will surely be the greatest event of the century” wrote

Karamanlis in his letter 10

.

8 EEC Joint Parliamentary Committee, XIVth session, 16-17 May 1978 – PE0 21243, in Historical Archives of the

European Union 9 Constantinos Mistotakis interview, The Times, 15 December 1980

10 Greece's application letter for Community membership which was signed by Constantinos Karamanlis, Greek Prime

Minister, and addressed to Garret FitzGerald, Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and President in office of the Council

of the European Communities.

http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/photo/photoDetails.cfm?sitelang=en&ref=008598#0

9

Karamanlis saw the members as potential allies and defenders, particularly in relation to Turkey,

which, after the invasion and occupation of Cyprus, appeared as a major threat to Greece. Instead of

facing the option of war with Turkey, on August 14, 1974, Karamanlis chose to withdraw Greece

from NATO, as France had done under De Gaulle.; he later explained that “the withdrawal from

NATO was not only justified but necessary. The fury of the Greek and Cypriot people was so great

at that time that the only alternative would have been war”.11

According to Jose M. Magone

“Karamanlis presented the EEC as an alternative to the rejected patronage of the United States”.12

Last but not least, the accession to the Community was regarded by Greece as a powerful

contribution to the development and modernization of the country‟s economy. The economic

consequences of the freeze of the Association Agreement had harmed the Greek economy, contrary

to what one might think, this act by the European Community had shown that the lack of democracy

in Greece had represented an obstacle to the rapprochement with the country. Greece‟s external

trade was directed above all at the European market. As Emanuel Gazzo suggests “the EEC’s

decision to suspend the Association gave rise to an interesting phenomenon where the process of

European integration was identified with the defence of democratic values”.13

FRIENDS AND FOES

The Community had been monitoring the correct implementation of democracy in Greece since the

fall of the Colonels, as shown in a note on the Greek political situation:

“Après les élections du 17 novembre 1974, le Referendum du 8 décembre 1974

et les élections municipales du 30 mars 1975, la démocratie grecque

fonctionne désormais dans des conditions normales. Le gouvernement semble

disposer d'un contrôle complet sur les Forces Armée et sur les Forces de

Police. La facilité avec laquelle il a déjoué le 24 février 1975 la conspiration

d'un nombre relativement restreint […] est en tout cas présentée comme une

"preuve objective" en ce sens.”14

11

Karamanlis‟ interview in New York Times, 27 May 1978 12

Jose M. Magone, “The Role of the EEC in the Spanish and Portuguese and Greek transitions”, in Gregorio Alonso

and Diego Muro, The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition. The Spanish Model, New York, Routledge, 2011,

p. 223. 13

Emanuel Gazzo, “Enlargement of the Community: Attitudes of Member States”, in Johannes Wilhelmus Schneider,

From Nine to Twelve: Europe’s Destiny?, Germnatown, Md., Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980, p. 10. 14

“After the elections of 17 November 1974, the Referendum of 8 December 1974 and the municipal elections of 30

March 197, Greek democracy now functions under normal conditions. The government seems to have a complete

control over the Military Forces and the Police Forces. The ease with which it stopped on February 24, 1975 the

conspiracy of a relatively small number is in any case presented as an "objective evidence" in this sense” (personal

translation)

Note sur la situation politique Grecque

EN - 2677

10

Despite the carefulness and caution of the Commission, it was decided to give Greece a positive

sign: the Community therefore agreed to unblock loans to Greece that the European Investment

Bank had frozen after the coup, in addition to the loans granted by Germany.

Although Karamanlis was trying to reassure the still uncertain heads of European governments, the

British remained doubtful about the effectiveness and timing of accession of Greece to the EEC as a

full member.

The UK showed hostility to the enlargement of the Community to a partner who would have moved

the continental balance on the Mediterranean side.

During the Debate in the House of Lords on the European Communities Committee‟s Report on the

Enlargement of the EEC, Lord Trevelyan revealed the “attitude” of the British government towards

the enlargement. “This is a matter of greatest importance” – said the Lord – “since the decisions to

be taken will change the map of Europe.” 15

.

Although the British recognized the role of the Community in the support and development of

democracy in Greece, Lord Trevelyan exposed all the fears the possible entry of a “new” country

could have brought in the Community; he addressed all sort of possible scenarios: the application

came during a period of deep economic crisis (the oil crisis), making it an inopportune time for a

new enlargement; the Community‟s centre of gravity, which until then and up to the first

enlargement had tended towards the north, was shifting south; Greece was geographically isolated

since it had not common borders with any member of the European Community; since Protestant

and Catholic conceptions of society had predominated in Europe, the UK feared that the accession

of Greece would add Orthodox elements; the increasing number of official languages was seen as a

problem; new agriculture and fisheries policies that suited Greece would present a major challenge

to the Community; possible changes in the agreements already made with developing countries

were feared to cause the collapse of the Community; a modification of the decision-making and

voting procedures was seen as the beginning of the end 16

. Furthermore according to the British

diplomats, the Greek application for membership would lead to a predictable application for

membership by Turkey, but that would ultimately involve the Cyprus issue: it was therefore

necessary to solve the problem before addressing the issue of the accession.

Objections to the entry of Greece into the European Community came, however, even from within

the country. Andreas Papandreou, leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), adopted

15

Hansard Report on the Debate in the House of Lords on the European Communities Committee‟s Report on the

Enlargement of the EEC – EN129

EEC reports: enlargement of membership and application from Greece, in Historical Archives of the European Union 16

Ibidem

11

an anti-EC rhetoric17

. Also the Communist Party (KKE) vehemently opposed Greece‟s joining of

the European Community.

Whereas countries in favour of the entry of Greece, showed the legitimacy of a political endeavour

interested in the integration of European democracies into a common system.

Germany enthusiastically described Greece‟s decision to seek full membership “as a further

demonstration of the unbroken power of attraction exercised by the process of European

unification” 18

. Germany was more concerned about its own economy interests, having strong a

trade partnership with Greece.

France, as well, was willing to welcome the newly democratic Greece in the Community, but its

position was more ideological. There were several meetings between the French and the Greek

authorities in which Greece‟s determination to join the EC was reiterated and, on the French side,

fully solidarity and support were granted to tackle the economic difficulties. Paris fully shared

Karamanlis‟ idea of an essentially political value of the application; economic issues would be later

examined in the course of negotiations, and for France, the hypothesis of the transitional period of

pre-accession still remained valid. What was essential was to give Athens a positive response in the

short term because this choice would have strengthened Karamanlis, it would have favoured the full

democratization and avoided a potential and dangerous drift of the country: the economic problems

were pushed right into the background of these objectives.

FULLY INTEGRATED

The European Commission, according to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome,19

had to state its

opinion on a country‟s application for the accession to the Community.20

The objective of the

17

At the legislative election of 1981, PASOK won over the conservative New Democracy party, and Papandreou

became Greece‟s first socialist prime minister. Contrary to what he had promised in his election campaign, Papandreou

failed to withdraw Greece from the EC. This happened due to economic reasons: thanks to the 1980s Integrated

Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs), inequality started to decrease in Greece.

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-89-808_en.htm?locale=en

The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes were established in response to a 1981 memorandum from the newly-

elected Socialist government of Greece, which had joined the Community at the beginning of that year on terms

negotiated by the previous centre-right government.

http://penguincompaniontoeu.com/additional_entries/integrated-mediterranean-programmes-imps/ 18

Telegram by A. Frydas, Bonn, 14 June 1975, GRCKP 135A 19

Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council,

which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission.

The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement

between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the

Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

Article 237, Treaty of Rome, 1957 20

Aspects Institutionnels de l‟enlargissement, Cours tenus par E. Noël à l'Université libre de Bruxelles, EN-855

12

Treaty of Rome was not only an economic union, but it went a great deal further than that towards a

political union.

The European Community‟s reaction to the Greek application was initially expressed by the

president of the Commission, François-Xavier Ortoli, who had visited Athens and had drawn a

positive impression from the talks with the Greek authorities, which had proven aware of the

economic implications of accession to the EEC, but nevertheless had seemed firm in their

intentions. The Commission published its opinion on January 28, 1976. While stressing that a

“clearly positive response” should be given to Greece‟s application, Ortoli proposed the

institutionalization of a transitional period before full accession, so that the necessary economic

reforms would be implemented.21

The question was not whether Greece should enter or not, there

was not a doubt about this anymore, but rather when and how it should. Economic backwardness,

political instability and turbulent relations with Turkey were the reasons why the Commission

called for the postponement of Greece entry22

.

On February, 9, the Council of Ministers of the Nine reunited. The Commission‟s opinion was met

with great criticism, especially from France and Germany.

Some countries wondered whether Greece, Spain and Portugal should all be admitted at the same

time in order to prevent the Community to find itself in a “permanent state of flux for several

years”23

, but the Council responded that Greece was at a stage where it could already join.

Ioannis Pesmazoglou, chairman of the Greek Parliament delegation, in a speech on behalf of the

Greek parliament, made clear that Greece was in a period of intense social and economic change

and tolerance was needed during the negotiations; he pointed out that Greece recognized and fully

supported the principle of human rights and the Greek people wished to contribute towards

maintaining peace in the Mediterranean. The confidence of the Greek people in the Community was

the guarantee of the support the country would give to the integration of Europe24

.

Prime Minister, Constantinos Karamanlis, appealed to the “ally” governments of France and

Germany and the Commission‟s proposal was rejected The British eventually decided to conform to

the Franco-German positions. Karamanlis‟ policy towards Europe was found correct and

appropriate.

On that date it was thus declared the official opening of accession negotiations of Greece to the

EEC. They concluded in May 1979, with the signing of the Accession Deed in Athens.

21

Note à l‟attemption de messieurs les membres de la Commission

Bruxelles 26 Janvier 1976

EN 2676, in Historical Archives of the European Union 22

European Commission, „Enlargement of the Community: Conclusion’, Bulletin of the European Communities 1/78. 23

Written question n70/78 by Mr Dondelinger to the Council of the European Community 24

EEC Joint Parliamentary Committee, XIVth session, 16-17 May 1978 – PE0 21243, in Historical Archives of the

European Union

13

The integration into the European system was completed in 1981 when Greece became the tenth

member of the European Community:

“Greece joins Europe convinced that national independence will be

consolidated for all parties concerned within the framework of European

solidarity; that democratic liberties will be strengthened; that economic

expansion will accelerate and that, with the co-operation of all, social and

economic progress will become a common asset.” 25

CONCLUSION

The events in Cyprus that brought to the fall of the Colonels were not the only factors that

encouraged a regime change in Greece during the seventies. International factors – or maybe even

better, European factors – contributed too. The EC pushed “for democratization through the use of

both sticks and carrots”.26

In other words they froze the Association Agreement after the 1967

coup, but swiftly responded to the new government‟s membership request by admitting Greece.

This transition was stimulated by a European environment that was strongly democratic and relied

on solid democratic values. The EC gave political support to the formation of democracy in addition

to the granting of the benefits of further economic integration and financial assistance.

Negotiations for membership virtually coincided with a successful democratic transition and an

actual entry represented international acceptance of this country‟s new democratic credentials and

was regarded as offering a form of guarantee against a possible return to the authoritarian past.27

If the European Community‟s first aim at its birth was to promote peace in Europe, a direct

consequence of this became to promote democracy in Europe, what better opportunity that the

Greek case? The French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing wrote in his memoirs that “it was

impossible to exclude Greece, the mother of all democracies, from Europe”28

.

The relation between the commitment to democracy and a sound economic base was very close. In

helping the applicant country to enjoy a share of the economic benefits of membership, the

25

Constantinos Karamanlis‟ speech on the Entry of Greece into the EU, January 1, 1981

http://www.ellopos.net/politics/eu_karamanlis.html 26

Juan J Linz, Alfred Stepan, and Richard Gunther, Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with

Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe, in Gunther, R., Diamadouros, N., Puhle, H-J, The Politics of

Democratic Consolidation, Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 112 27

Geoffrey Pridham “The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative

Perspective”, in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, and Hans-Jèurgen Puhle, The Politics of Democratic

Consolidation, Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 174-5 28

Serge Berstein and Jean-François Sirinelli, Les années Giscard. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Europe, 1974-

1981,Paris, Armand Colin, 2007, p 135.

14

Community helped with stability, which, in turn, was essential to the health and survival of

democracy itself.

Even though formally it was during the Helsinki European Council (1999) that an explicit linkage

between access to negotiations and democracy and an explicit use of the principle of conditionality

were made for the first time, Greece was allowed to join the Community with the aim of

strengthening its democratic system in a kind of “conditionality principle ante-litteram”.

After the second enlargement, the support of democracy became a publicly acknowledged aim of

the European Economic Communities29

.

29

Alan S. Milward, Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 24

15

BIBLIOGRAPHY & REFERENCES

Primary Sources: Archival Fonds from the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU)

Emile Noël Fonds – EN-855, EN-129, EN-2676, EN2677

AS-44, n 000044, 17/03/1969 – 05/08/1969, AS – 0044 04

BAC 48/1984 644, BAC 15/1993 51

PE0 21243, 21519, 21804, 21805

Additional Sources:

Gregorio Alonso and Diego Muro, The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition. The Spanish

Model, New York, Routledge, 2011

Serge Berstein and Jean-François Sirinelli, Les années Giscard. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et

l’Europe, 1974-1981,Paris, Armand Colin, 2007

Mario Del Pero, Victor Gavìn – Fernando Guirao, Antonio Varsori, Democrazie. L’Europa

meridionale e la fine delle dittature, Firenze, Le Monnier, 2010

Richard Gunther, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, and Hans-Jèurgen Puhle, The Politics of Democratic

Consolidation, Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995

Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman

OK, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991

Eirini Karamouzi, A Strategy for Greece: Democratization and European Integration, 1974-1975,

Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 90, 2015

George Kassimeris, “Junta by Another Name? the 1974 Metapolitefsi and the Greek Extra-

parliamentary Left”. Journal of Contemporary History 40.4, 2005

Alan S. Milward, Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union, Routledge,

London, 2005

Geoffrey Pridham, Encouraging Democracy: The Institutional Context of Regime Transition in

Southern Europe, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1991

Johannes Wilhelmus Schneider, From Nine to Twelve: Europe’s Destiny?, Germnatown, Md.,

Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980

Georgios Tsiridis, Southern Europe in Comparative perspective: Democratic Transitions in

Portugal, Greece and Spain, Utrecht University, 2006

http://www.ellopos.net/politics/eu_karamanlis.html

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-89-808_en.htm?locale=en

http://penguincompaniontoeu.com/additional_entries/integrated-mediterranean-programmes-imps/

http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/photo/photoDetails.cfm?sitelang=en&ref=008598#0

16

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karamanlis,-konstantinos-the-ideal-of-a-united-europe