Corruption and Political Change in Spain1

Fernando Jiménez Sánchezα/Manuel Villoria Mendietaβ

αUniversity of Murcia

βKing Juan Carlos University

Paper presented to IPSA 24th World Congress of Political Science

July 23-28, 2016 | Poznań, Poland

1ThispaperwaswrittenthankstothehelpofProjectCSO2012-32661,PROYECTOSI+DdelMinisteriodeEconomíayCompetitividadofSpain.

This paper focuses on how the way corruption is perceived in Spain has changed.

Corruption perception has reached historic levels in recent years and has become a great

cause for concern despite the rate of corruption victimization still is one of the lowest in

in all Europe (Section 1). The paper links the problem of corruption with political

dissatisfaction and studies the main factors found behind the extremely high level that

the latter has reached in the last few years (Section 2). The rise of both the

dissatisfaction with how the democracy operates and the growing concern about

corruption has driven to greater political mobilization. This has not only caused an

increase in the interest for politics by Spaniards, but it has also brought about a series of

important changes in voting behavior (Section 3). Ultimately, the combination of factors

such as the growing perception of the magnitude of corruption, the extreme lack of trust

in how the primary mechanisms of democracy and political representation work in the

country, and the progressive awakening of an increasingly more critical citizenry make

it necessary, in our view, to enact a series of substantial reforms aimed at fighting

corruption if citizen trust in the political system and its representatives is ever to be

recovered (section 4).

1. Corruption in the trigger: historic levels of perception and concern over corruption

Numerous indicators from a variety of different surveys conducted indicate an

alarmingly high perception among Spaniards regarding the extent of corruption, one

that grew particularly during the years of the deep economic crisis that began in the last

quarter of 2007.

We have data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas [Sociology Research

Center (CIS)]. As can be seen in Table 1, to date, the CIS has not bothered to construct

a solid historical series on the perception of corruption in Spain. The indicators that

have been used vary from study to study, and there has been no regularity. Nevertheless,

this table reflects an increasingly worrisome perception regarding how widespread this

phenomenon is.

Table 1: Data on the corruption perception based on CIS studies

Date Question Values Sum

Oct 2004 (E. 2575) To what extent do you believe corruption is present in public administration?

Almost everyone is involved 3.2 52.8 Many people are 17.7

involved There are more than a few corrupt people out there

31.9

Dec 2009 (E. 2826) Do you think corruption is extremely, somewhat, little or not at all present in national politics?

Extremely present 22.2 64

Somewhat present 41.8

Jan 2010 (E. 2829) Do you think corruption is extremely, somewhat, little or not at all present in national politics?

Extremely present 36.1 75.5

Somewhat present 39.4

Sept 2010 (E. 2956)

Do you think corruption is extremely, somewhat, little or not at all present in national politics?

Extremely present 50.4 83.9

Somewhat present 33.5

June 2011 (E. 2905) In Spain, do you believe corruption is...?

Extremely present 32.8 85.6 Somewhat present 52.8

Source: CIS studies

If we look at the special Eurobarometer data on corruption that has been gathered in the

European Union every two years since 2005, the decline in how the problem is

perceived in Spain is quite clear. Of all the EU countries, Spain is the one that, in the

last three years, has experienced the greatest changes in how corruption is perceived and

how it is considered one of the countries’ main problems.2 According to the latest study

available, which was conducted in February/March 2013, 95% of Spaniards believed

that corruption is extremely (65%) or somewhat (30%) present in the country. This

statistic places Spain at the head of EU countries where this perception is highest along

with Lithuania and the Czech Republic; only Greece (99%) and Italy (97%) have higher

rates, and all of these countries are clearly above the EU average of 76%. Eight years

earlier, in 2005, corruption was already perceived as a significant problem in Spain

(73%). The percentage was still high but it was almost at the EU average (72%) as can

be seen at Graph 1.

Graph 1: Corruption as a widespread problem in Spain and the EU

2 According to Eurobarometer 397 from February/March 2013, Spain was the country where those surveyed (77%) felt there had been an increase in corruption, and 63% stated that it had increased significantly. Spain was followed by Slovenia (76% and 50%), Italy (74% and 45%), Portugal (72% and 39%) and Romania (65% y 55%).

This deterioration is also reflected in Spain’s ranking in Transparency International’s

Corruption Perceptions Index3. Table 2 shows how the scoring in Spain has evolved for

this index.

Table 2: Spain and TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index

YEAR SCORE VARIATION* RANKING

(from least to most corrupt)

NO. OF COUNTRIES

EU15 RANKING

EU25 RANKING

NO. OF STUDIES

2015 58 37-71 36º 170 13º 18º 7

2014 60 45-71 37th 175 13th 16th 7 2013 59 41-73 40th 176 13th 16th 7 2012 65 52-73 30th 176 12th 13th 7 2011 6.2 4.5-7.3 31st 182 12th 14th 9 2010 6.1 5.3-6.8 30th 178 12th 15th 6 2009 6.1 5.5-6.6 32nd 180 12th 15th 6 2008 6.5 5.7-6.9 28th 180 12th 14th 6 2007 6.7 6.2-7.0 25th 179 12th 12th 6 2006 6.8 6.3-7.2 23th 163 12th 12th 7 2005 7.0 6.6-7.4 23rd 159 12th 12th 10 2004 7.1 6.7-7.4 22nd 146 11th 11th 11 2003 6.9 5.2-7.8 23rd 133 11th 11th 11 2002 7.1 5.2-8.9 20th 102 9th 9th 10 2001 7.0 5.8-8.1 22nd 91 10th 10th 8 2000 7.0 5.9-8.0 20th 90 10th 10th 8

3 This, of course, is an index based on studies from sources that are quite varied but which do not come exclusively from political opinion data; rather, they are the opinions of professionals, executives, and diplomats who are considered to be well-versed in corruption-related problems in various countries. See the methodology on this index and its annual results a thttp://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail (last accessed: 11/02/2015).

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2005 2007 2009 2011 2013

WIDESPREAD-EU WIDESPREAD-SPA

NONWIDESPREAD-EU NONWIDSPREAD-SPA

1999 6.6 s.d. 0.7 22nd 99 11th 11th 10 1998 6.1 s.d. 1.3 23rd 85 12th 12th 10 1997 5.9 s.d. 1.82 24th 52 12th 12th 6 1996 4.31 s.d. 2.48 32nd 54 14th 17th 6 1995 4.35 s.d. 2.57 26th 41 13th 13th 4 Source: CPI, Transparency International. Up until 1999, the variation in the scores from the various studies used was measured by standard deviation. Ranking began in the year 2000.

In general, the deterioration in how the problem is perceived in Spain seems quite clear.

Indeed, the increase in the perception of corruption has occurred at a time of deep

economic crisis and tough cutbacks in public spending, which have led to increasing

civil unrest. The rise in the perception of corruption, as well as—and above all—the

way in which public concern over this problem has skyrocketed in recent years, both

seem to be a fundamental component of the climate of distrust and dissatisfaction that

Spaniards have been experiencing; this matter will be addressed later on in the paper.

But let’s have a look at Graph 2, which shows how corruption became the second most

significant public problem Spaniards have been facing, after unemployment, since 2013.

As can be seen in the graph, concern over corruption does not rise in tandem with the

unemployment rate or the negative subjective perception regarding the overall economic

situation. In fact, although the crisis became evident at the beginning of 2008 and major

cutbacks began to be rolled out in the spring of 2010, concern over corruption rose

slowly throughout 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. It wasn’t until 2013 and 2014 that it

suddenly shot up.

Graph 2: Spain’s main problems, the unemployment rate, and the economic situation

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Source: Data from CIS monthly barometers from March, June, September, and December 2005-2016 and the quarterly unemployment rate from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística [National Institute of Statistics (INE)]’s Active Population Survey.

If we zoom in on the data to see how concern over corruption has evolved into one of

the nation’s top three problems, beginning in the last quarter of 2012, in conjunction

with the monthly CIS barometer data, we can see the precise moments when Spanish

concern over this problem was triggered. These data can be seen in Graph 3. As is

evident, there are two points in time when it most notably intensifies. The first was

during the final months of 2012 and beginning of 2013, when corruption became the

second most important problem of public concern. The percentage of people who

indicated corruption as one of Spain’s primary three problems went from 10 to 40%. In

December 2012, the Noós case and the possible involvement of Princess Cristina in her

husband’s questionable business made headlines, and in January 2013, the focus was on

the Bárcenas case, when it was discovered that the Popular Party’s former treasurer had

millions in a Swiss bank account and that, as he would later admit, the ruling party had

kept parallel accounting records for years where illegal donations accumulated and in

which the allowances of the ruling party’s main leaders were noted. A year and a half

later, in the fall of 2014, a new wave of Spanish concern over corruption is noted, when

it surpassed levels of 60% to shortly thereafter fall back to 50%. In this case, this

increase coincides with a series of scandals that took place over just a couple of weeks:

the misuse of “black” credit cards by Bankia executives4; the “Operación Púnica,”

which led to the arrest of many local and regional Popular Party leaders, such as the

former third in command of the Autonomous Community of Madrid, Francisco

Granados, and a few members of the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party; and the

definitive charges filed against Princess Cristina in the Noós case, among many others.

And the decline in December 2014 coincides with several months during which no new

scandals surfaced in the nation. However, that decrease is relative, and concern amongst

Spaniards over corruption seems to have hover around 40%, a level that is still

considered quite high, and it continues to be the second most important problem after

unemployment.

4Afterbeing rescuedwithmore than23.5 thousandmillionEurosby theGovernment in2012, itwasknown that 83 directors of this saving bank were each issued with a “black” credit card, with thecollective bill reaching €15m over a 10-year period. Themoneywas spent on holidays and shoppingtrips,with€3mspentinrestaurants.https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/oct/09/former-caja-directors-accused-credit-card-misuse-bankia

Graph 3: Corruption as a public problem in Spain between October 2012 and January 2015

Source: CIS monthly barometers.

It does not appear that concern over corruption has developed strictly in tandem with the

negative assessment of the economic situation. Rather, we get the impression that the

influx of reports of corruption scandals during these “difficult times” is pushing more

and more people to see corruption as one of the most serious problems that Spanish

society is facing. As Palau and Davesa point out (2013: 118-119 and Graph 11), “the

media’s impact on citizens’ perception of corruption increases when more than 50% of

citizens consider the economic situation to be bad or very bad.” It seems that in a

context such as this, the surge in the media of corruption-related news at certain times

triggers citizen concern over corruption. This extraordinary increase in concern over

corruption might also have a very positive lesson as well. If this high level of concern

were maintained for a sufficient amount of time, political leaders would have enough

pressure placed on them to be motivated to introduce effective anti-corruption policies.

This matter is more fully addressed in the last section of the paper.

As we have observed, the data on the corruption perception indicates that Spain has one

of the European Union’s highest levels. Additionally, we have a degree of citizen

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concern regarding this phenomenon that we have never before seen since the question

on the public agenda has been included in surveys5. However, there is another aspect we

must add to these data to obtain a more accurate description of the issue of corruption in

Spain. That is the direct experience citizens have with the payment of bribes or, as it is

known in the literature that analyzes corruption, victimization surveys. The data on

victimization, which are particularly low, are in stark contrast to the high perception of

corruption. Spain’s levels are similar to those of Germany, Switzerland, Norway and

even Finland, according to the different waves of TI’s Global Corruption Barometer

(see Table 3). The data from the last special Eurobarometer 397 (2013) confirm this

exact impression. In response to the question “Do you know anyone who accepts

bribes?” the European Union average positive response was 12%, whereas in Spain it

was 11%. To the question “Has anyone tried to bribe you in the past 12 months?” the

average rate of positive responses in the EU was 4%, whereas in Spain it was 2%, with

sectors such as healthcare and police where the rate of positive responses was 0%.

Table 3: Direct experience with the payment of bribes in Spain

YEAR People who claim to have paid a bribe in order to access a public service in the past 12 months 2004 2% 2005 0% 2006 2% 2007 3% 2009 2%

2010-11 5% 2013 2% 2015 3%

Source: TI’s Global Corruption Barometer data

As is evident in Table 4, according to the 2013 special Eurobarometer data, Spain is the

country where the difference between personal experience with corruption, measured by

victimizations rates, and the perception thereof is greatest. If we compare these data

with those of Hungary, Poland, Romania or Italy, for example, we can see that the

victimization statistics are higher for those countries, while the perception of corruption

among citizens is lower than in Spain.

Table 4: Percentage of people who admit to having paid a bribe in the last 12 months in Spain and other countries in the European Union and correlation to corruption

perceptions

5 The statistics on the concern generated by corruption as one of the nation's three primary problems has always been low (generally around 3%), with the exception of the final years of Felipe González's administrations, when this rate peaked at 35.5% in February 1995, but it has never been at the levels that it has been at over the last two years and certainly never for such a consistent amount of time.

People who claim to have paid a bribe in order to access a public service in the past 12 months.

2013: GCB-TI/ EB 397

EB 2009/2011/2013. Agreement with "My country’s national institutions are corrupt."

Difference between victimization and perception (EB 397)

Austria (1) 9/5 66/85/73 73-5=68 Czech Republic 15/8 96/95/94 94-8=86 Denmark 1/1 35/25/38 38-1=37 Finland 1/1 68/50/51 51-1=50 France (1) 7/2 83/80/76 76-2=74 Germany (1) 2/1 80/70/74 74-1=73 Greece 22/7 98/99/97 97-7=90 Hungary 12/13 98/86/72 72-13=59 Netherlands (1) 2/2 56/39/57 57-2=55 Italy 5/2 89/95/93 93-2=91 Poland (1) 15/15 86/73/78 78-15=63 Portugal 3/1 91/91/86 86-1=85 Romania 17/25 87/89/82 82-25=57 U.K. 5/1 76/73/72 72-1=71 Spain 2/2 91/93/95 95-2=93 (1) The data from TI’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB-TI) for Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands and Poland are from the 2010-11 wave (no data available for 2013). Source: TI’s Global Corruption Barometer/2013 and Eurobarometers (EB) 325, 374 and 397.

If we went exclusively by the second set of data (general perception by citizens) Spain

would belong to a group of European countries that are at the head of this classification:

Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Portugal, Slovakia and

Hungary. However, if we focus on the data regarding direct experience with bribery,

Spain would belong to a set of countries including the U.K., Portugal, the Netherlands,

Germany, Finland and Denmark.

This scenario has been repeating itself since these opinion studies were begun to be

conducted. It suggests that countries like Spain and Portugal—but also some others such

as Austria, Ireland, or France—share a unique difficulty regarding the extent and

characteristics of corruption. Citizens of these countries perceive a high level of

corruption but, unlike countries that suffer from systematic corruption (many Eastern

European and Balkan countries, in addition to Greece, if we stay within the European

realm), direct experience with corruption when accessing certain public services is

practically non-existent. Therefore, we should search elsewhere for the reasons behind

why this problem is perceived to be so pervasive.

In the case of Spain, there are various factors that can explain the situation: a series of

corruption scandals that received wide coverage from the media and political

spokespeople and which tend to have a major impact on public opinion (see Palau and

Davesa, 2013); the spread of the perception of impunity and lack of punishment driven

by exasperatingly slow court cases (around ten years per average term in major

corruption cases); and the recurring use of reprieve for this type of crime (132 reprieves

for politicians accused of corruption between 2000 and 20126). Additionally, as Frank

Rusciano (2014) has demonstrated, there is a high degree of correlation between the

perception of corruption and worsening of the perception of how public services are

provided, something that is surely true in Spain as well. In addition to these factors we

have, in the background, a political culture characterized by democratic cynicism, which

fuels great suspicion of the main political figures’ motives and, during some periods of

economic crisis such as the one we are currently experiencing, a profound sense of

institutional dissatisfaction that only further increases the perception of corruption.

2. The crisis, corruption, and worsening of political dissatisfaction in Spain.

Indeed, there has always been a high but stable level of political dissatisfaction in Spain,

despite, to a great extent, successful consolidation of the democratic system. As in other

Southern European countries, like Italy, Portugal and Greece, Spain has maintained a

certain suspicion and distrust of democratic institutions and their main operators. This

phenomenon’s primary analysts have traditionally referred to this attitude’s cultural

component. It is likely due to a past political trauma that has been transmitted from

generation to generation through socialization (Torcal y Montero, 2000; Galais, 2012).

However, after the economic crisis erupted, the components of Spanish political

dissatisfaction underwent major changes. As far as the stability (at relatively high

levels) of these attitudes up until 2008 is concerned, since that time the levels of trust in

the nation’s primary democratic institutions has deteriorated significantly. That is to

say, one of the components of political dissatisfaction, institutional distrust, which

already began at a high level, has risen even further. As we can see in Graph 4, which is

based on European Social Survey (ESS) data, and in Table 5, with data from the

Eurobarometer, Spaniards have witnessed their trust in the mechanisms of political

representation fall steeply. While trust in state institutions like the police has been

maintained, trust in parliament, politicians and parties has declined far below the

average for ESS member countries. For example, trust in the main actors of political

representation (politicians and parties) has gone from a low level of 3.2 in 2008, which

6 Data reported by the Centro de Inteligencia contra el Crimen Organizado [Anti-Organized Crime Intelligence Center (CICO)] of the Ministry of the Interior's State Secretary for Security in November 2013.

was the same as the average for ESS member countries (3.3), to an extremely low 1.9 in

2012, far below the joint average maintained at 3.4.

Graph 4: Evolution of institutional trust in Spain 2002-2014

Source: European Social Survey 2002-2014

Table 5:Public trust in Europe

Countries National Parliament 2013

Change Trust Parliament since 2008

National Government 2013

Change Trust Government since 2008

Political Parties 2013

Change Trust Political Parties since 2008

Europe 29% -7% 29% -8% 19% -3%

Southern Europe 19% - 19% 19% -16% 14% -8%

Spain 7% -32% 8% -37% 5% -25%

Source: Public Integrity and trust in Europe. ERCAS, Hertie School of Governance. Data from Eurobarometer 70.1 (2008) & Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013) It is clear that this marked deterioration has coincided with the devastating effects of the

deep economic crisis to which different administrations have responded with austerity

measures that introduced major cutbacks in welfare policies. Mariano Torcal (2014) has

studied the factors that might explain this deterioration, so as to determine the relative

weight that the different variables might have had. His conclusions are convincing and

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merit significant attention. Torcal’s analyses recognize the importance that the cultural

factor continues to have while also discovering the major impact of contextual factors.

The most interesting aspect of his results is that the weight of factors that we might

consider more instrumental, such as personal damage caused by the crisis (loss of

employment, etc.) or the (poor) assessment of the overall economic situation (beyond

one’s personal situation) is either insignificant (personal situation) or the relative weight

(that of the sociotropic assessment of the difficult economic situation) is considerably

less than that of various other factors related to citizens’ assessment of how the political

system is functioning. More specifically, according to Torcal, the indicators that allow

us to assess how Spaniards judge the political system’s receptiveness to their demands

and interests has a much greater weight than the instrumental variables related to

damages caused by the economic crisis.

As Torcal said after comparing the situation of Spain or Portugal to that of other

neighboring countries where, despite the crisis, trust in the institutions did not suffer a

similar deterioration, the harshness of the economic recession has subjected our

democracies to a stress test. Some of them managed to survive that test well enough,

while others, like Spain, have witnessed a series of operational problems that have

negatively impacted citizens’ degree of satisfaction, as we can see in Graph 57.

Graph 5: Evolution of satisfaction with how democracy operates in Spain 1995-2012

7 It's a shame that the CIS has not asked this question again since November 2012. It would be interesting to know how this indicator has evolved since then.

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Some authors, such as Donatella della Porta (2000), have been noting for years that

corruption perceptions are essential when explaining the decline in citizen trust in

governments in general and in the political establishment in particular. Other authors

agree with this observation, especially when the media publish scandals (Hakhverdian

and Mayne, 2012; Uslaner, 2011; van der Meer y Dekker, 2011). And some have

indicated that these effects are even greater in certain contexts, such as an economic

crisis (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005).

Given this situation, as well as the growing perception of corruption in Spain (one that

was already high to begin with), we can expect that it would significantly contribute to

the major increase in political dissatisfaction in the country. Torcal (2014) used some

data from a panel survey conducted in Spain in February/March 2012 and

November/December 2012 to determine how corruption perceptions impact institutional

dissatisfaction. According to his analysis, corruption has a notable and major impact,

and it reduces the effect of the political system’s lack of receptiveness (which continues

to be significant and intense). This result leads him to conclude that:

The current economic crisis is not entirely responsible for the decline in institutional trust. Economic and social crises place democratic institutions under pressure because scarcity creates more social conflicts. It is presumed that democratic institutions respond to such conflicts in a fair and inclusive manner. However, according to citizen perceptions, this has not been the case in Spain and Portugal, and this is why trust in these institutions has suffered greatly. This process has been exacerbated by the overall perception of corruption (Torcal, 2014: 1561).

This conclusion teaches Torcal (2014: 1561) an important practical lesson that many

political leaders have preferred to ignore over the last few years:

Economic recovery in the next several years will not restore acceptable levels of institutional trust on its own; rather, it must be accompanied by a series of institutional reforms and measures aimed at substantially reducing political corruption.

Therefore, in general, the crisis of 2008 has tested the very functioning of the Spanish

political system, but this process has not only affected the nation’s primary institutions

(especially those tied to political representation relations) but it has also had a profound

effect on Spaniards’ attitudes toward politics. Political dissatisfaction not only includes

institutional dissatisfaction; it also has a second component that Torcal and Montero

(2006) already pointed out. This is what they called “political detachment,” that is, an

attitude that implies a lack of interest in and commitment to public affairs and political

activity in general.

These authors maintain that political dissatisfaction in Spain was traditionally

characterized by high levels of both components: extreme distrust of political

representation institutions and their primary figures while, at the same time, a low level

of personal political involvement among citizens that approach this activity from a great

distance and with a high degree of distrust. Interest in politics, trust in oneself as a

political actor, and participation in political activities beyond voting have all been

particularly low in Spain, as compared to its neighboring countries.

However, what began happening with the 2008 crisis seems to have mobilized citizens

in a major way, particularly those whose political activity was considered especially

apathetic. These changes will be analyzed in the next section.

3. From indignation to activation: the mobilizing effects of the political crisis.

In his book Power and Discontent (1968), William Gamson pointed out that the

rejection of the most traditional representation institutions could lead to the mobilization

of dissatisfied individuals, which could, in turn, cause them to develop a greater interest

in politics. Based on the (scarce) data available on political detachment after 2008, it

would seem that we are witnessing this mobilization phenomenon in Spain.

Once again, it was Mariano Torcal (2016) who took note of the European Social Survey

data on these political mobilization indicators. To begin with, participation in protests,

which was already quite high in Spain, has increased significantly. Thus, petition-

signing has gone from 17% in 2008, somewhat above the European average but far

from that of Spain’s neighbors to the north, to 33.2% in 2012, the highest in all of

Europe. As for participation in demonstrations, Spain started in 2008 at 15.9%, the

highest in Europe; this rate has only continued to climb to 25.8% in 2012, which is

considerably above the European average (6.7%). In terms of participation in political

parties, the rate in Spain was one of the lowest in 2006, but by 2014 it had risen to

8.4%. This statistic is very close to what we see in countries with the highest rates, and

it is quite above the ESS average (4.5%).

Dissatisfaction with how democratic institutions operate and the notable increase in

political participation have both been accompanied by what appears to be a substantial

change in one of the key indicators for political detachment: interest in politics. As we

can see in Graph 6, the percentage of people who state that they are extremely or

somewhat interested in politics—which traditionally has been quite low and stable

(26.3% in 2008)—by 2014 had risen significantly (41%), although we are still quite far

from the rates and northern countries such as Denmark (which surpass two thirds of the

population).

Graph 6: How interest in politics has evolved in Spain 2002-2014

Source: European Social Survey

Indeed, both components of political dissatisfaction, institutional distrust and political

detachment, needn’t always go hand in hand, as Gamson (1968) already noted.

However, in the case of Spain, both dimensions have always been closely connected

throughout the entire democracy, up until the last several years. It would seem that the

2008 crisis had the precise mobilizing effect that Gamson anticipated. As Torcal says

(2016), the crisis—or, better yet, the evaluation that many Spanish citizens have

conducted regarding how our political system has responded to the crisis—has led to a

significant increase in institutional detachment while at the same time awakening an

interest in politics amongst the citizenry.

In effect, both Spain as well as several other countries like Portugal, Greece and Cyprus

(and, to a lesser extent, Ireland and Iceland), seem to be undergoing a process of change

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that is turning traditionally apathetic citizens into “critical citizens” (Norris, 1999), who

appear more like those of Northern European democracies. As Torcal states (2016), this

transformation implies that economic recovery alone will not solve the problem and that

“significant changes and actions are needed to enhance the credibility of institutions and

political representatives in the eyes of citizens” (p. 20).

Yet another important indicator of this transformation is the changes occurring in

Spaniards’ voting behavior. Since the European election of 2014, the electoral fate of

newly born parties such as Podemos or Ciudadanos, has been in the increase as it can be

seen in Graph 7. Although the traditional major parties, PP and PSOE recovered a

greater share of the vote in the recent general election of 26 June 2016, the new parties

seem to have consolidated their social support.

Graph 7: Evolution of electoral results 2008-2016

Source: Ministry of the Interior. The new parties include Union Progress and Democracy (UPyD) in 2008 and 2011, and UPyD, Podemos and Citizens, in the European elections of 2014; the latter two did not participate in the previous two elections.

It gives the impression that a good many people who have felt let down by the response

of the primary democratic institutions to the crisis have decided to place their bets on

options that are more openly reform-minded. A significant number of these “critical

citizens” that the crisis of 2008 created seem to be going from indignation to

mobilization. As Torcal (2014 and 2016) concluded, at this stage it would be pointless

to hope that mere economic recovery would be enough to reduce the profound sense of

political dissatisfaction generated by the combined effect of the unsatisfactory political

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response to the crisis and the visibility given to the reprehensible behavior of more than

a few Spanish political representatives. Substantial reforms are needed, ones that on the

one hand improve the political system’s responsiveness to citizens demands and

interests while on the other take a hard stance against corruption. The last section

suggests some guidelines for how to approach this second objective.

4. Reducing dissatisfaction while waging war on corruption

Thanks to the recent work of institutions such as the University of Gothenburg’s Quality

of Government Institute and the European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and

State-Building (ERCAS), we now know that they key element present in societies where

corruption is under control is, precisely, the emergence at a certain moment in their

historical evolution of institutions that effectively limit executive power, such as

parliaments, the media, courts, etc. What’s important is not that these institutions exist

but that they are sufficiently effective at limiting and controlling the role of government.

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) distinguishes two types of restrictions. On the one hand,

we have the dissuasive legal measures administered by the State as a responsible and

effective autonomous judicial power that is capable of enforcing legislation, as well as a

body of effective, comprehensive laws that deal with conflicts of interest and the

application of a clear separation of public and private spheres. On the other hand, we

have what she calls normative dissuasive measures that include both the existence of

social norms that promote public integrity and government impartiality as well as

monitoring of deviations from these norms through the active and effective role of

public opinion, the media, civil society and a critical electorate.

Thus, if the aim is to reduce the probability of corruption while improving how our

governmental institutions operate by strengthening their representativeness so as to

develop a more balanced design that enables public policies that are not only more

effective but also fairer and generate greater citizen trust in the political system, it will

be necessary to implement reforms that effectively limit the power of governments.

In a country such as Spain, where the vast majority of citizens see those involved in

corruption as immune to the law (Table 6) and where they maintain that public

institutions are not sufficiently impartial (Table 7), the objectives for the war on

corruption ought to be clear. The first would be to promote the impartiality of public

institutions, in order to hinder or prevent the temptation to appropriate them for

clientelist use. The second would be to boost society’s trust in public institutions as the

first step toward increasing mutual trust among citizens. To that end, it is imperative

that these institutions be reliable and predictable and, therefore, that they do not make

decisions exclusively at the whim of the short-term conveniences of those who lead

them.

Table 6: Effectiveness in combating corruption

Question: Corruption is not punished in Spain % of respondents Sum

Totally agree 37% 78%

Agree 41%

Disagree 18% 22%

Totally disagree 4%

Don’t know 0%

Don’t answer 0%

Source: MINECO survey December 2015

Table 7: Perception of fairness in public service delivery

Question: Some people are treated favorably by the government % of respondents Sum

Totally agree 37% 90%

Agree 53%

Disagree 8% 9%

Totally disagree 1%

Don’t know 1%

Don’t answer 0%

Source: Source: MINECO survey December 2015

Lastly, we mustn’t lose sight of a matter that we tend to forget when talking about the

war on corruption: inequality. The data on inequality in Spain are worrisome and there

are no effective policies to stop the Gini’s coefficient growth (see Table 8). Certainly, it

is no coincidence that societies with lower levels of corruption also exhibit higher levels

of social equality. A society that does not share the objective of fighting inequality will

not be in the best shape to foster the sense of community, public spirit, and individual

responsibility that are all needed to contain corruption. Fighting inequality must be in

the anti-corruption agenda too.

Table 8: Gini Coefficient in Spain (base 2013)

Year 2004 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015

Gini 31.0 32.4 32.9 33.5 34.0 34.2 34.7 34.6 Source: National Institute of Statistics.

Based on our own survey (MINECO) and the results of the “integrity index” of ERCAS

(2015) (see Table 9) a two-pronged strategy is needed. We should have the objective of

reducing the perception of impunity by promoting effective control of executive power

(at its various local, regional and national levels). To do so, it will be necessary to

strengthen the role of the justice system in controlling political power. In that regard

there is much work to be done: ensuring the independence/impartiality of the courts (see

Table 10), district attorney’s office and judicial police; and boosting their ability to take

action by granting them more resources, completely reforming the antiquated criminal

proceedings system, extending the statute of limitations for corruption-related crimes,

increasing penalties, etc. Beyond the justice system, all other mechanisms for

controlling the political system would have to be bolstered, as well, namely: counter-

majoritarian monitoring organisms (such as the Council on Transparency and Good

Governance, the Ombudsman, the Court of Audit, the General Council on Judicial

Power...), the media (depoliticization of public media and the reduction of political

dependence on private media through authorizations and subsidies), and the expansion

of citizen oversight bodies aimed at increasing responsibility among citizens themselves

for fighting corruption.

Table 9: ERCAS Integrity Index

Administrative Simplicity

Trade Openness

Auditing Standards

Judicial Independence

E-Gov. Services

E-Gov. Users

Europe 6.33 5.86 5.90 5.00 5.76 5.45 Spain 3.43 7.06 2.97 2.13 9.35 5.63

Source: ERCAS Report, 2016. The range of ERCAS Integrity Index goes from a minimum of 1 to a maximum value of 10.

Table 10: Fairness of the judicial system

Question: The judicial system prosecutes and punishes fairly % of respondents Sum

Totally agree 3%

29% Agree 26% Disagree 45%

71% Totally disagree 26% Don’t know 0% Don’t answer 0% Source: MINECO survey December 2015

Then, we also have the strategy’s second element, which consists of reducing

opportunities for corruption. We have noted elsewhere (Jiménez, 2014) that public

institutions too easily serve private interests (see Table 11), which often depart

drastically from general interest: public workers are promoted without regard for the

principles of merit and capacity, and they are subjected, above all else, including their

professional interests, to a sort of blind loyalty toward those who secured them their

position; public contracts are awarded too often not to whomever submits the offer best

suited to the Administration’s interests but, rather, to whomever commits to diverting

part of the public resources obtained to other purposes (government party funding, etc.),

even if this requires modifying the contract amount, which ultimately jacks up its final

price; subsidies or licenses are frequently granted not to whomever rightfully deserves

them—rather, they are granted based on the short-term and clientelist interests of the

entity awarding said subsidy or license; etc.

Table 11: Perception of fairness in policymaking

Q8 Wealthy individuals often use their influence on government for their own interests and there should be stricter rules to prevent this.

% of respondents

1 - Completely disagree 3% 2 1% 3 1% 4 1% 5 4% 6 3% 7 6% 8 15% 9 11% 10 - Completely agree 56%

Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2015/6. Average: 8.7

The main objective is to put a stop to the political colonization of public

administrations. To do so, it will be essential to strengthen and encourage impartiality

among officials and promote blowing the whistle early on potential irregularities by

protecting complainants and creating safe and effective channels for filing complaints,

while at the same time better defining professional careers and ensuring that their merit

remains intact. Additionally, prevention programs tailored to each public entity must be

developed for proper management of conflicts of interest. These programs would need

to guarantee that these entities operate with the utmost integrity.

Evidently, the practical problem consists of knowing how to get this kind of “executive

power institutional limitations” off the ground, when the current situation is one where

clientelist networks reign supreme, government institutions are only partially functional,

and there is a sense of mistrust of others (see Table 12) and of public institutions.

Without a doubt, the crisis we are still experiencing and, above all, the levels that

concern over corruption has reached in Spain, have opened a window of opportunity to

carry out the necessary reforms. But if anti-corruption measures do not truly guarantee

an effective strategy for limiting government power, we run the risk of ending up with a

sort of Lampedusian politics where we only pretend to seek reform, and the

consequences of this will be devastating. If we merely reduced the lack of citizen trust

in politics and politicians by faking some changes but everything, ultimately, remains

the same, the danger is that we end up once again like the Italians, that is to say, with a

boomerang effect that would end up triggering even greater levels of distrust.

Table 12: Trust in others

In general, would you say that we can trust most people or we are never cautious enough when dealing with others?

% of respondents

0 – We can trust 6% 1 1% 2 3% 3 4% 4 6% 5 22% 6 13% 7 21% 8 14% 9 3%

10 – Never too cautious 5% Source: MINECO survey December 2015. Average: 5.7

Indeed, the key to anti-corruption reforms involves making it impossible for those at the

helm of public administrations to use their funds to create or feed clientelist social or

financial support networks. The idea is to prevent people in this position from having

the possibility of falling victim to such a strong temptation. Just like Ulysses did to

prevent the sirens’ song from crashing his ship against the cliffs, good anti-corruption

reforms ought to force political authorities to tie themselves to the mast to prevent

themselves from making clientelist use of public resources. But we must remember that

the effective implementation of the institutional reforms must be accompanied by

citizen attitudes that, overall, clearly promote public integrity and demand impartiality

from government institutions. Political authorities will have incentives to introduce

controls if they face the risk of losing the elections if they do not do that. As we

mentioned before, there are ongoing changes in the social reaction against corruption in

Spain but there is still a certain level of fatalism that is necessary to modify (see Figure

1).

Figure 1: The most effective thing an ordinary person can do to fight corruption

Source. Global Corruption Barometer 2015/6

Last June the incumbent party in Government (PP) won the elections again (137 seats)

although did not achieve a majority (176 seats) in Parliament. This happened even if

there have been almost every month a corruption scandal linked to PP members in the

last four years. Spaniards know that President Rajoy is the leader of a corrupt party (see

Figure 2) but almost a third of the voters supported him. Will PP leaders continue with

the implementation of the anti-corruption reforms launched the last four years? Will

they continue with the enactment of new much needed reforms? If they think that voters

14% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 3% 4%

17% 32%

21%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other Boycott a business

Sign a petition asking for a stronger fight Talk to friends and relatives about the

Join or support an organization that is fighting Speak out about the problem, for example, by

Participate in protest marches or Refuse to pay bribes

Vote for clean candidates or parties or for Report corruption when you see or

Nothing / Ordinary people cannot do anything

Base. All respondents

do not request it they will have strong incentives to continue the old bad way.

Fortunately they need the support of other parties to form the government. We hope that

coalition agreements will sustain and strengthen the anti-corruption reforms. But

without a greater degree of citizen commitment, no institutional reform could

effectively succeed in the long term.

Figure 2: Perception of corruption, by institution - proportion that think most or all are corrupt

Source. Global Corruption Barometer 2015/6

6%

11%

15%

16%

26%

29%

31%

37%

55%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Police

Judges and Magistrates

Tax officials

Government officials

Religious leaders

Local government councilors

Business executives

Members of Parliament

The Office of the President/ Prime Minister

Base. All respondents

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