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Battle of YarmoukPart of the Muslim conquest of Syria

(Arab–Byzantine Wars)

Across the ravines lies the battlefield of Yarmouk, thispicture taken about 8 miles away, from Jordan.

Date 15–20 August 636

Location Near the Yarmouk River32.81411°N 35.95482°E

Result Decisive Rashidun victory

Territorialchanges

Levant annexed by RashidunCaliphate

Belligerents Byzantine Empire,

Ghassanid Kingdom Rashidun Caliphate

Commanders and leadersHeraclius† Theodore Trithyrius[1]

† Vahang[›]

Jabalah ibn al-Aiham† DairjanBuccinator (Qanateer)Gregory[2]

ʿUmar ibn al-Khattāb

Khalid ibn al-Walid Abu Ubaidah ibn al-

Jarrah Amr ibn al-A'as Kahula bint Azwar Shurahbil ibn

Hassana Yazid ibn Abu

Sufyan

Strength100,000(modern estimates)a[›]

15,000–40,000(modern estimates)d[›]

Battle of YarmoukFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Battle of Yarmouk (Arabic: ا�����ك �����,also spelled Yarmuk, Yarmuq or, in Greek,Hieromyax, Ἱερομύαξ, or Iermouchas, Ιερμουχάς)was a major battle between the Arab forces of theRashidun Caliphate and the armies of the EasternRoman-Byzantine Empire. The battle consisted of aseries of engagements that lasted for six days inAugust 636, near the Yarmouk River, along what istoday the border between Syria and Jordan, south-east of the Sea of Galilee. The result of the battle wasa complete Muslim victory which ended Byzantinerule in Syria. The Battle of Yarmouk is regarded asone of the most decisive battles in militaryhistory,[5][6] and it marked the first great wave ofIslamic conquests after the death of prophetMuhammad, heralding the rapid advance of Islaminto the then Christian Levant.

In order to check the Arab advance and to recoverlost territory, Emperor Heraclius had sent a massiveexpedition to the Levant in May 636. As theByzantine army approached, the Arabs retreatedfrom Syria and regrouped all their forces at theYarmouk plains close to Arabia where, after beingreinforced, they defeated the numerically superiorByzantine army. The battle is also considered to beone of Khalid ibn al-Walid's greatest militaryvictories. It cemented his reputation as one of thegreatest tacticians and cavalry commanders inhistory.[7]

Contents1 Prelude2 Byzantine counterattack3 Muslim strategy4 Battlefield5 Troop deployment

5.1 The Rashidun army5.1.1 Weaponry

5.2 The Byzantine army5.2.1 Weaponry

6 Tensions in the Byzantine army7 Battle

7.1 Day 17.2 Day 2

Coordinates: 32.81411°N 35.95482°E

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100,000–400,000(primary sources)b[›]c[›]

24,000–40,000(primary sources)e[›]

Casualties and losses45% or 50,000+ killed(modern estimates)[3][4]

70,000–120,000 killed(primary sources)f[›]

4,000 killed[3]

7.3 Day 37.4 Day 47.5 Day 57.6 Day 6

8 Aftermath9 Evaluation10 References11 Notes12 Bibliography

12.1 Primary sources12.2 Secondary sources

13 External links

PreludeFurther information: Rashidun Invasion of Levant (634) and Byzantine–Sassanid War of 602–628

During the last Byzantine–Sassanid Wars in 610, Heraclius became the emperor of the ByzantineEmpire,[8] after overthrowing Phocas. Meanwhile the Sassanid Persians conquered Mesopotamia and in611 they overran Syria and entered Anatolia, occupying Caesarea Mazaca. Heraclius, in 612, managed toexpel the Persians from Anatolia, but was decisively defeated in 613 when he launched a major offensivein Syria against the Persians.[9] Over the following decade the Persians were able to conquer Palestine andEgypt. Meanwhile Heraclius prepared for a counterattack and rebuilt his army. Nine years later in 622,Heraclius finally launched his offensive.[10] After his overwhelming victories over the Persians and theirallies in the Caucasus and Armenia, Heraclius, in 627, launched a winter offensive against the Persians inMesopotamia winning a decisive victory at the Battle of Nineveh thus threatening the Persian capital cityof Ctesiphon. Discredited by these series of disasters, Khosrau II was overthrown and killed in a coup ledby his son Kavadh II,[11] who at once sued for peace, agreeing to withdraw from all occupied territories ofthe Byzantine Empire. Heraclius restored the True Cross to Jerusalem with a majestic ceremony in 629.[12]

Meanwhile there had been rapid political development in Arabia, where Prophet Mohammad had beenpreaching Islam and by 630, he had successfully united most of the Arabia under a single politicalauthority. When the Prophet died in June 632, Abu Bakr was elected Caliph and his political successor.Troubles emerged soon after Abu Bakr's succession, when several Arab tribes openly revolted againstAbu Bakr, who declared war against the rebels. In what became known as the Ridda wars (Arabic for theWars of Apostasy, 632–33), Abu Bakr managed to unite Arabia under the central authority of the Caliphat Medina.[13]

Once the rebels had been subdued, Abu Bakr began a war of conquest, beginning with Iraq. Sending hismost brilliant general, Khalid ibn al-Walid, Iraq was conquered in a series of successful campaigns againstthe Sassanid Persians. Abu Bakr's confidence grew, and once Khalid established his stronghold in Iraq,Abu Bakr issued a call to arms for the invasion of Syria in February 634.[14] The Muslim invasion of Syriawas a series of carefully planned and well coordinated military operations that employed strategy instead ofpure strength to deal with Byzantine defensive measures.[15] The Muslim armies, however soon proved tobe too small to handle the Byzantine response, and their commanders called for reinforcements. Khalidwas sent by Abu Bakr from Iraq to Syria with reinforcements and to lead the invasion. In July 634, theByzantines were decisively defeated at Ajnadayn. Damascus fell in September 634, followed by the Battleof Fahl where the last significant garrison of Palestine was defeated and routed.[16]

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Map detailing the Rashidun Caliphate'sinvasion of the Levant.

Muslim and Byzantine Troop Movementsbefore the battle of Yarmouk.

Caliph Abu Bakr died in 634. His successor, Umar, was determined to continue the Caliphate Empire'sexpansion deeper into Syria.[17] Though previous campaigns led by Khalid were successful, he wasreplaced by Abu Ubaidah. Having secured southern Palestine, Muslim forces now advanced up the traderoute where Tiberias and Baalbek fell without much struggle and the Muslims conquered Emesa early in636. From thereon, the Muslims continued their conquest across the Levant.[18]

Byzantine counterattackHaving seized Emesa, the Muslims were just a march away from Aleppo, a Byzantine stronghold, andAntioch, where Heraclius resided. Seriously alarmed by the series of setbacks, Heraclius prepared for acounterattack to reacquire the lost regions.[19][20] In 635Yazdegerd III, the Emperor of Persia, sought an alliance with theByzantine Emperor. Heraclius married off his daughter(according to traditions, his grand daughter) Manyanh toYazdegerd III, an old Roman tradition to cement the alliance.While Heraclius prepared for a major offensive in the Levant,Yazdegerd was to mount a simultaneous counterattack in Iraq, inwhat was meant to be a well-coordinated effort. When Heracliuslaunched his offensive in May 636, Yazdegerd could notcoordinate with the maneuver—probably owing to the exhaustedcondition of his government—and what would have been adecisive plan missed the mark.[21] Umar won a decisive victoryagainst Heraclius at Yarmouk, and used greatstrategy[citation needed] to engage and entrapYazdegerd[citation needed]. Three months later Yazdegerd lost hisimperial army at the Battle of Qadisiyah in November 636,ending Sassanid control west of Persia.

Byzantine preparations began in late 635 and by May 636Heraclius had a large force concentrated at Antioch in NorthernSyria.[22] The assembled army consisted of contingents ofByzantines, Slavs, Franks, Georgians, Armenians andChristian Arabs.[23] This force was organized into five armies,the joint leader of which was Theodore Trithourios theSakellarios. Vahan, an Armenian and the former garrisoncommander of Emesa,[24] was made the overall fieldcommander,[25] and had under his command a purelyArmenian army. Buccinator (Qanateer), a Slavic prince,commanded the Slavs and Jabalah ibn al-Aiham, king of theGhassanid Arabs, commanded an exclusively Christian Arabforce. The remaining contingents, all European, were placedunder Gregory and Dairjan.[26][27] Heraclius himselfsupervised the operation from Antioch. Byzantine sourcesmention Niketas, son of the Persian general Shahrbaraz, amongthe commanders, but it is not certain which army hecommanded.[28]

At that time, the Rashidun army was split into four groups: oneunder Amr in Palestine, one under Shurahbil in Jordan, one

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under Yazid in the Damascus-Caesarea region and the last one under Abu Ubaidah along with Khalid atEmesa. As the Muslim forces were geographically divided, Heraclius sought to exploit this situation andplanned to attack. He did not wish to engage in a single pitched battle but rather to employ central positionand fight the enemy in detail by concentrating large forces against each of the Muslim corps before theycould consolidate their troops. By forcing the Muslims to retreat, or by destroying Muslim forcesseparately, he would fulfill his strategy of recapturing lost territory. Reinforcements were sent to Caesareaunder Heraclius' son Constantine III probably to tie down Yazid's forces which were besieging thetown.[26] The Byzantine imperial army moved out from Antioch and Northern Syria sometime in themiddle of June 636.

The Byzantine imperial army was to operate under the following plan:

Jabalah's lightly armed Christian Arabs would march to Emesa from Aleppo via Hama and hold themain Muslim army at Emesa.Dairjan would make a flanking movement – moving between the coast and Aleppo's road – andapproach Emesa from the west, striking at the Muslims' left flank while they were being heldfrontally by Jabalah.Gregory would strike the Muslims' right flank, approaching Emesa from the northeast viaMesopotamia.Qanateer would march along the coastal route and occupy Beirut, from where he was to attackweakly defended Damascus from the west to cut off the main Muslim army at Emesa.Vahan's corps would act as a reserve and would approach Emesa via Hama.[29]

Muslim strategyThe Muslims discovered Heraclius' preparations at Shaizar through Roman prisoners. Alert to thepossibility of being caught with separated forces that could be destroyed, Khalid called for a council ofwar. There he advised Abu Ubaidah to pull the troops back from Palestine and from Northern and CentralSyria, and then to concentrate the entire Rashidun army in one place.[30][31] Abu Ubaidah ordered theconcentration of troops in the vast plain near Jabiya, as control of the area made cavalry charges possibleand facilitated the arrival of reinforcements from Umar so that a strong, united force could be fieldedagainst the Byzantine armies.[32] The position also benefited from close proximity to the Rashidunstronghold of Najd, in case of retreat. Instructions were also issued to return the jizya (tribute) to the peoplewho had paid it.[33] However, once concentrated at Jabiya, the Muslims were subject to raids from pro-Byzantine Ghassanid forces. Encamping in the region was also precarious as a strong Byzantine force wasgarrisoned in Caeseara and could attack the Muslim rear while they were held in front by the Byzantinearmy. On Khalid's advice the Muslim forces retreated to Dara’ah (or Dara) and Dayr Ayyub, covering thegap between the Yarmouk Gorges and the Harra lava plains,[30] and established a line of camps in theeastern part of the plain of Yarmouk. This was a strong defensive position and these maneuvers pitted theMuslims and Byzantines into a decisive battle, one which the latter had tried to avoid.[34] During thesemaneuvers, there were no engagements save for a minor skirmish between Khalid's elite light cavalry andthe Byzantine advance guard.[35]

BattlefieldThe battlefield lies about 65 kilometres (40 mi) south-east of the Golan Heights, an upland region currentlyon the frontier between Israel, Jordan and Syria, east of the Sea of Galilee. The battle was fought on theplain of Yarmouk, which was enclosed on its western edges by a deep ravine known as Wadi-ur-Raqad,around 200 m (660 ft) deep. This ravine joins the Yarmouk River, a tributary of the Jordan River, on itssouth. The stream had very steep banks, ranging from 30 m (98 ft)–200 m (660 ft) in height. On the north

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Map detailing the location of the areawhere the battle took place.

is the Jabiya road and to the east are the Azra hills, although these hills were outside the actual field ofbattle. Strategically there was only one prominence in the battlefield: a 100 m (330 ft) elevation known asTel al Jumm'a (Arabic for hill of gathering), and for the Muslim troops concentrated there, the hill gave agood view of the plain of Yarmouk. The ravine on the west of the battlefield was accessible at a fewplaces in 636 AD, and had one main crossing: a bridge nearthe present-day village of Kafir-ul-Ma.[36] Logistically, theYarmouk plain had enough water supplies and pastures tosustain both armies. The plain was excellent for cavalrymaneuvers.[37][38]

Troop deploymentMost early Muslim accounts place the size of the Muslimforces between 24,000 and 40,000 and the number ofByzantine forces between 100,000 and 400,000. Modernestimates of the sizes of the respective armies vary: estimatesfor the Byzantine army are mostly between 80,000 and 150,000, with some estimates as low as 50,000 and15,000–20,000.[39] Estimates for the Rashidun army are between 25,000 and 40,000. These figures comefrom studying the logistical capabilities of the combatants, the sustainability of their respective bases ofoperations, and the overall manpower constraints affecting the Romans and Arabs. Most scholars,however, agree that the Byzantine army and their allies outnumbered the Muslim Arabs by a sizeablemargin.m[›]

The Rashidun army

During a council of war, the command of the Muslim army was transferred to Khalidi[›] by Abu Ubaidah,Commander in Chief of the Muslim army.[40] After taking command, Khalid reorganized the army into 36infantry regiments and four cavalry regiments, with his cavalry elite, the mobile guard, held in reserve. Thearmy was organized in the Tabi'a formation; a tight, defensive infantry formation.[41] The army was linedup on a front of 12 kilometres (7.5 mi), facing west, with its left flank lying south on the Yarmouk River amile before the ravines of Wadi al Allan began. The army's right flank was on the Jabiya road in the northacross the heights of Tel al Jumm'a,[42] with substantial gaps between the divisions so that their frontagewould match that of the Byzantine battle line at 13 kilometres (8.1 mi). The center of the army was underthe command of Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah (left center) and Shurahbil bin Hasana (right center). The leftwing was under the command of Yazid and the right wing was under Amr ibn al-A'as.[40] Center, left andright wings were given cavalry regiments, to be used as a reserve for counter-attack in case they werepushed back by the Byzantines. Behind the center stood the mobile guard under the personal command ofKhalid. If and when Khalid was too occupied in leading the general army, Dharar ibn al-Azwar wouldcommand the mobile guard. Over the course of the battle, Khalid would repeatedly make critical anddecisive use of this mounted reserve.[40] Khalid sent out several scouts to keep the Byzantines underobservation.[43] In late July 636, Vahan sent Jabalah with his lightly armored Christian Arab forces toreconnoiter-in-force, but they were repulsed by the mobile guard. After this skirmish, no engagementoccurred for a month.[44]

Weaponry

Helmets used included gilded helmets similar to the silver helmets of the Sassanid empire. Mail wascommonly used to protect the face, neck and cheeks either as an aventail from the helmet or as a mail coif.

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Heavy leather sandals as well as Roman-type sandal boots were also typical of the early Muslimsoldiers.[45] Armor included hardened leather scale or lamellar armor and mail armor. Infantry soldierswere more heavily armored than horsemen. Large wooden or wickerwork shields were used. Long-shaftedspears were used, with infantry spears being 2.5 m (8.2 ft) long and cavalry spears being up to 5.5 m(18 ft) long. Short infantry swords like the Roman gladius and Sassanid long swords were used; longswords were usually carried by horsemen. Swords were hung in baldrics. Bows were about 2 metres(6.6 ft) long when unbraced, similar in size to the famous English longbow. The maximum useful range ofthe traditional Arabian bow was about 150 m (490 ft). Early Muslim archers, while being infantry archerswithout the mobility of horseback archer regiments, proved to be very effective in defending against lightand unarmored cavalry attacks.[46]

The Byzantine army

A few days after the Muslims encamped at the Yarmouk plain, the Byzantine army, preceded by thelightly armed Ghassanids of Jabalah, moved forward and established strongly fortified camps just north ofthe Wadi-ar-Raqqad.[47]j[›] The right flank of the Byzantine army was at the south end of the plains, nearthe Yarmouk River and about a mile before the ravines of Wadi al Allan began. The left flank of theByzantines was at the north, a short distance before the Hills of Jabiya began, and was relatively exposed.Vahan deployed the Imperial Army facing east, with a front about 13 kilometres (8.1 mi) long,[48] as hewas trying to cover the whole area between the Yarmouk gorge in the south and the Roman road to Egyptin the north, and substantial gaps had been left between the Byzantine divisions. The right wing wascommanded by Gregory and the left by Qanateer. The center was formed by the army of Dairjan and theArmenian army of Vahan, both under the overall command of Dairjan. The Roman regular heavy cavalry,the cataphract, was distributed equally among the four armies, each army deploying its infantry at theforefront and its cavalry as a reserve in the rear. Vahan deployed Jabalah's Christian Arabs, mounted onhorses and camels, as a skirmishing force, screening the main army until its arrival.[49] Early Muslimsources mention that the army of Gregory had used chains to link together its foot-soldiers, who had alltaken an oath of death. The chains were in 10-man lengths and were used as a proof of unshakeablecourage on the part of the men, who thus displayed their willingness to die where they stood and neverretreat. The chains also acted as an insurance against a breakthrough by enemy cavalry. However, modernhistorians suggest that the Byzantines adopted the Graeco-Roman testudo military formation, in whichsoldiers would stand shoulder-to-shoulder with shields held high and an arrangement of 10 to 20 menwould be completely shielded on all sides from missile fire, each soldier providing cover for an adjoiningcompanion.[48]

Weaponry

The Byzantine cavalry was armed with a long sword, known as the spathion. They would also have had alight wooden lance, known as a kontarion and a bow (toxarion) with forty arrows in a quiver, hung from asaddle or from the belt.[50] Heavy infantry, known as skoutatoi, had a short sword and a short spear. Thelightly armed Byzantine troops and the archers carried a small shield, a bow hung from the shoulder acrossthe back and a quiver of arrows. Cavalry armor consisted of a hauberk with a mail coif and a helmet with apendant, i.e. a throat-guard lined with fabric and having a fringe and cheek piece. Infantry was similarlyequipped with a hauberk, a helmet and leg armor. Light lamellar and scale armor was also used.[51]

Tensions in the Byzantine armyKhalid's strategy of withdrawing from the occupied areas and concentrating all of his troops for a decisivebattle forced the Byzantines to concentrate their five armies in response. The Byzantines had for centuries

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Troop deployment. Muslim army

Byzantine army

avoided engaging in large-scale decisive battles, and the concentration of their forces created logisticalstrains for which the empire was ill-prepared.[34][52] Damascus was the closest logistical base, but Mansur,leader of Damascus, could not fully supply the massive Byzantine army that was gathered at the Yarmoukplain. Several clashes were reported with local citizens over supply requisition, as summer was at an endand there was a decline of pasturage. Greek court sources accused Vahan of treason for his disobedienceto Heraclius' command not to engage in large-scale battle with Arabs. Given the massing of the Muslimarmies at Yarmouk, however, Vahan had little choice but to respond in kind. Relations between thevarious Byzantine commanders were also fraught with tension. There was a struggle for power betweenTrithurios and Vahan, Jarajis, and Qanateer (Buccinator).[53] Jabalah, the Christian Arab leader, waslargely ignored, to the detriment of the Byzantines given his knowledge of the local terrain. An atmosphereof mistrust thus existed between the Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs. Longstanding ecclesiastical feudsbetween the Monophysite and Chalcedonian factions, while of negligible direct impact, certainly inflamedunderlying tensions. The effect of these feuds was decreased coordination and planning, one of the reasonsfor the catastrophic Byzantine defeat.[54]

BattleFor a good understanding of the description of the battle, it is useful to be acquainted with the divisions ofopposing forces. The battle lines of the Muslims and the Byzantines were divided into four sections: theleft wing, the left center, the right center and the right wing. Note that the descriptions of the Muslim andthe Byzantine battle lines are exactly each other's opposite, i.e.: so the Muslim right wing faced theByzantine left wing (see imagen[›]).

Vahan was instructed by Heraclius not to engage in battle until allavenues of diplomacy had been explored.[55] This was probablybecause Yazdegerd III's forces were not yet ready for theoffensive in Iraq. Accordingly, Vahan sent Gregory and thenJabalah to negotiate, though their efforts proved futile. Before thebattle, on Vahan's invitation, Khalid came to negotiate peace, to asimilar end. These negotiations delayed the battles for a month.[48]

On the other hand, Caliph Umar, whose forces at Qadisiyah werethreatened with confronting the Sassanid armies, ordered Sa`d ibnAbi Waqqas to enter into negotiations with the Persians and sendemissaries to Yazdegerd III and his commander RostamFarrokhzād, apparently inviting them to Islam. This was mostprobably the delaying tactic employed by Umar on the Persianfront.[56] Meanwhile he sent reinforcements[48] of 6,000 troops,mostly from Yemen, to Khalid. This force included 1,000 Sahaba(companions of Muhammad), among whom were 100 veterans of the Battle of Badr, the first battle inIslamic history, and included citizens of the highest rank, such as Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, Abu Sufyan, andhis wife Hind bint Utbah.[57]

Umar, apparently wanting to defeat the Byzantines first, employed the best Muslim troops against them.The continuing stream of Muslim reinforcements worried the Byzantines, who fearing that the Muslimswith such reinforcements would grow powerful, decided that they had no choice but to attack. Thereinforcements that were sent to the Muslims at Yarmouk arrived in small bands, giving the impression of acontinuous stream of reinforcements, in order to demoralize the Byzantines and compel them to attack.[58]

The same tactic would be repeated again during the Battle of Qadisiyah.[43]

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Day 1, limited attacks by theByzantine army

Day 2, Phase 1.

Day 2, Phase 2.

Day 1

The battle began on 15 August 636.[59] At dawn both armies linedup for battle less than a mile apart. It is recorded in Muslimchronicles that before the battle started, George, a unit commanderin the Byzantine right center, rode up to the Muslim line andconverted to Islam; he would die the same day fighting on theMuslim side.[60] The battle began as the Byzantine army sent itschampions to duel with the Muslim mubarizun. The mubarizunwere specially trained swordsmen and lancers, with the objectiveto slay as many enemy commanders as possible to damage theirmorale. At midday, after losing a number of commanders in theduels, Vahan ordered a limited attack with a third of his infantryforces to test the strength and strategy of the Muslim army and,using their overwhelming numerical and weaponry superiority,achieve a breakthrough wherever the Muslim battle line wasweak. However the Byzantine assault lacked determination; many soldiers of the Imperial Army wereunable to press the attack against the Muslim veterans.[61] The fighting was generally moderate, althoughin some places it was especially intense. Vahan did not reinforce his forward infantry two-thirds of whichwas kept in reserve with one-third deployed to engage the Muslims, and at sunset both armies brokecontact and returned to their respective camps.[60]

Day 2

Phase 1: On 16 August 636, Vahan decided in a council of war tolaunch his attack just before dawn, to catch the Muslim forceunprepared as they conducted their morning prayers. He plannedto engage his two central armies with the Muslim centre in aneffort to stall them while the main thrusts would be against thewings of the Muslim army, which would then either be drivenaway from the battlefield or pushed towards the centre.[60][62] Toobserve the battlefield, Vahan had a large pavilion built behind hisright wing with an Armenian bodyguard force. He ordered thearmy to prepare for the surprise attack. Unbeknownst to theByzantines, Khalid had prepared for such a contingency by placeda strong outpost line in front during the night to counter surprises,which gave the Muslims time to prepare for battle. At the center,the Byzantines did not press hard, intending to pin down theMuslim centre corps in their position and preventing them fromaiding the Muslim army in other areas. Thus the center remainedstable. But on the wings situation was different. Qanateer,commanding the Byzantine left flank which consisted of mainlySlavs, attacked in force, and the Muslim infantry on the right flankhad to retreat. Amr, the Muslim right wing commander ordered hiscavalry regiment to counterattack, which neutralized the Byzantineadvance and stabilized the battle line on the right for some time,but the Byzantine numerical superiority caused them to retreattowards the Muslim base camp.[63]

Phase 2: Khalid, aware of the situation at the wings, ordered the

cavalry of the right wing to attack the northern flank of the Byzantine left wing while he with his mobile

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Day 2, Phase 3.

cavalry of the right wing to attack the northern flank of the Byzantine left wing while he with his mobileguard attacked the southern flank of the Byzantine left wing, whilethe Muslim right wing infantry attacked from the front. The three-pronged attack forced the Byzantine left wing to abandon theMuslim positions they had gained on, and Amr regained his lostground and started reorganizing his corps for another round.[63]

The situation on the Muslim left wing which Yazid commandedwas considerably more serious. Whilst the Muslim right wingenjoyed assistance from the mobile guard, the left wing did notand the numerical advantage the Byzantines enjoyed caused theMuslim positions to be overrun, with soldiers retreating towardsbase camps.[57] Here the Byzantines had broken through thecorps. The testudo formation that Gregory's army had adoptedmoved slowly but also had a good defense. Yazid used his cavalryregiment to counterattack but was repulsed. Despite stiff resistance, the warriors of Yazid on the left flankfinally fell back to their camps and for a moment Vahan's plan appeared to be succeeding. The centre ofthe Muslim army was pinned down and its flanks had been pushed back. However, neither flank hadbroken, though their morale was severely damaged.[64] The retreating Muslim army was met by theferocious Arab women in the camps.[57] Led by Hind, the Muslim women dismantled their tents andarmed with tent poles charged at their husbands and fellow men singing an improvised song from theBattle of Uhud that then had been directed against the Muslims.

O you who run from a constant womanWho has both beauty and virtue;And leave her to the infidel,The hated and evil infidel,To possess, disgrace and ruin.[63]

This boiled the blood of the retreating Muslims so much that they returned to the battlefield.[65]

Phase 3: After managing to stabilize the position on the right flank, Khalid ordered the mobile guardcavalry to provide relief to the battered left flank. Khalid detached one regiment under Dharar ibn al-Azwar and ordered him to attack the front of the army of Dairjan (left center) in order to create a diversionand threaten the withdrawal of the Byzantine right wing from its advanced position. With the rest of thecavalry reserve he attacked Gregory's flank. Here again, under simultaneous attacks from the front andflanks, the Byzantines fell back, but more slowly because they had to maintain their formation.[66] Atsunset the central armies broke contact and withdrew to their original positions and both fronts wererestored along the lines occupied in the morning. The death of Dairjan and the failure of Vahan's battleplan left the larger Imperial army relatively demoralized, whereas Khalid's successful counterattacksemboldened his troops despite their being smaller in number.[67]

Day 3

On 17 August 636, Vahan pondered over his failures and mistakes of the previous day, where he launchedattacks against respective Muslim flanks, but after initial success, his men were pushed back. Whatbothered him the most was the loss of one of his commanders. The imperial Byzantine army decided on aless ambitious plan, Vahan now aimed to break the Muslim army at specific points. He decided to pressupon the relatively exposed right flank, where his mounted troops could maneuver more freely ascompared to the rugged terrain at the Muslims' left flank. And it was decided to charge at the junctionbetween the Muslim right center and its right wing held by Qanateer's Slavs, to break the two apart and to

fight them separately.

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Day 3, Phase 1.

Day 3, Phase 2.

Day 4, Phase 1.

fight them separately.

Phase 1: The battle resumed with Byzantine attacks on the Muslim right flank and right center.[68] Afterholding off the initial attacks by the Byzantines, the Muslim right wing fell back, followed by the rightcenter. They were again said to have met by their own womenfolk who abused and shamed them. Thecorps, however, managed to reorganize some distance from the camp and held their ground preparing for acounterattack.[63]

Phase 2: Knowing that the Byzantine army was focusing on theMuslim right, Khalid launched an attack with his mobile guard,along with the Muslim right flank cavalry. Khalid struck at theright flank of the Byzantines left center, and the cavalry reserve ofthe Muslims right center struck at the Byzantines left center at itsleft flank. Meanwhile he ordered the Muslims' right wing cavalryto strike at the left flank of the Byzantines left wing. The combatsoon developed into a bloodbath. Many fell on both sides.Khalid's timely flanking attacks again saved the day for Muslimsand by dusk the Byzantines had been pushed back to the positionsthey had at the start of the battle.[63]

Day 4

18 August 636, the fourth day, was to prove decisive.

Phase 1: Vahan decided to persist with the previous day's warplan as he had been successful in inflicting damage on the Muslimright. Qanateer led two armies of Slavs against the Muslim rightwing and right centre with some assistance from the Armeniansand Christian Arabs led by Jabalah. The Muslim right wing andright center again fell back.[69] Khalid entered the fray yet againwith this mobile guard. He feared a general attack on a broad frontwhich would he wouldn't be able to repulse and as a precautionordered Abu Ubaidah and Yazid on the left centre and the leftwings respectively to attack the Byzantine armies at the respectivefronts. The attack would result in stalling the Byzantine front andprevent a general advance of the Imperial army.[70]

Phase 2: Khalid divided his mobile guard into two divisions andattacked the flanks of the Byzantine left center, while the infantryof the Muslim right center attacked from front. Under this three-pronged flanking manoeuvre, the Byzantines fell back. Meanwhilethe Muslim right wing renewed its offense with its infantryattacking from the front and the cavalry reserve attacking thenorthern flank of the Byzantine left wing. As the Byzantine leftcenter retreated under three-pronged attacks of Khalid, theByzantine left wing, having been exposed at its southern flank, also fell back.[69]

While Khalid and his mobile guard were dealing with the Armenian front throughout the afternoon, thesituation on the other end was worsening.[71] Byzantine horse-archers had taken to the field and subjectedAbu Ubaidah and Yazid's troops to intense archery preventing them from penetrating their Byzantine lines.Many Muslim soldiers lost their sight to Byzantine arrows on that day, which thereafter became known as

the "Day of Lost Eyes".[72] The veteran Abu Sufyan is also believed to have lost an eye that day.[72] The

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Day 4, Phase 2.

Deployment of troops on the fifthday. Khalid gathered all his cavalryfor a decisive flanking charge.

the "Day of Lost Eyes".[72] The veteran Abu Sufyan is also believed to have lost an eye that day.[72] TheMuslim armies fell back except for one regiment led by Ikrimah bin Abi Jahal, which was on the left ofAbu Ubaidah's corps. Ikrimah covered the retreat of the Muslims with his four hundred cavalry byattacking the Byzantine front, while the other armies reorganized themselves to counterattack and regaintheir lost positions. All of Ikrimah's men were either seriously injured or dead that day. Ikrimah, achildhood friend of Khalid's was mortally wounded and died later in the evening.[71]

Day 5

During the four day offense of Vahan, his troops had failed toachieve any breakthrough and had suffered heavy casualties,especially during the mobile guard's flanking counterattacks. Earlyon 19 August 636, the fifth day of the battle, Vahan sent anemissary to the Muslim camp for a truce for the next few days sothat fresh negotiations could be held. He supposedly wanted timeto reorganize his demoralized troops. But Khalid deemed victoryto be in reach and he declined the offer.[73] Up till now, theMuslim army had adopted a largely defensive strategy, butknowing that the Byzantines were apparently no longer eager forbattle, Khalid now decided to take the offensive and reorganizedhis troops accordingly. All the cavalry regiments were groupedtogether into one powerful mounted force with the mobile guardacting as its core. The total strength of this cavalry group was nowabout 8,000 mounted warriors, an effective mounted corps for anoffensive attack the next day. The rest of the day passeduneventfully. Khalid planned to trap Byzantine troops, cutting offtheir every route of escape. There were three natural barriers, thethree gorges in the battlefield with their steep ravines, Wadi-ur-Raqqad at west, Wadi al Yarmouk in south and Wadi al Allah ineast. The northern route was to be blocked by Muslim cavalry.[74]

There were however, some passages across the 200 metres(660 ft) deep ravines of Wadi-ur-Raqqad in west, strategically themost important one was at Ayn al Dhakar, a bridge. Khalid sentDharar with 500 cavalry at night to secure that bridge. Dharar moved around the northern flank ofByzantines and captured the bridge. This maneuver was to prove decisive the next day.[75]

Day 6

On 20 August 636, the final day of the battle,[76] Khalid put into action a simple but bold plan of attack.With his massed cavalry force he intended to drive the Byzantine cavalry entirely off the battlefield so thatthe infantry, which formed the bulk of the imperial army, would be left without cavalry support and thuswould be exposed when attacked from the flanks and rear. At the same time he planned to push adetermined attack to turn the left flank of the Byzantine army and drive them towards the ravine to thewest.[75]

Phase 1: Khalid ordered a general attack on the Byzantine front and galloped his cavalry around the leftwing of the Byzantines. Part of his cavalry engaged the Byzantine left wing cavalry while the rest of itattacked the rear of the Byzantine left wing infantry. Meanwhile the Muslim right wing pressed against itfrom the front. Under this two-pronged attack, the Byzantine left wing fell back and collapsed and fellback to the Byzantine left center, greatly disordering it.[73] The remaining Muslim cavalry then attacked

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Day 6, Phase 1.

Day 6, Phase 2.

Day 6, Phase 3.

Day 6, The last phase.

the Byzantine left wing cavalry at the rear while they were heldfrontally by the other half of the Muslim cavalry, routing them offthe battlefield to the north. The Muslim right wing infantry nowattacked the Byzantine left center at its left flank while the Muslimright center attacked from front.

Phase 2: Vahan, noticing the huge cavalry maneuver of theMuslims, ordered his cavalry to group together, but was not quickenough; before Vahan could organize his disparate heavy cavalrysquadrons, Khalid had wheeled his cavalry back to attack theconcentrating Byzantine cavalry squadrons, falling upon themfrom the front and the flank while they were still moving intoformation. The disorganized and disoriented Byzantine heavycavalry was soon routed and dispersed to the north, leaving theinfantry to its fate.[77]

Phase 3: With the Byzantine cavalry completely routed, Khalidturned to the Byzantine left center which already held the two-pronged attack of the Muslim infantry. The Byzantine left centerwas attacked at its rear by Khalid's cavalry and was finallybroken.[77]

The last phase: With the retreat of the Byzantine left center, ageneral Byzantine retreat started. Khalid took his cavalry north toblock the northern route of escape. The Byzantines retreated westtowards Wadi-ur-Raqqad where there was a bridge at Ayn alDhakar for safe crossing across the deep gorges of the ravines ofWadi-ur-Raqqad.[71] Dharar had already captured the bridge aspart of Khalid's plan the night before. A unit of 500 mountedtroops had been sent to block this passageway. In fact, this was theroute Khalid wanted the Byzantines to retreat all along. TheByzantines were surrounded from all sides now.[73]k[›] Some fellinto the deep ravines off the steep slopes, others tried to escape inthe waters, only to be smashed on the rocks below and againothers were killed in their flight. Nevertheless a large number ofthe soldiers managed to escape the slaughter.[78] Jonah, the Greekinformant of the Rashidun army during the Conquest of Damascusdied in this battle. The Muslims took no prisoners in this battle,although they may have captured some during the subsequentpursuit.[79] Theodore Trithurios died on the battlefield, whileNiketas managed to escape and reach Emesa. Jabalah ibn al-Ayham also managed to escape and later, for a short time, came toterms with the Muslims, but soon defected to the Byzantine courtagain.[80]

AftermathImmediately after this operation was over, Khalid and his mobileguard moved north to pursue the retreating Byzantine soldiers; hefound them near Damascus and attacked. In the ensuing fight the

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commander-in-chief of the imperial army, the Armenian prince Vahan who had escaped the fate of most ofhis men at Yarmouk, was killed.[81] Khalid then entered Damascus where he was said to have beenwelcomed by the local residents, thus recapturing the city.[31][82]

When news of the disaster reached the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius at Antioch,[83] he was devastatedand enraged. He blamed his wrongdoings for the loss primarily referring to his incestuous marriage to hisniece Martina.[84] He would have tried to reconquer the province if he had the resources,[83] but now hehad neither the men nor the money to defend the province any more. Rather he retreated to the cathedral ofAntioch where he observed a solemn service of intercession.[83] He summoned a meeting of his advisers atthe cathedral and scrutinized the situation. He was told almost unanimously and accepted the fact thedefeat was God's decision and a result of the sins of the people of the land including him.[85] Heracliustook to the sea on a ship to Constantinople in the night. It is said that as his ship was set sail, he bade a lastfarewell to Syria, saying:

Farewell, a long farewell to Syria,l[›][83] my fair province. Thou art an infidel's (enemy's) now. Peace bewith you, O Syria – what a beautiful land you will be for the enemy.[85]

Haraclius abandoned Syria with the holy relic of the True Cross which was, along with other relics held atJerusalem, secretly boarded on ship by Parthia of Jerusalem,[83] just to protect it from the invading Arabs.It is said that the emperor had a fear of water.[86] and a pontoon bridge was made for Heraclius to cross theBosphorus to Constantinople. After abandoning Syria, the Emperor began to concentrate on his remainingforces for the defence of Anatolia and Egypt instead. Byzantine Armenia fell to the Muslims in 638–39after which Heraclius created a buffer zone in central Anatolia by ordering all the forts east of Tarsus to beevacuated.[87] In 639–642 Muslims invaded and captured Byzantine Egypt, led by Amr ibn al-A'as – whohad commanded the right flank of the Rashidun army at Yarmouk.[88]

EvaluationThe Battle of Yarmouk can be seen as an example in military history where an inferior force manages toovercome a superior force by superior generalship.

The Imperial Byzantine commanders allowed their enemy to have the battlefield of his choosing. Eventhen they were at no substantial tactical disadvantage.[47] Khalid knew all along that he was up against aforce superior in numbers and, until the last day of the battle, he conducted an essentially defensivecampaign suited to his relatively limited resources. When he decided to take the offensive and attack on thefinal day of battle, he did so with a degree of imagination, foresight and courage that none of the Byzantinecommanders managed to display. Although he commanded a numerically inferior force and needed all themen he could muster, he nevertheless had the confidence and foresight to dispatch a cavalry regiment thenight before his assault to seal off a critical path of the retreat he anticipated for the enemy army.[75]

Khalid ibn al-Walid was one of the finest cavalry commanders in history[7] and his use of mountedwarriors throughout the battle showed just how well he understood the potential strengths and weaknessesof his mounted troops. His mobile guard moved quickly from one point to another, always changing thecourse of events wherever they appeared, and then just as quickly galloping away to change the course ofevents elsewhere on the field.[89]

Vahan and his Byzantine commanders did not manage to deal with this mounted force and use the sizableadvantage of their army effectively.[90] Their own Byzantine cavalry never played a significant role in thebattle and were held in static reserve for most of the six days.[58] They never pushed their attacks and even

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when they obtained what could have been a decisive breakthrough on the fourth day, they were unable toexploit it. There appeared to be a decided lack of resolve among the Imperial commanders, though thismay have been caused by difficulties commanding the army because of internal conflict. Moreover, manyof the Arab auxiliaries were mere levies, while the Muslim Arab army consisted for a much larger part ofveteran troops.[91]

The original strategy of Heraclius, to destroy the Muslim troops in Syria, needed a rapid and quickdeployment, but the commanders on the ground never displayed these qualities. Ironically, on the field atYarmouk, Khalid carried out on a small tactical scale what Heraclius had planned on a grand strategicscale: by rapidly deploying and manoeuvering his forces, Khalid was able to temporarily concentratesufficient forces at specific locations on the field to defeat the larger Byzantine army in detail. Vahan wasnever able to make his numerical superiority count, perhaps because of the unfavorable terrain thatprevented large-scale deployment. However, at no point did Vahan attempt to concentrate a superior forceto achieve a critical breakthrough.[92] Although he was on the offensive 5 days out of the six, his battleline remained remarkably static. This all stands in stark contrast to the very successful offensive plan thatKhalid carried out on the final day, when he reorganised virtually all his cavalry and committed them to agrand manoeuvre that won the battle.[89] George F. Nafziger, in his book Islam at war, describes the battleas:

“ Although Yarmouk is little known today, it is one of the most decisive battles in humanhistory...... Had Heraclius' forces prevailed, the modern world would be so changed as tobe unrecognizable.[5] ”

References

1. ^ Kennedy 2006, p. 452. ^ Nicolle 1994, pp. 64–653. ^ a b Akram 2004, p. 4254. ^ Britannica (2007): "More than 50,000 byzantine soldiers died"5. ^ a b Walton 2003, p. 306. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 67. ^ a b Nicolle 1994, p. 198. ^ Haldon 1997, p. 419. ^ Greatrex–Lieu 2002, pp. 189–190

10. ^ Greatrex–Lieu 2002, p. 19611. ^ Greatrex–Lieu 2002, pp. 217–22712. ^ Haldon 1997, p. 4613. ^ Nicolle 1994, pp. 12–1414. ^ Luttwak 2009, p. 19915. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 8716. ^ Akram 2004, p. 24617. ^ Runciman 1987, p. 1518. ^ Akram 2004, p. 29819. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 6020. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 11221. ^ Akram 2009, p. 13322. ^ Akram 2004, p. 40223. ^ Al-Waqidi 8th century, p. 10024. ^ (Armenian) Bartikyan, Hrach. «Վահան» (Vahan). Armenian Soviet Encyclopedia. vol. xi. Yerevan:

Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1985, p. 243.25. ^ Kennedy 2007, p. 8226. ^ a b Akram 2004, p. 40927. ^ Al-Waqidi 8th century, p. 106

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27. ^ Al-Waqidi 8th century, p. 10628. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 1629. ^ Akram 2004, p. 39930. ^ a b Nicolle 1994, p. 6131. ^ a b Kaegi 1995, p. 6732. ^ Akram 2004, p. 40133. ^ al-Baladhuri 9th century, p. 14334. ^ a b Kaegi 1995, p. 13435. ^ Akram 2004, p. 40736. ^ Akram 2004, p. 40637. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 12238. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 6339. ^ Kaegi 2003, p. 24240. ^ a b c Nicolle 1994, p. 6641. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 3442. ^ Walton 2003, p. 2943. ^ a b Akram 2004, p. 41144. ^ Akram 2004, p. 41345. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 3946. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 3647. ^ a b Kaegi 1995, p. 12448. ^ a b c d Nicolle 1994, p. 6449. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 6550. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 2951. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 3052. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 3953. ^ Kaegi 1995, pp. 132–13354. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 12155. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 13056. ^ Akram 2009, p. 13257. ^ a b c Nicolle 1994, p. 7058. ^ a b Kaegi 1995, p. 12959. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 9260. ^ a b c Nicolle 1994, p. 6861. ^ Akram 2004, p. 41562. ^ Akram 2004, p. 41763. ^ a b c d e Nicolle 1994, p. 7164. ^ Akram 2004, p. 41865. ^ Regan 2003, p. 16466. ^ Akram 2004, pp. 418–1967. ^ Akram 2004, p. 41968. ^ Akram 2004, p. 42069. ^ a b Nicolle 1994, p. 7270. ^ Akram 2004, p. 42171. ^ a b c Nicolle 1994, p. 7572. ^ a b Al-Waqidi 8th century, p. 14873. ^ a b c Nicolle 1994, p. 7674. ^ Akram 2004, p. 42275. ^ a b c Akram 2004, p. 42376. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 11477. ^ a b Akram 2004, p. 42478. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 13879. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 12880. ^ Nicolle 1994, p. 8081. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 27382. ^ Akram 2004, p. 42683. ^ a b c d e Runciman 1987, p. 1784. ^ Runciman 1987, p. 96

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Image-1. Concepts used in thedescription of the battle lines.

84. ^ Runciman 1987, p. 9685. ^ a b Regan 2003, p. 16786. ^ Regan 2003, p. 16987. ^ Kaegi 1995, pp. 148–4988. ^ Kaegi 2003, p. 32789. ^ a b Nicolle 1994, pp. 87–8990. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 13791. ^ Akram 2004, p. 40892. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 143

Notes^ a: Modern estimates for Roman army:Donner (1981): 100,000.Britannica (2007): "More than 50,000 byzantine soldiers died".Nicolle (1994): 100,000.Akram (1970): 150,000.Kaegi (1995): 15,000–20,000Mango, Cyril (2002). The Oxford History of Byzantium: 80,000.^ b: Roman source for Roman army:Theophanes (p. 337–338): 80,000 Roman troops (Kennedy, 2006, p. 145) and 60,000 allied Ghassanidtroops (Gibbon, Vol. 5, p. 325).^ c: Early Muslim sources for Roman army:Baladhuri (p. 140): 200,000.Tabari (Vol. 2, p. 598): 200,000.Ibn Ishaq (Tabari, Vol. 3, p. 75): 100,000 against 24,000 Muslims.^ d: Modern estimates for Muslim army:Kaegi (1995): 15,000-20,000 maximum.Nicolle (1994): 25,000 maximum.Akram: 40,000 maximum.Treadgold (1997): 24,000

^ e: Primary sources for Muslim army:Ibn Ishaq (Vol. 3, p. 74): 24,000.Baladhuri: 24,000.Tabari (Vol. 2, p. 592): 40,000.^ f: Primary sources for Roman casualties:Tabari (Vol. 2, p. 596): 120,000 killed.Ibn Ishaq (Vol. 3, p. 75): 70,000 killed.Baladhuri (p. 141): 70,000 killed.^ g: His name is mentioned in Islamic sources as Jaban, VahanBenaas and Mahan. Vahan is most likely to be his name as it is ofArmenian origin^ i: During the reign of Abu Bakr, Khalid ibn Walid remained theCommander-in-Chief of the army in Syria but at Umar's accessionas Caliph he dismissed him from command. Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah became the new commander in chief. (See Dismissal ofKhalid).^ j: Some Byzantine sources also mention a fortified encampmentat Yaqusah, 18 kilometres (11 mi) from the battlefield. E.g., A. I. Akram suggests that the Byzantinecamps were north of Waddi-ur-Riqqad, while David Nicolle agrees with early Armenian sources which

positioned camps at Yaqusah (See: Nicolle p. 61 and Akram 2004 p. 410).

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positioned camps at Yaqusah (See: Nicolle p. 61 and Akram 2004 p. 410).^ k: Akram misinterprets the bridge at 'Ayn Dhakar for a ford while Nicolle explains the exact geography(See: Nicolle p. 64 and Akram p. 410)^ m: David Nicolle suggests at least four to one. (See Nicolle p. 64)^ n: Concepts used in the description of the battle lines of the Muslims and the Byzantines. See image-1.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Al-Baladhuri, Ahmad ibn Yahya (9th century), Kitab Futuh al-BuldanAl-Waqidi, Abu Abdullah Muhammad Ibn Umar (8th century), Fatuh al Sham (Conquest of Syria)Chronicle of Fredegar, 658Dionysius Telmaharensis (774), Chronicle of Pseudo-Dionysius of Tell-MahreIbn Ishaq (750), Sirah Rasul AllahIbn Khaldun (1377), MuqaddimahThe Maronite Chronicles, 664Pseudo-Methodius (691), Apocalypse of Pseudo-MethodiusMuhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (915), History of the Prophets and KingsTheophanes the Confessor (810–815), ChronographiaThomas the Presbyter (7th century), ChronicleFragment on the Arab Conquests, 636"West-Syrian Chronicle of 819" (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VdXMK4CYRToC&pg=PR9&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false) ,West-Syrian Chronicles, 819, http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VdXMK4CYRToC&pg=PR9&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false

Secondary sources

Akram, A.I (2009), Muslim conquest of Persia, third edition, Maktabah Publications, ISBN 0-9548665-3-3Akram, A.I (2004), The Sword of Allah: Khalid bin al-Waleed – His Life and Campaigns, thirdedition, ISBN 0-19-597714-9Conrad, Lawrence I. (1988), "Seven and the Tasbīʿ: On the Implications of Numerical Symbolismfor the Study of Medieval Islamic History", Journal of the Economic and Social History of theOrient (Brill Publishers) 31 (1): 42–73, JSTOR 3631765 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/3631765)Donner, Fred McGraw (1981), The Early Islamic Conquests, Princeton University Press, ISBN 0-691-05327-8Greatrex–Lieu; Lieu, Samuel N. C. (2002), The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars(Part II, 363–630 AD), Routledge, ISBN 0-415-14687-9Gil, Moshe; Broido, Ethel (1997), A History of Palestine: 634–1099, Cambridge University Press,ISBN 0-521-59984-9Haldon, John (2001), The Byzantine Wars, Tempus Publishing, ISBN 0-7524-1795-9Haldon, John (1997), Byzantium in the Seventh Century: the Transformation of a Culture,Cambridge, ISBN 0-521-31917-XHoyland, Robert G. (1997), Seeing Islam as Others Saw It, Darwin Press, ISBN 0-87850-125-8,OCLC 36884186 (//www.worldcat.org/oclc/36884186)Jandora, John W. (1986), "Developments in Islamic Warfare: The Early Conquests", StudiaIslamica (Maisonneuve & Larose) (64): 101–113, JSTOR 1596048(http://www.jstor.org/stable/1596048)Kaegi, Walter Emil (2003), Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium, Cambridge University Press,ISBN 0-521-81459-6

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Kaegi, Walter Emil (1995), Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests, Cambridge UniversityPress, ISBN 0-521-48455-3Kennedy, Hugh N. (2006), The Byzantine And Early Islamic Near East, Ashgate Publishing,ISBN 0-7546-5909-7Kennedy, Hugh (2007), The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the WorldWe Live In, Weidenfeld & Nicolson publishers: Great Britain, ISBN 0-297-84657-4Luttwak, Edward N (2009), The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Harvard UniversityPress, ISBN 0-674-03519-4Nicolle, David (1994), Yarmuk 636 A.D.: The Muslim Conquest of Syria, Osprey Publishing,ISBN 1-85532-414-8Palmer, Andrew (1993), The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles(http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VdXMK4CYRToC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false) , Liverpool University Press, ISBN 0-85323-238-5, http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VdXMK4CYRToC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=falseRegan, Geoffery (2003), First Crusader: Byzantium's Holy Wars (1 ed.), Palgrave Macmillan: NewYork, ISBN 1-4039-6151-4Runciman, Steven (1987, second edition), A History of the Crusades: The First Crusade, PenguinBooks: London, ISBN 978-0-521-34770-9Treadgold, Warren (1997), A History of the Byzantine State and Society, Stanford University Press,ISBN 0-8047-2630-2Walton, Mark W (2003), Islam at war, Greenwood Publishing Group, ISBN 0-275-98101-0

External linksYarmouk in Sword of Allah at GrandeStrategy (http://www.grandestrategy.com/2007/12/sword-of-allah-chapter-34-eve-of-yarmuk.html) by A.I. AkramBattle of Yarmuk animated battle map (http://www.theartofbattle.com/battle-of-yarmuk-636.htm) byJonathan WebbBattle of Yarmuk, 636 (http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/muslimwars/articles/yarmuk.aspx)

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