2016

1-3

4

4 , 4 (1-3 2016) .

- -

greekphilsci.blogspot.gr, email phos@phs.uoa.gr. Jasper Johns, White Target, 1957. Whitney Museum of American Art, New York.

http://greekphilsci.blogspot.gr/mailto:phos@phs.uoa.gr

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12

116

118

125

133

138

144

152

159

165

171

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

: : The Concept of Laws of Nature in Natural Philosophy from the 17th to the 18th century : Philosophical perspectives on probabilities in physics

178

188

Index

3

4

, .... 1-3 2016. 2010, 2012 2014, , , . 4 .... . 100 . 69 , . 9 . To 4 .... 2016 300 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1716-2016) : 300 Leibniz. 5 . Daniel Garber, , : Leibniz on Principles in Natural Philosophy: The Principle of the Equality of Cause and Effect : 300 Leibniz. Michel Ghins, , : The stability of the reference of theoretical terms through scientific revolutions. Carl Hoefer, , : Selective Scientific Realism Reformulated Philosophical perspectives on probabilities in physics : Probability in Bohmian Quantum Mechanics: Puzzles and Solutions. Genoveva Mart, , : The impact of experimental semantics' results on the theory of direct reference. Orly R. Shenker, , Philosophical Perspectives on Probabilities in Physics : Emergent chance.

5

, , . . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . .... . 4 !

6

Daniel Garber Michel Ghins Carl Hoefer Genoveva Mart

A. Watson J. Armour III University Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University Professeur ordinaire mrite, Institut suprieur de philosophie, Universit Catholique de Louvain ICREA & Departament de Filosofia Universitat de Barcelona ICREA & Departament de Lgica, Histria i Filosofia de la Cincia, Universitat de Barcelona

7

8

4

Daniel Garber

Leibniz on Principles in Natural Philosophy: The Principle of the Equality of Cause and Effect | Daniel Garber

A. Watson J. Armour III University Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University

Abstract Leibniz appeals to principles in virtually every area of his philosophy. In this essay, though, I would like to focus on the way in which he uses principles in one particular area, his broadly mechanistic natural philosophy. What I would like to do in this essay is look especially at Leibnizs thought in this domain in the period in which Leibnizs program for dynamics is just beginning to come together, starting in the mid- and late-1670s. I shall discuss in particular Leibnizs Principle of the Equality of Cause and Effect, show how it arose, what status Leibniz gave it, and the role that it played as a principle in Leibnizs thought.

9

4 Michel Ghins

Michel Ghins | The stability of the reference of theoretical terms through scientific revolutions Professeur ordinaire mrite, Institut suprieur de philosophie, Universit Catholique de Louvain Abstract The question of the stability of the reference of theoretical terms through the so-called scientific revolutions is a major issue for scientific realism. In this paper I will focus on an epistemological version of scientific realism according to which we have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories are partially and approximately true, in a correspondence sense, and that their central theoretical and explanatory terms refer or denote unobservable entities which exist independently of our thought, language, wishes etc. Ill defend a version of the causal descriptivist conception of reference developed by David Lewis and Robert Nola. Such conception of reference is not only more satisfactory from a philosophical point of view but also permits a more robust argumentation in favor of the stability of reference through theory change. My argumentation will be illustrated by several examples drawn from the history of physics.

10

4

Carl Hoefer

Selective Scientific Realism Reformulated | Carl Hoefer

ICREA & Departament de Filosofia Universitat de Barcelona

Abstract Scientific realists hold that we have reason to believe that theories in the "mature" sciences are approximately true, and that the theoretical and non-observable entities posited by those theories really exist. And given all the amazing technological advances of 20th-21st century science, and (apparent) discoveries about the microscopic features of the world, it is prima facie a compelling claim. Setting aside (mostly) the troubled fundamental theories of physics, we can say that our current canon of scientific knowledge, in many fields, has apparently reached a level of completion and stability that was unknown in the history of science before the 20th century. These parts of science are epistemically secure in a way that transcends mere credibility due to empirical successes. Due to the number and variety of epistemic handles that we now have on the entities and facts in these parts of science, we have reached a situation where to coherently doubt them requires recourse to skeptical scenarios of the brain-in-a-vat variety (or Cartesian demons). Setting aside such radical skepticism, as philosophers of science should, no room for doubt is left. So scientific realism about these parts of current science is defensible and not troubled by pessimistic inductions from the history of science. This brings us to a new form of selective scientific realism, one with important advantages over earlier selective realisms.

11

4 Genoveva Mart

Genoveva Mart | The impact of experimental semantics' results on the theory of direct reference ICREA & Departament de Lgica, Histria i Filosofia de la Cincia, Universitat de Barcelona Abstract Recent discussions of semantic theory by experimental philosophers cast doubt on the universality of the intuitions that drive direct reference theory, the approach to the semantics of singular and general terms inspired by Kripke and Putnam, among others. Data collected in several empirical studies seem to support a view according to which what an expression refers to is relative to cultural or conversational context. Some results appear to support even wide variations in the semantic modus operandi of names and general terms in different uses by one and the same speaker. According to experimental semanticists the results of those observations refute what we took to be the fundamental lessons of the Kripke-Putnam approach. Is the mode of determination of reference relative to cultural, individual or conversational factors? I will explore the impact that a positive answer to that question would have for direct reference theory, the approach inspired by Kripke and Putnam.

12

13

14

4

Leibniz |

, ,

(1710) Leibniz . fatum stocum fatum christianum, , . , ( , ), , , , Leibniz, . , 349, , , : . . , : , , , , , , , , , , . , . Leibniz, : , [] ( , . 16)

15

Descartes, ( , ) ( ), . Leibniz, Descartes, . , (Tentamen anagogicum, 1697), . | - | Leibniz, , , ,

16

4

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. , , , . , , , . , , , .

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17

4

| , (Universal Darwinism) . . (Gene-Darwinism) (Process-Darwinism). Dawkins G.C. Williams. A. Weismann C.S. Pierce. . , Karl Popper, Henry Plotkin, Daniel Dennett, . . Popper , , Plotkin Dennett. , .

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, , Popper, Plotkin, Dennet | -

19

4

| , , , . ( / , 449b25), , . , , , ( , 453a10), . (12 . ..) ( , 1-41) . , . , . . , () (, 15.15). , , . , , . , . , ( , 19.2) . , . , , , , .

20

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21

4

& | , , , & , (Rationality Principle RP), , , . RP 1967, , , RP a priori , . RP , . , RP . , / RP , / (problem situation). ' RP , , . , , . , , , , ( )

22

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Popper, Rationality Principle, Hayek | -

23

4

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24

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, . , . . (manifest) Sellars . David Chalmers, . . , , . , .

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, , , David Chalmers | -

25

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| , (Altertumswissenschaft) ( Forman). , (Oswald Spengler), 19 (Theodor Mommsen, U. von Wilamowitz). Friedrich Nietzsche (Lebensphilosophie) , ( ), (George Kreis). , , . Werner Jaeger , . | , - | , , ,

26

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- , , , . , , (Metzinger, 2009). , , , . , Petkova Ehrsson (2008), . , , , - , 10% - 15% () (Braithwaite, et al., 2011). , , . , . , . , . -

27

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28

4

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. (transparent introspection), Alex Byrne, . , , , : ; (Shoemaker, Moran, Fernandez) , . / (attitudes) (propositions). , .

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29

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30

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(509b7-8, 517c2), (508e3). (. 3 & 4 ), .

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31

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| McDowell Wright Brandom , John McDowell. , , Wright Brandom . McDowell, , . , , , , . McDowell, , . McDowell , . (thinking), (thinkable). , . , McDowell (transcendental) . McDowell , . , . McDowell ; .

32

Wright McDowell , . , , . McDowell Wright, . , Brandom McDowell . McDowell Brandom . McDowell, , Wright Brandom , . , , .

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McDowell, , , ,

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33

4

| .... ... , , ... , . ... ...., , , 2 , 6 13 ...., .. ( 47-50). , , . , erga omnes. . ( 28 ) , ( - - - - ). - - - (267 .... - 16 ) . ( ), , - - .

34

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35

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| , . , , . . . , . , , . , . . , , , . , , . , (received view), . -. , .

36

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37

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38

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40

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| , Humboldt-Universitt zu Berlin , , (126) , , , , (125). , , , , . , / . : , , ; , , ; , , ; . / (. Strawson 1966, Guyer 1987, Westphal 2004). . , . , , : , . . , ,

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| , , . , , . . . . , , 1 , 21. . () . ; .

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, Jean Franois Lyotard. Lyotard , , . (Les jeux de langage). , ad hoc, / . . , , , , , , . , , , , . . Lyotard, (paralogie), , , , , . Lyotard, . , , , . , Lyotard . Lyotard, , . , , : ,

45

. Lyotard . , . , , , , . , , , , , , , . , , Lyotard . | - | , , , ,

46

4

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, Friedrich-Schiller-Universitt Jena

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47

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49

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50

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54

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| John Dewey , John Dewey . Dewey . : , , , . , . Dewey , , , , , . ; , , . - . Dewey, : . Dewey , . . , , .

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| E : Western University . (dispositional monist) (powers), , . , (manifestation) , , , . , , . (categoricalism), , , (qualities), ( (categorical properties), , , (quiddities)). - . , . , , , , .. , . , , ; , , , , , ; ; (two-side view) , . .

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, Frege Russell, (proposition) , . , . , , , , , Frege, , Russell. , , , , , . Frege Russell , , , . . , Soames Hanks, . , Hanks , . Hanks, : , Hanks, , . : , . , Hanks , , , (content) (force) : Hanks, .

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96

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Mller

, () | Vincent C. Mller

Professor of Philosophy at Anatolia College

President of the European Association for Cognitive Systems

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6

The Concept of Laws of Nature in Natural Philosophy from the 17th to the 18th century | 6

Irene Goudarouli (Organizer)

Symposium Abstract The idea that nature is governed by laws is fundamental to the modern scientific thought. However, it has not always been a fundamental principle for understanding the natural world. It was not until the seventeenth century that the idea that nature is governed by specific laws, which can be studied and used to interpret as well as to predict natural phenomena, appeared in natural philosophical textual resources. This symposium aims to explore the concept of laws in natural philosophy of the 17th and 18th century. For this purpose, the speakers will present their studies on the concept of laws of nature in the philosophical framework of Ren Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, Isaac Newton, and George Berkeley. In the recent literature, it has been suggested that a concept of law, under the terms of lex, regula, and ordo, can be found in natural philosophy textbooks prior to the seventeenth century. However, its use was metaphorical and reflected an attempt of the natural philosophers of the time to limit the randomness of the Epicurean universe and the Stoic chain that connect God with secondary causes. In the late Middle Ages, it was generally accepted that laws can govern the behavior of rational beings, who are actually able to obey them. Any possible extension of the concept of law to non-rational beings was strictly metaphorical. Descartes is given credit for introducing the significant role the concept of law may play in the understanding and explanation of all natural phenomena. The three laws of nature firstly appeared in chapter seven of the early Le Monde (1633), and then in more detailed form in part two of the Principia Philosophiae (1644). By introducing the three laws of motion, in his mature work Principia Philosophiae, Descartes presents the idea that there are certain regul sive leges natur by which matter and all its movements are governed. In a world consisted of corpuscles in motion ruled by specific laws of nature everything is either mind or matter, while God is a distinct kind of immaterial substance. The Cartesian conceptualization of the laws of nature involves a causal power: the laws are the particular and secondary causes of matter in motion. Although called laws of nature, paradoxically, one might say, the Cartesian laws are not grounded in the physical world but in Gods immutability. In this context, the concept of laws of nature required a metaphysical foundation of nature. This assumption triggered a wide debate between natural philosophers regarding the ontology of laws of nature and their foundations.

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The symposium will explore the nature, foundation, and necessitation of laws of nature in the theories of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Newton, and Berkeley. The first paper will explore the relationship between laws of nature and causality in the philosophical systems of Descartes and Spinoza. The second paper will focus on the study of the concept of law of nature in Hobbess Leviathan and De Corpore. The third paper will focus on Newtons reconceptualization of law of nature in Principia, by which a new conception of force, as an external relation connecting bodies of definite masses, emerged in natural philosophy. The last paper will explore the relations between physics and metaphysics in Berkeleys thought, and the role of the concept of law in his denial of the existence of material bodies. Finally, the symposium aims at discussing the following questions: how and why have laws of nature become a central concept in the natural philosophy of the seventeenth century? What is the relationship between laws and powers of/in matter? What is the role of God in the foundation of the laws of nature? What happens to the concept of laws of nature when the metaphysical foundation of natural philosophy is rejected? Topics | General Philosophy of Science, History of Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Natural Sciences

Keywords | laws of nature, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Newton, Berkeley

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Vasiliki

Grigoropoulou

Natural laws as causes in Descartes and in Spinoza | Vasiliki Grigoropoulou

Phd, University of Athens

Abstract In his Principia Philosophiae, Descartes says that "laws of nature are the secondary and particular causes of the various motions we see in particular bodies" (Part II, article 37). The "universal and primary cause" of the laws is attributed to God. Natural laws are required to be of general validity in every place and for all bodies, given that they are grounded in the immutability of divine action. Descartes reformed the traditional metaphor of a divine law-giver, shifted into the context of a mechanical world, and he denied any teleological and anthropocentric explanation of nature. Natural laws were conceived as causes which could explain the motion of bodies and did not contain any ideas of command and obedience. I will focus on a central question, i.e. whether, besides God, the primary cause, bodies can also be assumed as causes. Yet, if they have a force and can be real causes, where does their force come from? According to the first law, "Each and every thing, insofar as it is simple and undivided, always remains, insofar as it can in the same state, nor is it ever changed except by external causes" (Pr. II 37). Descartes derives forces resisting change from the tendency that bodies have to remain in a given state (Pr. II 43). Leibniz had criticized this reasoning of Descartes. In the second section of this paper, I will argue that Spinoza anticipated the objections of Leibniz. For Spinoza, God is the primary cause, as in Descartes, but is conceived as immanent, not transcendent as in Descartes. Consequently, divine law as a cause is in nature, not external to it. Finite things are modes of the divine substance, whose essence is equivalent to its power, and they participate in the power and activity of God. Spinoza reformulates the first law of Cartesian Physics, which is given with complete generality, as in Descartes, but not specific only to simple bodies. In his Ethics (Part III, 6), each thing "as far as it can" does not have the tendency to remain "in the same state", as in Descartes, but it "strives (conatur) to persevere in its being". Striving (conatus), the actual essence of a being, is equivalent with power to existence and to "power to act". Besides the causality that derives from God's essence, individuals are conceived as degrees of power, proper to each one, and they have power to act in various ways and to produce various effects; consequently causality appears more complex than in Descartes. In Descartes, natural laws apply to all simple bodies. In Spinoza, a plurality of laws can be found, i.e. law of God's nature (Ethics, I 17), universal laws of nature (Theologico-

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political Treatise, ch. 4), laws that govern all bodies, laws of thought, laws of complex individuals. A natural law is "one which necessarily follows from the very nature or definition of the thing" (ibid.), in other words, a law is not imposed but is deduced from the nature of a thing as it really is and acts. Since natural laws are inscribed in the world and in everything, conceptualized in a necessitarian deterministic conception of Nature, it could be argued that there is not a realm of is, on the one hand, and a realm of ought, on the other. Spinoza's metaphysics in the geometrical order of his Ethics permits this conciliation; yet, mostly in his political writings, we meet expressions of a prescriptive law. I will attempt to explore whether prescriptive laws can be analysed in terms of a framework of causal powers.

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Irene

Goudarouli

Hobbes on Laws of Nature: From De Corpore to Leviathan and back again | Irene Goudarouli

Researcher, University of Warwick

Abstract The concept of laws of nature is one of the most central concepts in the philosophical thought of Thomas Hobbes. In my talk, I will focus on the concept of laws of nature in Leviathan (1651) and De Corpore (1655). The aim of the talk is to explore the different conceptions of laws of nature as they appear in Leviathan and De Corpore. The concept of law of nature as introduced by Descartes in Principia, requires a metaphysical foundation of natural philosophy. However, Hobbes argues that God cannot play a role in the study of nature. But, what happens to the concept of laws of nature, when the metaphysical foundation of natural philosophy is rejected? Answering this question will be the main aim of this paper. In De Corpore Hobbes based his natural philosophy on general principles of matter in motion, some of which are more or less identical in content with Descartes laws of nature. But Hobbes does not call them laws. In Leviathan, however, he takes the concept of law of nature as a central explanatory category. He introduces the concept of natural law (Lex Naturalis) as the general rule which can be obtained through natural reasoning (reason) and by which men are forbidden to do anything that is detrimental to their life. In this paper, I will explore why Hobbes never transferred the concept of laws of nature from the sphere of civil society to the realm of nature, while he chose the very same principles that Descartes called laws as basic explanatory principles in his natural philosophy.

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4 6 Vassllis Sakellariou

Vassilis Sakellariou | The law-governed phenomenon in Newtons Principia Phd, Philosophy of Science, University of Athens Abstract In the spirit of experimental philosophy, Newton, in the Principia, explores correlations between natural phenomena without making hypotheses about a micro-corpuscularian structure of matter, and shows how practical mathematics is transformed into a discourse about things natural, in combination with controlled experiments and observations. Modelled on Galilean kinematics, dynamics can then be developed in this spirit. Proceeding from phenomena to theory and from theory to phenomena, a conceptual framework is crystallised as a condition for the constitution of the object of investigation. It is precisely in such a framework that the concept of law of nature is embedded. Pivotal points in the Principia framework are: the raising of the intuitive notions of inertia and force to the level of concept; the adoption of a centripetal force; the explicit formulation of the desideratum of physics, as the search for the cause of changes in a bodys state of motion, i.e., the force in each case, devoid of occult connotations, as it is equated to the result of its action. Concerning the planetary system, it is this framework that allows phenomena according to Newton the features of planetary orbits, worked out and presented by Kepler in mathematical form to be deduced as the result of the action of central forces. I shall argue that the novel concept of universal gravity introduces a new type of law, where force emerges as an external relation connecting bodies of definite masses, establishing thus the unity of part and whole. From this viewpoint, the elaboration of a complete theory of interacting bodies is made possible, while leaving open the question of the nature or carrier of their interaction. These are fundamental issues which were to persist in the further development of the newly founded science of theoretical physics.

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Stathis Psillos

The role of laws in Berkeleys natural philosophy | Stathis Psillos

Professor, Philosophy of Science & Metaphysics, University of Athens

Abstract George Berkeley is known for his idealism. His basic position is immaterialism; a position he reaches because he takes it to be the natural conclusion of the view that matter is causally inert. In a sense, Berkeley pushes occasionalism to its extremes: if matter is causally inert and if the only real cause is God, why should the philosophical category of matter be posited? From occasionalism, Berkeley borrows the idea that nature is governed by laws of nature, which are grounded directly to the will of God. But he takes it that the knowledge of laws of nature is empirical and based only on experience. What exactly is the role of laws if there are no material bodies? In this talk I will answer the foregoing question focusing mainly on Berkeleys views about the relations between physics and metaphysics. In particular, I will show how Berkeley combines, via the laws, the acceptance of mechanical philosophy and his denial of the existence of matter.

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8 | Philosophical perspectives on probabilities in physics Maria Panagiotatou (Organizer) Symposium Abstract The concept of probability raises a great number of philosophical questions. A demanding one concerns the interpretation of probabilities in general, but also the interpretation of probabilities that abound in physics. Are probabilities aspects of the furniture of the world or useful tools that help us handle complex systems with an incredibly large number of variables? Are they some kind of properties of the physical systems or just a measure of our ignorance about them? In the context of the philosophical discussion concerning the meaning of the notion of probability, two mutually-opposite groups of views prevail. The objectivist views, according to which probabilistic statements state matters of fact and have fully mind-independent truth-conditions. And the subjectivist views which consider that the probabilistic statements express degrees of belief. Of course, there also are pluralist accounts of probabilities suggesting different interpretations for different domains. Transferring the philosophical debate to physical theories, a lot has been written about the interpretation of probabilities in Classical Statistical Physics and quantum theories. There is, almost, general agreement that the differences between classical and quantum probabilities are obvious. And that holds independently of whether we are committed to a certain interpretation of quantum mechanics or not. However, both kinds of probabilities have been interpreted, in different theoretical contexts, according to the objectivist as much as the subjectivist view. Hence, should we claim that the interpretation of probabilities in physics cannot be uniform but varies according to the physical theory and the goal served by their use? Or, are we obliged to defend the position that probabilities in physics, in order to guarantee their use in scientific explanation and laws, must be objective and independent from our beliefs? Carl Hoefer is a leading expert in the field of philosophy of probability in physics, and his presence as an invited speaker in the 4th Panhellenic Conference in Philosophy of Science gives us a great opportunity to organise a symposium about probabilities in physical theories and shed light on some of the above questions. In the first talk, Maria Panagiotatou will look into cases of probabilistic modelling in physics in order to examine whether scientific perspectivism is favoured and realism defeated.

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In his talk, Carl Hoefer will explore the subject of probability in Bohmian Quantum Mechanics and assess the compatibility of the treatment of probability in Bohmian theory with views concerning objective probabilities. The third participant will be Orly Shenker, another leading expert in the field who will present a new case of emergent chance based on inadmissibility in the reversed direction. Finally, Aristidis will examine the viability of the subjectivist interpretation of quantum probabilities (Quantum Bayesianism) in the local relativistic quantum field theories.

Philosophy of Natural Sciences | Topic

Probabilities, objectivist and subjectivist views, Bohmian theory, Quantum Bayesianism, scientific perspectivism | Keywords

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4 8 Maria Panagiotatou

Maria Panagiotatou | Probabilistic modelling in physics: a case in favour of perspectivism or not? PhD, Philosophy of Science, Teaching assistant, University of Patras Abstract Chakr