῎Ερως, ᾿Επιθυμία, and Φιλία in Plato (Drew A. Hyland)

8/9/2019 ῎Ερως, ᾿Επιθυμία, and Φιλία in Plato (Drew A. Hyland)

1/15

'Epc,'E7rmOu,ta,

nd

acxa

in Plato

DREW A. HYLAND

The encomium

proper

is

preceded by a

preliminary dialectical discussion with

Agathon, the

object of which is to clear the ground of some popular misconcep-

tions of the

nature

of Eros.

The

notion of

Eros, it is

shown, is equivalent to that

of

desire

(Ipcoq

=

s6

&iwLOuIAo5v)

..

a

quality, not

a

person.

Bury, R. G. The

Symposium

of

Plato, page

XXXVI-XXXVII, in a discussion of Socrates'

speech.

The subject of

conversation (in the Lysis) is

friendship (qX(a). But behind

this word,

it is

clear,

as will

be

briefly sketched,

hides

the

more

powerful

Eros...

There is hardly

any terminological distinction

between

love

and friendship,

so

that, first,

desire

is

said

to wish

that

of

which

it is

in

want,

and then

that

the

congenial

be the

object

of

'love, friendship,

and desire'

(,roil

IxkLou

6

re

Epwqxal

h

cpLXEa

al

t

sIouFdm

'ryX&vyL

5av,

221

E).

Friedlander, Paul, Plato, An Introduction,

page

50-51.

is

the purpose

of this

essay

to take some

first steps

towarddis-

pelling

the

popular conception, exemplified

by

the

two above

quotations,

that there

is

little

or no

difference

in

Plato's

dialogues

between the

three important terms

Epwq,

eTctE,

and

ptL?.1

I

say

first

steps

because

the vast

number

of

significant

occurrences

of

these terms

in

the dialogues

makes

it

impossible

to

give

an ex-

haustive

treatment in one short paper.

Consequently,

I

propose

to

do the

following: first,

I

shall elicit the

relevant distinctions

between

these

terms, and

the basis for the distinctions,by a carefulexamination

of

two

significant passages, Symposium

200a-201b,

and

Lysis

221-222.

I

shall attempt

to show therein that

although indeed these terms

have an

important connection with each other, nevertheless there

1

D. N. Levin, Some Observations Concerning Plato's Lysis , (presented at a

meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy,

Amherst, Massachusetts,

August 17, 1964), notes several different positions

taken on the

controversy

(see especially pages 12-18 including footnotes), and

he himself seems to come

out in favor of some distinction at least between

'Epcog

and

yWLX(

(pages

15-17)

However, since the distinction in question is not the

central theme of his

essay,

he does not offer decisive evidence for his view. I propose to do so in this essay.

32

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1968), pp. 32-46


2/15

are distinct

and

significant

differences.

I

shall

then consider several

relevant passages

from other dialogues

in which

I find the distinctions

I draw supported.

My

claim

is

not,

indeed cannot

be,

that

Plato

always

consistently distinguishes

the terms in

question,

that he never

uses

them

interchangeably.

To do so would necessitate

a consideration

of

every

occurrence

of one

or more of these terms

in the

dialogues.

Besides,

there are

undoubtedly

contexts in which

such

subtle

distinc-

tions

are

entirely

irrelevant to the

point being

made.

In

such

cases,

need we

doubt the

sincerity

or the wisdom

of

Socrates' words in

the

Theaetetus

that

To use words and

phrases

in an

easy-going

way

without scrutinizing

them too

seriously

is

not,

in

general,

a

mark of

ill breeding; on the contrary there is something lowbred in being too

precise. 2

Rather

my

more cautious claim will be that

in

at

least

several

important passages

where

the distinctions

would

be

relevant,

Plato

maintains them

consistently. My

suspicion

is

that

this

con-

sistency

is

maintained

more

broadly;

but this

cannot be

proved

in a

short

paper. Finally,

I

shall

offer a few

suggestions

as to

possible

philosophic consequences

that

would derive from a

realization of

these differences.

Let me

begin

with the discussion

between

Socrates

and

Agathon at

Symposium

200a-201b.

Socrates is concerned to

show

Agathon

that

'Epus

is

always

directed,

that

is,

it is

always

'Ep;

of

something

and

not

in

itself,

and also that it

is

always

of

something

which

it lacks.

I shall be concerned not

so

much

with the

establishing

of

these points

as with the careful

and distinct use of the terms

in

question.

Let

me

first arrange

the order

of

the

argument,

with

special emphasis

on the

interchange

of the relevant terms, then comment on the way in

which the

argument develops.

The crucial passage

begins

at

200a2

when, having

established

that

'Epco

always

has

an

object, Socrates

asks

Agathon

to remember

what he thinks the

object

to

be,

and

then

asks,

Does

'Epw;

desire that of which it

is

'Epco? (o vEps 'exeLvou

0o5

I=v

p@,

Out& ouTo5 i

o5;).

This

establishes what

I

shall cal

for reference

step

one,

that desire

(&VnQua4x)

s a

possible predicate

of

'Epco.3

'

EpG.;desires. This thing that it desires and loves, does it

desire

and love it

having

it

or

not

having

it?

(H6orepov

cwv

ocaur6

i5

2

Plato, Theaetetus, 184c. Translation

by F. M. Cornford.

'

I do not mean to imply by the

use of the term steps that these are necessarily

logical steps, that, say, step

four

follows

logically

from

step three.

I am simply

distinguishing the stages

in the

argument

relevant to

my paper.

33


3/15

s7rLOu)e

'r

xaXpI,

elZ'

I

tnUlIeZ

xre X

pI ,

O-

II

oV;).4 Probably

not

having,

says Agathon.

This

I shall

call

step two,

that 'Epod

both desires

and loves,

in other

words,

that love

is in

a

way

self-

predicative,

and that besides

this it

also

desires.

Consider,

says

Socrates,

whether,

rather than probable,

it

is

not necessary

that desire

desires

what

it

lacks,

or does not desire

if

it

does

not

lack.

(x67nC

8&1,

vXL

lo

eLX6toq

e

M&vcyxz

u'r

0'

Z'7rLOLouv

OtWVLU.ZV

Vi

VW;

'=LV,

'

'MtOU1?LV

&&v

-?

C'

ae;

i;).5

Here

we

have

step

three,

which

states

only (as

opposed

to

step

two) that

desire

desires

what it lacks.

An

important

element

in step

three then,

is

that

it

says

nothing

explicitly

about

'Epw;.

To this Agathon

assents.

Socrates next enters upon some examples which both illustrate and

expand

his point.

The object

of the

examples

is this:

if

someone

who

is strong

wishes

to be

strong,

or

if

someone

who is

healthy

wishes to

be healthy,

what he

really

wishes

is to

continue

to be strong

or

healthy

in

the

future,

something

which

he at present lacks.6

But

in the course

of

these

examples,

a

new

word

is

introduced

to

express

that

element

of

desire,

namely

ouXecaOL.

It

may

seem

at first

that

3ou'caoot

and

e7rLtieZvare used interchangeably in this passage, but if this were so,

Socrates

could be accused

of

ignoring

the obvious difference

that

e7r&LOtLdv

s

primarily,

if

not

exclusively,

a

passion,

whereas

PoUAeaOvL

has

the more

intellectual

connotation

of

wishing

or

willing.

But

he does

not,

I

think,

ignore

this.

Thus

Socrates

says

at 200d,

Con-

sider,

then,

whether

whenever

you

say

that

'I

desire

things

now

present,'

you mean

anything

else

than

this, that

'I

wish to possess

the things

I now

have

in the

future

also. '

This

suggests

that the

desire

for

present

possessions

in the future

somehow

loses

the

pas-

sionate

force

of a

present

desire

(ChLOupdc)

so

that

the more intellectual

PoU'Xo,uim

s

appropriate.

Let

us

call this

introduction

of

Poi'Xo,oa?

to

refer

to desire

for

future

possession

step

four.

Socrates

then

switches

back

to

?p&-v

o draw

his

conclusion

from

the examples.

But this

is

to love

that

which is

not

yet

ready

at

hand

for

one,

nor in

one's possession,

the

possession

and

preservation

of

these things in future time. 7 Step five seems to establish that Epwg

4

Plato,

Symposium,

200a5.

6 Ibid., 200a8.

6

Ibid.,

200b8-200e.

7

Ibid.,

200d8. ouxo5v ?o5Yr6

y'&a-lv &xeEvou

&p&v, ou'nwco

?tOL[LOV

MUrT45

&adv

0o8e

1XCL,

6

?et

t6V 17rCL'X

Xp6vov

'rac3rox

tvot

orCp

cO6Lxcvac

xodt

nop6vro;

34


4/15

is also

applicable

to the

possession

of

present

blessings

in the

future

- that

locution

to which

the

verb

Poi')?eaO

is appropriate.

This

man

and

anyone

else

who desires,

says Socrates,

desires

what

is not ready

at hand

nor

present

to him,

and

what he does

not

have, and

what he

is not himself

and

what

he

lacks,

such are the

kinds

of things

of which

desire

and love are. 8 Step

six thus

asserts

that

both

Ep(o

and ZatLOufL

are

of what

one does not have,

what

one

is not himself,

and of

what

one

lacks.

Finally

Socrates

sums

up

the

argument

by

establishing

that

vEpw4

is first

of

something,

and

second,

of

something

which one at

present

lacks (&Xo

7L

C'=tv

6o

Ep&g

np&-ov

,ev

'v

mVov,

?7rsoo'Cro&v

)v

&oXv

gv8eo ncpj

ocUs&

).9

The seventh and final step consists of droppingoff

the interest

in

e'tLOUpa

and

concluding

exclusively

concerning

ÈpwG.

Let

us

now

examine the argument

more closely to

see

what

dis-

tinctions

develop.

Step

one establishes

that

'Epcjg

desires,

that is,

that

desiring

is a

possible predicate

of

Ep,og.

It does

not establish

that

desire

is

the

only

predicate

of

Èpws,

nor,

certainly,

does it even

hint

that

'Ep&o;

nd

EtLOvCu-.

re identical,

as

Bury

would have

us

believe.

Step two increases the dubiousness of Bury's hypothesis when it

adds that vEpco&

oth

desires and loves what it

lacks. The

only way

this

could

be construed

as

implying

that

'Ep&o

and

eOur[Am

re

identical

would

be to

interpret

the presence

of

the

conjunction

here

as a rather sophomoric

redundancy

on Plato's

part.

If

vEpco=

VXLOU.dm,

hen

the

conjunction

of the two

is

entirely

unnecessary.

A much more plausible

explanation

would be that by ascribing

both

loving

and desiring

as

predicates

of

'Ep&g,

having just

ascribed

desiring

individually,

Plato is

indicating

to us that there

is

at least

some

difference

between

them.

What the

difference

is

has as yet

not

even been

hinted at.

We see here

only

the

suggestion

that

there is a

difference.

Step three

is

characterized

by

the

fact

that it

tells us

nothing

directly

about

Èpco.

It

does,

however,

tell

us

something

about

enu&Aoc.10

t tells us that

desire

desires,

that it is self-predicative

in

S

Ibid., 200el. xxl

o5roq

&pm

al

&XXoq

iq

6

&kntOu(13v

ro5

ph

&'rotLou

xl

SroV 0v?

7rpOvrO;

xoc

6

* lXCL

XMt

8

IAj

a-LV

XT6q

xma

o5

kvgt4 &aCrt,

roLat

r',r-m

ta'rlv &v

J

&rLOuJAC

-C

xOd

6

Ip@

&FTEV;

9

Ibid., 200e8.

10

Liddell and

Scott, under

&1=0u[&

say

that 'r

IntOu?.ov

... equals

&tOU[Eda.

Although this may

at times

be

debatable,

it serves the

point here; step

three

is

about

kMOu)imd,

ot

'Epw,.

35


5/15

the same

way

as

'Epcoc.

Epo~

and

sLOu&4o hus have this

much in

common:

they

both desire.

'Epco,

however loves

(4p5)

as

well,

i.e.,

it too is

self-predicative. One

possible

distinction

between

'Epco

and

6t0u,LOa

now begins to emerge: they both desire, but only Epc?

has

been said to

love. It

may be that

an0u[u(m

an

only

desire,whereas

'Epcog

can

both

desire and love.

Nor

ought we

to be

surprised that

such

a

difference arises.

After all,

VmOu,ul0

s

characterized by

Plato

in

the

Phaedrus as

but the

lowest

faculty of

the soul,

as an unruly

monster which

must

be

constrained, sometimes

violently

constrained,

by

the

higher

faculties in order to

prevent it

from

gaining

complete

mastery over

the

soul,1 whereas

'Epco

is

portrayed in the

same

dialogue as divine

madness,

the source of

inspiration

to

divine

philosophy.112

There

must,

then,

be

some other

element

in

'Epco&

n

addition to its

capacity

to

desire,

which

gives

it the

divine status

which

ehr&[da

lacks.

Looking

forward to

the ascent

passage

of

the

Symposium, the charioteer

image

of the

Phaedrus,

and even the

cave

analogy

of the

Republic,

we could

well

suspect

that

it

will

be some

element

of

rationality

which will

accomplish

this

enhancement

of

'Epco. When we think of the brute desire

(EtLOu[da)

of which 'Epco

is

capable,

modified

by

a more rational

element,

our

thought

ought

to turn to the

possibilities offered

by

y6ac

as a source

of

insight.

Perhaps qtXEm

s

also involved in

'Epo

in a

way

which

distinguishes

'Epw

from

e.mOuiEa.

o

explore

this

possibility,

we

must turn to certain

importantpassages

in

Plato's

dialogue

on

(pLkax,

he

Lysis.

The

Lysis

is a

dialogue

whose ostensible concern

is

the nature of a

friend (pLX6;) r more broadly, of friendship

(pLXcx).'8

t might be

pointed

out that the

very

fact that Plato wrote one

dialogue

on

friendship

(ypXoc)

nd

two

on

'Epco

indicates that he at least makes a

distinction between these two

terms,

even if his commentators do

not.

What

concerns

us

here, however,

are

certain

illuminating

statements

on the

possible

relationship

between

'Epw4,

9c0LX,

and

C7nLO04dc.

Near

the end of the

dialogue,

Socrates

is

pointing

out that

cXLai

eed not

be of what

is

absolutely

evil or

absolutely

good,

but

possibly

of

something neither evil nor good. He says at one point, Is it possible

for one

desiring

and

loving

not to befriend

(p6elv)

that which he

desires

and

loves?

(otov

re

oi9v

earLv

i7Ou&oUvrx'

x

?L&pAv'a

orouTOU

I

Plato, Phaedrus, 246ff.

12

Ibid., 244-246.

18

See D. N. Levin, op. cit. (n. 1), pages

9-10 for a

discussion

of

this.

36


6/15

0o

eOtU.tL

Xm,L

P T

(pLXBEZV;).14

o

which

Lysis replies,

It

seems to

me

not.

This

sentence

is most

instructive,

for

it

directly mentions

and relates the

three terms

in

question.

It

suggests

that

it

is

impossible

for

one

desiring

and

loving

(7rtLOouivat. xocL

pxv-dr) not to

befriend

(FI?

t9Xev)

ts

object.

That

is,

if

one

both desires

and

loves

(erLOUie

xal

kp-),

he must

also

befriend

(pLXd)

as well.

Now,

we

would

hardly

want

to say

that if one

simply

desired, he

would

also befriend.

'ETLOu-

tLCx,

as the lower

passion,

would

hardly

deserve

such

a

close

association

with the

more rational

yLX(c.

The

question

as

to

whether one

who

loves

(4p)

also

befriends

(pXct)

is

more

difficult,

but

probably con-

tains

the

crux

of our

problem.

I

offer

the

following

suggestion:

it

begins to look as though qLX6must be more closely associated with

'Epw;

than

with

C'mOulA.

A

hierarchy

begins to

emerge, with &rLOu-

.daCt the

bottom

and

(pLXLt

the

top,

and

these two

terms

mediated,

as

it

were, by

'Epwg,

which

contains

elements of

both.

The criterion

of

this

hierarchy

clearly

is

involved

with

the

degree of

rationality

implicit

in the

terms.

'E=Oufao,

the

lower

passion,

contains

virtually

no

rationality.

In

fact, it

is a

constant hindrance to

reason,

as

we learn

in the Phaedrus.'L Ep&s, as we learn from Diotima's revelation,

contains

a

considerable element

of

reason

or

deliberative

ability.

It

acts as

the mediator between

gods and men.16

In

its

mythical pre-

sentation

as

the son

of Poros and

Penia, it

is described as

...

plotting

after

beautiful

things and

good

things, being

manly

and energetic

and

impetuous, a

clever

hunter,

always weaving

plots,

desirous of

thoughtfulness,

inventive,

a

philosopher

throughout

its

life.. .17

Moreover,

in

the

famous

ascent

passage ,'8

we

leam

that

as the

degree

of

reason

in

'Epcs

increases, whereby

one

turns his

attention

to

increasingly higher

objects

of

love,

'Ep&q

becomes

transformed,

in its

highest

manifestation, into

p)LX,

indeed the

cpLXEm

or

aocptx,

1

Plato,

Lysis, 221b. I have

adopted

to befriend

for

qlXtlv ,

because

it

seemed

the most

plausible

way to

maintain

the

connection

between

qLxelv

and

TOA

(friendship).

However, it

is in fact an

inadequate

translation, because it

fails to

bring

out

the

subtlety

of the distinction

between

(pOXcv,

nd

&p&.v

n

this

sentence. The point is that

9LxCLv

has less

17:LO[uLEa

n it than does &p&v. ut to

befriend is

too weak.

Both

Ip&cv

nd

9LXclv

should really

be translated

to love

with the

former understood to

be

somewhat

stronger than the

latter.

15

Plato, Phaedrus,

247b,

and

elsewhere.

16

Plato, Symposium,

202e.

17

Ibid., 203b-204, not

to

mention that

in

this

description

'Epcq

is the veritable

image

of

Socrates.

Is

Ibid.,

210-212b.

37


7/15

or philosophy.

00kXa, hen, is 'Epcosmodified by an increased

degree

of rationality.

At the risk of

being

capricious

we

could say that the

highest pursuit

of man

is not

erosophy but philosophy

because

by the time man reacheshis highest condition, the erotic drive which

started

him on his way has

been modified, but not sublimated,

by

an

increased

rationality,

so that it becomes

a

pXtoc

or wisdom. In

fact, it is precisely

this

increased

degree

of

rationality

which has

enabled

man to settle his erotic drive on

its

most

proper

and

highest

object, wisdom itself.

To

hold such a view is

not,

of

course, to

maintain

that

there

is

no relation whatsoever between

these terms. That even

the two extremes,

pL?E

and

e.LOUVd4x,

are

somewhat related

is shown

by a statement which Socrates

makes shortly after the last quotation

from

the

Lysis,

at 221d. Desire

is the

cause

of

friendship,and that

which desires

is a friend

to

that which it desires, at the time

when it

desires.

(4

F

tOuliEm

rn

?tLcx,

oclx(a,

xal

'o

Z7rL0uLoiUvrp[LXov

'oTv

'O6'Z o6

C7tlOu4LC

xal'

6o'-e

6

7LOt

i

u...).19

Thus the

desiring

(so

ZmLOt)ou)v)

ecomes

a friend to that which it desires

in

order o

possess

it.

This

illustrates that the two terms

are

related but different.

Again,

that

Z'nu&.da

is the cause of friendshipalso indicates that at least the

extremes, cpL?,L

and

etLOuj.do

re

different,

unless we wanted to hold

the

unlikely

view that tLEot

s a causa sui. This is

reiterated

in another

way

a few

sentences

later when Socrates argues that although we

desire what

we

lack, nonetheless,

Love and

friendship

and

desire,

as

it seems happens

to

be

of

what

belongs

to it.

(soiu

o'Lxetou

,

c

gOtX?V,

0

T

9p

O

aL

Yn

TqLX(

XOCl

)

C7MOUpLLOCL

UyXxVEL

o?ia).20

The fact

that all three terms are mentioned again indicates that they are

different, yet

the content of the statement itself

suggests

another

important

similarity. Although

all three

are

of what

they

do not

have,

their

objects

nonetheless

are what

belong

to

them,

what is

proper

to them.21

Let us

now return to the order

of

argument

in

the

Symposium.Step

four

contains the introduction

of

Po&'sXaeOt

o

apply

to the desire for

present possessions

in the future. It is

important

to see that

PoUAXaOt

has at least this much in common with spavand

&C70utOZV;

it too is

19

Plato, Lysis,

221d3.

30

Ibid., 221e3.

31

Let us remind ourselves

again

that to construe the ascription

of the

same

predicate

to these terms

as an

indication

of their identity

would be

a wholly

unsatisfactory

procedure.

38


8/15

always of

that which it lacks.22But 3Ou'XeAocthas the sense

of deli-

beration

or

reasoning

for what

one

wishes,

which sense

&rntOuV.C

acks.

That is, the

difference

between

the

simple present

desire

(C'tMOUpit)

and the assessment

that the

object

is

also desirable

in the future

(for

which

Poi'XeaOa

is employed)

is that the latter

requires

some element

of

deliberation

as

to the

value

(or

at least

desirability)

of the

object.

At Republic

438 aff., a passagewe

shall

consider

later,

Socrates satisfies

Glaucon that an

&ItLOuji(

like

thirst,

makes

no

value

judgment

as

to

its

object;

it desires

not

good drink,

but

simply

drink.

Poueaott,

on the other hand, suggests

the deliberative

or rational element

whereby we

assess

the

object

of our desire as worth

having in the

future. Socrates' examples in the present passage are instructive in

this

regard.

His examples of

things which we

wish for

(3ouX6,eOoc)

n

the future are strength, health,

and

wealth.23

Evidence for

my

view

that these

things require

some deliberation

before one seeks them

(and

are not simply objects

of

erLu&.do)

s

that these

are

precisely

the three examples which Glaucon uses at

Republic

357c to convince

Socrates of

a third class

of goods

which

require

activities painful

and unpleasant in themselves (exercise, being healed, working) but

which are tolerated

and consideredgood because

of their

good conse-

quences.

As step

five

indicates,

this reasoned desire for present

possessions

in

the future qualifies as

`Epw4.

This is

to love that which

is

not

present

to one, and which he does not have... ('Ouxo5v oi5t6

y'ea'sV

~xexsou

9pV,

8

O57rcW

roL[Lov

c-rx

IarV

oi

&

ZXeL...),24

This too suggests

that the introduction of the

deliberation

involved in

Po'X?rOoct

ifts

the status of the

merely

passionate

&97c&4doo

the level

of

Ep&g.

Again

we can

argue

that central to the distinction

between

es;tu41(a

and 'Epcs

is the presenceof

rationality in

'Epw;.

Thus,

concludes

Socrates

in

step six,

both desire

and love are of

what one does

not have, of what one is not,

and of what

one

lacks.

This

is consistent,

because as we have seen,

both Epco

and

e&irLQt

desire,

and one

desires what

one lacks. This conclusion,

then,

concerns

only the fundamental similarity between Epto and Our?LEaocrates

does not

state

explicitly

the difference

between

these terms.

That

remains

the enterpriseof the reader.

In the

summary of his

discussion with

Agathon, Socrates

ceases

22

Plato,

Symposium,

200b.

23

Ibid.,

200d.

'4

Ibid., 200d8.

39


9/15

mentioning

both

'Ep;

and

krOupia

and concludes exclusively con-

cerning

Epw.

This is because the

stated topic of conversation s 'Epcoc

not

C'Ovudca.

We have

learned

about

&7rLOutLm

oo in this discussion,

as well as about

cpOEm,

but the explicit purpose in the context of

the Symposium

has been to determine

certain

things about

Epco;.

We have learned

that Epoj is always directed towards

an object,

and that its object

is

always

something that it

lacks.

In the context of these remarks

about the

nature of

'Epwq

in the

Symposium,

we

have seen the

necessity

of

making

a

more complex

distinction between

three related

but different terms:

C7LOu['to,

'Epo;,

and

cptXM.

et

me try to sum up in a coherent fashion

the distinctions

which have so far emerged.

'EmtOu[da

e know to be the lowest

faculty of the

soul, the brute desire

to possess what one lacks.

'Epco;

also desires,but unlike

mLOutita,

which only

desires,

Epwo

both

desires

and loves.

The difference

between

'Epo

and

?tLOu,u(a,

hen

must

lie in this

and loves.

I

have suggested that the qualitative

differencebetween

'Epco&

nd

'r=Ouda(

ies

in the

presence

of

rationality

in

'Epwg.

In

its purest form,

the modification

of the

desire

for

possession

by rationality or contemplation is y&X6.The aspect of Epwsand

ctoc

is thus a rational or contemplative aspect

which is

usually

accompaniedby desire.

I

propose now

to cite several passages both

in

the Symposium

and

in

other dialogues,

in

which

the thesis that there

is

a

distinction

between

L7tOUi.to,

Ep&gand

ytEa,

and

that the distinction hinges

on

the presence

and degree

of

reason

in

each,

is

borne

out.

At

the

same time I shall begin to suggest certain philosophic consequences

whichfollow therefrom.

To take the

ascent passage

of the Symposium

first;

in that

pas-

sage

we

are

presented

with the

erotic ascent

of a

lover and

potential

philosopher from

the love of one beautiful body,

through the

love of

all

physical beauty, through the

love

of increasingly higher objects,

to

the

love of

the beauty of knowledge,

and

finally

to the

love

of

Beauty itself.

This ascent is endlessly

rich with philosophicpossibilities,

but we must confine ourselves here to an examination of what it can

tell us

about

the distinction

between

'Epco;,

mOu,i(m

and

ypLX(m.

The first thing to notice is the first

step: It is necessary

says Diotima,

for

one

rightly

pursuing this business to begin

when

he is

young by

pursuing beautiful bodies, and first

if he is rightly

led by

his

leader,

he will

love one body and in it

he

will

beget beautiful

speeches. 25

25

Ibid., 210a4.

40


10/15

We see here that

although

Plato

begins

the erotic ascent to

philosophy

on

a much more

concrete level

than

many

philosophers

would

be

willing

to grant, he has still not

begun

at the

most concrete

level.

For Plato has Diotima

begin

this

ascent at what

is

already

a

fairly

advanced

stage

of

development;

the

young person

in

question has

already

discerned the

beauty

of the

physical

body,

and

picked

out

that

quality

as

worthy

of love. The

higher

level of this first

step

is

also

indicated by

the manner of

generation

which

results;

the

lover

will

generate not human

children,

or even sexual

gratification,

but

beauti-

ful

speeches

(?o6you

ocXoi))

n the

soul of

the

beloved. A

prior

stage

of

development, then, would have

been

an

undiscerning

or

indiscri-

minate desire for the possession of the physical body, a desire whose

generative

issue

would have been sexual

gratification,

or

at best

(if

the affair

were

heterosexual)

human

children.

But what else

would

that

desire be but

&7rLOuutO

This

ascent

is an

ascent of

Ep&o,

and

therefore does

not

begin with

the

absolutely

lowest

level,

which

would

be

&7rOu,(ac.

A

complete

ascent would

necessitate a

beginning with

pure

i'mOultm,

or

desire for

the possession of a

physical

body, that

is,

for sexual intercourse.Plato has given us that beginning in an earlier

ascent

just

prior

to

the

present

one,

which was

stated

in

terms of

the desire

(ZhrOudoc)

or

generation.26

There,

the

ascent

began

with the

lOUpd

for

procreation,which was

characteristic even of

beasts,

and

ascended to such

higher

procreations as

the

works of

Homer and

Hesiod, and

the

laws of

Solon

and

Lycurgos. If we

were

now to

juxta-

pose

these two

ascents,

we would

see

that

the first

ascent

constituted

the

absolute

beginning,

whereas

the

beginning

of

the second

ascent,

the

one now in

question,

already

represents a

certain

stage of

deve-

lopment. And

what

precisely is that

stage? It is

the

stage

of dis-

criminatingor

reasoningcapacity

which our

earlier

analysis suggested

differentiates

Epoc

from

Cr&LOdcu.

It

is

also worth

noting that

the

highest

stage

of the

earlier ascent

(of desire for

procreation),

aws

and

politics

(exemplified

by Solon

and

Lycurgus)

27

is

but a

middle

level in

the more

famous ascent of the

love of beauty.28 Whatever the deeper reasons for this, it reveals

that

m7rOu[Aoc

nd

'Ep&4

overlap, but

'Ep(o

has

higher

manifestations

than

does

'LmOu[da,

n

particular

the

two

highest

steps

on the philo-

sophic

ascent, love of

knowledge

(popOL,a6E)

nd love

of

Beauty

26

Ibid.,

207-210.

27

Ibid.,

209d.

28

Ibid.,

210c.

41


11/15

Itself

(ypXoaopc).

This was indicated in our

analysis

by the fact that

'Ep&o

and

C'=Ouda

both desire

-

this is where they overlap

-

yet the

reasoning ability of which Epwg

s capable makes it higher.

A look at the transitions in the erotic ascent to Beauty Itself

again shows the involvement of

reason and

Epcoq.

or the redirection

of

one's Ep&o rom one step

to another, for instance from the love

of one beautiful body

to

the

love of all physical beauty, is accomplish-

ed

when one realizes

(VVonamV

O)29

that the beauty of all physical

things

is

related.

Thus the ascent of

Epcog,he redirection of one's

'Epwg

on

increasingly worthy

objects, is possible because of the

in-

creased presenceof reason

in

Ep&o.

In the last two steps of the ascent, the love of all knowledge, and

the love of Beauty Itself, one's

Ep&;has become so imbued

with

reason that

it is

more properly

called

(cpLoc,

ndeed, the

pL?Wa

for

aop6x.

For

in the

next

to the last step, the love of the beauty of

all

knowledge

(ZhUaTn[),

the aspirant

is

partaking

in

unencumbered

philosophy

(v

pXoaoptoc

Op06v),30

and of

course,

in

the

last

step,

the glimpse

of

Beauty Itself,

one is at

the level of

philosophy

too.

This also supports the results of our earlier analysis; the difference

between Ep&g nd cpcao

s

one

of

degree.

And

the

degree

in

question

is

the degree of reason

which

is

present

in

one's Ep&g.

Thus the

''ascent

passage

is

entirely

consistent

with

the results

of our

earlier

analysis, both

in

regard

to the

order

of

the

hierarchy

(efLQu[dc-'Epwq-

ypaLXL)

and

in

regard

to

the

principle

of

differentiation:

the

presence

and

degree

of reason.

My thesis also finds ample support in Plato's other great dialogue

on

'Ep&o,

the

Phaedrus. To

take

the

negative way first;

in the

speech of Lysias, and

more

importantly,

in the

first

speech

of

Socrates

for

which

he

must later

offer

a

recantation,

Ep(o4

s

indeed

identified

with

ehnNu,i..

He

defines

Epcog

n this

speech

as irrationaldesire

('

&veu

Xoyou ebtLOtdo)31

which,

far from

inspiring

one

to

philosophy

as

the Symposium suggests,

rather

prevents

both

the

lover

and

his

beloved

from

pursuing

divine

philosophy. 32

t

is clear

throughout

these first two speeches that Epc is interpreted, and censured, as

irrational

and harmful

sexual

lust,

or

ehr&tLta.

his is

why

both

speeches

advocate

that

one

avoid

relationships

with

lovers.

Yet

Socrates

29

Ibid.,

210b.

20

Ibid.,

210d6.

al

Plato,

Phaedrus,

238b7.

32

Ibid.,

239b.

42


12/15

insists

that he

make a recantation for

this

speech because it was a

sin

against

'Epw, 33

the sort

of thing one would

expect

to hear

from

sailors

who

had never

experienced

any higher

love.34

Clearly then,

this

interpretation

of

Epwg

s to be

rejected.

The

more positive

statement of

the nature and function

of the

soul's

'Epwq

in

Socrates'

second speech offers even

stronger

support

for

my

thesis. There the famous

charioteer

image

is

presented; the

soul

is

likened

to a team

of

horses and

a

charioteer.

The black,

ugly,

unmanageable

horse,

it is

usually agreed,

represents

desire, or

entOu[LEo.

he handsome white

horse,

more obedient to the

orders

of

the

charioteer,

represents spirit

(Ouli6q).

The

distinction

between

'Epw; and kn&Ou[Aa.s clear from the outset;

?shOur.ta,

represented by

the black

horse,

is the lowest and

most

unruly faculty

of

the soul, a

constant danger

to its higher functions.

'Epcoq,

however,

is divine

madness

which

pervades

the whole

soul.

Indeed,

one

crucialdifference

between

'Epw~ and

inOuti?M

is

the relation of each to

the

charioteer,

reason.

'En&sL'o.c,he black

horse, resists and

disobeys the

charioteer

whenever possible.35 Ep&o,

on the

contrary,

finds its fulfillment (in

philosophy) only when the charioteer is in proper command. Per-

vading

the

whole

soul,

Epwq

ontains

in

its nature

desire,

spirit,

and

reason. But its fulfillment

requires

that

the

reason

which is

part

of

its

nature exhibit its

presence

and control

over its

?tnLOU[.da

6

This

should

be sufficient to

show that

it is

only when

reason

is

sufficiently

present and

active

in

'Ep&q

hat

'Epw;

can

achieve its

highest mani-

festation,

in

philosophy.

Remembering

that at this

highest mani-

festation, Epcos

s

indeed

a

cpLXEa,

e can

see that this

passage

alsois

consistent

with the

distinction,

however

slight,

between

Epwq

and

tEoc,

a distinction of

which Plato indicates he is

aware at

Phaedrus

255e,

where the

young beloved mistakes

his

feelings

of

Ep&g or

cpLXt.

Thus all the distinctions which

we found

present

in

the

Sym-

posium

are also

present

in

the

Phaedrus;

'Epco, kbrOupdo,

and

cpLtX

are

all

differentiated,

and the

principle

of

differentiation is

the pre-

sence and

degree

of reason.

I wish now to turn briefly to the Republicwhere support is also

present for my view. It

will

be

remembered that one

stage

in

my

88

Ibid.,

242e4.

84

Ibid.,

243c5.

85

Ibid.,

253e,

254a,

254c,

el.

al.

Il

This

is a constant theme

throughout

the

speech.

See

especially

the remark

of

of

Socrates at 256a8.

43


13/15

argument

from

the Symposium

concerned

the

introduction

of the

term

PoueafxL

which

was to

be

distinguished

from ?UL#OuLCZV

nd

which pointed

the

way to

4p&v.37

The

distinction between

?7rVrLOUZV

and

poUAeaOaL

s indicated

in the Republicat

437b-c,

where Socrates

is

establishing

the

tripartite

division

of the soul.

He

wants

to show

that

desire

(e7tOu[L(a)

s

one of these

parts,

and in so doing says,

What then,

said

I,

of thirst and

hunger

and the desires generally,

and

again

(my italics)

willing

and wishing... (-r[ou'v;

jv

'y6')c

aLt4v

xalJ~

t?lVmV XMt

6X,( e'7r&

OUtL'M

XOcdt5

'r O

XeLv

xaL

'rs

po,a...)

My

point here is

that

by distinguishing

the

desires

(k

e'7vOu[Eoc;)

from

wishing ('r6

PouieaOoc),

indeed emphasizing

the distinction

by

the use of and again (xot oa5),we see that that distinction is held

consistently

in this

dialogue

too.38

Again,

this

by

way

of

support

for

the difference

between 'Epw

and

ehr&u,uL,

Socrates at

438a

is satis-

fying

Glaucon

that

desire, qua

desire,

is only

of its object,

with

no

further qualifications.

He

warnsGlaucon,

'Let no one then,'

said

I,

'disconcert

us when off our guard

with

the

objection

that everybody

desires not drink but good drink

(4g

oC8clg

noTro5

ntLOu Zt

X

Xp ro'roo3)nd not food but good food because all men desire good

(7r6iv'T?

yip

&pa

-r&v

&yaxO&v

n&rOto5atv)

nd so if thirst is

desire

it would

be

of good

drink

or

of

good

whatsoever it

is;

and so similarly

of other desires. '

8

Since

hrrLu.Ltca

s not to

be understood

as discriminating

between

objects

as to their goodness,

it

must surely

be differentiated

from

'Epus

which

in

the Symposium

is

defined

as of the eternal

possession

of the

good. 40

Finally, to point to one of the so-called earlierdialogues, the

Charmides

offers

appropriate

support

for some of

the distinctions

I

have drawn.4

At

Charmides

167e,

Socrates

is concerned

to

call

into

question

the

possibility

that wisdom

should

have

no

subject

matter

of

its own,

but

rather be the science of sciences.

To

repudiate

this,

87

Above, pp. 38-39.

38

On

the other

hand,

see

Republic

439a9,

where Socrates

uses

Po6Xvrau

s

virtual-

ly synonymous

with

kn&Outet,

here

the subtle distinction

between

them is not

important.

39

Translation

is that of

Paul

Shorey.

See also

439a-b.

40

Plato, Symposium,

206a. Notice

that

at Symposium

205a,

Diotima, by way

of correcting

Aristophanes,

asserts that people

will even

cut off a

part

of

them-

selves if they think

it will bring them good.

41

I

wish to thank David

Gallop

for

pointing

out

these

passages

to me.

The

interpretation

of them

presented

here is of course

my

own responsibility.

44


14/15

he cites

several

parallel

cases

where,

he suspects,

the implausibility

wil

be obvious.

Three of these examples

are especially relevant

to

the present problem,

for they again

indicate a consistent

maintenance

of the

relevant distinctions

on Plato's

part.

Socrates

says

at 167e,

Could there

be

any

desire

(7rt0upAm)

hich

is not the desire of

any

pleasure,

but of itself

and of all other desires? Certainly

not. Or

can

you imagine

a

wish

(Po0X7atq)

which wishes

(Ao6XrcxL)

for no

good,

but

only

for itself

and all

other

wishes? I should

answer no. Or would

you

say that

there is a love

(fpcom)

which

is not the

love of

beauty,

but

of

itself

and

of other loves?

I should

not. '2

We

notice first that

the three terms

are

distinguished, supporting

the thesis

of this

paper.

But the

way

in which

they

are

distinguished,

namely, according to their objects, is also significant. The object of

&vutAa

s

pleasure.

This differentiates it

from

'Epcos

both

in

this

dialogue

and

in

Socrates' speech

in the

Symposiun.

Significantly

enough,

the

object

of

Epcos

s the Charmides

s

beauty (sorxocX6v)

whereas that of

Pou'-aL

is

the good

(ro6

&yaO6v).

n the Symposium

both

Agathon

and the

young

Socrates

begin

with the view that

'Epco;'

object

is the beautiful but

are

corrected

by

Diotima,

who shows

that

'Ept' true object is the good. Perhapswe could say that this transi-

tion

was

prefigured

by the transition

which

I

treated

earlier from

?7mOlutoA

o

'Epco;,

where these two terms

were

mediated,

as

it were,

by ,Bou')CGaO,

hose object,

we learn now

in the Charmides,

s the good.

If

so,

we see again the remarkable

consistency

with

which Plato used

these

important terms.

Still

further,

we see

again

that one

consequence of the

different

objects

of

Oupidcx

nd

Pou'i)Xa

(pleasure

and

the good) is that

PoUA-mLq

equires, over and above the simple desire for the object,

the

deliberative ability wherewith to

assess that

its object

is good,

once

again supporting

the distinction

drawn earlier between

these

two terms.46

Such

is

the evidence

I

wish to put forward

for

the

hierarchical

distinction

between

brLOu,da,

Epus, and

cpara

based on the

degree

and presence

of

reason. Some

of the consequences

of this view

for the

4I

Translation is

that of Jowett.

48

Plato,

Symposium, 205-206a.

44 Above, pp.

38-39.

6

That the object

of

'Epws

also involves this

deliberative ability

is

supported

by

a

general

consideration of

Socrates's speech

in

the Symposium,

but

especially

by the

correction

mentioned above, that

'Epcw

most proper object

is

really the

good.

45


15/15

Symposium, and in particular for

the important ascent passage ,

I

have already noted.

I

would like to conclude by suggesting a far

more pervasive consequence. If

Plato is indeed suggesting, as I

maintain, that reason is not

merely occasionally interrelated with,

but indeed

part

of the

very

nature of

Epcoq,

s

opposed

to

desire,

then he forces us to reconsiderthe

notion, popular

in

his day as it is

today, that love

is

necessarily and

unambiguously

in

the realm of

the irrational.

By

extension he

forces

us to reconsider

such clear-

cut distinctions in Greek thought as

Nietzsche popularized between

the Dionysian

and

the Apollonian.

Finally by lifting 'Ep&o

from

the

realm of irrational feeling, Plato avoids the rather bizarre conse-

quence that philosophy, which is after all a species of love, would,

while standing

as the

champion

of

rationality,

have its base

in

the

utterly, exclusively,

irrational.

As

Nietzsche

himself

said in Thus

Spoke

Zarathustra:

True,

we

love

life,

not

because we are

used

to

living but because

we

are

used to

loving.

There

is

always

some madness

in love.

But

there is

always

some

reason n

madness. 46

46 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by Walter Kaufmann in The

Portable

Nietzsche,

Viking Press,

New York, page

153.

Trinty

College,Hartford,

Connecticut.

῎Ερως, ᾿Επιθυμία, and Φιλία in Plato (Drew A. Hyland)

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