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Albet, A. Benach, N. (2012), Doreen Massey: Un sentido global del lugar, : Icaria.Allen, J. Massey, D. (1985) (.), Geographical Worlds, : Oxford University Press

Open University.

Allen, J. Massey, D. (1988) (.), The Economy in Question, : Sage.Allen, J. Massey, D. (1988) (.), Uneven Re-Development : cities and regions in transition,

: Routledge.

Allen, J., Massey, D. Cochrane, A. (1998), Rethinking the Region, : Routledge.Massey, D. (1973), Towards a Critique of Industrial Location Theory, Antipode 5(3): 33-39.Massey, D. (1985), Spatial Divisions of Labour. Social Structures and the geography of production,

: Macmillan ( 1995).

Massey, D. (1987), Nicaragua, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.Massey, D. (1991), A global sense of place, Marxism Today ( 1991).Massey, D. (1994), Space, Place and Gender, : Polity.Massey, D. (1998), Power Geometries and the Politics of Space-Time, Hettner Lecture, Department

of Geography, University of Heidelberg ( -

2001: , :, -).

Massey, D. (2007), World City, : Polity. Massey, D. (2008), When theory meets politics, Antipode (3)40: 492-497.Massey, D. Allen, J. (.) (1984), Geography Matters! A Reader, : Cambridge Uni-

versity Press, Open University Press.

Massey, D. Meagan, R. (1979), The geography of industrial reorganisation: the spatial effectsof the restructuring of the electrical engineering sector under the industrial reorganisationcorporation, : Pergamon Press.

Massey, D. Meagan, R. (1982), The Anatomy of Job Loss: The how, why and where of employ-ment decline, : Methuen.

Massey, D., Quintas, P. Sarre, P. (1992), High-Tech Fantasies. Science parks in society, scienceand space, : Routledge.

Phelps, N. (2008), Spatial Divisions of Labour (1984) Doreen Massey, Hubbard, P., Kitchin,

R. Valentine, G.G. (.), Key Texts in Human Geography, : Sage: 83-90, . , . (2012), , : . -

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RADICAL SPATIALITY AND THE QUESTIONOF DEMOCRACY

Doreen Massey1

It is a great honour to have been awarded an Honorary Doctorate here at the Ge-

ography Department at Harokopio University in Athens. I remember first coming

here in 2000 to present a paper about the importance and the structure of the dis-

cipline. The Geography Department then was in its infancy, but I had known about

plans for it for quite a while before, through my friend and colleague Professor

Costis Hadjimichalis, one of the people who, as I understand it, was instrumental

in its founding. So it was a joy to be one of the early celebrants of its birth. To be

invited back now, to receive this degree from you, is therefore also much more

than an honour: it is a deep personal pleasure.

I was also visited in 2005, when the theme of my lecture here concerned Lon-

don: a world city that is fiercely contested politically, that is a focus of networks

of power that dominate both the wider nation of the United Kingdom and vast

parts of our planet, a city that is, in all the aggregate statistics, immensely wealthy

and the places and the architectures of that wealth flaunt their success over the

central areas, a city that is rightly proud of its street-level multicultural nature, but

also a city that is riven by deep inequalities, and finally, and perhaps most impor-

tantly in the present context, a city that is a centre of global finance and that has

been crucial in the invention, birth and dissemination of what we have all learned

to call neoliberalism.

That was in 2005. The economic triumph of neoliberalism seemed then so as-

sured, the bankers so confident, the ideology of markets so unarguable, the new

class of the super-rich so convinced that the good times (for them) would go on

for ever. There was a host of warnings from the Left (it is not true that no-one pre-

dicted this crisis), but they were ignored. And then, from 2007, economically it all

imploded. The political challenges and opportunities that we face today are very

different, and it is in this present context that I want to develop the theoretical

propositions of this essay.

Yet some things endure. And I should like to take a moment to acknowledge

the enduring friendship both of Costis Hadjimichalis, whom I have already men-

tioned, and of Professor Dina Vaiou, of the National Technical University of

Athens. Their commitment and solidarity, their hospitality and warmth, and their

intellectual contribution have been immensely important to me for decades.

Among the many ways through which we came to know each other over the years

were the Aegean Seminars which they organised a mixture of intellectual ex-

ploration, personal friendship, social commitment, and much fun, that perfectly ex-

presses Costis and Dinas contribution (and is also what we all need). What those

seminars, and our longer and wider endeavours, have been about is trying to un-

derstand the world through a radical, and geographical, perspective. This is a per-

spective that has had to be actively forged; indeed the process is still going on. And

among our commitments was a theme very appropriate to the present occasion

that geography matters. That the spatiality of a society makes a difference to the

12 , 21, 2013

1 Professor Emeritus, Open Uni-

versity, UK d.b.massey@open.ac.uk

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way it works; that distinct societies and social settlements have distinct geogra-

phies; that building a new world means building new geographies too.

That geography really does matter could hardly be more evident in the present

conjuncture (Massey, forthcoming). The crisis of the Eurozone has its roots in ge-

ography and in the inability to take geography seriously. The failure to construct

a financial architecture that could adequately work with the pre-existing economic

uneven development between countries led to a further deepening of that eco-

nomic inequality. Today, and with unconscious but deep irony, the hegemonic dis-

courses explain the collapse of their geographically inadequate model by turning

the blame on to individual constituent spaces (Spain, or Greece) while in fact it is

the elites themselves who have produced the problem. In other words, having not

taken sufficient care with uneven development (geography) in their construction

of the euro they then set about politically constructing the inevitable disastrous

result precisely in those terms. It is a geographical sleight of hand that is now hav-

ing grave consequences.

First, it runs the risk of setting the peoples of different countries against each

other: the people of Greece or Spain against the people of Germany, for instance.

Second, and this is the purpose, in this geographical conjuring trick the real enemy

disappears. The capitalist reality, which is that the struggle is between on the one

hand the financial sector and the elites and on the other hand the majority of the

people of all the countries, is effectively obscured. Third, by this means in turn thepolitical frontier is converted from being one between classes and social and eco-

nomic interests into being one between countries and peoples. And fourth, this

entails the moulding of our political identities in terms of geography and nation-

ality rather than in terms of class (Im not saying that geographical identities are

never appropriate, but in this particular instance they are worse than inappropri-

ate). All of this follows from a lack of understanding of, and a political manipu-

lation of, geographies. For sure, geography matters.

In the present essay I want to take up again this theme of geography matters,

but in a rather different way, and in response to another issue that has come to the

forefront at the current moment. This is the question of democracy.

It has become commonplace to argue over the last three decades of neoliberal

hegemony that we have been witness to a serious evisceration both of the public

sphere and of democracy. We have observed this in a thousand ways, and some of

them will be taken up later in this essay. It has also been widely noted that some

of this closing down of the potential for democracy has had a specifically geo-

graphical configuration. Indeed the privatisation of public space has become a

major theme both within some critical social sciences and among political pro-

testers. It is a privatisation that selectively refuses access, and denies the right to

gather, protest or demonstrate. Londons contribution to the Occupy ovement,

to take one example, was deeply moulded by this denial its original choice of lo-

cation, outside Londons Stock Exchange (hence the name LSX) being refused

precisely on the grounds that this square was now private property (the subse-

quent move, to the steps of St. Pauls Cathedral, and on to land owned in part by

the Church and in part by the [financially dominated] Corporation of London was

in fact to prove highly propitious see Massey 2012). To this, many other less

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recognised phenomena could be added. I would argue, for instance, that the weak-

ened and often decrepit form of representative democracy that we have in many

European countries has become, even more than before, spatially centralised on

to major (capital) cities. This follows a certain spatial centralisation of capital, and

of elites. The voices of poor regions, and of rural areas, rarely get heard. Reporters,

of tv, radio and the print media, rarely venture to report seriously beyond the cap-

ital city, and so on. Indeed, in this regard much of the opposition to the neoliberal

regime has been just as guilty. In the so-called critical social sciences there is a per-

sistent tendency to replace the term society with the word city. Everything is about

the city. There are reasons for this for instance the argument that it is from the

cities that alternatives are most likely to be articulated (but even then what of the

Zapatistas and the Naxalites?). But it is both theoretically inadequate and in itself

undemocratic (and smacks a bit of self-absorption too, since this is where many

of the protagonists are based) to reduce the politically recognised world to that of

the large metropolis. The general point, however, is unarguable that democ-

racy in whatever terms has taken a severe battering.

It is in part as a result of this that there is a strong current within many of

todays street-level protest movements, not for the reinvigoration of current forms

of democracy (party politics and representative democracy) but for their complete

rejection.2 Instead, the proposal is for direct democracy, decision-making in as-

semblies, the pursuit of consensus and, at a wider level, the emergence of the

common.

Part of what I want to argue here is that these two approaches to democracy are

implicitly founded on contrasting spatial imaginations, contrasting background

assumptions about the geography of society, and that excavations of these spatial

contrasts may contribute to the debates between them. However I want to begin

with a wider argument: that there are deep connections, connections that go be-

yond the, perfectly correct, observations about public space and so forth, between

democracy and the conceptualisation of space.

Space: co-evalness and respect

What I should like to propose, then, is that there may be deep relations between

spatiality and democracy, relations that stem from the very conceptualisation of

these two phenomena.

One of the characteristics of space that is probably undisputed is that it is the

dimension of multiplicity. That is to say, if time is the dimension of succession

(one thing after another), of development, and of becoming in the Bergsonian

sense, space in contrast is the dimension of the existence at the same time ofmore than one thing, event, trajectory, etc. Space is the dimension of the simul-

taneity of a multiplicity of trajectories.3 This is important. Space is in that sense

the essential dimension of our thrown-togetherness.

A number of political implications follow from this. The first, simplest and

most obvious is that it is space, as that dimension of contemporaneous co-exis-

tence, that is the ground for posing to us that most fundamental of political ques-

tions: how are we going to live together. It is, in that sense, the grounding dimen-

14 , 21, 2013

2 There are many other rea-

sons too, the rejection of any

forms of constituted (as opposed

to constituent) power being one

of them see Hardt and Negri

2001, Holloway 2002.

3 This is only one element. On

the conceptualisation of space

more generally see Massey 2005.

001:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:33 PM Page 14

sion of the social (in its most general sense, referring not just to human society but

to our condition of living in a non-human world too that is, the social in contrast

to the individual). The second, and consequent, implication is that it is space that

poses to each of us the challenge of the existence of others, human and other-than-

human. Taken seriously, this characteristic of the spatial dimension urges upon us

an attitude of outward-looking-ness. It begins, thereby, to pose the challenge of

democracy.

This sounds so bland. It is easy to agree without taking seriously its political

implications. For what is at issue here is a radical contemporaneity: the acknowl-

edgment of co-evalness. The anthropologist Johannes Fabian, who has written

much about background conceptualisations of space and time within his own dis-

cipline, argues that co-evalness aims at recognizing contemporarity as the con-

dition for truly dialectical confrontation (1983: 154). Co-evalness concerns a

stance of recognition, of equality in mutual engagement. It is an imaginative space

of interaction that speaks of the power-relations in that interaction, and it is in-

formed by an underlying conceptualisation of space as the dimension of contem-

poraneous multiplicity.

This is a challenge posed by spatiality that, as has often been noted, is fre-

quently evaded. Fabian s critique is of a discipline (anthropology) which has a his-

tory of placing its objects of study in this case peoples in what we now call the

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global South not only far away in space but also back in time. As he writes, The

absence of the Other from our Time has been his [sic] mode of presence in our dis-

course as an object and victim. That is what needs to be overcome (Fabian 1983:

154). However it is not only in anthropology that this happens. Constantly, in so-

cial and political discourse, and in the implicit imaginations of space and time on

which they depend, the initiating recognition of equality that is required by radi-

cal contemporaneity is evaded. We speak of sequences such as developeddevel-

opingunderdeveloped, we implicitly imagine societies as backward, and so

forth. It is the compression of contemporaneous heterogeneity into temporal se-

quence, of the multiplicity of space into a singular temporality. Its pervasiveness,

and its political significance, is captured by Fabian in his Introduction when he

writes, The radical contemporaneity of mankind is a project (1983: xi). It is, I

suggest, a project fundamental to democracy.

There are two immediate implications of this evasion of this challenge of space.

The first is that there is assumed to be only one temporality, one big historical

path onto which different societies can be placed. The denial of the multiplicity of

space entails also the denial of the multiplicity of temporal trajectories. It could be

argued that the whole notion of modernity and of the modern themselves en-

tail this convening of spatial heterogeneity into temporal sequence. In what fol-

lows, however, I shall argue that it has become of particular significance during

our three decades of neoliberalism.

The second implication of this evasion of the challenge of radical contempo-

raneity is that we do not, in the founding imaginative constructions of our inter-

action, recognise the others as of equal standing. We relegate them to the past (oc-

casionally we may elevate them to the future) when what is required is simple ac-

knowledgement of our simultaneous existence in our difference.

It is something of this that Jacques Derrida seems to be trying to catch when

he aligns this recognition of the character of the spatial with an attitude of re-

spect. If Fabian concentrates (as I have done) on the denial of contemporaneity,

then Derrida is focussing on the distance implied in the multiplicity of space and

on rejecting any founding characterisation as more or less worthy of respect. Thushe writes, There is no respect without the vision and distance of a spacing(1997: 60, emphasis in the original; cited in Donald 1999: 166). There are many

aspects of Derridas conceptualisation of space and time with which I take some

issue (see Massey 2005), but this is a really important point. A real recognition of

the radical contemporaneity of others as an essential aspect of spatiality demands

an attitude of respect.

It is important to emphasise, however, that these notions of co-evalness and

respect refer to initiating stances in moments of interaction. In no way do they

imply that there will not be antagonism. Indeed it is an argument of this essay that

one necessary element of true political engagement is the drawing of clear fron-

tiers of contestation. Still less does urging respect and a recognition of co-evalness

imply the development of some stance of liberal toleration. Absolutely not. The en-

gagement may be one of fierce opposition, but before the fight, or at the same mo-

ment, there is respect. Respect in that sense is one of the challenges posed by the

dimension of space.

16 , 21, 2013

001:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:33 PM Page 16

Much of this argument is already present in our debates; indeed I have myself

often written about it. But I wanted to rehearse it here in order to draw it into new

arguments. Most especially, this question of respect and co-evalness is implicated

in the question of voice, and of whose voices are heard, and whose are not. One,

among many, of the essential preconditions for an adequate democracy at what-

ever level, from the household to the nation to the global arena, is that voices are

equally heard. How one responds to what those voices say is another matter.

Space; multiplicity, democracy and neoliberalism

This matter of the essential character of space as the dimension of multiplicity is

key, I believe, in the current conjuncture. It is a deep, but rarely remarked-upon

irony of the present age that we are bombarded by choice, consumer choice, and

dragooned into making a thousand choices we dont give a damn about, while at

the level that really matters the question of, for instance, the kind of society in

which we would like to live or what future we should like to build we are told,

implacably, absolutely, that There Is No Alternative.

For three decades, three neoliberal decades, the idea has become established,

certainly here in Europe, that there is no other way. The notion has become es-

tablished as the hegemonic common sense, in the Gramscian meaning, though as

we shall see there are ironic contradictions here, that there is no alternative. The

only way forward is that promoted by the elites. According to them, there is only

one possible path to follow, only one basis on which to build a future. There is, in

other words, no co-existing multiplicity of possible futures.Now, it is clear that, in one sense, this is quite normal. The battle to establish

the hegemony of a particular political position, and a particular strategy for the fu-

ture, is the very nature of political struggle (see below). Everyone, in political ar-

gument, claims their way to be the only one. Yet, I would argue, this strategy has

been of a different nature, and certainly more successful, in this period of neolib-

eralism than has been typical of other social settlements.

There are many reasons for this success. However, one element is key: the es-

tablishment of the idea that markets or the market are/is a force of nature a

force external to society. This can be detected in many ways. There is the lan-

guage that is used to describe the financial markets as they roam Europe attack-

ing country after country an external force, a wild beast maybe, certainly not the

product of particular social strata and their economic and political interests. There

is the understanding of human nature and of the long histories of human societies

as naturally, as part of their very nature, given to market trading: an under-

standing beautifully demolished by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation aslong ago as 1944, but still living on as an effective underpinning of political dis-

courses on the Right. There is that shrug of resignation and powerlessness by or-

dinary folk as something happens that they do not like: well, its the market I sup-

pose, isnt it. A thing one cannot gainsay. There is, within the academy itself, the

pretension on the part of neoclassical economics to be a natural, or physical, sci-

ence, rather than a social science. The degree to which these ideas, this ideologi-

cal scaffolding, currently infuses the hegemonic common sense is astonishing.

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The assumption that markets are natural is so deeply rooted in the structure of

thought, certainly here in Europe, that even the fact that it is an assumption seemsto have been lost to view. This is real hegemony.

This particular nature of the current hegemonic claim to be the only way for-

ward has serious consequences for democracy. Most obviously, the re-situating

of the economic into the realm of the natural or the scientific removes it from the

sphere of political and ideological contestation. It becomes a matter for experts

and for technocrats. The recent imposition of technocrats into the governments

in Athens and in Rome is just one of the most obvious examples of this. The wide-

spread popular understanding of the troika that governs European monetary pol-

icy as expert rather than as both political and as working for certain interests

rather than others is another. But there are subtler and deeper ways too in which

this removal of economic questions from political contestation has been accom-

plished. In the United Kingdom, for instance, one popular view on the streets at

the moment of the formation of the present government as a coalition of parties

(unusual in the UK) was that: it is good if they stop their political squabbling and

get together to sort this thing (economic crisis) out. In fact of course what we

needed was more, but real, political argument over the nature of the crisis, its rootsin class and political interests, and radically alternative ways out. And of course

the coalition government that emerged from this getting together is not expert at

all; as at the European level it is politically committed to a right-wing strategy, notonly in which the poor pay for the crisis but in which the deepening of neoliber-

alism and the further dismantling of the public sector and the public sphere is

avidly pursued. Yet all the while they told, and tell, us: We really dont want to

do this, we know it hurts, but there is no alternative.

There are many other examples that could be given but the point is that this as-

sertion of the naturalness of markets and the economic, and the consequent rhetor-

ical removal of that sphere from political debate is crucial in the assertion of, and

the success of, neoliberal ideological hegemony. And it is an assertion that, in it-

self, is anti-democratic.

Of course, there are many ways in which the last thirty years of what we have

come to call neoliberal hegemony have entailed attacks on democracy. At the local

level, as already mentioned, there has been the loss of public spaces, a loss of the

kinds of spaces propitious for the development of democratic subjects. And in-

deed privatisation in general is a way of reducing democratic control, whether it

be of industries, services, or spaces. Or again, genuine democracy requires a rea-

sonable degree of equality (in contrast to liberalism and the appeal to democ-

racy when Western governments intervene in other countries is often no more than

a cover for liberalism see Massey 2011). But neoliberal economic strategies pro-

duce increasing inequality. Indeed that redistribution from labour to capital wasone of the aims of neoliberalisms introduction by the currently hegemonic strata.

There are therefore many who argue that neoliberalism in its very constitution

represents a threat to democracy; and I agree with this. However, given the pre-

ceding discussion I would add two reasons for it, beyond those that are usually

cited. The first is what was discussed above: the removal of the economic from the

sphere of political contest, through the claim that markets are natural, and so forth.

But that in turn, I would argue, has been and is central to the claim that there

18 , 21, 2013

001:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:33 PM Page 18

is no alternative. And what that claim represents is a denial of multiplicity. And that

in turn is a denial of democracy. Keeping open the possibility of there being al-

ternatives, and thus the possibility of political argument, is the essence of democ-

racy. What are at issue here are implicit spatial imaginaries: the denial of the mul-tiplicity of the present closes down the possibility of alternative futures, and thus

the possibility of politics.

This is key at the present moment. For while there is most certainly an acute cri-

sis of the economic model of neoliberalism, it has not yet been thrown into crisisat the ideological level (Massey 2011). Certainly, there are challenges to this ide-ological dominance, from the indignados and Occupy through Melenchon in France

and Syriza in Greece, to the radical experiments underway at both grassroots and

governmental levels in Latin America. Indeed, the ferocity and mendacity of the at-

tacks launched against every one of these initiatives themselves demonstrate the im-

portance to the current elites precisely of maintaining their slogan that there is no

alternative. And there has as yet been no serious fracturing of, nor the production

of rupturing contradictions within, their ideological carapace. But without fractur-ing the hegemonic common sense it will be impossible to break the dominance of

the current economic discourse: to establish the multiplicity of futures between

which we can, and must, choose. And only if that can be achieved can a moment

of conjunctural rupture, in the Gramscian sense, be arrived at in which a change in

the balance of social and political forces may finally be possible.

Contrasting spaces of democracy

The very establishment of real alternatives is, then, equivalent to the spatialisation

of the political terrain. But we can go further. For one of the things at issue in this

argument, I would like to propose, concerns our spatial imaginations of both so-ciety and democracy. In discourses, and political debates, about forms of society

and alternative forms of democracy, these implicit spatialities are rarely brought

to light. Yet making these spatialities explicit may help us to understand more

clearly the alternatives before us.

It is perhaps easiest to begin with aspects of the implicit spatialities of the current

neoliberal hegemonic position, since these are reasonably well recognised. The

irony of the counterposition between the celebration of choice within, and the

lack of choice without, has already been pointed to. It is also ironic that, given

neoliberalisms resonance with many aspects of what has been called postmod-

ernism, and given that one of the most significant challenges posed by postmod-

ernists has been to the modernist conception of Grand Narratives, the current pos-

tulation of the mantra of There is No Alternative shares so much of the structural

form of a Grand Narrative. Here there is only one possible model of successful de-

velopment, and societies are evaluated, and imaginatively positioned, on a line

measuring out their progress along that path. This is a classic case of the imagi-

nary temporal convening of contemporaneous spatial heterogeneity (ie. between

societies) into a simple sequence; it is an annihilation at that level of the multi-

plicity of space. Given that this age of postmodernity is frequently described as

- 19

001:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:33 PM Page 19

spatial, in contrast to the dominance of the modern imaginary by temporality

(Jameson 1991), this is an irony indeed.

As has been argued, what is most required at the current moment is a blasting

open of this closure and a challenge to the ideological hegemony through the as-

sertion of radical alternatives.

One of the achievements of that street-level movement of indignados and Oc-

cupations over the autumn and winter of 2011-2012 was to do just that. And a so-

phisticated understanding and political use of space was critical in their success

(see Massey 2012, for a fuller discussion of this in relation to London). In Lon-

don, Occupy LSX finally set up camp alongside and on the steps of St. Pauls

Cathedral, but still amongst the buildings of finance capital. Its very location was

an assertion of the presence of a stream of thought that disrupted the assumptions

of its surroundings. The incongruity of the symbolic humility of the tents, huddled

between the soaring stone edifices, itself spoke of radical challenge. (I would argue

that it instituted a political frontier see below.) St. Pauls Cathedral, indeed, was

thrown into confusion by the very requirement to make a real choice (in this ageof meaningless choices), a dilemma that led to two senior clergy and one other

member of the Church, who were more sympathetic to the (right to) protest, leav-

ing their jobs. This was a dramatic eruption into, and disruption of, the smooth

space of neoliberal capitalism. In that sense it posed a radical alternative, irrec-

oncilable with the dominant ideology. It was posing questions we werent sup-

posed to ask: a kind of shock-tactics of the imagination which is just what is

needed, and what is essential for the operation of real democracy.

Occupy LSX enriched democracy in another spatially-aware way too. Out of

merely a place of passage (public space in the very loosest sense of that term) it

created a site for the nourishment, potentially at least, of engaged political sub-

jectivity. It was, it told us, open open to passers-by, open to debate, open

through the web to global connections and conversations. A place of engagement.

However, drawing upon this sense of openness and engagement, Occupy LSX

also asserted, in the concluding line of its main explanatory leaflet (its Initial State-

ment): This is what democracy looks like. This is a proposal that has been much

in use in these circles at least since Seattle. The reference in London was to the

democracy internal to the site, conducted through discussion and direct democracy.

And certainly, this did exemplify one challenging alternative form of democracy.

However, different kinds of democracy do different jobs. Moreover they imply

and require different kinds of spaces and places. This mode of direct democracy

leading to consensus makes one of two assumptions. Either it assumes, and in

spite of the invitation at the end of the Statement to come and join us!, the ex-

clusion of the enemy with whom one could never agree (in other words, it is not

really an open space) or and if taken to be the only form of real democracy itassumes that in the end there can be universal consensus, even with ones struc-

tural and political antagonists, a position that relies upon both the possibility of a

full totality and essentialist immanentism. What it does not include is that kind of

passionate conflict of values and ideas that are not simply reconcilable (the con-flict with finance capital, with the 1%, the conflict between classes). Yet I would

argue, along with many others (for instance, Chantal Mouffe, 2005) that this rad-

ical confrontation of political visions, the drawing of political frontiers, is what real

20 , 21, 2013

001:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:33 PM Page 20

politics (in the Mouffian sense of the political in distinction from the daily prac-

tice of politics) is all about. Real choice.The approach to democracy at Occupy does not contain, within its own space,

its own society, such political choice. This approach is consistent with that pro-

posed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001, 2004), and it lies behind many

of the experiments in democracy that have been developed within the social-forum

movement also.4 But in its claim to be the only form of democracy it entails a par-ticular spatial imaginary of society as potentially reconcilable into a totality, stem-

ming from universally immanent desires. Here, in this kind of consensual direct

democracy, there is a dependence upon an image of society, of the place of

democracy, as potentially coherent. Here there are no internal frontiers of politi-

cal antagonism, no radical heterogeneity. Within these societies/places/spaces therewill be no engagement with or, perhaps, no recognition of the potential exis-

tence of the political antagonist.

It is, in contrast, the insistence upon the necessary presence of the possibility

of radical heterogeneity of the possibility of challenge from radically distinct

political projects that is central to that stream of political philosophy that de-

rives from the work of Antonio Gramsci and that draws in particular upon the con-

cept of hegemony. In this view, any apparent coherence or unity of a society or

place is understood to be a political achievement a constructed hegemony

which is not therefore in fact totalising but always open to the possibility of rad-

ical contest. There is no assumption of any potential unfractured wholeness. This

is place as always multiple and always, at least potentially, contested. It is a view

that, first of all, respects the inescapable challenge of multiplicity that is thrown

up to us by the very existence of the spatial dimension, and its presentation to us

of the existence of others. It is also a view that is in accord with arguments within

geography that have challenged notions of place as settled coherences to insist

upon the inevitable need for their negotiation. This is not, then, a smooth or co-

herent unity, but a space that is fractured (differentially over time) and struggled

over. It is for that reason democratic: it is multiple.

Conclusion

Different kinds of democracy, then, do different jobs, and they are each open to dif-

ferent deficiencies. A system of political parties and representative democracy

without a public sphere of engagement with the potential for the formation of an

informed citizenry can result merely in an empty formalism. Consensual small

groups of the like-minded may fail to engage in their practices of democracy with

radically different political projects.

In practice, of course, different forms of democracy are rarely found in pure

form. And they may not even live up to their own potential. Actually-existing rep-

resentative democracy in many European countries has over recent years totally

failed to produce the political frontiers between different visions that, in principle,

it has the potential for.

What it seems wisest to conclude is that we need many different forms of

democracy to co-exist in a society, performing different kinds of roles in different

- 21

4 There has, of course, been

much critical debate about this

form of democracy. See Feather-

stone 2012, especially chapter 17,

for a discussion.

001:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:33 PM Page 21

kinds of spaces. A society is not really democratic only because of its formal

structures but also as a result of its more general texture. And that means lots of

different spaces, and different kinds of spaces, of engagement.

Finally, behind that again, lies the need for a more general stance. An attitude

that infuses peoples engagement with the world. An attitude that recognises mul-

tiplicity and the existence of others with their own, different, trajectories; an atti-

tude, in that sense, that is outwardlooking. An attitude that acknowledges co-eval-

ness an achievement more difficult than is commonly recognised and that en-

ters into any engagement with a stance of respect. And all these attributes, I would

argue, are in one way and another tied up with the hard discipline of developing

a radically spatialised imagination.

References

Derrida, J. (1997), Politics of friendship, London: Verso.Donald, J. (1999), Imagining the modern city, London: The Athlone Press.Fabian, J. (1983), Time and the Other: how anthropology makes its object, New York: Columbia Uni-

versity Press.

Featherstone, D. (2012), Solidarity: hidden histories and geographies of internationalism, London:Zed Books.

Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2004), Multitude, New York: Penguin Books.Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2001), Empire, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.Holloway, J. (2002), Change the world without taking power, London: Pluto Press.Jameson, F. (1991), Postmodernism, or, the cultural logic of late capitalism, London: Verso.Massey, D. (2011), Ideology and economics in the present moment, Soundings: a journal of pol-

itics and culture, issue 48, Summer, pp.29-39.Massey, D. (2012), Londres, diciembre de 2011, in Albet, A. and Benach, N. (eds), Un sentido

global del lugar, Barcelona: Icaria: Espacios Crtcos, pp.247-264.Massey, D. (forthcoming), Espacio, lugar y poltica en la coyuntura actual; Urban (Madrid).

Mouffe, C. (2005), The democratic paradox, London: Verso.Polanyi, K. (1944/2001), The great transformation, Boston, Mass: Beacon Press.

22 , 21, 2013

001:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:33 PM Page 22

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The role of economic sectors and occupational hierarchies in shaping housing segregation in met-

ropolitan Athens.

Spyrellis Stavros Nikiforos

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the segregation trends in the Athenian metropolitan urban zone, based on the economic sector that the eco-

nomically active population is employed in and their position in the occupational scale of employment. First, the dominance of

the Athenian economy over the national economic activity during the past 60 years is presented. Furthermore, the social divisions

deployed in the capital during the same period are investigated as are the social types of census tracts that are captured in the 2001

national census. After identifying the main economic sectors of the Athenian economy, we researched the concentrations of spe-

cific companies in particular areas of the capital and then investigated the existence of residential segregation trends due to the

economic sector and the position in the occupational scale of employment. The results of this analysis showed that the residen-

tial segregation in metropolitan Athens is significantly linked to occupational status rather than the economic sector of employ-

ment. In addition, this analysis revealed specific concentrations, of the public and social services and transports sectors workers,

in limited/specific areas of the urban landscape.

1 Y. , VII. : UMR no 8504 Gographie-Cits,CNRS.

email: s.spyr@parisgeo.cnrs.fr, st.spyr@gmail.com

003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 35

-

() -

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(Arapoglou 2006, Emmanuel 2002, Leontidou

1989, 1990, Maloutas 2004, 2007, 2007).

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2004), -

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36 , 21, 2013, 35-54

003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 36

(correspondence

analysis)

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- 37

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003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 37

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38 , 21, 2013, 35-54

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.

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2004, 1997.

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(Arapoglou 2006, Arbaci 2007,

Lianos 2001, Maloutas 2007, Rovolis Tragaki

2006). -

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(Petrakos Economou 1999).

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- 39

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-

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2004, Leontidou 1989, 1990, Maloutas 2007).16

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1960-1970,

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Sapountzaki Karka 2001: 423). -

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(coastalisation)

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40 , 21, 2013, 35-54

003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 40

(Arapoglou 2006, Maloutas

2007).

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, 67% ( 3,4 & 5), -

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6&7 7&8

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(ESeC). %

1 , 190,035 13.6 %

,

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2 158,216 11.3%

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4 218,034 15.7 %

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1,390,036 100%

: (EKKE 2005, Rose Harrison 2007)

003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 41

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42 , 21, 2013, 35-54

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003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 42

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,

- 43

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2000 ,

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: (EKKE ELSTAT 2005)

( 4

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. ,

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44 , 21, 2013, 35-54

4:

(2001)

%

1 318,991 22.9 %

2 311,426 22.4 %

3 , 311,351 22.4 %

4 177,025 12.7 %

5 131,572 9.5 %

6 57,574 4.1 %

7 - 36,445 2.6 %

8 20,921 1.5 %

9 20,352 1.5 %

10

4,378 0.3 %

1,390,036 100%

: (EKKE 2005, Rose Harrison 2007)

003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 44

6: -

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(2001)

: (EKKE ELSTAT 2005)

( 7).

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- 45

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003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 45

46 , 21, 2013, 35-54

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: (EKKE ELSTAT 2005)

003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 46

- 47

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1 .

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003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 47

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( 6).

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48 , 21, 2013, 35-54

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003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 48

-

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- %

1

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2 153,475 11%

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(+ ) 122,069 8.9 %

5 256,879 18.5 %

6

( , ) 218,034 15.7 %

7

23,615 1.7 %

8

140,729 10.1 %

9 149,462 10.8 %

10 253,064 18.2 %

1,390,036 100%

: (EKKE ELSTAT 2005)

003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 49

-

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2007).

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(Prteceille 2003).

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,

(28% 22%)

- 51

12:

.

003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 51

(16,5% 4%)

(16% 22%)

(8% 13%).

4. - ()

, ,

-

(Rose Harrison 2007).

-

,

(Breen 2005, Erikson Goldthorpe 1992).

5. Maloutas 2007.

6. Louri Pepelasis Minoglou 2001.

7. Burgel, -

: , , -

Burgel 1976: 129.

8. 1969 -

-

(Burgel 2003: 106, 115). 1950 -

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(Louri .. 2000).

(Burgel 1976: 357).

9. Rontos 1995: 69.

10.

1.378.586 1951 1.852.709

1961, 2.540.241 1971, 3.027.300 1981, 3.071.900 1991,

3.761.810 2001 3.812.330 2011 (Rontos 1995, Sarrigiannis

2000, ELSTAT).

11. Allen .. 2004: 59-65.

12.

(Maloutas 2007: 736).

13. -

1970 (Petrakos

Economou 1999),

, 20,2% -

(Louri Pepelasis Minoglou 2001). ,

1971-1982, -

.

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(Cho-

rianopoulos 2003, Kourliouros 1997, Louri 1989, Louri Ana-

gnostaki 1995, Sayas 2004, Vaiou, Golemis, Lambrianidis, Chadji-

michalis Chronaki, 1999).

15.

-

(Kandylis .. 2012: 271).

16.

1950-1970

1951 1961 +485%

+76,7%, 1961 1971, +320%

+244% , +428,5% 118,7% ..

(Sarrigiannis 2000: 159,187).

17. -

, , ,

,

1950 .

-

1970

. ,

1970-1980, -

97,5% 1980 2001

591%.

79,4% 85% (Sarrigiannis 2000: 218,

2001).

18. 750 -

32%

19%.

,

7,5% 4%.

42%

28%.

19. 27.400 1991 2001

.

20. ,

, ,

-

-

,

, -

1991 2001 (132%, 121% 106% -

) (Sints 2008: 259).

21. ,

-

-

-

(Maloutas 2007: 748, Maloutas Karadimitriou 2001).

-

-

.

(Kandylis .. 2012: 279).

22.

9 (Rose Harrison

2007)

.

4.

, ,

-

, -

2,2 % 350 -

13% -

. , -

(Maloutas 2007)

-

52 , 21, 2013, 35-54

003:Layout 1 5/13/13 1:34 PM Page 52

.

23 Maloutas Karadimitriou 2001.

24 1970 2001 48,6%,

.

-

.

(),

2004,

-

. ,

, -

, -

.

.

25. (Location Quotient)

.

LQ=1 -

.

LQ1 -

.

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I)

-

.

-

, ,

.

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-

,

.

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55

- : 1

, , -

, . -

, -

. , -

, .

1922 , . ,

, -

1922 , -

. -

. -

200

- , .

Socio-spatial transformations in Nikea: From the refugee settlement to the contemporary urban

scenery

Evgenia Tousi

ABSTRACT

This article is about the study of social and demographic changes in accordance with spatial transformations, in the Greek urban

scenery, since the Asia Minor Disaster in 1922. According to historical sources, around 1.200.000 refugees found shelter in urban

and rural areas, from